

Necessary conformism: An art of living for young people in Turkey

Demet Lüküslü

Abstract

This paper focuses on the everyday life experiences of the post-1980 generation in Turkey—a generation stigmatized for being depoliticized and apathetic. Rather than accepting this stigmatizing view, however, this analysis aims to better understand young people's actual lived experiences. To do so, it adopts the concept of “necessary conformism” developed in previous empirical research. This concept offers an alternative analytical framework that transcends the engaged/disengaged or political/unpolitical dichotomy in young people's social participation. Specifically, the application of this concept reveals that apathetic behavior may actually mask powerful discontent and suffering that can be expressed neither through conventional politics nor open resistance. The necessary conformism of young people, therefore, is not apathetic behavior, but the expression of an underlying discontent and often a hidden agony.

Keywords: *Youth, post-1980 generation, political apathy, necessary conformism, Turkey.*

The history of modern Turkey, from the nineteenth century until the 1980s, is also a history of the youth movements that have played an important role in Turkish political life.¹ The military coup of 1980 and

Demet Lüküslü, Yeditepe University, Department of Sociology, İnönü Mah. Kayışdağı Cad., 26 Ağustos Yerleşimi, 34755 Ataşehir-Istanbul, Turkey, dlukuslu@yahoo.com.

¹ For an in-depth analysis of the notion of generation in the late Ottoman Empire see, François Georjon, “Les Jeunes Turcs étaient-ils jeunes? Sur le phénomène des générations, de l'Empire ottoman à la République turque,” in *Childhood and Youth in the Muslim World*, eds. François Georjon and Klaus Kreiser (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2007). For an overview of the history of youth in Turkey from the nineteenth century onward, see Demet Lüküslü, *Türkiye’de Gençlik Miti: 1980 Sonrası Türkiye Gençliği* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009).

the subsequent neo-liberal economic policies of Prime Minister Turgut Özal's government, however, signalled a severance of the close ties between Turkish political life and political movements. As a result, the young people of the post-1980 generation who have been called "children of the military coup" and "neo-liberals," have been accused of acquiescing to a globalized, consumer society, and have been considered individualistic, apathetic, egotistical and incapable of forming the youth movements that characterized previous generations. Even though over thirty years have passed since the military coup of 1980, I argue that three different age cohorts that have emerged (from the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s) all belong to the same generation due to their common characteristics. As Xavier Gaullier notes, generations are larger than age cohorts and continue to exist until a new deal between generations is needed.² However, I argue that characteristics criticized in the contemporary young generation in Turkey seem to be part of a larger trend that demands careful scrutiny. As Ulrich Beck observes, in contemporary societies, "[the] political becomes unpolitical, and what was until now considered unpolitical becomes political."³ This claim raises questions about such notions as "political," "unpolitical," and "apathy," particularly for the post-1980 generation, which is accused of being obedient, silent, and depoliticized. The responses from the young participants of the current in-depth study can help us to rethink these terms, facilitating not only a better understanding of the Turkish case but also better comprehension of the different tactics invented by the generation socialized into global, neoliberal, consumer societies. Indeed, this paper argues that to understand the concept of "necessary conformism," a tactic invented by and adopted as an art of living by the young generation in Turkey, it must be placed within its global, neoliberal, and consumerist context.

Political climate after 1980 and the end of the "myth of youth"

The post-1980 generation symbolizes the end of the "myth of youth," in which young people played an active role in the political space; a notion that has existed in Turkish political culture since the late nineteenth century.⁴ In fact, all surveys of contemporary youth in Turkey conducted since 1999 indicate that young people feel apathetic toward the political sphere and their participation in political parties, political organizations,

2 See, Xavier Gaullier, "Ages mobiles et générations incertaines," *Esprit*, no.10, (October 1998), 6.

3 Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, Mark Ritter, trans. (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 24.

4 See, Lüküslü, *Türkiye'de Gençlik Miti*.

or NGOs is low.⁵ For example, according to one survey published in 1999, only 3.7 percent of young people reported being members of a political party, only 3 percent reported belonging to any political or social group or association, and only 10 percent reported talking about politics with friends.⁶ Apparently, young people see political parties as irrelevant to their own lives. For instance, when asked which political party was interested in the problems of youth, half of the respondents wrote in “none of them,” an option not offered on the survey, clearly demonstrating their lack of confidence in political parties. A 2003 survey of university students produced similar results and clearly indicated once again the “political apathy” of the young.⁷ The 2008 UNDP Report *Youth in Turkey* further confirmed young people’s widespread mistrust of politics and urged change:

While the youth’s distrust towards politics seems to be rather widespread, civil society can offer some adequate participation tools for the youth. Youth’s perception of politics too needs to change. Political participation is one of the most important means for youth to become responsible citizens.⁸

It seems, then, that to understand the political apathy of the contemporary generation, it is first important to understand the conjuncture into which they were born.

The military coup of September 12, 1980 marked an important rupture in the history of modern Turkey, and was launched on the pretext of stopping the political polarization and violence of the 1970s and creating a “peaceful” society. However, the military regime, which lasted until the 1983 elections, halted the violence between political groups only through other forms of state violence, including imprisonment, torture, executions, and the establishment of a repressive apparatus aimed at “rehabilitating” the whole society. Youth were seen as especially responsible

5 I refer particularly to the following surveys: *Türk Gençliği 98: Suskun Kitle Büyüteç Altında* (Ankara: İstanbul Mülkiyeliler Vakfı, Konrad Adenauer Vakfı, 1999); *Türk Gençliği ve Katılım* (İstanbul: ARI Düşünce ve Toplumsal Gelişim Derneği, 2001); Gülten Kazgan, ed., *Kuştepe Gençlik Araştırması 2002* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2002); *Türk Üniversite Gençliği Araştırması. Üniversite Gençliğinin Sosyo-Kültürel Profili* (Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi Yayını, 2003); İbrahim Armağan, *Gençlik Gözüyle Gençlik: 21. Yüzyıl Eşiğinde Türkiye* (İstanbul: Kırksraklılar Vakfı USADEM Yayınları, 2004); and İnci Erdem Artan, ed., *Üniversite Gençliği Değerleri: Korkular ve Umutlar* (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2005).

6 See, *Türk Gençliği 98*, 16.

7 *Türk Üniversite Gençliği Araştırması*, 85.

8 *Human Development Report Turkey 2008: Youth in Turkey* (Ankara: United Nations Development Programme, 2008), 9.

for the earlier political violence, so the constitution framed by the military regime and adopted in 1982, includes provisions (‘The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Article 58, A) purportedly drawn up to protect youth but which, in line with the “myth of youth,” explicitly reflects the desire to “tame” youth under the cover of such “protection”:

A. Protection of the Youth

ARTICLE 58. The state shall take measures to ensure the training and development of the youth, into whose keeping our state, independence, and our Republic are entrusted, in light of contemporary science, in line with the principles and reforms of Atatürk, and in opposition to ideas aiming at the destruction of the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation.

The state shall take all necessary measures to protect youth from addiction to alcohol, drug addiction, crime, gambling, and similar vices, and ignorance.

Even after the transition to democracy in 1983, the influence of the military regime remained highly visible, and was accompanied by an economic restructuring. As Keyder notes, under the military regime, “a radical makeover of the economy could be embarked upon with minimum resistance,”⁹ and this policy was later continued after the transition to democracy under the ruling Motherland Party. Thus, Turkish society was introduced into a consumer culture whose cities became home to fast-food chains, cafés, cybercafés, shopping malls, and all the other symbols of globalization. It is for these reasons that the contemporary youth are labeled the generation of the military coup, neoliberalism, and consumer society.

It is important to note, however, that the context into which the post-1980 generation was socialized was not shaped only by the economic and political context in Turkey (including the 30-year long Kurdish issue and related armed conflicts) but also by global factors. Not only was neoliberalism at its peak, but, in an important historical transformation, major alternatives to liberalism disappeared and the collapse of the Soviet Union had major global consequences and implications.¹⁰

9 Çağlar Keyder, “The Turkish Bell Jar,” *New Left Review* 28 (2004), 67. For studies of economic restructuring in Turkey see also Çağlar Keyder, *Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İfşası* (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1996) where Keyder underlines the relationship between economic restructuring and its political and social consequences. See also Ahmet İnsel, ed., *La Turquie et le développement* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003) and Ahmet İnsel, *Düzen ve Kalkınma Kısacasında Türkiye* (Istanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1996).

10 See, Zygmunt Bauman, “Living without an Alternative,” in *Intimations of Postmodernity* (London: Routledge, 1992).

It is because of these global changes that the characteristics of Turkish youth are not unique. The European Commission's 2002 white paper on youth, for example, clearly shows that the political attitudes of Turkish youth are shared by European youth: "Young people are now less committed than in the past to the traditional structures for political and social action (e.g. parties, trade unions), and they have a low level of involvement in democratic consultation."¹¹ Likewise, the Eurobarometer on young people in Europe in 2001 reported that, despite national disparities, "young people are slightly disaffected with organizations, with one in two young people stating simultaneously that they do not belong to any grouping,"¹² while the United Nations' *World Youth Report 2005* points to a global "trend of reduced political interest" among the young:

Apathy towards politics and a lack of interest in joining traditional youth organizations seem to characterize the younger generation in many countries. To many young people, the world of politics seems far removed from their daily realities of school commitments, leisure activities, and employment challenges.¹³

In fact, as Zygmunt Bauman argues, this trend toward reduced interest in politics may well be a consequence of the neoliberalism and globalization experienced by today's societies. For him, one of the effects of globalization is a progressive "separation of power from politics."¹⁴ As a result of that separation, political apathy has become widespread:

We may say that, with extant political institutions no longer able to slow down the speed of capital movements, power is increasingly removed from politics—a circumstance which accounts simultaneously for growing political apathy, the progressive disinterestedness of the electorate in everything "political" except the juicy scandals perpetrated by top people in the limelight, and the waning of expectations that salvation may come from government buildings, whoever their current or future occupants may be. What is done and may be done in government buildings bears less and less consequence for the issues with which individuals struggle in their daily lives.¹⁵

11 *A New Impetus for European Youth*. European Commission White Paper (Luxembourg: European Communities, 2002), 14.

12 Cited in *A New Impetus for European Youth*, 14, n. 9.

13 *World Youth Report 2005* (United Nations, 2005), www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/wyros.htm, 73.

14 Zygmunt Bauman, *In Search of Politics* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 120.

15 *Ibid.*, 19.

Yet, for Bauman, this is so because the remoteness of power in the globalized world cuts against traditional forms of political resistance: “one of the most seminal consequences of the new global freedom of movement is that it becomes increasingly difficult, perhaps altogether impossible, to re-forge social issues into effective collective action.”¹⁶ In these changing societies, the dominant literature on young people’s political participation either views them as disengaged and apolitical (particularly dominant in the Turkish case) or as engaged and political but using nontraditional forms of engagement, such as volunteerism or online activism. However, Ulrich Beck develops a third perception in youth sociology and proposes to transcend this engaged/disengaged dichotomy.¹⁷ Likewise, through its focus on the Turkish case, this paper aims to suggest an alternative way of analyzing young people’s participation by transcending this engaged/disengaged or political/unpolitical (or apolitical) dichotomy.

Post-1980 youth and political apathy

A new understanding of young people’s attitudes and experiences could eventually change not only our perceptions of the young generation but also how we define politics. As James C. Scott suggests, understanding political life solely through the “command performances of consent or open rebellion” is far too narrow a view.¹⁸ He elaborates:

Until quite recently, much of the active political life of subordinate groups has been ignored because it takes place at a level we rarely recognize as political. To emphasize the enormity of what has been, by and large, disregarded, I want to distinguish between the open, declared forms of resistance, which attract most attention, and the disguised, low-profile, undeclared resistance that constitute the domain of infrapolitics.¹⁹

Although Scott developed his theory primarily to analyze the experiences of the colonized, slaves, serfs, and subjugated races, it is possible to extend his concepts of the “weapons of the weak,”²⁰ “hidden transcripts,”

16 Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 68-69.

17 For an in-depth study of the extant literature on young people’s participation, see Rys Farthing, “The Politics of Youthful Antipolitics: Representing the ‘Issue’ of Youth Participation in Politics,” *Journal of Youth Studies* 13, no. 2 (2010).

18 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 20.

19 *Ibid.*, 198.

20 See, James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale

and “infrapolitics” to everyday life in contemporary societies and also to those groups who occupy the lower levels of the hierarchy of power. In fact, there is an important literature on the voice and the resistance of subaltern, subjugated groups and identities to which postcolonial studies has contributed enormously, starting from Edward Said’s *Orientalism*.²¹ In a justly famous essay, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has questioned the possibility of recuperating subaltern voices.²² In a similar manner, Robert Young’s different writings are concerned with the representation of people and cultures from the margins and peripheries,²³ whereas Homi K. Bhabha’s work on performative “mimicry” provides an important theoretical tool for rethinking resistance.²⁴ Another important theoretical tool is Ulrich Beck’s concept of “subpolitics,” which is elaborated for societies shaped by reflexive modernity and refers to forms of politics outside and beyond nation-states’ traditional institutions.²⁵ Also valuable is Asef Bayat’s application of Scott’s ideas in his empirical studies of the Middle East, which focus on “ordinary people,” including globalized youth, who resort to “non-movements” rather than mass protests or full-scale revolutions but offer a political response through daily practice and action.²⁶ These observations on the individual and his or her experiences can be combined with key concepts from the work of Timur Kuran (“preference falsification”),²⁷ Michel de Certeau (“tactic”),²⁸ and François Dubet (“necessary fiction”)²⁹ to provide a new perspective for analyzing Turkish youth and elaborating the concept of “necessary conformism.” Viewed within this novel framework, the experiences of Turkish youth clearly demonstrate that an apathetic attitude may mask powerful discontent and suffering that cannot be expressed through conventional politics or open and declared resistance.

University Press, 1985) and *Domination*.

- 21 See, Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
- 22 See, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–313.
- 23 See in particular Robert Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Culture, Theory and Race* (London: Routledge, 1995); *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001) and *Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
- 24 See, Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 85–92.
- 25 See, Ulrich Beck, *The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997).
- 26 See, Asef Bayat, *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
- 27 See, Timur Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), in particular part 1: “Living a Lie,” 3–102.
- 28 See, Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988).
- 29 See, François Dubet, *Le Déclin de l’Institution* (Paris: Seuil, 2002).

Recent surveys of youth in Turkey suggest a conformist tendency that implies what Albert Hirschman described as “loyalty” toward the system as external concept, and a quietist outlook far removed from his concept of a critical “voice.”³⁰ However, data from my own qualitative research with young people suggest more criticism of Turkey’s current system than attachment to it. Thus, young people’s surface loyalty in no way expresses confidence that rulers will do their best to quickly find solutions to youth’s problems and may be far removed from Hirschman’s definition. In fact, the empirical research into young people’s attitudes did not seem to provide any data matching any of Hirschman’s terms, neither “loyalty,” “voice,” nor “exit.” Rather, the young people’s reactions conformed more to Guy Bajoit’s addition to Hirschman’s trilogy; the “apathy” that characterizes those who are neither convinced enough by the finalities of group actions to act loyally, audacious enough to exit, nor in sufficient accord to have the courage to protest.³¹ Bajoit is surely right that the category of “loyals” is a very heterogeneous group that masks many different reasons for the apparent loyalty, one of which may be apathy.

However, this paper objects to the idea that young people’s attitudes are associated *only* with apathy. It draws on qualitative data from three research studies conducted between December 2000 and February 2010 to assess the political attitudes and social experiences of young people.³²

30 I refer to Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

31 Guy Bajoit, “Exit, Voice, Loyalty... and Apathy. Les réactions individuelles au mécontentement,” *Revue française de sociologie*, no. 29 (1988), 329 (my translation).

32 The first study, carried out between December 2000 and March 2004 for my doctoral research at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), comprised 80 hour-long in-depth interviews with 18- to 25-year-old Istanbul residents from different socioeconomic groups, and not actively engaged in political movements or civil society. The interviews addressed a range of issues—from TV shows to family relations—contrasting the present situation in Turkey with the participants’ future plans. The second study, conducted in August–November 2008 by a six-member research team at the Social, Economic and Political Studies Foundation of Turkey (TÜSES), consisted of 26 focus group sessions with three different types of 18- to 25-year-olds active in civil society: those active in the youth branches of political parties; those active in different NGOs, initiatives, and platforms; and those in the too-often-neglected category of disadvantaged youth. I personally led focus group sessions with participants active in different ecological groups and associations, young feminists active in different feminist associations or initiatives, and members of the Youth Union (*Genç-Sen*), Young Civilians (*Genç Siviller*), LambdaIstanbul LGBT Solidarity Association, the İstanbul branch of the European Students’ Forum (*Association des États Généraux des Étudiants de l’Europe*, AEGEE), the Community Volunteers Foundation (*Toplum Gönüllüleri Vakfı*, TOG), and the Women’s Rights Association Against Discrimination (*Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneği*, AKDER). These sessions lasted from two to two-and-a-half hours and addressed issues around political life, political participation, and the general experiences of young people in Turkey. The third study, carried out between September 2009 and February 2010 under the auspices of the Istanbul Bilgi University Youth Studies Unit (YSU), aimed to better understand the success indicators for youth policy in Turkey. It comprised a total of 20 focus group

The young research participants did not seem ignorant about the society or the world's difficulties, but were in fact conscious of such problems and unhappy about living in a society with so many. In addition, they were highly critical of the political space, which seemed far removed from their desires and needs. Thus, in these young people's minds, the traditional political space was a devalued one—a corrupted and clientelistic space that was extremely rigid and untransformable—and all political organizations were "authoritarian" entities in which individuals could only either join a group or become a militant but could not freely express and realize themselves. These young people thus had little trust in political institutions and political organizations, and, since they believed the system to be rigid and irreversible, had little hope for change, which explains their failure to react and protest that the situation had to improve. Yet, this lack of reaction does not mean that they were paying no attention to what was happening. Rather, their dissatisfaction may have hidden real discontent, or a latent desire to change things.

Interestingly, such negative perceptions of the traditional political space were also shared by young people active in civil society, who not only rejected conventional politics and ideologies but tended to situate themselves above all ideologies.³³ It is important, however, to stress that our empirical research excluded young people engaged in conventional or radical political movements, even though those movements continue to recruit the young.³⁴ As Barbara Cruikshank argues, such political "em-

sions conducted in seven different cities (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana, Samsun, Diyarbakir, and Van) with 135 socially active young people aged 16-26. In the first six cities, researchers conducted three different focus group sessions: with young people active in associations, NGOs, initiatives, and platforms; with young people active in university clubs; and with young people active in youth centers or youth assemblies. In Van, we carried out two focus group sessions; with young people active in youth centers and youth assemblies and with young people active in university clubs, different NGOs, initiatives, and platforms.

33 See, Demet Lüküslü, "Gençlerin Siyaset Algıları ve Deneyimleri: Yeni Bir Siyaset ve Örgütlenme Modeli Üzerine Düşünmek," in *Gençler Tartışıyor: Siyasete Katılım, Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri*, ed. Cemil Boyraz (Istanbul: TÜSES Yayınları, 2009), 192-203.

34 Some valuable research has already dealt with those issues, focusing on the political involvement of the young generation in Islamic circles, and in the identity politics of the Alevi and Kurdish movements in the post-1980 period. For studies of Islamic NGOs and study circles related to youth, see: Buket Türkmen, "Muslim Youth and Islamic NGO's in Turkey," in Nilüfer Göle and Ludwig Ammann, *Islam in Public. Turkey, Iran and Europe*, eds. (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006); and Hakan Yavuz, "The Renaissance of Religious Consciousness in Turkey: Nur Study Circles," in *ibid.* For in-depth studies of Alevi youth in Turkey, see: Fazilet Ahu Özmen, "Alevi Gençliğinin Siyasi ve Sosyo-Kültürel Kimlik Mücadelesi I", *Alternatif Politika* 3, no.1 (2011); and Hakan Yücel, "Une identité générationnelle-territoriale? Les jeunes d'origine alévie du quartier Gazi d'Istanbul" (PhD Dissertation, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2006). Finally, for analyses of the political socialization of Kurdish children, see: Haydar Darıcı, "Violence and Freedom: The Politics of Kurdish Children and Youth in Urban Space" (M.A. Dissertation, Sabancı University, 2009); Zeynep Başer, "Imagining Peace and Conflict: The Kurdish Youth in Diyarbakir" (MA Thesis, Sabancı University, 2011); Müge

powerment” can in fact be understood as a measure of subjection rather than autonomy from power: For her, “the citizen is an effect and an instrument of political power rather than simply a participant in politics,” and “the measure of democracy is not the extent to which citizens participate in politics rather than stand back in fear and apathy.”³⁵ However, the qualitative data demonstrate that, though young people’s engagement may be an effect and instrument of political power and an effect of the conjuncture, they are difficult to identify as either loyal, apathetic, or fearful since they express their discontent and invent tactics, making it vital that a new terminology be invented to supersede these definitions.

Necessary conformism: An art of living for the young generation

The concept of necessary conformism is clearly illustrated by responses from the 2003 survey, in which university students, asked about their problems, replied that they have no problems, either with their families, their professors, or their friends.³⁶ However, this “ideal” picture does not actually reflect the absence of problems but rather an inability to identify an “adversary.” For example, data from the same survey show that these students found no university services satisfactory.³⁷ Apparently, therefore, they believed that the difficulties faced in university arose not from individuals but from the overall weaknesses of both the economic system and the university’s bureaucratic structure.³⁸ The survey data also suggest that young people did experience problems with their families, particularly for economic reasons.³⁹ However, they seemingly believed that these problems had emerged because of the Turkish system (whether political, economic, or social) and were not the fault of their families. Once again, rather than being faced with a recognizable antagonist, they were up against a shadowy but powerful “adversary”—the system—which they considered too risky or impossible to fight.

In the same 2003 survey, as regards familial problems, most young respondents reported having no problems in their relationships with their families, yet when asked about topics of family discussion, the

Tuzcuoğlu, *Ben Bir Taşım* (İstanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayım, 2011); and Rojin Canan Akin and Funda Danışman, *Bildiğin Gibi Değil: 90'larda Güneydoğu'da Çocuk Olmak* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2011).

35 Barbara Cruikshank, *The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999) 5-6.

36 For more information see *Türk Üniversite Gençliği Araştırması*, Graphic 2.48-2.59, 212-215.

37 *Ibid.*, 247.

38 It is important to note that a recent Community Volunteers' Foundation study of university students in Turkey clearly revealed the problems they face, the hierarchical structures of the universities, and student demands to “have a say” in the university administration. See, *Üniversite Gençliğinin İhtiyaçları Araştırması 2009* (İstanbul: Toplum Gönüllüleri Vakfı, 2009).

39 *Türk Üniversite Gençliği Araştırması*, Graphic 2.54, 215.

young females admitted having conflicts over boyfriends, whereas young male students reported problems related to finances or leisure activities. Yet, in my fieldwork, even young females who reported many problems with their families and who admitted being under major pressure blamed the neighborhood and mindset of their community rather than their parents; a mindset, they indicated, that was extremely difficult to transform. As a result, it was also very difficult to invent counteractive "tactics," the ploys that de Certeau defines as an "art of the weak" (versus a "strategy" or "art of the powerful"), which emerge in a space controlled by the enemy:

It [the tactic] does not, therefore, have the options of planning general strategy and viewing the adversary as a whole within a district, visible, and objectifiable space. It operates in isolated actions, blow by blow . . . This nowhere gives a tactic mobility, to be sure, but a mobility that must accept the chance offerings of the moment, and seize on the wing the possibilities that offer themselves at any given moment. It must vigilantly make use of the cracks that particular conjunctions open in the surveillance of the proprietary powers. It poaches in them. It creates surprises in them. It can be where it is least expected. It is a guileful ruse.⁴⁰

Yet during my own interviews with young women who believed in the impossibility of changing mentalities, I constantly observed the invention of tactics, such as lying to their families or hiding their relationships rather than engaging in direct conflict with the rules and values of the family and/or the mentality of the neighborhood or community. These subterfuges also speak of Timur Kuran's concept of "preference falsification," the act of misrepresenting one's genuine wants under perceived social pressures, which can be summarized as "living a lie."⁴¹ These experiences also tell us about the continuing power of the institution of family in Turkish society. Earlier scholarly research has already demonstrated the impact of the institution of family. Nükhet Sirman has noted how family cannot be analyzed separately from the political context and the nation-state and nationalism,⁴² whereas Aksu Bora, in response to Esping-Andersen's concept of a Mediterranean welfare model,⁴³ has un-

40 de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, 37.

41 See, Kuran, *Private Truths*, 3-102.

42 See, Nükhet Sirman, "Kadınların Milliyeti," *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 4, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002).

43 See, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (New Jersey: Princeton University

derlined that, in Turkey, the family network is an important provider of welfare but also plays an active role in forcing its members into conformity with the system.⁴⁴ In the qualitative survey responses under study, the importance of the family is confirmed, which demonstrates that, in the absence of coherent youth policies, the family remains the most important institution in the lives of the younger generation.

These young people may experience this inability to recognize a definable adversary not only in private but also in public space, where, alternatively, they may identify an adversary so powerful that they feel it impossible or too dangerous to fight. For example, this post-1980 generation may hear from their parents that engagement in politics is risky and that history is full of instances in which youth was politically active but later repressed by military coups. These young people also show an overall lack of confidence in all political institutions and a view of political space as corrupt. Apart from this lack of confidence and the devaluation of all that is political, the problems of the nation may seem so vast that no individual believes in the “miracles” of their resolution. Some respondents admitted to feeling that Turkey is dominated by external forces, such as the United States, the IMF, the EU, or multinational firms, making the situation even more complex in a world shaped by globalization. This political attitude was perhaps best summarized by Billur,⁴⁵ a middle-class female student at a private university in İstanbul:

BILLUR: We mock, we make fun, [but] that’s all we do. We make fun of the political leaders, of all the things that happen in society. But we do nothing to change things. We do not believe that we can change things, anyway.

Based on the above observations, I argue that the young in Turkey adopt a “necessary conformism” as an art of living. Such necessary conformism echoes the “necessary fictions” of French sociologist, François Dubet:

[Necessary fictions] are neither ideologies nor moral convictions but cognitive and moral frameworks indispensable for the accomplishment of the socialization project . . . [They are fictions] in which

Press, 1990).

44 See, Aksu Bora, “Aile: En Güçlü İşsizlik Sigortası,” in “*Boşuna mı Okuduk?*”: *Türkiye’de Beyaz Yakalı İşsizliği*, eds. Tanıl Bora, Aksu Bora, Necmi Erdoğan, and İlknur Üstün (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011). On the issue of family in Turkey see also Ferhunde Özbay, “Türkiye’de Aile ve Hane Yapısı: Dün, Bugün, Yarın,” in *75 Yılda Kadınlar ve Erkekler* (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998).

45 In the interest of anonymity, all names have been changed.

actors do not really believe but cannot renounce without their work emptying itself of meaning.⁴⁶

In the case of Turkish youth, such tactics take the form of a necessary conformity to the rules of institutions like the family, society, and system so that socialization is possible. As with “necessary fictions,” in which people must believe in order to make sense of their lives, young people in Turkey seemingly choose to act in conformity with society’s rules without really believing in them but, paradoxically, also destroy them by inventing “tactics” rather than directly rebelling. It is, however, important to note that necessary conformism is not an apathetic behavior but rather hides a real and strongly-felt discontent and can mask a profound agony.

This underlying suffering is well illustrated by the experiences of young girls belonging to the lower classes who hide their relationships with boyfriends from their families. Postcolonial and feminist scholars have already studied the tactics of the women in the Middle East extensively,⁴⁷ and there is a rich literature on women’s studies in Turkey. Yet it is also essential to factor age into the analysis and combine gender and youth studies, as argued in a previous collective study.⁴⁸ For example, Fatma, a twenty-one-year-old female who works in a small textile workshop in Ümraniye, confessed that, before marrying her husband, she had dated him for two years but hidden their relationship. She added that her older sister had also been involved with a boy from the same workshop for one-and-a-half years but was hiding her relationship, not from her mother but from her father. Another female respondent who worked in a hairdresser’s salon reported having hidden her relationship for six years. Yet these young women, when asked if they had problems with their families, reported no serious problems. They did, however, admit that their families were very important to them, and they would in no way want to make them unhappy. Thus, instead of entering into direct conflict with their parents, they choose to lie and hide their relationships. Thanks to such necessary conformism, they could maintain their romantic relationships but also appear to be in conformity with

46 DUBET, *Le Déclin*, 48 (my translation).

47 For some examples of studies of Middle Eastern women, see: Deniz Kandiyoti, ed., *Women, Islam and the State* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); Deniz Kandiyoti, ed., *Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1996); and Lila Abu-Lughod, ed., *Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). On the search for a truly internationalist feminism, see Chandra Talpade Mohanty, *Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

48 See, Kezban Çelik and Demet Lüküslü, “Spotlighting a Silent Category of Young Females: The Life Experiences of ‘House Girls’ in Turkey,” *Youth & Society* 44, no. 2 (2012): 28–48.

family rules they perceived as unalterable. In other words, instead of identifying and confronting an adversary (in this case, their parents), these young women chose to “seem to conform” to parental wishes.

Interestingly, even the self-professed young feminist students from privileged universities admitted that the family as an institution constituted a “being together in silence” (*sessiz birliktelik*) to which young people feel psychologically and materially attached but in which they cannot always express themselves openly. This situation, and the necessary conformism used as a tactic within and against it, is particularly well illustrated by the following exchange between four young women in the focus group session:

TUBA: For example, I will never be able to tell my father directly that I want to live with my boyfriend or that I want to have a child without getting married.

SEMA: The young generation has started to tell more lies.

SİNEM: It is all dependent on lies . . . [Laughs. They start to talk together]

SEDA: These are all strategic moves in fact; strategic moves that we created in our lives. There is a being together in silence. . . . But this being together in silence . . . sometimes you run out of the kitchen, sometimes you try not to say a word, sometimes you tolerate [what they tell you].

A somewhat different perspective was revealed by Zeynep, interviewed in 2003 when there was a ban on wearing headscarves in universities. Zeynep, who had worn a headscarf since the age of 14, was unable to attend university for four years because she refused to uncover her head on campus. During those four years, spent primarily living a mundane life at home, she participated in meetings and protests for freedom to wear a headscarf. However, as she explained sorrowfully, even though the ruling Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*-AKP) seemingly defended the right to wear headscarves in university, she held out no hope for resolution of her problem. Rather, she reported being very pessimistic and believed that nothing would change. After wasting four years, she decided to sit the university entrance exam again and accept the university policy: she would uncover her head on campus in order to receive an education. Her words detail her feelings:

ZEYNEP: Before, I saw entering the university with my head uncovered as a defeat. You know, when something is forbidden, you begin

to react stubbornly. But now . . . after four years . . . I lost so much during that time and I gained nothing in return; nothing changed. [Smiles ruefully] If nothing changes, I should change, shouldn't I?

In fact, in 2010, the AKP government issued a statement announcing that it would support any student expelled or disciplined for covering her head. In practice, this statement ended the official prohibition against women wearing headscarves across all universities even though it did not bring about a permanent solution to the issue. However, on university campuses in İstanbul and elsewhere, particularly those with inflexible administrative policies against young women wearing the headscarf, pre-2010 fieldwork revealed that there were other young women like Zeynep who had decided that it was better to continue their education and either uncovered their heads on campus or wore hats or wigs as a tactic to cover their heads without violating university rules. Yet, these young women often felt guilty for "betraying" their friends who refused to enter university because of the rules against the headscarf. However, those who wore large hats or wigs or made a point of overtly covering their heads when leaving campus demonstrated a strongly-held objection to the rules without breaking them. That is, face to face with a powerful system that they felt was invincible, university students invented appropriate tactics and demonstrated a necessary conformism, even though they were a relatively privileged group among the other categories of youth.⁴⁹

Students preparing for university entrance also showed necessary conformist behavior. High school students preparing for the university entrance exam could not escape the education system, and, even though they believed that this one exam should not be the only indicator of their success, they felt obliged to conform to the system. This does not mean, however, that the conformist behavior was unaccompanied by anger or suffering.⁵⁰ Even after the exam, it was uncertain whether students would be allowed to choose their course of study themselves because

49 The UNDP clearly defines the privileged status of the student category: "According to the 2007 Population Census, there are more than 12 million young people between the ages of 15-24 in Turkey, corresponding to 17.6% of the total population. . . . Of the 12.4 million young people aged 15-24, 30% go to school, 30% work. While in part of educational institutions young people have access to high standard education and part of those employed work in quality jobs, a significantly larger part lack such opportunities. Moreover, almost 40%—5 million young people—are 'idle.' They neither work, nor go to school." UNDP, *Youth in Turkey*, 4.

50 A documentary produced by Serdar Değirmencioglu and Can Candan demonstrates the mix of fear, hope, and agony experienced by high school students preparing for the university entrance exam. See, 3 SAAT (*bir ÖSS belgeseli*) [3 HOURS (an ÖSS documentary)], directed by Can Candan, Turkey, 2008, 118 min.

of restrictions based on scores earned or assigned or family dictates. In April 2011, protests by these students reversed the dominant image of the contemporary young generation in Turkey. High school students from different parts of Turkey skipped classes and organized various events and marches to protest a cheating scandal affecting that year's university entrance exam. This sudden change in young people from being "inactive" "unpolitical" figures to young "actors" might be a surprise to those who defined the young generation as silent and obedient. However, for those who track the traces of "discontent" and "resistance" in their acts of silence and obedience, it is no surprise to see this rise in protests, due largely to the anger, suffering, and discontent extant before the scandal. For this reason, it is important to offer an alternative analytical framework that transcends the engaged/disengaged or political/unpolitical dichotomy in young people's participation.

Necessary conformist behavior is also evident in the workplace. Even middle or upper-middle class respondents who had graduated from good universities expressed their dissatisfaction and unhappiness with their present job. Whereas some complained of the boring and monotonous nature of their work, others noted that not receiving the education they wanted had hampered their success. Some complained of work overload; others of having no time for themselves or insufficient pay. Yet, even though they were experiencing dissatisfaction at work, they also explained that they should pretend that everything was fine and continue working, thereby perpetuating their necessary conformism. Yet while these interviewees continued their necessary conformism, they kept inventing tactics for making their time in the office more enjoyable; for example, sending instant messages to friends, making calls to friends from the office telephone, or surfing the Internet. To better comprehend the necessary conformism of the young generation, it is important to refer to Homi K. Bhabha's conceptualization of "mimicry" as the "almost the same but not quite" inspired by Lacanian analysis. For Bhabha, "As Lacan reminds us, mimicry is like camouflage, not a harmonization of repression of difference, but a form of resemblance, that differs from or defends presence by displaying it in part, metonymically."⁵¹

In terms of young people's Internet usage, it should be noted that the access to the video-sharing website YouTube was blocked around 20

51 Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, chapter 4, "Of Mimicry and Man", 90. In the epigraph to the chapter, Bhabha quotes Jacques Lacan: "Mimicry reveals something in so far as it is distinct from what might be called an itself that is behind. The effect of mimicry is camouflage... It is not a question of harmonizing with the background, but against a mottled background, of becoming mottled- exactly like the technique of camouflage practised in human warfare."

times between 2007 and 2010.⁵² Users in Turkey trying to log onto the site were confronted with a holding page that stated that access had been denied by court order. However, users evaded this block by again inventing tactics that took advantage of the cracks in the system; for instance, they accessed the website by modifying their connection parameters to use alternative servers. In fact, according to the web information company Alexa, during the two-and-a-half-year block, YouTube remained the eighth-most-accessed site in Turkey.⁵³

Interestingly, even participants who were active in civil society and hoped to bring about change gave examples of necessary conformism. For them, necessary conformism was not only a tactic in everyday life; it was also a tactic for getting things done and achieving their goals in civil society. To explain their conduct, they used Turkish expressions like *nabza göre şerbet vermek* (to treat someone in a way calculated to please him/her), *alavere dalavere* (to trick someone by playing games), *ayıya dayı demek* (to flatter someone until he/she does what is demanded from him/her), *huyuna gitmek* (to indulge somebody), *yerine göre politik davranmak* (to act politically according to the situation), and *karşılıklı olarak birbirini kandırmak* (to reciprocally deceive). For instance, during one focus group session in Adana, Ceyhun and Ayşen, two young people (one male and the other female) active in associations, initiatives, and platforms, vividly evoked how necessary conformism is a part of their lives and how they use it as a tactic for “seducing” other people and achieving their goals when looking for sponsorship, seeking help with their events from municipalities, or cooperating with the media, their own families, or professors at university. As a result, they admitted, they felt like “chameleons.”⁵⁴

Conclusion

This article has drawn on data from in-depth interviews and focus group sessions with young people to try to better understand the experiences of the post-1980 generation. I should once again emphasize that my analysis excludes young people engaged in traditional political movements even though such movements continue to exist and recruit the young. Once again, my primary aim in this paper has been to understand apparent apathy, submission, and loyalty rather than overt political activism or revolt. Based on my interpretation of the data, I

52 Freedom House, “Turkey”, *Freedom on the Net* 2011, 330.

53 Ibid., 333.

54 See, Demet Lüküslü, *Gençlik Örgütlenmelerindeki Gençlerin Sorunları, İhtiyaçları, İstekleri Temelinde Türkiye’de Gençlik Politikaları Göstergelerinin Oluşturulması Araştırma Projesi*, 31-33.

have argued that, instead of criticizing this generation and labeling them negatively as “apathetic,” “depoliticized,” or “apolitical,” youth studies should try to understand their experiences. My use of the term “necessary conformism” is thus an attempt to escape the prejudices against youth and to emphasize the backdrop against which the apparently loyal and apathetic attitudes of young people play out. As Scott suggests, “so long as a structure of domination is viewed as inevitable and irreversible, then all ‘rational’ opposition will take the form of infrapolitics: resistance that avoids any open declaration of its intentions.”⁵⁵ I thus argue that studying attitudes that superficially appear to be acts of “loyalty” and “conformity” is important because, as Scott explains, “conformity in the face of domination is thus occasionally—and unforgettably—a question of suppressing a violent rage in the interest of oneself and loved ones.”⁵⁶ Therefore, by revealing the rage and suffering felt by young people, necessary conformism can explain what underlies seemingly conformist or apathetic behavior.

The fact that necessary conformism, as an art of living, is shared by different age cohorts of young people implies that, in spite of differences, the young generation can be said to share common characteristics and experiences because of being born in the same conjuncture. Here, I make special reference to Karl Mannheim’s work on generation and François Dubet’s work on youth. Mannheim distinguished between “generation as actuality” and a “generation unit”: youth experiencing the same concrete historical problems are part of the same actual generation while those within the same actual generation who work up the material of their common experiences in different ways constitute separate generation units.⁵⁷ According to François Dubet, the social category of youth creates a similar bond across social categories. Contrary to Pierre Bourdieu, who argues that “youth is just a word” since young people of different social classes experience different worlds,⁵⁸ Dubet argues that, in spite of differences related to gender, class, ethnicity, and so forth, young people socialized in the same society during the same period share common characteristics.⁵⁹ In an edited volume, Asef Bayat and Linda Herrera clarify this argument:

55 Scott, *Domination*, 220.

56 *Ibid.*, 37.

57 See, Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations” in *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), 304.

58 Pierre Bourdieu, “‘Youth’ is Just a Word” in *Sociology in Question* (London: Sage Publications, 1993), 94–101.

59 See, François Dubet, *La Galère: jeunes en survie*, (Paris: Fayard, 1987), 160–161.

We are not suggesting, of course, that people from different gender and cultural backgrounds carry identical experiences of being (or even not being) young, because they do not. What we are suggesting is that despite important differences, certain fundamental dispositions, a particular habitus (to use Bourdieu's own term) renders 'youth' a meaningful analytical category.⁶⁰

Thus, being born in the same society and zeitgeist, young people in Turkey invent and apply the same primary tactic: necessary conformism. However, based on empirical research, it is also important to underline the heterogeneity and dynamism of the necessary conformist behavior. The practices and habitus of young people are shaped by particular fields and, as a result, the necessary conformist behavior in the university campus is significantly different to, for instance, that in the family. These fields are also subject to change as a result of their own dynamics as well as morphological shifts and impetuses from the outside.

The objective of this paper has been to transcend the engaged/disengaged or political/unpolitical dichotomy in the scholarship on young people's social participation. However, while challenging this dichotomy, it is also possible to fall into the trap of arguing that every behavior looks like necessary conformism at some level. It is important to underline once again that necessary conformist behavior is acting in conformity with society's rules without really believing in them—paradoxically “killing” the rules while reviving them as “zombie” categories—by inventing “tactics” rather than directly rebelling. This behavior is not apathetic but rather hides a real and strong discontent and can mask a profound agony. Taken together, these characteristics differentiate necessary conformism from either apathy or loyalty.

It is also possible, however, to question whether this necessary conformism is not exactly what the system, government, or other ruling bodies want. For example, is necessary conformism not welcomed while direct confrontation is banned or punished? It can therefore be argued that necessary conformist behavior maintains the status quo. Nonetheless, to maintain the social structure, individuals must believe in the system and conform to it whole heartedly and with devotion, and it is this loyal, devoted, and enthusiastic bond that is ruptured by necessary conformism; young people are only conformist when they believe it is necessary and try to escape being so whenever possible. In that sense,

60 Asef Bayat and Linda Herrera, “Introduction: Being Young and Muslim in Neoliberal Times”, in *Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North* eds. Linda Herrera and Asef Bayat (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 6.

necessary conformism turns institutions into entities that are both dead and alive or, as Beck explains it, the young generation in individualized societies is an “actively unpolitical younger generation which has taken the life out of the political institutions and is turning them into zombie categories.”⁶¹ In Turkey too, the so-called unpolitical younger generation strategically employs the tactic of necessary conformism to turn institutions—whether family, educational, or political—into zombie categories.

References

- A *New Impetus for European Youth*. European Commission White Paper. Luxembourg: European Communities, 2002.
- Abu-Lughod, Lila, ed. *Remaking Women. Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998.
- Akın, Rojin Canan and Funda Danişman. *Bildiğin Gibi Değil: 90'larda Güneydoğu'da Çocuk Olmak*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2011.
- Armağan, İbrahim. *Gençlik Gözüyle Gençlik: 21. Yüzyıl Eşiğinde Türkiye*. İstanbul: Kırksraklılar Vakfı USADEM Yayınları, 2004.
- Bajoit, Guy. “Exit, Voice, Loyalty... and Apathy. Les réactions individuelles au mécontentement.” *Revue Française de Sociologie*, no. 29 (1988): 325-345.
- Başer, Zeynep. “Imagining Peace and Conflict: The Kurdish Youth in Diyarbakır.” MA Thesis, Sabancı University, 2011.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. *Intimations of Postmodernity*. London, New York: Routledge, 1992.
- . *Globalization: The Human Consequences*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
- . *In Search of Politics*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999.
- Bayat, Asef. *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Bayat, Asef and Linda Herrera. “Introduction: Being Young and Muslim in Neoliberal Times.” In *Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North*, edited by Linda Herrera and Asef Bayat, 3-24. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Beck, Ulrich. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. Translated by Mark Ritter. London: Sage Publications, 1992.
- . *The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997.
- Beck, Ulrich, and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. *Individualization*. 2nd edition. London: Sage Publications, 2008.
- Bhabha, Homi K. *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge, 1994.
- Bora, Aksu. “Aile: En Güçlü İşsizlik Sigortası.” In “Boşuna mı Okuduk?” Türkiye’de Beyaz Yakalı İşsizliği, edited by Tanıl Bora, Aksu Bora, Necmi Erdoğan and İlknur Üstün, 181-201. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. “‘Youth’ is just a Word.” In *Sociology in Question*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993: 94-101.
- Boyras, Cemil, ed. *Gençler Tartışıyor: Siyasete Katılım, Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri*. İstanbul: TÜSES Yayınları, 2009.
- Cruikshank, Barbara. *The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.

61 “Zombie categories: Interview with Ulrich Beck” in *Individualization*, Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (London: Sage Publications, 2008). See, also Ulrich Beck, “Freedom’s Children” in *Individualization*.

- Çelik, Kezban and Demet Lüküslü, "Spotlighting a Silent Category of Young Females: The Life Experiences of 'House Girls' in Turkey," *Youth and Society*, 44, no.1, 2012: 28-48.
- Darıcı, Haydar. *Violence and Freedom: The Politics of Kurdish Children and Youth in Urban Space*. MA Dissertation, Sabancı University, 2009.
- de Certeau, Michel. *The Practice of Everyday Life*. Translated by Steven Rendall. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988.
- Dubet, François. *La galère: jeunes en survie*. Paris: Fayard, 1987.
- . *Sociologie de l'expérience*. Paris: Seuil, 1994.
- . *Le Déclin de l'Institution*. Paris: Seuil, 2002.
- Erdem Artan, İnci, ed. *Üniversite Gençliği Değerleri: Korkular ve Umutlar*. İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2005.
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990.
- Farthing, Rys. "The Politics of Youthful Antipolitics: Representing the 'Issue' of Youth Participation in Politics." *Journal of Youth Studies* 13, no. 2 (2010): 181-195.
- Freedom House, "Turkey," *Freedom on the Net 2011: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media*, 2011.
- Gaullier, Xavier. "Âges mobiles et générations incertaines." *Esprit*, no.10 (October 1998).
- Georgeon, François. "Les Jeunes Turcs étaient-ils jeunes? Sur le phénomène des générations, de l'Empire ottoman à la République turque." In *Childhood and Youth in the Muslim World*, edited by François Georgeon and Klaus Kreiser, 146-173. Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2007.
- Hirschman, Albert O. *Exit, Voice, Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.
- Human Development Report Turkey 2008: Youth in Turkey*. Ankara: United Nations Development Programme, 2008.
- İnsel, Ahmet. *Düzen ve Kalkınma Kısacasında Türkiye*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1996.
- , ed. *La Turquie et le développement*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2003.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz, ed. *Women, Islam and the State*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991.
- , ed. *Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1996.
- Kazgan, Gülten, ed. *Kuştepe Gençlik Araştırması 2002*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2002.
- Keyder, Çağlar. *Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1996.
- . "The Turkish Bell Jar." *New Left Review*, no. 28 (July-August 2004): 65-84.
- Kuran, Timur. *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995.
- Lüküslü, Demet. *Türkiye'de "Gençlik Miti": 1980 Sonrası Türkiye Gençliği*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.
- . "Gençlerin Siyaset Algıları ve Deneyimleri: Yeni Bir Siyaset ve Örgütlenme Modeli Üzerine Düşünmek." In *Gençler Tartışıyor: Siyasete Katılım, Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri*, edited by Cemil Boyraz, 189-215. İstanbul: TÜSES Yayınları, 2009.
- . *Gençlik Örgütlenmelerindeki Gençlerin Sorunları, İhtiyaçları, İstekleri ve Önerileri Temelinde Türkiye'de Gençlik Politikaları Göstergelerinin Oluşturulması Araştırma Projesi Raporu*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Gençlik Çalışmaları Birimi, 2010.
- Mannheim, Karl. "The Problem of Generations." In *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952: 276-320.
- Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. *Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004.
- Neyzi, Leyla. "Object or Subject? The Paradox of 'Youth' in Turkey." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, no. 33 (2001): 411-432.
- Özmen, Fazilet Ahu. "Alevi Gençliğinin Siyasi ve Sosyo-Kültürel Kimlik Mücadelesi I." *Alternatif Politika* 3, no.1 (2011): 31-54.
- Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.
- Scott, James C. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985.
- . *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*. New Haven, MA: Yale University Press, 1990.
- Sirman, Nühket. "Kadınların Milliyeti" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 4. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002.
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, 271-313. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988.

- Tuzcuoğlu, Müge. *Ben Bir Taşım*. İstanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayım, 2011.
- Türk Gençliği 98: Suskun Kitle Büyüteç Altında*. Ankara: İstanbul Mülkiyeliler Vakfı, Konrad Adenauer Vakfı, 1999.
- Türk Gençliği ve Katılım*. İstanbul: ARI Düşünce ve Toplumsal Gelişim Derneği, 2001.
- Türk Üniversite Gençliği Araştırması. Üniversite Gençliğinin Sosyo-Kültürel Profili*. Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi Yayını, 2003.
- Türkmen, Buket. "Muslim Youth and Islamic NGO's in Turkey" in *Islam in Public. Turkey, Iran and Europe*, edited by Nilüfer Göle and Ludwig Ammann, 227-256. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006.
- Üniversite Gençliğinin İhtiyaçları Araştırması 2009*. İstanbul: Toplum Gönüllüleri Vakfı, 2009.
- World Youth Report 2005. Young People Today and in 2015*. New York: United Nations, 2005, www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/wyros.htm.
- Yavuz, Hakan. "The Renaissance of Religious Consciousness in Turkey: Nur Study Circles." in *Islam in Public. Turkey, Iran and Europe*, edited by Nilüfer Göle and Ludwig Ammann, 129-162. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006.
- Young, Robert. *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Culture, Theory and Race*. London and New York: Routledge, 1995.
- . *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001.
- . *Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Yücel, Hakan, "Une identité générationnelle-territoriale? Les jeunes d'origine alévie du quartier Gazi d'Istanbul." PhD Dissertation, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 2006.