

Electoral System Effects on Gender Representation: The Case of Mixed Systems

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Electoral systems as endogenous re-distributive institutions (Tsebelis, 1990) help to define the rules of the game. In this manner they have an important impact among regional, class, ethnic, gender, and other sub-groups of the general population on the distribution and variation in outcome of who is nominated for, and elected to, national office. In particular, there is a well-established and growing literature on the impact of electoral systems and electoral system reform on the representation of women in national legislative bodies (Darcy, Welch, and Clarke 1994; Matland and Taylor 1997; Caul 1998; Rule 1987; Matland 1998). In general, these studies have concluded that more women are elected in proportional rather than in plurality or majority electoral systems. However, a major difficulty in interpreting these findings is created by the historical, cultural, economic, and institutional differences among cases chosen for comparison.

Electoral results in industrialized countries generally suggest that proportional representation systems are more conducive to women gaining office than are single member plurality district (SMD) systems. For example, in a study of stable democracies, Darcy, Welch, and Clarke argue that, 'on average twice a proportion of

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women (20.2 per cent) are currently elected to list proportional representation (PR) systems as compared to SMD (10.2 per cent)' (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994: 142). Our data suggest that this holds for nations regardless of the level of development.

In this paper, we undertake a systematic analysis of the difference in impact of proportional (PR) versus single member plurality (SMD) electoral systems on the election of women candidates to the lower houses of parliament within a select group of nations. Our research design combines three levels of analysis. At the first level we do a broad cross-national ($n = 153$) comparison of the relation between electoral system type and gender representation. At the second level, we employ a most different systems design in terms of the countries selected for intensive study and comparison (Przeworski and Teune 1970). Our sample of nations ($n = 7$) vary widely in terms of culture, world region, historic experience with democracy, level of development, role of women in society and politics, and institutional structure. What they share in common is the use of mixed electoral systems, although even in this instance they vary across the spectrum of such systems. Hence, rather than comparing countries with different electoral system types, in this paper we explore the patterns of representation of women within countries which have mixed electoral systems, that is both plurality and proportional elections to the same body in the same election (Massicote and Blais 1999: 345; also LeDuc, Niemi, and Norris 1996).

At the third level our within-system analysis compares the impact of different, but simultaneously implemented electoral formulas on gender representation. Within mixed systems, our major inquiries explore whether women are more likely to be selected/elected in the PR rather than in the plurality elections, and whether parties select more female candidates for PR rather than for the plurality part of the elections. For the PR part of the election we examine the placement of women on party lists relative to male candidates on the same lists. By focusing on a comparison of the components of mixed and mixed member proportional (MMP) systems within countries we are able to control for a diverse set of factors, such as region, culture, level of economic development, timing of the democratization process, and duration of democracy.

There has been extensive research that shows that electoral arrangements do affect electoral outcomes, including opportunities for women as candidates. Extension of the Duverger principle (Duverger 1954; also Cox 1997: 14) suggests that party elites will make different choices in the selection of candidates where the winner-takes-all principle applies than they will when multiple representatives of their party are likely to gain office. In the former case, these pressures create the strategic need to run candidates who can appeal to the broadest possible segments of the electorate. Hence, a candidate is more likely to be chosen if she/he has a national reputation, electoral experience, and success, and is likely to be positively identified by most voters. In the latter case, party leaders can choose a mix of people to run representing more diverse groups within the party and society.

The Duverger principle has frequently been cited to explain why single member

electoral arrangements in the United States have helped keep minorities out of office, and/or in competition with each other and with women. An extension of this argument is that women are also disadvantaged where there is a single member plurality electoral system. Women do not constitute a minority in most countries nor are they geographically concentrated in a limited number of constituencies. Nor do women fall disproportionately (compared to men) in one socioeconomic class despite the feminization of poverty in many countries. Yet women form a relatively small percentage of most national, regional, and local legislatures (Reynolds *et al.* 1997).

Traditionally, women's roles in many societies are conceived to be inconsistent with the competing for, or holding of, political office. Furthermore, the socialization hypothesis suggests that women are not as interested as are men in competing for such posts because of internalized values (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994: 104–118). In addition, it is often argued that the pool of qualified women from which potential candidates can be drawn is small, i.e. the supply thesis (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; see also Gidengil and Vengroff 1997a and 1997b). All three of these factors have undergone dramatic changes in the advanced industrial countries but not exclusively in those countries (Rule and Zimmerman 1992; Welch and Studlar 1986). But women are still handicapped in the competition for political office. Significantly fewer women than men present themselves as candidates and few are chosen as candidates for either safe or competitive seats. The ratio of female to male legislators remains quite modest in most nations (Interparliamentary Union 1998). In fact, the GEM (gender empowerment measure) continues to show important disparities, even in the best of cases, such as the Scandinavian countries (UNDP, 1998).

Women form small minorities in most legislatures but they are an even smaller group where there is a plurality electoral system. In the United States, for example, where feminist political movements have reputedly had a marked political impact, only nine out of 100 senators and only 58 out of 435 representatives were women in 1998 (Institute for Women's Policy Research 1998: 11). This contrasts rather sharply with several Scandinavian democracies, which have list proportional representation systems. In these countries women occupy a significantly greater number of legislative seats: 42.7 per cent in Sweden, 36.4 per cent in Norway in 1998 as compared to 13.3 per cent in the United States in that year, for example (see IPU 1998; also Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994: 142). Many authors attribute this difference in representation primarily to the existence of an SMD electoral system in the former (Rule and Norris 1992: 41, also see Amy 1993: 108).

Research suggests that the intermediary agency in the electoral process, the political party, acts as a gatekeeper in its role of appointing candidates to run (Karnig and Walter 1976; Andrew 1991; Maille 1990; Gidengil and Vengroff 1997a; Tremblay 1998). In plurality systems, the local party leaders generally have neither the means nor the incentive to balance their tickets to represent different groups within a particular constituency. Instead they will seek to win the seat with the strongest

possible candidate. However, in some parliamentary systems with plurality elections, women candidates have been parachuted into safe districts in order to promote gender equity as happened in Canada with the Liberal Party (e.g. Nôtre Dame de Grace in the 1997 parliamentary election).

In a PR system with several candidates running on a list, the party can try to balance its ticket so as to appear to be equitable, by selectively and strategically placing women on the list to assuage vocal pressure groups, particularly if there is a strong women's branch of the party. In this context, district magnitude clearly plays an important role as well. As the number of seats (M) in a district increase, the likelihood of electing at least some women also increases.

Proportional versus SMD are not the only characteristics of an electoral system which affect women's representation. Indeed, there are significant variations within the same overall type of system. For example, women are only a small proportion of the Israeli and Greek national legislatures (7.5 per cent and 6.3 per cent respectively as of 1998), both of which have list PR systems, large magnitude districts, and relatively low thresholds in contrast to the Scandinavian countries. There is also considerable variation among plurality and majority systems (from 0–22.4 per cent). Indications are that the specific design of a PR system will affect its impact on variation in women's selection/election in this group (Matland and Taylor 1997).

Among the characteristics of electoral systems that affect the likelihood of women being elected are district magnitude (the number of representatives per district) and party magnitude (the number of seats which a party expects to win). The more seats a party expects to win (which is generally related to, but not always predicted by, district magnitude), the more likely it is to include women candidates on its lists. The existence of a threshold, a percentage of votes which parties must win in order to gain PR seats, also positively affects the likelihood of women being selected as candidates even though it decreases the number of parties that will be able to elect representatives. This is because, again, the higher the threshold, the more the bigger parties, which expect to pass that threshold by a large margin, will be able to count on seats and thus can afford to run the more risky, if more diverse candidates, such as women (Matland and Taylor, 1997: 198, 205). The success by women in systems with a threshold may also be related to their lower placement on party lists, which in threshold systems still produces positive results because competing parties are eliminated and candidates lower on the party list have a chance of being elected. In addition, systems with closed lists increase the likelihood of women being selected over those with open lists where voters may select from among candidates. This has been a factor in Norway despite its progressive reputation (Reynolds *et al.* 1997). Thus in this study we believe that it is essential to examine the country-specific electoral arrangements of the PR and SMD election systems to help explain differences we find between electoral outcomes both within and between systems.

Party ideology may also interact with structural factors. In principle, leftwing

parties should be more likely to select women candidates for office because their goals call for reform and modernization, including greater equity in society rather than adherence to tradition and custom. In fact, some scholars have found a significant relationship between type of party (conservative or liberal/left) and likelihood of selecting women as candidates. Miki Caul, in a study of 68 parties in 12 advanced industrial societies, shows that 'Parties with New Left values . . . are more likely to see the need to promote traditionally underrepresented groups within the party' (Caul 1999: 94). Women's patterns of political preference support the link between party orientation and the likelihood of selecting women candidates. Although historically women were likely to vote more conservatively than men (Duverger 1955: 127), within the last twenty years, and especially in the late 1980s to 1990s, women in industrialized societies have become less conservative than men. Women are now more likely to vote for left-leaning parties than are men (Inglehart and Norris 1998: 8) and this may carry over to support for women candidates.

The impacts of the type of electoral system are affected themselves by a variety of contextual and socioeconomic factors, such as education of the population as a whole, and of women at the college level, high employment of women in the workforce and low unemployment overall (Rule 1987), strength of fundamentalist religion (Welch and Studlar 1986), profession of legislators, incumbency (Bullock and MacManus 1991; Kushner, Siegal, and Stanwick 1997), the level of organization and strength of women's groups (Chapman 1993: 11; also Caul 1997; and Maille 1990) and 'contagion' (Matland and Studlar 1996; Reynolds *et al.* 1997: 5) where some of the parties adopt quotas.

In sum, as Pippa Norris suggests, the likelihood of women being elected to parliament can be studied at three levels of analysis. First, at the level of the political system, the legal, constitutional, and electoral frameworks set the recruitment environment. Second, at the level of the recruitment structure, party organization, party rules, party ideology, and other non-party interest groups act as gatekeepers, the norms and standards of behavior, or rules of the game. Third, the recruitment process itself can be studied, including how many and which women are eligible to run and which present themselves to do so, which are selected by the gatekeepers, and which are finally chosen as members of parliament. (Norris 1999: 195–96).

Our research, however, concentrates on the first level, specifically on electoral rules and selection decisions. Other factors are taken into account but the significance of electoral system type and its various components are emphasized. Indeed, most scholars still believe that, as Chapman (1993) puts it, 'the most striking source of variation in the proportion of women in national legislatures is . . . the kind of electoral system in use'. We hypothesize this to be the case and explore the question in both developed and developing countries. Our hypotheses do not discriminate between contextual conditions that may moderate the importance of electoral system type and characteristics. However, our within-system comparisons in mixed and MMP systems, effectively control for context. The between systems comparisons

using a most different systems design allows us to assess the impact of specific institutional arrangements cross nationally.

Overall level of development may be a highly significant factor intervening between electoral system type and the impact of the latter on the likelihood of women being elected to parliament. In a recent article, Richard Matland studied women's representation in national legislatures in 24 industrialized countries and 16 less developed countries (LDCs) with democratic regimes in 1980, 1990, and 1997. His results tend to indicate that in LDCs the electoral system variable does not have a significant impact on the likelihood of women being elected to parliament nor did most of the other principal variables discussed above. His conclusion is that 'there appears to be a threshold, a minimum development level . . . needed to create the foundation for other variables to have an effect. Below that level the variables that assist women in gaining representation in more developed countries simply have no effect' (Matland 1998: 120). It appears that the forces aligned against female political activity are so great in LDCs as to permit only token representation regardless of electoral system type. As development increases, however, Matland observes that more women are able to acquire the resources to become politically relevant (Matland, 1998: 120). The sample for the latter study was limited but it nonetheless raises important questions. Our study carries this research a step further by looking within nations (both developed and developing) to see if, in mixed systems, one type of election is more likely than the other to lead to selection/election regardless of the lower levels of development at the national level.

Hypotheses

Mixed and MMP systems are structures that fall somewhere between the majoritarian and the proportional. Thus we expect the impact of this hybrid type of electoral institution on women's representation to fall somewhere between that of the other two major types.

H₁ In mixed and MMP electoral systems relatively more women will be elected to the lower house than is the case in majority/plurality electoral systems but relatively fewer will be elected than in pure proportional electoral systems.

Based on our review of the literature, women seem to have a better chance of being elected in PR list systems than under single member plurality electoral rules, hence:

H₂ In mixed and MMP electoral systems relatively more women will be elected in the PR part of the election than in the plurality or majoritarian portion.

Furthermore, we expect women to have greater access to the PR list than to opportunities to stand in single member districts with plurality rules. This may be related to the higher prestige associated with plurality than with list seats in many systems and/or to the impact of male incumbency.

Table 1. *The seven mixed and MMP cases for analysis*

Country	Type of electoral system	Legal threshold	Districts	District magnitude M (PR only)	Size of lower house (n-pl, n pr)
Germany	Linked*	5%	16 land	3–71	669 (328, 341)
New Zealand	Linked*	5%	nation	55	120 (65, 55)
Italy	Linked	4%	26 districts	1–11	630 (475, 155)
Mexico	Linked	None**	5 districts	40	500 (300, 200)
Japan	Parallel	2%	11 regional blocs	7–33	500 (300, 200)
Senegal	Parallel	None**	Nation	60	120 (70, 70)
Russia	Parallel	5%	Nation***	225	450 (225, 225)

Notes: * Integrated.

** Effective but not legal threshold.

*** Special criteria apply to nominees for Moscow seats.

! PL districts in Senegal are mostly multi-member.

H_{2A} In mixed and MMP systems relatively more women will be nominated for the PR portion of the election than for the plurality portion.

H_{2B} Among female nominees, success rates will be higher among list than constituency candidates, while the reverse will be true for males.

In spite of the greater opportunities for women in PR elections, these opportunities will still be relatively limited by the nomination process and by the construction of the list by the party leadership. For comparative purposes we operationalize the ‘top’ list positions as the first 20 per cent. Hence:

H₃ Women will hold proportionally fewer positions in the ‘electable’ top portion (top 20 per cent) of the lists than do males.

The cases for analysis

We first examine the relative success of women candidates in mixed systems compared to pure proportional and plurality/majority systems. Using a list of mixed and MMP systems compiled by Massicotte and Blais (1999) and a broader classification of electoral systems (Electoral Systems of the World 1999), we compare the electoral systems of 153 nations (including 25 with mixed systems) on which data are available on both electoral system type and women’s representation in the lower house of the legislature (IPU 1999).

We then move to the seven political systems chosen for in-depth examination here, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Russia, and Senegal. These were selected because they have mixed electoral systems, are representative of the diversity in that type of system (super position, linked, and integrated, see Massicotte and Blais, 1999) and of the variation in region, culture, level of development, experience, and the nuances of electoral laws, all factors which have a potential impact on the choice of women as candidates for lower house seats. We have collected data on electoral

results, candidacies for both plurality and proportional seats (and overlaps where relevant), party list composition and placement, the existence and impact of formal legal quotas, ballot structure, and party imposed quotas. All voting data for this paper came from national electoral web sites (Germany, Italy, and Mexico), from the respective electoral commission (Japan, New Zealand and Senegal) or other official sources (Russia). Each case has its own significant peculiarities which are elaborated on briefly below.

Germany

In terms of structural types, Germany, having used MMP for many decades, is the prototype for most other MMP systems (Scarrow 1998). In offering candidates for election to state and federal legislatures, all the parties currently represented in the federal legislature, the Bundestag, nominate candidates for both single member electoral districts and for state (Land) lists (LL) (Christian Democratic Union, CDU, which operates in 15 of the 16 states, excluding Bavaria; the Christian Social Union, CSU, which operates only in Bavaria; the Social Democratic Party, SPD; the Free Democratic Party, FDP; the Alliance '90–the Greens [Bündnis '90– die Grünen], and the Party of Democratic Socialism, PDS). A 5 per cent threshold (or victories in three constituencies) limits access to extremist parties.

However, the parties differ in their arrangements for nominations, their formal commitment to women's representation, and in the number of women nominated and elected. No Bundestag began its work with more than 10 per cent of women members until the entry of the Greens in 1987; women account for just over 30 per cent of the legislators elected in 1998 (Bundeswahlleiter 1998). Nevertheless, the operations of the electoral system, and a 'contagion' effect across the party spectrum (see Matland and Studlar, 1996) has served both to increase the numbers of women nominated and elected and to increase the similarity of results across parties.

New Zealand

New Zealand is a stable British-style democracy that has recently (1996) undergone a transformation of its electoral system. The country experienced broad-based dissatisfaction with existing party politics and seat vote distortions that discriminated against smaller parties. This resulted in a surprisingly successful referendum campaign, which led New Zealand to abandon its long standing British style plurality (FPTP) electoral system in 1993, replacing it with a MMP system modeled after that of Germany (Denemark 1998; Banducci, Karp, and Vowles 1998; McLeay 1999). It was first applied in the election of 1996, producing results which, in terms of the representation of parties, were dramatically different than the election which preceded it in 1993 (Gallagher 1998; Barker *et al.* 1998) as was the increase in the number of women holding seats. The system provided for 120 seats for the parliament, 65 to be decided by plurality vote in single member constituencies (five of these reserved for the Maori) and an additional 55 seats to be allocated on the basis

of proportional representation with party lists used as a corrective for seat/vote disparities in the plurality side of the election. The electoral threshold on the proportional side of the election is 5 per cent nationally, but a party which wins even a single constituency seat will get its proportion of seats (relative to the party list vote), even if it does not pass the PR threshold. List seats are allocated using the extremely equitable pure Sainte-Laguë formula.

Italy

The Italian electoral system has, in the past, been held up as an example that promoted an extreme form of party fragmentation, notorious government instability, and high level, high profile corruption. It was reformed after a complicated process set in motion by decades of political scandals and a 1993 enabling Referendum (Katz 1998). The new electoral system was put in place for the 1994 elections and was modified again for the 1996 elections. The result was a mixed member proportional system with some unique elements. For the lower house (Camera dei Deputati) seats were divided into 475 plurality election seats decided in single member districts and 155 proportional seats allocated in 26 districts (all but one of which is multimember). The National threshold is set at 4 per cent for the list seats with eight parties qualifying in 1996. The allocation of proportional seats is linked to the votes cast for the plurality seats. Within each of the multimember PR districts the number of votes required to win each single member (SMD) constituency seat is subtracted from the winning party's total list vote in the corresponding proportional circumscription. The calculation for the allocation of the proportional seats is designed to favor the smaller parties, those least likely to win the plurality (SMD) district seats. These parties are therefore compensated for the disproportionality introduced by the plurality vote.

Overall the system has forced a consolidation of parties into electoral alliances when contesting the plurality seats. The average number of candidates per SMD constituency was just over 3 (3.3), with 92 per cent of the districts having four or less contestants. But there was a return to the greater fragmentation of the party system for the proportional part of the vote (Warner 1998; D'Alimonte 1998; Garber 1998). Two hundred and fifty one parties registered but 12 of these won 97.9 per cent of the vote and all but six seats. Dissatisfaction with this system led to another referendum in 1999, again seeking popular authorization for major modifications in the electoral system. Although those voting for the pro reform side won an overwhelming victory, the results were voided because the turnout was under 50 per cent.

Mexico

Mexico is an example of a relatively stable, transitional democratic Latin American country which has switched electoral systems as part of its overall effort to democratize. It has an historical tradition of a strong conservative Catholic Church and of patriarchal male leaders in politics throughout much of the twentieth century

(Stevenson 1999). Until the 1998 elections the system was dominated by a single party, the PRI, which won virtually all national elections (Presidential and congressional) for over 70 years and tended to dominate elections to the Congress. Mexico has certain factors favorable to increasing representation for women. For one, it has a relatively new mixed electoral systems and an ongoing process of political reform and democratization. In addition, Mexico has experienced significant economic growth over the last 20 years despite recent economic downturns that also affected the outcome of its last two parliamentary elections.

The Chamber of Deputies in Mexico has 500 members. Following the reform of 1996, 300 of these seats are chosen by simple plurality in single member districts and 200 are chosen by proportional representation in five national voting districts with 40 members each. All parties are eligible for the latter type seats but none of them could receive more than 300 seats, nor receive additional PR compensatory seats which would allow it to exceed proportionality by more than 8 per cent (Dominguez 1999: 8; Balinski and Gonzalez 1996; Klesner 1997). Most countries with mixed electoral systems use a dual ballot, the choice of list and constituency candidates being made separately by the voter. Mexico is one of two countries in our set of cases (Senegal being the other) in which voters cast a single vote, a vote that is then applied to both the plurality and proportional seat allocations. In Mexico the vote is for the constituency candidate, a vote which is then aggregated for the allocation of the proportional seats. This type of ballot structure discourages both strategic voting and the nomination of women for the SMD seats but may be helpful to women on party lists. Congressional elections took place on 6 July 1997, resulting in a dramatic and unprecedented loss of majority control by the PRI. A coalition of the PRD on the left and the PAN on the right became the majority, and the PAN candidate won the Presidency in 2000.

Japan

Japan has, after years of using SNTV (single non-transferrable vote) in multi-member districts, adopted a mixed system. The new electoral system was voted into law in January 1994 as part of a political reform package aimed at decreasing corruption (Reed 1998). The case of Japan is an interesting one because of the importance of the cultural differences it adds to our sample and the fact that in the past SNTV in relatively small multimember districts promoted individual candidates and organizations but weak parties (Cox 1997). This led to intense intra-party competition and increased the importance of fundraising and personal campaign organizations. Partly as a result of corruption scandals the system was altered in the hope of decreasing the importance of money in campaigns and to strengthen party organizations. The new mixed system, employed for the first time in 1998, provided for a plurality portion that includes 300 single member districts. This was balanced by a parallel (unlinked) 200 seats to be decided by proportional representation in 11 regional blocs (ranging in size from seven to 33 seats) using the d'Hondt method.

Each voter casts two ballots, one for a candidate in her constituency and one for a regional party list. The results of the plurality and proportional elections are completely independent of each other, except for the fact that many SMD candidates also appear on party lists. The electoral threshold for the regional lists is set at 2 per cent, a figure so low that it did not come into play.

Senegal

Senegal is a democratizing, Muslim, African nation, which ranks among the world's least developed countries (UNDP 1998). Senegal adopted a mixed (parallel) electoral system as part of the democratic reforms instituted under the Diouf regime beginning with the 1983 elections. The system has been modified several times but its main dimensions have changed only marginally (Young and Kante 1992; Vengroff and Ndiaye 1997; Vengroff and Creevey 1997). The system in place for the 1998 elections provided for equal numbers of seats for the national proportional election (party list using a Hare system with largest remainders) and the plurality election (FPTP by party in 30, mostly multimember, constituencies). One of the distinct elements of the Senegalese electoral system is the use of a single ballot in which the voter selects a party only (in Mexico the single vote is cast for a candidate in a single member district). These votes are totaled at the national level to determine the distribution of proportional seats. The plurality constituencies are the 30 departments. The constituencies vary in size from one seat to five, based very roughly on population. The party winning a plurality of the votes in a department automatically elects all of its plurality district candidates in the department as a bloc. This system of course favors the largest party in each department and the largest party nationally, producing a considerable distortion in the vote seat distribution. Although numerous parties contested the elections, five main parties won 96 per cent of the seats with an additional six winning one seat each. With an independent electoral commission in place (ONEL) and international observers, the elections were among the fairest in Africa. In the year 2000 the Presidency was won for the first time by an opposition candidate.

Russia

Russia provides an example of a former communist nation in 'transition' to a democratic system. The Russian Federation – as is true of several post-Communist systems (Shevtsova 1999) – has had, since 1993, a parallel electoral system. Like Japan, it employs a mixed (super position) system without links between the two votes but, unlike Japan, with an equal distribution of plurality and proportional seats in the State Duma. The Russian case is especially interesting in that party system institutionalization is still in its early stages and nearly half of all voters chose parties that were unable to attain the national threshold for the PR election. This decreased considerably for the 1999 elections in which six parties passed the threshold.

Between the 1993 elections (a referendum on the Constitution and elections for the Duma) and the 1995 Duma elections, a lengthy political struggle was waged as to

possible changes in the system. The main contenders were the Duma, party leaders, President Yeltsin, and the regional representatives (Governors and Heads of Regional Legislatures) who constituted the upper house, the Federation Council. The Duma and party leaders supported a strong party list system, while Yeltsin and the regional representatives favored an exclusively, or at least strengthened, SMD procedure. Six months before the election, a compromise proposal maintaining the existing system, with minor modifications, was approved.

While preserving the 50–50 division between SMD and PR seats, the amended law provided that the national lists be divided into a Moscow section of up to 12 candidates who could not also run in SMDs, and a national list, whose members were not so limited. The law also maintained the 25 per cent minimum turnout requirement, as well as a single round of district voting. The last provision can be seen at work in some astonishingly low winning percentages in the plurality constituencies (White, Rose, and McAllister 1997). Clearly the electoral arrangements, along with the party structure and indeed the political system generally suffered from post-Communist growing pains.

Findings

Gender representation in mixed, plurality, and proportional systems

Before proceeding, it is necessary to test our first hypothesis in a more global format. If in fact proportional systems are more friendly or open to female candidates and increase the likelihood of women being elected to national legislatures, then we expect that they will have a higher percentage of women in their legislatures than do the other types. We expect mixed systems to occupy an intermediary place between proportional and plurality/majority systems in terms of female representation in the legislature. To test this proposition we compared 153 systems. As can be seen from Table 2, the mean percentage of women holding seats in proportional systems is 14.7 per cent, 11.5 per cent in mixed and MMP systems, and in majority and plurality systems 8.5 per cent. These differences are statistically significant ($F = 11.42$, $p < .001$) and fully consistent with our expectations. The mixed systems do occupy an intermediate position, seemingly offering greater opportunity for women than plurality and majority systems but less than that found in pure proportional systems.

The critical question for examination at this point is whether these differences are reflective of the impact of the proportional side of the vote, of cultural factors, or of some combination of these. To address these questions we proceed to a closer look within our sample of nations with mixed electoral systems.

Election and nomination of women

We find that in six of the seven countries examined (Russia being the exception), women are more likely to be nominated and gain election in the proportional part of the system than in the plurality election. Regardless of the overall percentage of

Table 2. *Anova–electoral system type and women's representation in lower houses*

Electoral system type	<i>N</i>	Mean % seats held by women
Proportional	56	14.73
Mixed and MMP	26	11.49
Plurality and majority	69	7.94
Total	153	11.28

Note: $F=11.42, p<.001$.

Table 3. *Distribution of female held seats in seven mixed and MMP systems*

Country and year of election	<i>N</i> and % women plurality election	<i>N</i> and % women PR election	Overall <i>N</i> and % women in lower house
Germany (1998)	72 (21.8%)	120 (35.2%)	192 (30.9%)
Italy (1996)	43 (9.1%)	29 (18.7%)	72 (11.4%)
Japan (1998)	7 (2.3%)	16 (8.0%)	23 (4.6%)
Mexico (1997)	34 (11.3%)	48 (24.0%)	82 (16.4)
New Zealand (1996)	10 (15.4%)	25 (45.4%)	35 (29.2%)
Russia (1995)	31 (13.8%)	14 (6.2%)	45 (10.0%)
Senegal (1998)	2 (2.9%)	14 (20.0%)	16 (11.4%)

Notes: * Of those parties passing the 5% threshold.

** Includes only the five major parties (those winning more than one seat).

Individual tables on each of the seven countries can be found in the Appendix (Tables A1–A7).

women seeking and winning office this proposition still holds. For example, in Japan, with the lowest percentage of females in the legislature, the distribution of seats won by women is heavily weighted toward the party list side as is the case in both New Zealand and Germany where there are very high percentages of women office holders. The same relationship holds for the intermediate cases, Mexico, Italy, and Senegal. Once in the race, women candidates are relatively more successful on the PR side of the election than are their colleagues who contest plurality elections, that is, a higher percentage of female candidates are elected on the PR side. The reverse is true for male candidates, although part of this may be attributed to incumbency in the more highly prized plurality seats (see the discussion under New Zealand below for example). Russia is the one exception but this may be more a function of the lack of institutionalization of the party system and short-term factors, such as the length of time and experience with democracy, than an enduring relationship.

Germany

In Germany, both the number and percentage of national legislators who are women has advanced steadily since the post-war low of 1969, ironically, the election that brought Willy Brandt and the SPD to power (Das Parlament 2000: 4). Since unification the numbers have been: 1990: 136 and 20.5 per cent; 1994: 177 and 26.3 per cent; 1998: 192 and 31 per cent (Hoecker 1996; *Bundeswahlleiter* 1998). Moreover, as in the past, more women were nominated for and elected from Land party lists (LL)

than SMD. Women candidates were 31.7 per cent of all nominees on LL, exceeding those nominated for SMD. Moreover, of women nominated for SMD by parties represented in the *Bundestag*, only 10.3 per cent were successful, compared to 36.6 per cent of those for LL.

These general observations, however, must be qualified by particular German factors. To enter the *Bundestag*, a party must gain either 5 per cent of the vote, nationwide, or elect at least three SMD candidates (in which case that party's PR vote gives it the proportional number of winners.) The impact of the threshold is to increase the number of candidates on the winning lists who are eligible for seats. This is a result favorable to women who as a group are traditionally placed lower on party lists than are men.

New Zealand

Virtually all of the parties included female candidates on both their party lists and as candidates in individual constituencies. It should be noted here that candidates could appear on both the party list and stand for individual constituencies. In fact the vast majority took advantage of this and were dual constituency and list contestants. The data from New Zealand are clearly consistent with hypothesis 2. Women won 35 of the 120 seats, 25 of these on the party lists (45.4 per cent of list seats) and ten constituencies (15.4 per cent of the constituency seats). Recall that there are more seats on the constituency side, but women still were considerably more successful on the proportional side.

Women appeared as candidates on all party lists and in 82 per cent (53 of 65) of the SMD constituencies. As expected more women were nominated for list seats than for constituency seats (by a margin of 106–86 among those parties winning seats). However, we must take the dual nominations into account. Among these same parties only eight women were nominated as constituency-only candidates while 28 appeared as list-only. This is reversed for males, 53 of whom were electorate-only candidates while 41 appeared as list-only candidates. Of the 114 total female candidates from these six parties, more than two thirds (68 per cent) were dual candidates. It is clear that women, while often dual candidates, tended to compete in the less-secure constituencies and were selected to contest plurality elections in very few 'safe' seats.

In terms of success rates, nearly a quarter (23.5 per cent) of female list candidates were elected while less than half of that percentage were successful on the plurality side (11.6 per cent). This contrasts with the situation for male candidates, 12.1 per cent of whom were successful on the party list side but 21.1 per cent of whom won on the plurality side. These two are linked by the fact that when males listed as dual candidates won a constituency they freed up places on the party lists for females.

Italy

Overall the number and percentage of women winning seats in the 1996 lower house elections is quite modest for an advanced industrial society, 72 out of 630 seats

(11.4 per cent), making it roughly equivalent to the distribution we found for Senegal, a developing country. This is especially surprising because there is a requirement that party lists be equally divided among men and women (Katz 1998; Reynolds and Reilly 1997: 97; Jones 1998: 5). Women won 18.7 per cent of the proportional seats but only 9.1 per cent of the plurality seats, a finding consistent with our second hypothesis. However, because three quarters of all seats are plurality seats the actual number of women winning SMD seats (43) is larger than the number of women winning proportional seats (29), the former representing 59.7 per cent of the female deputies. It appears once again that it is easier for women to win proportional seats than plurality ones.

It is significant that the success rate of female candidates for plurality seats is 27.7 per cent compared to a rate of 30.3 per cent for male candidates. This is quite surprising and differs significantly from the findings for most other nations considered here. It should also be noted that, although women constitute only 8.5 per cent of the plurality seat candidates, they won 9.1 per cent of the plurality seats. This leads to two possible explanations: (1) a very select group of high profile women were nominated and competed in a select group of the more cosmopolitan constituencies and/or (2) female candidates can effectively hold their own even in the single member plurality electoral districts when nominated by major parties.

Mexico

The number and percentage of women sitting as members of the Congress has increased in the last elections to an internationally very respectable figure of just under 17 per cent (11.4 per cent to 16.4 per cent from 1991 to 1997). Consistent with hypothesis H₂, the distribution of women elected between the list and proportional sides of the electoral system indicates that significantly more women were elected in the proportional races than in the single member districts (58.5 per cent compared to 41.5 per cent of the total number of women elected). This in spite of the fact that 60 per cent of the seats are SMD. Comparing the percentage of proportional and SMD seats which women hold, again the hypothesis is supported: 24 per cent of the proportional seats went to women and only 11 per cent of the SMD seats, clearly suggesting that women had considerably more success in the proportional races. In the case of all parties the percentage of women elected is greater on the PR side than on the plurality side. Recall that this is related to a ballot structure which by allowing for a single vote based on the plurality elections makes the nomination and participation by women far easier on the PR lists.

Japan

Japan has traditionally been one of a handful of advanced industrial countries which show a large disparity in rankings between the human development index and the gender disparity and gender empowerment measures (UNDP 1998). The 1998 election did little to change that perspective. Of the 500 elected members of the

Chamber only 23 (4.6 per cent) are women. Consistent with our hypothesis most women (70 per cent of those elected) won seats on the proportional side, and this even though 60 per cent of all the seats are on the plurality side. The plurality seats are considered to be more prestigious and highly prized, a factor that imposes an additional serious constraint for women.

Women were nominated for election in all 11 regional blocs and in over a third (34.3 per cent) of the 300 single member districts. Surprisingly more women were nominated for plurality seats (127) than for the proportional seats (73). This picture is quite deceptive, however, in that nearly half (60) of the women nominated for plurality seats were from the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). These candidates had little or no chance of election as the JCP won few plurality districts and many of those in which women were nominated were generally considered to be safe districts for other parties. Among the three leading parties the number of female list candidates exceed the number of plurality candidates (39 to 30). In the proportional election 21.9 per cent of female candidates were successful compared to only 5.5 per cent of the female candidates for plurality seats. These compare to 25 and 26 per cent success rates for male candidates on the list and plurality parts of the election respectively. Thus, in general, the data from Japan are consistent with the core hypotheses of this study, although additional institutional barriers exist to women's representation.

Senegal

Consistent with hypothesis H₂ more women were elected on the proportional (list) side of the system than on the plurality side and this by a margin of 14–2. Recall that 140 seats are divided equally between the plurality and PR sides of the system. Women won 20 per cent (14) list seats and only 3 per cent (2) plurality seats. Also consistent with our hypothesis, many more women are nominated for the list seats than the plurality ones, and this by a margin of better than three to one (321 to 98). Fully one quarter (25.5 per cent) of the PR candidates and one eighth of the plurality candidates (12.8 per cent) were women. Among the five leading parties only 21 out of 350 plurality seat candidates are women, a percentage only about half as large as that for all parties considered together. It is also worth noting that female candidates were nominated by at least one of the parties to run in 26 of the 30 departments (each department is a bloc). We would expect that in these plurality districts women would tend to be nominated in the larger constituencies, that is we expect to see a relationship between district magnitude and the number of female candidates. Consistent with that expectation, of the 98 female candidates for plurality seats, 28 competed in the two with the largest magnitude (five seats) constituencies; both located in the Dakar Region.

On the party list portion of the election all 18 party lists included women. Once nominated, the success rate for women on the proportional side (4.4 per cent) is more than double that on the plurality side (2 per cent). The gap between male and

female success rates is much lower in the list vote (6 per cent success for males) than on the plurality side where 10.2 per cent of male candidates are elected. As is the case in Mexico, the ballot structure which allows for a single vote contributes to these outcomes. Thus, the chances for males are better on the more prestigious and visible plurality side, while for women the reverse is true

Russia

The Russian political system has produced results regarding representation of women that appear to be inconsistent with our main hypotheses on the effects of list and SMD voting on representation. The position of women in the Duma reflected a general post-Communist phenomenon – given that Soviet-era legislatures had contained an honorific number of token women (unlike the centers of power in the state and especially Party hierarchies), the number of women in the Russian Duma was much lower than in the past. Whereas the last USSR Supreme Soviet had boasted 30 per cent and the Gorbachev-era legislature of 1989–90, 15 per cent, the State Duma elected in 1995 had 11 per cent. (*Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 1998), and the just elected (December 1999) Duma has only 7.7 per cent (IPU 2000)

How did women candidates fare in 1995? The number of women members in the Duma elected in 1995 (45) represents a sharp decline from 1993 (60) (Shvedova 1998). The parties that exceeded 5 per cent (the Communists, CPRF, the eccentric far-right Liberal Democrats, LDPR, the pro-government Our Home is Russia, NDR, and the liberal Yabloko), nominated about 25 per cent of women candidates (225), electing 14. (The total of list candidates for all 43 party slates was 5746.) The total of women candidates in 1995 compared to 1993 increased, but only by 3.2 per cent of the total number (which declined). (Tsentrāl'naya Kommissiya . . . 1996; McAllister and White 1998).

Contrary to our assumptions, the Russian elections showed more women elected from SMDs than from party lists. As Table A7 shows, women in SMDs won more than double the party list victories (31 to 14); thus, two thirds of the women in the Duma are SMD members compared to about one third of the party list winners. Of the 225 SMD constituencies there were 282 female candidates who competed in 156 (69.3 per cent) of them. How may we account for this anomalous finding? One possibility is that since the four major parties only nominated candidates in about half of all constituencies, women were elected as independents or as candidates of parties failing to clear the 5 per cent hurdle (these represent nearly half of all voters). The three Duma members from Women of Russia (which had exceeded 5 per cent in 1993) fall into that category. More women would surely have been elected from party lists had Women of Russia gone over 5 percent, given that in 1993 21 of 34 women elected on party lists represented that party (McAllister and White 1998: 18). Moreover, ten of the 78 independents who won SMD seats were women.

Finally, the low number of women elected from lists, which reflects the decisions

of party leaders as to nominations, demonstrates the hostile attitude of party leaders toward women in politics. Thus, although the CPRF has the most women Duma members, its leader, Gennadi Zyuganov, prefers women who 'do not ask too many questions and, after offering advice, do not insist that the next day their advice be acted on' (RFE/RL 1998). But most Russian parties are weakly represented at the local community level; thus, in SMDs, by contrast, women may stand a better chance – especially since a mere (and often low) plurality suffices. For example, of the 31 female winners in the SMD races, the average percentage of the vote for the victors was only 27.6. About two thirds of the SMDs that elected women are on the periphery of the country – in both Moscow and Saint Petersburg, only one women won an SMD. Our conclusion is that this is more a function of the state of the party system, its extreme fractionalization, limited organizational capabilities, and low level of institutionalization, than of a long-term effect.

List placement of women

The results appear to be mixed when we examine the pattern of women's placement on lists. We expected (hypothesis H₃) women to be consistently under represented in the top rungs of the party lists. That is, the proportion of women found in the more electable top 20 per cent of each party list (or lists) may generally be lower than the overall per cent of female candidates. This holds for Japan and Russia. In cases where legal requirements or party rules provide for quotas for women on party lists we expect to find the placement and election of women to be better. However, as has been shown for Latin American countries (Htun and Jones 1999) the impact may be quite limited. This applies to two of our cases because of institutional factors associated with the seat allocation process (Italy) and the placement of women on party lists (Mexico). New Zealand and Germany, and to a lesser extent Senegal are exceptions. Women in all three countries are well placed on their respective party lists.

Germany

Did German women candidates place high on LL? These data provide clear evidence for this, thanks to party strategies for recruitment of women (Hoecker 1996; Kolinsky 1994). Faced with pressure from women members and competitive pressure from other parties, most German parties, in the 1980s and 1990s, moved to formalize increased recruitment of women. These responses ranged from a general recommendation that candidates' numbers reflect gender composition (FDP), to a non-binding goal of one third women candidates (CDU), to formal quotas (SPD, Greens), to an informal commitment to gender equity (PDS.)

Each party in the Bundestag ran LL in each state, or 16 in all (CDU ran 15; CSU one only in Bavaria.) Women were in first place in all 16 for the Greens, in first or second place in all 16 for the SPD, in 14 for the PDS, eight for the CDU (the CSU list was headed by a women), and five for the FDP. As before, only one of the 16 Land

prime ministers is a woman. However, in May 2000, the CDU selected a woman as its national presiding officer.

The Greens had mandated gender equity in all party and public office since the early 1980s; the SPD set up a graduated, increasingly stringent quota system in 1988, one that a decade later mandated at least 40 per cent representation for each gender. Six of the SPD LL were headed by women, while four state organizations voted to have alternating male and female candidates (the so-called 'zipper' system.)

The CDU's less stringent system still produced substantial numbers of woman candidacies, due to competitive pressure. The party least receptive to women's demands, despite the presence of several prominent women Bundestag members, is the FDP.

New Zealand

The placement of female candidates on the party lists in New Zealand overall seems to be quite equitable. Among those five parties passing the national threshold (5 per cent) the percentage of women holding places on the top fifth of their lists exceeded the percentage of female candidates among all five. Of the 21 women in one of these positions (top 20 per cent of the list) on their respective party lists, 20 of them were eligible to win list seats (several won on the plurality side). Among the five top parties, on average 38.2 per cent of the candidates among the first 11 (top 20 per cent) on their lists were female. Thus these data for New Zealand are not consistent with hypothesis H₃. Women appear to be well placed on party lists to win seats and are different from males only in the overall percentage of candidates. There also does not appear to be much evidence of an ideological bias. Parties seem to be relatively open to limited but significant participation by women regardless of the party's placement on the left–right continuum.

Italy

What is surprising here is that, in spite of the 50 per cent quota for female candidates on party lists, they still won less than one in five of the list seats. The explanation is in the institutions (Katz 1996). The magnitude of the PR constituencies is relatively low (1–11). Recall that the compensatory nature of Italy's MMP system favors the smaller parties. This combination of relatively low district magnitude and vote compensation coupled with the fact that eight parties qualified by passing the 4 per cent threshold, means that the distribution of seats in any given PR constituency is likely to be highly fragmented. In fact, the average number of parties winning seats in the 26 proportional circumscriptions is 4.4 while the average number of seats is 6.0. Furthermore, 113 of the 155 PR seats (72.9 per cent) went to a person listed first on their party's circumscription list and an additional 28 (18 per cent) went to the second person on the list. This being the case, women, even though holding half of the list places, are only likely to win seats if they are listed first on the list, or occasionally second. Thus, the structural arrangement linking SMD and PR alloca-

tions serves to thwart the potential impact of the imposition of list candidate quotas based on gender (see Jones 1998: 18).

Mexico

Two of the three major parties, the PRI and the PRD, established quotas of 30 per cent for women on their party lists, while the PAN refused to adopt any quotas (Stevenson 1999: 76). However, list placement for women remains a critical issue. There are five regional districts each with 40 seats (and candidate lists). Based on our examination of the top 20 per cent (8) on each list we calculate the number of women in these places overall. For the PRI, on average only 10 per cent of the top list places (four out of 40 for the five lists) were assigned to women. The situation is considerably better for the right of center PAN (on average 20 per cent, eight out of 40 per list) and the left of center PRD (on average 25 per cent, ten out of 40 per list). Thus women's representation on the most electable parts of the lists is still lower than their numbers elected, but respectable for two of the three major parties. The influence of party instituted quotas that do not specify list order distributions seemed to have a much more limited impact than might be expected from a quota.

Japan

It is very difficult in the Japanese system to sort out list placement in the same manner we employed for New Zealand and Senegal for example. The problem is that in Japan, a large number of SMD candidates are also candidates on the party lists. The uniquely Japanese manner in which some parties compose their lists is the source of the problem. On many lists the candidates are not ranked in order but are grouped. For example in the Minami Kantou Bloc for the LDP, 27 of the 36 candidates received the same ranking (ninth) and among the Democratic Party list candidates in the same Bloc 24 of their 27 candidates were ranked fourth. The voters in the SMD elections determine the final ranking on the lists. That is, candidates were ranked by their party according to the percentage of the vote they received in the SMDs they contested at the same time. This is a compromise instituted at the time of passage of the new electoral law in order to overcome the opposition of Diet members who feared losing face if defeated in their districts. This helped maintain the personal organizations that characterized Japanese politics under the SNTV system and worked against the election of women. That is, it eliminated some of the advantages or opportunities that high list placement may provide for women in other systems by exposing them to the results of the plurality electoral system at the same time. For example in the LDP a single female candidate was ranked among the top 20 per cent of those on the list on only two lists. On still other LDP lists women were ranked fifteenth of 15, twenty second of 26, sixth of 25, and twenty fourth of 25. Where rankings were grouped LDP female candidates were ranked ninth out of 36 (with 26 male candidates also ranked ninth), fifteenth out of 28 with 12 other male candidates also ranked fifteenth, fifth out of 38, with 31 males also ranked fifth, and

first out of 45 but with 42 male candidates sharing this honor. As noted above, the percentage of vote obtained in constituencies was used to determine the final ranking. In most cases, however, the decision never reached far enough down the party list to affect women.

Senegal

Although a predominantly Muslim country, women have been able to participate actively in the parties and have had some success in election to local and municipal councils. Thus, although women remain at a distinct disadvantage it is expected that at least some prominent women will appear relatively high on party lists. For the leading party, the PS, the percentage of women on the top fifth of the list exceeds the percentage of women candidates by a slim margin. For the opposition parties we find that placement in the top 20 per cent of places on their lists is close to their percentage of candidates for the PDS and the JJUSD (now the URD), exceeded by the LD and very low for the AJ and the other minor parties taken as a group. Female candidates were only high enough on party lists of the top three vote-getting parties, the PS, PDS, and JJUSD, to win seats. Since most of the smaller opposition parties expect to win only a few seats (low party magnitude) they tend to place their leading male candidates high on the list, thereby excluding or greatly limiting opportunities for women, even some near the top.

Russia

Understanding of the overall impact of list placement in Russia is difficult because almost half of all list votes were wasted as a result of the weak and uninstitutionalized party system. Forty-three party lists were entered in the election. Of these, 21 won no seats at all, another 18 won some SMD seats but failed the 5 per cent threshold, and only four parties won seats on both halves of the ballot (White, Rose, and McAllister 1997: 224–5). In general, the placement of women on the lists of the four parties winning seats was limited numerically and the tendency was for very low placement. The CPRF placed no woman higher on its list than twentieth; the sole woman on the LDPR list was ranked forty fifth. NDR and Yabloko both had a woman in the third position. All of the list candidates of ‘Women of Russia’, are female but surprisingly the party failed to pass the threshold (it failed again in 1999). Some other parties saw this group as capturing the ‘women’s’ vote and were therefore less likely to see the advantages of placing women high on their own lists.

Conclusions

The three-level research design employed in this paper (broad cross-national comparison, comparative case studies using a most different systems design, and within-country comparisons of electoral system impact) allows for an in-depth assessment of the impact of electoral institutions on gender representation. As hypothesized, mixed electoral systems show better representation of women than do

plurality systems but less than do proportional ones. In spite of maximal variation in culture, region, experience with democracy, level of development, women's role in society, nuances in electoral system laws, party organization, party magnitude, and district magnitude between nations, the impact of electoral system type remains robust. Electoral institutions and electoral system type do matter.

What is important for our analysis is not just the level of representation of women between nations but the impact of the electoral system within nations. Mixed electoral systems allow us to do comparisons of these two electoral system types within countries, thereby controlling for the impact of exogenous factors. Even though the percentages of women elected in the seven systems examined intensively above vary dramatically, the same basic relationship holds for six of them. Women's chances of nomination and election are clearly better in the proportional part of their mixed elections than they are on the plurality side.

One important caveat is necessary here. As the case of Russia indicates, the existence of a well-developed party system may to be a necessary condition for this 'rule' to apply. This factor may account for the seeming lack of a relationship between gender representation and electoral system type in developing countries noted in some recent research (Matland 1998). Only two of our cases, Mexico and Senegal, can be considered to be underdeveloped so we cannot generalize from them. However, the results of recent elections in these countries do not appear to be consistent with some of the literature which suggests that the impact of the type of electoral system on gender representation in parliament does not apply in such cases. Both are rather robust in the distinction between women's success rates on SMD and proportional sides of their elections. These may be the other side of the Russian case. That is, they both have well-developed, institutionalized parties and party systems.

We hypothesized that even under the PR part of mixed systems women will hold proportionally fewer positions at the 'electable' top of the list as lists are constructed by the party leadership, generally traditionally male. The results, however, appear to be mixed. In the cases of Japan and Russia, the proportion of women found in the top 20 per cent of each party list (or lists) is generally lower than the overall percentage of female candidates. Party organization and the remnants of the single non-transferable vote (SNT) system in Japan may be critical here. In Russia, the underdeveloped party system comes into play. Even in cases where legal requirements or party rules provide for quotas for women on party lists, the impact may be quite limited because of institutional factors associated with the seat allocation process (Italy) or the placement of women on party lists (Mexico). New Zealand, and Germany, and to a lesser extent Senegal are exceptions. In the case of New Zealand for example, the placement of women on the upper portions of party lists is higher than the percentage of female candidates overall. In Germany a majority of the various party Land Lists are topped by women (either first or second on the list). In both Senegal and Mexico the ballot structure exerts some influence. Further research is clearly needed on the processes of party list construction before we have an answer to this question.

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Table A1. *Germany Bundestag elections, 1998*

Party	% vote PR	Total candidates	List seats won	Female candidates	Women PR seats won	Women list replacement (top 20% – on list)**	Seats PL	Women PL seats	Total candidates
SPD	40.9	543	86	212	36	35 (50%)	212	62	328
CDU	28.4	465	124	165	31	22 (28%)	74	5	282
CSU	6.7	51	9	13	3	3 (33%)	38	3	45
GREEN	6.7	264	47	129	23	17 (81%)	–	–	325
FDP	6.2	334	43	69	9	4 (17%)	–	–	327
PDS	5.1	181	32	75	18	6 (43%)	4	2	248
OTHER	3.0	2,168	–	*	*	–	–	–	1,148
TOTAL	100.0	4,006	341	663	120	84 (41%)	328	72	2,703

Notes: * Others not included.

** Numbers of candidates on the Lander lists varies by party.

Table A2. *New Zealand 1996 parliamentary elections*

Party	% vote PR	Total candidates	List seats won	Female candidates	Women PR seats won	Women list replacement (top 20% – first 11 on list)	Seats PL	Women PL seats	# female candidates	Total candidates
NZ National Party	33.8	74	14 (25.5%)	20 (27.0%)	4	3 (27.3%)	30	4	12	64
Labour Party	28.2	60	11 (20%)	28 (46.7%)	7	6 (54.5%)	26	6	24	65
NZ First Party	13.4	62	11 (20%)	14 (22.6%)	4	3 (27.3%)	6	0	15	65
Alliance	10.1	73	12 (21.8%)	26 (35.6%)	7	5 (45.5%)	1	0	19	65
Act NZ	6.1	56	7 (12.7%)	12 (21.4%)	3	4 (36.4%)	1	0	11	62
United NZ Party	0.9	29	0 (0.0%)	6 (20.7%)	0	3 (27.3%)	1	0	5	25
TOTAL	92.5*	354	55	106 (29.9%)	25	24 (36.4%)	65	10	86	346

Note: * % of total vote including parties not qualifying on the threshold (5%).

Table A3. Senegal 1998 National Assembly elections

Party	% vote PR	Total candidates	List seats won	Female candidates	Women PR seats won	Women list replacement (top 20% – first 14 on list)	Seats PL	Women PL seats	# female candidates	Total candidates
PS	50.2	70	35	18	10	28.6	58	1	5	70
PDS	19.1	70	13	18	3	21.4	10	1	2	70
JJUSD	13.2	70	9	10	1	14.3	2	0	4	70
LD	3.9	70	3	9	0	21.4	0	0	3	70
AJ	5.0	70	4	13	0	7.1	0	0	7	70
Others*	8.6	910	6	253	0	15.9	0	0	77	414
Total	100.0	1,260	70	321	14	18.7	70	2	98	764

Table A4. Japan, Chambers of Deputies, 1998

Party	% vote PR*	Total candidates**	List seats won	Female candidates	Women PR seats won	Women PL seats	# Female candidates	Total candidates
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	32.8	327		10	2	3	5	288
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)	16.1	159		20	3	0	17	142
New Komeito and Reformers Network (NKRN)	28.1	133		9	4	1	8	235
Liberal Party (LP)	–	50		4	0	1	8	89
Japanese Communist Party (JCP)	13.1	53		15	5	0	60	298
Social Democratic Party (SDP)	6.4	48		8	2	1	6	46
New Socialist	–	26		6	0	0	9	35
Independent & Others				1	–	1	14***	128
Total				73	16	7	127	1,261

Notes: * PR vote in 11 regional constituencies.

** Some candidates were listed for both single member seats and on regional lists.

*** Includes Green (1), Cultural Forum (4), Kokuminto (3).

Due to ties in rankings by many parties and the final ranking determined by performance in SMD constituencies by losers % of the vote this cannot be calculated here. See the main text for an explanation.

Table 8. *Mexico 1997 Congressional elections*

Party	% vote PR	Total candidates	List seats won	Female candidates	Women PR seats won	Women list replacement (top 20% – first 8 on regional lists)	Seats PL	Women PL seats
PRI	39.1%		74 (37%)		12 (16%)	4 (10%)	165	20 (12%)
PAN	26.6%		57 (28.5%)		13 (23%)	8 (20%)	64	1 (1.5%)
PRD	25.7%		55 (27.5%)		18 (33%)	10 (25%)	70	13 (18.6%)
PVEM	1.12%		8 (4%)		4 (50%)	–*	0	0
PT	2.53%		6 (3%)		1 (16.6%)	–*	1	0
Others	5%		0 (0.0%)		0	–	0	0
Total	100%		200		48 (24%)		300	34 (11%)

Note: * Women also appeared on the top portions of these parties lists.

Table A6(a). *Proportional part of election – Italy, Chambers of Deputies, 1996*

Party	% Vote PR	Seats PR	Women	Women <i>N-PR</i>
PDS	21.1	26	57.7	15
FORZA ITALIA	20.6	37	5.4	2
ALLEANZA NAZIONALE	15.7	28	7.1	2
LEGA NORD	10.1	20	10.0	2
RIFOND. COMUN.	8.6	20	30.0	6
POP-SVP-PRI-UD-PRODI	6.8	4	0.0	0
CCD-CDU	5.8	12	8.3	1
LIST DINI	4.3	8	12.5	1
TOTAL		155	18.7	29

Table A6(b). *Plurality part of election – Italy, Chambers of Deputies, 1996*

Electoral alliances	Seats PL	Women N-PL	Women %-PL
POLO per le LIBERTA	169	12	7.1
ULIVO	246	25	10.2
LEGA NORD	39	4	10.3
PROGRESSISTI	15	2	13.3
OTHERS	6	0	0.0
TOTAL	475	43	9.1

Table A7(a). *Russia: parties winning list seats, 1995 Duma elections*

Name of party	Votes for	Percentage of votes cast	Number of candidates/ Women	Position on list
Communists (CPRF)	15,432,963	22.30	99/9	20,23,37,46,55,56,76,82,90
Liberal-democrats (LDP)	7,737,431	11.18	50/1	45
Our Home-Russia (NDR)	7,009,291	10.13	45/3	3, 5, 45
Yabloko	4,767,384	6.89	31/2	3, 6

Notes: Tsentral'naya Izbiratel'naya komissiya rossiiskaya federatsiya, *Vybory Deputatov gosudarstvennoi dumy 1995. Elektoral'naya statistika*. Izdatel'stvo 'Ves' mir': Moskva, 1996, p. 91.

Table A7(b). *Russia: women in 1995 Duma election*

1995 Duma	# women	% women	Women as % of total	Total
Party list	14	31.1	6.7	225
SMDs	31	68.9	13.8	225
Totals	45	10.0	10.0	450
Federation Council	1	0.6		178

Source: Adapted from McAllister and White 1998, p. 17.