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FREEDOM, JUSTICE, AND THE POWER OF *ADAB*

Abstract

This article analyzes in depth four main writings by the pioneering *nahḍa* intellectual Rifa‘a Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi, who drew on classical kinds of *adab* to articulate new kinds of political subjectivities. He especially draws on the image of the body politic as a body with the king at its heart. But he reconfigures this image, instead placing the public, or the people, at the heart of politics, a “vanquishing sultan” that governs through public opinion. For al-Tahtawi, *adab* is a kind of virtuous comportment that governs self and soul and structures political relationships. In this, he does not diverge from classical conceptions of *adab* as righteous behavior organizing proper social and political relationships. But in his thought, disciplinary training in *adab* is crucial to the citizen-subject’s capacity for self-rule, as he submits to the authority of his individual conscience, ensuring not only freedom, but also justice. These ideas have had lasting impact on Islamic thought, as they have been recycled for the political struggles of new generations.

In one of Rifa‘a Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi’s last works, *Manahij al-Albab fi Mabahij al-Adab al-‘Asriyya* (Methods for Hearts and Minds in the Pleasures of Modern Literatures, 1869), he likens the homeland to both a body and a tree. “There is no doubt,” he writes, “that the homeland [*al-waṭan*] is like a body, thriving by clipping the dry branch, so that the useful branches may survive.”¹ Al-Tahtawi draws on a classic analogy from the Islamic discursive tradition that compares the body politic to a body (and the realm, the *mamlaka*, to the body of the ruler, *al-malik*). In this classic image, *adab* dictates the proper execution of each limb’s function, harmonizing the different parts of the whole. This *adab* is not just a kind of comportment, but also a body of literature with different branches that help structure the political relationships of the *waṭan*. “I harvested the ripe fruits of Arabic books,” he writes, “gathering with them useful French writings, ideas relevant to the issue . . . I reinforced these writings with verses from the Qur’an, true hadith, and clear signs, and included abundant examples of models of the scholars, *adab* of the rhetoricians, and words of poets—all that refreshes minds (*al-afhām*), strips the intellect (*al-dhihn*) of delusions, helps in happiness, and makes mastery eternal.”² Analyses of al-Tahtawi’s idea of *waṭan*, or homeland, tend to emphasize the purely French origins of his concept of *la patrie*.³ Yet it is clear that this is not an imported political imaginary, nor does he envision a wholly new political subject, but he roots these ideas in Arabic and Islamic political concepts and especially in the ethics of *adab*.⁴

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In the course of *Manahij al-Albab*, al-Tahtawi builds on classical Arab Islamic understandings of the polis as a body, and specifically the body of the sovereign. He refashions this allegorical image by placing the people rather than the king at the center of this body politic. Al-Tahtawi developed an Islamic concept of popular sovereignty through and within the Islamic intellectual tradition. He did so by cultivating an emergent conception of the political power and authority of the people, whose conscience is a “vanquishing sultan” and a “court of law” in the heart of the body politic.⁵ By reorienting politics in the hearts (*albāb*) of the people, rather than in the heart of the sovereign, he transforms classical conceptions of the sultan as the embodiment of the polity.⁶ Al-Tahtawi situates his argument in the tradition of Islamic *adab*, a moral code of conduct incumbent on both ruler and subjects, anchoring his writings in the Islamic intellectual tradition in which he innovates. His own corpus of *adab* includes popular writings, pedagogical treatises, grammatical manuals, essays on statecraft, translations, journal articles, and poetry. Some of his writings are composed in the “mirror of the princes”⁷ style, but his lessons are aimed not at the prince but at a new pedagogical subject—the common man, the people, the poor as well as the rich, and girls as well as boys.

I analyze al-Tahtawi’s four principal works in tandem and close this analysis with his acolyte Husayn al-Marsafi, who wrote on the eve of the ‘Urabi revolution. That revolution, too, drew on a vocabulary of freedom, justice, and tyranny to call for an Egypt for the Egyptians. I examine al-Tahtawi’s and al-Marsafi’s understanding of the political power of *adab*, in its multiple senses—as literature, education, bodily discipline, and ethical comportment.⁸ Incisive analyses of the transformations of the concept of *adab* have revolved around how *adab* became “literary”—or understood as “literature” per se—in the modern age.⁹ Instead, I examine how *adab* continued to function at the intersection of power and knowledge, through the disciplinary formation of political subjects for a nascent Egyptian nation-state. Both al-Tahtawi and al-Marsafi understand *adab* (and *ta’dīb*) as a methodological and interpretive approach to knowledge, but also as practical means of shaping political subjectivities for an emergent nationalism and a concept of self-rule. They developed these ideas under a distinct set of political circumstances: in the wake of Muhammad ‘Ali’s rule, in the face of looming European imperialism, and on the eve of the ‘Urabi revolution. In his drive to modernize, Muhammad ‘Ali helped reconfigure knowledge and literature. *Adab* became “reappropriated” within new constellations of political power—but in ways that were not necessarily alien or antithetical to its roots. Al-Tahtawi and al-Marsafi draw on the classical hierarchical relationship between the sultan and his subjects, but they make the sultan *subject* to the “court of law” of “public opinion.”

In *Colonising Egypt*, Timothy Mitchell characterizes al-Tahtawi’s writings as helping to formulate a nascent discipline of political science in Arabic letters, though Mitchell identifies (along with other scholars) a literary quality that complicates easy disciplinary boundaries.¹⁰ This science, Mitchell argues, introduced “new methods for working on the body” by envisioning education as both training the physical body and forming the mind and character.¹¹ This disciplining of the self and government of the body, *siyāsāt al-dhāt wa-l-badan*, was not something entirely new, but was drawn from within the Islamic discursive tradition and the tradition of *adab* literature. These disciplinary regimes did not supplant Islamic models as Mitchell often seems to suggest (with reference to education and law, for example), but rather worked within these earlier models. Calls for

indigenous modes of freedom and justice have been critical tools for claiming popular sovereignty, for demanding self-rule, for calling for the accountability of the ruler, and for asserting the rights (as well as duties) of citizenship, well into the 21st century. But the object of al-Tahtawi's politics moved from a centralized, hierarchical authority to the common man that populated the *umma*, to what Foucault calls the capillary forms of power.¹²

Classical understandings of *adab* gave meaning, content, and substance to the intellectual project of modernity, yet challenging some of the most basic assumptions about modernity—about its European and implicitly secular nature and about the European and secular nature of modern techniques of power, modern disciplines, and modern literary forms. The new disciplinary institutions that accompanied colonial modernity did not necessarily supplant Islamic models, but rather worked within and through them. As Talal Asad observes in *Formations of the Secular*, “new discursive grammars” involve ruptures with tradition, as much as continuities. “New vocabularies (‘civilization,’ ‘progress,’ ‘history,’ ‘agency,’ ‘liberty,’ and so on) are acquired and linked to older ones. Would-be reformers, as well as those who oppose them, imagine and inhabit multiple temporalities.”¹³ Al-Tahtawi transforms the “writing power” of a body of literature on Muslim kingship—and “political material that is composed of narratives of political behavior”—into a primer for a new generation of students that is being schooled in political knowledge.¹⁴ Now the “son of the homeland” (*ibn al-waṭan*) has “complete freedom” (*al-ḥurriyya al-tāmma*) that is one of a citizen's “civil rights” (*al-ḥuqūq al-madaniyya*).¹⁵ For al-Tahtawi, the ethical self becomes the very embodiment of freedom, in its capacity for self-government, cultivated through the discipline of education (*tarbiya*).¹⁶

TRAVEL IS TRANSLATION

“Travel in search of knowledge is not only a practice of translation,” writes Roxanne Euben in her own analyses of al-Tahtawi, “but a *term* of translation, a conceptual bridge across traditions separated by culture or time.”¹⁷ Al-Tahtawi's intellectual journey is well known: he was born in 1801 to a family of scholars and judges in Upper Egypt, studied at al-Azhar with Shaykh Hasan al-ʿAttar,¹⁸ and at age twenty-five was appointed imam of a delegation of students destined for Paris. He remained in Paris for five years, singled out by French orientalist Edme-François Jomard (an editor of and contributor to Napoleon's *Description de l'Égypte*) for training in translation.¹⁹ When al-Tahtawi returned from Paris, he would eventually become the director of Dar al-ʿAlsun, the school of translation that he founded in 1835. There, he supervised over 2,000 translations that became the basis of the “translation movement” in Arabic letters. At this moment of infiltration of European writings—both technical and literary—there was simultaneously a resurgence of Arabic and Islamic literature (“neoclassicism”).²⁰ The first works to roll off the newly privatized Bulaq press were Abu Hamid al-Ghazali's *Ihya' ʿUlum al-Din* (Revival of the Religious Sciences) and Ibn Khaldun's *al-Muqaddima*. Even as the study of foreign languages (French, Turkish, Italian, Persian) proliferated, the scholarly establishment of the ʿulama' strove to strengthen the Arabic language, to adapt and accommodate neologisms through Arabic etymologies, to spread literacy in the linguistic sciences, and to facilitate knowledge of Arabic and Islamic *adab*.²¹ Theories of cultural translation

have tended to see this process unfolding along a hierarchy of languages, where the “third world” language “submits” to the dominance of European languages and regimes of knowledge.²² Yet the seismic transformations in the Arabic language served to promote expanded literacy in Arabic and Islamic thought, as well as to aid in the dissemination and circulation of Arabic and Islamic literatures and educational materials.²³ Mass education, literacy, and print media helped revive consciousness—and scholarship—of the Arabo-Islamic intellectual tradition rather than supplant it. Moreover, this scholarly production formulated a new lexicon that helped in imagining, describing, and shaping new kinds of political subjectivities.

Al-Tahtawi was instrumental to this process. He was deeply connected to the group of intellectuals that founded Dar al-‘Ulum, the teachers’ training college envisioned as a “middle path” between the religious schools and the technical training schools first established under Muhammad ‘Ali.²⁴ Al-Tahtawi played an important role in developing and founding these technical training schools over the course of his long career. The curriculum at Dar al-‘Ulum was aimed to produce a new cadre of teachers trained in geometry, physics, geography, history, and calligraphy, as well as Azhari disciplines such as Arabic language and literature, Qur’an exegesis, hadith, and *fiqh*.²⁵ Dar al-‘Ulum initially recruited students from al-Azhar, many of whom went on to teach in the new government schools established under Khedive Isma‘il. These schools created less a “division of spirits” between “two systems of education” and “two different educated classes in Egypt, each with a spirit of its own,” than a melding of traditional sciences, disciplines, and institutions to new ones.²⁶ In an article on this “dual system,” Hoda Yousef observes that this was not “a complete ideological separation between two sides of a bifurcated system of education, with government schools gaining ground and replacing indigenous ones and a ‘new’ elite displacing the ‘old.’ Rather, government schools relied heavily, both academically and structurally, upon indigenous education for manpower, input, and intellectual sustenance.”²⁷

Al-Tahtawi’s impact on the field of education, on what became the “translation movement,” and on Egyptian public discourse was vast. He became known as “‘father of modern Arabic literature,’ pioneer of the Arab *nahḍa* (Renaissance), leader of the Egyptian ‘Enlightenment,’ and a ‘citizen of the world’ who helped initiate the ‘nineteenth century’s growing Arab awareness of the West.’”²⁸ Moreover, his work has been of enduring scholarly interest: it has witnessed a revival in recent years, in both literary scholarship and in the writings associated with the Islamic awakening.²⁹ *Ṣaḥwa* writers call him “the pioneer of enlightenment” and of “the new awakening” (*al-yaqāza al-jadīda*).³⁰ Al-Tahtawi’s ground-breaking work *Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz* (The Extraction of Gold in the Distillation of Paris, 1834) describes his delegation’s travels to Paris (from Alexandria via Marseilles) and back; the sciences, skills, and crafts that they went to acquire; the exams they took (of which a translated transcript is provided); French geography, culture, politics, medicine, charity, economics, religion, education; the French revolution of 1830; and finally, the organization of knowledge in France. Several scholars have marveled at—and extensively analyzed—al-Tahtawi’s inventiveness at the purely lexical level, especially his linguistic ingenuity in expressing concepts that had no direct equivalent in Arabic.³¹ “*Takhlis* can be understood,” writes Roxanne Euben, “in part, as an elaborate linguistic mediation . . . al-Tahtawi did not have a language ready-made to represent the new world he encountered; he was compelled to coin

Arabic neologisms, deploy classical Arabic terminology in unorthodox ways, or directly borrow from other languages simply to describe unfamiliar phenomena to his readers.”³² What we see in al-Tahtawi’s oeuvre, and indeed, in his career, is a translational negotiation of “indigenous” and “foreign” epistemes, different branches of the holistic tree that he mentions in *Manahij al-Albab*. He manages to navigate the shoals of renewal and reform within the Islamic literary tradition, establishing an effective dialectic between the past and the present, indigenous and foreign, and Arab-Islamic and European modes of knowledge. These are the tangled origins of an Arab-Islamic literary modernity, a rhizome-like genealogy growing out of the soil of the *waṭan* as a homeland.

In *Takhlis al-Ibriz*, al-Tahtawi translates *liberté* as *ḥurriyya*, a concept that had previously been used in contradistinction to “slavery,” but could also mean “nobility.”³³ In this translation, he began a process of reinterpreting Arabic and Islamic political concepts for the era of Muhammad ‘Ali’s emergent Egyptian state. This process of reinterpretation would go through several waves or instantiations, as al-Tahtawi himself traversed different political eras—from Muhammad ‘Ali to a period of severe repression under ‘Abbas (1848–54) to the educational reforms instantiated under Sa‘id (1854–63) and Isma‘il (1863–79). Through these successive periods, al-Tahtawi would elaborate on the seed of his earlier ideas, first sketched out in *Takhlis al-Ibriz*. In his commentary on Article 1 of the French National Charter, he writes, “What they call *al-ḥurriyya* and what they desire in it, designates what we refer to as justice and equity [*al-‘adl wa-l-iṣṣāf*]. The meaning of ‘to rule with *al-ḥurriyya*’ is to establish equity in injunctions and laws by which the ruler cannot oppress people.”³⁴ In his own translation of Article 1, “All French are equal before the law,” al-Tahtawi tactfully omits “*quels que soient d’ailleurs leurs titres et leurs rangs*” (whatever their title or their rank), perhaps in deference to the sovereign.³⁵ He later elaborates more fully on this part of Article 1:

All French are equal before the law, high and low, there is no difference in the application of the laws mentioned. The legal injunction even applies to the king, for it is enforced against him as it is against others . . . this is one of the clear signs of the application of justice among the French to a high degree, and their progress in civilized manners (*taqaddumuhum fī al-adāb al-ḥādīra*). What they call freedom and what they desire from it designates what we call justice and equity. Thus the meaning of ‘ruling with freedom’ is the establishment of equality in injunctions and laws so that the ruler cannot oppress any human being.³⁶

“Justice and equity” here invokes the accountability of the ruler before the law, but is extended to the individual’s right to freedom from oppression and tyrannical, arbitrary government. In this, al-Tahtawi draws on understandings in Islamic jurisprudence that the ruler is also accountable to the law and has “limits imposed on him by the existence of moral norms.”³⁷ Even if the caliph is the representative of God on earth, he is not above the law. By using the particular phrase, “to rule with *al-ḥurriyya*,” he interprets Article 1 as making the ruler subject to (Islamic) ethics of justice and fairness.³⁸

In this interpretation, the ruler is not necessarily the embodiment of the law, the dispenser of the law, the origins of justice, or *ṣāḥib al-nufūdh* (he who executes power and the law), but is *subject* to the law. Al-Tahtawi says that he translated the charter “so that you may see how their intellects judged justice and equity among the causes of the flourishing of kingdoms and of the wellbeing of their people [*al-‘ibād*] and how subjects and sovereigns submitted to that . . . Justice is the basis of civilization [*‘umrān*].”

Al-Tahtawi remarks on how sovereigns submit just like subjects; all of God's servants (*kull 'ibād*) are subject to God's law, including the king. This is also connected to al-Tahtawi's own experience witnessing Charles X being brought to justice during the French revolution of 1830.

In his analysis of al-Tahtawi's interpretation of *liberté*, Bernard Lewis evokes something of Talal Asad's "new discursive grammars" where new vocabularies (of "liberty" for example) are related to the old.³⁹

Shaykh Rifa'a's equation of *hurriyya* with the classical Islamic concept of justice helped relate the new to the old concepts, and fit his own political writings into the long line of Muslim exhortation to the sovereign to rule wisely and justly, with due respect for the law and due care for the interest and welfare of the subjects. What is new and alien to traditional political ideas is the suggestion that the subject has a *right* to be treated justly, and that some apparatus should be set up to secure that right. With remarkable percipience, Shaykh Rifa'a sees and explains the different roles of parliament, the courts and the press in protecting the subjects from tyranny—or rather, as he points out, in enabling the subjects to protect themselves."⁴⁰

Lewis complains that al-Tahtawi did little to further this vision of political liberty when he was in positions of government power. But al-Tahtawi played a critical part in wresting control of new educational institutions from the military, expanding the literate public, extending education to women and men and to rich and poor, developing the power of the press, strengthening the Arabic language through lexical and pedagogical innovations, and rooting modern educational and political concepts in indigenous paradigms. Through such changes, he helped cultivate the public sphere as a space where educated citizens come together to judge the performance of the rulers.⁴¹ By extending the literate public beyond the Azhar educated elite, he opened the public sphere to an ever-widening class of educated citizens, "widening the circle of civilization," in his own words.⁴²

Analyses of the idea of "cultural translation" have tended to proceed from assumptions of hierarchy, of a weaker culture submitting to translation into the dominant language. In Talal Asad's earlier writings, he sees the transformations of the Arabic language in the 19th century—under the auspices of al-Tahtawi's translation movement—as a process of "forcible transformation" to which Arabic "submits . . . push[ing] it to approximate" European languages as a "mimetic gesture of power, an expression of desire for transformation."⁴³ Yet what we see is not a weak and debilitated Arabic language and Islamic intellectual discourse submitting to a forcible transfer of ideas. Instead, the tradition shows itself to be malleable to regeneration—or "awakening" (*nahḍa*). As the tradition assimilates new ideas, it transforms them and reinterprets them in its own terms.⁴⁴ In Asad's later work, he would revise this earlier understanding of this relationship between colonial (and secular) modernity and the Islamic discursive tradition, seeing it as a process of rhizome-like hybridity and cross-fertilization. This is the way that al-Tahtawi himself saw the process, as a tree with different branches.⁴⁵

Toward the middle of the 19th century, there was a semantic shift in the word *hurriyya* as it began to connote ideas of political and personal freedom, sovereignty, and liberty.⁴⁶ Most analyses attribute this to the French revolution and developments in French thought.⁴⁷ Rather than a simple transference of French ideas into Islamic writings, however, these ideas were sanctioned with reference to the scriptural tradition, projected back into the early community (*salāf*), and framed within classical theological debates

about ethical conduct (*adab*). This ethical conduct was defined through reference to justice and fairness (*al-‘adl wa-l-inṣāf*), political consultation (*shūrā*), accountability before the law, knowledge and human reason, free will, and equality. Al-Tahtawi would further develop these concepts over the course of his long and prolific career under successive Egyptian governments. In *Takhliṣ al-Ibriz*, he moves away from the original sense of “justice and equity” as the prerogative of the ruler, reinterpreting this concept as a condition of freedom intrinsic to the subject, a condition to which the ruler is held accountable. Through this discursive move, al-Tahtawi shifts from the “absolutist imperative” of power enunciated by the ruler, articulated in a “corpus of universal wisdom,” to a modern ethics (an *adāb ‘asriyya*) that helps promote the (self-)mastery of the individual citizen-subject.⁴⁸

ERRANCY AND ADAB

After Muhammad ‘Ali’s death, al-Tahtawi fell out of favor with the new khedive. ‘Abbas I (1848–54) exiled al-Tahtawi to the Sudan under the pretense that he was needed to open a primary school for the children of Egyptian diplomats.⁴⁹ During his exile, al-Tahtawi translated the Archbishop of Cambrai François Fénelon’s *Aventures de Télémaque*, originally published in 1699. Eve Troutt Powell describes the book as “an allegory which perfectly fitted his case and the injustice done to him.”⁵⁰ *Télémaque* is a treatise on just rule, but also a critique of the absolute power of the sovereign and a dissertation on the accountability of the king. It is Fénelon’s rendering of Homer’s famous epic poem about Telemachus’ own educational voyage, guided by his Mentor Athena, goddess of wisdom. The didactic sermon, written in the “mirror of the princes” style, was a primer for Fénelon’s student, King Louis XIV’s eldest son, the Duke of Burgundy. Fénelon’s vision of the public good is deeply connected to virtue, to notions of ethical conduct, and to Fénelon’s own piety. But he also reconciles freedom with obedience to moral law, directly inspiring Rousseau’s own idea of *liberté* as secured through submission to the law, the “chains that make us free.”⁵¹ *Mawaqī‘ al-Aflak fī Waqā‘i‘ Tīlimak* (The Positions of the Planets in the Adventures of Telemachus) is, like Fénelon’s text, a commentary on political tyranny, expressed via changing literary forms, new political concepts, and emergent pedagogies. *Tīlimak* would not be published until 1867, much later in al-Tahtawi’s career, during the more liberal reign of Isma‘il.

Tīlimak develops ideas about liberty that al-Tahtawi had begun exploring in *Takhliṣ al-Ibriz* and that he would further develop in his last works. In *Tīlimak*, liberty is contingent on submission to the law, on the ruler’s accountability to the law, and on the virtuous self-government of the citizen that enables popular sovereignty. The text meditates on the nature of just rule and the ideal society, realized through a system of rights and duties that provide a blueprint for such a society. This blueprint is the law; and the “custodians of the law” are the scholars and wise men who are its interpreters. In *Tīlimak*, Minos is described as a great king “because of the justice, organization of rights, and morals that his laws preserve and protect.”⁵² This vision of good government, where justice is tied to rights (equality under the law, individual freedom), echoes al-Tahtawi’s interpretation of the French Charter, but includes the critical dimension of *moral* conduct—and *adab*—so central to his later writings on rights.

Télémaque elaborates a principle of sovereign accountability before the law, *quels que soient d'ailleurs leurs titres et leurs rangs*. Telemachus asks Mentor: In what does the king's authority consist? "The king, Mentor replies, is absolute over the people, but the laws are absolute over him. He has unlimited power to do good, but his hands are tied when he would do evil."⁵³ Telemachus and Mentor are taken to a sacred grove, "sequestered from the sight of the profane," where the 'ulama' keep the laws. The text moves into an extended description of the 'ulama' as free from "appetites" and hence able to purely use their reason. They are the embodiment of "enlightened and serene virtue." "Those who are entrusted with the execution of the laws for the government of the people ought always to be governed by the laws themselves. It is the law, not the man, which ought to reign. Such was the discourse of these 'ulama'." The 'ulama' are the keepers of the law not only through reason, but also through virtue and goodness. They pose a series of questions to test Telemachus (himself a prince in training), the first pertaining to freedom. "Who is the freest of all men?" A number of (erroneous) answers are proffered by the assembly. One of the erroneous answers is: "a king who had absolute dominion over his subjects." Telemachus gives the best answer. Mentor had often told him that "the freest of all men is he who can be free even in slavery itself. In whatever country or condition a man may be, he is perfectly free, provided he fears God, and fears nothing but God. In a word, the truly free man is he who, void of all fears and all desires, is subject only to God and reason."⁵⁴ This concept of freedom as submission to God alone would become extensively developed in modern Islamic thought by thinkers such as Muhammad 'Abduh, Muhammad al-Khidr Husayn, 'Abd al-Wahid Wafi, and Sayyid Qutb. They interpret submission to God (*'ibāda* and *'ubūdiyya*) as making God's servants (*'ibād*) free from servitude to earthly powers (*shirk*). It is a concept that would make its way directly into 'Abduh's *Risalat al-Tawhid*.⁵⁵

This vision of submission to God and the law as the source of liberty is reiterated throughout *Tilimak*. Two kinds of law are described, along with two utopian societies: Crete, ruled by the law of the books, and Andalusia, ruled by natural law. "The great riches of the Cretans are health, strength, courage, the peace and union of families, the liberty of all the citizens, a plenty of necessaries, a contempt of superfluities, a habit of labor, an abhorrence of idleness, an emulation of virtue, a submission to the laws, and a fear of righteous God." Muslim Andalusia is also described as an ideal society, living by an innate goodness that brings happiness, wellbeing, and social and political concord. These images give expression to Fénelon's Quietist views that preach a direct relationship to God without worldly interference. In Andalusia, the people are described as nomadic, without a sense of fixed territory, keeping few possessions, and living simply. The key symbol in this passage is the tent—Quietists believed that the man of God was a man of the tent or of the altar.

Each family, wandering up and down in this beautiful country, moves its tents from one place to another . . . They love each other with a brotherly love that nothing interrupts. It is the contempt of vain riches and deceitful pleasures that preserves this peace, union, and liberty. They are all free, and all equal. There is no distinction among them, except recognition of the experience of the ancient sages, or the extraordinary wisdom of some young men, who are equal to the elders in consummate virtue.⁵⁶

This passage was reiterated almost verbatim in Muhammad ‘Abduh’s *Risalat al-Tawhid*—that all men are naturally and originally free and equal and that there is no distinction among them, except in wisdom.⁵⁷ The passage has romantic intimations of an *a priori* golden age of simplicity lost among the ruins of modern existence. But it is also a political vision of *sacred law* (whose guardians are the elders in Crete) and of *natural law* existing without a formal political structure (Andalusia has no kings except fathers of families and chiefs of tribes). The twofold image of sacred and natural law, public and private government, kings and fathers, polis and family, structures al-Tahtawi’s later book *al-Murshid al-Amin li-l-Banat wa-l-Banin* (The Authoritative Guide for Girls and Boys, 1871). Through Fénelon’s idealistic, utopian, and romantic vision of a free, sacred, and ethical society, al-Tahtawi deploys his own utopian vision of the ideal Arabo-Islamic society and polity, not uncoincidentally through reference to an *a priori* idealistic Andalusia. These two models of good conduct and good government juxtapose a society governed by the law, books, and reason, with natural goodness that comes from living simply and through a direct relationship with God.

Both Fénelon and al-Tahtawi used new kinds of *adab* to meditate on the nature of good and just government precisely at a moment of intense political change. Fénelon’s *Télémaque* moved away from epic poetry to a new kind of narrative prose written in a readily accessible vernacular style. In an introduction to a later edition, Fénelon’s disciple Andrew Michael Ramsay described *Les Aventures* as conceived in the *ethical* framework of epic poetry, even as it ruptured with the form of epic poetry. *Télémaque* is a pivotal genre, mixing what is “old” in the epic—a metaphysical vision of the world—with what is new in the Enlightenment, an emphasis on freedom, equality, and justice and the role of reason. These virtues, long understood as emblematic of the move to secular government, did not have secular origins. *Télémaque* is informed by Fénelon’s own spiritual trajectory—as priest, archbishop, and theologian. He adapts the travel narrative of the Greek (and pagan) prince to a Christian ethics, describing an epic unity of the world where all knowledge is from God.⁵⁸ Ramsay describes the aesthetic nature of this metaphysical unity:

The universe is only a picture, representing the divine perfections; the visible world is only an imperfect copy of the invisible; and consequently, that there is a hidden analogy between the original and these portraits, between spiritual and corporeal beings, between the properties of the one and those of the other . . . When we consult those among the Persians, the Phoenecians, the Greeks, and the Romans, who have left us some imperfect fragments of the ancient theology . . . they all tell us, that these hieroglyphic and symbolic characters denote the mysteries of the invisible world, the doctrines of the most profound theology.⁵⁹

Ramsay laments the loss of this “oriental theology” which, he argues, both Homer and Fénelon sought to revive—a theology which al-Tahtawi would similarly revive for the context of his exile under ‘Abbas.⁶⁰ The epic form traveled from a Greek fable to the history of a French prince to the story of an errant Egyptian scholar. All were trying to set politics and ethics along the right path. Through this romantic portrait of the “hieroglyphics” of “oriental theology,” an Andalusia imbued with natural rights, al-Tahtawi was able to “create in the book the picture of beloved Egypt which unlocked the reins of my pen.”⁶¹ This errant political theology was able to flourish in multiple soils as a model—and as a primer—of good governance. It is an *adab* formulated and

reformulated, for a Greek prince, for a French one, and for an Egyptian one, grounded in an ethics that was both practical and metaphysical.

The process of translation that we see in al-Tahtawi's work is not just itinerant, linguistic, and geographic, but also generic and disciplinary. Some literary critics argue that al-Tahtawi's translation of *Télémaque* represents a shift in Arabic narrative discourse toward "modern" genres such as the novel. *Télémaque* is not just literature; it is *adab*, an ethical document, an instrument of instruction, a vision of ethical citizenship, and a portrait of just rule. It is not just a cultural translation, but a generic one as well, as Homer's epic poem becomes a primer for the prince, the myth of Telemachus an Enlightenment treatise, Greek mythology Christian mysticism, Fénelon's critique of Louis XIV al-Tahtawi's commentary on the ethics of Egyptian monarchic rule and a preliminary vision of Islamic citizenship for the modern age.

Al-Tahtawi's generic mediations demonstrate a complex process of balancing not just linguistic and literary styles (the travel narrative, the epic, the primer, the mirror of the princes, the emergent novel), but also the pedagogies associated with them. His translation of *Télémaque* echoes *Takhlis al-Ibriz*, the educational mission, the travel narrative, the *adab* style now "translated" into an Arabized and Islamicized version of Telemachus's travels around the Mediterranean. Al-Tahtawi further translates the French to the Arabic, the Christian Quietist content to the Islamic, epic poetry to the *adab* of *rihla* literature. As with his description of Paris in *Takhlis al-Ibriz*, he Egyptianizes the content to make the frame of reference familiar to his audiences, "dressing his work in an Egyptian garb with Egyptianized figures." Literary scholars have tended to see *Tilimak* as a radical "departure from traditional and static literary models," opening "a gate, however narrow, to future possibilities for the modernization of imaginative literature."⁶² *Tilimak* was at the juncture of a proliferation of innovative literary styles, drawing on older, classical forms like the *rihla* and contributing to the emergence of new genres.⁶³ As with other kinds of *adab*, its didactic, ethical, aesthetic, and political aims overlapped. Even as new literary forms and new narrative voices emerged for a new era, classical literary genres, styles, and forms still exerted their powerful force—not just in literature, but also in institutions such as new schools.

THE DISCIPLINE OF *ADAB*

After 'Abbas was assassinated by his eunuchs, al-Tahtawi was liberated from his exile and returned to government favor under Sa'id (1854–63). During this time he worked on a project to open ten *makātib ahliyya* ("national" or "peoples" schools) intended to be a "middle path" between the technical and religious schools, a project that would not be actively implemented until the reign of Isma'il (1863–79). Though these schools have been widely understood as modeled on European educational institutions, they combined the traditional disciplines such as Arabic language and foundations of religion with arithmetic, geography, and geometry. Most historians have tended to assume that "a strict dichotomy existed between 'new,' modern, Western schools and 'old,' traditional, indigenous education" and that government education was "virtually synonymous with modernization, westernization, and secularization." Moreover, historians have understood these schools as diametrically opposed to indigenous forms of (religious) education.⁶⁴ Yet the movement for educational reform—in both the religious

and the national schools—was laid by Azharis such as al-Tahtawi, his junior colleague Husayn al-Marsafi, and later educational reformers such as Muhammad ‘Abduh and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jawish.⁶⁵ This period in the late 1860s represented the pinnacle and culmination of al-Tahtawi’s career. He was a member of the Educational Council at the newly formed Ministry of Education and editor of the pioneering journal *Rawdat al-Madaris*, and he published three of his most important books—each concerned in different ways with the subjects of education, pedagogy (*tarbiya*), and the “division of knowledge” (*taqsim al-‘ulūm*). The first of these was a grammar book, a primer to teach students how to read and write; the second was *Manahij al-Albab*; and the third was *al-Murshid al-Amin*, a kind of “mirror of the princes” for a new, more plebian generation of students.

Manahij al-Albab begins by identifying the “two foundational means for perfecting civilization,” the first of which is rooted in *adab*, in “the training [*tahdhīb*] of morals and human virtues with the *adab* of religion.” The second is related to the cultivation of wealth through agriculture, trade, and industry. The book explores the “division of labor” between these two civilizational imperatives, as well as their imbrications, how one informs the other, is necessary to the other, is contingent on the other. These divisions in education, knowledge, and *adab* appear as divisions between body, spirit, and intellect within the pedagogical subject, conceptual divisions that also occur in the social body. Even as al-Tahtawi identifies different kinds of education and knowledge, he still relies on concepts of *adab* as structuring ethical relationships in the sphere of politics, as well as in the sphere of personal relations. In *Manahij al-Albab*, the *adāb ‘asriyya* of the title refers to “modern literatures” or “modern mores” as a curriculum for the formation of Egyptian hearts and minds.

In his long conclusion to *Manahij al-Albab*, al-Tahtawi compares the polis and the king to the body and soul (respectively), drawing on classical Islamic metaphors for the hierarchy of political relationships. The 11th- and 12th-century Islamic thinker Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, for example, drew analogies between the *adab* of the self and the *adab* of politics: “The relationship of the human spirit to his body is like the ruler to his city or kingdom.”⁶⁶ In Ebrahim Moosa’s analysis of this passage, he writes about al-Ghazali’s image as a political one, but also as a kind of bodily discipline or *adab* connected to Islamic ethics of the self, a “hermeneutics of the self.” “The monarch represents the spirit, while the ministers represent the organs and limbs of the body. Just as each minister must fulfill his responsibilities in order for proper and just government to exist, similarly, each bodily limb and faculty must comply with its assigned task to prevent degradation in an individual’s behavior and character.”⁶⁷ Al-Tahtawi elaborates on this traditional image from the Islamic discursive tradition, but puts the subject—rather than the ruler—at the heart and soul of politics. There is a perceptible shift to what Foucault calls the capillary forms of power, where “older forms of political authority, radiating outward from singular institutions or zones, or even bodies of sovereignty, are dissolved and dissipated by modern disciplinary practices into capillary forms of power.”⁶⁸

Manahij al-Albab concludes with three interlocking topics: on leadership and leaders (*wulāt al-umūr*), on the “art of politics,” and on “the rights of the citizens.” Al-Tahtawi returns to the connection between the *adab* of politics and the *adab* of body, self, and religion. He uses vivid imagery of a single organism, a human body, in which politics,

soul, mind, and body must co-exist harmoniously. Extending the bodily imagery, he puts “public opinion” literally at the heart of politics and *in the heart of the king*. Public opinion becomes what he calls “a conquering power” or a “conquering sultan,” a *sulṭān qāhir*, “a power conquering hearts of kings and nobles.” Justice, he writes, is incumbent on rulers and “the power of the people is fortified by complete freedom.”⁶⁹

Al-Tahtawi’s discussion blends the two kinds of *adab* mentioned at the beginning of *Manahij al-Albab*, the *adab* of the fulfillment of religious duty and the *adab* of politics. The king, he says, is the caliph of God on earth, he is accountable to God, but he does need advice from those who understand the revelation or politics. Here al-Tahtawi quotes a hadith: “Religion is advice.” But al-Tahtawi adds another dimension: religion is advice to the self. “The human being has in his spirit [*fī nafsihi*, also ‘in himself’] a court that applies laws to its owner, and this court is the conscience [*al-dhimma*] that is the spirit of censure or of reassurance [‘a censorious self or the reassuring self’], it is a judge that does not accept bribes.”⁷⁰ The king should act like others, in harmony with what is right for his own self and soul and for his *umma*. Echoing passages from *Tilimak*,⁷¹ he argues that the king is like an ordinary man who must listen to his heart and the light of truth that shines there. This is the *adab* of justice, of acting in accordance with the heart, with righteous will, and with conscience. This *adab* is not just the *adab* of kings, it is the *adab* of the common people (*al-‘amma*) who act in accordance with the proper *adab* of religious duty, which is also the proper *adab* of politics. In this, the king, al-Tahtawi reiterates several times, “is like others.” He, “like others,” has a conscience that rules over his heart. Even as al-Tahtawi reiterates this classical image of “kingly influence,” the moral power of public opinion is “embodied in the heart of kings.”⁷² By making public opinion the conscience at the heart of the king, he reverses the traditional model, making the people the soul of a righteous politics and putting justice in the hearts of the people.

Adab, al-Tahtawi says in the introduction to *Manahij al-Albab*, stems from justice. “The conscience is the rule of justice, instilling an aversion to oppression and injustice. It epitomizes fear of God on high, in its very existence it brings kings to justice.”⁷³ This *adab* is also an *adab* of rights and duties that structure the king’s relationship to his subjects and vice versa. Discussing the king’s accountability to the people, al-Tahtawi outlines rights that the king must not transgress, because he must not transgress “the limits of God.”⁷⁴ These rights—of equality in laws, freedoms, and protections of self and property—are the foundation of kingdoms.⁷⁵ Al-Tahtawi could not stress enough the importance of education and pedagogy to the inculcation of this *adab*. His own grammars (and al-Marsafi’s after him) were developed to make the Arabic language more accessible to a wider reading public. It is a subject that he took up in his subsequent work *al-Murshid al-Amin*, the “righteous guide” for girls and boys. In this he becomes the “mentor” not to the king (as in *Tilimak*), but to a new generation of students constituted not by the elite, but ideally by the “public citizenry” to which he constantly refers, the boys and girls, the rich and poor.

THE *ADAB* OF RIGHTS

Al-Murshid al-Amin was published in the midst of Isma‘il’s initiatives to expand and reform public education. The book is a theoretical and methodological treatise on the

nature of not just education (*al-tarbiya wa-l-ta'lim*), but also education's role in shaping the social body (*al-hay'a al-ijtimā'iyya*) and the nation (*al-waṭan*). In *al-Murshid al-Amin*, al-Tahtawi lays out an interconnected vision of *adab*—the *adab* of home, family, and body; the *adab* of the sunna of religion; and the *adab* of public life. Parallel sections on education in the family and public education introduce parallel concepts of rights and duties that structure the *adab* of different spheres. Through the literary structure of his text, the “rights of kinship”—taken from Islamic law—are used to map the public rights of citizenship. In this way, al-Tahtawi maps—or translates—the *adab* of one sphere into the *adab* of another. He does this by eschewing the division of spheres into binaries (of private and public), instead showing how one informs the other. The section entitled “Fi Umum al-Qaraba wa-Huquq Ba'dahum 'ala Ba'd” (In Kinship Communities and the Rights of Some over Others) describes the reciprocal rights and duties of parents and children, comparing this relationship to the relationship between the ‘ulama’ and the *muta'allimin*, teachers and learners. There are two main features of this relationship—the first one is of natural and instinctual feelings of love that come from the emotions (*jumlat al-wijdāniyyāt*).⁷⁶ The second feature—of justice and fairness (*al-‘adl wa-l-inṣāf*)—is usually the language used to describe the moral duties incumbent on the ruler with respect to the ruled, but is now used to describe the relationship between parents and child. This system of *adab* balances the rights and duties between parents and child, teachers and students, the ruler and the ruled. In capillary form, al-Tahtawi reorients justice and fairness as a virtue cultivated not just among princes, but also in schools, in the home, and in the family. Through this allegorical model, he takes classical understandings of rights between husband and wife, parents and children, and turns it into a model of political governance. The *adab* of the family becomes the place for inculcating new kinds of political subjectivities.

In subsequent sections, al-Tahtawi outlines the specific rights of the children first and then the rights of the parents. His discussion of *wilāya*, or guardianship, is two things at once: a discussion of the parents' *wilāya* of the family; and a discussion of the sovereign power of the ruler and of government. “Justice and fairness” mediates the relationship between parents and children, between teacher and student, and between the ruler and the ruled. Al-Tahtawi's discussion of *wilāya* is deftly argued, almost allegorical. Even as he separates out the “private” and “public” domains, family (*qaraba*) and homeland (*waṭan*), he conceptually connects them through a shared set of ethics, ethics connected in the revelation, the word of God, Qur'an, Sunna, and related *adāb*.

Al-Murshid al-Amin returns to the topic of limits on the king's authority. Any act on the part of the ruler not in conformity with God's will (or in conformity with his own hidden desires for victory) is illegitimate. This rule is bound by God, by the foundations of religion, by law, by religious people (*al-khalq al-maḥmūd*) guided by revelation and intelligence, and *love in the hearts of the people*. Al-Tahtawi closes this section with a discussion of “brotherly love,” connecting the microcosm of family and home to the macrocosm of the polity. Parents must treat their children with equality, he says, whether male or female, rich or poor. While arguing for accountability on the part of the parent/ruler, he is also describing the rights of the children/ruled, their freedom, equality, and fraternity as governed by the divine law of “justice and fairness.” This is not just divine law, al-Tahtawi says, but law that is as natural and instinctual as a mother's love for her child, as the mercy and compassion with which she treats her own children.

When al-Tahtawi begins talking about the nation, he describes it in vividly familial terms, of nests, umbilical cords, birth, family, nurturing. The nation, he writes,

is the human's nest in which he grows up and from which he is produced, the point of connection with his family, his umbilical cord. It is the country that raises him and educates him; it is his nourishment and his air. Its breath raised him and its amulets adorned him. Abu 'Umru bin al-'Ala' said: "Among the things that point to a man's freedom and the nobility of his instinct (*gharīza*) is his tenderness toward his homeland."⁷⁷

Al-Tahtawi identifies the principal characteristics of the "son of the homeland" through a system of rights and duties, like the rights and duties that structure the family. The duties of the nation to its people are like that of the father to his son: the nation protects the citizen. The relationship between the citizen and the nation is like that between son and father: one defends the other. Each has his rights and each has his duties. One cannot ask for rights without performing duties. The meaning of a "son deep rooted in his nation," al-Tahtawi says, is that "he enjoys the rights of his country, and the greatest of these rights is complete freedom incarnate in society."⁷⁸ But this citizen is only free inasmuch as he follows the law of the nation; this freedom is contingent on "obedience to the foundations of his country, requiring his nation to safeguard the enjoyment of civil rights [*al-ḥuqūq al-madaniyya*]."⁷⁹ Only then will he be considered a member of the social body, which evokes classical images of the relationship of the ruler to the ruled, the monarch to his kingdom, or the sovereign to his city imagined as the relationship between different parts of the body. When a citizen enjoys these rights and performs them, he feels he is a member of this body. In the past, some have been denied this function, have been unable to speak or act freely, unable to defend the dictates of shari'a, unable to disagree with the monarch, unable to write on politics, and unable to freely express their opinions. But now, he says, things have changed.

In order for God's justice and fairness to be preserved, the ruler is not just subject to God, but also to the men of religion and knowledge who will hold him accountable for the legitimacy and justice of his actions. The 'ulama' assume the position of ensuring the justice of rule, and hence the rights of the ruled. The relationship between the 'ulama' and the *muta'allimīn*, the teachers and the students, is modeled on the relationship between parent and child, ruler and ruled. The 'ulama' assume their own place as governors, as judges in the courts, as advisors, as interpreters of *adab*, and as instructors of hearts and minds. The 'ulama' are the Mentors, *al-murshid al-amīn*, the authorized guide of the title. The *muta'allimīn* are no longer the princes in the "mirror of the princes" *adab*, but are now the public at large. These learners, these students, are no longer just the male elite, but are the poor as much as the rich, the girls as much as the boys.

Foucault observes how power operates simultaneously through different spheres, both private and public, in what he refers to as the "rule of double conditioning." They are not "two different levels (one microscopic and the other macroscopic)," nor are they completely the same "as if the one were only the enlarged projection or the miniaturization of the other . . . The father in the family is not the 'representative' of the sovereign or the state; and the latter are not projections of the father on a different scale. The family does not duplicate society, just as society does not imitate the family."⁸⁰ Instead, they work through an overall strategy of "double conditioning" toward the transformation of society, functioning partly through the powerful, ancestral trope of

kinship. A generation of writers imagining the cultivation of political subjectivities in the intimate domain would follow in al-Tahtawi's wake, drawing on the powerful trope of kinship as a means of inculcating self-government—and all that it implied of freedom, rights, duties, and disciplines. For al-Tahtawi, as for those who followed him, this freedom was brought about through the discipline of *adab*, a system of rights and duties intimately connected to a sense of Islamic justice, to an Islamic politics, and to a politics of the home.

In al-Tahtawi there is no strict division between private and public, between the realm of kinship relations and the realm of political relations. Even though these are identified separately in *al-Murshid al-Amin*, analogies and parallels integrally joined the two realms. The mediating factor, al-Tahtawi argues, is the conscience, heart, mind, and spirit cognizant of rights and duties, good and bad, laws and ethics, and performing *adab* in body and actions. Similarly, he sees no separation of mind, body, and soul. Instead these elements interact in concerted ways to produce the ethical subject that is the citizen of the good nation, thriving, healthy, righteous, efficient, worthy, and pious. The mind, al-Tahtawi repeatedly says, is in the heart. “The light of truth shines on the heart”; “the mind is in the heart and has rays that connect to the brain”; God “made the shining mind in the human heart a mirror of knowledge.”⁸¹

In these writings, we see the recentring of politics onto the subject, the rooting of ethics in the individual conscience, and the impulse toward truth and knowledge in the instinct of every child born. Through this insistence on the mind, heart, and conscience of every individual, al-Tahtawi constructs an image of like individuals, bound equally under the law, and free insofar as they can govern themselves and adhere to mutually accepted law. Al-Tahtawi articulates these rights less within a French political framework than in the framework of Islamic *adab*. He draws on specifically Islamic concepts of rights and duties and of laws and leadership grounded in a body of Islamic literature, in the Arabic language, and in the linguistic sciences.

Mitchell argues that al-Tahtawi articulates a new art of political science, one that introduced “new methods of working upon the body,” “a process to be conceived according to the same processes as schooling, and was to work in the same way upon both body and mind.”⁸² But al-Tahtawi's three types of *tarbiya*—the *adab* of home, the *adab* of the sunna, and the *adab* of public life—closely echo Abu Hamid al-Ghazali's understanding of the sovereign's relationship to his subjects in *Mizan al-'Amal*. These include “three interlocking aspects: the disciplining of the soul [*tahdhīb al-nafs*], the governance of the body [*siyāsat al-badan*], and administration of justice [*ri'aya al-'adl*].”⁸³ But now they are inculcated into the common man, as new conceptions of personal and political liberty reconfigured earlier conceptions of authority and governance. It is no coincidence that al-Ghazali's *Revival of Religious Sciences* was republished at the same time as *al-Murshid al-Amin* on the newly privatized printing press at Bulaq.

FREEDOM IS JUST ANOTHER WORD

The 'Urabi uprising came in the wake of the intellectual mobilization partly set in motion by al-Tahtawi's writings, his educational reform initiatives, his work to spread literacy, his contribution to the nationalist press, and his pivotal role in disseminating print media at Bulaq. The intelligentsia and the press played a critical role in galvanizing

public opinion against Tawfiq, who had replaced his more progressive brother, the modernizing reformer Isma‘il.⁸⁴ Al-Tahtawi’s junior colleagues Muhammad ‘Abduh and Husayn al-Marsafi were critical players in mobilizing public opinion.⁸⁵ Al-Marsafi published his *al-Kalim al-Thaman* (Eight Words) on the eve of the ‘Urabi revolution, defining a series of terms that were in current circulation: *umma*, *waṭan*, *ḥukūma*, ‘*adl*, *zulm*, *siyāsa*, *ḥurriyya*, and *tarbiya* (Islamic community, homeland, government, justice, oppression, politics, freedom, and education). He helped keep alive a set of themes first sketched out by al-Tahtawi about the nature of political community, just rule, freedom, rights, and education for an era of popular mobilization and colonial occupation.

The opening chapter on the *umma* echoes al-Tahtawi’s images of the body politic as a body or a tree. “The *umma* is like a tree that planted itself in good soil,” al-Marsafi writes, “irrigated with what it needs to grow and flourish, so that it remains of blooming appearance, diverse species, verdant shade, abundant fruits. And when its time is over, it leaves behind others like it.”⁸⁶ Constructing a traditional analogy between the *umma* and the body, al-Marsafi compares the different parts of society (soldiers, scholars, men of religion, judges, etc.) to the limbs of a body. *Adab* coordinates the different parts of the body, with each part performing its particular task or function to the best of its abilities, according to the *adab* of its own discipline. This *adab* perfects the social body.⁸⁷ The shift from the *mamlaka* (the kingdom) to the *waṭan* is accompanied by a shift from the sovereign body of the king to the body of the common man. In defining the homeland, al-Marsafi writes that:

The people (*al-‘ammī*) of the *waṭan* are like a strip of land that populates the *umma*, while the elite (*al-khāṣṣī*) is like its house (*maskan*, abode, dwelling). The soul is a homeland (*waṭan*) because it is the house of consciousness; the body is a homeland because it is the house of the soul; clothes are a homeland because they are the house of the body; the house, street, city, region, land, and world all are homelands because they are houses. Each has rights (*ḥaqq*) that must be recognized, defended, perpetuated, and observed.⁸⁸

In this passage, the *waṭan* becomes embodied first and foremost in the soul of the common man—moving from his consciousness, body, home, house, and street to the city, land, and world. The elite helps form the “house” that is the *waṭan*, but they are duty bound to recognize the fundamental rights of its inhabitants. Al-Marsafi’s analogy is grounded in traditional conceptions of political relationships, but now the scribes and scholars have a direct role in shaping the common man rather than the prince.

Al-Marsafi’s first two keywords, *umma* and *waṭan*, have been understood as connoting different kinds of political community, one religious and Islamic and the other the secular nation-state. *Waṭan* has often been understood as the French idea of *patrie*, but al-Marsafi uses it in its more classical sense as a dwelling place, an abode, a house, or a refuge. The word connotes a kind of limit that protects, encloses, and joins a habitus of body and home. Al-Marsafi never opposes *umma* to *waṭan*, but elucidates them through an overlapping set of tropes. The *khāṣṣa*, the intellectual elite, builds the foundations of this house. They are the ‘*ulama*’, ‘*uqalā*’, ‘*ḥukamā*’, and *bulaghā*’ who interpret language, books, and religion. They help “build a house in the hearts of the public,” a house that will be their *waṭan*, their abode, their dwelling place.⁸⁹

The performance of *adab* regulates different parts of the *waṭan*, coordinating the relationship of one part to another. Al-Marsafi articulates the “right” (*ḥaqq*) of each part

of the *waṭan* with respect to the other. He begins with the “right of the soul to protect against perceptions that are not beneficial . . . Beneficial perceptions are enough to build that abode of the soul.”⁹⁰ Using al-Tahtawi’s language of *murshid* and *albāb*, al-Marsafi writes that the “minds of the ‘ulama’” are “your guide” (*murshid*) as the heart and mind (*albāb*) strive to build “beneficial perceptions that are the structure of the abode” that is the soul. A person must use his mind to become skilled in the art of this building, but also follow a guide. “The ideal ‘ulama’ guide with virtue, use knowledge to discipline the spirit, adhere to religion and follow its rules, and mix *adab* and love of goodness in their characters. They command that the revelation be upheld and convey it to the people, until *adab* was common to all. In this, they epitomize righteous leadership.”⁹¹

To be trained in *adab* one must understand language and grammar. Only through grammar will a person be able to properly understand the words of the prophet, the Qur’an, and the speech of the *aslāf* (*khuṭbat al-aslāf*). Through this “picture, the public will arrive at an understanding of the performance of religion.”⁹² The ‘ulama’ show the way to the soul, which leads to the wellbeing of the life of the body (preserving life, strength, health, vitality, health). Preserving the “right” (*ḥaqq*) of one leads to the preservation of the “right” of the other, the right of the soul to the right of the body to the right of the house to the right of the world, ensuring the righteousness of these various homelands. But the ‘ulama’ must teach a set of skills that help inculcate the “proper image of religion” in the bodies of the populace. Al-Marsafi writes about the role of the ‘ulama’ in teaching “sacred arts” and the “ethics of social relations” (*adab al-mu‘ashara*) in the schools.⁹³ Similar to al-Tahtawi, the body of the common man, the public citizen, is the model for the *waṭan*, the plane on which the politics of the homeland plays out.

Al-Marsafi draws on the ‘ulama’’s traditional role in advising the ruler, but now they advise the people, even as they act as spokesmen and representatives of the population. This ensures fairness and justice, but also preserves the rights (*ḥuqūq*) of the people. Al-Marsafi describes the ‘ulama’ as

mediators between the shepherd and the sheep, ambassadors of goodness, preserving and regulating rights (*ḥuqūq*), the *umma* must approve them, and unleash their tongues in praise of them. The ‘ulama’ must defend these rights completely and with integrity . . . They are the mediators of what is in the innermost thoughts and minds of the self, what is between the leader and the led.⁹⁴

The best way to ensure justice, al-Marsafi argues, is through education and “enlightening the understanding of the people” so that they can lead themselves.⁹⁵ In his short chapter on “Justice, Oppression, and Politics,” he turns to a politics of the self, authority over the self, and self-discipline. From there, he moves on to “freedom.”

Freedom for al-Marsafi “is knowledge, honor, obedience [*inqiyād*], and pride. A person is ignorant if they do not possess these things.”⁹⁶ To enforce this understanding of freedom, the “whip of discipline and correction” should be applied to the erroneous interpretations of the new generation. *Inqiyād* (obedience, submission, or subservience) seems antithetical to freedom, but it is precisely this kind of disciplinary training that makes the citizen free and cognizant of his rights, rights only secured through discipline and training (*ta’dīb*). Otherwise, appetites will take over the body and infringe on others’ rights and property. Knowledge is not specific to a certain class of learned people, but is open and available to everyone. Integral to self-government is a rigorous training in *adab*, in the proper ethics of self-government.

CONCLUSION

The first sentence of al-Tahtawi's last work, *al-Murshid al-Amin*, published just before his death, opens with *adab*: "Praise to those who made attaining *adab* the first habit of hearts and minds [*albāb*], and peace be upon our lord Muhammad who was given wisdom and the final word, and on his people, his parties, and those who were educated with his *adab*."⁹⁷ This opening is an alliterative poetic play (*jinās*) that follows formalistic rhetorical conventions of rhyming prose: *ja'al kasab al-adab da'b awwali al-albāb*. Here al-Tahtawi connects *albāb* (hearts and minds) with *adab*, *da'b* (habit), and *ta'addaba* (to educate). His use of the word *albāb* is critical, a word that intimates heart and mind simultaneously, making one inextricable from the other, in stark contradistinction to a mind/body split. The heart becomes the seat of all knowledge, and *adab* the habit of body, mind, and soul simultaneously. As the "seat of knowledge," it is with the heart (*qulūb*) that one "understands," as in Qur'an 7:179, 22:46.⁹⁸

Al-Tahtawi organizes *al-Murshid al-Amin* into sections that treat different kinds of *adab*: bodily discipline, ethical behavior, linguistic sciences, "scientific literatures," "literary arts," and creative "genius." Only a few scholars—such as Kamran Rastegar and Tarek al-Ariss—have insisted on the primacy of the literary framework of Arabic *adab* (in how al-Tahtawi draws on the *rihla* and the *qaṣīda*, for example).⁹⁹ In a recent essay, Peter Gran situates al-Tahtawi's writings in the "mirror of the princes" intellectual tradition in Islamic thought, arguing that al-Tahtawi's famous travel narrative about his stay in Paris is less travel literature than a vision of Islamic statecraft.¹⁰⁰ Yet *adab* and statecraft in al-Tahtawi are not antithetical. On the contrary, one elucidates the other through a poetics of Islamic politics. With the spread of printing and literacy during the 19th-century *nahḍa*, *adab* came to encompass new literary forms that dramatized new kinds of political communities, as much as new kinds of political subjectivities. New kinds of literatures were instrumental to the education and training (*al-ta'dīb*) of the modern citizen subject, so that s/he could participate in the world of letters and in the civilizational project of nation building. *Adab* was critical to al-Tahtawi's understanding of the conduct of the modern citizen subject, righteously schooled in the disciplines and ethics of modern political subjectivities, for which Islamic ethics—and Islamic literature—provided a blueprint. In writing about al-Marsafi's *Risalat al-Kalim al-Thaman*, Timothy Mitchell observes, "Texts too carried their own authority, an authority which mirrored that of politics . . . The proper preservation and interpretation of the authority of writing was in this sense an essential resource of political power." The purpose of the study of *adab* "was more political than the term 'literature' might suggest . . . Words were not labels that simply named and represented political ideas or objects, but interpretation whose force was to be made real."¹⁰¹ The very preservation—and reinterpretation—of an Arabic and Islamic *adab* was, in itself, a political act.

Al-Tahtawi's reconceptualization of *hurriyya* (freedom) and *al-'adl wa-l-iṣṣaf* (justice and fairness) have had an enduring impact on political theologies in Egypt. His intellectual legacy can be traced to the present through thinkers such as Husayn al-Marsafi, Muhammad 'Abduh, Muhammad al-Khidr Husayn, 'Abd al-'Aziz Jawish, Sayyid Qutb, Anwar Jindi, Muhammad 'Imara, and Hasan al-Hanafi.¹⁰² All of these thinkers elaborated Islamic ideas of freedom and justice for their own political battles over the course of the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries. Al-Tahtawi's pioneering contribution forged the

way for contemporary conceptions of the moral authority of popular sovereignty in Islam. Intellectuals connected to the *ṣaḥwa*, the Islamic awakening of the 20th century, have drawn extensively on *nahḍa* ideas of freedom and justice to legitimize their own political struggles¹⁰³—concepts that remain salient to Egyptian politics today.

NOTES

¹Rifa‘a Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi, *al-A‘mal al-Kamila li-Rifa‘a Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi* (Beirut: al-Mu‘assasa al-‘Arabiyya li-l-Dirasat wa-l-Nashr, 1973), 247.

²Ibid.

³Albert Habib Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962); Franz Rosenthal and Bernard Lewis, “Hurriyya,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd Ed.*, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W. P. Heinrichs, Brill Online, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/hurriyya-COM_0301; Ahmad Zakaraya al-Shilq, *Ru‘ya fi Tahdith al-Fikr al-Misri* (Cairo: al-Hay‘a al-Misriyya al-‘amma li-l-Kitab, 1984).

⁴For an excellent discussion of early Islamic conceptions of *maslaḥa* as the “public good,” see Asma Afsaruddin, “Maslahah as a Political Concept,” in *Mirror for the Muslim Prince: Islam and the Theory of Statecraft*, ed. Mehrzad Boroujerdi (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2013), 16–44.

⁵Al-Tahtawi, *al-A‘mal al-Kamila*, 520.

⁶For a discussion of the sultan as the heart of the body politic, see Aziz al-Azmeh’s *Muslim Kingship: Power and the Sacred in Muslim, Christian and Pagan Politics* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001), 119–20.

⁷Peter Gran, “Al-Tahtawi’s Trip to Paris in Light of Recent Historical Analysis: Travel Literature or a Mirror for Princes?,” in *Mirror for the Muslim Prince*, 190–217.

⁸C.A. Nallino, *La Littérature arabe des origines à l’époque de la dynastie Umayyade* (Paris: G.P. Maisonneuve, 1950); Charles Pellat, “Variations sur le thème de l’adab,” *Correspondance d’Orient* 5, no. 6 (1964): 19–37; F. Gabrieli, “Adab,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd Ed.*, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/adab-SIM_0293?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-2&s.q=adab; S. A. Bonebakker, “Adab and the Concept of Belles-Lettres,” in *Cambridge History of Arabic Literature: ‘Abbasid Belles-Lettres*, ed. Julia Ashtiany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁹Iman Farag, “Private Lives, Public Affairs: The Uses of Adab,” in *Public Islam and the Common Good*, ed. Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 98–99; Michael Allan, “How Adab Became Literary: Formalism, Orientalism and the Institutions of World Literature,” *Journal of Arabic Literature* 43 (2012): 172–96.

¹⁰Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1991), 100–104; Eve M. Trout Powell, *A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the Mastery of the Sudan* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2003), 49; Roxanne Euben, *Journeys to the Other Shore: Muslim and Western Travelers in Search of Knowledge* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), 122.

¹¹Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 100–101.

¹²Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Vintage, 1980), 39.

¹³Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 25, 222; Farag, “The Uses of Adab,” 93.

¹⁴Al-Azmeh, *Muslim Kingship*, 89.

¹⁵Al-Tahtawi, *al-A‘mal al-Kamila*, 433. For a discussion of al-Tahtawi’s concept of freedom in *al-Murshid al-Amin*, see Benjamin Geer, “The Priesthood of Nationalism in Egypt: Duty, Authority, Autonomy” (PhD thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, 2011), 147.

¹⁶Al-Tahtawi, *al-A‘mal al-Kamila*, 281; Charles Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003), 20. See Farag’s discussion of “Adab as education” in *Public Islam and the Common Good*, 95–98.

¹⁷Roxanne L. Euben, “Traveling Theorists and Translating Practices,” in *What Is Political Theory?*, ed. Stephen K. White and J. Donald Moon (London: Sage, 2004), 145; Euben, *Journeys to the Other Shore*, 15.

¹⁸Peter Gran, *Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt, 1760–1840* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1998), 75.

¹⁹Rifa'ā Rafī' al-Tahtawi and Daniel L. Newman, *An Imam in Paris: Al-Tahtawi's Visit to France 1826–1831* (New York: Saqi Books, 2011), 73–75.

²⁰Muhammad Mustafa Badawi, *A Critical Introduction to Modern Arabic Poetry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 14–67; Pierre Cachia, *An Overview of Modern Arabic Literature* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), 180–84.

²¹Jaroslav Stetkevych, *The Modern Arabic Literary Language: Lexical and Stylistic Developments* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

²²Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 171–99; Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, 220, 222.

²³Hoda A. Yousef, "Reassessing Egypt's Dual System of Education Under Isma'il: Growing 'Ilm and Shifting Ground in Egypt's First Educational Journal *Rawdat al-Madaris*, 1870–77," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40 (2008): 109–30.

²⁴Ahmad 'Izzat 'Abd al-Karim, *Tarikh al-Ta'lim Fi 'Asr Muhammad 'Ali* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriyya, 1938), 555.

²⁵James Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt* (London: Luzac and Co., 1939), 376–77.

²⁶Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 138.

²⁷Yousef, "Reassessing Egypt's Dual System of Education," 110.

²⁸Euben, *Journeys to the Other Shore*, 90.

²⁹Muhammad 'Imara, *Sirat al-Rasul wa-Ta'sis al-Dawla al-Islamiyya* (Beirut: al-Muassasa al-'Arabiyya li-l-Dirasat wa-l-Nashr, 1977); 'Imara, *Rifa'a al-Tahtawi: Ra'id al-Tanwir fi al-'Asr al-Hadith* (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1984); Sulayman Khatib, *al-Din wa-l-Hadara fi Fikr al-Tahtawi: Qira'a Islamiyya* (Cairo: al-Markaz al-Islami li-Dirasat al-Hadara, 1992); Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 90–133; Kamran Rastegar, *Literary Modernity Between the Middle East and Europe: Textual Transactions in Nineteenth-Century Arabic, English, and Persian Literatures* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 77–84; Ian Coller, *Arab France: Islam and the Making of Modern Europe, 1798–1831* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2010), 167–86; Shaden M. Tageldin, *Disarming Words: Empire and the Seductions of Translation in Egypt* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2011); Tarek El-Ariss, *Trials of Arab Modernity: Literary Affects and the New Political* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 19–52; Gran, "Al-Tahtawi's Trip to Paris."

³⁰'Imara, *Rifa'a al-Tahtawi*.

³¹Stetkevych, *Modern Arabic Literary Language*; Ami Ayalon, "Dimuqratiyya, Hurriyya, Jumhurriyya: The Modernization of the Arabic Political Vocabulary," *Asian and African Studies* 23 (1989): 23–42; Mohammed Sawaie, "Rifa'ā Rafī' al-Tahtawi and His Contribution to the Lexical Development of Modern Literary Arabic," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32 (2000): 395–410.

³²Euben, *Journeys to the Other Shore*, 117–18n127.

³³Edward William Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon* (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1968), 539.

³⁴Al-Tahtawi, *al-A'mal al-Kamila*, 102.

³⁵Newman, *An Imam in Paris*, 195.

³⁶Al-Tahtawi, *al-A'mal al-Kamila*, 102.

³⁷Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 74.

³⁸He also understands justice and fairness as a nearly unattainable ideal, "like complete faith or total goodness (*al-halāl al-širf*)."
Al-Tahtawi, *al-A'mal al-Kamila*, 103.

³⁹Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, 220.

⁴⁰Lewis, "Hurriyya."

⁴¹Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, 89. This is Taylor's definition of the modern public sphere.

⁴²Al-Tahtawi, *al-A'mal al-Kamila*, 247.

⁴³Asad, *Genealogies of Religion*, 190–91.

⁴⁴John O. Voll, "Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdīd and Islāh," in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, ed. John L. Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); Samira Haj, *Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition: Reform, Rationality, and Modernity* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008), 7. Haj talks about the concepts of renewal, revival, and reform in the Islamic discursive tradition as "imperative for safeguarding and ensuring the continuity of the moral community."

⁴⁵Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, 25, 222.

⁴⁶Franz Rosenthal, *The Muslim Concept of Freedom Prior to the Nineteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1960); Muhammad al-Khidr Husayn, *al-Hurriyya fi al-Islam* (Cairo: Dar al-ʿItisam, 1982); Abdallah Laroui, “Islam et liberté,” in *Islam et modernité* (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 1987).

⁴⁷Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*; Lewis, “Hurriyya”; al-Shilq, *Ruʿya fi Tahdith al-Fikr al-Misri*.

⁴⁸Rifaʿa Rafiʿ al-Tahtawi, *Manahij al-Albab fi Mabahij al-Adab al-ʿAsriyya* (Cairo: al-Bulaq, 1869); al-Azmeh, *Muslim Kingship*, 84–92, 115–53.

⁴⁹Jak Tajir, *Harakat al-Tarjama bi-Misr Khilal al-Qarn al-Tasiʿ Ashar* (Cairo: Dar al-Maʿarif, 1945), 149.

⁵⁰Powell, *A Different Shade of Colonialism*, 51.

⁵¹Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (New York: CreateSpace Independent Publishing, 2013), 6.

⁵²Rifaʿa Rafiʿ al-Tahtawi, *Mawaqif al-Aflak fi Waqaiʿ Tilimak* (Cairo: Matbaʿat Dar al-Kutub wa-l-Wathaʿiq al-Qawmiyya, 2002), 133.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 135.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*

⁵⁵Muhammad ʿAbduh, *The Theology of Unity*, trans. Kenneth Cragg (New York: Islamic Book Trust, 2013), 125; Husayn, *al-Hurriyya fi al-Islam*; ʿAli ʿAbd al-Wahid Wafi, *Huquq al-Insan fi al-Islam* (Cairo: Maktabat Nahdat Misr, 1957); Sayyid Qutb, *al-ʿAdala al-Ijtimaʿiyya fi al-Islam* (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1975).

⁵⁶Al-Tahtawi, *Tilimak*, 240–41.

⁵⁷ʿAbduh, *Theology of Unity*, 125.

⁵⁸Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature*, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974), 38, 56.

⁵⁹Andrew Michael Ramsay, “A Discourse on Epic Poetry and the Excellence of the Poem of Telemachus,” in *The Adventures of Telemachus*, by François de Salignac de la Mothe Fénelon, trans. F.R.S. Des Maizeaux (Paris: Theophile Barrois le jeune, 1798), 11–12.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 36.

⁶¹Powell, *A Different Shade of Colonialism*, 52.

⁶²Matti Moosa, *The Origins of Modern Arabic Fiction* (Washington, D.C.: Three Continents Press, 1983), 6.

⁶³The popularity of al-Tahtawi’s *Takhlis al-Ibriz* resulted in a surge of similar publications that combined *rihla* and *adab*. As Kamran Rastegar points out in his *Literary Modernity between the Middle East and Europe*, they also innovated on these traditional genres.

⁶⁴Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, “The Ulama of Cairo in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” in *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East Since 1500*, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1978), 163; Yousef, “Reassessing Egypt’s Dual System of Education,” 110–11.

⁶⁵Lois A. Aroian, *The Nationalization of Arabic and Islamic Education in Egypt: Dar al-ʿUlum and al-Azhar* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1983), 12–14.

⁶⁶Muhammad Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, *Mizan al-ʿAmal*, ed. Sulayman Dunya (Cairo: Dar al-Maʿarif, 2003), 235.

⁶⁷Ebrahim Moosa, *Ghazali and the Poetics of Imagination* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 215.

⁶⁸Partha Chatterjee, *Texts Of Power: Emerging Disciplines in Colonial Bengal* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 8.

⁶⁹Al-Tahtawi, *al-Aʿmal al-Kamila*, 516.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 520.

⁷¹Al-Tahtawi, *Tilimak*, 15.

⁷²*Ibid.*

⁷³Al-Tahtawi, *Al-Aʿmal Al-Kamila*, 520.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 523.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 519.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, 664.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, 429.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 433.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*

⁸⁰Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, *An Introduction* (New York: Vintage, 1990), 100–101.

⁸¹Al-Tahtawi, *Al-A‘mal Al-Kamila*, 284, 520.

⁸²Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 100, 102.

⁸³Moosa, *Ghazali and the Poetics of Imagination*, 216.

⁸⁴On the role of the intelligentsia in the ‘Urabi revolt, see Juan R. I. Cole, *Colonialism & Revolution In the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt’s ‘Urabi Movement* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1999), 234–72; and Sean Lyngaas, “Ahmad Urabi: Delegate of the People, Social Mobilization in Egypt on the Eve of Colonial Rule,” *al-Nakhla* (2011): 1–13.

⁸⁵Al-Marsafi’s lectures on literature were published in the journal *Rawdat al-Madaris*, for which al-Tahtawi was the editor-in-chief between 1870 and 1873. These lectures were later compiled into a two-volume work *al-Wasila al-Adabiyya ila al-‘Ulum al-‘Arabiyya* (The Literary Means to the Sciences of Arabic).

⁸⁶Husayn al-Marsafi, *Risalat al-Kalim al-Thaman* (Cairo: al-Hay’a al-Misriyya al-‘amma li-l-Kitab, 1984), 64.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 173, 174.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, 85.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 74.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, 85.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, 85, 86.

⁹²*Ibid.*, 74.

⁹³*Ibid.*, 82.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, 117.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, 119.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, 121.

⁹⁷Al-Tahtawi, *al-A‘mal al-Kamila*, 281.

⁹⁸J. C. Vadet, “Kalb,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/kalb-COM_0424?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-2&s.q=kalb.

⁹⁹Rastegar, *Literary Modernity*, 77–84; El-Ariss, *Arab Modernity*, 19–52.

¹⁰⁰Gran, “Al-Tahtawi’s Trip to Paris.”

¹⁰¹Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 135–36.

¹⁰²Al-Marsafi, *al-Kalim al-Thaman*; Husayn, *al-Hurriyya fi al-Islam*; ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jawish, *Athar al-Qur’an fi Tahrir al-Fikr al-Bashari*, ed. Muhammad ‘Imara (Cairo: Majallat al-Azhar, 2012); Qutb, *al-‘Adala al-Ijtima‘iyya fi al-Islam*; ‘Imara, *Rifa‘a al-Tahtawi*; Hasan Hanafi, *al-Din wa-l-Thawra fi Misr* (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1988).

¹⁰³Muhammad ‘Imara has published over seven books on al-Tahtawi, many of them multiple times, including a five-volume edition of al-Tahtawi’s complete works.