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**Reforming Parliamentary Democracy**

F. Leslie Seidle and David C. Docherty, eds.

Montreal &amp; Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003, pp. vii, 246

This book derives from a conference held by the Canadian Study of Parliament Group at which distinguished persons discussed the efforts for reform in Westminster style parliamentary democracies. Topics covered include: second chambers (the British House of Lords, South Africa); proportional representation (New Zealand); the role of the Crown (Australia); political rights and representation of aboriginal peoples (New Zealand and Canada); and federalism and devolution (Britain and Canada). An introduction and conclusion by the editors, and a useful chapter by Jennifer Smith on reform of the Canadian Parliament complete the book.

As in Canada, reform of parliamentary institutions is an active issue in all these countries. And while these other countries might not have talked more about reform than Canada, most have made more reforms to their institutions. New Zealand has adopted a system of mixed single-member constituency and proportional representation for its national legislature. Britain has begun a process of reforming its upper chamber, and has devolved powers to assemblies in Wales and Scotland. South Africa has fundamentally changed its parliamentary and federal system.

Australia shares with Canada the dubious distinction of having proposals for reform fail in a nation-wide referendum. Cheryl Saunders discusses referendum in Australia on the narrow question of moving from a monarchy to a republic. Canada's referendum was on the much broader issues in the Charlottetown Accord. In both countries the problem was that while a majority agreed that reform was needed, the specific proposals for reform could not gain majority support.

Christina Murray's fascinating chapter on South Africa's National Council of the Provinces has doubtful relevance for Canada. The intentions in South Africa were to prevent fragmentation in a decentralized state. The National Council of the Provinces, based in large part on the German Bundesrat, provides representation for the provinces at the centre. The role of the provinces is limited to administering programmes and policies established by the national government. Canada's extremely decentralized federation is at the opposite end of the spectrum.

If reform to the present Canadian Senate were to build upon the present Senate's strengths, then the British proposals as described by Lord Wakeham offer some provocative leads. His royal commission proposed a mixed assembly composed of outstanding persons drawn from various spheres of public life, and elected representatives from regions. The term for a member would be fifteen years. The key differences between the upper chamber proposed by Lord Wakeham's commission and the Canadian Senate are in the method of appointment, the limited tenure of members, and retention of the already restricted power of the Lords to reject legislation coming to it from the Commons. So far these proposals have not been adopted by Britain, though the number of hereditary peers in the very large upper chamber has been reduced.

The New Zealand experience with proportional representation suggests that it changed less than opponents feared or reformers hoped. It produced a proliferation of very small parties and parliaments in which neither of the two large parties enjoys a majority. If, in the 2004 election, Canada's system had been like that of New Zealand, Canada would still have a minority Parliament. But there would be less over-representation of the *Bloc*, greater representation of the NDP, a smattering of Green members, greater diversity in representation from each province, and slightly fewer but much more regional diversity in both Liberals and Conservatives. Some might think that an improvement.

Mason Durie's chapter on Māori in governance contrasts strongly with Paul Chartrand's chapter on Canada's aboriginal people, not only because of the great differences in political participation and position, but what the papers do not cover: the profound difference between the economic and social position of the Māori in New Zealand and aboriginal people in Canada. Where New Zealand's Māori belong to a relatively homogenous aboriginal culture and society, Canada's aboriginal people belong to hugely varied cultures, economies, legally recognized groups, and social positions. New Zealand's Māori rank well above Canada's aboriginal people as measured by social indicators. In fact so do Indians in the United States. Australia's aboriginal population would rank below the Canadian. Bearing these differences in mind, I'm doubtful about how much Canada can learn from New Zealand.

The British experience with devolution as described by Robert Hazell is interesting, though again I wonder about its relevance to Canada. The Welsh and Scottish assemblies have adopted proportional representation, as some Canadian provinces might in the near future, but Britain still remains a highly centralized and largely unitary state. Stéphane Dion's discussion of the interdependence of governments in Canada is a model of clarity and concision.

In short, this is a useful book for stimulating discussion of issues important to Canada. We have a lot to learn from other countries. The riddle remains why Canada has been so retarded in its efforts to reform parliamentary institutions.

C.E.S. FRANKS *Queen's University*

### **The Integrity Gap: Canada's Environmental Policy and Institutions**

Eugene Lee and Anthony Perl, eds.

Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003, pp. xi, 288.

This collection, which grew out of papers presented at a conference at the Sookyung Centre for Canadian Studies in Seoul in 1999, is one of a number of recent publications to call attention to a peculiar feature of Canadian environmental policy. In spite of our much publicized commitment to greenery at home and our hectoring criticism of other countries' environmental policies abroad, our own record, when closely examined, proves to be lamentable and is actually getting worse in comparison with our counterparts in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This yawning gulf between promise and performance is the "integrity gap" of Lee and Perl's title.

The editors provide a conceptual introduction to the gap and its likely causes. They also briefly sketch the main outlines of the three main institutionalist approaches—historical, sociological and rational choice—which, they claim, provide some unity to the contributions that follow: policy makers and the broader policy community are grappling with a significant policy inheritance that has the paradoxical outcome of facilitating deliberation about environmental problems while simultaneously reducing capacity to solve them. Neo-institutionalism, with its focus on policy legacies, path dependencies and other nightmares weighing on the minds of the present generation of policy makers, seems admirably suited to analyse such a situation.

Eight chapters are presented as cases illustrating different aspects of the gap. Three are broader in scope: William Leiss rehearses his important distinction between risk assessment and risk management and the dangers of confusing the two; Michael Howlett combines political economy and neo-institutionalism to identify some significant policy legacies from the staples era that constrain environmental policy options

in a transition to a “post-staples” economy; and Steven Bernstein uses his familiar construction of “liberal environmentalism” to illuminate the constraints on policy-making in what is perhaps the archetypal case of an integrity gap in Canada, climate change. The other five chapters are more focused case studies: Michael Mehta on the nuclear power industry; Fikret Berkes and others on participatory planning in BC land use policy; Anthony Perl compares air quality initiatives in Toronto and Vancouver; Richard Gilbert describes the constraints on new approaches that have accumulated as Toronto’s land use and transportation policies have developed; and David Gurin looks at the curious policy impasse that has built up around the future of Toronto’s ageing Exhibition Place.

In the final chapter, the editors make a valiant effort to pull this rather disparate collection together. They list five policy constraints whose malign interaction provides the basis for understanding Canada’s embarrassing performance in environmental policy: a general lack of fit between historically entrenched political institutions and current environmental problems; the political influence of old resource industries; the conflict between multilateralism and continentalism in foreign policy; technocratic elitism in the public service; and ambiguous jurisdiction over environmental legislative competence that encourages “buck-passing” and blame avoidance strategies rather than accountable and transparent governance. They conclude with an interesting discussion of alternative scenarios that might provide reasons to believe that the gap could be closed, ending with a forceful plea for institutional reform, especially in intergovernmental relations.

While the individual case studies are not without interest, this is a collection where the whole is rather less than the sum of its parts. Anyone familiar with recent work in Canadian environmental policy will recognize that, with the possible exception of the under-explored idea of lack of “fit” between institutions and challenges, the five constraints identified in the conclusion amount to little more than a round up of the usual suspects. This disappointing outcome can be traced to problems with the idea of an integrity gap itself. “Integrity” commonly has two meanings. One, which is purely descriptive, simply implies a damaging lack of coherence, as we might attribute the collapse of a building to lack of structural integrity. The other sense, however, implies moral judgement, for example, when we describe someone who breaks a promise as a person lacking integrity. If the integrity gap in environmental policy manifests a lack of the descriptive kind of integrity—a lack of coherence between the identification of problems, the choice of policy instruments, and the deployment of resources—then it is hard to see how the integrity gap itself is anything other than what has been traditionally called an implementation deficit. It is perhaps useful to know but hardly surprising to find that this group of collaborators has come up with similar causes of the implementation deficit as others working in the same field. If, however, invoking an integrity gap is intended as a moral condemnation of policy makers who promise what they cannot or do not intend to deliver, neo-institutionalism with its appeal to large, impersonal historical forces is probably not the best approach to take. If such an exercise were to be something other than a simple-minded populist attack on untrustworthy elites, it would require more sensitivity to questions of problem definition and agenda-setting and greater use of interpretive and discursive analysis of the kind found intermittently in William Leiss’ contribution. In doing so, it would address the neglected but critically important insight at the start of this volume: there is something very peculiar and slightly sinister about a state of affairs in which citizens are encouraged to talk endlessly about the environment and its problems while having so few opportunities to do anything about them. The result, however, would be a different book altogether.

JEREMY RAYNER *Malaspina University-College*

**The Politics of Public Management: The HRDC Audit of Grants and Contributions**

David A. Good

The Institute of Public Administration of Canada Series in Public Management and Governance

Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2003, pp. 240

The literature in public administration in some ways suffers from not having more practitioners reflecting, writing and analyzing their experiences. Thus David Good's book analyzing the HRDC's so-called "billion dollar boondoggle" is a welcome contribution. His background as both a senior manager/executive within the Federal government and his academic credentials—a doctorate in policy and administration sets him apart—as a practitioner-academic. Good possesses the senior public manager's mind for detail and this book provides a clear account of the ebbing and flowing of events, beginning with the January 2000 release of HRDC's internal audit that implied a loss of a billion dollars, to the Auditor General's report of October that same year which, while critical of monitoring and reporting practices, concluded that only \$85,000 was unaccounted for. The media and the opposition, at this point quickly lost interest.

Throughout, the case study raises important questions respecting traditional public administration values and practices such as neutrality, professionalism, responsiveness and accountability and the uneasy, if not bluntly dysfunctional, relationship that exists between public administration, politics and the media. The drama of this story, its real value, is in the contradictions and tensions created by the implementation of new public management reforms. As Good writes: "In short, a significant reduction in staff, dramatic program changes and restructuring, a determined effort to improve service to the public, the elimination of administrative processes, and the expanded role of Members of Parliament all contributed to a significant weakening of the management and control of the grants and contributions expenditures" (9). In essence, these are the "dichotomies and contradictions" (9) that emerge from public management reform. Good questions the inevitability of "inherent contradictions and harsh trade-offs" (19) in reform processes and raises the challenge of finding a "balance" between all the contending forces.

Good's central quest for a balanced approach, according to which public management is embedded within a highly political context, rests on the agenda of public management reform. To this end he cites Christopher Pollitt and Geert Boukaert who wrote "public management cannot be adequately comprehended without reference to the crucial relationships which exist between administration and politics and between administrators and politicians" (153). For Good this is a matter of identifying the most appropriate trade-offs. And this is where he misses the point. While Good struggles to develop a case for the politics of public management, he seems to gloss over the power dynamic driving public sector restructuring and of which HRDC is a fitting illustration. If we were to engage in an archaeology of Canadian public administration we would find, as we sifted through layers of institutional sediment, that the key program and policy mandates housed within Human Resources and Development Canada are features of the Canadian version of the Keynesian Welfare State and the post-war compromises between capital, labour and region built into that edifice. Even HRDC's new vision could not escape, at least the principles of this history. Good describes HRDC's vision as "decidedly ambitious and expansionist" constructed upon three concepts: "enabling Canadians to help themselves by building upon the traditional role of the department as "provider" and "guardian"; encouraging full participation of all Canadians in the economy and society; and integrating the "workplace" and the "community to capture the social and economic aspects of

human development” (46). The words are sufficiently plastic to allow ample interpretation but they do connote a much more interventionist Federal state than the one we have come to know for some decades now. This vision is unrealizable in the context of broad and deep neoliberal inspired restructuring. There is more to the HRDC case than just a tension between “the old values of public administration ... rubbing up against the new values of the new public management” (49) and the need to find the trade-offs which lead to a restoration of balance. HRDC, as a new institutional arrangement, was born out of the 1990s, a decade of aggressive budget austerity. The contradiction not explicitly raised by Good is that for more than a decade now Canadians have witnessed a steady disabling of the Federal state as a meaningful policy and program presence in their daily lives. It should be of no surprise that Members of Parliament particularly but not exclusively on the Government benches, had a great interest in the grants and contributions function of HRDC. It allowed them the occasional opportunity to announce something tangible in their own constituency.

While Good does not adequately address the story of HRDC in a larger political economy context, he does a great service by fundamentally asking the right question at the managerial level—“could an audit adequately fill in ‘the hole’ that the new public management has created?” (49). The answer is no. There is a need, as the book suggests, to rebuild managerial and accountability capacities. In the name of efficiency, effectiveness and economy, too much was stripped away, not just from HRDC but from throughout the public sector—federal, provincial and municipal.

BRYAN EVANS *Ryerson University*

### **Chrétien and Canadian Federalism, Politics and the Constitution, 1993–2003**

Edward McWhinney

Vancouver: Ronsdale Press, 2003, pp. 220.

Edward McWhinney, a legal scholar and former professor of political science, sat as the Member of Parliament for Vancouver Quadra through much of the Chrétien period. The title of the book promises an examination of the Chrétien era in terms of its legacy for Canadian federalism and the constitution. Sadly, the book fails to deliver. Although the author is quick to insist that his work is not a “personal biography” (12), but rather an analysis framed through “participant observation,” the examination of the past decade’s events is largely a form of political memoir, with little by way of a sustained analysis of Canadian federalism or the constitution.

The book is organized into several thematic sections. The first several chapters provide an overview of the structure of the parliamentary system of government. The first chapter, although titled “Presidential Prime Ministership,” is less about the ascendancy of the Prime Minister into a presidential type figure as it is an introduction to the primary “players” in the parliamentary system: PMO, cabinet, the PM, individual MPs, political parties, and the Senate. Chapters 2 and 3 continue this introductory discussion with an overview of the role of the Speaker, the function of question period, parliamentary committees, party whips, and the Supreme Court of Canada. While the discussion of these various institutions of our parliamentary system provides some interesting information, the lens through which they are viewed is the author’s personal experience with them. McWhinney’s consideration of party whips, for example, becomes a discussion of McWhinney’s dissatisfaction that the Liberal party whip used appointments to the parliamentary committee he chaired as a means of punishing disobedient members. McWhinney then expands at some length on the importance of his committee and the work it did.

This tendency to personalize the information presented continues throughout the rest of the text. Chapters 4 and 5, entitled “Fault-lines” and “Crossroads” respectively, deal with the major policy issues confronting the Chrétien government. The discussion, however, is uneven. Fiscal questions, for example, are discussed in only one and half pages and there is no acknowledgement of the significance of the cuts to transfer payments and the termination of the Canada Assistance Program and its replacement with the Canada Health and Social Transfer. Admittedly, McWhinney’s primary interest is in constitutional issues, but these policy changes had a very significant effect on the structure of Canadian federalism, undermined the ability to sustain national standards in social programs, and had an adverse effect on federal-provincial relations. Immigration, on the other hand, is given an extensive discussion (8 pages). While important, the reason it should be given such a protracted discussion is less than clear. One explanation is simply that as a Vancouver MP, McWhinney’s constituency work dealt with a considerable number of immigration issues, whereas he had relatively few dealing with fiscal matters.

More troubling, in this reviewer’s opinion, is McWhinney’s discussion of constitutional issues. Given his expertise in constitutional matters, it is surprising that he has little to say about the 1996 Quebec referendum campaign, the Supreme Court reference case on Quebec secession, or the passage of the *Clarity Act*. McWhinney’s primary discussion of this issue tends to focus on his own previously published constitutional opinions of Quebec’s right to hold referendums and the failure of successive justice ministers to adequately respond to opposition questions relying on those opinions (119–121). The absence of a sustained discussion of these issues weakens the overall text.

McWhinney does offer some interesting proposals for the reform of our constitutional system. In particular, his idea to adopt a separation of powers in which the executive is removed from parliament is provocative and would amount to a substantial redrawing of our constitutional system. His other suggestions include parliamentary review of Supreme Court appointments, senate and electoral reform and a more formalized constitutional role for political parties. However, these ideas are dropped into the text, often by way of conclusion, and are not fleshed out in any depth.

In conclusion, this book is a highly personal reflection on the author’s role as an MP (as reflected in the 16 pages of photographs of the author with various dignitaries and parliamentary colleagues). As such it fails to live up to the promise of its title and does not provide an analysis of the Chrétien legacy for Canadian federalism. The absence of footnotes to the academic literature makes the books of limited utility for students. The only bibliography provided is one of the author’s own works. The book might be of interest to those concerned with the inner workings of parliament and of the Liberal party. However, McWhinney was not close enough to the inner circles of the party to provide much new information about the internal party debates that characterized the decade. This is too bad. Clearly the author has a rich knowledge and understanding of the Canadian constitutional order. A more sustained and balanced analysis would have made a valuable contribution to the literature of Canadian politics.

BYRON SHELDRIK *University of Winnipeg*

### **La seconde Révolution tranquille—Démocratiser la démocratie**

Gil Courtemanche

Montréal, Boréal 2003, 172 p.

C’est bien à une seconde Révolution tranquille que l’auteur-journaliste-essayiste Gil Courtemanche nous convie tout au long de ce petit essai au ton pamphlétaire, écrit

dans l'euphorie consécutive au sommet de Porto Allegre. Démocratiser la démocratie, voilà la véritable finalité de cette seconde Révolution tranquille, qui, contrairement à la première, devra venir de la base.

Dans un premier temps, Courtemanche brosse un sombre bilan de l'évolution des démocraties libérales à la mode occidentale : déficit démocratique, démission de l'État devant l'économie mondialisée et libéralisée, et finalement absence d'une gauche véritable, une gauche unifiée, pragmatique et citoyenne. Afin d'appuyer ces différents constats, l'auteur relève bon nombre de symptômes susceptibles de renforcer sa thèse, soit la concentration de la presse, notamment au Québec, et son corollaire, la violation du droit à l'information, le carriérisme de nos élites politiques, le caractère désuet de notre mode de scrutin, le développement d'une économie de l'immatériel, etc. Ce qui le conduit à affirmer : « Ces inégalités, ces distorsions, ces imperfections ne sont pas inévitables. Elles ne font pas partie du destin de la démocratie, mais constituent, des avortements volontaires, provoqués par ceux qui ont détourné l'idéal démocratique au profit des partis, des institutions et du capital. » (p. 26).

C'est donc cette forme de manichéisme qui opposera tout au long de l'essai capitalisme et démocratie, tenants de la droite et tenants de la gauche, avec pour résultat une démonisation de la pensée économique libérale qui « ... n'a jamais désiré ni la démocratie ni ce qu'on appelle aujourd'hui les droits de l'homme » (p. 66) au profit d'une gauche à qui nous devons « ... tous les droits démocratiques auxquels nous tenons (capitalisme compris) » (p. 66).

Démocratiser la démocratie, c'est redonner aux citoyens le contrôle de leur gouvernement et de leurs institutions. Mais c'est aussi, pour l'auteur, un retour aux fondements du processus de démocratisation : la solidarité. Il devient nécessaire que les citoyens se redonnent les moyens de changer les choses, même s'il faut se contenter de la mince marge de manœuvre que cette démocratie corporative semble nous laisser, à savoir la rue. S'appuyant sur les exemples de Meudon et de Porto Allegre, l'auteur entend démontrer que « redonner la vie municipale aux citoyens constitue le premier pas vers la démocratisation de la démocratie » (p. 114). Les exemples qu'il cite semblent illustrer une diminution du déficit démocratique, que l'auteur définit comme un éloignement entre le corps social et les centres de décision. Cependant, et bien qu'il reconnaisse que la démocratie est « ... un travail, une tâche, un engagement sinon quotidien du moins permanent », il oublie que l'apathie qui semble affecter nos corps sociaux relève aussi du droit démocratique; un droit que l'on peut ou non exercer. Qui plus est, cet appel à l'engagement local ne risque-t-il pas de canaliser des énergies à la mauvaise place quand on sait que les véritables décisions se prennent au niveau national, continental, voire supranational ?

Courtemanche s'égare en faisant de la décentralisation, tant au niveau municipal que régional, une panacée de la réappropriation citoyenne de la démocratie. « Pour construire le changement, *dit-il*, il faut s'appuyer sur l'identité et sur ses formes les plus immédiates » (p. 94) Une telle affirmation peut s'avérer véridique lorsque la problématique demeure locale; cependant, elle ignore que certains pans de nos politiques doivent nécessairement avoir une direction nationale, notamment l'éducation ou la santé. Sans quoi, des disparités régionales apparaîtraient, car ces politiques seraient soumises aux volontés de quelques roitelets régionaux.

Cependant, Courtemanche vise juste lorsqu'il aborde la question du déficit démocratique, qui découle en partie du système de scrutin nominal à un tour, ou encore lorsqu'il s'en prend aux règles de remboursement des dépenses électorales obligeant un parti à obtenir 20% des voix pour avoir droit au remboursement de son investissement. Il est d'avis qu'un seuil de 5% des voix favoriserait l'émergence de nouveaux partis et stimulerait ainsi l'édifice démocratique. Même chose lorsqu'il s'en prend à la concentration de la presse. On ne peut qu'être d'accord avec le con-

stat qu'il en dresse. Par contre, s'il existe un droit à l'information, on doit y accoler la responsabilité, et même le devoir, de bien s'informer (multiplier les supports, les sources et les obédiences idéologiques). C'est ce manque de contreparties qui fait trop souvent défaut à cet ouvrage.

En somme, cette seconde Révolution tranquille, qui a pour assise la solidarité, souffre, avant même d'avoir vu le jour, des mêmes symptômes que les problèmes auxquels elle entend apporter des solutions. Invoquer la solidarité communautaire comme remède aux maux de notre époque relève d'une forme perverse de manque de réalisme. Il est évident que le sens commun ne peut s'opposer à des choses aussi fondamentales que la juste répartition de la richesse, l'accès au logement, aux soins de santé, à une éducation de qualité...

L'auteur se défend bien de verser dans l'utopie en alléguant que « Porto Allegre nous indique le chemin » (p. 172) et en citant en exemple l'implication de dizaines de milliers de personnes dans les ONG, les groupes communautaires ou encore, les protestations entourant les grands sommets comme celui de Québec. Ces différentes prises de position du corps civil témoignent, ce qui est encourageant, d'une volonté de participation à l'édifice démocratique. Cependant, le nombre de regroupements et la disparité de leurs revendications, lorsqu'elles ne sont pas carrément concurrentes (groupes anarchistes, syndicats, associations étudiantes, altermondialistes, groupes de femmes), tendent à les enfermer dans une posture essentiellement critique qui a contribué au déclin de la gauche. Qui plus est, et sans vouloir tomber dans une analyse de type générationnelle, comment peut-on concilier les intérêts des syndicats, « ...outils fondamentalement démocratiques... » (p. 57), avec ceux des groupements de jeunes, qu'ils soient étudiants, contractuels ou simplement exclus de la convention collective faisant office de contrat de travail dans leur entreprise ? Bref, la grande force des dirigeants du G8 ou des membres de l'OMC demeure leur communauté d'intérêts, ce qui ne semble pas être le cas des groupes traditionnellement associés à la gauche.

En d'autres mots, l'auteur propose des solutions beaucoup trop simplistes à des problèmes d'une complexité grandissante.

OLIVIER DE CHAMPLAIN *HEC Montréal*

### **Egalité hommes-femmes ? Le militantisme au Québec : le PQ et le PLQ**

Evelyne Tardy (avec la collaboration de Rébecca Beauvais et André Bernard)

Montréal, Collection science politique, Cahiers du Québec, Ed. Hurtubise, 2003, 222 p.

Lors des dernières élections québécoises du 14 avril 2003, la proportion de femmes élues a augmenté, avec trois femmes députées de plus, soit une représentation à hauteur de 30% contre 28% auparavant. Indéniablement, le pourcentage de femmes élues n'a cessé de progresser depuis le milieu des années 80, soit quarante ans après l'obtention du droit de vote. La représentation parlementaire des femmes au Québec dépasse ainsi largement la moyenne mondiale qui est de 14%. Néanmoins, la proportion d'élues peut paraître encore faible, sinon insuffisante, par rapport au vivier de militantes existant dans les partis (37% de femmes en moyenne) et de l'objectif idéal de parité. Analyste incontournable du rapport des Québécoises au politique et du militantisme féminin, Evelyne Tardy, dans son dernier ouvrage, tente d'expliquer cette sous-représentation des femmes parmi les candidats aux différentes élections, à la lumière, notamment, des propos tenus par les militants et militantes. Une telle analyse conduit à s'intéresser aux ressources potentielles en femmes politiques. En effet, si les militants et militantes agissent pour faire triompher leurs idées, ils n'ont pas forcément de responsabilité de direction. Ils se situent en quelque sorte entre l'amateur (ils s'initient à la politique) et le professionnel de la politique. C'est aux instances

dirigeantes des partis qu'il revient de sélectionner ceux qui sont susceptibles de remplir des fonctions politiques. Seules les hypothèses relatives au fonctionnement des partis politiques ont donc été retenues pour cette recherche dont les auteurs ont considéré comme militant « toute personne qui siégeait à un comité exécutif du parti, qu'il soit local, régional ou central, autrement dit toute personne qui était susceptible de se voir confier des responsabilités au sein du parti (27). » Il n'en demeure pas moins que les militants se caractérisent aussi par une grande diversité et qu'une typologie plus fine aurait pu enrichir le propos. On aurait pu imaginer, par exemple, de distinguer le militant ponctuel, dont la mobilisation est fonction de l'enjeu, du militant engagé qui prend des responsabilités dans l'organisation (seul considéré ici *a priori*) et enfin le militant qui possède un mandat électif. Parallèlement aux militants et militantes de base, il aurait été intéressant également de s'intéresser aux personnalités féminines qui ont fait carrière dans ces partis, aux militantes devenues députées ou ministres, par exemple, à leur profil et à leur parcours au sein du parti, par rapport aux hommes, pour avoir une analyse différenciée des parcours d'exception et d'une éventuelle évolution des années 70 à aujourd'hui. On aurait ainsi dégagé les profils valorisés par chacun des partis politiques.

Ceci dit, quinze ans après sa précédente enquête réalisée en 1986/87, l'intérêt de cette nouvelle recherche est assurément une réactualisation de l'identification des différences de genre entre les militants et les militantes des deux principaux partis du Québec, à savoir le Parti Québécois et le Parti libéral du Québec. L'hypothèse posée est que les militantes font face à des contraintes spécifiques et sont moins sollicitées. On constate en effet que, bien que le nombre de militantes ne cesse d'augmenter, aucun des deux partis n'a pris de dispositions particulières pour augmenter leur représentation parmi les candidats aux élections, malgré des discours parfois volontaristes. Seul le Parti Québécois est encore doté d'un comité national d'action politique des femmes, tandis que la structure équivalente s'est dissoute dans le Parti libéral du Québec au profit de quotas de représentation. Cependant, les mesures prises par les gouvernements péquistes en faveur des femmes (création du poste de ministre d'État à la condition féminine en 1976, élaboration du premier programme politique en matière de condition féminine en 1978, réforme du code civil en 1980, loi sur l'équité salariale en 1996) ne doivent rien à l'action du Comité national de la condition féminine devenu Comité d'action politique des femmes, mais plutôt à celle du Conseil du statut de la femme et des groupes de femmes qui exerçaient des pressions sur lui. Bien qu'Evelyne Tardy ne l'affirme pas, il serait peut-être possible de considérer qu'aujourd'hui le Parti Québécois est le parti le plus favorable aux femmes.

Néanmoins, dans leur comportement face à leurs militantes, les deux partis ne se distinguent guère l'un de l'autre, comme en témoigne la présente enquête. Les deux premiers chapitres sont consacrés à l'évolution historique du rapport de chacun des partis avec ses militantes : progression du nombre d'éluës et promotion des politiques d'égalité entre les sexes lorsque ces partis sont au pouvoir. Les trois autres chapitres exploitent les résultats des 3000 questionnaires adressés aux militantes et militants (1703 questionnaires remplis, ce qui constitue un taux de réponses élevé) et d'entrevues semi-directives auprès d'un échantillon représentatif. Les questionnaires sont riches d'information sur les différences de profils et de motivations des militantes et militants. Au niveau des critères socio-économiques, les différences de genre sont peu significatives. Cependant, dans le domaine de l'activité professionnelle, les femmes occupent des emplois moins bien rémunérés que les hommes (elles sont 2 fois plus nombreuses que les militants à avoir des emplois à bas salaire, toute proportion gardée) ce qui reflète en fait la réalité de la société en général. Quant au militantisme, il semble avoir un effet pénalisant sur la vie familiale des femmes ; par exemple, chez les libéraux, les hommes sont plus souvent mariés et moins souvent célibataires que les femmes. L'enquête établit aussi une corrélation entre militan-

tisme et position de leadership dans la famille: parmi les militantes, les aînées sont surreprésentées. En outre, l'existence d'un modèle à qui s'identifier semble déterminante puisque le rôle joué par le militantisme de la mère est plus évident chez les militantes. Toutefois, les différences les plus probantes entre les genres se situent dans la manière de militer : « les femmes expriment des intérêts plus variés que leurs homologues masculins dans leurs raisons pour militer dans leur parti. En effet, pour elles, c'est davantage la perspective de changer les choses, de participer au pouvoir et de relever un défi qui les pousse à militer dans un parti politique » (196). De plus, l'enquête contredit un certain nombre d'idées reçues qui voient dans la conciliation vie professionnelle-vie familiale la principale difficulté rencontrée par les militantes. Comme chez les hommes, seul un petit nombre de femmes évoquent un manque de disponibilité et les contraintes familiales. Les militantes préfèrent généralement invoquer d'autres intérêts en plus de la politique ou encore l'absence de courage pour s'engager dans une campagne électorale, etc. Les difficultés seraient ainsi plutôt liées à la vie du parti qu'à la vie familiale. En comparaison de l'enquête précédente menée dans les années 80, qui portait sur les contraintes pesant sur les militants et militantes, les différences dans la façon de militer tendent à diminuer entre les femmes et les hommes. Les femmes s'affirment désormais davantage et critiquent dans une moindre mesure l'organisation du parti. Toutefois, ce sont toujours les hommes qui se portent candidats aux élections et les explications fournies par les militants et militantes sont encore empreintes de stéréotypes. Les militants sont plus nombreux que de militantes à invoquer des valeurs différentes selon que l'on appartient à l'un ou l'autre sexe, le manque de confiance des femmes et le fait qu'elles soient moins persévérantes [donc des « insuffisances des femmes » (161)]. Les femmes, par contre, expliquent leur sous-représentation par une moindre disponibilité en raison des rôles sociaux, ce qui contredit ce qu'elles affirment pour elles-mêmes. Les femmes avancent donc des raisons « objectives » tandis que les hommes ont tendance à les « naturaliser ».

L'enquête demandait également des suggestions aux militants et militantes pour améliorer la participation des femmes aux élections. Moins la mesure est contraignante, plus militants et militantes préconisent d'y avoir recours (167). Les hommes sont plus nombreux à percevoir les quotas comme une mesure discriminatoire. Constatation plus intéressante encore, l'attitude face aux quotas varie selon l'âge pour les femmes, les jeunes femmes militantes (moins de 35 ans) y étant le moins favorables. L'expérience aidant, les plus anciennes y voient moins d'objections. Globalement, les militantes souhaitent une plus grande sensibilisation à la situation des femmes, tandis que, pour les militants, il revient aux femmes de faire l'effort nécessaire. La majorité des femmes souhaiterait un soutien financier spécifique. Les plus audacieuses proposent un changement de mode de scrutin, voire la création d'un parti de femmes sur le modèle de ce qui a existé dans les pays scandinaves. L'exemple français, à savoir le recours à une loi sur la parité, recueille l'approbation de plus de 60% des femmes et d'un tiers des hommes (178). Mais, contrairement à ce qu'affirme Evelyne Tardy, la loi française ne vise que les scrutins électoraux et non les structures partisanes dont l'organisation est laissée à la seule initiative des partis (178).

Si les militantes prennent davantage confiance en elles avec les années, il n'en demeure pas moins qu'elles sont moins sollicitées pour poser leur candidature aux différentes élections. Aussi Evelyne Tardy plaide-t-elle pour des mesures incitatives et envisage-t-elle le recours à la parité bien que l'idée ne fasse pas encore l'objet d'un véritable débat politique au Québec. L'idée de réformer les institutions québécoises fait cependant son chemin, non seulement parmi les intellectuelles (Maillé, 2003), mais également dans la société avec les États généraux de la démocratie qui se sont tenus à Québec en février 2003 sous la présidence de Claude Béland. Au-delà du principe et d'un modèle français qui ne doit pas être séparé d'une certaine culture

politique, il revient sans doute aux partis politiques, sous la pression des groupes de femmes, à inventer leurs propres modalités pour augmenter le nombre de femmes parmi les candidats aux différentes élections en tenant compte des réalités québécoises. Cet ouvrage constitue un bilan critique pour les partis politiques dont il ne leur reste plus qu'à tirer les conclusions.

SANDRINE DAUPHIN *Université d'Ottawa*

### **Still Counting: Women in Politics Across Canada**

Linda Trimble and Jane Arcscott

Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2003. pp. xvi, 210

Numbers matter. This is Trimble and Arcscott's fundamental message. The ratio of women in elected and appointed political posts to their proportion in the population at large is a measure of fairness in political representation that has obvious implications for women's impact on political processes and policy outcomes. Although Canadian in perspective, the authors draw international comparisons where appropriate and find Canada rather lacking. Perennial under-representation, despite marked improvements over the past three decades, is an evident problem and an issue worthy of investigation.

In seven chapters, Trimble and Arcscott offer a competent and interesting account of the advancement of political women from roughly the early 1970s onward. The book is short, but well researched. A strength of the book is the wealth of data on sex imbalances in myriad positions—from elected legislators to party leaders to lieutenant governors and more—at the federal, provincial, and territorial levels. Alone, this makes the work a valuable resource for Canadian political scientists. In addition, interwoven throughout are rich, contextual accounts of the experiences of women politicians in their navigations across the political landscape. These narratives are employed to illustrate what the authors identify as the main causes of under-representation: the parties' failure to adequately bolster female candidacies; the masculine political environment; media imbalances in the treatment of women politicians; and the role conflict that can result from juggling a political career with social and family commitments.

While the overarching message and data collection efforts are both positive aspects of the book, the reader may not always be satisfied that key arguments are sufficiently supported by the evidence presented. Gauging representational progress in contemporary politics, chapter two examines women's political success over three periods: 1917–1969, 1970–1984, and 1985–2000 (31). According to the data, the proportion of women politicians at all levels has increased by roughly 10 percentage points over each period. Following significant gains through the 1980s and early 1990s, the authors argue that women's representation has reached a plateau of about 20 per cent of elected and appointed politicians in Canada. Indeed, closer examination of the last decade provokes a warning that progress has “stalled” (49–51). The proportion of women elected to the federal legislature did not budge from 1997 to 2000, for both elections returned about 20 per cent female MPs. At the provincial/territorial level, several jurisdictions saw a slide in the proportion of women office holders since the mid-1990s. However, while the pace of change has hardly been breakneck, of the 14 jurisdictions analyzed, seven of them witnessed a rise in the proportion of women, a few of them markedly (Table 3.1, 50). This is not duly emphasized in the book, and talk of a 20 per cent plateau in women's representation may be premature. Several elections since the book's release provide grounds for guarded optimism that women will continue to make gains, albeit gradually and at least in terms of candidacies if not at the helms of parties. In the 2003 Québec provincial election, 27 per

cent of the ridings elected a female candidate, a 4 point increase over 1998 results of 23 per cent. At the federal level, the 2004 election produced a slight rise in women's representation. Sixty-five women won their seats, and the House of Commons is now 21 per cent female.

Predictions for the future are similarly pessimistic. The authors' projections for the year 2015 place women's share of political posts at 26 per cent (39–40). Little firm evidence is offered to support this forecast, nor is it explicitly outlined how this figure was derived. Even a cursory look at past numbers suggests a prediction of a 10 per cent gain or more over the next 15 years (as has been the case in each time period studied) is equally plausible.

*Still Counting* is weakest in defending the claim that political stripe and ideology are second in importance to increasing the numbers of women in politics. The argument is that politics needs more women, regardless of partisan affiliation. Non-feminist and even anti-feminist women of the political right "if successful ... will produce beneficial outcomes for all women as well as for some groups of men that have received relatively poor representation" (151). This theme is repeated several times, and it relates to the authors' call for enhanced representation of diversity in legislatures and at cabinet tables. For the goals of symbolic representation and "normalizing" the presence of women in politics, partisanship and ideology may not matter that much. Moreover, there is certainly room for right-wing women in Canadian politics, and it is dubious to automatically assume that women of the right are hostile to feminist/women's interests and aspirations. On the other hand, some readers may question whether it is desirable to normalize the presence of women from right and centre-right parties whose platforms are often ambivalent at best to women's interests and policy goals.

Certainly, the book is not neglectful of the potential clash between numbers and ideology. The authors explain that discussion of women's issues and perspectives in provincial legislatures was enhanced by the 1990 election of the Ontario NDP government (139–140) as well as by the boost in female opposition members in the Conservative-dominated Alberta legislature in the late 1980s (143). However, they also warn that the 1993 Alberta provincial election "brought more women into the legislature, temporarily cast out the NDP from the House, and brought neo-liberal and neo-conservative policy ideas to the fore, many of which were in direct opposition to women's equality claims" (144). The idea that numbers always, or even often, trump ideology and partisan affiliation as a measure of women's progress in representational terms is unconvincing. There are times when counting does not matter. Rather, ideology and attitudes often matter far more.

*Still Counting* is a valuable contribution and will likely be a favourite for undergraduate courses across the country. Trimble and Arscott combine rich data and historical accounts, clever cartoons and graphics, and punchy writing for a succinct look at this important political issue.

ELIZABETH GOODYEAR-GRANT *McGill University*

### **Feminist Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Policy**

Claire Turenne Sjolander, Heather A. Smith and Deborah Steinstra, eds.  
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. xiv, 246

This timely must-read collection of fourteen essays is a welcomed addition to a growing body of feminist Canadian foreign policy literature. It is an accessible collection which challenges traditional Canadian foreign policy analyses (including feminist ones) by deploying feminist approaches and presenting feminist foreign policy

(re-)formulations. Each author carefully explains relevant feminist theory or scholarship to link tightly their theoretical arguments with their case studies.

Steinstra, Sjolander and Smith's introduction provides a series of guiding questions which are followed by a concise introduction to feminist approaches. Smith, Steinstra and Sjolander's essay on feminist pedagogy is innovative in showing how to create inclusive, holistic teaching and "student-centered learning" (13) by allowing students to become active teachers—not passive recipients—of foreign policy analyses.

Part I examines the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's (DFAIT) internationalist rhetoric in the context of globalization. Smith's critical feminist analysis shows how domestic policies concerning Aboriginal peoples, the reception of illegal migrants/refugees, or global environment issues are at odds with our foreign policy pronouncements. Laura Macdonald uses liberal and socialist feminist approaches to show how Canada's global trade policies fail to address globalization's negative impact on women. Sjolander's demonstrates how trade policy is masculinized through sports analogies and terminology and thus limits the burgeoning relationship between DFAIT and women entrepreneurs due to a discourse which "celebrates ... masculine values" (71).

Part II examines human security. Sandra Whitworth's critical feminist examination of the 1993 Shidane Arone murder by Canadian peacekeepers in Somalia shows that sending soldiers socialized through militarized masculinity—"norms of masculinity that privilege violence, racism, aggression, and hatred towards women" (87)—as peacekeepers needs re-consideration. Ann Denholm Crosby compares Voice of Women's feminist conception of human security to DFAIT's conception, which is shown to be a "conditioning framework" (91) "in that human security is about security *within the context* of global market forces" (96, italics in original) and may "[exacerbate] the root causes of a vast array of human insecurities" (102). Rebecca Tiessen uses critical and postmodern feminist approaches to analyze DFAIT's Sustainable Development Strategy to illustrate silences on women and gender are due to the lack of women in DFAIT and the adoption of selected masculinist principles from the UN's *Agenda 21* document.

Section III examines human rights. Human rights activist-expert Shelagh Day shows Canada's international commitments are "not reflected in an equivalent political commitment to fulfill women's human rights at home" (135); in fact, many domestic policies silence, negate or violate those very rights. Edna Keeble and Meredith Ralston examine efforts to deal with trafficking and the sex trade in the Philippines; they show states' focus on law and order measures are an incomplete solution, and so women need "opportunity spaces", such as participatory video, to seek gender-sensitive solutions (137). Erin Baines lauds Canada's recognition of gendered persecution as criteria for refugee status, but shows the policy's contradictions and limited impact on women due to a general policy of limited refugee intake.

Section IV deals with how women's groups have organized for voice(s) in Canadian foreign policy. Healy uses a post-colonial feminist approach to highlight the marginalization of challenged, lesbian, poor, etc., women's concerns and points to possibilities for transforming foreign policy by examining the Canadian World March of Women 2000 coalition. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon shows DFAIT's engagement with Canadian women's groups for the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women led to greater participation and networking, but resulted in limited influence on DFAIT's positions and policies. Finally, Steinstra examines the Canadian Feminist Alliance for International Action's goals and priorities to critique identity, human rights, economy and gender issues, and therein, provide a feminist formulation of Canadian foreign policy.

Undoubtedly, the key tension is between DFAIT's foreign policy and what women's groups and feminist scholars have argued for prioritizing and setting as goals. Moreover, there is debate as to how this gap is to be assessed and addressed. Simi-

larly, the gendered impact of foreign policy is debated. Consequently, the tension between cooperating with the state and co-optation by the state is explored, but the level of cooperation with the state appears to depend on the differences in basic conceptions and goals between women groups' and DFAIT. For example, DFAIT's human security agenda is often trumped by its international trade agenda; thus, most authors criticize Canadian trade policies because they have a negative impact on women, especially due to the dismantling of state provided social and economic supports.

One innovative discussion in this collection concerns the tensions between the scholars, their analyses and their topics. The authors respond to the enthusiastic, indifferent and vituperative reactions endured during the collection's genesis. They also grapple with how they teach, study, analyze, and research Canadian foreign policy with a focus on women and feminist concerns given their own privileged positions, access to power, etc. Indeed, this collection is enhanced by providing essays by feminist activists, graduate students, and junior and senior academics. As well, while they investigate gender analyses of foreign policy, they also connect gender with other analytical categories, such as race, class, or ability. Finally, debate between the different feminist approaches as to what is to be analyzed and to be done is found throughout the collection.

Overall, this book effectively introduces feminist approaches to international relations. Methodologically, the reader is clearly shown how to do gender analyses from multiple approaches. Empirically, the discussion of Canadian foreign policy provides an array of topics and arguments to demonstrate the breadth and depth of feminist analyses. In addition, each author alludes to other works useful for further reading. *Feminist Perspectives on Canadian Foreign Policy* encourages students, scholars, practitioners and activists to analyze and engage issues of women and gender in Canadian foreign policy in order to formulate gender-sensitive policy options.

NIGMENDRA NARAIN *University of Western Ontario*

### **Welfare Hot Buttons: Women, Work, and Social Policy Reform**

Sylvia Bashevkin

Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002, pp. viii, 188.

*Welfare Hot Buttons* raises important, and in some ways uncomfortable, questions. Its major argument, in comparing social policy reform in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, is that the conservative leaders (Ronald Reagan, George Bush Sr., Margaret Thatcher, John Major, Brian Mulroney, Kim Campbell) were, in their social policy reforms, less punitive, less restrictive and less obsessed with paid work than their post-conservative successors (Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, Jean Chrétien). This raises important questions about the importance of elections and of elected politicians. There were real expectations that, to take the Canadian example, electing Chrétien's Liberals was a major shift away from Mulroney's Conservatives yet, as Sylvia Bashevkin shows, this was not true in the vital policy area of social policy reform.

However, Bashevkin is certainly not arguing that political action is irrelevant and indeed the book is primarily about the importance of ideas in the formulation of social policy. Her principal argument is that the ideological terrain had shifted decisively and that arguments about individual responsibility, the need to build self-reliance and the importance of paid employment had gained precedence over the structural interpretations of poverty that had been more generally accepted in earlier periods. The organizations of civil society, particularly women's groups and anti-poverty groups, that were motivated by structural visions of society were not able to make their case in the period of the conservatives but also unable to do so in the period of the post-conservatives.

Bashevkin's answer to why the post-conservatives were so disappointing to those who had hoped for more progressive social policies follows from this analysis; Clinton, Blair and Chrétien were all essentially pragmatic politicians not willing to challenge the moralistic arguments of the right and, secondly, their political challenge came from the right and they therefore moved in that direction as part of their electoral strategy. It is not new to argue that the Alliance had a major political impact by pushing Chrétien to the right but what is important about *Welfare Hot Buttons* is that it empirically demonstrates this impact through the detailed analysis of social policy reform.

The book covers two political eras in three countries across social policy reform generally. This very broad scope permits Bashevkin to outline her theory of the less progressive post-conservatives with three clear examples and it also allows her to make the case for comparative analysis. The comparative framework is useful, both showing the similar trends to what Bashevkin calls "the responsibility-obsessed duty state" (133) but also being very clear about the differences between the three cases.

The regret is simply that covering so much ground means that some of the material is not exploited to its full potential. There are only about 6 pages that describe the interview material with feminist and anti-poverty activists during the Chrétien period, obviously a very condensed analysis of the almost 40 interviews conducted with civil society activists. Given Bashevkin's argument that ideas count and that the continuation of repressive social policy reforms reflected the incapacity of progressive civil society organizations to influence the universe of political discourse, one wishes there had been more analysis of the strategies attempted. Were alternate discourses tried in any of the three cases with differing levels of success? We know some of the worst and best examples at the provincial level but what about the American states? And do any of the sub-national examples illustrate patterns of civil society organizing that might explain the ways in which alternative discourses can be made more effective.

Bashevkin's book is particularly pertinent at the present time with the new federal government arguing that it intends to do something about child poverty and the urban Aboriginal condition and with the Ontario Liberals replacing Ernie Eves and the Mike Harris heritage. One lesson from this book seems to me to be that we should be worried and that it is unlikely that we will see truly progressive social policy coming either from the federal or the Ontario governments. But perhaps the more optimistic lesson would be to emphasize the importance Sylvia Bashevkin accords to civil society in articulating explanations for social problems. Social policy reform is often written about through a rather technical expert lens; Sylvia Bashevkin's book places it in its political context and she strongly argues that one of the major jobs for politics now is to rearticulate collective responsibility. Otherwise, progressives may continue to be disappointed by the post-post conservatives as much as by those original electoral victories of the conservatives.

CAROLINE ANDREW *University of Ottawa*

### **Imagining Interest in Political Thought: Origins of Economic Rationality**

Stephen G. Engelmann

Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003, pp. x, 194

This always fascinating but sometimes frustrating volume undertakes to trace the natural history of what its author calls *neo-liberalism*, meaning the kind of economic analysis and approach to governance practiced by such denizens of the Chicago school as Nobel Prize winner Gary Becker and appeals court Justice Richard Posner. A professor at the University of Illinois in Chicago, Engelmann contends that this mode of

analysis grew out of a way of thinking that was brought to maturity by Jeremy Bentham but had already begun to take root in Cromwell's England.

Professor Engelmann, who reads Bentham using the methods of Michel Foucault, fascinates by offering new interpretations of old texts but frustrates by stating his readings in the jargon of post-modern abstraction and reification. Thus, the thought of Bentham, a stickler for precision and clarity, is presented in the allusive and elusive manner favored by the man that Jacques Derrida, of all persons, once accused of *obscurantisme terroriste*. Despite this, the treatment is not only original but also informative and illuminating.

Engelmann begins by denying that Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Hume had the concept he sometimes calls *monistic interest*, at other times simply *interest*. As Engelmann puts it, these were not "philosopher[s] of monistic interest" (26) but "theorists of passion," (27) by which he means that they understood reason as merely an instrument for calculating means to antecedently given and largely fixed ends. By contrast, the economic rationality favored by neo-liberals involves asking not only whether changeable ends are wanted but also whether they are worthwhile. When these are the ends of a single person, we speak of his self-interest; when they are the ends of a social group, we speak of the public interest.

Engelmann sees a precedent for the idea of monistic interest in Lord Shaftesbury, who was the first to think of society as a grand economy; and, before that, in talk by Cardinal Richelieu about interest (or reason) of state, which was distinct from the interests and reasons of rulers. For other precursors we are treated to learned discussions of Justus Lipsius, Thomas Mun, Henri Duc de Rohan, John Goodwin, and James Harrington. Once Engelmann starts looking backwards, he sees even more rudimentary forms of the concept in Richard Hooker's theological jurisprudence, which set the stage for Cromwellian identification of the common interest with the will of God as revealed by conscience, at the time another name for reason or prudence.

Although he dwells on these historical antecedents with erudite care, Engelmann emphasizes that it was Bentham who secularized the concept of interest and articulated the economic understanding of political rationality that goes with it. So, the heart of his book is a chapter on Bentham. In it Engelmann argues that "In [Bentham's work] interest is already and always the work of a [political] regime" (49). Therefore, it concerns not an individual person but a community, a fictitious entity constructed by summing the diverse interests of many individual persons, whose separate interests are conceived not as things to be observed and described but as futures to be imagined and manufactured in the context of some social and legal order. Although Bentham declared pleasure and pain to be the sovereign masters of mankind, he emphasized that what motivates men is not so much present as prospective—that is, imagined or anticipated—pleasure and pain. In a Foucauldian phrase, Engelmann describes this shift from felt to imaginative pleasure and pain as "Bentham's foregrounding of and retreat from viscerality" (54). The language is opaque, but the thesis seems right. I think it is a useful addition to commentary on Bentham.

Engelmann's final chapter, the briefest in his book, closes his case by making two worthwhile points. One concerns Gary Becker, about whom Engelmann says, "for Becker, as for Bentham, every question is, in a sense, an economic one" (146). The other point concerns Richard Posner, a legal pragmatist who thinks the judge's job is to correct the legislature's tendency to favor special interests. Although Bentham, a legal positivist, disapproved of judge-made law, his desire to serve the common good is one that Posner shares. Still, Engelmann sees a significant narrowing in the meaning of utility when it is translated into the terminology of modern economics.

Engelmann does not so much seek to evaluate the questionable concept of monistic interest as to show what it is and how it works. His stance throughout is that of a

disinterested naturalist putting specimens of political ideology under the microscope for a closer look, in order to understand their origin and development. Everything considered, I think he succeeds.

MAX O. HOCUTT *University of Alabama*

### **The Logic of Political Survival**

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow  
Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 2003, pp. xiii, 536

*The Logic of Political Survival* is much more than its title suggests. Its main focus is certainly on the survival of political leaders, but its embrace extends to economic development, nation-building, democratization, war and peace, protest, civil war, and revolution. All of these topics are subsumed under a single theory that is elaborated formally and validated through a truly gargantuan exercise in data analysis. It is, without doubt, an extraordinary attempt to answer some very big questions.

For those who are not hardcore game theorists, non-cooperative models can generally be sorted into two categories: those that are too complex to be believable and those that are too simple to be believable. If the formal model proposed in this study errs, it errs in favour of simplicity. In the model, outcomes are determined by an institutional set-up that consists essentially of two components: the winning coalition and the “selectorate.” All rulers require a winning coalition to gain and hold political power, but the size of that coalition can vary enormously. In a dictatorship, the ruler may be sustained by a mere handful of citizens, but acquiring power in a democracy can (but need not) require the support of half the citizenry. The selectorate is the slice of society from which the winning coalition is drawn; it, too, can vary greatly—from a single individual or family to virtually all adult citizens.

What drives the model’s predictions is the premise that the manner in which the winning coalition’s support is maintained varies according both to its size and to that of the selectorate. Where the winning coalition is small, support can best be maintained by directing private goods to its members; the outcome is corruption, poverty, and slow growth. Kleptocracy is facilitated when a small ruling coalition is coupled with a large selectorate: a larger choice of replacements lowers the price that must be paid to current winning coalition members and therefore increases the amount that is left over for the ruler’s own benefit. The flip side of this dismal picture is that as the size of the winning coalition becomes larger, each member’s share of private goods becomes smaller and his or her interests increasingly become better served by the provision of public goods. From this prioritization of public goods flows all the benefits characteristic of the developed world: greater wealth, higher growth, more civil liberties, better provision of health care education, higher levels of social equality—just about everything, in fact, but enhanced political survival for rulers (since their support is based on providing public goods, they cannot buy their way to longevity).

What is conspicuously absent from the theory is any notion of the role of values or norms (apart from that of material advantage). The only norm that figures in the formal modelling is the “loyalty norm,” but this is not a norm any culturalist would recognize. It simply refers to the implication that members of the current ruler’s winning coalition are likely to be especially loyal when their odds of being included in the next ruler’s winning coalition are low. Otherwise, cultural traits play no role at all: leaders never care for the welfare of their countries; supporters believe in nothing but the size of the wallets; democratic regimes spread democracy only when it is in their material interest to do so. Even the so-called “democratic peace” is maintained by the realization that other democratic rulers have a strong incentive to fight back with great determination, not by any commitment to pacific values as such.

The simplicity of the model has one paramount virtue: unlike many non-cooperative models, it is actually possible to believe that political actors could function in (rough) accordance with it. But this virtue may also be seen as its undoing: do we really need an equilibrium and its accompanying mathematical paraphernalia when the essence of the model is simply that rulers' best strategy is to divide government expenditures between public and private goods according to the size of their winning coalitions? In fact, there are some less-than-obvious model implications, the most notable being the asymmetric and non-monotonic relationship between the welfare of members of the winning coalition and the size of that coalition, which is used to explain the relative stability of democratic regimes. Nonetheless, most of the extensive testing goes to sustain the basic intuition, not the more specific assumptions and implications of the model.

Some of the testing, moreover, seems quite perverse. A good example is the theory's answer to which form of democracy, presidentialism or parliamentarism, is superior. Since the winning coalition in parliamentary systems can be small (especially in single-member plurality systems, where parliamentary majorities can rest on relatively small vote pluralities), these systems should tax more, experience more corruption, provide fewer public goods (including civil and political rights), and so forth. The empirical analyses supporting this conclusion will not be convincing to comparativists who know that tax levels in developed parliamentary systems are higher than in the U.S in order to sustain larger welfare systems, promote greater social equality, and achieve longer life-spans—not because more resources are diverted into corruption and kleptocracy. In fact, the authors' Hobbes index (which measures how short, nasty, solitary, poor, and brutish life is in the world's countries) is dominated at its good end by this group of countries, including most of its single-member plurality systems.

This is not the only place where perversity rears its head. The mantra (their term) that "good policy is bad politics and bad policy is good politics for small-coalition leaders" (325) is sustained by evidence that economic growth sustains leader survival less, and black markets sustain it more, in small-coalition (i.e., non-democratic) systems; however, the conclusion appears to rest upon interaction terms that are insignificant (306). Another depressing conclusion which will raise doubts is that big-coalition countries, despite their democratic commitments, prefer to install small-coalition governments in the countries they defeat; here, the evidence is simply very thin (e.g., 452). Other findings are not perverse but may be questioned all the same. For instance, the conclusion that anti-government action and violent action occur more often in richer small-coalition systems, consistent with the theory, is not supported by the evidence as presented (393). The relevant findings in the "Big Action" model are internally inconsistent, while the evidence for the "Action" model actually suggests that anti-government action in question is more likely to occur in richer, big-coalition systems.

These problems must, however, be taken in context. Given the massiveness of the data analysis undertaken in this study, it is only to be expected that occasionally fails to convince. The basic thrust of this approach, if not the models' specifics, appears to be strongly supported by the evidence and the questions it poses for democratic theory and international relations are fundamental and disturbing. If this thrust is right, the policies Western nations currently advocate and the aid they currently give serves only to sustain "venal, greedy, corrupt, rent-seeking governance" (485). To argue that things could be otherwise is to undercut the theory, but it is a step the authors are willing to embrace in an impassioned final chapter that proposes a provocative new foreign policy agenda for the Western world. This agenda is one which scholars and leaders alike would do well to consider carefully.

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**Breve histoire philosophique de l'Union soviétique**

Fabrice Bouthillon

Paris : Plon/Commentaire, 2003, 195 p.

Ce petit ouvrage au titre intrigant est iconoclaste sous plus d'un rapport. L'auteur l'a élaboré « en dépit de toutes les règles du bon sens universitaire » (15): ne sachant pas un mot de russe, il en a forgé les idées dans un cours de premier cycle (plutôt que dans des séminaires d'études supérieures ou dans des colloques spécialisés) et l'a écrit à Brest (plutôt qu'à Paris, seule ville de France où l'on pense sérieusement, comme chacun sait). Défenseur, comme l'indique le titre de l'ouvrage, d'une « histoire philosophique », c'est-à-dire d'une histoire qui cherche à conceptualiser l'événement à mesure qu'en est exposée la trame, l'auteur n'hésite pas, en outre, à puiser dans l'héritage plus que suspect de la tradition contre-révolutionnaire (Burke, Bonald, Maistre), laquelle insiste sur l'antériorité et la pesanteur des structures dans lesquelles sont enracinés les individus (histoire ou langue). Il en résulte un ouvrage éblouissant d'intelligence et d'une ironie mordante—chose rare dans une université où, comme le relève l'auteur, règne souvent un « ennui lourd, massif, profond » (11).

La thèse principale exposée par Fabrice Bouthillon, comme cela arrive fréquemment dans le cas d'un véritable exercice de pensée, est fort simple. Tout tient à ce qu'il appelle le « sublime du soviétique ». Une société, quelle qu'elle soit, repose sur un contrat social. Cette notion ne doit pas s'entendre au sens du libéralisme; elle indique plutôt que les institutions et les mœurs font l'objet d'une mise en partage plus ou moins consensuelle entre les habitants de la cité (même s'il peut y avoir des débats ou des conflits autour de leur signification). Ainsi qu'Aristote l'a indiqué l'un des premiers, « avoir de telles notions en commun [la perception du bien, du mal, du juste, de l'injuste et des autres notions de ce genre] c'est ce qui fait une famille et une cité » (Aristote, *Les politiques*, 1253a –trad. de Pierre Pellegrin, Paris, Garnier-Flammarion, 1990, p. 92). Or l'ère moderne est périodiquement le théâtre de situations où le « corps politique anciennement constitué vient à implorer » (10) et où, en même temps, les individus par là rendus à la liberté s'assemblent pour discuter d'un nouvel ordre à fonder. Ces épisodes révolutionnaires donnent tous invariablement naissance à des soviets, qui ne désignent pas seulement pour l'auteur les assemblées apparues en Russie en 1905 et 1917, mais plutôt toutes les assemblées qui visent la refondation de la société (ainsi, « la Constituante fut un soviétique »—25). Le soviétique peut donc être défini comme « l'exercice immédiat de la souveraineté du peuple », de telle sorte que sa « traduction exacte » devrait être « purement et simplement démocratie » (20, 23). Dans un soviétique, la parole et la pensée sont censées être entièrement libres, elles se déploient en dehors de tout ancrage, de tout enracinement dans une tradition qui les enserme ou les étouffe. La logorrhée des orateurs n'est que la manifestation de la raison qui s'exerce à tout repenser selon la justice et le bien. Mais tout cela n'est vrai qu'en principe. Car en réalité, dans un soviétique, « il n'y [a] plus ni pouvoir, ni peuple » (27). Il n'y a plus de peuple car il n'y a plus de contrat social; il ne reste que des individus, qui, quand ils sont assemblés, ne forment plus qu'une masse, un *ochlos* comme disaient les Grecs. Par conséquent, il n'y a plus de pouvoir: dans la mesure où il suppose l'autorité, c'est-à-dire la capacité d'être obéi sans recours direct à la contrainte, le pouvoir est en effet dissous du fait que la fin du contrat social marque la fin de toute légitimité: « s'il n'y a plus aucun pacte qui vaille, il n'y a plus non plus pour personne aucune raison d'obéir » (28). Le soviétique se révèle ainsi anarchie.

Ce sont ces traits propres au soviétique qui suscitent le « sentiment du sublime » (Kant, Burke) et qui font inmanquablement émerger une Gauche et une Droite, selon l'auteur. Le sentiment du sublime tient au rappel de la « différence entre la capacité bornée de notre sensibilité et celle de notre esprit qui est illimitée » (29). Notre fini-

tude nous empêche de faire directement l'expérience de la totalité du cosmos ou de l'immensité de l'océan, par exemple, mais cela ne nous empêche pas d'avoir un sens de l'infinitude qu'ils incarnent et qui dépasse toute capacité de représentation (on ne peut que se forger à leur sujet l'idée d'un « tout autre »). Si le soviétique suscite pareillement le sentiment du sublime, c'est qu'il place soudain les individus devant le vertige de la « liberté absolue » (30), c'est qu'il fait miroiter devant eux la possibilité d'être comme des dieux, de se faire « cause de soi », commencement absolu d'eux-mêmes, refondation à neuf de l'ordre social et politique à partir du seul exercice de la raison. Rousseau ne disait-il pas que la démocratie ne convenait qu'aux dieux (*Du contrat social*, Livre III, ch. III, Paris, Garnier-Flammarion, 1966, p. 106)? La Gauche est par définition maximaliste (au moins à sa naissance): elle refuse toute stabilisation de l'ordre puisque la raison ne cesse jamais de faire comparaître devant le tribunal qu'elle incarne les institutions et les mœurs qu'on cherche péniblement à recomposer et qui ne réussissent jamais à ses yeux à réaliser pleinement la liberté, la justice et le bien. La Droite, à l'inverse, oppose au vertige de la parole qui s'épuise à chercher un fondement ultime et qui ne découvre qu'un abîme sans fond, la valeur de ce que l'auteur appelle le « local », c'est-à-dire le particulier, la tradition. À l'esprit libre, elle oppose le corps, ses ancrages, ses pesanteurs, ses enracinements. Elle ne peut ainsi que s'opposer dans un combat à mort à la Gauche pour restaurer ce qui a été perdu et dont l'absence désoriente, selon elle, les individus. La logique du soviétique contient ainsi en elle la potentialité de la guerre civile.

Une telle analyse ne conduit à aucune morale du type « il faut être contre-révolutionnaire », « la révolution est toujours un échec », etc. Elle évoque plutôt d'abord une anthropologie, Gauche et Droite logeant en définitive en chacun: « En chaque homme, il y a l'ouverture sur l'universel que lui procure sa raison, mais il n'est homme, et non pas pur esprit, que parce que cette ouverture s'opère à travers la dimension locale que lui confère le corps qui se situe *hic et nunc*, dans un lieu et un temps que nul n'occupera à sa place » (110). De telles formulations renvoient, on l'aura compris, à l'héritage du christianisme, qui lie indissolublement la chair et l'esprit—le « Verbe s'est fait chair » (*Jean*, 1;14)—tout en les opposant (113).

Le christianisme doit d'ailleurs être compris comme une tentative, non d'harmoniser dans une synthèse (cela est impossible, la tension est irréductible), mais de réaliser une sorte d'équilibre entre le Verbe (la raison) et la chair (le corps, les lieux, le temps). Par définition, de tels équilibres sont instables, même si ceux qui les prouvent aiment les croire définitifs. Le totalitarisme s'inscrit dans la longue histoire de la recherche de tels équilibres entre l'esprit et le corps—entre la Gauche et la Droite. Lénine n'est pas le père fondateur du régime totalitaire soviétique, comme on le dit très souvent maintenant. Les dernières années de sa vie le montrent plutôt douloureusement conscient de la déchirure entre, d'un côté, la représentation d'une liberté absolue qui nourrit la volonté du Parti de modeler la société et, de l'autre, la pesanteur du local, sous la forme, de l'« impensé le plus radical », de la Gauche et du marxisme, soit la nation (c'est à propos de l'affaire de Géorgie que Lénine chercha en 1923 à constituer une coalition avec Trotsky contre Staline, qui ne réussit cependant pas). Le totalitarisme en U.R.S.S. naît plutôt avec Staline, dont la formule « le socialisme dans un seul pays » indique bien la volonté de trouver un équilibre stable entre le local et l'universel (en ce sens, le totalitarisme est, bizarrement peut-être, un « centrisme »—112–113). Ce qui distingue l'entreprise de Staline des tentatives antérieures de conciliation des contraires, c'est que Staline croit qu'il revient à la volonté de réaliser cet équilibre en « moulant » la totalité du tissu social (institutions et mœurs), considéré comme un matériau entièrement plastique (Mao dira plus tard que la Chine est une « page blanche »). Le totalitarisme, en définitive, prétend ainsi « rien de moins qu'à s'élever au divin » (125), en refondant un « homme nouveau », une humanité « une » par delà les déchirements entre Gauche et Droite.

Régime fragile, contrairement aux apparences, le totalitarisme ne peut, par définition, admettre le moindre déchirement et c'est pourquoi la volonté s'y incarne dans un seul homme. Le « petit père des peuples » mort, le régime commence d'ailleurs à vaciller presque immédiatement (révolte de Berlin-Est, 1953). Mais il a aussi fallu que des hommes de l'intérieur agissent. Avant Gorbatchev, il y eut Khrouchtchev. Figure énigmatique, assez oubliée maintenant, qu'on a peu étudiée pour elle-même, selon F. Bouthillon. À la fois homme d'appareil, compromis autant qu'on voudra avec le stalinisme, Khrouchtchev est aussi une sorte de « rebelle » —mais au sens, il faut le préciser pour éviter l'équivoque, d'Ernst Jünger (*Traité du rebelle, ou le recours aux forêts*, Paris, Seuil, 1986). Le rebelle est celui qui, sans être croyant (peut-être simplement parce qu'il a vu trop de choses déplaisantes), se plie à la volonté du maître tant qu'il le faut (« Quand Staline dit *Danse!*, le sage danse », écrit Khrouchtchev dans ses *Souvenirs*) tout en conservant intacte en lui la possibilité d'une parole qui, soudain, déchire le voile. Même s'il n'a rien d'un philosophe ou d'un « grand homme », en disant au XXe Congrès que Staline voulait le bien de son peuple mais lui avait fait un mal incommensurable et en concluant que « là [...] réside la tragédie » (159), Khrouchtchev envoie (quasi-innocemment) toute la dialectique de l'histoire dans le mur. Il n'y a en effet aucune conciliation possible entre le tragique et la philosophie de l'histoire marxiste pour laquelle les événements les plus sanglants prennent un sens après-coup, comme des moments de l'avènement du bien. Après Khrouchtchev, c'est fini, l'effondrement du régime, sans être programmé, est un possible que rappelle sans cesse la brèche ouverte en 1956. Brejnev et consorts ne parleront pas la langue de bois pour rien, c'est la seule qui leur reste.

Il y a trop peu de livres comme celui de F. Bouthillon. L'univers de la subvention de recherche et de la carrière programmée se prête mal à l'audace. Il en faut beaucoup, à l'ère où la démocratie fait l'objet du consensus que l'on sait, pour la présenter comme une visée de l'impossible (l'autofondation)—comme, disons-le, un fantasme. Il en faut aussi pas mal pour proposer à la fois une anthropologie et une esquisse de philosophie politique qui s'ancrent, même si ce n'est que médiatement, dans une partie de la tradition contre-révolutionnaire (on aime mieux oublier aujourd'hui que Bonald et compagnie ont été très importants dans la naissance de la sociologie au XIXe siècle—et donc, par extension, de toutes les sciences sociales) et dans l'héritage chrétien (le rapport entre le Verbe et la chair). Mais par delà l'audace, ce qu'il faut peut-être surtout relever est que le livre de F. Bouthillon fait penser; dans l'université d'aujourd'hui, ce n'est tout de même pas si courant.

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### **Regionalism in a Global Society: Persistence and Change in Atlantic Canada and New England**

Stephen G. Tomblin and Charles S. Colgan, eds.  
Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2004, pp. 333

Perceived economic globalization and Europe's progressive supranationalism have inspired a regional politics growth industry, centred on Europe, which addresses how regions increasingly form and operate trans-border institutions. Defining regionalism as the creation of new partnerships or regions across jurisdictions, Memorial University's Stephen Tomblin describes this book's thirteen essays, divided almost evenly between Canadian and American scholars, as an effort to overcome the lack of substantial research on North America's cross-border regions (8). The book will satisfy most readers seeking an update on the slowly growing regional initiatives *inside* the Atlantic region (only sometimes including Newfoundland) and the states of New

England. But as the book's contributors make clear, for all the ever-increasing trans-border truck crossings and energy sales, most recently for Sable Island gas, institutional cooperation *between* these provinces and states remains limited.

Tomblin's Introduction and the concluding chapter by co-editor Charles Colgan of the University of Southern Maine present the argument clearly. The familiar European-influenced finding of functional cooperation that inspires spillover, eventually leading to institutional change and the removal of barriers, must yield, at least for the foreseeable future in this corner of North America, to a state-centred institutionalism emphasizing the resilience of established federal, provincial, state, and local government institutions (293–4). We find scant support for Joel Garreau's 1981 prediction that the cross-border regional cultures in the "nine nations of North America" would soon pursue economic and political unity, or for Thomas Courchene's "glocalization" trend in which a global economy promotes restructuring and regionalization, not to mention Kenichi Ohmae's globalization-inspired "invisible continent" that can undermine national sovereignty and eventually make borders obsolete (98–9, 19, 246).

Nearly all of the contributors concentrate on their own side of the clearly still formidable border. Most describe often frustratingly slow progress in securing support across provincial or state boundaries for joint economic, educational, and environmental initiatives. To be sure, small victories have been won, as through the Maritime Provinces Higher Education Commission (MPHEC) and the New England Board of Higher Education (NEBHE). These regional bodies have overcome embedded resistance sufficiently to instill some regional consciousness if not regional coordination of public university systems. Writing on Maritime universities, David M. Cameron observes that provincial governments' structures and politicians' jealous safeguarding of their own power do not easily accommodate regional interests (214). Cameron does not expect the further pooling of resources that could enhance the region's competitiveness (218). South of the border, things are much the same. Robert L. Woodbury and John O. Harney believe a history of competition and bickering, plus a pervasive localism, preclude a sense of New England solidarity and common purpose in operating the region's public universities and much else besides (222, 241).

Perhaps at one time Atlantic provincialism and New England localism were affordable indulgences. No more. Sounding like Stephen Harper, Donald Savoie warns that the writing is on the wall for federal largess in his region. With Ottawa progressively and inexorably cutting back its subsidization, regional leaders must undertake initiatives for closer inter-provincial cooperation. Savoie urges his fellow Maritimers to recognize that the emerging north-south North American economy requires their region to "untie its economic boat" from its dependency on Ottawa and join the global economy (124). Unlike Harper, Savoie avoids the word "dependency," but his message is clear—or it should be. Similarly, Woodbury and Harney note New England's steady loss of policymaking influence in Washington to the Sun Belt. They propose that New Englanders set aside their particularisms and undertake more shared endeavours (243). Even if leaders on both sides of the border unexpectedly take this advice, however, they may perceive little incentive to coordinate policies across the international boundary.

The contributors offer diverse reasons for perpetuated particularisms and for the lack of cross-border coordination. Robert Finbow notes that globalization strengthens local identities to compensate for the growing role of distant unaccountable forces (167). Charles H.W. Foster calls New Englanders cautious about change and hard to convince that change is desirable. Moreover, Americans remain willfully ignorant of Canada (274, 286). Comparing cross-border environmental policies, Rod Bantjes maintains that nongovernmental organizations actively and successfully lobby New England's local governments. By contrast, in Atlantic Canada they fare so poorly at local and provincial levels, at least on this issue, that they direct most of their atten-

tion to Ottawa (262–9). Tomblin notes that finding common cause is difficult in the absence of a regional agenda inside these regions or across the border. Continuing cultural, institutional, and policy differences between states and provinces also complicate cooperation. Tomblin expects both sides of the border to maintain the status quo as long as they believe it is viable (99–100). Besides, Roger Gibbins notes that the two federal governments continue to guard their powers jealously. Initiatives for cross-border integration can succeed only when pursued incrementally, even by stealth, to keep from alarming the authorities in Ottawa and Washington (54). Perhaps so, but Ottawa and Washington may have little cause for concern for quite some time.

These points are valid, but there is more to consider. New England and Atlantic Canada may be too similar; too often they find themselves competing for the same tourism, potatoes, lumber and fishing markets. Besides, neither region is a coherent unit. For one thing, while the book generally focuses on the whole six-state region, Canadians must contend with two New Englands. The 85% of New Englanders and their governments located outside Maine and Vermont have fully integrated into the Boston-to-Washington Megalopolis. They look southward and have limited interest in Canada. Equally consequential are the still-developing effects of September 11, 2001 on the border and on attitudes about cross-border initiatives. The book all but ignores September 11, whose impact may help perpetuate a sense of separateness on both sides of the border. Anecdotal reports, letters to the editor, and newspaper columns on border crossing delays and annoyances have induced many residents of the area, as well as potential cross-border investors, to perceive a progressively tightening border. Atlantic Canadians and (especially northern) New Englanders already tend towards risk aversion, acceptance of things as they are, and a localistic “sense of place”; for generations, more dynamic regions to the west and south have lured away aggressive risk-takers and enthusiasts for change and experiment. Perceived momentum is key here: if uncertainty and unpredictability-averse residents believe the border is tightening, they will conduct a hardheaded cost-benefit analysis and minimize their need to cross it. In this way September 11’s North American legacy may impose a momentum that takes a direction different from the European Union’s Schengen-facilitated “Europe of the regions.”

Evidence from this book and elsewhere suggests that state-centred and institutional characteristics, distinct political cultures, persistent particularisms, and externally imposed circumstances can hold off economic and functional integration, perhaps indefinitely. New trans-border integrative initiatives will proceed, but only for compelling reasons. As Colgan notes in his concluding chapter on the future, well established mutually beneficial cooperation, as on energy and the environment, will endure not because of a cross-border regional identity, or in pursuit of greater regional integration, but purely for practical mutual advantage (301). Perhaps above all this book helps us appreciate the possibilities and limits of cross-border integration in a region whose experience the literatures on globalization and integration would do well to absorb and accommodate.

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### **Social-démocratie et mouvements ouvriers : la fin de l’histoire?**

Serge Denis

Montréal : Les éditions Boréal, 2003, 226p.

Peu importe le pays, la relation entre le mouvement ouvrier et les partis sociaux-démocrates est en crise. Ces derniers ont cessé de promouvoir les revendications du mouvement ouvrier et ont coupé les ponts avec leur base. Ce constat est au cœur de ce livre qui débute avec le fameux « *winter of discontent* » britannique de 1978–79.

Les récentes décisions de certains partis sociaux-démocrates confirment que la tendance se maintient. Serge Denis, auteur de plusieurs ouvrages sur le syndicalisme, analyse la métamorphose des partis sociaux-démocrates telle qu'elle est vécue par les mouvements ouvriers.

L'importance d'un ouvrage intellectuel peut se mesurer de plusieurs façons. Certains génèrent des contributions théoriques innovantes, tandis que d'autres soulèvent des questions pertinentes sur les phénomènes sociaux. L'ouvrage de Serge Denis est intéressant parce qu'il souligne les difficultés du mouvement ouvrier à « retrouver » un mouvement politique et nous invite à questionner l'avenir et le programme idéologique et politique des partis sociaux-démocrates. Le point fort de ce livre est son ambition de présenter une évolution comparative des mouvements ouvriers. L'Allemagne, le Canada, les États-Unis, la France, le Royaume-Uni et la Suède sont parmi les pays étudiés. Contrairement aux ouvrages qui consacrent un chapitre à chaque pays, celui-ci nous présente une analyse comparative du début à la fin. L'approche utilisée par l'auteur a un seul défaut : les cas qui ne supportent pas ses hypothèses ne sont pas discutés. Il donne, par exemple, les cas des partis travaillistes néo-zélandais et britannique comme preuve que le mouvement ouvrier a « perdu » son parti, mais il ne mentionne pas qu'en Suède les syndicats exercent toujours une influence non négligeable sur le parti social-démocrate. Ce type d'omission tient probablement au fait que l'argument principal est formulé de façon à s'appliquer à tous les pays étudiés.

Malgré une problématique contemporaine évidente, l'auteur présente l'évolution historique de la relation politique entre la social-démocratie et les mouvements ouvriers. Ce mariage a grandement aidé la classe ouvrière de plusieurs pays occidentaux du point de vue tant politique que social. La majeure partie de l'ouvrage est en fait une analyse historique de l'évolution de la relation entre les mouvements ouvriers et les partis sociaux-démocrates. L'auteur démontre de façon convaincante que la place du mouvement ouvrier a toujours été prédominante dans l'évolution des partis sociaux-démocrates qui ont, dans la majorité des cas, été créés de toutes pièces par le mouvement ouvrier.

Parmi les questions fondamentales que soulève cet ouvrage, permettez-moi d'en mentionner trois. Premièrement, l'auteur avance que tous les partis sociaux-démocrates de la planète ont choisi d'épouser les politiques néo-libérales qui furent traditionnellement associées à la droite (p. 87–92). La question clé est de déterminer s'il y a des différences programmatiques majeures entre la droite et la gauche. Cet ouvrage affirme clairement qu'il n'y en a plus et que les partis sociaux-démocrates ont été dénaturalisés (p. 148–156). L'argument avancé par l'auteur va à l'encontre d'articles récents tels que celui de Korpi et Palme<sup>1</sup>, pour ne citer que celui-là, qui conclut que l'opposition subsiste entre les gouvernements de gauche et de droite en ce qui concerne leurs actions vis-à-vis de l'État providence.

Deuxièmement, quel est l'avenir (politique) du mouvement ouvrier? Malheureusement, l'auteur aborde cette question tardivement. Néanmoins, il propose quelques pistes intéressantes, dont la transformation du mouvement en intérêts particularistes et la reconstruction d'un nouveau mouvement incluant « comme ensemble social les ouvriers, salariés, démunis et non-propriétaires dans les disputes de pouvoir » (p. 159). Bien que le parti travailliste brésilien corresponde à cette image (172–77), il semble suivre les traces des autres partis de gauche en adoptant les politiques néo-libérales du Fonds Monétaire International (FMI), ce qui a pour effet de détruire sa nouvelle

<sup>1</sup>Korpi, Walter, and Joakim Palme. "New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and Globalization: Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries, 1975–1995." *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (2003): 425–46.

identité sociale et politique. La question fondamentale demeure : est-ce que les mouvements ouvriers peuvent trouver une alternative viable aux partis sociaux-démocrates qui les ont désertés? Cela nous amène à identifier les « nouveaux » supporteurs des partis sociaux-démocrates. Étant donné que ceux-ci se sont dissociés de leur base, qui les supporte désormais? Est-ce que le nombre décroissant de cols bleus force les sociaux-démocrates à adopter une position plus centriste? En prétendant que la proportion des salariés demeure inchangée et que les syndicats servent toujours de véhicules clés pour faire des revendications (chapitre 3), l'auteur évite ces questions et affirme que les secteurs traditionnels, même en déclin, vont jouer un rôle primordial dans l'élaboration d'une nouvelle identité. La question est de savoir si ces nouveaux mouvements peuvent créer une coalition assez puissante pour déloger les partis traditionnels et obtenir un véritable pouvoir politique.

Troisièmement, cet ouvrage nous amène à réfléchir au rôle de l'État. Dans bien des cas, « l'échec programmatique » des partis sociaux-démocrates a été attribué à la mondialisation des marchés. En citant plusieurs exemples contemporains, comme l'expérience des gouvernements Rae en Ontario et Blair au Royaume-Uni, l'auteur démontre clairement que les valeurs de l'économie mixte ont été abandonnées. Selon lui, ce sont les sociaux-démocrates qui, sans l'ombre d'un doute, ont cessé d'écouter le mouvement ouvrier. Malheureusement, quoi qu'en dise la couverture, ce livre ne fournit pas de réponses convaincantes à la question suivante: comment se fait-il que « les partis sociaux-démocrates, une fois au pouvoir, ne défendent pas leur base naturelle et historique, la classe ouvrière? » Quelques pistes sont présentées pour éveiller notre appétit, dont une allusion à Mitchells, mais aucune ne réussit à nous rassasier.

En guise de conclusion à ce rapide survol, nous dirons que ce livre est instructif pour tout étudiant qui s'intéresse à l'évolution de la relation entre le mouvement ouvrier et les partis de gauche. Pour les néophytes de l'analyse du mouvement ouvrier, certains passages pourront être parfois difficiles, surtout parce que l'auteur fait de nombreux parallèles historiques avec le contexte actuel. C'est un ouvrage stimulant parce qu'il est d'une grande actualité et parce que l'auteur cherche à fournir une réponse globale aux défis que doivent relever les mouvements ouvriers et les partis sociaux-démocrates. La conclusion, avec une analyse centrée presque exclusivement sur l'échec de Jospin aux présidentielles de 2002, est quelque peu décevante pour un ouvrage comparatif de telle envergure surtout si l'on considère l'originalité du chapitre précédent.

PATRIK MARIER *Concordia University*

### **L'atelier de l'organisation. Un observatoire sur les changements dans les entreprises**

Bruno Maggi (sous la direction, 2001)  
Paris : L'Harmattan. 284 pages.

Cet ouvrage fort original est issu d'un séminaire que Bruno Maggi, professeur de théorie de l'organisation à la Faculté d'économie de l'université de Bologne, a organisé pendant une douzaine d'années à l'université de Bologne. Ce séminaire réunissait des praticiens d'entreprise et des chercheurs universitaires et constitue un observatoire tout à fait privilégié des changements survenus dans les entreprises, dont plusieurs très grandes entreprises publiques et privées : Ciba, FIAT, Fininvest, Mediaset, Iveco, RAS, Rinascente, Télécom, Zurigo. Au total, 78 rencontres ont été organisées et elles ont donné lieu à l'analyse de 92 cas.

L'ouvrage réunit une douzaine de textes provenant de praticiens d'entreprises et de spécialistes de l'organisation, qui cosignent des analyses sur les cas concrets de

certaines organisations. Chaque texte présente à la fois une étude approfondie d'un cas de changement, avec de nombreux détails, et une proposition d'outils intellectuels permettant d'analyser la réalité.

Parmi les sujets traités conjointement aux cas étudiés, on note la réorganisation de divisions d'entreprises, la « tertiarisation » de la société holding FIAT, l'externalisation, la gestion des effectifs, une analyse de l'approche intégrée organisation-systèmes chez Rinascente, un cas de réingénierie de processus chez Fiat Auto et un autre cas de réingénierie qui pose la question de la rationalisation ou de la redéfinition de l'activité. Un autre cas porte sur l'introduction du travail en équipe et de la qualité totale et aborde les défis que pose ce type de transformation dans l'organisation.

Il est évidemment difficile de résumer l'ouvrage puisque chaque cas soulève des enjeux précis, en regard d'un cas particulier. Son apport essentiel est de susciter des questions sur les cas examinés, d'inciter à une analyse approfondie du changement organisationnel, d'en illustrer les enjeux et les défis, ce qui peut être très utile pour l'analyse du changement organisationnel dans toute entreprise publique ou privée de quelque pays que ce soit. L'ouvrage est en effet suffisamment général pour dépasser largement la réalité italienne, que l'on ne fait que deviner en filigrane, mais qui ne détermine pas l'analyse.

Là où l'ouvrage innove, c'est en reprenant des discussions ou des notes de relecture possibles des cas; ceci contribue à en faire un excellent ouvrage pédagogique sur l'organisation et le changement organisationnel. À une époque où nombre d'organisations publiques et privées épousent ces formules ou projets que sont la réingénierie, l'externalisation ou la sous-traitance, il est fort intéressant de lire non seulement le point de vue des chercheurs, mais également celui des dirigeants de grandes entreprises eux-mêmes. Sur ce plan, la contribution du livre de Bruno Maggi est tout à fait essentielle.

L'ouvrage fait appel à diverses disciplines, dont la théorie de l'organisation, la sociologie du travail, l'économie du travail, l'économie politique, la gestion d'entreprise, ainsi que l'ergonomie.

Il s'adresse ainsi à la fois aux praticiens qui souhaitent mieux comprendre les situations auxquelles ils sont confrontés grâce à l'analyse de cas apparentés, et aux chercheurs, qui y trouveront des cas bien documentés qui soulèvent des interrogations présentant à la fois des enjeux théoriques et des enjeux professionnels et sociaux. Les étudiants s'intéresseront à l'exposé des évolutions en cours dans les organisations, notamment dans les organisations publiques, ainsi qu'aux excellents exemples de présentation d'études de cas détaillées.

DIANE-GABRIELLE TREMBLAY *Télé-Université*

### **International Environmental Policy: Interests and the Failure of the Kyoto Process**

Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen and Aynsley Kellow

Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002, pp. xi, 214

This valuable critique of climate change politics is written by two of its leading observers. The authors—who variously describe themselves as skeptical, dissident or agnostic about the scientific issues—acknowledge that their views on the process are controversial and unpopular. Why, they ask (1), was Kyoto so widely embraced? Unlike other complex international agreements, the Protocol has been iconized. To criticize it, they write, is to attack not only the “moral crusade” (104) of environmentalism but also the global development agenda (110). Behind the complaint is a well-crafted argument about the inadequacies of science as a guide to policy, and a detailed account of what they see as the politicization of climate science. The science, in sum, has

been “inescapably tied up with the play of interests from the outset,” and “reflects, rather than simply drives, politics” (6–7).

The case is directed more specifically against the processes of scientific consensus formation in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and the political use made of its findings by governments, NGOs and other players. The IPCC reached its conclusions in a process of “informed politics, not science” (118), or “manufacturing consensus” (161). The authors detect a “systematic bias” in the IPCC. Its link to the intergovernmental level as a result of the Framework Convention on Climate Change “created a strong pull on the kind of conclusions it was likely to produce” (118, 139). Thus the IPCC in its policy role became “a coalition of advocacy in favour of climate alarmism” (148). Some debate among scientists was allowed, but uncertainties in the science were downplayed, data which “appear[ed] to maximize rates of warming” were preferred, and the “negative impacts of any likely future warming” were emphasized (150, 159). On some points—such as the nature of the causal links between weather and the spread of disease—IPCC findings, they argue, were either simplistic or wrong (160–61).

This process has reflected the interests of end-users and clients. When the science enters their realm, they “strip away all caveats and quote the science selectively for political effect” (for example, by talking of IPCC “predictions” instead of “scenarios” or “projections”) (167).

The main suspects here are the more strident NGOs and the more moral-toned European states. Greenpeace is “a means by which an agenda reflecting Northern European values is prosecuted in international politics” (94). The interests of states, industry players and others drive the process. Behind the “high moral tone” of European climate change voices, and the one-world cosmopolitanism of the NGOs, can be found self-interest (51, 87), as in the political divisions over the issue of climate change base years. US and EU policy differences over Kyoto thus reflected the pursuit of interests grounded in differences in natural resource endowments. This logic applies too to industry actors such as the renewable-energy sector, coal, and the nuclear industry, and in the approaches of developing countries, for example in Costa Rica’s pursuit of credits for new forest carbon sink creation.

Much of this general point, that interests may be promoted and are sometimes hidden by moral claims, is of course not novel. That it is a provocative observation in the context of climate change debates also says something about these, as does the authors’ occasional use of the point to lodge a normative critique of pro-Kyoto actors. Did the various actors share this belief, and deploy ethical and policy arguments known by them to be scientifically groundless? This is not clear; and the authors also appear to suggest that at least some were deluded at least some of the time, taken in by the power of their own rhetoric. The protagonists were “essentially operating within different paradigms,” and the Kyoto process as a result had a “surreal” character (82–83). Some of this behaviour might be better accounted for by falling back on notions of enlightened or long-term self-interest, but this step the authors are reluctant to take. And while it is intuitively plausible that NGOs were influential, as opposed to merely noisy and visible, key questions—how influential, on what issues, and in what ways—are not pursued as far as they might be.

The authors rightly emphasise the uncertainties of climate science. The anti-anthropogenic thesis is strengthened by recent scientific findings based on Antarctic ice-core research, particularly on the geological history of warm inter-glacials and variations over time in greenhouse-gas levels, and cautious forecasts of climate stability over the next several thousand years (see *Nature*, 605, June 10, 2004, p. 611). The contending precautionary argument that stems from concerns over evidence of rising carbon dioxide and other gas levels finds little support in this study. The authors occasionally concede that the failings they observe may originate not so much in

policy-relevant science itself, as in the special features of the climate change issue. The ozone layer regime is generally regarded as successful on the criterion of the smooth translation of good science into sound policy. Boehmer-Christiansen and Kellow acknowledge other success stories, particularly the long-range transboundary air pollution (LRTAP) regime (17).

This fine analysis of the cleavages in climate change science and politics deserves to be widely read not only by fellow-members of the skeptical minority, but also by those sympathetic to the current consensus.

ROBERT BOARDMAN *Dalhousie University*

### **La politique étrangère des États-Unis. Fondements, acteurs, formulation**

Charles-Philippe David, Louis Balthazar et Justin Vaïsse

Paris : Presses de sciences po, 2003, 382 p.

Avec l'avènement de l'administration de George W. Bush et les suites des attentats de septembre 2001, l'étude de la politique étrangère des États-Unis, en langue française, connaît un dynamisme renouvelé. Plusieurs travaux récents, dont ceux de Jean-Yves Haine et de Sabine Lavorel respectivement sur la politique américaine face à l'Alliance atlantique et sur la formulation de la politique de sécurité nationale sous G.W. Bush, sont des exemples qui illustrent bien cette tendance.

Jusqu'à présent, il n'existait pas de véritable ouvrage d'introduction en langue française à la politique étrangère américaine comme ceux de Bruce Jentleson ou encore de Charles Kegley et Eugene Wittkopf. C'est donc l'objectif que se sont assigné les trois spécialistes canadiens et français de la politique américaine que sont Charles-Philippe David, Louis Balthazar et Justin Vaïsse. Ils ont chacun rédigé une des trois sections de l'ouvrage. La première section s'intéresse au contexte de la formulation de la politique étrangère et comporte quatre chapitres; trois ont été écrits par Louis Balthazar et le quatrième, par David Grondin. Le premier chapitre présente le cadre constitutionnel à partir de dimensions historiques et politiques. Ce chapitre explique que, contrairement à la politique interne, la politique étrangère américaine est « un mécanisme plus complexe, fondé sur la complémentarité du pouvoir exécutif et du pouvoir législatif (p. 23) ». Cet aspect ressort d'ailleurs à la lecture des trois sections. Le deuxième chapitre, qui est l'un des plus intéressants, dresse un portrait général du cadre culturel; autrement dit, du style national. Ici, Balthazar se propose d'identifier des éléments fondateurs du style national de nature historique et politique comme l'individualisme, l'isolationnisme et les tendances profondes du style national que sont, d'une part, la destinée manifeste—qui fait référence à certains éléments comme l'ethnocentrisme et le style paranoïaque développé, entre autres, par l'historien Richard Hofstadter—et, d'autre part, la pensée experte—c'est-à-dire la prédilection pour des solutions concrètes et immédiates. Ces divers éléments colorent la politique étrangère des États-Unis et permettent de mieux comprendre pourquoi, en général, celle-ci se campe dans le court terme et tend à être versatile, quelques fois contradictoire et souvent imprévisible (p. 65). Le chapitre suivant dresse un portrait des grands courants de pensée touchant la politique étrangère, en reprenant des aspects historiques comme les visions différentes d'Hamilton et de Jefferson sur ce sujet, et des réflexions plus contemporaines. Balthazar suggère de regrouper les visions de la politique étrangère des États-Unis dans les catégories suivantes : l'isolationnisme, l'idéalisme, le réalisme et l'internationalisme libéral. On remarquera que cette nomenclature de Balthazar est légèrement différente de celle que propose Justin Vaïsse dans des travaux antérieurs. Le dernier chapitre de cette première partie est écrit par David Grondin de la Chaire Raoul Dandurand de l'UQAM. Celui-ci dresse un panorama

des approches académiques de la politique étrangère américaine en donnant comme exemple des auteurs importants tels que Robert Kagan ou Joseph S. Nye.

La seconde partie est de la plume de Charles-Philippe David et s'intéresse au pouvoir exécutif comme noyau de l'action internationale des États-Unis. Dans le chapitre cinq, David brosse le tableau d'une présidence toujours impériale en proposant d'approfondir certaines dimensions déjà identifiées par Balthazar dans la première partie. Il présente de façon détaillée les pouvoirs qui font de la présidence le centre névralgique de la politique étrangère, tels que les pouvoirs de guerre du président. Il fait aussi un survol des variables importantes de l'approche décisionnelle du président pour la politique étrangère, à savoir le style présidentiel, qui renvoie à des travaux de psychologie politique rarement utilisés par les chercheurs francophones, et les systèmes de gestion, plus précisément la typologie développée par Alexander George. Le chapitre six analyse les principaux acteurs du jeu bureaucratique que sont le Département d'État, le Pentagone, les services de renseignement et le nouveau Département de la Sécurité intérieure (*Homeland Security*). David met en exergue les faiblesses du Département d'État et le rôle important joué par le Pentagone dans la formulation de la politique étrangère américaine. Il constate aussi l'influence de plus en plus grande des enjeux internes sur la politique étrangère de la première puissance du monde. Dans l'ensemble, David présente clairement les éléments importants de ces différents acteurs, sauf en ce qui concerne le Département de la Sécurité intérieure dont le tableau nous laisse sur notre faim. En effet, si le 11 septembre 2001 accélère la création de ce département, on doit rappeler que l'idée d'un tel ministère était dans l'air depuis quelques années et que l'administration de G.W. Bush était plutôt réticente au départ d'où la création du *Office of Homeland Security* et du *Council of Homeland Security* après les attentats de septembre 2001. Enfin, le chapitre sept qui clôt cette deuxième partie fournit une excellente introduction au fameux Conseil de sécurité nationale.

La troisième partie, enfin, est l'œuvre de l'historien français Justin Vaïsse, chercheur affilié au prestigieux *think tank* (groupe privé de recherche) américain *Brookings Institution* de Washington. Encore une fois, cette partie approfondit plusieurs aspects identifiés précédemment par Balthazar et aussi par David, en présentant le rôle du pouvoir législatif et le poids de la société civile dans la formulation de la politique étrangère. Chacun des chapitres porte sur une dimension particulière : le chapitre huit s'intéresse au rôle et aux pouvoirs du Congrès ; le chapitre neuf présente l'importance de l'opinion publique et le rôle des médias, tandis que le chapitre dix se penche sur le rôle unique au monde des *think tanks* américains dans les débats d'idées sur la politique étrangère et la défense nationale, ainsi que sur les divers groupes d'intérêts et leur influence sur la formulation de la politique étrangère. Vaïsse brosse un panorama très utile de ces groupes d'intérêts qui cherchent à influencer la politique étrangère de la première puissance du monde. Il souligne qu'à l'exception de quelques médias, l'Américain moyen n'est pas très bien au fait des grandes problématiques internationales. À l'instar de David dans la seconde partie, Vaïsse constate aussi que les enjeux internes se répercutent sur les considérations de politique étrangère au Congrès. Or, ces enjeux internes ont souvent des liens plutôt ténus avec les problématiques internationales. L'exemple, qui peut paraître anecdotique, de l'interdiction faite à *USAID* de participer à la reconstruction de maisons en Bosnie-Herzégovine parce qu'un sénateur craignait que les associations de sans abri de son État le lui reproche, est tout de même symptomatique ! La conclusion de l'ouvrage traite plus particulièrement de la politique étrangère de G.W. Bush dans le nouvel environnement stratégique découlant du 11 septembre 2001. Les auteurs cherchent à faire la part des tendances lourdes et des particularités de l'administration Bush dans la formulation de la politique étrangère actuelle. Enfin, il faut aussi souligner la présence d'une très utile bibliographie introductive aux thèmes contenus dans le livre.

Bien entendu, on peut relever, comme je l'ai fait d'ailleurs, des lacunes sur certains éléments qui auraient mérité un traitement plus approfondi ou encore des désaccords sur certains points. Toutefois, ceci n'enlève rien à l'excellent travail qu'ont réalisé les auteurs. Ils atteignent pleinement l'objectif qu'ils se sont fixé en introduction. Ce livre s'adresse donc à tous ceux et celles qui cherchent un manuel de référence et d'introduction, en langue française, sur la politique étrangère américaine. Il reste maintenant à espérer que la recherche et les travaux publiés sur la politique étrangère américaine, en langue française, continueront sur cette lancée et, qui sait, un ouvrage semblable verra peut-être le jour sur la politique étrangère canadienne cette fois...

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**L'administration publique. De L'École classique au nouveau management public**  
Jean Mercier

Québec, Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2002, 518 p.

Le livre de Jean Mercier, destiné à un public d'étudiants, est un manuel d'introduction assez exhaustif qui permet de s'initier à l'administration publique et d'en apprendre les principaux processus, structures et théories. L'auteur situe son ouvrage dans une perspective temporelle et offre ainsi au lecteur un large éventail de thèmes, de tendances et de théories qui touchent l'administration publique. Ses exemples, souvent tirés du secteur de l'environnement, reflètent les expériences québécoise, canadienne et internationale.

La présentation du volume est attrayante. Chaque chapitre est précédé d'une table des matières qui permet d'en comprendre d'emblée la structure. Le style est clair et la lecture est aisée. Si le contenu des chapitres, pris individuellement, couvre l'essentiel des thèmes relatifs à l'étude de l'administration publique, leur ordre est toutefois discutable; il a néanmoins le mérite de permettre une lecture non linéaire, selon le thème qui intéresse le lecteur. Les figures intégrées au texte servent d'illustration à la discussion et sont bien expliquées. Par ailleurs, le texte souffre quelquefois de redondance, en ce sens que l'auteur reprend des concepts vus dans les chapitres précédents et les explique à nouveau sous un nouvel angle. Cette façon de procéder donne parfois lieu à des explications morcelées et déroutantes pour un public inexpérimenté. De plus, certains mots auraient pu être définis à leur première mention dans le texte, procédé qui facilite toujours l'intégration de nombreux concepts présentés simultanément. Rappelons que l'on s'adresse à un public étudiant peu habitué au jargon de l'administration publique. Le livre est également ponctué d'énoncés généraux (« certaines formules... », « quelques types... », « plusieurs facteurs... », ...) qui ne sont pas nommés concrètement, ou d'idées insuffisamment soutenues pour comprendre vraiment l'intérêt qu'avait l'auteur à les ajouter.

Tablant sur la différence entre l'administration publique classique et le nouveau management public, l'auteur nous fait parcourir en douze chapitres les principaux fondements de l'administration publique (en tant que *lieu de pratiques administratives*) afin de mieux saisir les raisons d'être, les fins et les moyens de l'administration publique (en tant que *domaine d'étude*). Après une introduction générale aux contextes historique, économique, politique et constitutionnel qui façonneront l'administration publique, le deuxième chapitre met en lumière les apports disciplinaires et les cadres d'analyse les plus utilisés et se conclut sur l'historique de l'administration publique et de la théorie des organisations. Ce chapitre est un des plus intéressants à lire pour un public étudiant non initié ou pour profiter d'une synthèse très bien menée. On y fait un bon survol des principaux auteurs qui ont contribué à la discipline en soulignant les grandes approches et les cadres d'analyse qui sont le plus fréquemment utilisés. Soucieux de ne pas s'en tenir aux seuls auteurs

américains, Mercier brosse pour le lecteur un excellent aperçu de l'évolution de l'administration publique et de la théorie des organisations. La sous-section sur les *techniques (documentaires et vivantes)* en administration publique est toutefois trop peu développée pour éclairer le lecteur sur les méthodologies utilisées en administration publique. Cette partie aurait pu être plus étayée et facilement intégrée au chapitre 9 qui porte sur les méthodes de recherche en administration publique, ce qui aurait enrichi ce chapitre de méthodes autres que l'analyse comparative.

Les chapitres 3 à 7 constituent le cœur du livre et présentent les éléments opérationnels de l'administration publique. Bien que brève, la discussion présentée au chapitre 3 sur l'organisation administrative fait un tour assez complet des principales classifications administratives, lesquelles sont illustrées par des exemples tirés à la fois du secteur privé et du secteur public. Sans être le plus intéressant du volume, le chapitre 4, sur la fonction publique, offre au lecteur qui s'intéresse à l'aspect comparatif des diverses fonctions publiques, un survol général des particularités propres au Canada et au Québec, aux États-Unis, à la France et à la Grande-Bretagne. Le chapitre gagnerait toutefois à être divisé en thèmes précis (neutralité, expertise, professionnalisme, ...) à l'intérieur desquels une comparaison entre les diverses fonctions publiques choisies serait plus utile au lecteur. On notera aussi avec surprise la pauvreté de certaines descriptions, notamment celle des critères d'avancement dans la fonction publique au Canada. De plus, à une époque où l'administration publique s'évertue à proposer de nouvelles pratiques de gestion et des modes de contrôle inusités, il est surprenant que le thème de l'éthique et de ses codes soit exclu de la discussion. Il faudra attendre le chapitre 8 pour une brève discussion sur le sujet. Enfin, ce chapitre aurait dû être précédé du chapitre 11 consacré à l'évolution du phénomène bureaucratique.

Pour sa part, le chapitre 5 sur la prise de décision constitue un excellent résumé des modèles de processus décisionnels et du cycle administratif. Bien que chaque processus soit traité plutôt brièvement, les différences sont bien marquées et bien démontrées. Les chapitres 6 et 7 abordent les finances publiques et le contrôle administratif. Ils offrent une discussion assez classique et étayée du processus budgétaire et de la notion de *contrôle* en administration publique. Le chapitre 6 explore ce qu'est un budget, de ses caractéristiques à ses finalités. La section sur les types de budget met en relation les concepts de prise de décision *gradualiste* et *rationnelle* vus dans le chapitre précédent avec l'élaboration d'un budget et les techniques administratives et budgétaires qui y sont associées (analyse coûts-bénéfices, PPBS, MBO, BBZ). Le chapitre 7 présente, dans une perspective comparative, les différents types de contrôle exercés sur l'administration publique, et décrit à la fois les moyens existants et les instances impliquées.

Le chapitre 8 traite de l'environnement sociopolitique et des idées politiques. Ce chapitre aurait dû venir plus tôt dans la discussion (peu après l'introduction) puisqu'il pose un regard plus global sur l'interaction entre l'administration publique et son environnement. Le chapitre 10 aborde l'administration publique internationale et celle des pays en voie de développement, un ajout intéressant dans la ligne comparative de l'auteur. Enfin, le chapitre 12, chapitre de conclusion, se penche particulièrement sur le débat public-privé, à la lumière des thèmes abordés dans les chapitres précédents.

On pourrait reprocher à l'auteur d'avoir un biais *Public Choice* car il intègre régulièrement l'apport de cette école de pensée aux divers thèmes abordés. Il justifie indirectement sa position en notant qu'il s'est permis d'émettre ses opinions après avoir donné la parole aux avis contraires—ce qu'il fait effectivement. La principale critique tient plutôt au fait que cette approche ne soit pas définie a priori, mais que l'on en retrouve des détails, explications et définitions, parfois répétitives, tout au long des chapitres du livre. Il est évident que l'importance de cette école de pensée

n'est pas négligeable pour l'auteur, ce qui est légitime, mais le lecteur néophyte aura très certainement du mal à saisir ce qu'offre vraiment cette perspective. C'est au chapitre sur la prise de décision que Mercier s'y étend le plus. Le contraste avec les autres modèles de prise de décision est intéressant et pertinent pour comprendre les tendances managériales issues du nouveau management public. Toutefois, contrairement à ce qu'il laisse entendre, l'auteur n'explique pas pourquoi « il faut prendre ce mouvement au sérieux ». Il se contente d'un paragraphe sous la forme interrogative pour affirmer son importance, précisant que « *si on met de côté les aspects les plus discutables du Public Choice, sa confiance excessive dans les lois du marché, ses aspects idéologiques et son absence de perspective historique, ce mouvement est séduisant* ». Il est légitime de se demander ce qu'il reste du *Public Choice* après ces exclusions...

En conclusion, ces remarques n'enlèvent toutefois rien à la qualité et à l'ampleur de la tâche accomplie par l'auteur. Ce manuel est certainement une contribution francophone importante à l'administration publique et l'ouvrage atteint son but d'introduction à une science (ou un art ...) difficile à synthétiser de par sa complexité.

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### **Democracy, Human Rights, and Civil Society in South East Asia**

Amitav Acharya, B.M. Frolic and Richard Stubbs, eds.

Toronto: Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies, 2001, pp. 208

This is an important volume on the hotly debated topic of democracy, human rights and civil society in South East Asia, a region that has witnessed a confrontation between the old order of authoritarian regimes and strong states on one hand, and the new democratic forces embedded in an emerging civil society, on the other. The focus of the book is on the evolution of debates about democracy and human rights during the decade following the end of the Cold War in 1989 to the 1997–98 Asian economic crisis, with the latter being regarded as the watershed that unleashed the democratic forces. The book consists of nine chapters, plus an introduction and a conclusion, contributed by nine political scientists. Except for Johan Saravanamuttu, who is from the region under study, the other contributors are Southeast Asianists teaching at various universities in Canada, the United States, and Australia.

The book addresses three inter-related questions. First, whether economic growth would produce a momentum towards democracy and human rights, or would “performance legitimacy” of the developmental states preclude such outcomes. Second, the universalist versus the culturally relativist debate about the nature of human rights and democracy in Asia; and third, whether the emerging civil society in Asian countries would have an impact on the evolution of human rights and democracy, and if so, to what extent.

Many arguments in the book are quite refreshing particularly those that deal with civil society, which is the book's central theme. The term “civil society”—while highly in vogue—is unfortunately a grey area and a contested concept that has been used rather loosely by many authors. Nevertheless, the two chapters in the book, written respectively by Gary Rodan and Johan Saravanamuttu, make a significant contribution by clarifying the issue analytically and empirically.

The proposition that civil society is the space between the individual (or family) and the state, and is made up of associational groupings of sorts—while useful—is problematic. All sorts of associations—democratic and undemocratic, or even fascist and criminal—can inhabit that space. Thus, it is vital for the concept to be fleshed out, specifying it—as Rodan does—to refer only to “a particular form of political space—the least restrictive,” and making the necessary distinction between civic and

civil society (61). This is complemented by Saravanamuttu's usage of the "third sector" (equivalent to Gramsci's "political society") which, to him, is the core of civil society that politically engages the state on various issues on behalf of the citizenry in pursuit of democracy, human rights, and so on.

Nevertheless, some parts of the book leave the reader with a rather unpleasant intellectual aftertaste. The volume editors begin with a discussion on "Third Wave Democratization," and draw attention to the fact that within the span of a decade, the discourse on human rights and democracy in Asia has undergone major shifts. But the assumption about democracy is Western-style liberal democracy, and the volume generally seems to be upbeat about transitions to such a form of democracy, giving the impression that there is only one version of democracy. The most persuasive chapter taking this line of argument is the one by Michael Frolic who uses the "transition theory" or "transitology" when dealing with transitions to democracy after the Cold War. According to him, Asian countries including China, in the long term "will follow the Western pathway of transition"; though in the short term, these transitions will be erratic, hesitant, slow and uneven, he believes that "political change is in the (East) wind" (34). What is disturbing in his argument, which follows the old down-trodden path of modernization theory, is that the key factors to induce such change must come from the outside, the West. While it is true that "External factors play a key role in the flow of ideas and values of Western democracy as well as exposing Asians to the commerce and technology of the West" (34), the internal dynamics and its engagement with the external is very important to be captured. To be fair, the author's argument is not a reinvention of the White Man's burden. Also, it was written before 9/11 and the US-led "war on terror," with the resultant human rights abuses and mockery of democracy committed by the so-called champion of liberal democracy—the US itself—thus inviting a serious re-look at the whole idea and practice of liberal democracy. Nevertheless, one would appreciate a nuanced rethinking that should stay clear of any biased lenses (Western or Eastern) so that one can achieve some intellectual breakthrough in the varied theorizations of democracy (or democracies) and modernity in the contemporary world.

The editors also raise unnecessary expectations when in the Introduction, they ask the important question "is Asia on the verge of a democratic revolution?" (11–12). However, the question is not adequately answered. The conclusion is very cautious, viz: "Prospects for the future of civil society, human rights and democracy, while better than at any point in the past, remain decidedly uncertain" (208)—which is quite an anti-climax to the raised hopes of "a democratic revolution." Finally, the book would look better if it included an index.

Nevertheless, the book is an important contribution to the discourse on democracy, human rights and civil society in general, and in South East Asia in particular.

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### **Critical Political Studies: Debates and Dialogues from the Left**

Abigail B. Bakan and Eleanor MacDonald, eds.

Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002, pp. xiv, 432

For political observers, scholars, analysts and practitioners on the left the last two decades have been very difficult. With the rise of globalization, the decline of the Keynesian welfare state, the triumph of Thatcherism, Reaganism and Mulroneyism and the decade long dominance of neo-liberalism in Canada, a great deal of creative rethinking has become necessary—not only for the socialist left, but also for social democrats, left liberals and red Tories.

In other words for all those who identified with the virtues (and there were plenty of them) of the post-war welfare state and the Keynesian consensus. This book which is dedicated to the talented and generous Colin Leys who was Professor of Politics at Queen's University for a number of years and is now Professor emeritus has taken up the challenge of creative thinking largely, but not exclusively, from the democratic socialist post marxist and left social democratic perspective. But it contains much that ought to be of interest to anyone like myself who is appalled by the state of the world but who does not share all of the left's analysis any longer.

Like any collection based upon a conference the book is wide ranging and impossible to do justice to in a short review. I believe that a number of its essays are worth reading and considering in depth. I particularly liked the essay by Leys himself which focuses on the pathologies of the neo-liberal policy regime and the way that it has impacted on national economic strategies in the face of globalization and the emergence of trade blocs.

This excellent piece is followed by impressive essays by Bob Jessop, Leo Panitch and Alex Callinicos which examine Leys's work in the context of British politics under Margaret Thatcher, John Major and Tony Blair who have governed Britain during the period that Pierre Trudeau, Brian Mulroney, Jean Chrétien and now Paul Martin have governed Canada. There is much useful insight in these essays which illuminate I think the dead ends to which the third way of Blair has led. Manfred Bienefeld also develops a trenchant critique of the outrageous claim that there is no alternative to the neo-liberal approach to globalization. Here it should be pointed out that the Chrétien-Martin approach is regrettably much more fiscally conservative than that of Blair.

Unfortunately none of the analysts proposes a convincing policy orientation that is likely to succeed in the face of Blair's clear failure to re-establish a broadly supported progressive alternative to the conservative approach of Thatcher. In the light of the sense of betrayal over his decision to commit Britain to invade Iraq (a decision which Chrétien to his ever lasting credit rejected) this sense of failure is likely to become more striking in the months to come. A simple reversion to labour politics as usual is not likely to succeed. But as Callinicos admits, neither the counter-hegemonic stakeholder alternative developed by Will Hutton nor Panitch's notion of socialist renewal that goes beyond the timidities of social democracy are any more likely to succeed. Jessop's suggestion of a Schumpeterian workfare post national regime that emphasizes competitive success within the new international division of labour combined with neo-corporatist and neo-statist social wage reforms is probably a more promising alternative and a better electoral strategy.

I think that this approach can be combined with a return to a Keynes inspired strategy that builds upon post Keynesian insights about alternative anti-inflation strategies to strict monetarism including a serious attempt to weaken the power of the oil cartel that accounts for most of whatever inflationary threat there still exists.

But, of course, this is a major task of policy conversion and coalition building at the electoral level on the national and world stage. In Canada we will also face a very difficult task in this regard as the bitter fruits of fiscal retrenchment become clearer in the months to come.

There is also a rich set of essays on African politics and development issues which I found to be of superior quality. Here accomplished scholars like John Saul, Bonnie Campbell, Loren Dobell, Bruce Berman and Michael Chege explore aspects of African politics and development which have drawn Canadians on the left as sympathetic analysts and actors over a number of decades.

John Saul rather beautifully explores the dimensions of Leys work on Africa as both a tribute to his commitment to the cause of justice on a developmental scale and as a deconstruction of neo-colonial capitalism. In many respects it is an essay look-

ing backward to the heady idealism of the early post-war period whose excitement has been difficult to transmit to the current generation of prematurely jaded scholars.

There is also a section devoted to third world politics and strategies for change there and in our own world including some very insightful work by Manfred Bienefeld, Abigail Bakan, Phil Goldman, Laurie Adkin and Margie Mendell.

The final section of the book explores the dangerous and dissolving appeal of post modern notions and Nietzschean analyses including the fatal decisionist neo-fascist analysis of Carl Schmitt in a number of fascinating essays by Anne Phillips, Banu Helvacioğlu, Radhika Desai, and Eleanor MacDonald. Helvacioğlu's brilliant assessment of ethical possibilities in the post-modern world is particularly striking. The book concludes with a summary essay by the editors.

Clearly each reader will approach the collection differently. This reading is my own and I was particularly taken with the early essays on Thatcher and Britain, the powerful essay on Amnesty by Phil Goldman and the arguments against post-modernism and Schmitt. This does not mean the other essays are less worthwhile, simply that my own hermeneutic and the necessities of space preclude my analysis of them.

I once as a student in Britain, as part of a small group, met and had dinner with Margaret Thatcher when she was a member of Ted Heath's government. I was impressed by the force of her personality, the resolve with which she pushed her right wing and in many ways outrageous view of the world. Because of this her principal success was bringing about major lasting political change. It is a lesson the left needs to understand and one which I believe Leys, Panitch, Callinicos, Jessop and Bienefeld, Saul and other contributors do understand.

More of the left would understand it even better if they ventured more often from the shelter of the academy into the world of electoral and real politics and discovered how much work there is to be done and where compromise is necessary in order to advance the cause of social justice and the necessity as Winston Churchill put it so well after a political defeat, despite the sorry state of the world, "we just have to keep bugging along." *Critical Political Studies* makes a fitting tribute to Colin Leys and the wisdom of creative persistence even in the face of adversity.

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### **Real Libertarianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van Parijs**

Andrew Reeve and Andrew Williams, eds.

London: Palgrave, 2003, pp. x, 223

Philippe Van Parijs' *Real Freedom for All* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) is one of the most stimulating contributions to left-libertarianism published in the last decade. It is, therefore, not surprising that an edited volume that critically examines his ideas has now been published. The contributing authors (two of whom, Peter Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner, are other well known left-libertarians) raise interesting and often pointed questions, but they all have some good things to say about Van Parijs' original proposal.

To assess these criticisms, it is necessary to begin with a brief account of *Real Freedom*, something that Andrew Reeve does quite well in the introductory chapter. *Real Freedoms* advances the idea that one should have the opportunity to do as one chooses, subject to certain constraints having to do with the rights of others. Since most people do not have a choice between working and not working, a central point in *Real Freedom* is that the state should guarantee a generous and unconditional basic income to all. "Such a payment" Reeve notes "is ... different from standard welfare

payments, which are often means tested, [and] depend upon a person's availability and willingness to take employment [among other conditions]" (5). Van Parijs justifies this scheme as a necessary condition for building a free society and he further claims that a free society is a just society. "Van Parijs also defends a second form of redistribution, which is targeted at those with a particular disadvantage, and designed to achieve what he terms *undominated diversity*" (3). Because only capitalism can generate the wealth necessary for implementing these programs, Van Parijs offers a qualified defence of that system in comparison to socialism. An acceptable form of capitalism would have to accommodate the concept of "employment assets"; in his view, individuals who hold jobs "have appropriated a (social) asset, just as if they occupied a piece of land, and are required to pay a fair price for doing so" (3). This could be a considerable source of revenue for the state.

Chapter 2 by John Cunliffe, Guido Erreygers and Walter Van Tier retraces the origins of the idea of a basic income. They analyze proposals formulated by Joseph Charlier (in 1841) and by Mabel Milner in 1918. Their detailed accounts of these schemes provides an interesting historical context. In chapter 3, Vallentyne examines more specifically Van Parijs' ingenious use of the notion of self-ownership. He identifies three forms of self-ownership in Van Parijs' writings: "control self-ownership"; "leisure self-ownership"; and "non-brute luck income self-ownership" (34). The first refers to control of one's own body; the second implies everyone is entitled to choose between work and leisure and, in particular, prohibits taxing individuals' personal endowments (skills and abilities) to the point where gifted individuals would have to work more than non-gifted ones just to pay their taxes; the third means that only "brute luck income," that is, income that does not result from an individual's choices or efforts can be taxed heavily—potentially up to one hundred percent. This emphasis on self-ownership denotes Van Parijs' libertarian frame of mind. At the same time, self-ownership so defined leaves plenty of room for taxing various sources of income. Since Van Parijs' conception of self-ownership does not confer to any individual rights over the nonagent part of the world and, in fact, since he agrees with Henry George that natural resources ought to be socially owned, the state should be able to collect the revenues it needs. Vallentyne is sympathetic to Van Parijs' vision but questions the merits of heavily taxing at least one form of "brute luck" income: gifts received from other people. I agree that this contradicts the self-ownership rights of the givers.

In chapter 4, Brian Barry analyzes in detail the idea of the basic income. Although Barry remains fair throughout his paper, he clearly sees many difficulties with this scheme. He begins by comparing Pareto optimality with Van Parijs' real freedom, emphasizing the latter is not based on a "welfarist" premise. Real freedom comes short of being an improvement on Pareto optimality, because Van Parijs' definition, which precludes privileging an individual's actual wants over his or her potential ones (i.e., the "non-welfarist" nature of real freedom), also makes it impossible to measure the difference between alternative societal arrangements. In other words, it seems impossible to determine whether situation *x* is better than *y* in terms of real freedom. Barry concedes that Van Parijs is aware of the problem but is unconvinced that limiting comparisons to levels of income, as Van Parijs suggests, is a defensible move. Even if it is, there remains a contradiction because justifying an unconditional income on the ground that contingent social programs discriminate against those who prefer leisure over work is an argument that rests on a welfarist intuition. Also Barry takes Van Parijs to task for equating real freedom with justice but not providing a definition of justice. Finally, Barry points out that the arguments used by Van Parijs to counter the objections of those who would regard his basic income as unfair will remain unconvinced because they are derived from premises that these people are likely to reject.

Robert J. Van der Veen defends Van Parijs in chapter 5. He addresses what he regards as Barry's most pertinent criticism, namely that real freedom cannot be a valid "currency" of justice (81). While Van der Veen is doubtful that Van Parijs actually meant what Barry said above about people's actual choices being unimportant, he replies that "in so far as the well-being of persons depends on having access to income and leisure, the well-being they can achieve in different situations is captured by the comparative extent of real freedom they enjoy, however they happen to value income relative to leisure" (82). Van der Veen also devotes considerable space to a defence of Van Parijs' use of a leximin criterion of justice (ranking the worst of the worst off first, then the second worst off, and so on), although I do not think that this matter is as central to Barry's critique as Van der Veen believes. He concedes, however, that while Van Parijs' theory has "moral weight," it is not a "knockdown argument from social justice speaking in favour of the proposal" (82).

Richard Arneson addresses *Real Freedom's* "contribution to the philosophy of distributive justice" (96) in chapter 6. Space lacks here to recount the very detailed and rigorous analysis he offers. In the end, Arneson faults Van Parijs for his commitment to the Rawlsian idea of neutrality with respect to the nature of the good, and states his preference for an idea of justice that holds people fully responsible for the values they adopt and the ends they achieve. Van Parijs' theory is further undermined by Andrew Williams' contention in chapter 7 that it "exaggerates the tax base appropriate to fund universal, unconditional transfers" and also "it underestimates the need to compensate for differences in internal resources" (132).

In a somewhat more nuanced critique (chapter 8), Stuart White raises the question of whether the Van Parijs' basic income scheme is an instrument of "fair reciprocity," by which he means a norm of mutual advantage which also accounts for situations where some people need special attention because of their disadvantageous circumstances. He answers that question negatively because, in his view, Van Parijs' supportive arguments are insufficient to deflect the exploitation objection, but he offers three alternative ways of designing basic income programs that would meet that test.

Chapter 9 by Steiner examines the tension between Van Parijs' belief in global justice and his defence of a local implementation of his scheme justified in terms of solidaristic patriotism; Steiner argues that the latter strategy could be counterproductive. And in chapter 10, which readers who are more concerned with democratic theory will probably find closer to their interests, Thomas Christiano takes issue with what he views as Van Parijs' one-sided view of democracy simply as a procedure that produces good results without attaching any specific value to the intrinsic aspects of the procedure itself. Christiano argues that both approaches are necessary and complementary.

In the final chapter, Van Parijs has a chance to reply to his critics. As the title of this chapter ("a selective reply") suggests, Van Parijs chose to respond more specifically to only two authors, namely Steiner on the scope of social justice, and Christiano on the nature of democracy. To the former he replies that solidaristic patriotism would not have detrimental effects on people in other countries who do not (yet) receive benefits; and to the latter he retorts that "more democracy" just by itself "can be badly counterproductive in terms of civil peace and social justice" (213).

I agree with the contributors to this volume that after Van Parijs wrote *Real Freedom*, political philosophy has been changed. New ideas need to be examined and new directions of research have been opened. Their contributions show that such new explorations promise to be rewarding.

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### Modern Social Imaginaries

Charles Taylor

Durham: Duke University Press, 2004, pp. 215

The originality of Charles Taylor's thought can be seen in the fact that it is not easy to "place" his work over the last fifteen years in the categories of standard academic disciplines. It is not really political philosophy. It is not really sociology (though it perhaps leans more towards sociology than towards political philosophy). It is something else. But what? Cultural history and the history of philosophy clearly provide the materials for Taylor's enterprise, but whatever it is, it aims for something intellectually more ambitious than mere intellectual or cultural history. The term "social imaginary" in fact captures quite well this "unplaceability" of his work between philosophy and sociology.

To be a modern is to be shaped in one's identity by a package of moral conceptions shared with all other members of one's society: the idea of moral individualism (the notion that one has a life of one's own to live—a life with its own authentic integrity); the idea of society as conferring mutual benefits on its constituent members; the idea of equality and equal rights; and so on. The general model that Taylor has in mind is something like applied and popularized theory, and the way it shapes public consciousness (such as the image of political community as the product of a society-wide "contract" [29, 46]). Taylor is interested in the historical process whereby a new set of moral and political conceptions "penetrates" (29) or "infiltrates" (28) the social imagination of the whole society, and thereby transforms the common practices that define social and moral order. As he puts it, "the theory is schematized [that is, given a particular shape] in the dense sphere of common practice" (30; cf. 115–116). The focus is not theory but what Hans-Georg Gadamer called the historical effectivity (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) of theory. The question of whether the articles of faith that make up the modern social imaginary are philosophically compelling is not a question that Taylor is interested in pursuing; indeed, it probably does not make much sense to him. The point is that we live it, so we don't have much choice but to try to make sense of it. In vindicating it, we vindicate ourselves.

It is probably a bit misleading to speak of *the* modern social imaginary, for Taylor is strongly committed to the idea of modernities in the plural, and this plurality of modernities would be put in question or compromised if there were a singular social imaginary of modernity. Taylor (rightly) insists "that we [must] finally get over seeing modernity as a single process of which Europe is the paradigm, and that we [come to] understand the European model ... as, at the end of the day, one model among many" (196). In any case, the main features of the modern social imaginary (or imaginaries) as sketched by Taylor are easy to summarize. In Chapter 4, Taylor offers a very simple typology of the history of religion, contrasting "early religions" with higher, "post-axial" religions, in order to dramatize how individualism over the course of history fundamentally reshapes religious life both in the West and in the East. Taylor's thesis is that modern moral individualism has its foundation in these much older transformations in religious experience (64). Here as elsewhere, one marvels at just how many insights into the intellectual and cultural history of our current experience of the world are packed into this little book.

In the central chapters of the book, Taylor's genealogy of modern society privileges three main ideas: the idea of economy as a network of mutual benefit; the idea of a sphere of publicity where opinions are shared and contested among members of the society—a space where public opinion can take shape; and the idea of popular sovereignty or sovereign self-rule. Chapter 5 discusses the new understanding of economic life (dating from the 17th–18th centuries) according to which the mutually beneficial exchange of services gives evidence of God's providential care for human

beings. Needless to say, this view renders economic exchange much more central to how one conceives the purposes of human life (72: “the economy ... came to be seen more and more as the dominant end of society”). In Chapters 6 and 7, Taylor shows that Jürgen Habermas’s theme of “the public sphere” (Taylor calls it “metatopical common space” [86]) is constitutive for the self-understanding of modernity (although the idea of privacy/intimacy is no less constitutive). In the latter half of the book, notably Chapters 8 to 10 and Chapter 13, Taylor reprises the analysis of the structure of modern nationalism that he has offered in other writings.

Taylor tells us that the book under review is a preliminary installment of a larger work on “Living in a Secular Age,” so we are led to expect that he will give special attention to the problem of secularity within social imaginaries that define themselves as modern. But Taylor does not mean by secularity what we commonly associate with this term (a society liberated from religious authority). Rather, according to the idea of secularity as Taylor construes it, the secular (i.e., modern) society is one that does not aspire to express some transcendent, metaphysical order, but simply the self-constructed order composed by its citizens (93, 97, 194). It is, as he puts it, a society that does not feel obliged to found its social order on anything that “transcends our common action” (94). In that sense, the discussion of secularity isn’t confined to the chapter entitled “The Meaning of Secularity” (Chapter 13), but rather, pervades the whole book.

Taylor says that his project consists in “describing the social imaginary of the modern West” (196) in order to contribute to an eventual intercultural dialogue between the West and non-Western societies. In other words, the essential lesson that study of the shape of modern consciousness is meant to teach is humility in the face of cultural possibilities that are yet to be experienced or explored. No one can deny that this is a good lesson for social theory to teach. The question remains whether Taylor’s practice of philosophy in a sociological mode (or philosophical sociology) honours or betrays philosophy’s historical ambition to confront questions of moral and political validity apart from the fact that particular societies happen to embrace various beliefs. If Plato wants to get us out of the cave, Taylor responds—if this is a cave, at least it is *our* cave.

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### **Toleration as Recognition**

Anna Elisabetta Galeotti

Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. viii, 242

In *Toleration as Recognition* Anna Elisabetta Galeotti offers up a sympathetic critique of liberal toleration and suggests a modification to the theory that she believes necessary in order to bring cultural minorities into the public sphere as equal citizens. This carefully argued book marks a timely contribution to the debate over group rights and multiculturalism.

Galeotti acknowledges at the outset that liberal principles have on the whole been a great success. Embodied in liberal constitutions and translated into a system of rights, the liberal ideal of toleration that emerged during the religious conflicts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries today allows for the peaceful coexistence of persons who differ profoundly in matters of religion, lifestyles, moral and aesthetic values, and so on. Liberal toleration seeks to accommodate the pluralism of modern societies by constructing an expansive sphere of personal liberty that is off-limits to direct political intervention. As Rawls and other advocates of political liberalism argue (echoing Locke’s position in the *Letter Concerning Toleration*), citizens of the liberal state need not approve of one another’s personal beliefs or private conduct in order to affirm as reasonable the public conception of justice that guarantees an equal liberty

to all. The limits to liberal toleration are defined, however imprecisely, by the harm principle and society's right of self-defence. Conduct injurious to other individuals or inimical to the survival of the liberal state receives no protection. Short of that, people are free to live as they choose subject at worst to the disapprobation of their fellow citizens. As Galeotti remarks, minor infringements of toleration remain all too common in liberal democracies; "but, regrettable as they are, they do not usually raise genuine theoretical and political problems, as the theory and the practice of toleration is generally equipped to answer them" (3).

Importantly, however, she contends that there are several "genuine, non-trivial" cases of toleration roiling contemporary politics that the theory and practice of liberal toleration cannot adequately address. "Contemporary non-trivial cases that raise issues of tolerance typically involve situations in which members of a new minority exhibit their differences in some public-political space—differences that are regarded by the cultural majority as unfamiliar and strange, often outrageously excessive, and potentially threatening to the standards of proper behaviour and civility of that society" (85). Among the examples she gives are *l'affaire du foulard* in France, the controversy over gays in the military in the United States, and the suppression of hate speech in Europe and North America. Galeotti argues that these cases prove resistant to the logic of liberal toleration because they involve differences between *groups* rather than between *individuals*. Each results from asymmetries in social standing, status, respect, and public recognition that effectively exclude members of culturally insurgent minority group from full citizenship or the full enjoyment of rights. Liberal toleration fails to grasp what is really at stake in these cases, because it assumes (incorrectly in Galeotti's view) that equal liberties suffice to ensure equal public standing for all. Thus, if minorities have difficulty gaining access to the public sphere it must be because they suffer an unjust legal disability or lack the resources that would enable them to participate more fully. From this perspective the problem appears to be one of distributive justice, not toleration. Galeotti objects, however, that minorities do not have to be deprived of legal entitlements or of resources and opportunities in order to be excluded from the public sphere. The fact is, she argues, that disfavoured minorities are made into second-class citizens simply because they are the bearers of certain identities. Insidiously, public disrespect for their collective identity prevents the members of socially stigmatized groups from developing self-esteem and self-respect, "two crucial conditions for being fully functioning social agents and citizens" (112). The only viable solution is to remove the social stigma attached to membership in the group.

Galeotti proposes that this be accomplished through public acts of recognition that legitimate and normalize minority differences, setting them on a par with the behaviours, traits, practices and values associated with the majority culture. This, she thinks, is very different from the conventional liberal approach, which seeks to render cultural differences irrelevant by constructing citizenship as a universal identity. Indeed, the liberal principle of neutrality, which is usually understood to mean that the state should be blind to differences, presents an obstacle to putting toleration as recognition into effect. Galeotti responds by arguing that difference blindness hardly results in impartiality when the dominant majority, whose culture pervades the public sphere, fails to show respect for new immigrant groups or historically oppressed minorities that must disguise themselves, or become invisible to the majority, if they want to appear inoffensive. She further contends that symbolic acts of recognition by the state do not necessarily violate the neutrality principle. Public recognition "neither says nor implies that the difference in question is intrinsically valuable, beautiful, or important for the human good, but it does imply that there are many different codes of dress, lifestyles, religious rituals, and so on among the viable options in society at large" (104–5).

In the realm of symbolic politics, policy matters less for what it *is* than for what it *says*. Thus, it is important to Galeotti that toleration be extended for the right reasons. It will not suffice to treat *l'affaire du foulard* as a violation of individual rights, as a Lockean or a Rawlsian might do, for that approach fails to give due recognition to the cultural significance of the Islamic headscarf and will not advance the acceptance of Muslims immigrants on equal terms with the French majority. Or will it? Galeotti emphasizes the importance of symbolic action by the state at the risk of ignoring the real gains to be had by affording members of vulnerable minority groups the right to assert their identity publicly. Galeotti herself admits that public recognition will not magically erase the stigma minorities suffer on account of their identity, but she believes that “symbolic recognition indirectly redraws the map of the standards of action and belief a society accepts” (105). Perhaps, but so does the physical presence of persons who demand respect for themselves by daily affirming their identity in the public eye. Liberal rights make their self-affirmation possible. Far from consigning differences to the private sphere where they become invisible, as Galeotti claims, liberal rights enable the public display of personal and group differences. Recall that for Locke the whole point of religious toleration was the *public* worship of God by religious nonconformists. In the end, it’s difficult to see any practical difference between Galeotti’s call for the symbolic recognition of French Muslims and a liberal approach affirming their religious liberty.

There are other soft spots in Galeotti’s argument. For example, it is possible to quibble with her insistence that symbolic acts of recognition legitimate but do not valorize group differences. (Surely, same sex marriage, which Galeotti champions as a contribution to overcoming the stigma felt by gays and lesbians, will be perceived by religious conservatives as public endorsement of behaviour they deem sinful.) Toleration as recognition also raises any number of practical questions. Will it prove an easy thing to make a symbolic statement in opposition to racism by criminally penalizing hate speech without inviting greater censorship? Will it be possible to prevent the inclusive politics of recognition from degenerating into a socially divisive identity politics? It is safe to predict that Galeotti’s answers to these and other questions will not fully satisfy her critics, this reviewer among them, but it is impossible to deny that she brings a keen and humane intelligence to modern problems of toleration.

STEPHEN L. NEWMAN *York University*

### **Rousseau as Author: Consecrating One’s Life to the Truth**

Christopher Kelly

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003, pp. 182

Christopher Kelly’s latest book makes an important contribution to the study of Rousseau. Kelly investigates Rousseau’s attitude towards authorship in the light of his motto, “consecrating one’s life to the truth.” He maintains that for Rousseau this motto implies the need for two kinds of authorial responsibility: “it meant both publicly taking responsibility for what one publishes and only publishing those things that would be of public benefit” (1). Kelly then uses this two-pronged conception of responsible authorship to investigate Rousseau’s understanding of the practices of citizenship and of philosophy.

The first chapter explores the significance of the first type of responsibility, that is, of Rousseau’s decision to refuse anonymity and name himself as the author of his unsettling works. Kelly explains that Rousseau was very unusual in his resis-

tance to predominant Enlightenment practice of publishing controversial works anonymously. This decision brought him into conflict with censors, publishers and many authors.

Kelly's account is particularly compelling as it reveals how Rousseau's stance fed the fires of his famous quarrel with Voltaire. Voltaire fully adapted to the practice of anonymity and encouraged his followers to do the same. He employed a combination of "pseudonyms, false attributions and anonymity" (15). Voltaire justified the use of these strategies, explaining that they provided the protection that allowed him to serve the cause of enlightenment. They freed him, he pointed out, to use satire and personal attacks to undermine the reputations of powerful opponents of enlightenment without fear of imprisonment. But Voltaire took his practices to extreme lengths, sometimes attributing scandalous works of his own to respectable authors. When he attributed his antireligious work, the *Oath of the Fifty* to Rousseau, Rousseau responded by divulging Voltaire's authorship of the book in his own *Letters Written from the Mountain*. Whatever errors of judgment are involved here, Kelly rightly argues that this was also a conflict of principle. For his part, Rousseau contended that anonymity had become a shield allowing irresponsible authors to spread what he called "the poison of calumny and satire" (27). Responsible authors, he thought, should have the courage to name themselves, to risk punishment and, if necessary, to challenge and confront the censors publicly. This first chapter is original in scope and content; it adds a new dimension to the debate about the impact of censorship and persecution on authors and their works.

Kelly then argues that there is no contradiction between Rousseau's refusal of anonymity and the second aspect of his concept of authorial responsibility, his view that authors should exercise restraint with regard to the contents of their published works. Accordingly, in Chapter two, Kelly contends that Rousseau believes that philosophers need to engage in self-censorship so as not to undermine the morals and religious beliefs that sustain a community. In his *Letter to D'Alembert on the Theatre*, Rousseau implied that the best setting for the discussion of some religious issues is that of private, philosophical conversation. "For Rousseau," Kelly writes, "while the activity of authorship is in its essence public, the activity of philosophy is private" (49).

It could be objected here that if the author has a responsibility to determine restraints on content, the task of censorship is in effect shifted from government officials to authors. This leads to the question of whether this self-censorship of authors (with its curtailing of the open airing of ideas) does not undermine the efficacy of democratic deliberation.

If Kelly does not tackle this formulation of the objection directly, he does address the related questions of Rousseau's teaching about the arts and of the adequacy of his concept of deliberation in the next three chapters, which form a section about citizenship. In chapter 3, he argues that, in Rousseau's view, the arts activate strong emotions that can either undermine the "sentiments of sociability" that hold a society together or reinforce them. Chapter 4 builds on this argument; it shows that Rousseau seeks to inculcate good morals in modern communities by using the arts to provide new sorts of heroes for modern citizens to emulate.

In Chapter 5, Kelly responds to critics who have read Rousseau's remarks in the *Social Contract* as a sign of his intolerance of deliberation and dissent. Here he deftly interprets both Rousseau's own actions as a citizen and his responses to Genevan political debates in the *Letter to D'Alembert* and the *Letters Written from the Mountain* to recover his idiosyncratic view of citizenship. He concludes that Rousseau "gives models of civic activism that include deliberation about proposed legislation, oversight of the administration of existing laws and reflection on the constitution as a whole" (138).

This book is based on a number of previously published articles and readers will have to pay careful attention to maintain a sense of its unity of purpose. The final section is about philosophy and, as its argument develops, it becomes clear that the theme of responses to anonymity has faded from view. More comparison of Rousseau's ideas about publication, anonymity and the vocation of philosophy with those of other major thinkers might have helped to further develop the overall argument.

Nonetheless, this is a very good book, one that gets better with re-reading. Kelly's interpretations will leave their mark; it is not every year that a book about Rousseau of this quality emerges.

LEE MACLEAN *McGill University*

### **Hegel on Ethics and Politics**

Robert B. Pippin and Otfried Höffe, eds.

translated by Nicholas Walker

The German Philosophical Tradition Series

Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 358

In a better world, all books involving Kant or Hegel might come with a reverse price tag. Instead of making prospective readers pay for the privilege, they would encourage and reward the gruelling labour facing those who would brave the convoluted prose, the merciless grind of thousand-word paragraphs lecturing in German no matter the language in which they appear to be written. In our own world, of course, such learned works tend to be especially expensive, a whopping hundred dollars in this case.

Billed as a collection of "the finest postwar German-language scholarship on Hegel's social and political philosophy" and promising to "be of enormous value to Anglophone students and scholars," this collection suffers from no false modesty. Its impeccably Teutonic credentials are unmistakable, too, in the sheer relentlessness of the demands it makes on the addled brains of the North American academic in July. As Prof. Dr. Pippin's introduction makes explicit, the intellectual curiosity of the mere historian of ideas—better type of scholarly journalist that he is (4)—will not suffice for the heavy lifting at hand. Better not take this book to the cottage, let alone the beach.

To start with the positive, Joachim Ritter's lucid account of the intimate connection between the person and private property in Hegel reminds us of what is too often overlooked by those who approach Hegel via Marx: namely the unshakably *bourgeois* core of Hegel's thought. Clearly as he saw the dislocations and challenges of modern civil society, and much as he insisted on the limitations and poverty of man considered merely as a bourgeois, the domain of private property always remained indispensable, in Hegel's eyes, for the free and inalienable development of the individual that is the glory of the modern age. In stark contrast to the Romantic strands of yearning that run from Rousseau through Marx to our day, Hegel insists that man has been able to leave behind the *unfreedom* of nature precisely by and through appropriating *things*. While acknowledging that the institution of property goes hand in hand with the objectification of relations in civil society, making things, too, of skills and aptitudes—or making a commodity of labour, as Marx would put it—the business of buying or selling serves also to educate mere bourgeois to the universal. As Ritter puts it, "The 'mediation' that finds legal expression in the contract represents the positive character of civil society itself ... That is why Hegel describes the contractual sphere of civil society as 'the true and genuine ground in which freedom has actual existence'" (112).

That being said, Hegel never wavers in his insistence that man as a rational being must be a political being and that the ethical community of the state must

therefore never simply be conflated with the perpetual striving of civil society. Citizenship is an indisputably higher calling quite distinct from life as a bourgeois, and the question of how to delineate the two realms has long animated commentators. Rolf-Peter Horstmann's chapter (208–238) discusses this issue with a view to Hegel's efforts, in the *Philosophy of Right*, at reconciling classical and modern ideals as well as pre-empting misunderstandings of his position resulting from his earlier involvement in the constitutional disputes pitting the Wurtemberg Estates Assembly against their monarch. Siegfried Blasche (183–207) supplements the discussion of property with an examination of the family, the second axis of Hegel's core bourgeois commitments—for Blasche stresses that it is the small *bourgeois* family, specifically, that Hegel posits as “ethical totality” in its immediate, modern form. Blasche faults Hegel primarily for believing that the family so conceived would be able to withstand and maintain itself intact against the “deleterious ethical effects of civil society”; but Hegel was no naïf, and it is clearly not the case that the corrosive dynamics of modern civil society simply come to a standstill before the family. Hegel would insist merely on the *relative* robustness of that institution, not its immunity, and in that he surely continues to be borne out. Given Blasche's own attention to the Hegelian family's roots in marriage rather than childbearing, a neo-Hegelian position might even survive the gay-marriage debate.

Wolfgang Schild's defense of the contemporary relevance of Hegel's concept of punishment (150–179)—and indeed his claims for its superiority—may mostly concern the specialist, except insofar as the notion that an offender might be wronged by the withholding of punishment is concerned. (Pippin scoffs at the idea as one that “would come as news to most criminals” (10), and so it would, no doubt; philosophically, however, the notion has impeccable ancient pedigree and might remind us that Hegel professed himself to owe everything to Plato, at least according to Popper.) Of similarly rarified appeal are the chapters on “The Rights of Philosophy” by Hans Friedrich Fulda (21–48), on the Kant-Hegel nexus by Karl-Otto Apel (49–77), as well as on the personality of the will by Michael Quante (81–100) and on the universal will by Manfred Baum (124–149).

The collection culminates with three chapters on the state. Ludwig Siep (268–290) offers a reasonably transparent and interesting treatment of Hegel's conception of the constitution, fundamental rights, and social welfare. Aiming to clear away some common misunderstandings and narrow the gap separating Hegel's thought from Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau and Kant, the piece ultimately reaches some cautiously critical conclusions about the principle deficiencies of the *Philosophy of Right*. So far as I was able to determine, the remaining two chapters, by Dieter Henrich (241–267) and Michael Wolff (291–322), deal with the formal structure and the ontology of Hegel's “organicist” theory of the state: but beyond the striking fact that Hegel wrote his thesis on the orbits of the planets and deemed their relationships to have great conceptual significance, both pieces read like Greek to me.

Climbing down from the skies, let it be said that the volume's rather inelegant cover, its drab paper and lapses in quality of print are hardly designed to delight the bibliophile. Perhaps all this is meant to convey the Olympian heights, clouds and all, from which the book descends to us; alternatively, perhaps such garb was found, in the spirit of Fawcett Towers or a bout of GDR-nostalgia, to be just how The German Philosophical Tradition deserves to be presented. At the hands of a lesser publisher such low regard for the aesthetics of the printed word might be merely deplorable; in light of CUP's half-millennium in the business of making some of the world's finest books, it is also disappointing.

DANIEL PELLERIN *University of Redlands*

**Kant and Liberal Internationalism**

Antonio Franceschet

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp. 164

Few political notions are at once so normative and so equivocal as liberal internationalism. Today, the official discourse of the West resounds with appeals to a term that was long a trademark of the Left. Whatever sense is given it, the meaning of internationalism logically depends on some prior conception of nationalism, since it only has currency as a backward construction referring to its opposite. Yet while nationalism is of all modern political phenomena the most value-contested—judgements of its record standardly varying across a 180-degree span, from admiration to abhorrence—no such schizophrenia of connotation affects internationalism: its implication is virtually always positive. But the price of approval is indeterminacy. If no one doubts the fact of nationalism, but few agree as to its worth, at the entry to the millennium the status of internationalism would appear to be more or less the reverse. It is claimed on all sides as a value, but who can identify it without challenge in the form of force?

Franceschet has delivered a *tour de force* with this text; when preparing my thought after reading it, I decided to do a quick search on the syllabi of universities in the United Kingdom. Not one reputable library is without a copy of this work. He provides a lucid and vivid account of Immanuel Kant's role as architect of our current world system of states and the future for which these states strive (give or take the will of a George W. Bush or two). With great clarity of discourse Franceschet outlines the key concepts and the disputes that erupt from the opponents benches as a result of resounding works by those Kantians such as Doyle, O'Neil, and Linklater.

Beginning in the eighteenth century and slowly growing since then, a zone of peace, which Kant called the "pacific federation" or "pacific union," began to be established among liberal societies. Those such as Doyle would readily point out that more than fifty liberal states currently make up the union. Most being in Europe and North America, although they can be found on all continents.

Here Franceschet illustrates that Kant's predictions of liberal pacifists are borne out—liberal states *do* exercise peaceful restraint and a separate peace exists among them. This separate peace provides a political foundation for the decisive alliances with the liberal powers. This foundation appears to be impervious to economic competition and personal quarrels with liberal allies. It also offers the promise of a continuing peace among liberal states. And, as the number of liberal states increases, it announces the possibility of global peace this side of the grave or world conquest.

Franceschet opens Kant's theory of liberal internationalism and helps us understand the world in which we live. The importance of Kant as a theorist of international ethics has been well appreciated. But Kant also has an important analytical theory of international politics. *Perpetual Peace*, written in 1795, helps us understand the interactive nature of international relations. Methodologically, he tries to teach us that we cannot study either the systemic relations of states or the varieties of state behaviour in isolation from each other. Substantively, he anticipates for us the pacification of a liberal pacific union, explains that pacification, and at the same time suggests why liberal states are not pacific in their relations with non-liberal states. Through its interaction and development of Kantian dialogue, this book places Kant's argument that perpetual peace will be guaranteed by the continuing acceptance of his three "definitive articles" of peace in the foreground of international relations. When all nations have accepted the definitive articles in a metaphorical "treaty" of perpetual peace he asks them to sign, perpetual peace will have been established.

*Kant and Liberal Internationalism* highlights the renewal of Kant's philosophy at a time when the international community is seen in disarray by much of its citizenry. Without question, for those of us teaching international political thought this text is a must.

JAMIE MUNN *University of West England, Bristol*

### **Du retour. Abécédaire biopolitique. Entretiens avec Anne Dufourmantelle**

Antonio Negri

Paris : Calmann-Lévy, 2002, 243 pages

*Du retour* est un entretien avec Antonio Negri mené par la psychanalyste Anne Dufourmantelle. Negri est sorti des prisons italiennes en 2003, après avoir été accusé d'avoir participé, avec les Brigades rouges, à l'assassinat d'Aldo Moro. Il est l'auteur, avec le philosophe américain Michael Hardt, de *Empire*—un ouvrage dont il n'est pas exagéré de dire qu'il est désormais la référence théorique principale du mouvement altermondialiste. L'intellectuel et professeur italien, le « mauvais maître », comme on l'a appelé, a livré cet entretien en 2002 alors qu'il était encore en semi-liberté.

Les thèmes de la pensée de Negri se dessinent au fil de l'entretien, construit à la manière d'un abécédaire qui rappelle celui de Parnet-Deleuze. Action politique, travail immatériel, multitude, corps, et religiosité sont des topiques qui réapparaissent sans cesse à travers les propos de Negri—qui donne l'impression de penser, parfois de manière obsessive, à voix haute. Mariant les idées et le monde dans une mouture explosive, passionnée, la pensée d'Antonio Negri est une pensée ronde. Il affirme entre autres ne pas croire à l'inconscient, pense comme on lance des flèches—il est entrain de faire la révolution, même quand il dort.

La part biographique est importante dans l'entretien et enrichit certainement notre compréhension de ce qu'on peut appeler le projet multitude. L'action et la foi sont au cœur de cette entreprise centauresque, tissée par une réflexion sur l'ontologie et par le désir.

Du point de vue de la prise de position politique, l'expérience italienne des années 70 est marquante : c'est le commun, la joie, l'expérience, la liberté, la révolution, l'immanence totale—une préfiguration de cette révolution qui gît tout de suite et maintenant au creux même de l'humanité qui est là partout en train de se faire. Cette période semble être le paradigme du travail théorique de Negri : « ce n'était pas une révolution, c'était la réinvention de la production de la vie » (40). Nous voulons tout, était le mot d'ordre, un mot d'ordre qui, pour Negri, a trouvé sa première vigueur dans la résistance au fascisme, et retrouve un second souffle en 1999 à Seattle.

Le projet, inscrit dans une jeune tradition européenne de résistance, un engagement politique total propre au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle, est très exigeant: abolition des frontières, revenu minimum garanti, réappropriation de toute la productivité humaine, c'est-à-dire de tout. « Il n'est pas suffisant de s'en aller du marché mondial, il faut que celui-ci saute » (185). Il n'y a pas chez Negri de cette lâcheté du néo-marxisme académique, pas d'euphémismes, pas d'analyse des conditions favorables, pas de distance par rapport à l'action. Son programme implique la fin de l'idée de propriété. La vie coopère et se produit elle-même, elle le fait déjà, l'a toujours fait—les incrustations capitalistes dans le réseau humain sont superflues. C'est à ce point, et Negri est très cohérent là-dessus, politiquement et épistémologiquement, que l'idée de médiation disparaît. Il envisage la fin des institutions, la coopération humaine étant conçue comme un mouvement perpétuel qui s'autosuffit—et dont le moteur est l'expérience existentielle de la joie. « L'infini est vécu entièrement dans chaque singularité, l'intériorisation totale de l'acte de vie est à chaque fois présente » (193). Si l'intensité

religieuse de cette idée du commun n'était pas si puissante dans le discours de Negri, on pourrait parler d'anarcho-communisme.

La résistance—c'est par là que se manifeste l'heureux postmodernisme de Negri qui ne mentionne pas une seule fois Marx dans les 240 pages de l'entretien—est complètement individualisée : « cela consiste surtout à éprouver le plaisir de la singularité » (193). Il n'y a plus de sujet de l'histoire que l'expression radicale de l'humanité comme une multitude—comme une infinité de singularités constamment en mouvement, constamment entraîné de se connecter. Il a trouvé cette capacité de la singularité comme phénomène ontologique premier et révolutionnaire chez Spinoza et Deleuze. De son propre aveu, témoignant par là du passage du marxisme par la longue propédeutique du langage, cette acceptation a été difficile. Elle mène, telle que l'incarne l'homme-Negri lui-même, à une intériorisation de la révolution qui fonctionne dès lors à la manière d'une transfiguration de l'activité productive par la conversion... des corps. Les corps, chez Negri le matérialiste, se convertissent au commun : « c'est le corps lui-même qui interprète le commun » (46). Et c'est la joie—la fin de l'Empire, parasite de l'activité productive.

C'est aussi l'expérience religieuse qui semble se trouver au cœur de la vie et de la pensée de Negri—il évoque ses prières, ses superstitions, sa dévotion à sa mère et les résonances de cette dévotion avec l'image de la Vierge. Il souligne également son intérêt pour l'histoire des religions comme mouvements politiques. Cette conversion des corps au commun tel que Negri l'évoque a décidément un goût christique. Comme pour Jésus dans l'Empire romain, l'exil spatial n'est pas possible—c'est la résistance, cette conversion des corps à la joie du commun qui est l'exil : « ... dans ce monde sans 'dehors', on ne peut que tenter l'exode. Un exode qui ne va nulle part. J'entends par 'exode' une puissance constituante : exode et 'guerre à la guerre' veulent dire la même chose » (185).

« La résistance, c'est le sens que le commun offre aux singularités » (194). Il y a un accueil de l'humanité telle qu'elle est chez Negri, un grand oui à la François d'Assise, dont Negri fait le modèle du militant contemporain. Cet homme nouveau, révolutionnaire, désire tout ce qui fait le monde : l'individualité, les corps, les sens, le plaisir, le savoir, la technologie, la mondialisation. Ce désir théorique du commun, Negri en trouve d'ailleurs le paradigme chez Job qui, contre les calamités, veut croire—et cela déjà suffit à l'existence de Dieu.

À cet homme nouveau, derrière qui se cache certainement Negri lui-même, qui se donne à voir comme modèle de révolution entraîné de se faire là maintenant, s'attache la capacité d'une ascèse du commun. L'ascèse est construction intériorisée de l'objet; c'est un état constituant, une transformation des sens et de l'imagination, du corps et de la raison. Pour vivre le bien commun, explique Negri, l'ascèse est toujours nécessaire. L'incarnation christique, dit-il, est une piste pour une vie vertueuse. Être le monde désiré, le faire, chaque jour.

C'est l'acte qui fait advenir?

Oui, c'est l'acte. L'acte produit par la passion, par la communauté : cela vient d'une espèce de coopération métaphysique, d'un élan réciproque, d'une ouverture réelle. À chaque moment où l'on vit, on crée. Chaque moment est une création, à moins qu'il s'agisse de moments que l'on ne peut véritablement pas vivre, où l'on est à ce point neutralisé que la vie en devient une parodie d'elle-même (190).

Negri, par cette idée d'ascèse, mais aussi par cette insistance à propos de la surabondance et de la richesse de l'être, cet embrassement du trop-plein, se pose explicitement contre une mystique du néant, qu'il exécra notamment à travers les figures de Levinas et de Heidegger—flanc nihiliste de la pensée chrétienne contemporaine. Le mysticisme est un éloignement de l'objet, une théologie négative, une théorie des marges. De Heidegger il dit de la conception du temps qu'elle est « folklorique et

caricaturale » , parce que—et il me semble qu’il y a quelque chose là—dans cette conception l’Être est fixe et le temps tourne autour. Le temps négrien est toujours, lui, rencontre avec l’être qui par là crée le monde—*kairòs*. Il est un appel à la création du commun, un appel à la communion, ici, maintenant. Une multitude sans Empire ou une religion sans église—en écoutant Negri penser, on a l’impression que c’est un peu la même chose.

Sa position sur la biotechnologie reflète cette toile étrange que forme la pensée de cet intellectuel dont les convictions, leur apparence à tout le moins, semblent inébranlables—coulées dans l’acier d’un oui aveugle et lumineux.

Il est clair que le biopouvoir n’a aucune intention de laisser l’hybridation dans les mains de la multitude—mais c’est précisément pour cela qu’il nous appartient de la revendiquer comme un terrain de liberté et non pas comme une extension de l’asservissement, de l’exploitation et de la marchandisation de la vie. Je dis donc que nous sommes pour l’hybridation parce que nous sentons notre propre corps comme un hybride... [...] confrontation entre l’hybridation et la démocratie—parce que seule la démocratie absolue est capable de permettre de rendre compte de la multiplicité des singularités qui prolifèrent dans le commun—qui est susceptible non seulement d’organiser la multitude mais de récupérer l’hybridation comme une richesse (113–4).

Au plan de l’action, l’idée est de s’approprier cette productivité biotechnologique, cette richesse, qui est celle de l’humanité. La démocratie des cyborgs, il ne faut pas en avoir peur, nous dit Negri, il ne faut pas demander de l’ordre, paniquer, invoquer quelque transcendance. C’est à ce moment de l’action, quand la confiance veut céder le pouvoir à l’Empire, que la foi sauve tout : dire oui à l’hybridation, à la rencontre entre la technologie et l’humain, c’est dire oui à l’humanité, faire confiance au commun, expérimenter la joie de la confiance au commun. Il s’agit tout simplement de croire. Communie! répète le révolutionnaire qui accorde l’éternité au corps, qui bénit le temps.

En lisant Negri, si on accepte de le prendre au sérieux (et pourquoi pas, puisqu’il est un homme qui s’adresse à tous, ce qui est, on en conviendra, de plus en plus rare), on se sent comme devant celui qui offre une promesse de volupté dont les conséquences, si elles s’avéraient néfastes, seraient en fait catastrophiques—honteuses. Mais le raisonnement est rond, et la séduction est puissante. Negri est bien un mauvais maître—cherchant sa « légion de démons » . Qui a dit que le postmodernisme était nihiliste? On est reparti pour un autre tour ...

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### **Cyber-Diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century**

Evan H. Potter, ed.

Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002, xii, 208.

We are repeatedly told that we live in a revolutionary age, a time in which dramatic new developments in information and communication technologies (ICTs) will fundamentally transform the ways in which we live and work. Even the collapse of the dot.com bubble in 2000 has not much dampened the spirits of the techno-utopians. Given these often-exaggerated claims, I approached *Cyber-Diplomacy* with some trepidation, as the editor cites Marshall McLuhan’s ‘global village’ in the first line of his introduction, and speaks of an information revolution in his second paragraph. However, as I pressed on in the text I was very pleasantly surprised to find that the editor and authors of this short volume are well aware of the dangers of overstatement in relation to ICTs, and work very hard throughout to avoid techno-utopianism. Instead, the authors attempt to take a fairly sober look at “how diplomacy is adapting to the new global information order” (7).

While the title and early references to the present information revolution suggest a focus on networked computing in general and the Internet in particular, *Cyber-Diplomacy* take a rather broader view of the new global information order, and in doing so usefully sets the present Internet frenzy into the context of the development in the last half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century of means of global mass communication, particularly television. Through a series of both scholarly research papers and reflections of practitioners, the book usefully surveys the challenges posed to the foreign policy apparatuses of the state by the growth in the range and volume of publically available information. These challenges range from the so-called CNN effect, considered directly in Chapters 3 and 4, through the growing capacities of non-state actors that are provided by ICTs, to the greater demands of public diplomacy. The challenges are usefully summarised by the editor at the outset as “interconnectivity, decentralization, acceleration, amplification, and hypertextuality” (5), although it might have been useful for the authors to have made more explicit use of these five terms in tying the text together.

What does tend to tie the text together, through most of the chapters, is an implicit Canadian focus. All but two of the authors are Canadian-based academics or practitioners, and so most of the chapters have some significant Canadian referents. Even Ronald Deibert’s theoretical scene-setting chapter draws most heavily on two noted Canadians—Marshall McLuhan and Harold Innis—to develop his ideas on medium theory as a way of thinking about world politics in an information age. The text also provides useful Canadian case studies, as with Andrew Cooper’s consideration of the use of the internet in the Canada-Spain fish war, Evan Potter’s discussion of Canada’s public diplomacy, and, perhaps most notably, Gordon Smith and Allen Sutherland’s account of the DFAIT’s adaptation to ICTs in the past fifteen years. Indeed, perhaps the most obvious weakness of the text is that it was not somewhat more consistent in its Canadian focus, as the two chapters by non-Canadian-based authors seem somewhat out of place.

Ultimately, the overriding question for the text is whether the development of more rapid, widespread, and accessible media of communication that the Internet in particular provides, marks the end of diplomacy. The conclusion that runs throughout the book is that, of course, it does not. Rather, the new communications technologies and the tremendous increase in the availability of information, the range of actors who can provide that information, and the speed with which it can be made available, will demand changes in the ways in which diplomacy is practised, but also provide states with important opportunities. The singly greatest such opportunity, pointed to by a number of authors, is that of providers of reliable information. As anyone who has used the Internet for research, or who has received papers from students who have, knows, there is tremendous variability in the quality and reliability of the information available on the Internet. The authors suggest that states in general, and their diplomatic arms in particular, have the chance to establish themselves as leading sources of reliable, trustworthy information, building on their heritage of privileged access to intelligence.

The problem with reliability and trust, however, is that they are resources that are easily squandered and difficult to recapture. As Stephen Livingstone points out: “[Diplomats] must offer careful, sound analysis that is as open as possible and unflinching in its adherence to honesty” (123). Openness and honesty are crucial in the present information environment, because so much of what is said can be checked against other sources. Since this volume appeared, the reliability and trustworthiness of two the most important diplomatic actors, the United States and United Kingdom, has been significantly undermined by their disregard for openness and honesty in relation to their ‘intelligence’ on Iraq. It is now an open question whether the recent revelations have fundamentally undermined the trust publics will be willing to put in the reliability of state information.

It might be that the central conclusion to be drawn from this volume has already been overtaken by events. Nevertheless, the collection is valuable for its careful and measured consideration of the place of diplomacy in a world of rapid-paced, high-volume information flows.

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### **Globalization and Human Rights**

Alison Brysk, sous la direction de

Berkeley : University of California Press, 2002, 311 p.

Quel est l'impact de la mondialisation sur les droits de l'Homme ? La mondialisation favorise-t-elle la défense des droits de l'Homme ou fournit-elle plutôt de nouveaux instruments, de nouvelles possibilités de violation des droits de l'Homme ? Qu'en est-il des avancées technologiques et des moyens de communication divers ? Selon la vision libérale, la mondialisation serait porteuse de développement, de démocratie, d'autonomisation et d'une meilleure gouvernance mondiale. Cela se vérifie-t-il dans la réalité ? Le but du collectif *Globalization and Human Rights* est d'apporter des éléments de réponse aux nombreuses questions que soulèvent les bouleversements de notre monde actuel. Les auteurs cherchent ainsi à dégager les grandes tendances de la mondialisation et l'impact qu'elles ont sur les droits de l'Homme. C'est ce qui explique la division du volume en quatre parties distinctes : la citoyenneté (*citizenship*), la marchandisation (*commodification*), la communication et, finalement, la coopération. C'est le deuxième chapitre du collectif qui sera traité ici, soit celui qui étudie la mondialisation des marchés. Les auteurs y examinent tour à tour l'impact politique de la mondialisation, les contradictions entre l'économie et le libéralisme politique en ce qui a trait aux droits sociaux, l'impact différencié de l'intégration structurelle sur différents types de droits et la mobilisation contre l'exploitation que pratiquent les firmes multinationales dans certains pays.

Le débat présenté par les différents auteurs qui ont participé à la rédaction de ce chapitre oppose deux visions de la mondialisation économique : une mondialisation « par le haut », c'est-à-dire par les institutions, et une mondialisation « par le bas », par les marchés et les acteurs économiques. La question n'est donc pas de rejeter ou non la mondialisation mais plutôt de déterminer comment la mondialisation pourrait profiter au plus grand nombre. La mondialisation, telle qu'on la connaît, pourra-t-elle survivre sans acquérir davantage de légitimité ? Quelle est sa viabilité politique ? La mondialisation néolibérale peut-elle être réformée sans qu'une telle réforme ne lui enlève ses effets bénéfiques ? Ce sont ces questions que soulève Richard Falk. Selon lui, les partisans de la mondialisation par le haut adoptent une définition restrictive des droits de l'Homme en ne considérant que les droits civils et politiques. À l'opposé, les partisans de la mondialisation par le bas embrasseraient une définition plus large, qui engloberait, en plus, les droits économiques, sociaux et culturels. De ce point de vue, la mondialisation acquerrait une certaine légitimité, ce qui assurerait sa pérennité, si elle garantissait l'inclusion, la participation, l'ouverture et l'imputabilité de tous les acteurs qui la façonnent. Il est, selon l'auteur, nécessaire d'en venir à une démocratie mondiale.

Wesley T. Milner adopte, lui aussi, une définition large des droits de l'Homme, qu'il s'agisse des droits de subsistance ou des droits liés à la sécurité (droit d'accès à de l'eau et de l'air non pollués, droit de manger suffisamment, droit de se vêtir et d'avoir un toit, et accès à des services de santé minimaux). À l'aide d'une étude économétrique, l'auteur vérifie une hypothèse à trois volets : l'intégration d'un pays à l'économie mondiale, le niveau de liberté économique et la démocratie assureraient une meilleure protection des droits fondamentaux. Les conclusions que tire

l'auteur sont on ne peut plus surprenantes. Premièrement, l'intégration à l'économie mondiale (la participation au système de Bretton Woods, l'ouverture commerciale et financière) a des effets mitigés. L'ouverture commerciale a des effets positifs sur les droits de subsistance et de sécurité. L'ouverture financière, quant à elle, a des effets négatifs sur les droits de subsistance et positifs sur les droits de sécurité. Deuxièmement, la liberté économique ne fait aucune différence en ce qui a trait aux droits de subsistance, mais a des effets négatifs sur les droits de sécurité. Ceci s'expliquerait par le fait que cette nouvelle liberté creuse les inégalités économiques des sociétés en question. Ces inégalités seraient source, à leur tour, de conflits sociaux et de répression. Troisièmement, la démocratie aurait des effets positifs tant sur les droits de subsistance que sur les droits de sécurité, bien que son impact sur ces derniers soit moins prononcé que dans le premier cas. La mondialisation, dans certaines de ces dimensions, pourrait donc promouvoir la protection des droits de l'Homme. Cette étude invite par conséquent à une réflexion plus poussée sur la vision libérale qui soutient que tous les pays profitent nécessairement du commerce international.

Finalement, le troisième texte explore les divers arguments présentés par deux groupes distincts quant à l'inclusion de normes du travail dans les accords internationaux : ceux qui s'opposent à une telle inclusion (l'approche par le marché) et ceux qui militent pour l'inclusion de certaines normes dans les institutions. Raul C. Pangalangan illustre le fossé entre la mondialisation des marchés et la localisation des normes du travail. Qui sont ceux qui plaident contre l'inclusion de normes du travail dans les traités internationaux ? La main-d'œuvre bon marché est-elle réellement un avantage comparatif pour les firmes multinationales ? Le choix devrait-il revenir au consommateur ou les États devraient-ils plutôt légiférer en la matière ? De quelles façons la mondialisation remet-elle en question les compétences des États ? Quels sont les domaines dans lesquels les États peuvent prendre des décisions individuelles (loi nationale) et ceux où ils doivent décider collectivement, en tant que membres du « village global » (loi internationale) ? Quelle institution devrait être chargée de faire respecter ces normes ? l'OMC ou l'OIT ? La question est une question de morale et la différence entre les deux approches réside dans le choix du « décideur ». Les « institutionnalistes » privilégient les communautés qui elles-mêmes s'en remettraient par la suite aux institutions pour veiller à l'application des normes. L'approche par le marché défend, quant à elle, la liberté de décision du consommateur. L'auteur opte pour l'approche institutionnaliste parce qu'elle permet de limiter les tentations de l'unilatéralisme même si cette approche entretient le mythe de la nation monolithique.

Le principal problème lié à la mondialisation découlerait du décalage entre les nouvelles possibilités qu'elle offre et l'absence d'institution capable de gérer ces nouveaux défis. Si l'on pousse plus loin la question des institutions, comme le fait Richard Falk, auteur du premier texte, on en vient à questionner la légitimité et l'opacité des institutions existantes (l'OMC) ou encore leur efficacité (l'ONU). La mondialisation par le haut a ses limites, comme le démontre Richard Falk. Mais s'en remettre aux marchés et aux acteurs économiques pour veiller à la défense et à la promotion des droits de l'Homme n'est pas une avenue garante de succès, selon Raul C. Pangalangan. Le défi serait ainsi de trouver l'équilibre délicat entre souveraineté étatique, autonomie des marchés et régulation institutionnalisée. Ce trinôme a été baptisé éloquemment de « triangle d'incompatibilité »<sup>1</sup> par certains auteurs. Au-delà de ces constats, une remarque s'impose. La mondialisation de l'économie a des répercus-

<sup>1</sup>Voir à ce sujet D. Brunelle, C. Deblock et M. Rioux (2000), *Globalisation, investissement et concurrence—La voie du régionalisme : Le projet des Amériques*, Cahiers de recherche CEIM-GRIC 01-09, septembre (disponible en ligne à l'adresse suivante : [www.unites.uqam.ca/gric](http://www.unites.uqam.ca/gric))

sions sur de multiples autres sphères. À l'heure actuelle, le seul droit international qui s'applique de façon efficace est celui qui a été mis en place dans le cadre de l'OMC. Il importe que les autres dimensions soient traitées le plus rapidement et le plus efficacement possible. La mondialisation de l'économie signifie aussi la mondialisation des problèmes qui en découlent, que ce soit par rapport à la pollution environnementale, aux problèmes de sous-développement ou aux pressions migratoires. Les pays développés ne peuvent plus se permettre d'ignorer les problèmes des pays en développement puisqu'ils en subissent eux aussi les conséquences négatives, comme nous l'ont démontré les attentats du 11 septembre 2001. *Globalization and Human Rights* n'a pas la prétention d'apporter des réponses étayées à toutes les questions soulevées, mais se propose plutôt comme un incitatif à poursuivre plus loin les recherches et la réflexion dans ces domaines.

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### **Governing Global Trade: International Institutions in Conflict and Convergence**

Theodore H. Cohn

Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002, pp. xi, 329.

At a time when all eyes are riveted on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the ups and downs associated with its current round of negotiation initiated in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, Theodore Cohn's latest publication provides a vivid reminder: The global trading regime is made up of much more than the WTO. The GATT/WTO is still pivotal in Cohn's diachronic overview of the evolution of the global trade regime since the creation of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) in 1947, but unlike several other studies on a similar topic, the author untangles the relationship between the GATT/WTO and other formal and informal international institutions, such as the G7/G8, the Quadilateral Group (Quad), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the G77, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Each institution, as well as the United States and the European Union, is given relatively equal coverage in this notable study. Yet, as an indication that the GATT/WTO is still *primus inter pares*, most chapters revolve around the major negotiation rounds of the international organization. Chapter 2 traces the origins and early period of the postwar trade regime (1947–1962). Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on the Kennedy (1962–1972) and Tokyo (1973–1979) rounds of the GATT respectively. Chapter 5 details the uncertainty associated with the survival of the GATT (1980–1986). Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the momentous Uruguay Round of the GATT (1986–1994), and chapter 8 highlights the post-Uruguay Round period (1995–2001).

The introduction of *Governing Global Trade* is the strongest section of the book. It constitutes a must read for any International Political Economy course, be it at the graduate or undergraduate level. The introduction could be assigned on its own to the classroom, as a valid theoretical overview of the international trade regime. In his usual highly accessible prose, Cohn underscores the pyramidal structure of the global trade regime. At the top of the pyramid, sits the two most salient actors, that is, the United States and the European Union. The G7/G8, the Quad made up of the trade ministers of the United States, the EU, Japan and Canada, and the OECD comprise the second layer of the pyramid. Cohn locates the GATT/WTO one step below these institutions, and inserts the G77 and the UNCTAD at the base of the pyramid. The author's discussion of the interaction between the building blocs of the international trade regime is not limited to the members of the pyramid. When appropriate, Cohn draws attention to the role of regional trading blocs, other informal trade alliances such as the Cairns Group, and a variety of private groupings.

Cohn points out that the role played by these variegated institutions and actors fluctuates through time and, consequently, he is interested in addressing three essential questions throughout the book: 1) How and why have the G7/G8, the Quad, and the OECD become influential in the global trade regime? 2) What is the nature of their influence? 3) How has their influence changed over time? The following eight chapters represent a journey through the evolution and role of the members of the pyramid. The reader will not find in-depth answers to each of these questions, but Cohn does a splendid job providing a wealth of references for whoever is interested in pursuing more comprehensive analyses of the role and evolution of specific institutions. In short, any serious student of international trade commerce and negotiation should use *Governing Global Trade* as the starting point for a thorough investigation of these prominent international phenomena.

Cohn's self-avowed goal is to "provide a more complex and varied view of the global trade regime than studies that limit their focus almost completely to the GATT/WTO" (27). Mission accomplished! In a straightforward fashion, Cohn brings the reader through a web of entangling relationships between international trade institutions and, by the time the reader reaches the conclusion, she or he is much more conversant on the role and significance of the global trade regime on our everyday lives. In conclusion, I should point out one minor irritant with this book: it is filled with a lot of redundant text. Sometimes an important point is repeated word by word in different sections of the book. This is especially true of the summaries at the end of sub-sections of the text and chapters. This might not offend a dilettante who might need a constant reminder of the central issues treated in the volume, but this extraneous text affects the reading flow and distracts from the substantive content of the book.

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