

her if she had been a woman since birth. After revealing that she had undergone sex transformation surgery five years earlier in 1990, Nixon was cut from the program because she had not been “oppressed since birth.” Nixon subsequently filed a case with the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal, which ruled in her favor in 2000, but on appeal the case landed in the BC Supreme Court, which ultimately ruled against Nixon.

In the first chapter of the book titled “Sexed Bodies: Provocations,” Hawkesworth offers a detailed reading of the decision by the leading justice on this case; she does so to introduce the thorny issues presented by the fact that we are all embodied individuals subject to political interpretation by courts, legislatures, executives, and even state, city, and local ordinances. Yet, as Hawkesworth deftly notes, if we look to the Western tradition of political theory, we routinely see sex, gender, and race presented as natural, pre-political, or even nonexistent or at least not worth worrying over or theorizing. In subsequent chapters of the book, Hawkesworth organizes her discussion into these themes: “Conceptualizing Gender,” “Theorizing Embodiment,” “Refiguring the Public and Private,” “Analyzing the State and the Nation,” and “Reconceptualizing Injustice.”

The book is at its best when discussing specific everyday examples that bring to life the many processes—public and private; local, state, national, and international; social and legal—that work to produce hierarchies within the population based on interpretations of embodiment. The last section of the chapter, “Analyzing the State and the Nation,” is exemplary in this regard. Discussing dress codes, Hawkesworth shows that stringent dress regulations are not just a feature of authoritarian regimes, but are also remarkably present in liberal democratic nations such as our own. She cites evidence from scholars who document that between 1848 and 1914, 45 cities in 21 US states passed laws against cross-dressing to prevent “gender fraud” (p. 137) and that, even today, women’s dress is often cited as a reason for rape. She introduces a section on post-Civil War Black Codes mandating that for Blacks, “standing on public sidewalks was criminalized as loitering” and that “failure to step into the gutter when a white person passed on a sidewalk was deemed a disruption of public order” (p. 139). Not much has changed as we think about police regulation, intervention, and even the murder of those seen driving while Black, texting while Black, shopping while Black, running while Black, and gathering while Black.

I also appreciate Hawkesworth’s practice of centering scholarship that makes the lived experience of people from oppressed categories the focus of attention. The book casually, and rightly (to my mind), assumes that political thinkers must take as their starting point the fact that we are entangled within spaces, time, and cultures that mark us by predetermined meanings attached to our bodies; that

we are always situated in relationship to others; that freedom cannot be accomplished or experienced alone; and that, to work toward a more egalitarian and democratic future, we must join in coalition with others to listen and learn as we attempt to transform our world as well as ourselves within it. Although, to this reader, this is the political point of the book, as well as the reason to critique methods of political thinking that deny these conditions, Hawkesworth never directly (or indirectly) acknowledges these as her goals.

The first sentence of the final paragraph of the book states, “Despite diverse analytical approaches, contemporary feminist theory routinely involves disidentification from some of the guiding precepts of political theory, such as the norm of neutral, distanced, dispassionate analysis, and the quest for universal explanations” (p. 193). She ends the book with this sentence: “By troubling false universals and confining stereotypes, this form of feminist theorizing seeks to enable new ways of thinking, thereby creating the conditions of possibility for new modes of social, political, and intellectual life” (p. 193). Here I come to my criticism of this informative, scholarly, and well-researched book. My concern is that, although Hawkesworth is rightly critical of the “norms” just stated, her own writing style is *itself* dispassionate, analytical, neutral, and distanced. Packed with the work of other scholars, this book is primarily concerned with synthesis of material, and Hawkesworth does not amplify nor make space for her own voice. At times, I struggled to find the argument, and I looked to subheadings and section breaks to try to situate where she was headed in the narrative. Additionally, there are long indented quotations, and it was never apparent to me why certain scholars and contributions were studied in depth, some were quickly glossed, and others do not appear at all.

Scholars already familiar with the scholarship cited in the text will likely get the most out of Hawkesworth’s contribution, and graduate students will also find the synthesis of material useful and noteworthy. This is an important contribution to why and how the body needs to be the starting point of political theorizing, a perspective that, although studied now for several decades, has yet to be our default mode of engagement.

Dangerous Counsel: Accountability and Advice in

Ancient Greece. By Matthew Landauer. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2019. 256p. \$90.00 cloth, \$30.00 paper.
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Matthew Landauer’s *Dangerous Counsel* is a lively, erudite, and judicious presentation of ancient Greek thinking about accountability and advice. To best understand the

adviser or counselor (*sumboulos*), it argues that we ought to look at “Greek conceptions of both democratic and autocratic politics,” because given “the structural similarity between [them]...both the demos and the autocrat were recognized as unaccountable rulers” (p. 4). At the book’s core lies the demos–tyrant analogy. In a democracy the adviser stands before “a sovereign, nearly all-powerful demos” (p. 10; see also p. 58) empaneled on a jury or in attendance at the assembly; like the adviser of an autocrat, he is in an asymmetrical relation with the officeholder. This comparative approach positions Landauer to argue against democratic exceptionalism, which casts the counseling orators and the decision-making demos as co-deliberators in ancient Athens (p. 7): such claims are undercut by the “structural parallels between the tyrant’s role and the demos’ in accountability politics” (p. 143). A reader will not find abstract claims, be they inferences or deductions, about the aims of counsel, nor does Landauer offer a set of characteristics that make for a good adviser. “The problem of logos in politics cannot be treated merely abstractly,” he writes (p. 105). *Dangerous Counsel* thus demonstrates the importance of thinking about accountability not merely comparatively but also relationally and in context. A sure-footed guide through numerous incidents and several texts from the ancient world, Landauer, through his transparent and concise prose, stops short of overwhelming the reader and, importantly, of reducing the complexity of the original texts.

Dangerous Counsel consists of six chapters bookended by an introduction (pp. 1–24) and conclusion (pp. 179–85). The first two chapters delineate the two faces of unaccountability: the *idiôtês* and the tyrant. Chapter 1 (pp. 25–58) analyzes the Athenian institutions of accountability, the assembly and the lawcourts, showing that the demos was unaccountable—a status justified in part by construing the citizen as an *idiôtês*, “an amateur participant in politics” (p. 54). Chapter 2 (pp. 59–82) documents the link between tyranny and unaccountability, with special focus on the unaccountable juror Philokleon in Aristophanes’s comedy *Wasps* and, through Xenophon’s *Hellenica*, on how the institutional procedure of charging advisers of the assembly with making an illegal proposal (the *graphê paranomôn*) maintained the unaccountability of the demos, in the historian’s account of the trial after the battle of Arginusae (406 BCE).

The next two chapters continue mining Greek history, first Herodotus in chapter 3 (pp. 83–104) followed by Thucydides in chapter 4 (pp. 105–28). Landauer reads the former, perhaps a mite vigorously, as providing a “theory of political counsel” (p. 84) that “dramatiz[es] the process of advice-giving, [and] furnishes readers with resources for thinking about—and practically confronting—the problem” (p. 90). To Thucydides, whose account of the debate between Cleon and Diodotus in the Athenian assembly (427 BCE) is the focus of chapter 4, Landauer attributes

no such theory. But he does read him in a similar exploratory way: “Canvassing multiple possibilities and explicitly endorsing none, Thucydides has left the right way to understand responsibility for the Mytilenean revolt open to competing interpretations” (p. 110).

The last pair of chapters turn first to fourth-century BCE Athenian orators and then to Plato’s *Gorgias*, a fourth-century dialogue about oratory set in wartime Athens in the late fifth century BCE. In chapter 5 (pp. 129–48), Landauer discusses frank speech (*parrhêsia*) and flattery in Isocrates’s counsels to the Macedonian regent Antipater and the Cypriot king Nicocles, and Demosthenes’s counsel to Athens. The asymmetries of accountability caused the “paramount democratic cultural value” (p. 130) of frank speech to operate “as a remedial virtue” (p. 132; emphasis in original), practiced in democratic and autocratic regimes alike. Chapter 6 (pp. 149–78) contrasts the all-powerful orator whom Gorgias posits to Socrates’s portrayal of the same as a slave to the whims of the demos. Plato “points to the limits of the power” (p. 156) of orator and demos alike and “holds out the possibility of a kind of learning on the part of the demos” (p. 176).

The persuasiveness of any comparative project depends on the similarities and differences the author draws. Of the three features Landauer identifies as salient to Athenian institutions of accountability, only their (1) popular character is unique to democracies, whereas (2) discretionary judgment and (3) asymmetrical accountability are shared with autocracies (p. 29). Glossing (1) as “democratic inclusion” Landauer concludes that it “did not fundamentally alter the structure of the problems these authors sought to explore” such as incentives and trust (p. 182). Much hangs on what we understand by inclusion: interpreting it as openness to challenge or ideologically could, *pace* Landauer, alter the structure of incentives and trust, respectively. I illustrate these in turn.

In Athens, one who claimed at his defense trial to abstain from politics, Socrates of Alopece, found himself presiding over the assembly at the Arginusae trial simply because it was his deme’s turn to do so; as a consequence, he tried to persuade the demos that putting the generals on trial en masse would violate the law as he understood it. Even if Socrates failed, the incident shows that anyone might challenge the demos, an occurrence hard to imagine in tyrannies that are more likely to be contested by disaffected members of the domestic elite or foreign regimes. It is arguable, then, that the structure of incentives is indeed regime dependent.

Similarly for the operation of trust, which increases as it divides across a population, if we interpret democratic inclusion ideologically; that is, according to the sum of its habits, pursuits, and expressed self-justifications. Consider *Against Leocrates*, a speech from an impeachment (*eisangelia*) and subsequent trial of an Athenian citizen who had

sold his property and fled after the city's defeat by Macedon at Chaeronea (338 BCE) and had since returned (331 BCE). Its author is Lycurgus, a prominent pro-democracy politician, who charged Leocrates with treason, calling on Athenian democratic ideology capacious enough to include not only those presently counted among the many but also the regime's normative commitments and collective memory. Lycurgus makes universalizing appeals (e.g., what would happen if everyone left Athens (para. 59–62)?), recounts the democracy's past victories against Persia (para. 68–73 *et passim*), and recites that which “preserves our democracy” (para. 79; Landauer quotes the very same line at p. 43); namely, the Ephebic Oath that confirmed young Athenians as citizens in a festival in which they presented themselves fully armored to the city. The inclusion that democratic ideology brings in its train seems to recast the problem of trust; as was the case with incentives, the relevant comparison with an autocracy would be one of difference rather than similarity. Perhaps democratic exceptionalism is not dead after all.

For all the ground that it covers, Landauer's expert reconstruction of the Greek tradition of “the politics of advice” (pp. 14, 21 *et passim*) overlooks its concern with the soul (*psuchê*) of the advisee. We hear Isocrates advise Nicocles that the daily struggles he will face means that “kings are required to train their souls (*psuchai*) as no athlete trains his body” (2.11) and recommend he associate with wise advisers to develop the qualities necessary for good ruling (2.13). The orator also draws Antipater's attention to the nature of rulers: Do they have a noble soul (*psuchê*) and thus value frank speech (*parrhêsia*), or is their nature “weaker than their circumstances would require” (4.5)? The concern with the soul extends, in Plato's *Gorgias*, to another kind of perilous accountability absent from *Dangerous Counsel* and without doubt present in the texture of ancient Greek life where religion and politics were inseparable: accountability to the gods. Although Landauer recognizes that Socrates privileges the care of the soul over politics as these are ordinarily understood (pp. 158–59), he stops short of discussing its apotheosis in the eschatological myth with which the dialogue ends (*Grg.* 523a–27e). Therein, and by contrast to Landauer's logocentric Athens, both judge and judged are silent, the gods judging souls naked and unadorned, without accompanying witnesses. Quaint as it might sound to modern, secular ears, the concern with the soul and with accountability to the gods is still with us. As Lycurgus's ideological appeal and Socrates's myth both suggest, it will not get us very far to say democracies do not have a collective soul. Not only are we well aware of the soul-ministering religious figures who orbit around aspiring and elected representatives alike but also, and like their ancient counterpart, modern democracies shape the souls of the demos through the ethos that they expound and practice.

These reservations and omissions notwithstanding, I would recommend the book to anyone interested in the politics of advice. Those familiar with the material will find much to grapple with; those who are less so will recognize contemporary political science terminology brought to bear on ancient worlds; and both sets of readers may, like this reviewer, find themselves carried along by Landauer's zest for making the past useful to the present.

Protest and Dissent: NOMOS LXII. Edited by Melissa Schwartzberg. New York: New York University Press, 2020. 304p. \$65.00 cloth.
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Bookended on one end by Occupy Wall Street and on the other by Hong Kong residents protesting police violence, the 2010s have been called the decade of global protest. The year 2020 is on track to eclipse the previous decade in terms of protests, from armed challenges to shelter-in-place orders, to health care workers calling for more personal protective equipment, to mass demonstrations that began in response to George Floyd's murder at the hands of the Minneapolis Police Department—all in fewer than six months. The publication of *Protest and Dissent: NOMOS LXII*, edited by Melissa Schwartzberg, thus could not be more relevant to our contemporary political moment, and its 10 essays pose questions that encourage us to think carefully about some of the normative, strategic, and democratic nuances of the politics of resistance.

As to be expected from an interdisciplinary group of philosophers, legal scholars, and political theorists, the collected contributions approach a core set of themes from a variety of perspectives and reference points. Among these themes are the appropriate bounds of civil and uncivil dissent, considerations of systemic reform and radical transformation, the relation between the ends of protest and the appropriate means to achieve those ends, and the democratic significance of protest and dissent. As a collection of contributions that originated in conference proceedings in 2017, the published volume presents a lively and ongoing discussion between chapters, with many directly responding to or engaging with others.

One line of inquiry woven through the volume concerns the proper function of protest. Should it be understood primarily as a communicative endeavor, wherein participants aim to convey an existing injustice and seek change in public opinion and policy? Richard Thompson Ford's provocative chapter “Protest Fatigue” suggests that protest is a persuasive activity that should aim to voice legitimate concerns about grave injustices. Today's mass protests, he claims, are overused and misused, producing a