

constituents of the mind. In the terms of the writer's formula, "the development of mind can only be regarded as the progressive manifestation in consciousness of the life of a real being which, although taking its start and direction from the action of the physical elements of the body, proceeds to unfold powers that are *sui generis* according to laws of its own" (p. 632).

On the one hand the author admits that the changes in the brain are a *cause* of the states of consciousness, the mind behaving as it does, the cause of the behaviour of the cerebral molecules of the brain; while on the other hand he denies that the sole cause of mental activity can in any case be found in this condition, and he affirms that it is equally true to say that the states of consciousness are a cause of the molecular condition of the brain. So, then, he concludes that the mind is a real being which can be acted upon by the brain, and which can act on the body through the brain, and, indeed, that this view is the only one compatible with all the facts of experience. Finally, while physiological psychology is unable to determine the origin or destiny of what we call mind, it discovers no reason why it should not exist in some other relation than that which it holds in this life to the structure of the cerebrum. More than this, Professor Ladd maintains that there are certain phenomena that seem to make this possibility quite probable. Beyond this it does not pretend to go, and leaves the question to the departments of rational psychology, theology, &c.

The standpoint of the author of this work will be abundantly clear from the foregoing analysis. That it runs counter to the prevalent teaching of psychologists in this country cannot be denied. It is, however, an advantage to have this aspect of the great question before us discussed in an able and philosophical manner from the other point of view.

---

*La Raison dans la Folie, étude pratique et Médico-Légale sur la persistance partielle de la raison chez les aliénés et sur leurs actes raisonnables.* Par le Dr. VICTOR PARANT, Directeur-Médecin de la Maison de Santé Toulouse, Paris. Octave Doin Éditeur, 1888, pp. 423.

We have pleasure in giving a cordial welcome to this work, which enters upon a field of observation and reflection which has been almost entirely neglected. This neglect has doubt-

less been the natural consequence of the fact that the primary object of the alienist in the examination of a patient is to discover proofs of the loss of reason, and not of its presence. Seeing, however, that the experience of those familiar with the insane, convinces them of the frequent co-existence of indisputable insanity with normally acting intelligence outside the range of delusion or impulse, while, on the other hand, the lawyer is constantly disputing this combination of mental states in the same person, it becomes an imperative duty on the part of alienists to demonstrate how large an amount of reason is compatible with mental alienation. This task Dr. Victor Parant has undertaken, and has performed it in the able manner his former publications would lead us to expect.

The author proves that the retention of the memory is no proof of a patient's sanity. It may even remain in dementia. Moreover, in some instances the memory may be hyperacute. Again, the occupations of patients in asylums, &c., including art and the drama, are illustrations of certain powers being retained. The conversation of a lunatic may be reasonable; his letters, and even his will, may be free from a trace of mental disorder. Physiognomy may be deceptive and reveal absolutely nothing of the demon behind the mask. A higher quality of mind than memory, even the judgment, may be intact. Some will deny this; but those who do so would be obliged to admit that it may be available in business matters in persons undoubtedly labouring under mental disease. A patient may be conscious not only of his surroundings, but of his own alienation; or he may be well aware that he is dominated by imperative conceptions or impulses, and who could deny that a vast number of the insane know right from wrong, the difference between good and evil? Then as to conduct—how many patients are driven to commit one species of crime (or what would be crime if they were responsible) who would be the last people in the world to commit other criminal acts? What, again, can be more remarkable, as a proof of a certain amount of remaining reason, than the desire of a patient to be protected from himself—that is to say, from his own hallucinations? The simulation of insanity by the insane is itself evidence of certain mental powers being in force and of the persistence of motives and foresight. The same may be said of the dissimulation of insanity by the insane as bearing on the same point. What shall we say as to logic? Well,

granting the truth of the well-known dictum of Locke, almost all patients labouring under delusion are logical in their acts. Some suicides are, it must be allowed, desperately illogical. As Martial's epigram has it:—

Himself he slew, when he the foe would fly;  
What madness this, for fear of death to die.

Some other suicides, however, are logical enough if once the premise is admitted. A patient is logical who refuses to take food, believing that the Almighty has commanded him to starve.

The application of the principle that reason may survive in certain directions in those who have "lost their reason," paradoxical as it may seem, is of the utmost importance in relation to medico-legal questions. The persistence of reason, considerable as it may be, does not render a person necessarily responsible for his acts. On the other hand, however, a partial amount of reasoning power cannot be allowed to carry with it, so far as legal punishment is concerned, a corresponding partial responsibility. A delicate and difficult question is no doubt raised by the position here taken; but we are unable to see how the mental physician can arrive at any other.

We have said enough of the general tenor of this work to induce our readers to study the treatise for themselves. It is one which will add to the reputation of the author, and, through him, of the family of which he is so worthy a member. His grandfather was the celebrated Dr. Foville, and his uncle was the late Achille Foville, whose loss we have had so recently to deplore, and of whom obituary notices have appeared in the last and present number of the *Journal*. To the memory of these distinguished relatives this volume is most appropriately dedicated.

---