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The Moral Ecology of Markets: Assessing Claims about Markets and Justice

Daniel K. Finn

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. ix, 169

There is a subtitle to this book: “Assessing Claims about Markets and Justice.” Its aim is not to settle the question of how just markets are, but rather to identify the framework within which the morality of markets can be profitably discussed. In the opening chapter, he takes to task some celebrated economists who, he thinks, try to defend markets without moral judgment. We can certainly agree that if they really thought they were doing that, their task was hopeless. But more likely they felt their moral premises were uncontroversial.

The next two chapters respectively summarize the moral cases for and against markets. Discussion of the first is fairly straightforward, though strangely missing is the argument that the basic idea of the market is itself just, even the very hallmark of justice, viz. since it consists of freely made exchanges which respect the freedom of others. Discussion of the critiques of the market is rather undiscerning; e.g., that markets “threaten the environment.” Still, these are the sorts of things that are said. Finn doesn’t try to pass judgment, though he appears to endorse most of these to some extent.

Chapter 5 then identifies what Finn proposes to be the four main problems of economic life: “allocation, distribution, scale, and quality of human relationships.” Finn does not, however, show much awareness of the specifically free-market handling of all these. (E.g., is there really a distinction to be made between “allocation” and “distribution,” given that people make things for reasons, including, often, who will use them and on what terms?)

Part 2 of the book devotes three chapters to “the market as an arena of freedom,” the “moral ecology of the market,” and “implications.” In the first of these, the point is made that discussing the market exclusively in terms as general as “capitalism vs. socialism” is largely pointless, since the real question is just where to put the “fences” that delimit the sphere of full market behaviour; socialism would be one view about where those fences should be. Now, the alternative to markets is *always* control by a central agency that is not itself acting as a market participant, which is the essence of socialism—perhaps the familiar bifurcation makes more sense than Finn allows. But, granted, the choice of “fence locations” is not an all-or-nothing issue. Finn does, however, fall into the familiar but undiscerning habit of holding that *some* “intervention” by government is necessary to the market itself.

Chapter 7 is the source of the book’s title: “The Market’s Moral Ecology.” This consists, first, in the aforementioned “fence-placing” and then in the “provision of essential goods and services, the morality of individuals and groups, and civil society” (126–7). Calling these things “ecology” suggests that they are distinct from the market itself; but a stout defender of the market would deny this. Markets provide goods and services, including “essential” ones; they *are* defined by moral prohibitions (against violation of rights to persons and property); and they certainly take place only in civil society, which is certainly a “network of voluntary associations” (138) and does pervade society. How can an organization be voluntary that doesn’t instantiate the freedom of the marketplace, seeing that exchanges among participants are quintessentially *voluntary*?

This last brings up a question about the understanding of the term “economy.” The basic notion is that of individual freedom: individuals confining their activities to those that are consistent with the freedom of others. Is that exclusively “economic”? If not, then economics does indeed have an “ecology” lying outside itself; but it might make more sense to insist that what is usually called “economics” is simply the application of this same social principle to certain narrower activities in which, say, money figures prominently, the line between it and other things being essentially arbitrary.

Chapter 8 then summarizes what Finn supposes to be implications of the preceding analysis. For some reason, a rather perceptive discussion of political lobbying for economic purposes occupies a fair bit of this chapter, even though such lobbying is anti-market in essence. He then moves to a final summary: that “all participants in the debate about the justice of markets are already addressing the same four problems of economic life and taking positions on the same four elements of the moral ecology of markets.” Given this, we should also have a “common conversation” (154). Some of what Finn says might promote that object, but some will not. Serious defenders of markets can complain that much of the structure identified here is misleadingly characterized. (The discussion of freedom on pp. 117–19 is so confused as to deserve an article in itself.) The market idea can do a lot more than he suggests. However, he does the literature a service by producing this classification of aspects to discuss.

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Femmes et Parlements. Un regard international

Sous la direction de Manon Tremblay

Montréal, Éditions du remue-ménage, 2005, 672 pages

Femmes et Parlements se donne comme objectif de présenter un état des lieux des droits politiques des femmes et de leur présence dans les assemblées législatives, et d'examiner les mesures prises par les États et les partis en vue d'accroître la participation politique des femmes dans 37 pays répartis sur les cinq continents. Cet ouvrage collectif, qui rassemble des textes de 34 auteurs, spécialistes de différents pays, sous la coordination de Manon Tremblay, professeure à l'Université d'Ottawa, s'inscrit dans un débat engagé depuis environ vingt ans quant à la présence des femmes dans les instances représentatives (cf. *Projets féministes*, n° spécial « Actualité de la parité », février 1996). On s'est aperçu que, si les femmes ont obtenu le droit de vote et d'éligibilité dans les démocraties représentatives, leur présence numérique dans les assemblées législatives progresse lentement. L'objectif récent de la « parité » adopté par des mouvements féministes et quelques partis politiques résulte du constat que l'égalité en droit acquise entre hommes et femmes n'a pas apporté ce qu'elle était censée apporter en matière d'égalité représentation des hommes et des femmes en politique. Un certain nombre d'États ont élaboré des cadres législatifs destinés à promouvoir la féminisation de leurs institutions représentatives.

Dans ce recueil, on a choisi de ne traiter que de la présence des femmes dans les parlements nationaux, qui correspondent à l'échelon le plus élevé de l'autorité législative de l'État, et non pas, par exemple, de leur présence dans les instances régionales ou municipales. Les auteurs fournissent des analyses concrètes du fonctionnement des systèmes politiques, des mécanismes d'exclusion et d'inclusion des femmes dans les instances représentatives et des actions étatiques et partisanes visant à surmonter les obstacles à l'élection des femmes.

Cinq textes sur l'Afrique ouvrent le volume (Afrique du Sud, Égypte, Rwanda, Sénégal et Tunisie). La proportion des femmes parlementaires y va de 48,8 % au Rwanda à 2,9 % en Égypte. Les élections d'octobre 2003 au Rwanda—les premières élections législatives tenues après le génocide—ont permis la formation d'un parlement quasi-paritaire. Le Rwanda se classe au premier rang mondial en ce qui concerne la représentation des femmes dans les parlements. Powley analyse cette évolution sous l'angle des mesures concrètes constitutionnelles et législatives mises en place pour accroître le nombre des femmes élues (entre autres, la réservation d'un taux de sièges à la Chambre des députés, p. 115) et des actions conjointes des organisations de femmes et du gouvernement rwandais (plus précisément, du Front patriotique rwan-

daus au pouvoir). Plusieurs États de l'Afrique sub-saharienne ont adopté, au cours des dernières années, des formes de quotas et le taux des femmes parlementaires s'accroît dans cette partie du monde plus rapidement que dans d'autres régions (p. 126). Cette avancée dans le champ de la représentation politique peut cependant cacher le fait qu'un rôle secondaire continue à être assigné aux femmes dans la société, comme le laissent entendre Ba et Diop dans leur texte sur le Sénégal. Parmi les pays du Maghreb et les pays d'Asie qui ont incorporé des lois religieuses islamiques à l'ordre public, la Tunisie fait figure d'exception avec un taux de 22,8 % de femmes parlementaires. K. Cherif considère que ce chiffre est peu indicatif de l'exercice de la citoyenneté de plein droit par les femmes tunisiennes et que les femmes qui entrent au parlement sont tenues à l'écart des décisions significatives qui pèsent sur l'ensemble de la société. L'État tunisien, soucieux de se présenter sur la scène internationale comme un État « moderne » et de contrer à l'intérieur la contestation islamiste, instrumentalise l'intégration des femmes dans l'espace politique.

En Asie, le Bangladesh et le Pakistan ont établi un système de « sièges réservés » aux femmes. L'Inde utilise la même méthode dans les instances locales. Au Pakistan, cette politique a permis de passer, selon Abou Zahab, de 1,8 % en 1993 à 21,3 % de femmes parlementaires en 2005. Elle signale néanmoins que les femmes élues aux sièges généraux sont pour la plupart le « prête-nom » de leur mari, ou d'un parent qui est dans l'incapacité de se présenter (p. 281). Les sièges réservés conduisent à produire une classe politique de femmes élues par « procuration », privées de base électorale réelle et recrutées dans des familles politiques établies (p. 285). Un large éventail de pays d'Asie et d'Océanie aux réalités sociales, économiques et politiques très diverses sont abordés dans cette section du volume (Israël, Palestine, Iran, Corée du Sud, Japon, Taiwan, Nouvelle-Zélande et Australie). L'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande affichent les plus forts taux de femmes parlementaires parmi ces pays (24,7 % et 28,3 %). Le nombre de femmes députées est bas en Israël (15 %) où en dépit de la rhétorique nationale sur l'égalité entre hommes et femmes (Golan et Hermann, p. 253), les femmes sont systématiquement tenues à l'écart des décisions importantes et, jusqu'à nos jours, les femmes élues font rarement partie des comités chargés d'examiner les questions de « haute politique », telles que les finances et les affaires étrangères (p. 265).

En Amérique latine, le taux de participation des femmes aux institutions représentatives reste bas, mais il a augmenté au cours des années 1990. Les trois pays sud-américains étudiés, le Brésil, le Pérou, et le Mexique, ont adopté un système de quotas législatifs pour favoriser l'élection des femmes, qui établit un plancher de 30 % de chaque sexe dans les listes électorales. Cette politique a donné des résultats, mais comme le souligne Navarro Swain pour le Brésil, il ne faut pas surestimer la portée de ces mesures. Dans ce pays, loin d'atteindre le taux de 30 %, les femmes élues n'ont pas dépassé le seuil de 10 % à la Chambre basse aux premières élections après la mise en application des quotas en 2002.

En 2005, le taux de femmes parlementaires était de 21,1 % au Canada et de 15 % aux États-Unis. Ces deux pays n'ont introduit aucune mesure législative pour accroître le nombre de femmes élues. Swers décrit les blocages que le système électoral des États-Unis oppose aux candidates en favorisant les membres sortants du Congrès, mais signale aussi la pénurie de femmes qualifiées disposées à se porter candidates, du fait d'une division sexuelle du travail qui les rend les principales responsables du soin des enfants (p. 444).

En Europe (16 pays européens sont analysés dans le volume), les pays scandinaves ont été pendant de nombreuses années considérés comme des modèles quant à la promotion de l'égalité des sexes. Bergqvist attribue l'entrée d'un grand nombre de femmes en politique, depuis les années 1970, à leur participation massive au marché du travail dans un contexte d'expansion du modèle scandinave de l'État-providence,

mais aussi à la mobilisation des mouvements sociaux. Le recul des femmes élues de 38 % à 33 % aux élections de 1991 en Suède, perçu comme une menace pour la démocratie et l'égalité des sexes, provoqua une vaste mobilisation (p. 549). Rueschemeyer affirme que la transition à l'économie de marché en Europe de l'Est de l'après 1989 a particulièrement touché une grande partie des femmes, qui ont dû faire face à l'interruption des services sociaux et aux problèmes de chômage (p. 563). Elle émet l'hypothèse que la baisse de la proportion de femmes dans les assemblées législatives qu'on y observe est imputable au retrait des structures alternatives à la famille. L'indépendance économique des femmes et surtout le partage des tâches ménagères et de la responsabilité des soins aux enfants sont des conditions nécessaires, mais pas suffisantes, à l'entrée des femmes en politique, comme le montre le cas de la France. Il faut également que les femmes aspirant à la politique brisent des traditions politiques bien ancrées. En France, les premiers résultats de la loi passée en 2000, qui impose 50 % de candidats de chaque sexe pour toutes les élections au scrutin de liste, ont été peu spectaculaires (le taux de femmes parlementaires y est de 12,2 %). Aux élections législatives de juin 2002, les grands partis ont préféré encourir les sanctions financières que prévoit la loi lorsque les listes ne sont pas paritaires (Dauphin et Praud, 597).

Les femmes élues vont-elles changer la politique ? La question de savoir si les femmes sont porteuses d'une « spécificité » a opposé et oppose encore dans les mouvements féministes, et en dehors d'eux, différentialistes et universalistes. La position universaliste considère que femmes et hommes appartiennent à la même humanité; toute affirmation d'une spécificité sexuée est rejetée, parce qu'elle est susceptible de renforcer l'idée de la complémentarité des sexes et de favoriser la hiérarchisation. La position différentialiste soutient que les femmes, tout en appartenant à la même humanité que les hommes, ont des qualités spécifiques qui pourraient enrichir le monde commun (sur ce point, voir Collin, F., 1999 *Le différend des sexes. De Platon à la parité*). Les études de cas de ce volume attestent que cette opposition n'est pas décisive pour prendre position pour ou contre les mesures qui visent l'augmentation du nombre de femmes dans les instances de décision. L'objectif de « parité » est parvenu à rallier des mouvements féministes malgré leurs différences idéologiques. D'ailleurs, les auteurs du livre ont des opinions divergentes quant à la question de savoir si les femmes au pouvoir sont soucieuses d'améliorer les conditions de vie des femmes dans le domaine qui leur est imparti. La « parité » ne révolutionne pas les rapports sociaux de sexe, mais le fait que les femmes investissent de plus en plus les instances de prise de décision témoigne de changements majeurs survenus dans les rôles des sexes dans de larges parties du monde. Les contributions de ce volume indiquent qu'il s'agit néanmoins d'une évolution lente et parfois ambiguë puisque les femmes politiques sont confrontées aux mécanismes de ségrégation internes des partis politiques et des parlements.

Le lecteur trouvera dans les textes rassemblés un matériel riche d'analyses concrètes et d'interrogations cruciales sur la question des femmes et du pouvoir et y rencontrera des approches variées, parfois complémentaires, parfois divergentes.

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Le Canada, les États-Unis et le monde, la marge de manœuvre canadienne

Sous la direction de André Donneur

Québec : Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2005.

Ce livre réunit cinq articles traitant de la relation du Canada avec son voisin du sud, cette superpuissance dans l'ombre de laquelle le gouvernement canadien déploie sa

politique étrangère. Les réflexions proposées portent essentiellement sur les questions de sécurité. Publié à la fin de 2005, l'ouvrage analyse les politiques des gouvernements Chrétien et Martin. Or ce sont des questions de politique intérieure plutôt que de politique étrangère qui ont mobilisé les ressources de ces gouvernements. Cette publication pose la question de l'avenir, question qui est encore plus pertinente depuis le changement de gouvernement survenu à Ottawa en janvier 2006

Le premier chapitre est de Nelson Michaud. Il nous éclaire sur le rôle des valeurs canadiennes dans la définition de la politique étrangère des gouvernements en poste à Ottawa. Il retrace la trajectoire historique des valeurs qui guident la politique étrangère canadienne et démontre que la décision du gouvernement Chrétien de ne pas participer à la guerre en Irak s'inscrit dans la logique du multilatéralisme canadien. Cette intervention armée n'avait l'aval ni de l'ONU, ni de l'OTAN, ce qui a lourdement influencé la décision canadienne. L'article analyse ensuite les valeurs psychosociales et politico-opérationnelles qui sont à la source de la politique étrangère canadienne. Toutes ces valeurs distinguent le Canada des États-Unis. L'auteur souligne cependant le fossé entre valeurs et réalité. Adoptant une démarche prescriptive, il dresse la liste des défis auxquels doit faire face le gouvernement canadien, entre autres : l'urgence de réévaluer la pratique du multilatéralisme et de résoudre le dilemme entre héritage historique et innovation; l'importance de préserver le respect et la crédibilité de la position canadienne sur la scène internationale; la nécessité de protéger la souveraineté canadienne tout en gardant une relation saine avec les États-Unis; etc. Pour relever ces défis, le Canada doit redéfinir ses priorités et y consacrer les ressources nécessaires. Mais ces réalités ne sont pas priorisées dans les plateformes électorales, version 2004, des partis politiques siégeant au Parlement canadien. En terminant, l'article analyse l'énoncé de politique étrangère canadienne déposé en 2005. Contre toute attente, celui-ci se démarque des pratiques précédentes. La sécurité nationale et continentale y occupe une place plus importante que par le passé. Le texte affirme le rôle central du gouvernement fédéral en matière de politique étrangère et les défis à relever ne sont plus ignorés, notamment en ce qui a trait à l'avenir du multilatéralisme. Quant à la relation Canada-États-Unis, l'énoncé souligne l'importance d'être différent mais non indifférent. Cette politique innove donc. D'après l'auteur, l'innovation a été possible parce que c'est une ressource externe, plutôt que la fonction publique, qui a produit cet énoncé, dont l'avenir demeure toutefois incertain en raison du climat politique canadien.

Le chapitre deux a été écrit par André Donneur et Valentin Chirica. Ils explorent les questions d'interdépendance et d'autonomie qui structurent les relations entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Pour ces auteurs, il est clair que, malgré quelques incohérences, le Canada a toujours su préserver sa spécificité en matière de politique étrangère. Ils étudient les facteurs structurels et les pressions qui influencent la politique étrangère canadienne en accordant une attention particulière aux positions développées par la communauté épistémique, les groupes de pression et les partis politiques. Les auteurs estiment que ces différents facteurs ont permis au Canada de resserrer sa coopération avec son voisin d'une manière nuancée, de développer sa législation antiterroriste et d'améliorer son cadre institutionnel en matière de sécurité. Ils analysent en détail la coopération multilatérale et bilatérale en matière de sécurité non militaire entre le Canada et les États-Unis et soulignent qu'elle est bien antérieure à 2001 et que les mesures antiterroristes internes du Canada lui sont spécifiques. Le Canada a toujours gardé ses distances avec Washington sur ces questions. La nouvelle politique canadienne de sécurité nationale déposée en 2004, première politique de ce type, a intégré un nouveau principe, le principe de prévention, et a élargi les préoccupations sécuritaires aux questions de blanchiment d'argent. Néanmoins, cette politique ne résout pas l'épineux problème de l'arrimage d'une coopération continentale plus poussée avec une politique favorisant le multilatéralisme.

Dans un texte court et d'une grande cohérence, le chapitre trois, de Stéphane Roussel, présente une réflexion sur la construction institutionnelle de la défense canado-américaine. Il rappelle que les relations entre le Canada et les États-Unis sont les plus stables et les plus denses au monde. En se référant aux théories institutionnalistes et à celles touchant à la coopération entre démocraties, cette analyse nous permet de mieux comprendre les phénomènes de coopération qui ne reflètent pas du tout le rapport de forces entre ces deux États. Roussel brosse un tableau de la construction des institutions qui lient les États-Unis et le Canada, un réseau comptant aujourd'hui pas moins de 80 traités, 250 autres protocoles, et 145 tribunes bilatérales. Trois phases distinctes ont conduit à la construction de ce réseau; la première débute à la veille de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la deuxième, en 1947 et la troisième, en 1957. Chaque étape a suscité critiques et débats mais, dans l'ensemble, la construction de ces institutions s'est déroulée sans heurts et a permis d'établir des règles du jeu claires, tel que le prévoient les institutionnalistes. L'auteur aborde ensuite les enjeux actuels de la défense de l'Amérique du Nord et l'avenir de la coopération canado-américaine en matière de sécurité. Des menaces asymétriques posent le problème de la frontière entre les deux pays et celui de la dépendance canadienne vis-à-vis du marché américain. Dans le contexte des relations post-2001, les institutions bilatérales pourraient s'avérer particulièrement utiles pour aborder ces questions, même si elles sont elles-mêmes sujettes à des changements majeurs. Héritées de la guerre froide, ces institutions doivent aujourd'hui faire face à de nombreux défis, notamment : l'intégration du Mexique dans l'architecture de sécurité; l'adaptation à la réorganisation des commandements militaires aux États-Unis avec la création du *Northern Command*; l'adaptation des politiques et actions canadiennes dans un nouvel environnement institutionnel américain depuis la création du *Department of Homeland Security*; et finalement, l'avenir du NORAD qui est compromis par le refus canadien de participer à la défense antimissile de l'Amérique du Nord. Le thème de la coopération demeure central. Si la coopération pour la défense antimissile pose un problème au Canada, plusieurs commentateurs proposent d'approfondir la coopération dans d'autres domaines, le domaine maritime notamment. Pour l'auteur, l'utilité des institutions bilatérales n'est plus à démontrer. Devant les nouveaux dangers qui menacent la sécurité nationale et étant donné la force de la superpuissance américaine, Ottawa a tout intérêt à renforcer le tissu institutionnel avec Washington. Cette relation constitue un de ses meilleurs instruments pour défendre sa souveraineté, son identité et son économie.

Le chapitre quatre, proposé par Philippe Lagassé, reprend des thèses abordées dans les chapitres précédents en mettant l'accent sur la coopération canado-américaine en matière de défense stratégique. Il brosse un historique des positions américaine et canadienne pour ensuite analyser les facteurs qui ont influencé la politique étrangère canadienne sur le bouclier antimissile. L'auteur souligne que la participation du Canada à la défense stratégique de l'Amérique du Nord n'est pas nouvelle et commence après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Pourtant, un fossé s'est creusé depuis 2001. Les États-Unis ont conclu le traité SORT avec Moscou, ils se sont retirés du traité sur les missiles antimissiles balistiques (ABM), et ils ont réorganisé les institutions chargées de la surveillance et de la défense de leur territoire national. Pendant ce temps, le gouvernement canadien restait silencieux et poursuivait sa politique de l'ambiguïté. Même après son refus de combattre en Irak, le gouvernement canadien était disposé à participer à la défense stratégique de l'Amérique du Nord, mais il a été confronté à une opinion publique hostile. Cette situation, conclut l'auteur, a forcé le gouvernement libéral minoritaire à sacrifier ses relations avec les États-Unis.

Le dernier chapitre reprend le thème de l'ambiguïté de la politique du gouvernement Chrétien face à la guerre en Irak. Les auteurs y analysent la marge de manœuvre que conserve le Canada face aux États-Unis depuis le 11 septembre 2001.

Ce chapitre reprend plusieurs éléments développés dans les chapitres précédents. Il décrit l'ambivalence, ou plus précisément le couple attirance-répulsion qui caractérise la relation du Canada avec les États-Unis, ainsi que la culture de l'ambiguïté qui en découle et traverse toute la politique étrangère canadienne. Ce chapitre examine les positions défendues par les différents acteurs qui influencent de près ou de loin la formulation de la politique étrangère, soit les élus, la communauté épistémique et les journalistes, pour conclure que ces acteurs canadiens partagent une certaine « nostalgie du passé ». On regrette le temps où le Canada jouait un rôle important sur la scène internationale, ainsi que la diminution des ressources consacrées à la défense. Pourtant, les intérêts canadiens exigent une bonne entente avec Washington et, selon les auteurs, il est important de développer une diplomatie de créneaux spécifiques (*niche diplomacy*).

Les analyses proposées dans cet ouvrage mettent en évidence l'ampleur des défis que doit relever le Canada face aux réalités, non pas de l'environnement international comme le titre l'indique, mais plutôt de sa relation avec les États-Unis et ce, particulièrement en matière de sécurité. Ces défis n'ont d'autre solution que la coopération avec Washington. Soulignons en terminant que les contributions sont de qualité inégale et les répétitions, nombreuses. Cette publication pose néanmoins un diagnostic clair : le Canada est à l'heure des choix, ce qui reste tout à fait vrai avec l'arrivée du gouvernement de Stephen Harper à Ottawa.

ISABELLE BEAULIEU *Université de Montréal*

It Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don't Run for Office

Jennifer L. Lawless, Richard L. Fox

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 203

It Takes a Candidate explains why professional women aren't running for political office in sufficient numbers to narrow the persistent gender gap in political representation in the United States. By means of a comprehensive survey of men and women in the political "pipeline professions," the authors discovered that women remain less politically ambitious than men. Even highly qualified women tend not to envision political careers or to believe they have the right stuff for politics. Remarkably, women who do decide to run for office often doubt their credentials. In contrast, men with similar qualifications have little difficulty imagining holding even the highest political positions, as they accept their life and work skills as unique training for elected public service.

Wait a minute, you're probably thinking. Doesn't this explanation individualize the problem, blame (and essentialize) women and let political parties and electoral systems off the hook? No, for two reasons. First, Lawless and Fox firmly reject rational choice approaches in favour of social constructionism, arguing that traditional gender binaries and patriarchal thinking intersect to inhibit women's political ambition. That women don't see themselves as qualified for politics is not their own fault; it is, rather, "often rooted in traditional family role orientations and a masculinized ethos, the consequence of which is the gendered psyche, whose imprint leaves women far less comfortable than men with the idea of pursuing public office" (96). Secondly, the study does not overlook demand factors such as party recruitment, incumbency and electoral opportunity.

Lawless and Fox administered a comprehensive questionnaire to 6,800 male and female members of the "candidate eligibility pool," by means of random national samples of people in the four occupations most likely to yield political candidates, namely law, business, education and political activism. An impressive response rate of 60 per cent buttresses their claim to offer a thorough assessment of the relationship between gender and the decision-making processes that lead to political candi-

dacy. The empirical findings are presented clearly and accessibly, and enriched with quotations from in-depth interviews with two hundred of the respondents. Indeed, the qualitative material supplements the survey data and offers a series of compelling narratives to guide the less quantitatively oriented reader through the reams of regression analyses. In short, *It Takes a Candidate* is rigorous and engaging. This book is a must for students of women and electoral politics, would serve as a superb text for an advanced course on the subject and will provide illuminating data and examples for lectures on women's candidacy in a junior-level gender and politics class.

What are Lawless and Fox's most intriguing findings? In a nutshell, women don't run for office because they aren't asked, and because they aren't convinced that they have the ability to run, win and do the job well. Women in the sample were less likely than men to experience a politicized upbringing, to be encouraged by their parents to run for office, and to be actively recruited by political parties. Women were more likely than the men in the sample to see their family roles as a barrier to public office and to "underestimate their qualifications to seek and win elective office" (96). The solution seems simple; women need to be encouraged to run for office by family, friends or, most importantly, party elites, and they need to be convinced that they are eminently qualified to succeed. Why isn't this happening? That party leaders are not recruiting highly skilled women suggests they don't think women are up to the task. A sexist double standard is also indicated by the qualitative findings on the impact of child rearing on women's candidacy.

This research project should be imported to Canada. While Lawless and Fox's key conceptual arguments about the gendered nature of political involvement and recruitment have already been made, by Brodie in 1985 (*Women and Politics in Canada*; Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson), an investigation of the relative weight of supply and demand factors is long overdue. I urge researchers working in this area to design a project that builds upon Brodie's (1985) benchmark study of women's candidacy. Here's my proposal: the project should replicate Brodie's questionnaire with a survey of all women candidates, and a random sample of male candidates to achieve equivalent numbers, for provincial, territorial and national legislatures since 1971. As well, a comprehensive sample of men and women in the relevant "pools of eligibles," to use Brodie's term, would allow researchers to understand if Canadian women are more likely than men to say "no" to political candidacy. Overall, this sort of mega-research project, while challenging and expensive, would provide rich fodder for comparisons across the sexes, between Canadian jurisdictions and with the United States.

LINDA TRIMBLE *Professor, Political Science,
University of Alberta*

World Cities Beyond the West: Globalization, Development and Inequality

Josef Gugler, ed.

Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. xv, 396

This book seeks to redress what its editor regards as an imbalance in the social science discourse on globalization and cities by providing a collection of research on cities in the global South, in the lower income countries of the world. In his introduction to the book, much of which could stand on its own as a valuable contribution, Gugler demonstrates that many cities "beyond the core" are involved in articulations that span broad regions of the world, if not always the whole world. Gugler also warns of the tendency to over-generalize across these "second tier" cities, insisting that scholarship needs to attend to the unique history, context and culture (especially political culture) of each city.

On many levels the book is quite successful. The scholarship represented in each of the contributions is of high quality, and the coverage of non-core cities is

broad, with chapters on twelve different cities, including Bangkok, Cairo, Hong Kong, Jakarta, Johannesburg, Mexico City, Mumbai, Moscow, Sao Paulo, Seoul, Shanghai and Singapore. One could perhaps argue that other cities, such as Buenos Aires, Beijing, Dubai, Kuala Lumpur or Taipei, and another large city in the former socialist bloc, such as Budapest, should have been included. Also, considering that the editor is a scholar of African urbanization, one wonders about the omission of a “true” sub-Saharan African city.

Each chapter is well crafted and begins by following a similar general template. The city is introduced in general and the author presents the main thesis and plan of exposition, often a brief theoretical exposition on world cities and globalization. Each of the chapters emphasizes changing patterns of social inequality within the city. This, of course, is a key point in the world cities literature: to the extent cities articulate on a global basis, social polarization becomes heightened. The editor organizes chapters into three broad areas, purporting to represent the authors’ emphases on of three themes: global connections, the national state, and the importance of social movements to a city’s social structure and dynamic. In Forbes’ contribution on Jakarta, for example, we learn how Suharto’s unique political vision shaped the city’s profile. In Alves’ contribution on Sao Paulo, the reader learns that working-class labour movements in Brazil forged alliances with the intelligentsia, allowing it to have its interests institutionalized within the national state to a significant degree, and tempering the polarizing effects of globalization through state policy.

For me, the most satisfying chapters in the book were those which took the title of the book seriously by engaging the literature on world cities and describing the nature of global relations for the city in question. Obviously the contributions do this in part 1, *The Impact of the Global Political Economy*. Outstanding is Abu-Lughod’s contribution on Cairo, which details that city’s changing socio-spatial patterns in light of Egypt’s changing global relations and, at the same time, in light of “domestic” and local factors. At several points in this contribution, the author suggests that we might find useful the old notion of “dependent urbanization,” harkening back to the research that first made connections between local urban patterns and extra-national processes and relationships. Her chapter belies the notion, given voice by Gugler in his introduction, that the local and the global are somehow analytically distinct agents of change and require separate strategies. Abu-Lughod’s approach recognizes that the global is sometimes contained within the local. Is the Shiv Sena movement described by Patel in her chapter on Mumbai an anti-globalization movement? It would seem to be, given that it mobilizes support on the basis of opposing the in-migration of other ethnic groups—a likely concomitant of globalization. Yet Gugler, in his introduction and through his organization of the book, presents it as evidence of the primacy of local factors, as if the global is never embedded in the local.

In the end, the book provides a fine collection of scholarly work on a group of major world cities that are often neglected (with the exception of Shanghai, which is now a growth industry in social science research). However, the book remains a collection of chapters related only loosely theoretically. In the volume’s “afterword,” Saskia Sassen does make a valiant, if intellectually acrobatic, effort to provide an overarching intellectual framework uniting these contributions—an impossible task considering the editor of the book seems to regard the global, the state, and resistance to globalization and states as mutually exclusive analytic frames, rather than as involving processes and institutions that are related nearly constantly if often dialectically. In spite of its faults, I would recommend this book for those who study world urbanization and world cities.

MICHAEL TIMBERLAKE *University of Utah*

La diversité culturelle. Vers une convention internationale effective?

Gilbert Gagné

Montréal : Fides. Points chauds. 213 pages

La diversité culturelle. Vers une convention internationale effective?, publié sous la direction de Gilbert Gagné dans la collection « Points Chauds », est en bonne partie issu d'une conférence sur le thème de la diversité culturelle organisée par le Groupe de recherche sur l'intégration continentale (GRIC) de l'Université du Québec à Montréal le 31 mars 2004. Cette rencontre visait à organiser une réflexion collective sur ce qui était encore à l'époque à l'état de projet : l'organisation, par l'UNESCO, d'une Convention internationale sur la diversité culturelle (CIDC).

Cet ouvrage cherche une réponse à la question suivante : comment conceptualiser une notion, la diversité culturelle, qui a le mérite d'être partout utilisée, mais aussi l'inconvénient d'être mal comprise parce que difficilement définissable? Autrement dit, comment rendre compte d'une question qui paraît pour l'ensemble des intervenants aussi importante, sinon plus, que les préoccupations strictement commerciales, alors que les conventions internationales ne s'y intéressent que de manière marginale?

Les questions qui sont débattues dans cet ouvrage n'ont pas toutes trouvé de réponses avec l'adoption récente par les représentants des États à l'UNESCO de la Convention internationale sur la diversité culturelle (CIDC) le 20 octobre 2005 à Paris, bien au contraire. Et c'est précisément ce qui fait l'intérêt de ce petit ouvrage : il permet, en défendant la thèse du caractère exceptionnel de la culture, et à la lumière des débats qui y sont exposés, de mieux saisir l'intérêt, la portée, mais aussi les limites, d'une telle convention internationale sur la diversité culturelle et partant, de renseigner utilement sur la notion même de diversité culturelle.

Organisé autour de trois grandes thématiques (culture et commerce, culture comme droit fondamental, diversité culturelle et société de l'information) et complété par une importante annexe reproduisant la déclaration universelle de l'UNESCO du 2 novembre 2001 sur la diversité culturelle, l'ouvrage cherche à dresser le portrait de la question susmentionnée, non sans avoir au préalable proposé une définition fort utile de la notion de diversité culturelle qui cherche—enfin!—à dépasser le slogan populaire pour bien montrer l'intérêt heuristique d'un tel concept. La tentative montre d'ailleurs à quel point l'exercice peut être difficile...

La première partie de l'ouvrage vise à rendre compte des deux approches concurrentes concernant le rapport culture-commerce : nécessaire dissociation ou inévitable association? Gilbert Gagné effectue sur la question une très éclairante synthèse historique des acteurs (en particulier du Canada et de la France) et des efforts qu'ils ont déployés en faveur d'une reconnaissance de la diversité culturelle, puis de l'organisation de la CIDC. La dialectique public-privé, ou culture-commerce, est ensuite abordée par Georges Azzaria qui explore le télescope entre la protection de la diversité culturelle et les entraves à la liberté du commerce que cette exception implique, étant donné l'imbrication entre le culturel et l'économique dans nos sociétés post-industrielles : la culture, c'est aussi le disque, la vidéo, le cinéma, la presse, l'édition. Autant de secteurs marchands a priori peu réceptifs à l'argument du caractère exceptionnel de la culture.

Il convient donc de changer de forum, et de ne pas laisser les économistes discuter seuls de culture. À l'appui du caractère exceptionnel de la culture, l'ouvrage montre ainsi que la diversité culturelle n'est pas seulement une question « d'exception culturelle » ou plus vulgairement « de gros sous ». Elle est aussi (surtout?) une question de norme et de droit; on peut en effet se demander si les droits culturels ne constituent pas, eux aussi, des droits fondamentaux nécessaires au respect de la dignité humaine telle que l'entend l'ONU dans ses conventions. Ils auraient alors présence sur les marchandages caractéristiques des autres « biens et services » soumis à la

libéralisation sous l'égide de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC). En la matière, on peut vouloir bien faire et finalement mal faire : la marginalisation des thématiques extracommerciales pose un problème quant à la reconnaissance d'une diversité culturelle qu'il peut être dangereux d'enfermer dans les termes stricts d'une convention. Le témoignage de Louise Beaudoin apporte, quant à lui, un éclairage très intéressant sur les acteurs de ces conventions, et sur les freins internes qui empêchent souvent un gouvernement d'accorder toute l'attention requise aux questions culturelles. Dans ce domaine, les gouvernements semblent pécher par manque d'initiative.

Autre aspect abordé par l'ouvrage : le thème de la technologie rapporté à la culture, et la cascade d'interrogations que suscite, à l'égard de la problématique culturelle, l'apparition des nouvelles technologies de l'information : fracture numérique entre le nord et le sud, asymétrie des flux culturels, etc... La fameuse « société de l'information » souvent vantée dans les forums internationaux révèle ainsi ses limites, sinon l'antinomie qui existe entre le projet de société de l'information et celui de diversité culturelle. Les articles que lui consacrent Raphaël Canet, Alain Ambrosi et François de Bernard mettent en évidence le rôle de la « société civile » qui se révèle en fait être un acteur de première importance de ce mouvement de reconnaissance de la diversité culturelle, soit en participant aux débats, soit en flanquant les forums internationaux concernés et en surveillant de très près ce qui s'y fait. Ils relèvent également les approches qui divisent les forums internationaux en la matière : réguler, libéraliser, ou globaliser les flux d'information ?

C'est la double nature—culturelle et économique—des biens et des services culturels qui est mise en évidence en guise de conclusion. Le projet qui conduira (mais après la publication de l'ouvrage) à l'adoption de la CIDC vise essentiellement, comme le montre Gilbert Gagné, à inventer un équilibre nécessaire entre préservation de la diversité culturelle, promotion culturelle et mise en œuvre des politiques culturelles. La CIDC doit contribuer à démarginaliser la culture. Après tout, comme l'affirme Gilbert Gagné « l'hégémonie du néolibéralisme ne renvoie en fait qu'à une pratique culturelle spécifique (...). Le commerce est avant tout une activité culturelle ».

Ce qui fait la richesse de l'ouvrage contribue aussi à sa faiblesse : la diversité des perspectives (scientifiques ou plus engagées), les réflexions théoriques et les études de cas, les bilans et les perspectives, le caractère transversal et interdisciplinaire des approches révélées dans les diverses interventions rendent l'ouvrage particulièrement intéressant, même si on peut regretter les redites ou le caractère quelque peu déclamatoire de certaines contributions, ce qui est difficilement évitable avec un sujet aussi polémique et discuté. Il reste que cet ouvrage est un outil très utile pour qui souhaite comprendre sérieusement l'actualité de la question abordée, ainsi que les tenants et les aboutissants de la « diversité culturelle » en évitant l'incantation coutumière ou le dénigrement compulsif qui caractérisent de trop nombreux livres publiés sur la question.

CHRISTOPHE TRAINSEL *Université d'Ottawa*

Dynamiques partisanes et réalignements électoraux au Canada (1867–2004)

Pierre Martin

Paris : L'Harmattan, 2005, 302 pages.

Les politologues canadiens ont abondamment documenté la plupart des élections fédérales depuis le milieu du 20^e siècle par des ouvrages collectifs (en particulier, la série *The Canadian General Election of...*), des analyses de données provenant d'enquêtes d'opinion publique (les études sur les élections canadiennes) et d'autres contributions. La plupart de ces publications se concentrent sur un ou deux rendez-vous électoraux. L'ouvrage de Pierre Martin est différent puisqu'il adopte une per-

spective historique englobant toutes les élections fédérales depuis 1867 et rejoint ainsi certains travaux de David Smith, Kenneth Carty et Richard Johnston. Le politologue français examine le cas canadien en y appliquant une version revisitée de la théorie des réalignements électoraux.

Au premier chapitre, Martin dresse un état de la littérature sur l'évolution du système partisan au Canada. Il porte une attention particulière aux travaux de Smith et Carty sur le rôle des partis dans le développement du système politique, ainsi qu'à ceux de Johnston sur les évolutions électorales et les positions adoptées par les partis quant à certains clivages qui ont divisé la société canadienne. Ces auteurs ont distingué dans l'histoire canadienne diverses périodes en fonction des rôles assumés par les partis politiques ou de leur proximité à l'égard de certains segments de l'électorat. Martin constate qu'ils se concentrent sur la dimension partisane du système politique alors que la théorie des réalignements insiste plutôt sur la dimension électorale.

Le deuxième chapitre expose le cadre théorique de l'auteur. Dans un premier temps, il présente la théorie classique des réalignements et discute des principales critiques formulées à son endroit. D'abord développée aux États-Unis, principalement par V. O. Key, elle met en relief l'existence de tensions entre l'inertie du système politique et le dynamisme de la société. Lorsque ces tensions sont trop fortes, le système partisan en place s'effondre, ouvrant la voie à une phase de réalignement. Le réalignement peut être de niveau ou de structure. Dans le premier cas, il y a un changement dans le rapport de force des partis. Dans le second cas, la répartition des appuis électoraux d'un même parti est transformée. Cette version classique de la théorie a été critiquée pour son incapacité à expliquer des évolutions électorales observées dans les années 1960 et 1970 aux États-Unis, son manque de précision dans la définition du concept de réalignement et sa pertinence décroissante à mesure que les identités partisans s'amenuisent et que la volatilité de l'électorat s'accroît.

En réaction à ces critiques, Martin expose dans un second temps la version revisitée de la théorie. Il reprend les propositions qu'il a élaborées dans un ouvrage précédent sur les élections françaises (*Comprendre les évolutions électorales : la théorie des réalignements revisitée*, Paris : Presses de Science Po, 2000). Il circonscrit notamment la zone de validité de la théorie des réalignements aux évolutions électorales brutales et durables, par opposition aux évolutions progressives et durables ou brutales mais conjoncturelles. Puis, il substitue au concept d'élection critique la notion d'élection de rupture, qui marque le début d'une phase de réalignement, et celle d'élection de réalignement, qui amorce un nouvel ordre électoral. Il énonce aussi des règles précises devant présider à l'identification de ces élections de rupture et de réalignement.

L'analyse empirique du cas canadien débute au troisième chapitre et se poursuit jusqu'à la fin de l'ouvrage. Martin repère d'abord les élections de réalignement, puis celles de rupture. Sa méthode est présentée pas à pas, en distinguant les évolutions de niveau et celles de structure—pour ces dernières, l'électorat canadien est segmenté en quatre régions—et ce, pour chacun des deux principaux partis canadiens, libéral et conservateur, et pour la somme de leurs résultats. Ce procédé est laborieux, mais c'est le moyen trouvé par l'auteur pour répondre aux critiques reprochant à la théorie des réalignements son manque de précision. En bout de piste, Martin identifie cinq phases de réalignement dans l'histoire canadienne : 1896–1900, 1917–1926, 1935–1940, 1957–1963 et 1984–1993. Entre ces phases, on distingue autant d'ordres électoraux : 1900–1917, 1926–1935, 1940–1957, 1963–1984 et 1993 à nos jours. Les deux premières phases de réalignement sont examinées brièvement au chapitre 3 alors que les trois autres font chacune l'objet d'un chapitre distinct. On y retrouve une description plus détaillée des réalignements de niveau et de structure propres à chaque phase, des mutations du système partisan fédéral associées à ces périodes de

transition et des changements induits dans le fonctionnement du système politique canadien. Un dernier chapitre examine conjointement l'évolution des systèmes partisans fédéral et provinciaux au Canada.

Après avoir décrit les ruptures et les réalignements, Martin tente de les expliquer. Les ruptures seraient parfois attribuables à des crises économiques (par exemple, l'effondrement du Parti conservateur en 1935 et du Parti libéral en 1984), à l'usure du pouvoir (la défaite libérale de 1957) ou à une combinaison de ces facteurs (la défaite conservatrice de 1896). Quant aux réalignements, l'auteur les attribue tantôt à la capacité d'un nouveau gouvernement à gérer les conséquences d'une crise économique (la domination libérale après l'élection de 1993), tantôt à l'émergence d'enjeux autour desquels les partis se positionnent de façon à rejoindre des segments différents de l'électorat par rapport à l'ordre électoral précédent (par exemple, le rôle de l'État dans l'économie lors du réalignement de 1940 et la redéfinition de l'identité canadienne en 1963).

Par contre, ces mêmes variables explicatives ont parfois des effets différents. Ainsi, les restrictions économiques liées à l'économie de guerre au début des années 1940 n'ont pas entraîné un prolongement de la phase de réalignement amorcée quelques années plus tôt, comme ce fut le cas entre 1988 et 1993. D'autre part, l'usure du pouvoir après 16 ans de gouvernement libéral n'a pas entraîné de rupture en 1979, comme ce fut le cas en 1957. L'auteur interprète des éléments contextuels pour rendre compte des ruptures ou des réalignements, mais ces explications paraissent singulièrement limitées à chaque cas étudié. Il s'agit davantage d'une discussion bien documentée que d'une démonstration rigoureusement structurée. Il aurait été intéressant que l'étude du cas canadien permette d'énoncer des propositions plus précises visant à expliquer les réalignements et de dégager des règles d'inférence afin de mieux dépasser l'analyse descriptive.

Cet ouvrage n'apporte pas une perspective tout à fait inédite par rapport aux travaux existants sur l'évolution du système partisan canadien. L'analyse de Johnston présentait un découpage semblable à celui de Martin, en liant la position des partis sur divers enjeux à leur performance électorale. Ici, Martin fait aussi intervenir les enjeux pour rendre compte des évolutions électorales. En revanche, il offre aux politologues intéressés par le système politique canadien des règles précises permettant de découper l'évolution du système partisan. Elles pourraient leur permettre de réanalyser de nouvelles analyses sur les systèmes partisans de chaque province, un objet de recherche encore peu étudié.

Ce livre montre que la théorie des réalignements peut s'appliquer à un système partisan qui ne soit pas bipartite (comme aux États-Unis), ni dualiste (affrontement entre la gauche et la droite en France) puisque l'analyse distingue le Parti libéral et le Parti conservateur de ceux qui ne participent pas à la formation du gouvernement mais constituent néanmoins une force politique significative. Enfin, l'ouvrage offre une quantité impressionnante de résultats électoraux qui satisferont les étudiants et les chercheurs en quête de renseignements sur le vote au Canada. Il est aussi l'occasion de se rappeler des moments importants de l'histoire politique canadienne et de leur donner un sens, exercice auquel les analyses immédiates sont généralement peu propices.

FRÉDÉRIK BASTIEN *Université de Montréal*

Continuity and Change in Canadian Politics: Essays in Honour of David E. Smith

Hans J. Michelmann and Cristine de Clercy, eds.

Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006, pp. 273

Festschrifts pose tricky problems for editors, publishers and reviewers. Editors have to confront the sensitive issue of whom to ask to contribute, how to nudge tardy

contributors along and whether the honoree will be pleased with the result. Such collections are seldom thematically coherent enough to guarantee large sales, which is an issue for publishers facing bottom-line calculations. Reviewers have to critically appraise essays on which they are often not experts and they have to remember the occasion for putting those essays between covers. Despite these problems the genre persists, partly on the basis of tradition but also out of the genuine desire to honour colleagues who have been outstanding scholars and “citizens” in their professional fields.

This collection does an excellent job of honouring Professor David E. Smith at the University of Saskatchewan. David has been a distinguished scholar, great teacher and accomplished leader in the profession—one of the amazing number of excellent academics that Saskatchewan has produced. In terms of scholarship, David’s work might be described as “traditional” because of the careful attention he pays to the foundation principles of institutional design and to the historical context in which institutions operate. His concern for institutional integrity leads him to accept change if necessary, but to avoid overselling the benefits of sweeping reforms. The phrase “continuity and change” in the title of the book nicely captures this academic orientation of the honoree.

Between the introduction and the conclusion written by the editors there are ten essays written by leading political scientists and economists from across the country. Contributors were allowed to select their topics, but were asked to connect their individual essays to the scholarship of Professor Smith. The editor who writes the conclusion identified six integrating themes: devolution of power, centre-periphery relations, Quebec’s place in Confederation, constitutionalism, the new localism, globalization and governance and political leadership. Readers of this eclectic collection will probably see other potentially overarching ideas. This reviewer found the somewhat philosophical essay by Eric Montpetit, dealing with declining legitimacy in the federal system, a challenging read, but helpful in interpreting the content of other essays. Peter Russell argues that Canadians have left the era of “mega-constitutional change” behind them in favour of small “c” change. Economist Tom Courchene offers his usual stimulating blend of economic and political analysis to conclude that city-centred regions have become the growth centres for the future. Donald Savoie insightfully investigates the neglected topic of whether the bureaucracy can and should play more of a role as a broker of competing regional interests. Brook Jeffrey focuses on social policy in the federal system and reinforces Russell’s theme that sweeping changes are not in favour these days. Aboriginal issues are the focus of the contribution by Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, who examine the critical place of the Crown in defining the historical and contemporary relationships between First Nations and governments in Canada. Greg Machildon focuses on coalition governments in four provinces in terms of how they arise, operate and end. Generalizations, he finds, are difficult to draw. Joseph Garcea examines the failure to integrate the important policy areas of immigration and citizenship. Greg Skogstad and Roger Gibbons focus on the West, the region that figured prominently in David Smith’s scholarship. Skogstad examines the responsiveness of national Liberal governments to western agricultural concerns and concludes that disunity among farm groups as much as the insensitivity of the Liberals has contributed to a gap between expectations and outcomes. Gibbons argues that the Liberals once depended upon the prairie West for their political success, but through a complex series of choices involving politics, policy and party organization, came to identify with Central Canada.

David Smith should be pleased with the themes and qualities of these essays, proving that not all *festschriften* fall prey to the genre’s inherent difficulties. The essays recognize the importance of the Constitution and institutions as useful starting points for understanding the Canadian political process and its close connections to the types

of policies produced and their impacts on Canadian society. Most readers will probably select from the essays based on their own interests, but there is much of value in the collection.

PAUL G. THOMAS *Duff Roblin Professor of Government
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Calling Power to Account: Law, Reparations, and the Chinese Head Tax Case

David Dyzenhaus and May Moran, eds.

Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005, pp. 471

This is a collection of fifteen essays that addresses different aspects of the Chinese head tax case. Edited by two law professors and written mostly by lawyers and law professors, the collection has a strong legal flavour. The book begins with the legal case of *Mack vs. Attorney General of Canada*. However, the book does not provide a succinct summary of the case. In brief, the case involves three Chinese Canadians, Shack Jang Mack, Quen Ying Lee and Yew Lee, filing a statement of claim through their attorney in December, 2000, in a class action on behalf of head tax payers in the Ontario Superior Court. In all, the case went through three courts, and the original ruling dismissing the claim of head tax payers was upheld by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.

The papers in the book use arguments from legal, social, historical and moral perspectives to criticize the decisions of the court and to appeal to the legal system to examine broader issues of injustice beyond legal technicalities. The fifteen papers are grouped under four sections. The introductory section, called Context and History, has five papers. Avvy Go, one of the two co-counsel in the head tax redress case, has written a short but informative piece on Chinese Head Tax redress campaign. The paper by Constance Backhouse is a narrative based on the life experience of Lem Wong, juxtaposed on a historical narrative of racial discrimination against the Chinese. Both pieces are informative and easy to read. In contrast, the following two papers, by Audrey Macklin and John McLaren, are more technical and often dwell on arguments about the rule of law and liberalism, although Macklin's paper also gives a historical background of Chinese migration, Japanese migration, and South Asian migration to show a deep-seated history of racism in Canada.

Section two of the book, called Limits of Institutional Capacity to Address Injustices, includes four papers. The first paper, by Mary Eberts, the other co-counsel of the head tax redress case, explains how the case was intended "to bring the moral standards of ethical-rights society to bear on a grave historical wrong," and rejects the court's reliance on what she calls "market-based democracy." The next three papers, by Catherine Lu, Jeremy Webber and Lorne Sossin, use concepts such as "moral regeneration," "moral norms" and "equitable approach" to resolve what the courts cannot do about past injustices.

As the title of the third section suggests, the two papers included deal with "Legal Theory and Gross Statutory Injustice." Both contributors, Julian Rivers and David Dyzenhaus, point out the limits of the rule of law and adjudication, and the inherent tensions moving from legal theory to the practice of the court.

The last section, titled "Private Right and Public Wrong," has four papers. The first two papers, by Lionel Smith and Dennis Klimchuk respectively, deal with legal arguments and opinions regarding "unjust enrichment" and "timing of injustice." In essence, lawyers of the head tax redress case argue that the head tax constitutes unjust enrichment for non-Chinese, and the historical injustice transcends time to continuously victimize people of Chinese origin. Both authors are sympathetic to the arguments advanced by head tax campaigners. The next paper, by Anthony Sebok, provides

a brief summary of mass restitution legislation in the US. The final paper, by Moran Mayo, one of the editors of the volume, is a strong indictment of the moral inconsistency of the court in refusing to recognize the universality and timelessness of principles of equality and justice.

This is a book with a strong view about the law, historical injustices and present obligations of the court and other institutions of a democratic society. All the papers support redressing the head tax and develop moral, social and legal arguments to refute what the courts did in rejecting the basis of claims by head tax payers. The book is complex and often legalistic, intended for those who are well informed about the Chinese head tax case and the legal arguments of redressing historical injustices.

The book represents a very useful reference book for readers interested in reparations of historical injustices generally and in the head tax redress case specifically. The recent political settlement of the head tax redress in the form of an apology with compensation from the government of Canada does not invalidate or outdate the book. Rather, it speaks even more strongly of the need for a democratic society to recognize the limits of the court in being able to adjudicate historical injustices.

PETER LI *Professor of Sociology*
University of Saskatchewan

Unfinished Constitutional Business: Rethinking Indigenous Self-Determination

Barbara A. Hocking, ed.

Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2005, pp. 293

In the introduction to this collection of papers from a 2001 conference in Brisbane, Australia, the editor asks, “can indigenous peoples’ experiences of colonisation reshape our constitutional language?” (xv). The contributions to the book reflect the breadth of indigenous experiences as well as the range of ways that many nation-states will have to revisit their constitutions in order to satisfy the goal of decolonization/self-determination. Indeed, the book requires us to rethink what we consider to be a *constitution* in the context of unresolved and highly unsatisfactory indigenous-settler relations. More than a document or series of political institutions, the book explores the many ways that colonial societies have been and remain constituted by non-indigenous assumptions and ideologies and considers whether and how these impair claims for indigenous self-determination.

The book’s first half has a focus on Australia and several chapters examine the embedded colonialism of contemporary policy and institutions. John Bradley and Kathryn Seton describe the reproduction of injustice in the statutory land rights regime in the Northern Territory of Australia. Chris Cunneen’s excellent account of indigenous interactions with the police and criminal justice system in Australia shows that positive outcomes are correlated with indigenous peoples’ access to and participation in broader social and communal institutions. Michael Mansell laments the underlying insecurity that Australians feel, which prevents the federal government from moving towards indigenous self-government, as it has done for the inhabitants of Norfolk Island.

The second part of the book broadens the empirical ground further to include a timely focus on developments in the Pacific, where the understanding of indigenous-settler relations is often quite different to that of the settler-states of Australia or Canada. Joshua Cooper historicizes the continuing struggle of Kanaka Maoli/Native Hawaiians from the islands’ annexation in the late nineteenth century and describes battles with government authorities over housing, language rights, tourism and the presence of the US military.

Three chapters report on developments in Aotearoa/New Zealand: Andrew Eru-eti critically assesses the means by which indigenous institutions and traditions of governance and law are respected in the dominant legal system, particularly since changes made to the *Maori Land Act* in the 1990s, and argues that the system creates tensions between different *hapu* or communal groups and larger collectives, known as *iwi*, that are comprised of the smaller groups. Catherine Iorns Magallanes examines the New Zealand electoral system's provision for a Maori electoral roll and dedicated seats (established in the mid-nineteenth century) in the broader context of indigenous self-determination. She concludes that although the system functions reasonably well, its rationale and principle is now obscure. John Buick-Constable attempts to reconstruct Maori-Pakeha relations according to a norm of contractualism between indigenous and settler sovereignties.

Peter Russell wonders whether contemporary Canada is as "good as it gets" (170) or whether a deeper indigenous self-determination may emerge from what he calls Canada's "emerging multi-nationalism" (175). He notes that since the long period of constitutional haggling from the 1970s to the 1990s, indigenous leaders have lost interest in collective and national reform efforts, preferring to focus on nation-to-nation negotiations over specific and comprehensive claims. Moreover, he sees a widespread if unaggregated non-indigenous opposition to the few results of these new negotiations, such as the Nisga'a treaty. Russell now advocates a "Burkean" approach of gradual reforms taking place in many settings and including "interim" agreements, rather than seeking sweeping national reforms that would only likely exacerbate differences.

However, the lack of a substantial introduction and conclusion hampers the effectiveness of the book. The breadth of the materials collected here may be thought of as representing an overview of the myriad legacies of colonialism. But few contributors have taken on the general questions made possible by a comparative collection such as this. Russell comes closest in the conclusion to his chapter, where he considers indigenous self-determination to be at the stage of the decolonization movement circa 1960, when the balance of momentum shifted significantly, allowing colonized peoples to initiate proposals for decolonization and independence. Proposals that emerge from non-indigenous or settler peoples, he insists, are unlikely to appeal to indigenous peoples as the way to move forward.

What does comparative analysis of the multiple circumstances offer to our understanding? How are we to take up these insights in the particular locations where we find ourselves confronting the continuing injustices of colonization? Readers will need to draw their own conclusions on this point. However, the book's main contribution is in inviting us to expand our understanding of what constitutions are and how we are to conceive of the fundamental challenges we face in reforming and perhaps decolonizing them.

RAVI DE COSTA *Institute on Globalization and the
Human Condition McMaster University*

Perfection and Disharmony in the Thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Jonathan Marks

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. viii, 191

This is a thoughtful and ambitious book that seeks to challenge standard schools in the interpretation of Rousseau, while at the same time arguing for the importance of new attention to Rousseau to address questions concerning the defects of liberalism. It is well written and well argued, even if not fully convincing, and deserves the attention of serious Rousseau scholars.

The central thesis of the book is that Rousseau's work can be best understood as a "reflection on the natural perfection of a naturally disharmonious being" (1).

What Marks means by this is that the standard of nature that plays such an important role in Rousseau's thought is not that of the original or savage man alone in the state of nature, but rather nature as a goal of human development. In terms of Rousseau's own work, it is seen as the primacy of the model of the educated individual in *Emile* over that of natural man of the *Second Discourse* or even the citizen of the *Social Contract*. Through this, Marks rejects a common understanding of Rousseau as trying to retrieve an experience of unmediated unity in the self and with others.

Marks takes on a three-pronged strategy to fulfill his task. The first is an exegesis of Rousseau's treatment of the theme of nature. In a convincing way, Marks points out the places in Rousseau's texts where he seems to go against the grain of more conventional interpretations—that is, Rousseau as a proponent of a return to a purely original and natural state outside of history and Rousseau as a precursor of Kant, with a vision of a fully denaturalized, moral being. Against the first, Marks shows how Rousseau demonstrates how our original natures drive us to greater corruption, and he acknowledges that the most fulfilled model of human happiness in the Second Part of the *Second Discourse* is not the original and solitary individual, but an already socialized and somewhat civilized being. Against the second, among other things, Marks shows that in *Emile*, the life of the citizen is not regarded as the highest form.

The second tack of Marks is a discussion of Rousseau's rhetorical strategy in order to address the question of how and why Rousseau seems to, on the surface, portray another reading. He argues that the praise of the solitary natural man serves as a model to encourage a sense of independence and detachment necessary for the task of molding good citizens in Rousseau's own day, even though Rousseau does not deem that original nature good nor does he advocate a return to that state.

The final chapter of the book is devoted to the consequences of Rousseau's new interpretation for contemporary theory. Taking Charles Taylor's interpretation of Rousseau as axiomatic of a communitarian appropriation, Marks seeks to show where Taylor went wrong in his interpretation, in order to open up new avenues of debate. In particular, by showing how Taylor's ontological message about the necessity of human community for individual development derives from an erroneous reading of Rousseau, Marks strives to open ground for a more individualistic Rousseau.

This work provides a forceful challenge to existing trends of interpretation of Rousseau and for this it merits close attention. Still, there are points where the work is not fully convincing. Marks maintains that his Rousseau remains an anti-liberal, partly due to his ongoing invocation of a need for virtue. But the interpretation of Rousseau offered by Marks comes very close to mainstream liberalism, thereby stripping Rousseau of much of his critical power. Virtue is no longer seen as the practice of unmediated citizenship, but as the individual task to balance a multiplicity of impulses and attraction to a number of goods, all the while maintaining some modicum of peace with others.

In addition, Marks' discussion of Taylor seems to confuse the ontological point of Taylor's phenomenological approach to the question of the development of human identity, i.e., that individual identity is only possible within the context of community, with the normative question of what this implies for the individual's obligations to the community. Indeed, Marks' focus on *Emile* as a Rousseauian ideal would appear to place a great deal of authority in the hands of educators for the formation and management of character of the "common minds" (70), something that does not square fully with the strong defence of individuality and independence that he offers in his discussion contra Taylor.

I would recommend this book to students and scholars of Rousseau seeking a good synopsis of existing interpretations and a thoughtful challenge to them.

REBECCA KINGSTON *University of Toronto*

Sustainability and the Civil Commons: Rural Communities in the Age of Globalization

Jennifer Sumner

Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005, pp. viii, 179

As we are continually reminded, Canada is now an overwhelmingly urban country. Mythic vastness notwithstanding, most of its people and certainly its mobile “creative class,” presumed driver of the knowledge economy, live in major cities, whose policy requirements have captured a good deal of national attention in the past decade. By contrast, rural Canada has been reduced to the status of the space in-between. Its resource-based communities and livelihoods—farming, fishing, forestry—live with the downward price pressures of global commodity trade as well as the most intractable trade disruptions. Its public services and social infrastructure have been diminished. Aside from pretty places that have become recreational or residential enclaves, its population typically is declining and aging. Its widespread sense of abandonment so far has generated only inchoate, perhaps incoherent political responses. Meanwhile, the growing consensus among newspaper editorialists and think-tank policy specialists is that “dependent” and “unsustainable” rural Canada has been subsidized long enough for sentimental reasons at the expense of real needs elsewhere.

This slim book rests on some clear and contrary propositions. One is that rural communities, however vulnerable, are a “vital link between society and the natural environment” (4). A second is that rural communities represent a “wealth of knowledge, range of skills, and diversity of people” (6)—in short, alternative ways of living that benefit the larger society. Put another way: “Rural communities should not survive just because they have learned to adapt to the demands of the global market. They should survive, and thrive, because they are home to many people, places of employment, centres of learning, and hives of biodiversity” (7). A third is that “corporate globalization” has had a distinctive, destructive impact on rural communities. Not only has it deepened historic practices of hinterland domination, it plays on current vulnerabilities to induce a rural municipal entrepreneurialism sufficient to enter the bidding war with other communities for the only kind of future imagined—that is, industrial projects that create low-wage jobs, mess up the landscape, and extract wealth from the region to reward outside investors.

It is a tall order to imagine other rural futures or to enable rural people to imagine them. This is essentially Sumner’s project. Her argument moves from what might be called a critical utopianism—this against the idea that there are no alternatives—to a rehabilitation of the much co-opted idea of sustainability as a core principle around which to think and act. The great strength of the book is its conceptual and structural clarity. Readers from across academic disciplines, as well as outside the academy, should find accessible and useful its three-legged theoretical stool (Gramsci on hegemony, Habermas on communicative action, McMurtry on “life” and “money” codes of value), though it should be said that while those positions might pull in the same broad critical direction, the significant differences among them are left mostly untended here.

The book’s most promising conceptual opening concerns the civil commons. By this it means those resources, institutions, rules and spaces—protective and enabling—that are accessible to members of a community on terms other than market-based pricing. The civil commons encompasses everything from safe water to public schools to producer cooperatives to local cultural organizations. It represents a “social fabric” (97) and a “social immune system” (100). In this light, Sumner effectively highlights what is at stake in rural communities in the erosion of public services and cooperative practices for the sake of either efficiency or market emulation. The implication she draws for sustainable rural communities is intriguing and intuitively correct: that the focus should be on structures and practices that build the civil commons,

rather than on the narrower pursuit of “economic growth” that is characteristic of the commonplace, extractive model of rural municipal entrepreneurialism.

For all its compact conceptual strength, *Sustainability and the Civil Commons* is too short and skeletal a book. Its claims about corporate globalization make the appropriate references to the political economy literature, but sometimes have the character of brisk polemic rather than the kind of sustained analysis intended to persuade fair-minded skeptics. More than that, the book maintains a curious, high-level remoteness from the rural communities that constitute its subject. It seldom touches down to the extent of naming particular rural places, or, with the exception of Wal-Mart, the corporate names that are so close to the experience of rural people. That means its analysis, though universal enough, lacks the force it might have gained, say, from a comprehensive case-study chapter that helped readers to understand how hegemony operates in a rural community, what municipal entrepreneurship looks like, how depopulation and poverty are not “natural” but an outcome of political-economic choices, and how the civil commons is the contested space and key to a sustainable future.

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The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry

T.V. Paul, ed.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005

The rivalry between India and Pakistan has clearly been both deep and enduring. The two sides have fought four wars since attaining independence in 1947, and have waged a low-intensity conflict in the disputed territory of Kashmir since the late 1980s. And despite recent improvements in Indo-Pakistani relations, their fundamental political and territorial disagreements remain unresolved. However, it is not obvious why the two countries' relationship has been so stubbornly antagonistic. *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry*, edited by T.V. Paul, addresses this issue. Specifically, the volume asks: Why has the Indo-Pakistani rivalry been so persistent, even compared to other long-standing conflicts? How have factors at the international, state and leadership levels contributed to this outcome? And why are the prospects for achieving a negotiated settlement of the rivalry so dim?

The essays' answers vary considerably, and turn on a wide spectrum of variables. As Paul argues, scholarship on the Indo-Pakistani conflict has generally remained within the confines either of international relations or of comparative politics. This volume therefore deliberately crosses disciplinary lines, bringing together the insights of a diverse set of comparativists and international relations specialists.

The result is a rich compendium of discussions that conveys the multi-dimensional complexity of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. As Daniel S. Geller's essay explains, India and Pakistan are predisposed to conflict by numerous structural factors. For example, the two countries' geographical contiguity creates issues of contention and increases opportunities for confrontation. The combination of Indian democracy and Pakistani authoritarianism lowers the likelihood of conflict resolution based on shared non-violent norms, or institutional constraints on war making. The two states' relatively low levels of economic development reduce the opportunity costs of war, thereby making it a more attractive foreign policy option. And an unstable Indo-Pakistani military balance encourages aggression designed either to improve relative standing, or to protect against a growing threat.

But as other essays make clear, these structural factors exacerbate deeper, more fundamental tensions between the two countries. Deep causes of the rivalry lie in such factors as India and Pakistan's ideas of their own nationhood. For example, as

Vali Nasr argues, Pakistan's national identity is based not on values indigenous to its culture or civilization, but rather upon an opposition to the idea of India. Thus, the existence of Pakistan necessarily implies tension with the Indian state. This tension is most clearly evident in the two countries' dispute over the territory of Kashmir. As Stephen M. Saideman explains, Pakistan's irredentist claim to Jammu and Kashmir drives violent Pakistani attempts to acquire the territory. These attempts spur forceful Indian resistance, which further stokes Kashmiri separatism. Thus Indo-Pakistani conflict has roots in the two countries' very conceptions of statehood, even apart from problematic structural variables.

The book's contributors argue that some of the factors that could have played a constructive role in dampening the Indo-Pakistani conflict have actually worsened tensions between the two countries. And the volume's explanatory breadth comes at the expense of an easily discernable central argument. However, the book makes a useful contribution in bringing together a range of scholars in both international relations and comparative politics, whose diverse viewpoints and expertise illuminate the spectrum of factors underlying conflict in South Asia. And while some readers might wish that the volume offered a more parsimonious argument, its explanatory diversity probably better represents the complex reality of Indo-Pakistani relations.

The authors are generally pessimistic as to the prospects for near-term resolution of the Indo-Pakistani dispute. Despite recent improvements in relations between the two countries, the fundamental factors driving Indo-Pakistani conflict, such as conventional asymmetry, national identity, irredentism and the presence of nuclear weapons, are unlikely to change soon. Thus, as Paul F. Diehl, Gary Goertz and Daniel Saeedi suggest, even major political shocks such as international power shifts, civil war or domestic regime change may fail to transform the Indo-Pakistani relationship.

The essays in *The India-Pakistan Conflict* do not offer new empirical evidence on the Indo-Pakistani rivalry, or break much theoretical ground. And the volume's explanatory breadth comes at the expense of a single, easily discernable central argument. However, the book makes an important contribution in bringing together a range of scholars in both international relations and comparative politics, whose diverse viewpoints and expertise illuminate the spectrum of factors underlying conflict in South Asia. And while some readers might wish that the volume offered a single, parsimonious argument, its explanatory diversity probably better represents the complex reality of Indo-Pakistani relations. It also serves as a sobering reminder of why this multi-layered conflict has proven to be so difficult to resolve.

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at the United States Naval War College*

Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement

Stephen Eric Bronner

New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, pp. xiii, 181

I am very sympathetic to the project that Stephen Eric Bronner undertakes in this book. As someone inspired by the progressive potential of the Enlightenment, I find myself constantly on the defensive in a world deeply suspicious of the dead white men of eighteenth-century Europe. So I welcome a vigorous and uncompromising defence of those men and the ideals and values they stood for. For those of us who already see ourselves as working to further that tradition, this book is an inspiring call to keep up the good work. But for those who have been hesitant in their enthusiasm for the Enlightenment, this book will be more like a red flag waved in their face, confirming many of their suspicions of Western rationalism. Theorists of rec-

ognition, identity, post-colonialism, post-modernism, republicanism, communitarianism, post-secularism and multiple-modernities, are just some of the people who will not find this book very congenial. Ultimately, Bronner's uncompromising defence of the Enlightenment is less successful than it might have been.

The central claim of the book is that the Enlightenment is the foundation of progressive politics. This claim has both a historical and normative component and in each case there is a weak and stronger version of the claim. Historically, Bronner could either be saying that the Enlightenment is a source of progressive politics, even though the historical figures themselves might have had less than progressive political views. Or he could be making the stronger claim that the eighteenth-century Enlightenment figures themselves articulated a progressive politics that we should reclaim. Bronner often appears to be making the second claim. He makes, for example, the historically startling claim that Enlightenment thinkers "spoke for the lowly and the insulted, the exploited and the oppressed" (167). We could argue about how many eighteenth-century reformers could be described in this way. Kant is a prime example of someone who can offer one of the most compelling and influential articulations of the equal dignity of all humanity while at the same time excluding women and labourers from full citizenship and denying anyone, ever, under any circumstances, the right or even the moral permission to resist authority, including tyrannical authority. But this is not my main objection. Bronner is not simply saying we can retrieve things of value from the Enlightenment for our purposes, he is saying that their purposes are our purposes. While I agree that the men of letters of the eighteenth century, especially *Les Philosophes* (Scottish Enlightenment interestingly enough is not very visible in this book), were a progressive force, to depict them as being only a source of all things politically good, while presenting the counter-Enlightenment as the source of all that is bad, is an exaggeration. Nowhere does one see the slightest acknowledgment that, for example, the expansion of individual autonomy, while "progressive," might have entailed loss and contributed to cultural pathologies associated with individualism.

The same problem crops up when we move from the historical to the normative. Bronner does not simply say that the Enlightenment is a foundation of progressive politics; he argues that it is "the foundation for any kind of progressive politics." It is an exclusionary claim that makes it seem traitorous to the cause of justice and freedom to entertain the possibility that the Enlightenment might have brought some unwanted baggage along with its defence of the autonomous individual and its attack on the exercise of arbitrary power. Any appeal to emotion, intuition, tradition, religion or identity play into the hands of the counter-Enlightenment. I find this partisan defence of the Enlightenment not only intellectually unpersuasive (a Habermasian view that sees the Enlightenment as Janus-faced appears more plausible, but Habermas is strangely absent in this book), but also self-defeating. As Bronner himself notes, the role of the engaged intellectual within the Enlightenment is built on the notion that persuasion and not coercion is the friend of autonomy and legitimacy. But this book makes no effort to persuade; it makes no effort to allay the fears of traditionalists, the religiously minded, or the inheritors of colonial injustice that their suspicions of the Enlightenment are unfounded. Instead, we are told that tradition stifles autonomy, religious belief always views toleration with suspicion, and questioning the legacy of enlightenment rationalism leads to barbarism.

While sympathetic to the project, and finding myself nodding in agreement at many of the parts that are reclaimed, I did not find this book helpful with the original problem: how to defend the Enlightenment to those who have been the losers in the march of rationalized modernity.

SIMONE CHAMBERS *University of Toronto*

Quelle formation pour l'éducation à la citoyenneté?

Sous la direction de Fernand Ouellet

Québec : Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2004, 246 pages.

Face à la baisse du taux de participation aux élections et à l'accentuation du pluralisme dans un monde où les frontières sont de moins en moins étanches, le gouvernement québécois a institué des réformes ayant comme objectif d'inclure au curriculum une éducation à la citoyenneté. Différents penseurs s'interrogent sur le rôle des enseignants et sur la formation nécessaire en vue de cet enseignement. *Quelle formation pour l'éducation à la citoyenneté*, sous la direction de Fernand Ouellet, est le produit de ces préoccupations.

L'ouvrage soutient qu'il faut améliorer les programmes. S'il fixe des objectifs pour l'éducation à la citoyenneté, le ministère ne propose pas de pédagogie claire, et ne définit pas ce qu'est la citoyenneté, bien que le concept se prête à diverses interprétations. Les maîtres jouent pourtant un rôle fondamental et doivent être mieux formés à cet enseignement. L'ouvrage propose des pistes de réflexion, tant sur les programmes que sur la formation des maîtres. Il est divisé en trois parties, la première portant sur les programmes, la seconde, sur l'aspect théorique de la formation et la troisième, sur son aspect pratique.

La première partie est un regard critique sur les orientations québécoises quant à l'éducation à la citoyenneté et sur les programmes proposés. Il y a indéniablement des lacunes, notamment en ce qui concerne les définitions de la citoyenneté et les techniques d'enseignement, mais l'ouvrage accorde une place à différentes perspectives. Luc Guay et France Jutras soulignent d'abord l'importance des enseignants. Ils examinent l'enseignement de l'histoire, matière à laquelle les programmes québécois associent l'éducation à la citoyenneté. L'ajout de la citoyenneté au programme suscite certaines inquiétudes—contraintes de temps et besoins de formation, par exemple. Cependant, les auteurs sont d'avis que cette initiative arrive à point et concluent que son succès repose sur l'audace et l'ingéniosité des enseignants.

Marie McAndrew accorde aussi une grande importance aux enseignants, et relève les carences des programmes actuels. Elle explique que l'État n'a pas fixé les balises de la citoyenneté dans les programmes. L'ambiguïté pose problème, puisqu'on évacue certains débats de société, comme l'équilibre entre les valeurs communes et le pluralisme. Cette situation peut engendrer la confusion et des interprétations de sens commun. En revanche, McAndrew admet que ces défauts peuvent peut-être se corriger par la pratique, mais que cela nécessitera une formation initiale et continue des enseignants.

Si les auteurs précédents accordent une grande importance aux enseignants, Michel Pagé s'intéresse, quant à lui, directement aux programmes. Il les voit sous un jour assez positif et considère qu'ils sont conçus dans l'esprit de la neutralité de l'école. Il souligne cependant qu'il faut développer les compétences nécessaires pour la participation en démocratie. Pagé affirme que les programmes doivent être explicites quant aux attentes, qu'ils doivent promouvoir la civilité et établir ce qui est attendu du citoyen. L'important, c'est de préparer les étudiants à vivre dans une société pluraliste.

David Lefrançois revient sur l'absence d'une conception claire de la citoyenneté. Il affirme qu'un curriculum caché ne suffit pas, que l'instruction civique doit avancer une définition de la citoyenneté et définir une pédagogie qui encadre cet enseignement. Comme solution, il propose la théorie de la démocratie délibérative. Dépasant les conceptions libérale et républicaine, il conçoit la théorie délibérative inspirée d'Habermas comme étant essentiellement démocratique tout en tenant compte du pluralisme. Et il existe une pédagogie concrète qui permettrait de bien former les enseignants à son enseignement. Le texte de Lefrançois clôt la première partie et confirme qu'il existe différentes pistes de solution, sans en imposer aucune.

La deuxième partie de l'ouvrage, plus théorique, porte sur les défis de l'égalité et de la participation dans l'éducation à la citoyenneté. Les auteurs traitent du modèle théorique de formation qui permettrait d'atteindre les objectifs de l'éducation à la citoyenneté. Selon Fernand Ouellet, c'est l'apprentissage par la construction sociale. La clé est de favoriser le travail de groupe de façon structurée. Les enseignants doivent déléguer les responsabilités en s'assurant de tenir compte des différentes habiletés des individus afin de favoriser la participation de tous et de valoriser la contribution de chacun. Ce modèle de pédagogie coopérative nécessite, selon lui, une meilleure formation des enseignants, ce qui rejoint le diagnostic des auteurs de la première partie.

Sandra Regina Soares et Reinaldo Matias Fleuri traitent de l'expérience brésilienne. Rappelant que la citoyenneté n'est pas un concept univoque, Soares souligne l'importance pour le style d'enseignement du maître des modèles de société et des visions du monde, de la citoyenneté et de l'éducation auxquels il adhère. Elle démontre qu'un style favorisant l'apprentissage critique et stimulant le questionnement est associé à une conception non-conformiste de la citoyenneté brésilienne.

En abordant la création d'écoles démocratiques et populaires, Fleuri poursuit le rêve de Paulo Freire. Il faut dépasser la dynamique professeur-étudiant pour incorporer une vision d'ensemble de la place de l'école dans la communauté. L'auteur prône un processus pédagogique dialogique et inclusif. Les membres de la communauté sont invités à participer et la structure de pouvoir est remodelée de façon à encadrer les élèves au lieu de simplement les évaluer avec des chiffres. Fleuri démontre le succès de ce modèle par des exemples d'application.

Alors que la deuxième partie établit qu'il existe des approches théoriques propres à favoriser une éducation à la citoyenneté, la troisième partie de l'ouvrage porte directement sur les programmes de formation des maîtres. Rappelant l'absence d'une pédagogie établie pour l'éducation à la citoyenneté, Luc Vigneault propose l'enseignement de la philosophie socratique. Une telle pédagogie repose sur la pensée critique, mais aussi sur l'importance de la préservation de l'ordre public. Vigneault insiste sur l'importance de la pensée critique pour éviter l'endoctrinement.

Luc Guay et France Jutras examinent, quant à eux, le programme de l'Université de Sherbrooke, adapté en vue de l'éducation à la citoyenneté. Ils présentent la réforme des programmes comme une occasion pour les universités de trouver des approches novatrices qui, à Sherbrooke, incluent de nouvelles stratégies d'intervention et le développement de l'esprit critique. Ils soulignent aussi l'importance de la formation continue.

Enfin, Sylvie Courtine-Sinave montre l'importance de la construction de sens, l'éducation à la citoyenneté ne devant pas être considérée comme un objet neutre. Les maîtres en formation doivent prendre position face à l'éducation à la citoyenneté pour développer leur identité professionnelle. Sinave propose différentes techniques pour arriver à cette prise de position qui donne un sens à l'éducation à la citoyenneté pour des maîtres formés ainsi dans le respect de leur autonomie professionnelle.

C'est un ouvrage agréable à lire. L'argumentation est bien construite, le choix des textes est pertinent et bien équilibré entre la théorie et la pratique. Les auteurs abordent différents sujets liés à la question de la formation des maîtres en vue de l'éducation à la citoyenneté. Les trois parties de l'ouvrage ont aussi leur place respective, bien que la démarcation ne soit pas toujours évidente. Le texte est très accessible, mais s'adresse particulièrement au monde de l'éducation. Certains y trouveront des conseils pédagogiques, d'autres, une réflexion sur la place de la citoyenneté dans les programmes scolaires ou encore une analyse des différents défis que soulèvent les réformes en vue de l'éducation à la citoyenneté.

L'ouvrage tient compte de la réalité du débat sur la définition de la citoyenneté en présentant différentes perspectives sur son enseignement. Il ne tente pas de résoudre

dre le débat, mais de démontrer la nécessité d'une meilleure formation pour les maîtres et d'une pédagogie claire; il montre aussi qu'il existe des pistes de solution tenant compte des réalités de la citoyenneté en société pluraliste. C'est sur ce point que l'argumentation et les exemples sont les plus convaincants.

L'ouvrage présente explicitement une certaine vision de la citoyenneté, bien qu'elle soit tempérée. Michèle Vatz-Laaroussi résume cette vision dans la postface en énonçant que l'important est d'aider les jeunes à construire une citoyenneté critique, ouverte et dynamique. Il ne pourrait y avoir de meilleur résumé de l'image de la citoyenneté qu'évoque cet ouvrage. Une pédagogie favorisant l'esprit critique est essentielle dans ce contexte. La vision proposée est pertinente dans le contexte d'une société pluraliste et démocratique. D'ailleurs, Lefrançois s'inspire de Habermas et Vigneault, de Socrate. De plus, la pédagogie proposée tient compte des objectifs de la réforme en vue de l'éducation à la citoyenneté. Cependant, cette vision peut-elle faire l'unanimité que l'on retrouve rarement au sujet de la citoyenneté ?

La place accordée à l'esprit critique est justifiable, mais ce n'est pas la seule vision possible d'une citoyenneté partagée par tous les Québécois. L'ouvrage s'inscrit clairement dans la lignée des tenants d'une citoyenneté dialogique et démocratique, où chaque individu peut trouver sa place. Le respect de la civilité et la participation en sont les principaux facteurs d'inclusion, mais sont-ils suffisants pour revaloriser la citoyenneté ?

Enfin, l'ouvrage rappelle la réalité indéniable du travail des maîtres qui doivent enseigner la citoyenneté. Les carences conceptuelles ne leur facilitent pas la tâche. *Quelle formation pour l'éducation à la citoyenneté?* tente de remédier à ces carences et est en ce sens une contribution pertinente. Toutefois, seule la pratique et le temps permettront d'évaluer le succès des programmes et des stratégies pédagogiques. Entre-temps, l'État voudra peut-être remédier aux défauts de ses programmes. Cet ouvrage sera utile pour soutenir la réflexion sur les solutions en vue d'une pédagogie claire permettant d'atteindre les objectifs de l'éducation à la citoyenneté.

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The Big Red Machine: How the Liberal Party Dominates Canadian Politics

Stephen Clarkson

Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005, pp. xii, 335

Stephen Clarkson's *The Big Red Machine* offers an insightful chronicle of the Liberal Party of Canada's electoral behaviour over a period of thirty years. By bringing together revised versions of his previously published accounts of the Liberal Party's successes and failures in the nine general elections held between 1974 and 2004, Clarkson provides a unique opportunity for serious reflection on Liberal Party dominance of twentieth-century Canadian politics. Beyond that, however, his accessible and compelling presentation of the story of Liberal electoral politics offers a nostalgic review of the events and personalities that shaped the political journey from Pierre Elliott Trudeau to Paul Martin. In accomplishing this, Clarkson has produced a book that will be of as much interest to non-academic followers of Canadian politics as it is to serious students of partisan politics.

Those who are interested in understanding the determinants of political success will appreciate the careful way in which each chapter explores the factors that influence electoral outcomes, including the strategic dimensions of party and campaign organization, leadership and the leader's campaign, advertising and media coverage, policy, and financing. While Clarkson cautions that we cannot "derive simple lessons from history and apply them to future campaigns" (265), the process of reviewing nine election campaigns in one volume sheds considerable light on the complex

role these factors played in, for example, the Liberal's 1974 victory and Chrétien's three consecutive majorities, as well as the Trudeau government's defeat in 1979 and the Turner debacle of 1984. Quantitative voting behaviour studies play only a minor role in Clarkson's analysis of electoral outcomes. Instead, he relies on a careful review of events—often made more compelling by the sense of insider knowledge his writing exudes—to allow for a rich interpretation of electoral success and failure.

Students of party politics will appreciate Clarkson's effort to use his book's introduction and conclusion to confront what has become the dominant approach to studying Canadian party politics and party system change—that is, the “party systems approach” popularized by Ken Carty, Bill Cross, Lisa Young and a number of other leading researchers. Many readers will recall that Clarkson's analysis of the Liberal Party's 2000 campaign challenged Carty, Cross and Young's interpretation of Canada's “fourth party system.” In particular, he disputed their claim that regionalization of party support during the 1990s coincided with the fragmentation of party politics into a series of distinct regional party subsystems that undermined the pan-Canadian character of party politics prior to the critical election of 1993.

Clarkson is correct to stress the ways in which evidence from his studies of the Liberal Party conflict with the Carty group's characterization of the fourth party system. But such deviation is to be expected. The identified characteristics of any party system are never anything more than the norms that tend to be reflected in the operation of parties and partisan politics. There will always be aspects of the party system that seem out of step, more in tune with a previous (or future) party system. As such, if Clarkson had abandoned his dogged insistence that the Carty group has incorrectly characterized the most recent transformation in the character of the Canadian party system, and instead opted to work toward a respecification of the character and norms of this system, he could have made a more significant contribution.

As a political economist, Clarkson is keenly aware of the value of historical conjunctural analysis of the sort associated with the party systems approach. This is evident when, in the concluding chapter, he discusses how micro-level critical elections (such as the 1993 election) take place in a macro-level context that is occasionally transformed—such as when the postwar political and economic paradigm was superseded by a neoliberal political economy. Unfortunately, he fails to make full use of this political economic analysis in rethinking his own perspective on the party systems approach. He contends that the ground moves with political economic events like the neoliberal turn, but this analysis is merely “added on,” rather than integrated into his perspective on party system change.

The Big Red Machine is an example of scholarship emerging from years of careful and sustained observation. It provides a fascinating review of thirty years of Liberal history. It offers very thoughtful analysis of the potential role of leadership, organization, policy, communication and finances in electoral success and failure. It also provides considerable food for thought to those interested in the study of party systems. With this, Stephen Clarkson has made another important contribution to the study of Canadian politics.

STEVE PATTEN *University of Alberta*

Canada Among Nations 2005: Split Images

Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands, eds.

Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2005, pp. xiv, 295

Split Images marks the twenty-first installment of the *Canada Among Nations* series. It also marks a new beginning as the first collaboration between the series host institution, the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, and the Centre for Inter-

national Governance and Innovation at the University of Waterloo, editors Andrew Cooper and Dane Rowlands, and publisher, McGill-Queen's University Press. It is reassuring to see that others have come forward to assume the task of providing an annual assessment of Canadian foreign policy, its current challenges, and future prospects. The *Canada Among Nations* series has, through the years, provided a valuable chronicle of the pressing concerns of the day. On occasion the volume has been overshadowed by unexpected events, such as the terrorist attacks of September 11th, that give the text less urgency than it would otherwise have. Potentially, this volume could have suffered a similar fate, given the election of Stephen Harper's minority government after the collection went to press. Repeated references to the Liberal government's *International Policy Statement* (IPS), not to mention the image of Paul Martin, Jr., that graces the cover, seem somewhat nostalgic, in the face of the Harper government's move to put its own face on such critically important policy arenas as relations with the United States, defence spending, climate change and the Middle East, among others.

Despite this obvious and unavoidable turn of events, *Split Images* contains much of value for students of Canadian foreign policy and contemporary global politics. The contributions are not as bound by the former government's priorities as the references to the IPS might suggest. Instead, the contributors try to focus in on the direction that Canadian foreign policy should take in a shifting global environment, where the traditional supports of Canadian foreign policy no longer seem secure and a domestic consensus no longer exists. For contributors Burney and Jockel and Sokolosky, it is a matter of getting it right in Canada's bilateral relationship with the US. In Burney's words, "by establishing a more confident relationship with the United States, Canada would also be better positioned to play a more constructive role on global issues" (60). Not so for Drache, who advocates a "North American Scepticism" that would move Canada away from the Bush Revolution in American foreign policy in areas including security, global governance and human rights. A series of chapters considers alternatives to the bilateral relationship and the potential for developing enhanced relations with Brazil, Russia, India and China as emerging powers in both economic and political terms. Canada's relations to date with these and other members of the so-called BRISCAM group are accurately described here as missed opportunities, yet the authors point to the urgent need for the government and Canadians to begin cultivating a more extensive set of relations with them, to expand from the marginal commercial activities that have defined connections to date. They are equally clear on the economic, political and security contradictions in existing policy that will surely complicate such efforts.

Moving beyond the particulars to consider the more general orientations available to guide policy, essays by Nossal, Knight and Welsh provide a mixed picture. Nossal dismisses the frequent comparisons with Australia as a model largely because of Canada's "markedly different geostrategic location" (90). Nossal's analysis suggests that is unlikely Harper can become the Howard of the North. Knight calls attention to the state of flux that characterizes global politics today and that confronts Canadian foreign policy makers with rival multilateralisms. He advocates the need for a policy that is pragmatic, flexible and effective, but also one that reflects a concern for "representative democracy and global legitimacy" (111). Welsh draws on themes first discussed in her *At Home in the World* and suggests that developments at the UN and elsewhere provide a "favourable geometry of forces" that would enable Canada to move away from its geostrategic constraints and redefine its interests to better reflect its values. To do this successfully will require the government "to think more strategically about its role internationally" (42). The collection concludes with three valuable essays that focus more on the process of policy making and especially the confusion over trade policy and its place in Canadian foreign policy and in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

As the editors suggest, this is very much “a patchwork of voices and visions” (17). There is little coherence here and little that holds the different essays together. This not so much a fault as it is a reflection of what is going on. It demonstrates the uncertainty and lack of consensus that exists about the current state and future direction of Canadian foreign policy. The reasons result from changes in the global environment, but also from competing interests and principles at home. This collection presents a timely survey of this muddled state of affairs.

TOM KEATING *University of Alberta*

Municipal Reform in Canada: Reconfiguration, Re-Empowerment, and Rebalancing

Joseph Garcea and Edward C. LeSage, Jr., eds.
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. ix, 350

This book will be an essential reference for students of local government in Canada. It deals with the most recent period of municipal reform, from 1990 onwards. There are chapters on each of the ten provinces, plus a combined chapter on the northern territories. The editors establish an analytical framework for the book in their introduction, and then try to bring things together in a long concluding chapter. The individual chapters differ somewhat in approach, but the editors were fairly successful in getting the contributors to keep to a common analytical framework. Reading the whole book straight through is a bit of a slog, because there is so much detail; on the other hand, it is handy to have all this material collected together. It will stimulate useful reflection, as much about what is not here as what is.

The book focuses on the structural, functional, financial and jurisdictional aspects of reform. Matters related to the “internal organizational, administrative, and managerial apparatus” (6) of the municipalities are left to one side. This leaves enough to cover: for instance, the *structural* changes that have led to major amalgamations in Ontario, Quebec and Nova Scotia (and some subsequent de-amalgamations in Quebec); the *functional* changes associated with the “who does what” exercise in Ontario and other efforts at “rebalancing”; the *financial* changes associated with rebalancing and the various municipal efforts to secure better funding; the *jurisdictional* changes marked by Alberta’s move to give “natural person” powers to the municipalities, Toronto’s campaign for its own charter, and the much ballyhooed Community Charter in British Columbia. Garcea and LeSage carefully review the arguments about the effects of the reforms in their concluding chapter. As they freely admit, the evidence necessary for definitive judgements is difficult to come by. On the other hand, “the reality is that the structural, functional, financial, and jurisdictional configurations of municipal governments have not been changed in a fundamental manner,” so one could hardly have expected a “transformational effect” (320).

This conclusion might be read in relation to the sometimes hysterical debates over amalgamation in Toronto and Montreal. Nevertheless, Garcea and LeSage seem to have missed much of what is interesting about the recent reform era, because they have abstracted so much from broader political trends. The drive to balance budgets and reduce the size and scope of the public sector, the pressure to be more business-like and compete for private investment, and the demand for government “partnerships” with private businesses and NGOs are all aspects of the new model of governance that came to predominate in the 1990s. The recent reforms were adumbrated in the context of political struggles around this new model. How are we to understand those struggles? Who was seeking reforms and why? How was municipal reform related to broader political agendas? If relatively little was achieved, why was that? What symbolic value did the reforms have in relation to various polit-

ical agendas? Were controversies such as the ones in Montreal or Toronto (or indeed in rural areas) surrogates for something else?

It took half a century before urban historians were able to assess the municipal reform movement of the Progressive Era (1890s-1920s) realistically. What became clear is that the reforms were bound up with a particular kind of class struggle, and that the implicit objectives of reform were rather different from the ones publicly acknowledged. Is this also true now? An overly tight focus on official exchanges is an obstacle to answering such a question. One must also get away from an approach that treats Toronto and Moncton or Ontario and PEI as analytical equals. This book gives four times as much consideration to the Atlantic provinces as it does to Ontario, even though the latter is almost six times as big. The demographic realities of the country, the basic economic trends within and outside it, the pattern of demand for public services and much else has to be considered in a comprehensive analysis. It is difficult to do any of that if municipalities and provinces are considered as abstract entities. Whoever follows up on the analysis in this book needs to open it up, take better account of broader trends, and situate the analysis in relation to the political economy of Canada in the world. One would hardly know from this book that Canada is an urban country with a very peculiar configuration, and that debates about urban reform here echo ones in the US and Europe. Municipal reform is too interesting a subject to be approached within the sort of narrow frame that early students of local government adopted.

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Friends, Citizens, Strangers: Essays on Where We Belong

Richard Vernon

Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005, pp. vii, 325

“Should we put locality before citizenship, citizenship before human obligations?” This is the central question animating Richard Vernon’s new book. He defines the three sorts of relationship it invokes as follows. Ties of friendship are those partial relationships which “arise from the particular and local character of our lives, lived as, clearly they must be, in particular local contexts”; ties of citizenship are those that “arise from sharing political space, from common subjection to law, and from participation in institutions and processes through which consent to political authority is generated”; and ties among strangers “arise among those who are ‘only humans,’ [who are] categorically but not concretely related to us” (3–4). Vernon recognizes that all three are important, and that is why he believes we need to face “the question of priority of attachment.” He himself does so through an investigation of citizenship, which he pursues in two ways. First, with a number of fascinating chapters—all of them models of scholarship in the history of political ideas—that examine how the question of priority of attachment was dealt with by eight writers, four English (Locke, Wollstonecraft, George Eliot and Mill) and four French (Rousseau, Comte, Proudhon and Bergson). Vernon claims that his question has, for historical reasons, been particularly pronounced in these two countries, although I must say that I cannot think of one country in which it has not. Regardless, he then deals with it more directly, in chapters about the notion of a crime against humanity and about the very nature of special ties and what they imply we owe each other. Finally, in the book’s concluding chapter, Vernon offers us an outline of his own solution to the question.

If I have a difficulty with all this, it is with the question itself, as well as with the assumption that it is capable of being “solved.” For how could it be that “we”—by

which Vernon means everybody—could ever agree upon any single answer given the many differences between us, as well as between the various situations each one of us faces? Surely it would be right for some people, given who they are and their particular contexts, to put their local ties before those deriving from their citizenship, while others should be doing the opposite, and the same may be said of how one prioritizes obligations to foreigners. We need to be facing such questions, moreover, only when they have emerged out of these specific conflicts. That is when those involved ought to engage in dialogue, which is to say politics.

Vernon, however, is among those who reject such a “particularist” approach (as he, following Jonathan Dancy, would call it). Instead, he favours an antipolitics, of the kind that would have those involved in a conflict apply an abstract theory of justice rather than engage in dialogue. Now, while I shun the development of such theories in my own work, I do not agree with those, such as Martin Heidegger and Richard Rorty, for whom theories arise from the asking of bad—in other words, abstract or “metaphysical”—questions. This is because I find it hard to deny that such questions have, on occasion, been a spur to creativity, as I believe has been the case with Vernon’s book. Essentially, Vernon ends up offering us an answer in the spirit of subsidiarity: he starts with the affirmation of universal rights, but thinks that the entitlements based upon them should be increasingly waived as we advance through levels of personal relationship, as such connections would be undermined by asserting these rights. The point of this process, he says, is to minimize the vulnerability of those involved in the more personal or local associations. While I doubt that his, or any other such theory, can do that, I nevertheless believe that Vernon has developed a genuinely original conception, indeed one that all thinkers about justice can benefit from considering.

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Plaidoyer en faveur de l’intolérance

Slavoj Žižek

Éditions Climats, 2004, 164 pages.

La tolérance est aujourd’hui la nouvelle vertu cardinale de la science politique. Intégration, ouverture, compréhension de l’autre, hybridité : toute pensée politique doit être au diapason du discours sur la tolérance. Plusieurs seront heureux de voir un philosophe introduire une note discordante dans ce refrain. Dans son essai *Plaidoyer en faveur de l’intolérance*, Slavoj Žižek tente de démontrer qu’il est possible et même nécessaire aujourd’hui de penser et d’agir à contre-courant des tendances politiques actuelles qui favorisent la tolérance et le multiculturalisme.

Slavoj Žižek est professeur à l’Institut d’études sociales de l’Université de Ljubljana en Slovénie et professeur invité dans plusieurs universités d’Europe et des États-Unis. Sa renommée ne cesse de grandir, quoique le public francophone n’ait accès aux traductions de ses ouvrages publiés d’abord en anglais que depuis peu de temps : trois livres publiés en 2004, trois autres en 2005, et déjà un depuis janvier. Comment expliquer cette soudaine popularité ?

Žižek, qui a fait ses études de psychanalyse à Paris au début des années 1980, n’a rien du « néo-conservateur américain »—image devenue incontournable voire lieu commun des études politiques sur l’Amérique—ou du « réactionnaire ». Mais voilà, c’est peut-être là que se trouve l’originalité de son opinion. Se réclamant de la gauche—il s’est déjà présenté à la présidence de la Slovénie pour un parti social-

démocrate—il ne s'abstient pas pour autant de la critiquer. Double critique, donc : de la gauche et de la droite, ce qui suscite à la fois la méfiance et la fascination.

Si le thème de son livre est une charge contre le libéralisme multiculturel et tolérant (contre les *Liberals*, dans le sens américain), il observe que la gauche comme la droite se sont révélées incapables d'offrir une alternative à « la dépolitisation de l'économie », cœur du problème de la politique d'une époque que Žižek qualifie de *post-politique*.

Au niveau de la forme, l'argumentation de Slavoj Žižek n'a rien de conventionnel. De nombreux chapitres très courts, pas toujours liés directement les uns aux autres, et surtout une rhétorique, un style particuliers : un mélange d'interprétations diverses (particulièrement du cinéma), d'analogies avec la psychanalyse lacanienne, de commentaires philosophiques très érudits (Kant, Hegel, Schelling), le tout étalé de manière assez disparate. Cette façon d'argumenter rend d'autant plus difficile l'élaboration d'une synthèse. Il est tout de même possible de percevoir sa critique de ce qu'il appelle le désaveu du moment politique (thème qu'il emprunte partiellement à Jacques Rancière). Ce moment, c'est le phénomène par lequel les « sans-part » prennent la place du Tout, lorsque le particulier devient l'universel.

Du démos athénien aux révolutionnaires de 1789, le moment politique est un court-circuit entre le particulier et l'universel, lorsqu'« une demande particulière n'est pas simplement partie de la négociation entre intérêts, mais conduit à quelque chose de plus, et commence à fonctionner comme la condensation métaphorique de la restructuration globale de l'espace social dans sa totalité » (p. 60). Un tel moment politique ne peut plus se produire. Ce désaveu du moment politique, Žižek le présente sous forme d'une typologie : 1) l'*archi-politique*—les tentatives « communautaires » de définir un espace social homogène et traditionnel; 2) la *para-politique*—la dépolitisation du politique en le traduisant en une compétition au sein de l'espace de représentation; 3) la *méta-politique*—compréhension du conflit politique comme un théâtre d'ombres où se reflètent des enjeux qui se jouent en réalité sur une autre scène (économique); 4) l'*ultra-politique*—dépolitiser le conflit en l'amenant à une agonistique guerrière entre « nous » et « eux »; et finalement 5) la *post-politique*, la collaboration entre technocrates éclairés, adeptes de négociations et de compromis. Le seul critère évaluatif de cette post-politique est l'efficacité : les bonnes idées sont « les idées qui marchent » (p. 40), celles qui sont réalisables. Or, la manifestation la plus claire de la post-politique aujourd'hui est la tendance au multiculturalisme; une politique authentique serait donc ce qui irait à son encontre, en d'autres termes une politique de l'impossible.

L'antagonisme gauche/droite, conceptualisé respectivement comme le multiculturalisme d'une part et le fondamentalisme ethnique/sexiste/religieux d'autre part, est faux, dit Žižek. S'il est vrai que la poursuite d'enjeux particuliers dont la résolution doit être négociée à l'intérieur d'un ordre global « rationnel » (en d'autres mots la politique post-moderne), constitue une politique inauthentique et « non-substantielle », la réponse sous forme de retours passionnés, souvent violents, aux racines ou autres formes de « substances » ethniques ou religieuses ne vaut pas mieux (p. 61). Cette opposition est un simulacre car les deux peuvent être liés : « Un défenseur du multiculturalisme peut aisément trouver attractive même l'identité ethnique la plus 'fondamentaliste', à condition qu'elle soit l'identité du prétendu authentique Autre (disons, aux États-Unis, l'identité tribale américaine originaire); un groupe fondamentaliste peut facilement adopter, dans son fonctionnement social, les stratégies post-modernes de la politique identitaire, en se présentant comme l'une des minorités menacées luttant simplement pour conserver son mode de vie spécifique et son identité culturelle (p. 64). » Unis plus qu'il ne paraît, les deux s'entendent d'ailleurs très bien aujourd'hui, car, l'un et l'autre, ils épousent parfaitement le mouvement capitaliste circulaire.

La société dépolitisée, entrée dans l'ère de la « fin de l'idéologie », vit dans l'immobilisme du non-événement. Toutes les décisions relatives à l'économie—c'est-à-dire celles qui nous affectent vraiment—sont prises dans les cercles privés : « La manière dont l'économie fonctionne est acceptée comme une simple manifestation de l'état des choses objectif (p. 147). »

Jusqu'à maintenant, les solutions qu'on a pu trouver à nos sociétés—de la théorie de la société du risque d'Ulrich Beck aux post-modernes—n'ont rien réglé, et pour cause : « Aussi longtemps qu'[aura lieu] cette dépolitisation de la sphère économique, l'ensemble du discours sur une citoyenneté active, sur un débat public conduisant à des décisions collectives responsables, etc., restera circonscrit aux enjeux culturels des différences religieuses, sexuelles, ethniques. » (p. 147) La seule solution serait de politiser l'économie. Comment ? En réduisant la liberté du capital. Si la post-politique semble interdire la politisation de l'économie, un tel acte qui semble impossible—et qui l'est vraiment—créerait rétrospectivement, lorsque accompli, les conditions de sa propre possibilité.

Le sens subversif d'un retour au politique serait de faire passer les demandes de la classe moyenne—nouvelle sans-classe—d'un statut particulier à un statut universel. Du démos athénien au prolétariat chez Marx, rappelle Žižek, les « sans-part » sont toujours porteurs de l'universel, qui n'est jamais neutre. La solution de Žižek serait donc « une suspension de gauche de la loi » (p. 85). Le seul moyen de rejeter l'opposition entre tolérance et fondamentalisme est de suspendre l'espace neutre (qui n'est jamais vraiment neutre) de la loi, c'est-à-dire la « suspension politique de l'Éthique » : il faut agir contre la loi au nom de la vraie universalité à venir et « suspendre le cadre moral abstrait » (p. 87). Pour cela, la classe moyenne doit s'identifier avec le point d'exclusion—il faut pouvoir dire : « Nous sommes tous des travailleurs immigrés! ». Le point d'exclusion a cette importance qu'il est l'élément de l'incohérence, de « la contradiction vivante » qui permet au mouvement d'avoir lieu. Alors que les multiculturalistes acclament tout ce qui se rapporte à l'hybridité comme « retour à des identités résistantes », Žižek leur répond qu'il faut plutôt « affirmer l'hybridité comme le lieu de l'Universel. (p. 91) » Il s'agit donc de faire fonctionner la mécanique dialectique.

On comprend bien le court-circuit par lequel Žižek reprend des thèmes du multiculturalisme pour les retourner contre lui. Or, la solution n'est pas si simple. La situation politique actuelle est problématique, elle est dans une impasse. Cette impasse, qu'il nomme « interpassivité » est l'activité engagée dans le but d'assurer la passivité de l'autre (p. 155). Ce qui est justement, dit-il, l'aboutissement des politiques identitaires des enjeux particuliers, forme post-moderne de la politisation (droits des homosexuels, écologie, minorités ethniques). Tout cela est profondément inauthentique et évoque l'obsessionnel névrotique qui parle en permanence et s'active frénétiquement pour s'assurer que ce qui *importe réellement* ne sera pas perturbé. La post-politique demande l'interpassivité, et cette dernière se nourrit de la première.

Le programme de Žižek était ambitieux. Son essai est parfois difficile (les références à la psychanalyse peuvent être fort nébuleuses pour un profane de la philosophie de Lacan), parfois drôle; il passe du léger (un chapitre sur Oprah Winfrey) au sérieux, du badin (anecdotes personnelles en Slovénié) au vulgaire (blagues cochonnes sur les pénis), mais aussi du ridicule au sublime. Le style Žižek étonnera toujours—en particulier ce qu'il nomme la « doxa académique ». Étonnement tourne rapidement à l'ennui quand on lit plus d'un livre de Žižek : l'originalité, marque de commerce de Žižek, peut vite se transformer en son contraire quand sont continuellement répétés les mêmes blagues, anecdotes, interprétations et coups de gueule. Le lecteur a de quoi se poser des questions sur la pertinence des nombreuses publications de ce professeur qui n'enseigne presque plus, tant il est occupé à écrire.

En fin de compte, ceux qui s'attendaient à un renouveau de la pensée ou à la révélation d'une source théorique seront déçus. Les concepts abordés par Žižek ne sont pas toujours bien explicités. *Post-politique, universel, dépolitisation*—autant de concepts avec lesquels jongle habilement Žižek, sans toutefois réellement les approfondir. Par ailleurs, son intolérance n'est pas une grande découverte—et, passé le titre, Žižek ne mentionne quasiment jamais ce mot. Le désaveu du moment politique tant critiqué par Žižek semble être une idée que son écriture perpétue. « Politiser l'économie ! », crié comme un slogan, n'a-t-il pas quelque chose de la *méta-politique*, autre forme de désaveu politique?

À la lecture de son essai, on a le goût de répondre à Žižek que ce qu'il prétend être le moment politique—la mécanique dialectique—survient jour après jour, inlassablement, mais dans le domaine juridique : un jugement est l'accession d'une position particulière à une universalité. Žižek ne cherche peut-être pas le moment politique au bon endroit : plutôt que dans la mécanique dialectique, ne se trouverait-il pas, justement, dans le déraillement, la panne et le dysfonctionnement de cette mécanique?

RENÉ LEMIEUX *Université du Québec à Montréal*

Mao: The Unknown Story

Jung Chang and Jan Halliday

New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005, pp. 814

Mao Tse-Tung has always had a radical allure. Mao's legions of fans have included such luminaries as Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Pierre Trudeau and numerous others. Now we have a book that forces us to radically reconsider our view.

This is not a strictly academic study. Jung Chang was born and raised in China. Her mother was a Party functionary, and she herself experienced the Cultural Revolution firsthand, including briefly as a Red Guard. However, what makes this book unique is the authors' use of hitherto hidden Soviet sources, items from the Stalinist archives, as well as insider information from a vast array of people who knew Mao personally: children and other relatives, doctors, nannies and servants, colleagues and political rivals, bodyguards, secretaries, interpreters and sexual companions.

In essence, this book explodes a number of myths about its subject, while also giving us new insight into Mao's character. There is no space to go into these myths here, but the main picture that emerges is of a supreme egoist with virtually no loyalty to, or feelings for, other people. Mao was committed first and foremost to the quest for power.

Even his embrace of Marxism seems to have been a means to that end. In one of his earliest writings, written when he was still a young man, Mao expresses approval for a German philosopher espousing a creed similar to that of Nietzsche's "übermensch." Mao wrote:

I do not agree with the view that to be moral, the motive of one's actions has to be benefiting others. Morality does not have to be defined in relation to others.... People like me want to ... satisfy our hearts to the full, and in doing so we automatically have the most valuable moral codes. Of course there are people and objects in the world but they are only there for me.

Mao did not believe that he had responsibility for other persons. In his conception of "Great Heroes,"

[e]verything outside their nature, such as restrictions and constraints, must be swept away by the great strength in their nature.... When Great Heroes give full play to their

impulses, they are magnificently powerful, stormy, and invincible.... [T]here is no way to stop them.

It is clear that Chang and Halliday want to smash Mao's iconic status. However, if even half of what they say about him is true, he was probably the worst and most deadly tyrant of the twentieth century.

To take a couple of examples: while Hitler and Stalin had specialized apparatuses to carry out their deeds of terror—arrest, imprisonment, torture and execution—Mao added the new wrinkle of having much of the denunciation, torture and execution occur in public, with those present being forced to watch and participate.

In addition to medieval-style public inquisitions, Mao perfected the technique of thought control, whereby all Party members and many members of the public were forced to reveal their personal and family contacts, allegedly for security reasons, and to subject themselves to relentless and unending criticism and self-criticism, often in mass public humiliation sessions.

Even the top leadership was not immune to this. When Mao targeted one of his colleagues for punishment, he also took great pleasure in making sure that the person's family members suffered as well.

In addition to "improving" on the techniques of terror and mass persuasion developed by Hitler and Stalin, Mao was also responsible, directly, or indirectly, for close to 70 million deaths—from execution, suicides, famine, overwork and other causes.

As with Christian Europe, where the Bible, and the Church's interpretation of it, was one of the few sources of culture available, the Gospel according to Mao was virtually the only source of culture available to ordinary people and Party members, especially during the Cultural Revolution. During his reign, thousands of cultural monuments and manuscripts were destroyed: inestimable treasures of Chinese culture were lost, and the heritage of the Chinese people was irrevocably damaged.

At the end of his life, obsessed with his slipping grip on power, Mao empathized strongly with ousted leaders, and even his old rival, Chiang Kai-shek. He was filled with self-pity and, now blind, asked his attendants to read old polemics against opponents against whom he still felt so much venom. He spent a lifetime seeking and building up his power base and, within a month, his wife and closest colleagues had all been arrested. Twenty-seven years in power and countless deaths, and it all started to unravel within weeks of his death. Whatever one may think of the authors' treatment of its subject, this will remain the definitive sourcebook on Mao Tse-Tung for years to come.

DON ALEXANDER *Simon Fraser University*

Human Rights in the 'War on Terror'

Richard Ashby Wilson, ed.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. xv, 347

Given this book's title, I assumed that it would consist mainly of elaborations of already over-rehearsed debates about the "trade-offs" between "liberty" and "security." And while it does include plenty of this, several chapters in this volume offer thoughtful, nuanced analyses which challenge the dichotomous rhetoric of the day, and force the reader to rethink not just the future, but also the nature, of contemporary human rights and security.

In compiling the essays for this volume, it is clear that some effort has been put into ensuring that the authors speak with more than a single voice. While most of the contributors do make some version of the argument that liberal values—including civil and political rights and the rule of law—should not be sacrificed at the altar of

“national security,” there are chapters that seek to present alternative views, including Thomas Cushman’s challenging “The Human Rights Case for the War in Iraq.” Most thought provoking, however, are the chapters which contest the conventional framing of debates, and problematize the concept of human rights itself. For example, in his chapter, “Eight Fallacies about Liberty and Terror,” David Luban clearly demonstrates how the “whole conversation about ‘trade-offs’ conceals persistent fallacies; there is no real trade-off taking place, he argues, when ‘your’ rights are being traded off for ‘my’ security” (242–243). He points out (as do other contributors in the volume) that rights are themselves forms of security, and that the tendency to regard the current debate as one between “realists” and “idealists” rests upon yet another unhelpful dichotomy (245, 247). Luban also addresses the thorny problem of the presumption of terrorists’ guilt, an issue central to Geoffrey Robertson’s chapter, “Fair Trial for Terrorists?” In his short but historically rich analysis, Robertson demonstrates with reason and clarity why trials for terrorists can never be “exquisitely fair,” since they are demonized by the society from which their judges and jurors are drawn, but why they must, as far as possible, conform to our “inherited Anglo-American traditions” of criminal justice (169). One of the most important reasons for this, he argues, is that the process of a fair trial itself tends to demystify dictators and terrorists by forcing them, and their followers, to confront their “hypocrisies and cruelties” (182).

However, the best chapters in the book are those that emphasize the fundamentally *political* nature of debates over rights, and which link ideas about rights to the agency and selfhood of real people in local contexts. John R. Wallach’s critical analysis, for example, reminds us that human rights must be understood, especially today, as a “tool of the powerful.” For human rights to be meaningful, he argues, they must “extend beyond standard liberal rights guaranteed by security-conscious states partnered to global capitalism” (108, 131). He advocates, by contrast, an understanding of human rights as “a political ethics of the governed,” focusing on the “local and social conditions that promote democracy” (132). This emphasis on the need to “take back the local” is also central to Carol Greenhouse’s excellent chapter. Greenhouse rejects the idea that the debate between security and civil liberties is primarily a value conflict, arguing instead that, in practice, what we are talking about is a restructuring of political space that is, in effect, “widening [the] distance between national government and local political life” (186). Finally, Peter Galison and Martha Minow remind us that in order to understand the “hot” issues of the day, including our “right to privacy,” we need to dig beneath the rhetoric, and think about the connection between privacy and the emergence of the modern self, which can “experiment, relax, form and enjoy intimate connections and practice the development of ideas and beliefs for valued expression” (258).

With a few exceptions, however, the general approach of this volume is one of criticism of the effects of political power on human rights, rather than a thoroughgoing *critique* of the discursive power of the international human rights regime itself (see T. Evans, *The Politics of Human Rights: A Global Perspective*. London: Pluto Press, 2005). Given its subject matter, there is little reference in this book to race, ethnicity, gender, geopolitical exclusion and poverty. For example, only Mary Robinson makes any real reference to women and gender; in her chapter, she refers, strikingly, to the situation of women in zones of conflict and in post-conflict zones as a “widespread form of terrorism” (311). While she may not have intended it, her use of the term “terrorism” in this volume to describe the relentless, widespread violence against women—violence that has and will occur before, during and after 9/11—destabilizes the gendered dominant discourse of rights and security, and forces the reader to confront the terror which rarely makes headlines. This includes the structural violence of grinding, terrifying poverty which affects millions of women, men

and children, people for whom the “terrible attacks of 9/11 had no discernible impact” (310). It is this hard truth, perhaps more than any other, that needs to be remembered when addressing the most “pressing” human rights issues of the day.

FIONA ROBINSON *Carleton University*

La négation de la nation. L'identité culturelle québécoise et le fédéralisme canadien

Eugénie Brouillet

Sillery: Septentrion, 2005, 478 pages.

Compte tenu de la multitude d'ouvrages portant sur le fédéralisme canadien et son incapacité à reconnaître la spécificité nationale du Québec, est-il vraiment possible d'apporter un éclairage nouveau sur cette question ? Kenneth McRoberts a déjà démontré l'influence qu'a eue le trudeauisme sur la négation de la nation québécoise (*Un pays à refaire : l'échec des politiques constitutionnelles canadiennes*, Montréal : Boréal, 1999), alors que Guy Laforest a illustré les impacts similaires de la Constitution de 1982 sur le fonctionnement actuel du fédéralisme canadien (*Trudeau et la fin d'un rêve canadien*, Sillery : Septentrion, 1992). À première vue, il semble que la question ait déjà été discutée sous tous ses angles et qu'il soit impossible d'innover en la matière.

Or, c'est justement le tour de force que vient de réaliser Eugénie Brouillet avec son premier livre. Brouillet a une formation de juriste, mais elle a su allier à ses connaissances juridiques une littérature beaucoup plus vaste. Aussi Guy Laforest peut-il dire dans la préface qu'elle « renouvelle le droit constitutionnel en puisant généreusement du côté de la littérature des sciences sociales » ce qui lui a permis « d'intégrer dans sa réflexion les résultats des meilleurs travaux contemporains sur l'identité, le nationalisme, le sens de la culture et le fédéralisme » (p. 12).

Plutôt que d'analyser l'influence que les acteurs politiques ont eue sur l'évolution du fédéralisme au Canada, Eugénie Brouillet se concentre plutôt sur les décisions juridiques du Comité judiciaire du Conseil privé de Londres et, à partir de 1949, de la Cour suprême du Canada quant à la reconnaissance (ou la négation) de la nation québécoise à l'intérieur du système politique canadien. Forte d'une vaste connaissance de la jurisprudence, l'auteure soutient la thèse que l'acte constitutionnel de 1867 reposait sur l'idée d'une reconnaissance explicite du caractère binational du Canada, contrairement à l'analyse effectuée par McRoberts et Stéphane Paquin (*L'invention d'un mythe : Le pacte entre deux peuples fondateurs*, Montréal, VLB, 1999). À cet égard, la jeune auteure estime que l'on retrouvait cette reconnaissance dès la conquête au 18^{ème} siècle, dans l'Acte de Québec, l'Acte constitutionnel de 1791 et même dans l'union législative des deux Canadas avec l'Acte d'union. Selon Eugénie Brouillet, « Les constitutions qui ont jalonné l'histoire des colonies britanniques d'Amérique du Nord avant l'adoption d'un régime fédératif en 1867 ont, chacune à leur manière, tenté de répondre à la réalité biculturelle qui s'exprimait au sein des collectivités en présence » (p. 147). À titre d'exemple, l'auteure affirme que dès avant 1867 des pratiques fédératives faisaient en sorte que le Parlement des Canadas unifiés post-1840 acceptait que des questions touchant l'identité culturelle, notamment l'éducation, soient traitées de manière différente dans le Canada Est que dans le Canada Ouest. La Confédération n'aurait donc fait qu'instituer de manière constitutionnelle ces pratiques d'accommodement entre les deux nations canadienne-anglaise et canadienne-française. L'auteure soutient à ce propos que les décisions du Comité judiciaire du Conseil privé « révèlent que le principe directeur qui a guidé l'interprétation des règles relatives au partage des compétences législatives et celle concernant d'autres arrangements institutionnels est le principe fédératif »

(p. 251), ce qui a permis aux provinces, et plus particulièrement au Québec, de faire respecter leurs compétences, ainsi que leur spécificité.

Toutefois, l'auteure souligne que la première atteinte au principe fédératif remonte au remplacement du Comité judiciaire du Conseil privé par la Cour suprême en tant que plus haut tribunal au pays. En effet, dans une perspective résolument « activiste », Eugénie Brouillet affirme que la Cour suprême est devenue l'outil des valeurs dominantes de la société canadienne qui étaient orientées, depuis la crise économique de 1929, vers une centralisation du système politique canadien afin de lutter plus efficacement contre les déséquilibres économiques. « Dans son interprétation des dispositions relatives au partage des compétences législatives, dit l'auteure, la Cour suprême a favorisé plutôt un accroissement des pouvoirs législatifs fédéraux au détriment des pouvoirs provinciaux » (p. 264). Le principe fédératif de 1867 a ainsi cédé le pas au critère d'efficacité du système. Par exemple, alors que le Conseil privé avait fortement restreint l'application du pouvoir fédéral d'empiéter, la Cour suprême en a plutôt élargi la portée, s'attaquant ainsi au principe fédéral. Il en est allé de même pour la règle de la prépondérance fédérale, le pouvoir fédéral de dépenser ou pour la compétence fédérale relative aux échanges et au commerce et l'union économique canadienne. Ce sont ces éléments qui font dire à l'auteure que « le texte constitutionnel originaire a subi des transformations jurisprudentielles dont l'effet cumulatif est une plus grande centralisation des pouvoirs, et ce, au détriment des pouvoirs législatifs nécessaires à la survie et à l'épanouissement de l'identité culturelle québécoise » (p. 323).

La loi constitutionnelle de 1982 n'aura fait qu'amplifier cette tendance à la centralisation, plus particulièrement en raison de la Charte des droits qui a limité la compétence du Québec en matière linguistique. Cette problématique est discutée en détail dans la dernière section du livre.

Dans cet ouvrage, l'auteure a su utiliser une infrastructure juridique offrant un regard neuf et extrêmement complet sur l'évolution jurisprudentielle du fédéralisme canadien. C'est cette innovation qui permet à Eugénie Brouillet de se distancer des thèses que nous connaissions déjà au sujet de la centralisation causée par le *canadian nation building*. Compte tenu de ce portrait assez sombre du fédéralisme canadien et de la [non]reconnaissance de la nation québécoise, il aurait été pertinent que l'auteure s'interroge sur la possibilité (ou l'impossibilité) de voir coexister deux groupes nationaux à l'intérieur d'un même État fédéral. Comme Ferran Requero l'a déjà mentionné, le fédéralisme demeure affecté par l'héritage fédéral américain qui reposait sur l'idée de l'homogénéité de la nation étasunienne. L'analyse d'Eugénie Brouillet semble corroborer cette idée de l'auteur catalan. Il aurait donc été pertinent qu'elle se prononce sur cette problématique.

Il n'en demeure pas moins que ce livre va rapidement devenir un incontournable dans l'analyse du fédéralisme canadien. Espérons que la première incursion de cette jeune auteure dans l'univers du fédéralisme ne sera pas la seule.

JEAN-FRANÇOIS CARON *Université Laval*

Pension Power: Unions, Pension Funds and Social Investment in Canada

Isla Carmichael

Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005, pp. 219

Isla Carmichael has been writing about union pensions for a decade. Over the past ten years, she has examined different aspects of union-based pension funds and labour-sponsored investment, including fiduciary responsibility, the role of union pension trustees, social accounting, collateral benefits and economically targeted investment. In this book, she brings together these, and other, arguments to make a case for the

greater involvement of unions in directing and investing pension funds, not only to provide benefits to union members but also to shape economic growth and community development. Her analysis is comprehensive and her argument is persuasive.

The book is divided into three parts. Part one describes the vested interests—of employers, governments and even of some unions—which form barriers to workers' control of pensions. Initially, Carmichael documents how workplace pensions evolved in Canada and how fiduciary, or "prudent man" and loyalty, rules have required pension trustees to focus on the maximum rate of financial return to the exclusion of social criteria. She then goes on to show how existing practices have led to inefficiencies in the structure of capital markets in Canada, an increased concentration in the ownership of large blocks of shares by institutional investors and limitations in shareholder activism.

In spite of these restrictions, Carmichael documents how some unions and socially minded institutional investors have acted to redirect management and investment practices without necessarily reducing the rates of financial return. Two examples are the California Public Employees Retirement System in the United States and the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility in Canada, which have used proxy votes to change corporate behaviour. Similarly, she shows how social audits, ethical screens, value added accounting and economically targeted investment can be used by investors to develop measures of corporate social performance, which provide practical guides for alternative ways of investing in the market and economic development.

Part 2 of the book is a fascinating and informative case study of Concert, a real-estate development company in British Columbia funded through the pooling of capital from 26 pension funds with union trustees. Concert is currently one of the largest real-estate companies in the province. It is owned exclusively by union and management pension funds. It was founded on the principle of building affordable housing.

Carmichael uses the experience of Concert to illustrate, through social accounting, how union-based pensions and investments in British Columbia contribute to increased benefits to pension funds, job creation and government. One advantage, for example, is the creation of employment for unionized carpenters in housing projects because of an insistence of union labour on construction sites. Another is a significant contribution to the Carpentry Workers' Pension Plan (one of the union investors). Still another is the amount of taxes paid to government because of the employment of the carpenters.

Carmichael argues convincingly that unions can play a bigger role in the economy if they gain more control over their own members' funds—she uses the term deferred wages to refer to such funds. She demonstrates, by example, how the investment of pension funds can move beyond current, conservative, fiduciary practices to incorporate labour, environmental and social standards without financial loss (and possible gain) to pension beneficiaries. At the same time, she recognizes that her examination of Concert and Mortgage Fund One, while illustrative of the potential of unions to control their pension funds, is only a first step in gaining a more comprehensive understanding of economically targeted investment, ethical screening and social accounting. To achieve the larger goal, she argues that it is important to research the extensive experience of the solidarity fund of the Quebec Federation of Labour and the "Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec," as well as other provinces like New Brunswick and Manitoba.

Still, one has to ask why unions across Canada have been so slow to move in the direction she proposes. Part of the reason is the resistance of some big private-sector unions, like the CAW, which argue against social investment and union involvement in pension fund management on the grounds of conflicting role obligations and

diminishing returns. Another is that some big public-sector unions have limited negotiability in terms of their pension funds. In spite of these limitations, however, several union federations across Canada have teamed up with academics, at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education and abroad, to develop more research and education resources for the labour movement to help shape a union pension agenda. Carmichael's book is part of a set of building blocks. More needs to be done if the ideals of the book are to be realized.

GLENN DROVER *Dalhousie University*

**The Quest for Modernity in the Middle East and the Islamic World
Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq**

Eric Davis

Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005, pp. xi, 385

The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq

Brendan O'Leary, John McGarry and Khaled Salih, eds.

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005, pp. xxi, 355

Nationalism and Minorities Identities in Islamic Societies

Maya Schatzmiller, ed.

Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005, pp. xiii, 346

Muslims and Modernity: An Introduction to the Issues and Debates

Clinton Bennett

London, New York: Continuum, 2005, pp. xviii, 286

These four books encapsulate a range of political issues that have shaped the formation of states and ideologies in the Middle East and North Africa since the beginning of the modern encounter between Europe and the Islamic world, from the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt through the post-World War I demise of the Ottoman world up to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The overarching methodological approach to the analysis of these books can be seen through the themes developed by the writers and contributors. The authors and contributors describe and analyze the quest for modern political representation, especially in light of the presence of religious and ethnic minorities, in the context of the clash between religion, tradition and modernity in the Islamic world.

The current war and religious conflict in Iraq can be better understood through the Gramscian approach of Eric Davis. He focuses on the relationship between intellectuals, culture, state formation and civil society by analyzing details of Iraqi intellectual developments in the twentieth century. He throws light on the formation of the debate on the Iraqi political identity among Iraq's literati and intelligentsia and the "roads not taken" since 1922, which marks the beginning of the British mandate on that territory. It is a book for specialists.

This approach complements the articles in *The Future of Kurdistan* that deal with the more immediate political crises in Iraq following the American invasion. Of particular importance here is the role of Iraqi Kurdistan in its uneasy and often tragic dimension as a component of the Iraqi state. This last point can be compared and contrasted with the articles edited by Maya Schatzmiller in *Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic Societies*; the contributors to this opus analyze religion and ethnic minorities from Morocco to the Arab Middle East, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

Clinton Bennett's *Muslims and Modernity* contributes to the themes by introducing the reader to the ideological debates among Muslim intellectuals in Europe

and the Islamic world, addressing the relationship between Islam and its response toward Western civilization, minorities, secularization and the separation between religion and state.

Historically, the formation of nation-states has seen a particular region and/or a particular ethnic or linguistic group impose its hegemony on a wider territory through military, economic and cultural means. Classic examples are the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon at the closing of the Middle Ages in Spain, and Prussia and Piedmont respectively in Germany and Italy in the nineteenth century. This is an ongoing and dynamic process that characterizes the modern state and sees its consolidation challenged by minorities and majorities in all areas of the world, irrespective of the degree of economic development and modernity.

Examples from the modern state experience can be seen in Canada with Quebec, in Spain with Catalonia and the Basque region and in a much more tragic sense in the former Yugoslavian federal state ever since the demise of the Communist systems. Examples from the developing world are numerous—Sri Lanka, India, China, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Pakistan come to mind, as well as areas such as the Caucasus with Chechnya and Abkhazia, and South Asia, where Burma and Thailand face internal insurrections by religious and ethnic minorities.

The themes and subjects that the authors and contributors of these books probe can be best seen through the comparative context of the development of the modern nation-state and its continuous mercurial and Protean dialectical encounter with a post-Cold War international system.

Maya Schatzmiller has collected ten case studies in this volume, all with the potential to answer some questions on the elements and dynamics that shape the formation of minority identities. These are cases of religious and ethnic minorities living in Muslim majority nation-states. The authors attempt to outline and define the social and cultural boundaries of each minority group and, at the same time, to develop a set of variables, and possibly a taxonomy, for a common and larger comparative framework. Two classes of minority groups are of particular interest in the development of such an approach. The first category, in which the main distinguishing characteristic is religion, includes ancient religious minority groups such as the Copts in Egypt, and more recent religious minorities formed during the nineteenth century or later, such as the Christians of Pakistan and the Baha'is of Iran. The second category consists of Muslim ethnic groups whose presence overlaps two or more nation-states but who claim their own linguistic autonomy and cultural and historical identities: these are the Berbers in Morocco and Algeria and the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey.

Among the religious minorities, the factors dominating the process of minority identity formation were not only creed or clerical institutions, but varied considerably from region to region. One can argue that the Egyptian Coptic case is not comparable to the Lebanese Maronite case because of the fragmented nature of Lebanese society and its colonial experience with France. A different set of historical factors affects the role of religion in minority identity formation in the case of the Christians in Pakistan and the Baha'is in Iran. In the Pakistani case, conversion to Christianity through missionary work among the untouchables in Pakistan created a Christian community perpetually imprisoned and locked into a low social economic status best described as a caste. In the case of the Baha'is, the development of such an identity has to be seen in light of the development of millenarian Shiism in the nineteenth century and its illegitimacy when viewed through the dogmatic prism of the majority. The Baha'is also came to be perceived suspiciously by secular Iranian nationalists, who saw them as a source of disunity or a fifth column for foreign powers. They had been harassed and persecuted by the Islamic government in Tehran. Under the Shah, they were tolerated though they were not considered an officially recognized religious minority.

Among the Berbers and the Kurds, the formation of an identity has involved strong and sometimes violent claims for cultural and linguistic autonomy as well as the appropriation and incorporation of secular ideologies from the European experience, such as nationalism and marxism. What unites all the cases in this group is how the formation of minority identity was influenced by the adamant hostility it provoked from the modern Islamic nation-state, as the Kurdish experience indicates in Turkey and Iraq. The decades old internal wars of Turkey and Iraq are very instructive in this regard.

In the Berber case, Morocco tried to co-opt, if not encourage, the Berber identity on its territory. However, the Algerian case took a different path, as the Algerian state tried to repress any claims to cultural or linguistic distinction by its Berber population.

It is interesting to note here the references by many authors to the creation of diasporas that have influenced and continue to influence the politics of minority relations in the home countries—Copts, Berbers and Kurds are all good examples of this phenomenon.

The issue of the Kurds in Iraq is taken up by Brendan O'Leary, John McGarry and Khaled Salih in *The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq*. Several articles focus on the Kurdish population problem since the inception of the Iraqi state in 1922 to fully integrate its Kurdish-speaking population with the Arabic-speaking. The demise of the Ottoman Empire meant that the French and the British had to confront the issue of the status of the territories seized by London and Paris. Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine were assigned as mandates to Britain while France came to control Lebanon and Syria.

The Ottoman Empire, in the person of the Sultan, had controlled much of the Arab Middle East, where the Porte imposed its political domination through a system of local religious autonomy. Until the rise of nationalism in the Middle East and in the Ottoman dominions in the Balkans and North Africa, ethnicity was never as important an issue as religious allegiance. Jews and Christians were considered protected minorities and the relationship to the Islamic universal community was regulated by Islamic law and in some cases by local traditions. Theoretically, the allegiance of all the subjects was to the person of the Sultan as the inheritor of the theocratic power of the Khalif.

The creation of new states, ostensibly an emanation of the liberal European experience in the Middle East, introduced anew the problem of loyalty and legitimacy, and the role of religious and ethnic minorities, in societies with no previous experience in the formulation of political systems above and beyond religious and traditional legitimacy.

In the case of Iraq, the relationship between Kurds and Arabs, and that between Sunnis and Shiites, posed fundamental barriers to creating a modern Iraqi state. With the rise of pan-Arabism, communism and socialism, the populations of the Middle East were confronted with basic political dilemmas that have yet to be resolved. It is instructive and relevant to read Ofra Bengio's essay on the historical perspective in analyzing the Kurdish search for a role in twentieth-century Iraq. The essays in *The future of Kurdistan in Iraq* provide the reader with insight into the ongoing problems of the Kurdish population in adjusting to either Iraqi nationalism or pan-Arabism. Following the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958, as the Iraqi state evolved, the rise of the Baath Party in the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein underlined even more emphatically the problematic issue of multi-ethnic states in the Middle East. One of the essays addresses the subject of a federal state by suggesting a Canadian solution; there is naivety in such an answer, given the radically different historical circumstances that governed the formation of the Canadian Confederation.

Critical writing on the transitional stages of the development of the Iraqi Constitution and its government should be read in light of the final acceptance of the

document by the Iraqi Parliament in 2006, following the election of a representative body. The articles by Peter Galbraith should also be viewed from the same perspective. In part 4, the title “What Went Wrong” serves as an introduction to more recent debates on the contemporary conflict in Iraq, and the problems of the American administration in engineering security and a stable political system in that country. What is clear is that this volume is only one of numerous articles written in both America and Europe on what went wrong. The initial Anglo-American optimism on regime change and democratization came up against a murderous civil war between Shiites and Sunnis, where power struggles, Iranian intervention, Al Qaeda and Sunni Arab involvement met Islamic millenarianism, Jihadism and anarchy. Only in the Kurdish areas of Iraq does local administration seem to function with a degree of law and order, in contrast with the apparent lawlessness in some of the Southern provinces.

The confessional war, with the Sunni reaction to the rise to power of the Shiite majority, was the result of a combination of both immediate and longstanding political, theological and social conflicts and differences between the two branches of Islam. It is a conflict that needs to be understood in its historical development and a chapter on the topic would have been appropriate.

The gap between theory and practice appears to be a consistent and abiding characteristic of Arab and to a lesser extent Iranian politics and society. Over thirteen centuries of historical evolution, Islam has remained, by far, less institutionalized than Western Europe: social organizations such as guilds, urban centres, tribes, professional associations and political parties are segmented rather than corporate in nature. The fundamental units of the Islamic community have been and remain primarily those of the individual and his or her immediate kinship or friendship groups.

Political organizations are of limited efficacy and lack the cohesion and institutionalized directiveness common to their Western counterparts, save in the sense of providing social settings within which individuals build and maintain power and influence. Political culture in the Arab and Islamic Middle East is shaped by patrimonial and neo-patrimonial systems that are less differentiated and less complex than the more organized and reutilized structures of Western nation-states with their legal-rational traits. Personalism characterizes patrimonial rule and often defines leadership in the Arab and Islamic world, as in the case of Iraq, with Saddam Hussein and his extended family, or in Syria, with the Assad dynasty. This is not to say that Iranian and Arab political systems in the past and present have lacked the elements of a state organization and bureaucracy, which traditionally have been linked to the person of the ruler rather than to his or her position, and have provided for the articulation and exercise of power.

This has been the case in both Sunni and Shiite experiences, though it is relevant to point out that the theological differences do magnify structural and behavioral gaps in Shiite and Sunni world views. Shiite Islam, the majority religion in Iran and amongst the Arabic-speaking population of Iraq, has always had an active millenarian component, with a concomitant expectation of the kingdom of God on earth. The belief in the coming of the Messiah, central to Orthodox Judaism and fundamentalist Christianity, is even more relevant in Shiite Islam, and it is perhaps this concept that gives salience to its dogmatic differences with Sunni Islam. Mainstream Islam has a very vague and undeveloped concept of a Messianic arrival.

The cleavage between the two main branches of Mohammed’s message goes back to the dawn of Islamic history. The split was grounded in the dispute between theologians, and eventually Arabs and Persians, as to who the successor to Mohammed was and which line of descendants should rule. Shiites did not accept the first three kalifs—Abu Bakr, Omar and Osman—as the rightful inheritors of Mohammed’s religious, political and military mantle. In fact, it has been the proper duty of Shiites to ritually curse them, though the emphasis on this practice has varied over time.

Shiites maintain that in the realm of Islam, supreme political and religious leadership descended by blood from Mohammed to his cousin and son-in-law, Ali, and eventually to particular members of his progeny. The Alid line eventually disappeared with the twelfth imam, a child who went into occultation and whose return is expected at some time in the future as a harbinger of the kingdom of God on earth. This belief forms the core of Shiite eschatology, and has parallels with the classical notions of the divine right of kings in Europe and the Davidic origins of the Christian and Jewish Messiahs. It is also worth noticing that the Ethiopian kings made similar claims by linking their legitimacy to rule to the putative origins of the encounter between Solomon, son of David and the queen of Sheba.

There are other Shiite sects with their own interpretations of the lineage of Ali's putative descendants, but it is the Twelevers who have steadfastly held to this legend. In early Islam, the theological and eventual social differences between Sunnis and Shiites led to open warfare and persecutions, with the Shiites suffering the most. As a result, a tradition of martyrdom and martyrology developed within the main body of Shiism, giving it a rather morbid and pathological character best represented in the mournful celebrations commemorating the death of Shiite imams.

Clinton Bennett's *Muslims and Modernity* cites prominent Muslim thinkers, theologians and philosophers on relations between Islam and the non-Islamic world, principally Europe and North America. Strangely enough, none of these thinkers, intellectuals, literati, philosophers and pundits seem to be concerned about intra-Muslim relations and relations between Muslims and the rest of the non-Western world, such as China or India. They are even less concerned about Sunni-Shiite relations, which are at the core of the internal wars of Iraq, Lebanon and Pakistan. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to see Shiism and Sunni Islam as two different religions that share common theological underpinnings, very much like the relationship between Christianity and Judaism. The hatred and the genocidal Sunni behaviour toward Shiites in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan are symptomatic of theological differences that can be better understood in terms of the millennial conflicts between the interpreters of the Abrahamic message.

The hierarchical structure of Shiite Islam and its rejection of the world, especially among some of its more radical schools of thought, the Khomeinist interpretation being one, set the Shiite world totally apart from the Sunni world view. The destruction of Shiite shrines by Sunni suicide bombers in Iraq is symptomatic of the many problems that plague the construction of a modern state in Iraq. Here, the confessional differences that have often been manipulated by political leaders in Iraq and elsewhere in the Arab and Islamic world (as described by Davis in *Memories of State*) have been the grist of continuous bloodshed in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq. All of the authors reviewed here would have benefited from including some reference to the Wahabi school in Sunni Islam and its radical rejection of Shiism, to the extent that Shiites are considered idol worshippers by Sunni radicals.

Nation building in the Middle East has been characterized by an underestimation of ethnicity and religion by leaders in the Arab or Islamic world, who have swept under the rug the conflicts that historically were controlled and contained by traditional leadership. Only in Turkey has a charismatic leader such as Ataturk been able to fashion the premises of a modern secular state, and even that model is now under scrutiny and challenge. All the same, it is a model that has potential for emulation in the Middle East in the separation of church and state and the development of a modern, Western-based legal system. The Turkish treatment of the Kurdish issue may be seen as enjoining nation builders to avoid some of the pitfalls of the strong unitary nation-state toward linguistic and cultural autonomy by minorities. It could serve as an instructive example for the Algerian state.

The issue of Turkish entry into the European Union and the skepticism in many European quarters about Ankara's liberal democratic credentials is matched by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in some areas of Turkish civil society. This skepticism was strengthened by the rise of radical Islam and its official entry onto the international stage after the 9/11 Al-Qaeda attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.

In one state after another—Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia and Afghanistan, to name a few examples—radical Islamic movements challenge the social and political establishments, threaten minorities and majorities, and hinder international tourism and trade and any kind of European or American presence. Meanwhile, segments of immigrant Muslim minorities in Europe and North America are challenging established norms governing church-state relations, gender equality, secularism and individualism. Policies ranging from full integration to various forms of multiculturalism appear to be symptoms, arguably, of a much deeper problem, namely, the relative inability of the Islamic world at large to adapt to the modern and post-modern capitalist globalized international system and its relentless inherent drive to challenge conventions and traditions. Clinton Bennett's book can be read in this context, as can the other volumes reviewed here.

Ever since the "Rise of the West" and the worldwide expansion of the European and American models of economic and political development, whether liberal, fascist or marxist, only Japan has managed to successfully match European and American power through a fast-paced programme of economic and technological modernization. Today, a few other regions in Asia, such as the Chinese enclaves of Hong Kong and Singapore and South Korea and Taiwan, seem to have adapted their societies to the process of political and economic modernization. As for India, it should be noted that its society has accepted and integrated the premises of a modern representative democracy and it seems presently committed to rapid full-scale economic modernization. The case of Mainland China needs further analysis, but even there, the Communist Party has come to accept some of the premises of modern liberal capitalism.

The constant and fashionable debates on "globalization" and the rhetoric of aid, free trade, WTO rounds, IGOs, NGOs, regional integration and similar topics of great concern to social scientists, economists, international specialists and politicians mystify some harsh truths about development and ideologies. The annual United Nations Arab Human Development Reports are a solid starting point for some critical perspectives on socio-economic developments in the Arab world, where it is clear that the social, economic, technological and scientific gap between that part of the international system and Western Europe and North America is not being reduced.

All the same, different rates of economic growth, approaches to capital accumulation and investment strategies, as in the case of some oil-producing countries in the Gulf and North Africa, seem to indicate that leadership, institutions and resources offer relevant points of comparison that go beyond ideological rhetoric and the clash of civilizations. Compare and contrast, for example, the problematic rule of Ghaddafi in Libya, or the military elites in Algeria, with the United Arab Emirates or Kuwait: the traditional and quasi-autocratic Gulf entities on the Arab littoral have enjoyed an economic boom, substantially improved the quality of life of their citizens, and increased relative social and political freedoms.

The weaknesses or omissions in these works stem from a lack of insight or explanation into the Arab-Israeli conflict and the relationship between Jews and Moslems in the Islamic world. The fact that Jewish communities have practically disappeared from the Islamic world and that hostility to Israel is the basis of foreign policy in an overwhelming majority of Islamic societies and states needs to be explored in greater depth and detail. Any study of minorities in the Arab world should attempt to

do so, as should any study of nation building and nationalism in the Middle East. The recent war between Lebanon and Israel, and the two-decades old presence of Iran in Lebanon and its intrusion into the Arab world, are cases in point.

The evolution and transformation of traditional societies is not a new phenomenon, neither historically nor as a subject for social scientists and political economists; a systematic study of the Middle Eastern Islamic societies, whether in the areas of ethnic or religious relations, democratization or secularization, should not overlook a comparative historical approach. The future of minorities and the creation of modern states in the Middle East and other Islamic territories constitute a chapter in the evolution of the modern world, however painful its cycles have been, following the demise of European colonial empires and the fall of Soviet Communism.

These four books should be seen in the final analysis from this methodological standpoint.

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