

holding out an illimitable field for inductive research, while investigation is directed by the fundamental principles. The more work that is done in this way, the more will "the practical" gain in certainty and success; work on any other foundation is useless and embarrassing, and work ostensibly on any other foundation is really instinctively and intuitively on this. Dr. Laycock has raised instinct and intuition out of unconscious forgetfulness into cognition, science, and system.

2. We make a strong counter-assertion to Dr. Bushnan's gratuitous accusation, that Dr. Laycock "continually abuses the psychology of the schools," "sneers at Locke and Leibnitz as being pretenders." Never have we, in intercourse with Dr. Laycock, from his lectures or his writings, experienced the slightest foundation for such an unfounded charge. "Sneering and abuse" are neither Dr. Laycock's philosophical tone nor his habit; and if he investigates new facts inconsistent with former tenets, or elaborates new principles in opposition to them, or, in a solid, dignified way, refutes fallacies of former assertion and method, unfounded personalities will not avail against the conclusion.

There still remains for performance the third and most important portion of our purpose, the testing of the philosophy of each by actual occurrence. This will form the subject of a future communication, when we shall inductively examine the results in experience and practice of the methods inculcated by Dr. Bushnan and Dr. Laycock.

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*Personal Identity, and its Morbid Modifications.* By J. CRICHTON BROWNE, M.D. Edin., L.R.C.S.E.; Ext. Mem., late Senior President, Royal Medical Society, Edinburgh; Assistant-Physician Derby County Asylum.

(Concluded from p. 295.)

At the close of our last paper on personal identity we had just turned to the consideration of those apparent morbid divisions of the unity of consciousness which are sometimes, though happily rarely, brought under the notice of medical psychologists. Double consciousness, as we have already hinted, is essentially a result of diseased action, and comprehends a variety of conditions, distinguished from each other by differences in the mental symptoms, and by the relations to each other of the lucid and insane or of the two insane "oscillations." In all of them, however, there is, for the time, a change, a perversion, or an exaltation, of the mental identity of the individual, of

that principle which is, as it were, a centre round which the other faculties of mind revolve, and about which memories cluster. In the intensest forms of double consciousness, so called, mental identity is separated or multiplied into two distinct parts, so that two identities reside in the same individual, while in the milder manifestations of this condition there is a partial division of the same principle, a confusion of two natures in the same person. Where two alternating, though altogether unconnected, lives are lived by the same being, there is afforded, we think, a proof that mental identity is something more than consciousness, and so far independent in its affections. Indeed, it appears to us that the morbid states at present under examination would have been more aptly described as instances of double identity rather than of double consciousness. The phrase double consciousness is a contradiction in terms, for it is manifestly absurd to suppose that the mind can exist in two different states at the same moment. It is also a misleading expression, for this is not, of course, the meaning which it is intended to convey, nor is it at all descriptive of the conditions to which it is applied. These conditions are not necessarily characterised by any alteration of consciousness; that is to say, if consciousness is regarded as having reference simply to the present existing operation of the mind, for the man who inhabits alternately two distinct mental spheres may be perfectly conscious in both of them. In both of them his eyes, his ears, and all his organs of sense, may be normally active. In both of them, with equal accuracy, he may appreciate his surroundings, govern his movements, and express his ideas. In both of them he may be equally conscious, but he is not *similarly* conscious. The same world is inspected from different points of view in each. In the one it may be the real world, as it is to the perceptions of ordinary people; in the other, the world clad in the unsubstantial figments of a feverish fancy; or in both, a shadowy world, made up of metamorphosed realities. But whatever the metamorphoses may be, they arise, not from errors of perception, but of the personality—perceiving. A man who has passed into the abnormal phase of double consciousness sees all the familiar faces that surround him, but he does not recognise them; he hears loved and well-known voices, but they fall upon his ears as strange sounds; he beholds his household gods, but these do not, as they were wont, awaken emotion in his mind; in short, he regards everything in a new light and apart from former associations. The mind, shorn of its past, begins to learn the lessons of life anew, and perceives every object in relation to its new condition, the result of internal changes. The outward creation becomes subordinate to the inward idea, and is regarded only as it harmonises with the reigning delusion.

But the distinction between the two phases of double consciousness does not merely consist in the failure of memory, in the absence of

remembrances of the past, either singly or in their relations. An American author, distinguished alike for the subtlety and beauty of his thoughts, has made identity altogether a matter of memory. He has said, "It is by very little things that we know ourselves. A soul would very probably mistake itself for another, when once disembodied, were it not for individual experiences that differed from those of others, only in details seemingly trifling." Without speculating as to what shall eventuate in the unknown future, in that day when soul shall meet soul, "without the clay between," we may safely assert that, in the sense in which the word is here used, identity has little or nothing to do with experiences. Apart altogether from the experiences here referred to, minds cannot be regarded as resembling each other as much as do the waves of the ocean, and as having as little individuality as these. Minds are not projected upon the earth as from a machine of a fixed pattern, according to contract. They cannot be regarded as masses of clay left to be moulded in the hands of time. The identity of a mind does not depend upon the result of any such moulding, nor does this fundamental belief grow, and develop, and increase, according to the number of experiences, with all their trifling accessory circumstances, through which the mind has passed. A man of mature years and intellect and of vigorous memory has not more identity about him than the child who is just beginning to taste the sunshine of existence. In both the vital forces are operating continuously, and both have, therefore, a conviction of continuous existence. In the morbid conditions of double consciousness, however, there is something positive as well as negative. One identity is laid aside, with all the remembrances connected with it, but another is put on, and with the new identity a new memory acts in concert. A well-marked illustration of much that has just been stated is to be found in the case related by Professor Stillman, and repeated by Dr. Pritchard. "A lady of New England, of respectable family, became subject to paroxysms, which came on suddenly, and after continuing an indefinite time, went off as suddenly, leaving her mind perfectly rational. It often happened that when she was engaged in conversation she would stop short in the midst of it, and commence a conversation on some other topic, not having the remotest connection with the previous one, nor would she advert to that during the paroxysm. When she became natural again she would pursue the same conversation in which she had been engaged during the lucid interval, beginning where she had left off. To such a degree was this carried, that she would complete an unfinished story or sentence, or even an unfinished word. When the next paroxysm came on she would continue the conversation which she had been pursuing in her preceding paroxysm; so that she appeared as a person might be supposed to do who had *two souls*, each occasionally active

and occasionally dormant, and utterly ignorant of what the other was doing."

It is necessary to remark that in this case, as in the one immediately following, there is no distinct statement as to an impairment of personal identity. These cases, however, are in all respects so closely allied to others in which there was an obvious involvement of that fundamental belief, that it is almost fair to conclude that in them, too, it was somewhat defective. The morbid condition was not merely the result of a failure of memory and an obliteration of the past, for the acquisitions of the past were retained and made use of in the new conversation, which had no connection with the conversation of the previous state. The patient in both cases was a new creature. In the case which follows, and which is recorded by my father, Dr. W. A. F. Browne, there was in the natural and healthy state an entire effacement of one half of the actions and impulses which went to make up the patient's history, which rendered her the complex being that she was, and preserved her in relation to surrounding persons and objects.

"J. H—, about two years ago, was affected with hysteria, previous to a great constitutional change. The symptoms noticed were the globus and spasmodic flexure of the fingers. The phenomena which now exist followed this state, and were not modified by the establishment of the constitutional change alluded to. For many hours each day the patient is in what may be called her normal condition; for nearly an equal number she is in an abnormal state. She has no recollection during the one what passes or what she has done, or acquired, or suffered, during the other. There is no tie or connection between the two periods. The somnambulic state is ushered in by a yawn, a sensation of globus, and the drooping of the eyelids, which remain half-closed during its continuance, but do not obstruct vision. It generally passes away by the ejection of a mouthful of phlegm. Between these two acts, the yawn and the eructation, the woman is vivacious, more mirthful than when *herself*, knits, reads, sings, converses with relatives and acquaintances, and is said to display greater shrewdness than at other times. Her letters are better in composition and penmanship than she can produce when awake, or in her natural state. This may be called her state of clairvoyance. When aroused, she has no recollection whatever of anything that has taken place. She has forgotten the persons she has seen, the songs she has learned, the books she has read, and if she resumes reading it is at the place at which she had stopped when in her natural condition. When she reads in her abnormal state the same thing happens. The development of the fit is generally sudden and unexpected, but occasionally it is determined by noise or the movement of articles in the room, such as the fall of a poker or an alteration in the position of a chair. Her bodily health

is perfect; all her functions are regular and vigorous. She has lately complained of headache after the cessation of the somnambulism, and upon one occasion she described the painful sensation as confined to one side of the head." In connection with this case, it is worthy of remark that it was similar to those recorded by Mr. Dyer in the 'Philosophical Transactions,' by Dr. Dewar in Abercrombie's 'Intellectual Powers,' and by Major Ellicott in Combes' 'Phrenology,' in so far as the patient was a girl of hysterical temperament, and manifesting symptoms of well-formed hysteria. The disease in this case yielded to moral treatment, all the morbid phenomena disappearing before the dread of removal to an asylum.

In Major Ellicott's case the lady periodically passed through two conditions, separated from each other by a profound sleep, and termed by the lady's relatives the "old" and "new state." These two states were in no way bound together, the patient's disposition, capacities, and attainments, being different altogether in each of them, so that she seemed alternately to be two distinct persons.

The following instance of double consciousness is in many respects unique, and is taken from notes of the case made by my father, under whose care the gentleman was. A. B. felt convinced that he was himself and another person at the same time, and could not divest himself of the belief that in his own body were two minds, suggesting courses of conduct widely opposed. He felt assured that A. B., his old or original self, was a base, abandoned villain, tempting his new or other self, to whom he attached the emphatic *ego*, to commit misdemeanours and acts to which his feelings were opposed. The second person of the duality struggled with and resisted the vicious solicitations of the first, such as that he should perpetrate self-destruction. This internal combat sometimes became objective, when the hands, acting under the will of the original or virtuous personalty, beat and bruised the legs, body, and head, which were supposed to belong to the second or depraved nature. The blows were so severe as to leave marks for days; and when these were referred to, the voice of No. 2 said, "Don't justify him; he deserved it." The struggles between the two natures generally took place during the night, the interference of the night-watch being sometimes required to separate the belligerent powers. In conversation with those around, A. B. spoke at one time as No. 1 and at another as No. 2. In this gentleman the normal personal identity of the individual was set aside by an erroneous belief, springing out of cerebral disease. A state of mental duality existed, with this unusual peculiarity, that the two opposite mental states did not apparently alternate, but ran parallel to each other. The true explanation was, that the two conditions did in reality rapidly alternate with each other, the mind being thrown first into one attitude and then into another, according to certain principles of

suggestion; just as, in reading a dialogue, we can carry on two or more independent trains of thought, by turns. When we argue with ourselves, when we are doubtful upon any point, and hold an internal controversy regarding it; when we hesitate between two courses of conduct, and submit to our own judgment the reasons for and against each, we are, so far, in the condition of the gentleman whose case has just been related. But our nervous systems being healthy, and our personal identity entire, and correlating the order of phenomena in nature, we do not project the arguments on the one side without us and convert them into hallucinations, nor do we conceive them to be the offspring of another intelligence resident within us. On the contrary, we continue to regard both processions of thought as the products of one mind; we continue to recognise the links that connect them, no matter how antagonistic they may be, and to believe that two very adverse counsellors may be united in one personality. But all this A. B. failed to do. It may have been in him, the ideas of opposite complexions succeeded each other with morbid celerity, scarce giving him time to scrutinise the process of their succession; but at any rate, he utterly failed to classify these ideas, to reduce them to order by tracing them to a common origin, whilst he discriminated, distinguished, and analysed them all too narrowly and minutely. This he did in obedience to the natural bent of his mind, for even when in health he had been always prone to indulge in abstruse and vain philosophical inquiries.

It is sometimes attempted to explain cases of double consciousness, such as those we have described, by a reference to Dr. Wigan's bold and startling theory of the duality of the mind. The theory, however, we venture to think, fails to throw any light upon the conditions, for if there be two minds, capable, under certain circumstances, of independent action, each, whilst acting independently, ought to manifest all the ordinary mental powers, and to retain or to lose the recollection of the circumstances of the period when they both acted consentaneously. But if the constantly varying inequalities in the two mental conditions of double consciousness be opposed to Dr. Wigan's doctrine, so also is the mere fact of the transference of consciousness alternately from one to the other. What could determine the conscious existence of one half of the mind in this moment, and of the other half in the next? According to Dr. Wigan's theory, they should both be contemporaneously conscious. To say nothing, however, of the other weighty objections to the duality of the mind, we may remark that there is much more to support Sir Henry Holland's suggestion regarding the duplicity of the brain as elucidating those obscure conditions which we have been examining. It cannot be denied that there are difficulties connected with this theory also, that the evidence is insufficient for its complete esta-

blishment; but still it is more plausible than any other that has been advanced, and explains circumstances that would otherwise be without explanation. Acute or chronic disease, producing obvious lesion, affecting one side of the brain only, might, by disturbing the correspondence or unity of action of the two sides of the cerebrum, occasion double consciousness, and original inequality in the formation of the two hemispheres might also tend to disorder and derangement in the trains of thought, passing into actual perversion on the occurrence of any irritation. In accepting this theory, it is not necessary at the same time to adopt the conjecture that two states of mind may be coincident in time. On looking at other parts of our constitution in which a double organ is made subservient to a single function, we find that accident, disease, and other causes, interfere with their normal functions, and it is therefore conceivable that the two hemispheres of the brain, when subjected to morbid influences, may act separately and individually as well as the organs of the senses and voluntary power, and by their separate action produce incongruity and confusion, where ordinarily all was order and unity, as a result of their entire correspondence.

Changes in the cerebral circulation seem, occasionally, to hold an etiological relation to attacks of double consciousness. A gentleman of refined mind, the notes of whose case have been submitted to me, lost his personal identity, upon assuming the horizontal position. During the day his mind was clear and coherent, and for twelve hours he could laugh at the delusions of his companions and at his own, but at night he believed that he had two natures; he supposed himself to be in a state of mesmerism, that he was mad, and had the delusions of all the persons in the same ward concentrated in himself; that he was at the mercy of supernatural powers, which ruled all his thoughts and actions, filled his mind with visions of things past and things to come, and compelled him to accompany the night-watch on his rounds, and perform many other inexplicable deeds. He, the sane man, positively declared these to be the delusions of an insane man, who was himself, and yet different. This gentleman probably laboured also under the effects of overstrained mental exertion. When in health he had applied himself to metaphysical investigations with intense devotion and energy, and, indeed, his affliction was but the reflection of his ordinary habits of thought.

High intellectual tension, especially when combined with excitement of the feelings, is sometimes productive of other errors of personal identity besides double consciousness—of errors which have not, at least, been usually enumerated as instances of double consciousness, but which, nevertheless, have many points of resemblance to the ordinary standard examples of that affection. Great intellectual efforts, violent emotions, bursts of passion, of anger, of love, of hate, of jealousy, are occasional causes, on the psychical

side, of all forms of alienation ; and the influence of these is greatly increased when they act conjointly with detrimental physical agencies, such as mephitic air, abuse of stimulants and narcotics, alterations of the cerebral structure and of remote organs ministering to respiration, circulation, digestion, and the sexual functions. But the intellectual effort, when associated with mimic emotions, with simulated passions, put on in the representation of some other character and personality, seems to have an especial tendency to produce errors of identity. The individuality of the great actor is sometimes borne away by the tide of passion, the whirlwind of contending emotions, which he has himself created. He conjures up a shadow, and in his contemplation of it forgets his own substance. It is recorded by the biographer of Mrs. Siddons that on the nights following some of her most triumphant performances she was profoundly agitated ; that for hours subsequently, when unrobed, and in the silence and solitude of her bedroom, she walked backwards and forwards, not quite herself, not dissociated from the feelings and sentiments of the Juliet or Desdemona she had represented, and that her looks retained the fire or disdain, as the case might be, of "the tragedy queen." This observation was recorded to demonstrate the reality and sincerity of her acting, and it certainly demonstrates this ; but it does more, by showing that her impersonation was complete, that she had not merely assumed a character, but lost her own in the creation of the poet ; merged her identity in that of another mind differing from her own, and experienced difficulty in casting off the fancies of an hour and in regaining her natural and familiar modes of thinking and feeling. Dr. Andrew Combe, I have been told by one to whom he himself described the following scene, was one evening suddenly called to the Theatre Royal Edinburgh to see M—. The curtain had just fallen and the footlights been extinguished, and he found the company still in their grotesque dresses, in great alarm, and rushing to and fro around M—, who had performed the part of Midas, and was seated grasping convulsively the arms of his chair, staring wildly and fixedly on air, and muttering through clenched teeth, "I can't get out! I can't get out!" The ears of the closely fitting dress nodded over his brow, the paint had been partially removed by the water used to restore consciousness, the face was deadly pale, he was surrounded by a cloud of smoke from the sacrifice of royal plumes of feathers, and altogether the scene mingled much of the ludicrous with the horrible. In a short time the exclamation "I can't get out!" ceased, and after a few full sighs the morbid condition passed away, and the actor was "himself again." He then stated that his feelings and fears had overmastered him, that he became overpowered by the conviction that he could not and never could denude himself either of the character or of the leather skin ; that instead



of turning everything into gold by his touch, he was himself transmuted for ever into a mine and mummer; and he felt as if bound and closed up, "cribbed, cabined, and confined," and that all his struggles to escape were and must be fruitless. M— was, constitutionally, a sensitive, impressionable man, and at one time a somnambulist. Similar anecdotes have been related of several illustrious actors and actresses. Rachel experienced attacks like those of Mrs. Siddons. It is stated in the affecting episode of Coralie Walton, in Vandenhoff's 'Dramatic Reminiscences,' that the fragile, heart-broken girl could not, at the conclusion of Hamlet, doff either the character or the madness of Ophelia. It is impossible for us to say how often the truly great artist does really throw off his own identity and put on that of the character, so long and ardently studied, so triumphantly represented. That this is sometimes the case there can be no doubt. The heat, the anxiety, the excitement, the glare of light, all tend to induce the morbid condition. But in quiet retirement, or in the paths of daily life, the exclusive or excessive study of any one character or person may bring about mono-idealism and interfere with identity, so that at length a man may come soberly to believe himself to be truly the person whom he has so minutely contemplated, probably admired, and act in all things in harmony with his belief. Cases of monomania in which this is an unmistakable and permanent perversion of identity are, as has been already mentioned, of rare occurrence, but they are occasionally encountered. On visiting an asylum once I saw a man in the dress of a patient, standing in a shady corner of the airing court, aloof from his fellows, in the attitude of an ecstatic, with eyes turned heavenward and hands crossed upon his breast; his hair was long and hung about his shoulders, his face pale, his expression gentle and devout, and, altogether, his aspect was so striking as to attract my special attention, and to induce me to inquire of my medical guide, whose permission I have to place the case on record, about his history and delusions. I then learnt that this man had for years past believed himself to be Christ, and that he never for a moment forgot or abandoned this delusion, but that his whole life and conversation were in accordance with a fixed and predetermined plan, and with the impious fancy which so constantly and exclusively occupied his mind. He had been a labourer, of loose morality, of little lore, either secular or religious, when suddenly, after a period of excitement and ardent study of the Bible, he became persuaded that his personality was changed. All his real antecedents sank into oblivion. He forgot everything about the cottage where he was born and where he had spent his life. He could not find his way about the fields which he had roamed over as a boy and cultivated as a man; he denied his relatives, and treated them as strangers, and yet he displayed considerable power of mental

concentration when applying himself to the subject uppermost in his thoughts. He carefully studied the New Testament, and adopted the Gospel narrative as being an accurate account of his earthly career. He would talk of the miracles which he believed he had wrought, of the parables he had spoken; he would reprove those who laughed at him as scoffers and blasphemers, and promise rich rewards to the patient auditor. When placed in confinement he continued to cherish his delusions, but was always quiet, docile, and reserved. When I saw him even the wild fantastic edifice that had been piled up upon the ruins of his mind had begun to crumble away, for several circumstances in the case heralded the approach of dementia; but still, with all the unreasoning pertinacity of Wordsworth's little cottage girl, he adhered to his morbid convictions; and when told that he could not be Christ, for Christ was in heaven, replied, "Heaven is wherever I am." Combe mentions a case corresponding to the above. It was that of a clergyman who, having become insane, believed himself to be Napoleon Bonaparte; and under this conviction felt the most poignant remorse for having commanded the massacre at Jaffa, and thus caused the death of so many brave men.

Of the psychical epidemics of mediæval epochs, that of lycanthropy is among the most interesting, and in it there was doubtless sometimes a modification of identity. Two kinds of lycanthropy, however, require to be distinguished—first, that in which the zoomorphism was limited to the body; and secondly, that in which it extended to the mind. In the first variety the sufferer believed—and this belief was fostered by the superstitions of those around him—that at certain periods his body was transmuted into that of an animal, while his mind remained human and unclouded. Learned discussions took place as to whether the transmutation was real or only apparent, but the former was, of course, the more popular view. In the second variety it was held that the mind was involved, and assimilated to that of the creature whose form was worn, its human attributes being temporarily abolished, so that the feelings and instincts of the brute usurped the place of the sentiments and reason of the man. The persons afflicted with this variety of genuine lycanthropy were impressed with the belief that they were really animals; that they traversed mountains and forests as beasts of prey, running down and eating indiscriminately animals and children; and the state of the palms of the hands and nails proved that some of the sufferers had actually adopted the mode of progression of quadrupeds. The disease has been chiefly manifested in pastoral districts, and may have been suggested by the superstitions incidental to a solitary and shepherd life, and by the entire devotion of the thoughts to flocks and herds, and the accidents to which these are liable. It was observed among the hunters and shepherds of

Chaldea; it has appeared in Egypt, India, Greece, Germany, Brazil, Abyssinia, and Jura. At the present day solitary cases are sometimes, though rarely, encountered. Those affected with it always exhibited symptoms of grave bodily disease, for we are told that "their looks were pale; their eyes hollow and dry; their tongues exceeding parched; their thirst excessive, and their legs ulcerated." The bodily diseases under which the unfortunate victims of lycanthropy laboured so affected their psychical nature that they misapprehended the external world, themselves, and their mutual relations. The belief of the transmutation in some instances probably depended upon morbid sensations reflected in consciousness as verities. In modern times the demon of lycanthropy is exorcised by tonics, chalybeates, sedatives, nourishment, and moral discipline.

It is probably true that errors of identity sometimes occur in delirious states and during intoxication, but the difficulty of recognising them is then very great, just as it is in mania, so that it is generally impossible to arrive at any knowledge of the condition of this fundamental belief in a maniacal paroxysm. One anonymous author, who has given us some powerful pictures of insanity, blemished, however, by a varnish of inferior fiction, seems to maintain that a condition allied to double consciousness may be sometimes observed in mania, and that the wild raving of that disease may be resolved into a comminglement of two distinct currents of thought. A careful analysis, however, of the incoherence of several maniacs has failed to reveal to us any principle save that of suggestion.

There are, doubtless, errors of identity, having reference to continuous existence in the future, as when the patient believes that his personality is about to be changed. The connection of these with the belief in identity is shown by their coexistence with and relations to errors such as have been already described, having reference to the past and present. A gentleman, illustrating the doctrine of metempsychosis, believed that he had been changed from a dog into a man, but he also held that in a certain definite time the canine nature would return upon him, that he would lose his human identity, and he therefore refused to make any provision for the future, to gain any mental acquisitions, as these would all have to be sacrificed when he again became a dog.

It would be highly interesting to examine personal identity more minutely in relation to the last results of the combination and mixture of all the particulars that go to make up the man, or what are commonly called idiosyncrasies—that give the peculiar character to the man and his apprehension of external nature. This we may at some future day venture to attempt, but at present we must be content with having roughly indicated some of the more prominent of the errors of personal identity, which do not as yet appear to have received that attention which they deserve.