three key variables: interests, ideas, and institutions. Although the chapters are structured about common themes, the authors explicitly state that they are not constructing a comparative case study (p. x). Rather, they seek to illustrate a set of general points about the politics of education reform in multiethnic cities. They do so because some reforms and some issues are not considered part of the politics in all four cities. Equally important, the dependent variable—successful efforts by Asian Americans or Latinos to reform education—does not vary much across these cities.

The core of the argument is that institutions of education were reformed and redesigned in the 1960s and 1970s to address African American access to public education. This politics, fought out both in the courts and in the electoral arena, achieved some gains, but more importantly, spawned a set of institutional processes that incorporated the interests of African Americans into the education process. Similar successes for Latinos or Asian Americans are more difficult because the politics of ideas in education has shifted from concerns with equity to concerns with choice and performance. The dominant education reforms of the 1990s—site-based management, school vouchers, charter schools, and private partnerships—are concerned with maximizing choice as a means to facilitate better educational outcomes. The interests of Latinos and Asian Americans in equity concerns, as a result, generally lose out in this politics of ideas and are unable to gain access to the policymaking agenda. When these issues do get on the agenda, they are undercut by institutions that were designed under the old biracial regime. These institutions privilege equity concerns for African Americans but not for the new emerging groups. In the end, the authors are pessimistic about education reforms that might benefit Latinos or Asian Americans.

The rich detail of the case studies (often organized in summary tables in a nicely comparable way) provides much fodder for scholars of urban education seeking other explanations for urban politics. Some of the groundwork for such efforts is established by a set of explicit comparisons to six of the other seven cities in the larger study. Differences between the cities and African American–dominated cites (Atlanta, Baltimore, Detroit, and Washington, DC) and the urban machine cities (Pittsburgh and St. Louis) illustrate just how unique multiethnic politics is. Strikingly absent from these comparisons is Houston, one of the original study cities that is also multiethnic. Houston could have provided additional relevant data; its absence from the book is perplexing.

At times the authors appear to stop their analysis too soon. The convincing argument that Latinos and Asian Americans cannot get on the agenda is undercut by the simple assertion that they lack rhetorical capital. Is this not a tautology? Is rhetorical capital anything other than the ability to get on the political agenda? The absence of variation on the dependent variable is especially troubling in this regard since we do not have any counterfactuals for comparison.

While the combination of ideas, institutions, and interests makes a nice explanation for these four cases, one can imagine others that are equally compelling. The most logical alternative explanation is that Latinos and Asian Americans have been unable to gain sufficient political representation (or bureaucratic representation) to force their issues onto the agenda: "The relative absence of both Latinos and Asians from the education policy arena in these multiethnic cities and also their lack of policy influence were striking" (p. 12). Political representation seems to be both a more testable hypothesis and a more parsimonious explanation.

The institutional argument is also a bit troubling. If institutions reformed in response to African American political action are the problem for Latinos and Asians, why do these institutions not benefit black students? Data in the appendix show that African American students do poorly in all four of these districts. The authors allude to Wilbur Rich's argument about racial patronage and cartels, but do not fully explore this possibility.

In the end, the authors have examined four interesting cases of urban education politics. What we still do not know is how typical those cases are. Do Latinos fare equally poorly in Corpus Christi or San Antonio? Do Asian Americans face similar problems in Seattle or San Diego? But one should not criticize authors for not writing a book that they did not intend to write. *Multiethnic Moments* provides a rich set of hypotheses that could be tested with larger samples and different data sets. That is a valuable contribution to scholars and well worth the reading. A second major contribution that needs to be recognized is the utility of the book for classroom usage. The cases are engaging, and the analysis is accessible. The book has the potential to be useful in upper-division undergraduate classes in urban politics, race and politics, and education policy, as well as more specialized graduate classes.

Troubled Pasts: News and the Collective Memory of Social Unrest. By Jill A. Edy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006. 240p. $71.50 cloth, $23.95 paper.
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707071782

— Karen M. Kedrowski, *Winthrop University*

Jill A. Edy seeks to answer a difficult question: How do Americans construct a "collective" memory—as opposed to individual memories—of past events through the news media? Edy focuses her analysis on two case studies: the 1965 Watts riots in Los Angeles and the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. She chose these cases because they were complicated, significant, newsworthy events when they occurred and each case became a basis

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of comparison for contemporary events. In 1992, South Central Los Angeles, including Watts, erupted into riots again after the acquittal of police officers who had beaten motorist Rodney King, and in 1996, the Democratic Party once again held its national convention in Chicago.

Edy uses multiple forms of media in her analysis. She uses *Time* and *Newsweek* to analyze contemporaneous coverage of the 1965 riots and the 1968 convention. To understand how the media constructed collective memory over the following decades, she analyzes three newspapers in detail—the *Chicago Tribune,* the *Los Angeles Times,* and the *New York Times,* the last of which is used as a surrogate for national news coverage.

The author first provides the reader with a summary of the original events, listing the undisputed "facts" of the two cases and being careful not to place her own interpretation of those facts into this part of the narrative. She then describes the contemporaneous coverage from the newsmagazines, demonstrating that the news reporters had no way of understanding why the events unfolded. In fact, the events inside the 1968 Democratic National Convention were reported separately, as though divorced from the events occurring outside. Similarly, coverage of the Watts riots allows observers to impose a variety of competing frames on the events—poverty, joblessness, and racial unrest—into the contemporaneous coverage.

Next, Edy examines how the public ritual of an investigation helps to frame these events for coming generations. She compares the McCone Commission, which investigated the root causes of the Watts riots, with the Walker Report, issued after the 1968 Democratic National Convention. She argues that the McCone Commission did not attempt to affix blame as much as it listened to competing explanations of the violence and exonerated the longtime residents of the African American community of Los Angeles. The Walker Report attempted to affix blame for the unrest on demonstrators and police alike, and its conclusions were rejected by Mayor Richard Daley and others involved in the events in Chicago. Thus, Edy concludes, the collective memory of the Watts riots and the 1968 convention was not shaped by any official body. Any collective memory, consequently, had to be shaped by the news media.

Edy then uses indices and key word searches to determine how many times the Watts riots or the 1968 Democratic Convention were mentioned annually in the *Los Angeles Times,* the *Chicago Tribune,* and the *New York Times* in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s (until 1992 for the Watts riots and 1996 for the Chicago convention). She finds that there are frequent mentions of both events in the newspapers. They occur in obituaries of individuals who participated in either event, in retrospectives of the events on major anniversaries, or simply as metaphors. This is the most fascinating part of her analysis, where she demonstrates how the competing frames eventually dissolve into one common explanation: The Watts riots are framed as an outcry against urban poverty and the failure of the Great Society, and the demonstrations outside the 1968 Democratic Convention express opposition to the Vietnam War. Competing frames—including Watts as a riot about racial tensions caused by African American migrants from the South, or representations of the other counterculture movements taking part in the Chicago clashes—are simply missing. Another key finding is that the collective memory of the Democratic Convention constructed by the *Chicago Tribune* differs from those adopted by other newspapers. The *Tribune* consistently characterizes the unrest as the fault of the demonstrators and exonerates the police. Only when the 1996 Democratic Convention again comes to Chicago does the *Chicago Tribune* begin to revise its frame to coincide with the interpretations of the *New York Times* and other newspapers.

Edy concludes her work by calling to mind Santayana's oft-quoted phrase, "those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it." She argues that Santayana's caution implies that there is but one lesson to learn from the past. Her case studies demonstrate that the "lessons of the past" include not only remembering discrete events but also attaching particular meanings to those events and forgetting other interpretations of them. She then discusses how collective memory of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks may be shaped over time.

Unfortunately, Edy overstates her conclusions to some extent, largely because she does not adequately justify her methodology. For instance, she uses the *New York Times* as the sole representative of national media coverage, stating, as many others have, that it is used as a touchstone for editors and producers in other national outlets. However, in so doing, she ignores a growing literature that finds that the *New York Times* is not a reliable surrogate for national media coverage. Consequently, conclusions about the differences between local and national coverage may be overstated; these differences may only apply between the *New York Times* and the *Tribune* or *Los Angeles Times,* however. Nor does Edy include television news coverage in her analysis. She has practical reasons for not doing so; yet she does not explore adequately whether and how this decision might influence her conclusions, especially given the importance of images to the construction of individual and collective memory. Along the same lines, she does not mention the development of the Internet, and whether and how this new medium may influence the construction of memory. Finally, she does not discuss how the materials were coded or how many coders were used. If she alone is responsible for classification and interpretation, she should have mentioned this and discussed the ramifications of this approach as well.

These concerns aside, Edy's short book is extremely well written and her work is well grounded in the literatures of communication and political science. As such, the

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work is an excellent resource for scholars interested in political communication, framing, media studies, and social history. It makes a significant contribution to our collective understanding of social movements and media coverage of them.

The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass Incarceration in America. By Marie Gottschalk. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 466p. $75.00 cloth, $28.99 paper.

Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement and American Democracy. By Jeff Manza and Christopher Uggen. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 384p. $29.95.

Punishment and Inequality in America. By Bruce Western. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006. 224p. $29.95.
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707071794

— Naomi Murakawa, *University of Washington*

The American penal system has acquired an alarming rap sheet: Incarceration rates more than quadrupled from 1970 to 2005; African Americans are seven times more likely to be incarcerated than whites; more than five million Americans are barred from voting because of a felony conviction; and the United States incarcerates a greater proportion of its citizens than any nation in the world. Each of the three books reviewed here begins with some incantation of these daunting statistics, and from there they grapple with questions of the political causes and consequences of mass incarceration. What drives the contemporary prison boom, and how does mass incarceration in turn influence the distribution of political power, the mobilization of interest groups, and the citizenship of all those living under the ever-expanding criminal justice net?

These are politically pressing questions that, for the most part, political scientists have too often avoided. While the prison explosion has prompted a concomitant flurry of research, it is sociologists who have produced the preponderance of books on the politics of punishment, and major works from the last decade alone include Katherine Beckett's (1997) *Making Crime Pay,* David Garland's (2001) *The Culture of Control,* and Jonathan Simon's (2007) *Governing through Crime.* This odd disciplinary division of labor is nothing new. Sociologists and social theorists have long dominated the study of crime and punishment, drawing on the rich traditions of Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Michel Foucault. Political science seems to have forgotten its own rich traditions of exploring the ways in which crime and punishment suffuse American political history. The rights of the accused and the limits of punishment are central dilemmas of legitimate state power, so much so that four of the 10 amendments in the Bill of Rights address criminal procedure and punishment. Alexis de Tocqueville, along with Gustave de Beaumont, were originally commissioned to study the penitentiary in America, not democracy, and an impressive if comparatively small group of political scientists like James Q. Wilson and Stuart Scheingold have produced accounts of crime and punishment worthy of testing, revising, and updating. Even with this political history and the present-day prison boom, political science's tools of the trade and areas of expertise—agenda setting, interest groups, electoral incentives, party competition, and especially state building—have not been widely applied in book-length examinations of the politics of punishment. Punishment remains a nascent topic in political science, and what the discipline can bring to the subject is still up for grabs.

Marie Gottschalk's *The Prison and the Gallows* is a great stride forward in showing what political science can contribute to the study of punishment. Gottschalk, the only political scientist of the four authors reviewed here, calls on insights from American political development and interest-group politics to identify how the carceral state expanded and why its growth did not face more political opposition.

This book makes two central arguments. The first is that even though contemporary incarceration rates are unprecedented, contemporary penal policy "has deep historical and institutional roots that predate the 1960s" (Gottschalk, p. 4). This may sound like a modest claim, but it actually challenges dominant accounts of the rise of the carceral state, which often begin no earlier than Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential campaign and proceed to emphasize supposedly new post-1960s phenomena—an escalating crime rate, shifts in public opinion, the war on drugs, the emergence of the prison-industrial complex, changes in American political culture, and politicians exploiting law and order for electoral gain. In an ambitious historical sweep from convicts in the New World to supermax prisons, Gottschalk illustrates that fearful citizens and opportunistic political elites are nothing new; rather, "the state structures and ideologies that eventually facilitated the incarceration boom and other contours of the carceral state were built up well before the 1970s" (ibid., p. 7).

Because early American political development lacked any significant interest in creating federal- or state-level law enforcement, penal apparatuses developed in a "fitful, roundabout, and morally charged manner" (ibid., p. 42). For example, Progressive era alarm over prostitution catalyzed the professionalization of state and local police, as well as the new Federal Bureau of Investigation; Herbert Hoover's law-and-order campaigns led to the establishment of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the Federal Bureau of Prisons; and alcohol prohibition led the courts to expand police search-and-seizure powers. Crusades against prostitutes, bootleggers, gangsters, and pornographers faded away, but Gottschalk shows that even short-lived law-and-order campaigns left "in their wake increasingly fortified law enforcement institutions" (p. 43). Gottschalk's historical account highlights both

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