

means understand when one stands to benefit from compromise and cooperation and when one needs to remove challenges forcefully” (p. 978). But this would suggest that in the end (and the beginning), dominance is the only strategy that matters, determining the choice between integration through dominance and secession for dominance. That does not explain why any other strategy is tried, or when the light strikes about the unique need for dominance. But which groups are hell-bent on dominance? And does understanding that the insurgents’ self-interest is necessary as the starting point for conflict resolution mean that every (self-declared) group needs to be given its dominance to settle conflict?

The conclusion does not tell us. It does not pull the three themes or other ends together. It tells us that the international community has three strategies, once the inevitability of African anarchy is recognized: intervene to end anarchy and control its harmful effects, recognize that it can do nothing in the face of local strategies, or invent something to replace the inadequate state. The conclusion states that all three approaches have their pros and cons; it does not refer back to the threefold strategic choice with which the study started, nor a fortiori address the “which when why and how” question. And so it leaves us with three good case studies as examples of different strategies adopted under various conditions, with domination through secession as the dominant strategy, and conflict management a pretty lost cause. That is realism, but it is not much of a guide for how to handle it.

The Politics of Military Occupation. By Peter M. R. Stirk.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. 272p. \$90.00.
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— Jasen J. Castillo, *Texas A&M University*

Peter Stirk has written a book that all those interested in the conduct and consequences of military occupations should read. It describes in rich detail the continuities as well as the changes in international legal guidelines for foreign occupiers, including their obligations to the occupied. Tracing the evolution of these international legal standards, Stirk argues that military occupation represents a type of government in its own right. Unfortunately, by emphasizing how occupations should end, international law gives conflicting guidance for the ways that military and civilian officials should conduct them. This confusion played out painfully during the recent U.S. occupation of Iraq, in the author’s view, as officials struggled to find the right strategy for restoring local rule and ensuring stability. Clearly written and easy to read, this book will be valuable to students of international relations, especially those interested in international law.

The book begins with a discussion of the meaning and practice of military occupation, with the core focus on the nineteenth century to the present. In the first two

chapters, Stirk explains how changes in the norms of international politics made occupation a more acceptable international practice for states than outright annexation, reinforcing a point that Paul Schroeder convincingly makes in *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (1995). He then describes, in Chapters 3 and 4, how military and civilian officials often disagree on the methods and goals of occupations. These two chapters will resonate with policymakers involved in military occupations or planning for one in the future. Subsequent chapters depict the tension between the interests of the occupier and pressure from international law to provide for the occupied, restore sovereignty, ensure objective justice, and manage a successful transition to a new regime.

The central argument is that international legal principles treat military occupations as temporary situations, rather than as a distinct form of government. In Stirk’s view, international law emphasizes the restoration of sovereignty but remains unclear about the day-to-day conduct of military occupation. The ambiguous status of occupations helps neither the foreign rulers, struggling to balance competing interests, and the occupied population, suffering in the resulting confusion. Although the author never clearly articulates it, he seems to suggest that the solution to this problem requires two changes in international law: the recognition of military occupation as a type of government and a greater focus on the legal questions surrounding the effective operation of such a polity.

In addition to this central argument, *The Politics of Military Occupation* advances our understanding in two ways. First, it demonstrates how the norms constraining the conduct of occupiers have evolved over the last 200 years. Stirk illustrates how international standards to guide military occupations increased as territorial annexation and the exploitation of foreign populations became rare occurrences. Second, the book demonstrates the multiple struggles confronted by occupiers when they undertake these missions. On the one hand, foreign rulers want to pursue their interests; on the other hand, they face pressure to meet certain international legal obligations that might cut against their goals for the occupation. Still further, occupiers do not always agree on the best strategy for effective foreign rule. These disagreements arise most strongly between civilian and military administrators, a problem plaguing occupations since the nineteenth century. According to Stirk, “Conflict between civilian and military leaders, the confusion of liberation and occupation and lack of clarity about what occupation entails, or should entail, recall the practices of revolutionary and Napoleonic France” (p. 27).

Even though it describes in great detail the constant struggle faced by diplomats and international lawyers in defining military occupations, the book raises several

unanswered puzzles. Stirk has pushed open the door to a larger set of research questions, which I hope he tackles or inspires others to pursue. There are at least three questions that arise from his discussion. Most of these questions stem from the book's narrow focus on international jurisprudence, and not the larger questions that interest most students of international relations theory. Such a criticism does not mean that the book is without value. On the contrary, his study forces readers to confront issues beyond the scope of his work.

The first unanswered question is concerns the conditions under which occupiers have found themselves hampered or their hands tied by international law? Throughout his survey of the historical record, some occupiers follow the "rules" more than others do. Perhaps the answer lies somewhere with the interests, identity, or the regime type of the occupier. The variation in compliance with international law suggests an interesting puzzle for further research. This puzzle also points to larger debates in international relations theory about the power of international norms either to constrain or to constitute the identities of the same states embarking on military occupations.

A second and related question is: Who defines the laws of occupation? Many scholars, especially realist ones, would contend that powerful states define international law. If the great powers define the legal standards of military occupation, then perhaps they see ambiguity in their interests. Any occupier, even one with noble intentions, might not want to tie its hands, since circumstances can change. Legal ambiguity, then, could prove too valuable for occupiers that want or might need the freedom to alter the terms of a military occupation.

Finally, would international recognition of military occupation as a form of government decrease resistance to foreign rule? This last question remains the most important challenge facing foreign occupiers. David M. Edelstein's excellent study *Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail* (2008) gives strong reasons to believe that simply resolving international legal issues will do little to dampen the nationalistic motivation of the occupied to resist foreign rulers. Stirk's book, in fact, says very little about how international law directly shapes the attitudes and behavior of the occupied.

These questions aside, this detailed study of military occupation and international law tackles a timely subject, which is important to scholars and practitioners alike.

Cosmopolitan Regard: Political Membership and Global Justice. By Richard Vernon. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 232p. \$78.00 cloth, \$30.00 paper.
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— Adam Lupel, *International Peace Institute*

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the rise of globalization and an evolving human rights regime inspired a prolifer-

ation of work dedicated to cosmopolitan theory. Attention to the concept of cosmopolitanism never completely waned, but the muscular foreign policy of the Bush years and the reemergence of assertive nation-states such as China led to a sense that the cosmopolitan moment had passed. In 2011, however, with a rising interest in the international "responsibility to protect"—most recently cited in the case of Libya—and continuing debates over the global threat of climate change, cosmopolitan concerns are back in the ascendant. In this context, Richard Vernon's book is poised to make an important contribution to debates over the moral foundations of cosmopolitanism.

The international community assumes a responsibility to assist the victims of disaster or violent conflict when their own states cannot or will not do so themselves. This commitment is based upon international law and current understandings of international peace and security. But one might ask why should citizens—in the United States, Japan, South Africa, or elsewhere—feel a moral obligation to assist victims in a far-off land in the first place? Why should we sacrifice to provide support for such endeavors? *Cosmopolitan Regard* tries to answer that question, to provide a "ground-level principle" to guide debates about these matters (p. 181).

Vernon's argument develops out of a reformulated social-contract view of civil society. He argues that "national societies [are] justified, not as sources of moral experience, nor as embodiments of intrinsic associative value and meaning, but as a way of protecting human persons from dangers to which they are commonly vulnerable" (p. 196). To exit the dangers of the state of nature, people enter into civil society to protect themselves, giving up some element of natural freedom in the process. This is familiar ground, but what is novel here is that the author uses the social contract starting point to argue for the necessity of political obligations beyond the nation-state.

Vernon argues that cosmopolitan duties are political obligations that "are as binding as our obligations to other citizens, for they are sustained by the same considerations of political morality" (p. 208). We form separate societies as a way to best address the challenges of common dangers, but we can justify our own exclusive political arrangements only "if other societies can, likewise, seek their own best solutions to the balance of risks and benefits in political association, and give special weight to their own shared and exclusive interests in doing so" (p. 194). That is, if we assume the equal moral worth of all human beings, the exclusiveness of our own social contract is only justifiable if others have the right and capacity to form similar contracts. And Vernon argues that this not only implies a duty to avoid impeding others from forming effective political units; it also implies a duty to provide them with support when needed.

The author addresses the consequences of this view with regard to three practical issues: humanitarian intervention, international criminal law, and something he calls the "global