

growing power competition” (p. 180) best explains imperial strategies. There is much to agree with in this appraisal.

However, this is one point where Kohli is not judicious enough with his dismissal of other explanations. Throughout the book, he argues against Lenin and Hobson’s Marxian theories of imperialism, and in this example he argues that “evidence does not support the suggestion that the Scramble for Africa was driven mainly by investors and financiers looking for higher rates of return” (p. 179). Instead, Kohli argues that the search for markets in the context of growing power competition among industrializing powers best explains late nineteenth-century expansionism. Yet this latter explanation is fully compatible with Lenin and Hobson’s theses, as well as W. E. B. Du Bois’s related argument in “The African Roots of War” (1915), which closely resembles the line of reasoning Kohli pursues. A deeper engagement with these works, as well as associated dependency theories, would have been welcome.

In the second half of the book, Kohli traces the United States’ attempts to build an informal empire that would reap economic benefits. Before World War II, the United States intervened in Asia and in the Western Hemisphere to provide future economic outlets for its production and “smooth out the boom-and-bust quality of rapid capitalist expansion” (p. 416). However, the United States pursued informal imperial interests for broader reasons after World War II. Kohli presents the cases of Iran, Vietnam, and Chile to demonstrate how the United States sought to suppress nationalist movements throughout the Global South to mitigate potential risks to its hegemonic position at the center of an open global economy. Controversially, he claims that these economic ambitions, rather than anti-communism, motivated these interventions. This argument is persuasive in the Chilean and Iranian cases, but the connection between America’s economic interests and support for the French in Vietnam is more tenuous, particularly because the United States did not support France at Dien Bien Phu.

In many ways, chapter 6 provides the ideal synthesis of the ideas presented earlier concerning modern American imperial strategy. In this chapter, Kohli outlines the United States’ informal imperial interventions post-Vietnam in Latin America and in the Middle East. These cases not only convincingly accord with the main economic argument but they also show how the United States has updated nineteenth-century imperial strategies for the modern day. The United States and its allies now use the global financial system and postwar international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank to influence the developing world and protect economic interests, as Kohli previews with his discussion of the Washington Consensus. Yet financial globalization does not always preclude military interventions, as the recent case of the United States’ post-Cold War interventions in Iraq epitomize. Finally, Kohli’s examination of American

imperialism after 1945 demonstrates not only that modern motivations for intervention resemble earlier economic justifications but also that the effects of those interventions remain devastating.

There is much to love about *Imperialism and the Developing World*. It is extensive, it is provocative, and it provides a great template for historically informed scholarship that is also relevant to contemporary political issues. To the extent that there is anything more to criticize, one could argue that the book does too much. Kohli covers an incredible amount of ground, and it can be hard to keep one’s eye on the ball. Is the book’s purpose to argue why informal empire crops up in certain situations? To debate extant explanations for all types of imperialisms? To demonstrate where and when the most pernicious effects of Anglo-American intervention reared their head? To reveal the character of the imperialisms that will persist in the modern world? Kohli tries his hand at all of this and more, the effect of which is a remarkably ambitious book that will be relevant to a multidisciplinary constituency of readers for years to come.

#### **Military Courts, Civil-Military Relations, and the Legal Battle for Democracy: The Politics of Military Justice.**

By Brett J. Kyle and Andrew G. Reiter. Oxford: Routledge, 2021. 252p. \$160.00 cloth.

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This book by Brett Kyle and Andrew Reiter does what no other volume before has done: it provides an overview of military justice systems in the modern world and examines the ways in which they are created and changed. Although parallel legal systems of the armed forces are common in democracies and autocracies, the political science literatures on civil–military relations and on judicial systems have mostly ignored the role of military courts and the implications of military justice for democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights. This book has the ambition to fill that gap, and in doing so, it examines three key questions. The first one concerns the evolution of military justice systems worldwide. Second, the study seeks to explain the varying degree to which military courts are subordinated to civilian control. Third, it investigates the relationship between legal subordination of the military, democratic civil–military relations, and human rights. To address these questions, the authors combine thorough conceptualization and theory-building, statistical analysis of an original dataset that compiles information about military justice systems in 120 countries, and historical case studies.

The book is structured in eight chapters. Following the introduction, chapters 2 and 3 present the conceptual and

theoretical contribution of the study. The authors define legal subordination of the military as “the degree to which military courts are subordinated to democratic, civilian control” (p. 5). Building on recent approaches in the study of civil–military relations that understand civilian control as a continuum ranging from uncontested civilian supremacy to complete military dominance over state and politics, the authors develop a “conceptual typology” (p. 35) of three distinct systems of military legal subordination. It ranges from full subordination (military courts only try military personnel for a narrow set of military crimes); to jurisdictional contestation (military courts have jurisdiction over military and nonmilitary crimes committed by soldiers, but not civilians); to military overreach (military courts have jurisdiction over nonmilitary crimes and the civilian population).

The authors apply this typology to a sample of 120 countries in the period from 1800 (or the year of the creation of military courts) until 2017. Analyzing their data, Kyle and Reiter find that the so-called third wave of democratization correlates with the global rise of systems of full legal subordination and the decline of systems of military overreach and, to a lesser extent, jurisdictional contestation. Military legal subordination is the rule in Western Europe and in postcommunist Eastern Europe. Interestingly, Eastern Europe since the late 1950s has had even more success in curtailing the military’s legal power than has Western Europe, which may suggest some incoherence in the author’s coding of states as cases of military legal subordination to *democratic*, civilian control. Among the other regions, Latin America has seen the most dramatic recent changes from military overreach to full subordination, whereas in the Asia-Pacific region and sub-Saharan Africa, changes have been fewer or less successful and jurisdictional contestation is more common—a finding that reflects broader regional trends in democratization and regime hybridization. Furthermore, the three types perform differently in terms of quality of democracy, levels of repression, and the protection of civil liberties. However, because the authors compare group averages for the period 1974–2017, it remains unclear how much variation exists within each category or whether shifts from one type to another lead to more democracy, less repression, and better protection of civil liberties. Although the authors seem to believe that better legal control of the armed forces contributes to more democracy, testing causal relationships between those different phenomena would have required a different research design.

The question of what factors lead to changes in military judicial systems is discussed at a theoretical level in chapter 3. Here, Kyle and Reiter present a framework for understanding how civilian actors are able to gain or lose legal control of the armed forces. According to their “model of change,” a “critical juncture” (e.g., a regime transition, civil war, or terrorist incidents) is a prerequisite for change

in the type of military legal subordination. The process of change is driven by the interactions of three key actors—government, civilian courts, and the military—which are subject to international and domestic influences. Although the authors could have been more explicit in their conceptualization of causal mechanisms and theorization of explanatory variables, their framework offers a useful heuristic for further case studies.

The following chapters look at empirical country cases. The authors have carefully chosen them so that there is variation along two dimensions: the causal pathways to reform and the outcome of such causal processes. Chapter 4 presents a paired comparison of Portugal and Colombia. The two cases represent different pathways from jurisdictional contestation to full legal subordination of the military: through democratic transition (Portugal) and through a protracted struggle among the three key actors and international and civil society actors (Colombia). Chapter 5 compares Indonesia and Fiji, which represent the same outcome (jurisdictional contestation) but which is achieved through different pathways: stalled reform from military overreach to full subordination in democratizing Indonesia versus backsliding from full subordination as a result of political polarization and military intervention in Fiji. Chapter 6 analyzes two cases of military overreach. In post-authoritarian Brazil, the continuation of military overreach is the result of unreformed practices from the authoritarian past, whereas in post-2014 Pakistan, it is a result of backsliding from a “successful” (but short-lived) reform. Finally, chapter 7 draws inferences from a comparison of two episodes of transition from subordination to military overreach and back again in the United States: the Civil War and the post-9/11 War against Terror. Chapter 8 summarizes the findings, discusses their practical implications, and suggests directions for future research.


Overall, *Military Courts* makes five important contributions to the literature. First, it develops a much-needed conceptualization of military legal subordination. Second, it presents a useful framework for analyzing the “politics of military justice.” Third, it demonstrates that, after their initial establishment, military justice systems are resistant to change. The transition from authoritarianism to democracy is often associated with positive change, but it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a shift from less to more legal subordination of the armed forces. Fourth, it shows that systems of full subordination are fragile and may erode as a result of autocratization or in response to the rise of new security threats. Fifth, the book identifies different pathways to reform and key players and key factors that shape the politics of failed, stalled, or successful reform toward legal subordination of the military.

Still, no book is perfect, not even an excellent study such as this one. For example, a glance at the impressive dataset compiled by the authors raises the question why they did not employ more statistical analyses of the causes and

consequences of military legal subordination worldwide. Although this reviewer is sympathetic to the definition of legal subordination in this book, the authors seem to suggest that full subordination is only possible in democracies (which would contradict their own findings for Eastern Europe). With that said, this book remains an impressive piece of scholarship, one that should attract the attention of a broad audience of students, experts, and practitioners in the civil–military field.

### **Clash of Powers: US-China Rivalry in Global Trade**

**Governance.** By Kristen Hopewell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. 249p. \$89.99 cloth, \$29.99 paper.  
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Was an open and liberal international trade order a product of US hegemony after all? Kristen Hopewell's fascinating and well-researched book on the US-China rivalry in global trade governance gives pause for thought. Her key claim is that the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China has become the “predominant dynamic” in the governance of global trade (p. 2). Moreover, this rivalry is “profoundly undermining global institutions and rule-making in trade” (p. 11).

In making her case, Hopewell seeks to refute two arguments that underpin what she calls the “prevailing view” on the rise of China (p. 2). The first is that China is still not powerful enough to fundamentally challenge US dominance of the international system. Yet Hopewell shows quite convincingly that China has already begun to severely constrain US power in global trade, with the United States increasingly unable to achieve its goals or “set the rules” (p. 8). The second argument that Hopewell puts to rest is that China can be integrated relatively smoothly into the existing multilateral trade system. Although China may not seek radically to challenge the status quo, its unique economic structure renders its rise “highly disruptive” (p. 10) to established trade rules. Moreover, because the United States can no longer induce and cajole others to follow its preferred rules, China's rise has “created serious difficulties for the functioning of the global trade regime, eroding the efficacy of existing trade rules and institutions and preventing the construction of new and stronger rules to govern global trade” (p. 194).

The book develops its argument through five highly engaging case studies. Each one draws on Hopewell's extensive background knowledge and the insights from numerous elite interviews at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva. Chapter 1 succinctly charts the rise and fall of the WTO's Doha Development Agenda. Hopewell argues that the core reason for its failure was US concerns about the flexibilities and exemptions that China

continues to enjoy as a developing country. Chapters 2 and 3 turn to sector-specific multilateral trade negotiations that have emerged out of the rubble of the Doha round. Chapter 2 focuses on negotiations on creating new multilateral restraints on agricultural subsidies, whereas chapter 3 examines negotiations on fishery subsidies. Chapters 4 and 5 go beyond the WTO context to examine the impact of China's rise on multilateral rules governing the provision of export credit. In each case, Hopewell shows how China's rise has complicated multilateral negotiations, even if it is not always clear that China has been the decisive factor.

At the heart of each case is what Hopewell refers to as the “China paradox”: the unprecedented situation that China is both the number two economy in the world *and* a developing country. As a developing country, China continues to demand exemptions and less than full reciprocity in its multilateral trade commitments. Many other countries, with the United States foremost among them, demand that China take on obligations that they believe are commensurate with its economic heft. In each case, Hopewell shows how multilateral negotiations have been complicated or even derailed by the China paradox. China appeals to the norm of Special and Differential Treatment for developing countries, while the United States demands greater concessions but is not powerful enough to coerce China to accept them. The result has been protracted stalemates and unprecedented tensions in the multilateral trade system.

Hopewell has a mastery of the technical details of multilateral trade negotiations. The book is filled with juicy quotes and insider sniping from her elite interviews of national delegates and secretariat staff at the WTO. It is fascinating, for example, to see how developing country delegates are loath to criticize China publicly but are ready and willing to decry its trading practices in private. Public statements are often full of platitudes and blandishments. In private everybody knows the score.

This is not a theoretical book, but its argument has clear theoretical implications. Hopewell's finding that the United States has lost its ability to control multilateral trade negotiations could easily be interpreted as supporting some version of hegemonic stability theory. Even when China has been incorporated into existing institutions and is supportive of their aims, as at the WTO, “it is clear that changes in the distribution of power are thus having destabilizing effects” (p. 13). Yet, as Hopewell points out, these difficulties are not only a result of changes in international power relations but also derive from the nature of China's domestic political economy (p. 17).

Less clear is the book's message about normative conflicts and (de-)legitimation strategies in multilateral settings. The crux of the “China paradox” is that both China and the United States can present their demands as deriving from established, widely legitimate norms.