his texts too seriously (as W. claims), then much of W.'s own analysis begins to buckle and bend. (The fact that W. is keenly aware of this keeps it from breaking.) As previously mentioned, W. presents dialectic again and again as a superior form of human activity, a position that has allowed him continually to submit myth to the rule of dialectic. Yet, given W.'s insistence of the playfulness of Plato's texts, this would mean that the description in the palinode of a purely noetic 'discourse' in which one would somehow overcome or transcend the limitations of one's human condition *is itself made within a context of play*. Why, then, take it seriously as a goal or ideal to be attained? And why use such a description, as W. does, as a pivot upon which to support a Platonic system in which dialectic stands as the highest expression of human intellectual achievement? The playfulness of Plato's text undermines the apparent seriousness of the celebration of dialectic that occurs therein: and although W. at one point insists upon the mythological character of the *entirety* of the *Phaedrus* (and therefore, it seems to follow, of the privileging of dialectic that occurs therein), he stops short of asking if the entirety of the *Phaedrus* – including its apparent privileging of dialectic – is *playful*. This is an avenue that must be explored given W.'s own otherwise excellent analysis of play.

W. concludes with an honest and admirable self-reflection upon the scope and uncertainty of his own interpretation, as well as a concise meditation on what it means *to encounter* a Platonic text. For W., the *Phaedrus* is not meant to provide us with prepackaged and easily-digestible philosophical 'truths', but rather to prompt us into philosophical inquiry and debate: to draw us, as Socrates attempts to do to Phaedrus in the dialogue that bears his name, into philosophical conversation. W. hopes that his book will do the same. In this, and much more, it is certainly a success: for, in offering a careful and textually-based interpretation that clarifies *and* problematises the *Phaedrus*, it will doubtlessly invite the sort of scholarly consideration and criticism that all outstanding interpretations deserve.

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PHILOSOPHERS IN THE *REPUBLIC*

WEISS (R.) *Philosophers in the* Republic. *Plato's Two Paradigms*. Pp. xii + 236. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2012. Cased, US$49.95. ISBN: 978-0-8014-4974-1.
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On standard readings of Plato's *Republic*, Socrates discusses a single group of philosopher-rulers from 473c–543c. W. argues instead that Socrates describes two distinct kinds of philosophers: philosophers by nature (473c–502c; Chapter 1) and philosophers by design (502e–543c; Chapters 2–3).

Philosophers by nature love wisdom and its objects. Their love of wisdom makes them moderate, courageous and just. They are typically corrupted, but Socrates proposes no educational programme to prevent this; chance occasionally sees them safely through. Their justice is such that they want to benefit others, and so they want to rule – though political circumstances usually prevent it. Philosophers by nature are true philosophers, and they would rule in Socrates' ideal city.

Philosophers by design, in contrast, are appetitive and love war and hunting. (W. never says how their appetitive nature fits with their spirited objects of love.) They are clever, but

because they do not love wisdom, they must be forced into an education that culminates in their being compelled to learn the Good. They lack the character virtues that stem from love of wisdom. In particular, they do not want to benefit others; at best, they refrain from harming others. So, they must be compelled to rule. Philosophers by design are bastard philosophers, and they would rule in Kallipolis, which is not Socrates' political ideal.

On this view, Socrates introduces philosophers by design at 502c–e. He says that they must discuss rulers 'as it were from the beginning' (*hôsper ex archês*). He needs a new beginning because Glaucon and Adeimantus reject philosophers by nature. Glaucon threatens violence when Socrates proposes philosophical rule (473e–474a) and he wants to speak in a measured way about philosophers' merits as rulers (*metriôs*; 484b). Adeimantus says that philosophers are either useless or corrupt (487c–d). In response, Socrates creates a hybrid philosopher-warrior that will appeal to the brothers.

These claims are highly dubious. Socrates explains his shift: 'we must next deal with the remaining issues – in what way, by means of what subjects and pursuits, the saviors of our constitution will come to exist, and at what ages they will take up each of them' (502c–d). Earlier, Socrates describes the job of guardian and the nature that suits someone for that job (373e–376c). He then turns to the education needed to make someone suited for guardianship into a guardian (376c–e; that conversation continues through 412b). Socrates' stated reason for his shift at 502c–d exactly parallels his earlier one. He does say that he will discuss philosopher-rulers 'as it were from the beginning' (*hôsper ex archês*), but this is an obvious joke: Socrates will now discuss philosopher-rulers from the beginning *of their lives*. Glaucon and Adeimantus say that *others* will react badly to the idea of philosophical rule. W. says they thereby obliquely express their own views, but she offers no real argument. Glaucon's desire to talk in a measured way about philosophers as rulers manifests no deep resistance to philosophical rule; when he says this, after all, Socrates has not yet argued that philosophers have the virtues of character.

W.'s other claims and arguments about philosophers by nature and design are no more persuasive. She says that philosophers by design violate the 'one person, one job' principle by being both soldiers and philosophers. But before her dividing point, Socrates says that philosophers will be soldiers earlier in life (498b–c). W. says that philosophers by design must be compelled to rule, while philosophers by nature need not be compelled. But, again before her dividing point, Socrates says twice that philosophers rule under compulsion (499b5, c7). The first passage refers to the compulsion coming about 'by chance', but that does nothing to suggest that philosophers rule willingly. W. says that philosophers by design do not love wisdom or its objects, so they must be compelled in their education and they lack the virtues that stem from love of wisdom. Here, the difficult passage comes after her dividing point, when Socrates repeats that philosophers should be keen on the subjects proposed in his educational programme (535b), should not be compelled in their education (536e) and will have the qualities of mind and character attributed to philosophers earlier (535a–536b). W. tries to account for these passages by appealing to 536b–c, where Socrates says he has made himself ridiculous in describing the philosophers' qualities. He saw philosophy being abused, became irritated and spoke out too seriously. W. says that Socrates now realises *he* has abused philosophy by calling his philosopher-warriors 'philosophers', becomes irritated with himself, and so speaks out too seriously by attributing the virtues of philosophers by nature to his philosopher-warriors. I cannot see how this would constitute an excess of seriousness; nor can I see why, on W.'s reading, Socrates insists that the philosopher-warriors must be educated through play *after* chastising himself (536e; 536b–c).

Chapter 4 argues that Socrates possesses a higher degree of justice than other philosophers by nature – piety – which leads him to help others willingly even when helping is

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dangerous. W.'s claims here are just as odd. She never directly addresses Socrates' description of his philosophical mission as divinely *ordered* or *commanded* by god. Here it is natural to see a parallel to the philosophers' agreement to rule in *Republic* VII. Philosophers have benefited from the city's laws – especially by receiving an education that prevents their corruption into extreme vice – so a legal requirement for philosophers to rule is just. Socrates has benefited in the same way from his *daimonion* and other divine interventions, which makes it just for god to command him to philosophise with anyone (not just with his friends). Perhaps it is to avoid this obvious parallel that W. says, perversely, that we need not take Socrates' talk of divinities and gods literally (pp. 143–5).

Chapter 5 argues that Socrates never seriously defends justice as profitable for the just person; rather, he defends moderation while calling it 'justice'. W. offers arguments for this claim, but her interpretation seems driven largely by her own ethical views. She is so confident that justice is by its nature the virtue that profits others *and not the just person* that she cannot imagine Socrates disagreeing. W.'s moral confidence guides interpretation earlier in the book as well. Philosophers by design start their city by sending everyone over ten to the country (540e), 'an alarmingly monstrous procedure' that shows they are not just. Philosophers by nature are just, so Socrates' reference to the 'clean slate' they require for governing (501a) cannot anticipate the later plan and must be understood metaphorically (pp. 117–20). Likewise, if X does Y a favour expecting reciprocal benefit, justice cannot require Y to reciprocate – certainly not as X specifies. Hence, Socrates cannot seriously argue that if the city calls on philosophers to rule in return for their education and upkeep, justice requires that they obey (pp. 100–2).

This review only touches the surface of the difficulties – both internal and textual, on both a small and large scale – that W.'s interpretation faces. To the last page, which says that Socrates would 'choose justice where there is no justice to be chosen' in the afterlife (p. 218), the book makes puzzling claims and offers unsatisfying arguments. It takes a majestically self-assured tone, brimming with rhetorical questions. The book is at its best when it raises puzzles or calls attention to passages that are sometimes papered over. The interpretation that W. builds around those passages and her proposed solutions to the puzzles hold considerably less interest.

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PLATO'S *PHILOSOPHOS*

GILL (M.L.) *Philosophos. Plato's Missing Dialogue*. Pp. x + 290, figs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Cased, £30, US$55. ISBN: 978-0-19-960618-4.

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Tantalising hints of a dialogue on the nature of the philosopher may be found at the beginning of Plato's *Sophist* (217a–b) and *Statesman* (257a–258b). *Philosophos* would have been the final instalment of a trilogy. There is *prima facie* evidence that such a dialogue was conceived, and the joint investigation of the Eleatic Stranger, Theaetetus and Young Socrates is advertised as culminating in an account of the philosopher as a discernible type, both distinct from and more important than the sophist and the statesman. Were a manuscript of *Philosophos* to be discovered in a forgotten desert cave it would ascend immediately to a prominent position among Plato's dialogues.