

achievement of this important book, but rather to hope that it will serve to inspire further engagement by political scientists with the political and intellectual history of early postcolonial Africa.

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**Alex de Waal. *The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power*.** Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2015. xii + 267 pp. Figures and Maps. Acronyms. Notes. Bibliography. Index. \$24.95. Paper. ISBN: 9780745695587.

Alex de Waal has been deeply involved in researching the politics of the Horn of Africa over the last three decades as well as contributing actively to peace processes in the region. I cannot think of anyone as well placed or well qualified to write this kind of book. The style is clear, engaging, and accessible. The argument is important. And the range of examples and detail—much of it interlaced with first-hand impressions and telling anecdotes—is hugely impressive.

The book analyzes Horn of Africa politics in terms of the concept of “the political marketplace”—an arena in which buyers and sellers trade loyalty for resources, and each buyer is also a seller. When peace dawns following periods of violence, the political marketplace mutates, with various actors likely to use the continuing threat of disloyalty and even violence as a way of leveraging resources for themselves and their followers. This is a powerful explanation for why conflict has often endured. It also provides a valuable framework for understanding how peace becomes possible. In this, the book complements very neatly the important work on political constituencies for war and peace by Rajesh Venugopal, in particular.

De Waal’s case-study chapters cover Sudan (two chapters), South Sudan, Somalia, Somaliland, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. In the chapter on South Sudan, he shows how the local political settlement was built on an oil-based patronage system that proved unsustainable. Loyalties were very fragile, particularly given Khartoum’s longstanding habit of “buying off” restive elements in the south (notably among elements of the Nuer). To counter this, the South Sudan state largely avoided DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration), absorbing non-SPLA militias into the army and providing generously for a swollen military sector and other state officials. Yet this emerging system of patronage had the effect of squeezing the potential for government spending that could have met wider needs and appeased wider grievances. Meanwhile, South Sudan was chronically dependent on pipelines, refineries, and port infrastructure in Sudan itself, and South Sudan’s expensive patronage system ran into obstacles when revenues from oil dried up following a north–south dispute over their distribution.

The chapter on Ethiopia benefits from de Waal's access to former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. In general it conveys the impression that Ethiopia represents at least a partial exception to the harsher workings of the political marketplace, although it would have been interesting to hear more about some of the more ruthless aspects of politics in Ethiopia, as well as why this country might be such an exception.

The integration of economic motivations into political analysis is a major strength of the book. But can one take this emphasis too far? The rather relentless emphasis on "greed, not grievance" from Paul Collier and his colleagues, and their portrayal of rebels in particular as a collection of utility-maximizing "one-dimensional men," certainly struck a chord in a policy world that was in love with the "rational actor" model. But depending on one's point of view, this perspective can be seen as representing either an apogee or a nadir of economic analysis. De Waal's book is very different, however. First, it is richly informed by fieldwork. Second, the analysis of the political marketplace embraces every key actor (including many within the state) and not just rebels. Third, it emphasizes that the goal of acquiring resources is frequently political—in particular, maintaining the loyalty of followers. Fourth, it explicitly acknowledges the importance of emotions generated by violence. Even so, the book would have benefited from more attention to how the legitimacy of rebel groups and militia groups is constructed, maintained, and eroded, as well as what kinds of grievances animate different rebel movements and how these mutate when leaders are tempted to sign deals that benefit mostly themselves.

De Waal's "political marketplace" concept extends rather neatly to the international sphere, and he discusses, for example, the counterterrorism "rents" that are paid to governments that put themselves forward as allies in international efforts to combat terrorism. (A further question his analysis suggests is whether states that are collecting particularly high rents may have a limited, or even a nonexistent, interest in eliminating the groups that are the source.) In applying the concept of the "political marketplace" to the international system, de Waal's book is a valuable complement to Ruben Andersson's excellent *Illegality Inc.* (University of California Press, 2014), which highlights the system of benefits and negotiations that surround recent and current migration flows.

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**Daniel Maxwell and Nisar Majid. *Famine in Somalia: Competing Imperatives, Collective Failures, 2011–12*.** New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. xvii + 269 pp. Maps. Acknowledgments. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Paper. \$32.50. ISBN: 978-0-19049938-9.