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Courtney Freer

RENTIER ISLAMISM IN THE ABSENCE OF ELECTIONS: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AFFILIATES IN QATAR AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Abstract
Drawing on contemporary history and empirical research, this article revises traditional rentier state theory, which fails to account for the existence of Islamist movements in states accruing substantial outside wealth. Rentier state theory expects that citizens of such states will form opposition blocs only when their stake in rent income is threatened. Examining the development of Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in two archetypal rentier states, or super-rentiers, in the Gulf—Qatar and the United Arab Emirates—this article shows that ideology rather than rent motivated the formation of independent Islamist movements. This research helps to break the causal link established by rentier state theory between oil rents and lack of politically relevant Islamist organizations. We find that the presence of oil rents, instead of rendering Islamist complaint politically irrelevant, shapes the ways in which Islamist movements seek to influence government policies.

Keywords: Gulf politics; Islamism; Muslim Brotherhood; rentierism; political Islam

The study of political Islam has primarily been confined to states in which Islamist[1] groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood can participate in elections, provide much-needed social welfare, or more broadly constitute powerful social movements.[2] Due to the absence of such criteria in the wealthy monarchical Arab Gulf states, these states have not been examined in literature on political Islam. Existing scholarship on political life in the Gulf has similarly overlooked the role of Islamist movements in that region. Since Hussein Mahdavy introduced the theory of the "rentier state" in 1970,[3] many scholars have deferred to this framework to explain the domestic politics of states that accrue substantial oil profit, or rents, in the region. Numerous studies, both qualitative and quantitative, have demonstrated the reality of a "rentier effect," distinguishing rentier states from those without large external windfalls.[4] In such states, taxation is described as spurring citizens' demands for representation, with lack of taxation expected to yield political quietism. According to a leading scholar of rentier state theory, Hazem Beblawi, "with virtually no taxes, citizens are far less demanding in terms of political participation."[5] The simple formula "no taxation, no representation" is thus often considered to describe the extent of political[6] life within rentier states.

Courtney Freer is a Research Officer at the Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance, and Globalisation in the Gulf States, London School of Economics and Political Science, London; e-mail: c.j.freer@lse.ac.uk

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Though the attributes of the rentier political economy undoubtedly influence activities and agendas of independent political and social movements inside the Arab Gulf states, the reality is far more complicated than rentier state theory portrays.

This article examines the role of political Islam in the Gulf through the study of Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in two of the least-studied rentier states in the region: Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These states represent archetypal rentiers, or super-rentiers,[7] as the region's wealthiest and most generous countries, which also lack parliamentary oversight and means for local Brotherhood groups to participate in institutional political life. We find that, due to the combination of immense oil wealth and closed political systems in these two countries, Muslim Brotherhood movements are motivated primarily by ideology and are more informally organized than their affiliates elsewhere in the region. We will trace how Muslim Brotherhood movements, the most powerful independent political voices in the Middle East, emerged in and currently influence government policies in rentier contexts.

That Muslim Brotherhood groups in the small Gulf monarchies do not resemble their counterparts elsewhere in the region should not be surprising. These groups face a different set of political opportunity structures. In the Gulf's rentier states, the presence of oil rents, rather than rendering Islamist complaint irrelevant, shapes how Islamist movements seek to influence government policy in numerous ways. First, due to handsome disbursements from rentier governments, these groups have neither the need nor the ability to rival the government in the provision of social welfare. Second, a dearth of electoral politics (other than in Bahrain and Kuwait) means that Brotherhood affiliates are not responsible for the organization of parliamentary political campaigns. Third, due to the prevailing strength of tribal social ties, the Brotherhood throughout the Gulf rentiers does not need to provide an alternate social network as affiliates have done elsewhere in the Middle East. Free of the responsibility for providing any of the above tangible outcomes to followers, rentier Islamist organizations are far more flexible than Brotherhood branches elsewhere in the Arab world, especially in states such as Qatar and the UAE where political participation remains limited. In these latter states, Brotherhood affiliates exist primarily as ideological inspiration rather than as organized parties. This flexibility is as much a conscious adaptation to the Gulf political terrain as it is an imposed constraint—actors within wealthy rentier states remain dependent on, and stand to benefit from, powerful central governments.

By examining the strategies employed by Islamist affiliates in the super-rentiers of Qatar and the UAE to gain political influence, this article fills a gap in the existing literature on political Islam. Engaging with work on the relationship between social movements and political opportunity structures, it argues that the Muslim Brotherhood is not a monolithic entity with a rigid playbook, but rather a social movement able to adapt to highly divergent political and economic environments. We now turn to an analysis of how local branches of the Muslim Brotherhood adapt to rentier environments.

RECONCILING SCHOLARSHIP ON RENTIER STATE THEORY AND POLITICAL ISLAM

Hussein Mahdavy first defined rentier states, in the context of Iran, as "those countries that receive on a regular basis substantial amounts of external rents. External rents are

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in turn defined as rentals paid by foreign individuals, concerns or governments of a given country."[8] Hazem Beblawi later expanded this definition by describing four characteristics of the rentier state: its economy is dominated by rent money; the economy is reliant on external, rather than internal, rents; small numbers of people are involved in the creation of this rent; and the government is the primary recipient of external rent.[9] Beblawi goes on to explain that, in these states, citizens tend to receive payments from their wealthy governments. In such an environment, "income is no longer a reward of serious and hard work."[10] Rather, nationals are recompensed for being citizens, making them less likely to form political opposition movements or to make demands of the state generally. As Michael Ross summarizes, "when oil revenues provide a government with enough money, the government will use its largesse to prevent the formation of social groups that are independent from the state and hence that may be inclined to demand political rights."[11] To test for the presence of this effect, Ross examines the state sector gross domestic product (GDP). He finds that "the greater the government's size (as a fraction of GDP), the less likely that independent social groups will form."[12]

What we find, however, is that independent political and social groups can and do emerge from within the rentier framework, regardless of the government's size as a fraction of GDP. Such organizations garner followers not by providing material provisions or involving themselves in direct confrontation with the system, but through ideological appeal. As Hootan Shambayati points out, economically based opposition movements are not likely to emerge in rentier contexts; instead, "organized challenges to the state are based on moral and cultural issues, where rentier states are most vulnerable."[13] Indeed, the political system, like the economy, becomes "a hierarchy of layers of rentiers within the state with the government at the top of the pyramid."[14] As such, independent groups compete for government support without which they are unlikely to gain economic or political influence. Because rentier governments provide their populations with a variety of public goods and services at an impressive level and at little to no cost to citizens, they retain primary power.[15] Islamist groups, like other actors, attempt to maintain "their favorable cut of the political-economic pie."[16] Since all rentier actors are dependent on the state, at least to some extent, challenging it outright is irrational, and so gradualism prevails.

Yet few existing studies have focused on the Muslim Brotherhood as a social movement within the Arabian Peninsula. Academics have long debated whether Islamist movements generally constitute, at their core, a sociocultural or psychological reaction to the failures of the modern state and Western encroachment in the Muslim world,[17] a response of the disenfranchised to economic disappointment,[18] or a political movement agitating for a greater say in government.[19] Central to most of these explanations has been the power of such groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, to provide benefits that governments could not. As the Egyptian case shows, particularly in the Mubarak years, "the necessary precondition for the rise of Islamism has been the declining efficacy and legitimacy of the Egyptian state."[20] That the Brotherhood has traditionally been able to provide "concrete economic benefits," as well as a stable community of people with common beliefs, has made the organization attractive.[21] Because rentier states function, for the most part, as effective service providers, however, rentier Islamists use different means to mobilize support.

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As a result, social movement theory treatments of the Muslim Brotherhood do not adequately capture the multidimensional nature of Brotherhood affiliates in the Gulf. Gilles Kepel's notion that Islamism became attractive to youth disappointed with a lack of economic opportunities, "crises of legitimacy in their political systems," and the failure of secular oppositional ideologies is less relevant in the Gulf states.[22] The description of Islamists supported by Tarek Masoud, among others, that Islamist groups are, at their core, "*political organizations* with strategies and resources that can be observed directly and measured with precision,"[23] is insufficient to explain their presence in states lacking institutionalized political spaces. If Brotherhood groups existed solely to secure political power by contesting parliamentary polls, how and why would they be found in states that deny them the opportunity to contest any type of election? The existence of local Muslim Brotherhood branches in states where they cannot compete for institutionalized political power demonstrates that there is more to their platform than politics and that they often exert political influence through the informal sector.

The Brotherhood has historically defined itself as far more than a political organization or social group. Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna famously described the organization as "a Salafi movement, an orthodox way, a Sufi reality, a political body, an athletic group, a scientific and cultural society, an economic company and a social idea."[24] Such a wide-ranging definition reflected al-Banna's holistic view of Islam's role in society and of his Brotherhood's mission to spread this vision of religion's central role in political and social life. Though other Brotherhood thinkers have undoubtedly influenced the group, the aim of reconstructing the social order by appealing to faith remains central. In line with this vision, Islamist mobilization comes from the grassroots and is, in the words of Janine A. Clark, "an attempt to create a seemingly seamless web between religion, politics, charity, and all forms of activism."[25]

Carrie Rosefky Wickham's study of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt aptly reflects the multifaceted nature of Islamist movements, though it explains Brotherhood activity in the context of state retreat absent in the Gulf states. She describes the Brotherhood as gaining followers not only through the provision of material and social benefits, but also through its ideology, something that social movement theory–based explanations overlook.[26] As John Obert Voll put it, the Islamist trend "would not be a serious movement worthy of our attention were it not, above all, an idea and a personal commitment honestly felt."[27] Islamists provide an ideology of reform encompassing all aspects of life, including social structure, politics, and economics. Writing about the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Wickham explains: "What defined the Islamic movement was less its opposition to a given regime or set of policies than its efforts to construct, from the bottom up and over time, a new kind of society inspired by Islamist ideals."[28] In Steven Brooke's estimation, Islamist groups have even avoided confrontation with regimes; they "participated in political systems, adopted national discourses, and largely subjugated their activism to regime laws."[29] Brotherhood-related institutions have historically registered with state authorities, and regimes have chosen to target such organizations without tackling the root causes for their activities.[30]

Under authoritarian regimes that provide limited institutionalized means of Islamist political participation throughout the Middle East, the social realm becomes the primary site for Islamist activism and mobilization. Members of the Brotherhood, as Sherri Berman describes, "finding themselves unable to achieve their revolutionary goals

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directly by conquering the state, turned to gradually remaking Egyptian society and culture. And in this they have been remarkably successful."[31] In rentier environments, where governments provide not only generous material benefits and services to their citizens but also a state-sanctioned vision of Islam, the multifaceted nature of the Muslim Brotherhood and appeal of its ideology become especially clear. It has often been assumed that wealthy Gulf regimes are well equipped to face down complaints, Islamist or otherwise, using generous welfare packages, repression, or patronage,[32] and that their commitment to Islam and promotion of the type of Islam they find appropriate leave little space for independent Islamists to act. This lack of space is, of course, no accident: with the influx of expatriate Islamists during crackdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, Gulf governments hoped to discourage indigenous groups with similar political appeal. Nonetheless, after Brotherhood members arrived in the Gulf eager to spread their organization's ideology, local affiliates developed and became increasingly nationally focused. As Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke point out, "the ideological affiliations that link Brotherhood organizations internationally are subject to the national priorities that shape each individually."[33]

EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP AND THE WAY FORWARD

Perhaps the only extended scholarship in English[34] specifically dedicated to Islamist activism inside the Gulf is Stéphane Lacroix's 2011 book on Saudi Arabia. In this study, he explains the rise of independent Islamism inside the Kingdom, tracing Muslim Brotherhood infiltration of the education system, outlining the transformation of Islamists into independent actors in the form of the Sahwa movement, and analyzing the ultimate failure of this group to effect major change. While Islamist complaint initially constituted "politically neutered opposition [that] gradually became primarily a cultural opposition," dynamics changed with the advent of the Sahwa movement in the 1990s.[35] This group united previously disjointed sectors of society, namely the ʿulamaʾ and intellectuals, behind an Islamist agenda. Until 1994, the Sahwa movement managed, as an independent Islamist movement, to gain control of political discourse.[36] By tracing how Islamists in a rentier context came to hold political appeal, Lacroix makes an important contribution. He also provides scholars with the important notion of "state Islamism": "In almost all countries in the Muslim world, Islamism arose and developed outside the state. The converse was true of Saudi Arabia: from the beginning, Islamism was integrated into the official institutions."[37]

Because the state dominates life in rentier societies, it has historically played a large role in the Islamic sector, even more so than governments elsewhere in the region. Further, because religion is an important component of political legitimacy for rentier Gulf governments, state authorities remain willing to use ample funds to bolster its social role. Such governments use ministries of endowments (*awqāf*) and Islamic affairs to monitor mosques, imams, and sermons, while spending vast amounts of money to promote Islamic activities such as Qurʾanic recitation festivals and grand mosques to assert their own commitment to Islam. As a result of these characteristics, the trajectory of Islamist organizations is different in Gulf states, whose governments can and do put their substantial assets behind Islamic causes.

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While Brotherhood movements elsewhere in the region originated in opposition to the existing order, Islamists in the Gulf gained political capital by working *through* the prevailing system before coming to challenge it. As Herbert P. Kitschelt puts it, "political opportunity structures functioned as 'filters' between the mobilization of the movement and its choice of strategies and its capacity to change the social environment."[38] Like other actors in rentier states, Islamists compete for state support, whether material or symbolic. Since they cannot afford to exist outside of the system, they work gradually from within it to promote their ideology. As a result, writing the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in rentier states, especially in the super-rentiers, involves tracing their influence through various ministries, particularly education, Islamic affairs, and justice. Kitschelt also observes that closed systems, wherein a small number of elites formulate policy, are least likely to welcome input from social movements.[39] In such states, Sidney Tarrow points out, "elites chose their allies and attacked their enemies, and the state provided opportunities to some groups and not to others."[40] At their inception, Muslim Brotherhood groups in the Gulf were closely allied with their government; as they became increasingly powerful through state support, however, this relationship changed, in turn altering political opportunity structures.

As Gwenn Okruhlik has pointed out, Sunni Islamist movements in the Saudi context have benefited from the fact that the ruling family "cannot easily quash or oppose Islamist arguments, since they stake their right to rule on largely Islamic grounds."[41] The same is true to a large extent elsewhere in the Gulf. Okruhlik's study goes a long way toward demonstrating that Islamist actors in the Gulf do, in fact, hold political influence, though this influence may be uninstitutionalized. Nonetheless, like Lacroix's research, Okruhlik's work remains focused on the Saudi case. Because Islam in Saudi Arabia is institutionally wedded to the state through a centuries-old alliance between the Saudi ruling family and the Wahhabi ʿulamaʾ, one of the ruling elite's political priorities is support of Wahhabi Islam. A threat to Wahhabism thus constitutes a threat to the political ruling order, making it difficult for independent Islamist movements to form in that country. Nowhere else in the broader Middle East does such an institutionalized link between religious and political leadership exist.

The Kuwaiti case has been less documented but provides an interesting example of rentier Islamist political activity within a parliamentary system. Since the 1980s, the country's Muslim Brotherhood organization has successfully fielded candidates for the legislature and, in 1991, created a specialized political branch, al-Harakat al-Dusturiyya al-Islamiyya (Islamic Constitutional Movement, or ICM), which functions as a political party in all but name (political parties are formally banned). The ICM works alongside Jamʿiat al-Islah al-Ijtimaʿi (Social Reform Association), the organization's social branch, established in 1951. The Kuwaiti Brotherhood is highly organized and well funded, benefits from a broad support base, and undoubtedly boasts the most clearly developed political platform of all Brotherhood affiliates in the rentier states, as it is the only one that participates in electoral politics under the umbrella of the institutionally powerful ICM. Because Kuwait, despite being a super-rentier state, houses a politically powerful parliament, the Brotherhood in that country has been able to participate in the institutionalized political sphere, making its structure and aims different from Brotherhood branches in other super-rentier states.

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The Kuwaiti Brotherhood is also the only Brotherhood branch in the super-rentiers that has been forced to take on the responsibility of service provision, which occurred during the Iraqi occupation. Whereas before the Iraqi invasion the group focused on ensuring the Islamization of society and the implementation of shariʿa, during the occupation the ICM adapted a more flexible prodemocracy agenda through which it garnered greater popular support. It has become outspoken in its criticism of the regime and of the government system more broadly, pushing for the passage of a political parties law and the creation of a constitutional monarchy, and often allying with secular groups to advance these aims. By forming coalitions with secular opposition blocs, the Kuwaiti Brotherhood has become increasingly politically relevant and has continued to emphasize the need for reform above social Islamization.

Such a system differs greatly from the more informal and less institutionalized political systems of Qatar and the UAE. Qatar has one elected political institution, the Central Municipal Council, which, due to the ban on political parties, plays little more than an advisory role in primarily nonpolitical matters. Policy decisions remain in the hands of a relatively small number of people, namely members of ruling Al Thani family. Though Qatar does not have a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which formally voted to disband itself in 1999, Islamist influence remains palpable, if not structurally salient, through grassroots movements to alter social policies.

The UAE is composed of seven emirates, each with its own ruling family. Still, the country is dominated by the ruling families of Abu Dhabi (the president is Abu Dhabi ruler Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan) and Dubai (the vice president is Dubai ruler Shaykh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum). The UAE has one partially elected body, the Federal National Council (FNC), yet its members are chosen by a small percentage of Emirati nationals. Further, because political parties are also illegal in the UAE, the FNC is largely apolitical and holds only nonbinding advisory power in a variety of federal government matters.[42] As a result, decision making in the UAE, like Qatar, remains personalized and concentrated in the hands of relatively few people, making comparison of the two apt.

The extent to which the political influence of Brotherhood affiliates in the super-rentiers is institutionalized depends on the degree to which the systems wherein they operate are formalized. In the restrictive political environments of Qatar and the UAE, which lack influential professional organizations, student groups, and political parties, the informal sphere is the most plausible arena for independent political activity. Meetings of *majālis*[43] are primary modes of voicing political and social concerns. Such meetings, some of which are convened by rulers, remain an important element of domestic politics, serving as "the final court of appeal on all important matters."[44] Considering the uninstitutionalized and highly personalized nature of political life in the super-rentiers, it is unsurprising that social trust remains an important component of political allegiance and that religiosity becomes a political asset. The Qatari Brotherhood is the least overtly politically active because Qatar's system allows the least institutionalized space for formal political participation. In the UAE, the federal system has allowed for the existence of independent Islah branches within the state.

Notably, Qatar and the UAE are the wealthiest states in the Gulf and thus would be the least likely, at least as predicted by rentier state theory, to house any type of influential groups independent of the government. They are also the most demographically

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unbalanced: as of mid-2010, Qatar's population was 85.7 percent expatriate, compared to 88.5 percent in the UAE.[45] As non-Muslim expatriate populations increase, Islamism becomes a means of reasserting national identity against increasing secularization and, in some cases, Westernization. Moves to promote the use of Arabic language, for instance, are at once a means of promoting local identity and of upholding Arabic and Islamic education of the type traditionally supported by the Muslim Brotherhood. Though their means for exercising political pressure differ, Brotherhood affiliates in Qatar and the UAE gather political capital in much the same matter, as will be illustrated.

THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN QATAR AND THE PERSISTENCE OF THE INFORMAL SPHERE

Though formally dismantled, the Qatari Muslim Brotherhood retains ideological appeal that the government has largely accommodated by implementing social policies of the type supported by Islamists. Long before the creation of a formal Muslim Brotherhood organization in 1975, its supporters, many from Egyptian and Palestinian branches, had managed to secure substantial influence inside Qatar's education sector. In fact, as ʿAbdulla Juma Kobaisi, describes,

> for a period of three years (1953/54 to 1955/56) most of the teachers who were brought in to run the Qatari schools were ideologically in favour of the Muslim Brotherhood Party, and in particular politically against the leadership of President Nasser. They stamped the educational system with their Islamic ideology since the education department of Qatar was under their control.[46]

Into the 1960s, influential Brotherhood members were appointed to important positions in the education sector. Egyptian Brotherhood scholar ʿIzz al-Din Ibrahim was made assistant director of knowledge, responsible for creating a school syllabus.[47] When the head of Islamic sciences at the Department of Education ʿAbd Allah bin Turki al-Subuaʿi went to Cairo's al-Azhar University in 1960 to recruit Islamic scholars, he returned with several Islamist intellectuals. Most notably, al-Subuaʿi recruited outspoken Brotherhood ideologue Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi from al-Azhar to teach at the Qatari branch of the university in 1961. ʿAbd al-Muʿaz al-Sattar, Hasan al-Banna's personal emissary to Palestine in 1946, also served as a school inspector and director of Islamic sciences in the Ministry of Education, in addition to coauthoring "numerous textbooks for the nascent Qatari school system in the early 1960s."[48] These Brotherhood members, able to disseminate their ideology through schools, sparked a desire for greater organization of the Muslim Brotherhood at the grassroots level.

Islamist influence increased when Arab nationalism retreated across the region in the 1970s. Brotherhood sympathizers, especially the young cohort, many of whom had studied in places with active Muslim Brotherhood movements, insisted that an official organization was needed to oversee the group's activities.[49] Founded in 1975, the Qatari Brotherhood affiliate, was, in the words of its then leader Jassim Sultan, "just a collaboration, a simple thing." Testifying to the informal nature of the organization, even at its inception, he went on, "only one page described the organization, and no one knows where that paper is." [50] The group focused primarily on *daʿwa* (lit., making an invitation, or proselytization), intense study of shariʿa, organization of sporting activities,

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and integration into the community, attracting young people in particular to Brotherhood-sponsored trips, sports, charity, and public lectures.[51]

As they endeavored to expand and formalize the group's activities, however, Qatari students returning from studying abroad in states with active Brotherhood affiliates clashed with the past generation. Whereas the older members were skeptical about the utility of ramping up the Muslim Brotherhood's activities, the younger generation saw no reason not to expand the Brotherhood's presence.[52] Without elections to contest and lacking the need to provide social services or the ability to compete with the government in service provision, yet still hoping to spread its ideology, the Qatari Brotherhood found itself in a unique position. Younger members began raising questions about what form the organization would take in the future (whether a political bloc or cultural group), the impact it could have on Qatari society, and its overarching goals. In part to resolve differing approaches among the leadership and to maximize the organization's impact, beginning in 1980–81 and until 1991 the Qatari Brotherhood undertook an extensive two-part study.[53] The first portion, published as *Hawla Asasiyyat al-Mushruʿ al-Islami li-Nahdat al-Umma . . . Qiraʾat fi Fikr al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna* (On Basics of the Islamic Plan for the Renaissance of the Umma: Readings in the Thought of the Martyr Imam Hasan al-Banna),[54] focused on the ideology of al-Banna.[55] Interestingly, the listed author was ʿAbd al-Hamid al-Ghazali, a member of the Shura Council of the Egyptian Brotherhood and the leader of its political department for nearly eight years. The use of such authorship may have indicated tensions between the Qatari affiliate and the mother organization because the volume was seen as a critique Muslim Brotherhood ideology, which the authors considered in need of update.[56]

The second part of the study remains unpublished and concerns the affiliate of the Brotherhood in Qatar specifically.[57] This study was essentially "an intellectual and organizational dissection of the Brotherhood" in terms of its structure, communication, leadership, prevailing culture, and goals, as well as the feasibility and risks associated with pursuing them.[58] Important questions included: Is there a real plan for the organization? How much has been achieved (in Qatar and elsewhere)? What remains to be achieved?[59] Generally, "it finished with one of the problems that pushed the re-evaluation to begin: that the Muslim Brotherhood's plans generally lacked clarity—what did it want exactly? And how would it get there?"[60]

After years of research and inquiry, the study revealed that many members considered the Qatari Brotherhood to have failed to tailor Hasan al-Banna's ideology to the Qatari situation, particularly due to the group's immutable commitment to ideological purity.[61] Members questioned the need for a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate in Qatar, a conservative and religious society with few major economic, social, or political problems or openings.[62] Such questions led to broader discussion about how Islamist movements can survive in Gulf states where governments derive legitimacy from Islam and therefore dominate the religious outreach sphere.[63] As Jassim Sultan put it, "by study and research, the pitfalls were obvious. The program doesn't fit Qatar. There is a major defect in the theory."[64]

The Qatari Muslim Brotherhood was officially disbanded in 1999 by a vote among its members.[65] The process of its dissolution, about which little is known, was completed in 2003. Qatari Brotherhood members have, for the most part, remained silent about the reasons for the organization's dissolution, and a great deal of speculation remains as to

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the motivations behind it.[66] The primary explanation, as Mustafa ʿAshur explains, is that the Brotherhood's formal structure in places like Qatar became "an irrelevant matter," as the group can easily offer the same services, such as lectures, religious study groups, youth activities, and social meetings, without having any defined structure.[67]

Harboring no ill will toward the government and able to function as they wished under its supervision, Qatari Brotherhood members simply did not require a separate organizational structure, which was weak and informal from the start. As an ideological movement, rather than an organization, the Brotherhood could maintain its followers and popular relevance, which it may have lost as an institutionalized entity: "ideas live longer than any organization," as Jassim Sultan explained.[68] Maintaining structural flexibility, individual members of the movement have maintained a degree of influence over political debate and policymaking, at least with regards to social policies, within the country without inciting government action against it.

Still, determining what exactly it means to be a Muslim Brotherhood member in a state where the group lacks a formal organization is challenging. Making matters more difficult, few Qataris publicly identify as members of the Brotherhood even if they agree with its ideology, making it difficult to determine the organization's domestic popularity and strength. A difference in labeling comes into play: as Gulf analyst Michael Stephens put it, "it is very complicated because lots of Qataris agree with the Muslim Brotherhood but don't even realize it." The conflation between support for the Brotherhood and allegiance to conservative Islam further complicates the study of the organization in isolation in Qatar. In Stephens's words, "lots of Qataris agree with what [Shaykh Yusuf] al-Qaradawi is saying, but they see this as being religious, not as being Muslim Brotherhood."[69]

All in all, Brotherhood sympathizers, at least in the explicit sense, do not constitute a large proportion of Qatari society. One Qatari interviewee said that he would "be surprised if there was any substantial number [of Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers]."[70] Others maintain that the organization is "just a few people," and remains highly informal.[71] In terms of activities, Qatari Brotherhood sympathizers still gather primarily to recite the Qurʾan, with the organization existing on a structural level only at the smallest unit, the *usra* (lit. "family," or the smallest unit of Muslim Brotherhood structure). Without means to disseminate its ideology through an official publication or even a formal meeting place, the Qatari Muslim Brotherhood does not appear to harbor ambitions beyond continuing intellectual and spiritual pursuits, which is not to say that these do not have a social agenda or political influence.[72] Still, because many Brotherhood members hail from prominent families, the organization is "hardly subversive."[73] This nonconfrontational relationship has led the government to be more accepting of the Brotherhood. As a former advisor to the Amiri Diwan put it, "why should the government put pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood when [Brotherhood members] don't challenge it? The two are interdependent."[74]

Despite the informal nature of Brotherhood influence inside Qatar, since the Arab Spring the government has become more responsive to Islamist-leaning demands for social reform. It has been particularly attuned to complaints about the availability of alcohol, banning its sale in December 2011 throughout the Pearl-Qatar development.[75] Shortly thereafter, objections from locals led to the closure, in a number of days, of a branch of the Qatar Distribution Company in 2012, which sells pork products and liquor,

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on the manmade island.[76] In 2015, the Qatar Tourism Authority began prohibiting hotels from serving alcohol in the nine days preceding Eid al-Adha, in observance of Dhu al-Hijja, during which hajj is undertaken.[77] Such restrictions may signal the government's efforts to balance the desires of national and expatriate populations—a challenge unique to the super-rentier states. In the words of an advisor to the amir, Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, "alcohol is not essential to modernization."[78]

Other recent examples of the government taking a cue from public complaints include the removal in 2013, after only three weeks, of a statue of football player Zinedine Zidane head-butting another player on the Doha Corniche.[79] Locals had found the statue inappropriate, as the depiction of humans and animals is discouraged in the hadith and the act portrayed was considered "morally wrong."[80] The grassroots campaign to foster modest dress, launched in 2012 as "One of Us" and recently rebranded as "Reflect Your Respect," represents another effort by nationals to maintain traditional values, fostering "modesty in all behaviors."[81]

The above actions suggest that a certain vocal segment of the Qatari population favoring conservative social policies can influence the government's domestic policy but chooses to do so *within* the rentier framework, using informal means such as *majālis* or social media. Similar efforts elsewhere in the region are led by the Brotherhood yet seem to have been informally arranged in Qatar. As Kitschelt explains, "political opportunity structures influence the choice of protest strategies and the impact of social movements on their environments."[82] In a context wherein politics remain largely uninstitutionalized, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Brotherhood exerts political influence without a formal structure. In such an environment, it is also difficult to discern which political trends are most popular among nationals. While support for the above social changes suggests a leaning toward the conservative social program favored by the Brotherhood, it could also reflect the desires of a conservative Wahhabi population, though Wahhabi movements tend to be less organized in agitating for the implementation of specific social policies. In sum, regardless of the lack of Brotherhood institutionalization, Islamism clearly has political weight inside Qatar.

THE EMIRATI MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND RED LINES FOR RENTIER ISLAMISTS

Though the first decades of the Emirati Brotherhood's history resemble those of the Qatari branch, as early as the 1990s its activities were limited due to government fears of Brotherhood influence, and by the end of 2012 it was definitively driven underground. As in Qatar, at the start of the 1970s, Emirati students who had returned from study abroad brought with them the idea of establishing a group to organize activities similar to those conducted by the Muslim Brotherhood in countries where they had studied.[83] In 1974, three years after the UAE's independence, Jamʿiat al-Islah wa-l-Tawjih al-Ijtimaʿi (Reform and Social Counseling Association, hereafter Islah) was established as the local arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Dubai. It was only the second civil society organization to receive approval from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.[84] In fact, Vice President and Dubai leader Shaykh Rashid bin Saʿid Al Maktoum donated money toward the establishment of the group's headquarters in that emirate, signaling the government's willingness to patronize an Islamist group as a bulwark against Arab

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nationalism.[85] As described by one prominent Emirati political scientist, "the initial drive of the Muslim Brotherhood was that the UAE is not Islamic enough, not justice/injustice, or reform."[86]

After the founding of Islah in Dubai, branches were established in the northern emirates of Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah, with Shaykh Rashid donating toward the cost of their establishment.[87] At the end of the 1970s, Emirati President and Abu Dhabi ruler Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahyan also contributed land for the establishment of a branch of the group in that emirate, yet an affiliate ultimately never gained permission to form.[88] Interestingly, a branch also never opened in Sharjah. Former Vice-Chairman of Islah in Ras al-Khaimah and lawyer Muhammad al-Mansuri considers the Sharjan government's refusal to allow for the opening of a local branch of Islah to reflect the prevalence, at that time, of Arabism and nationalism, rather than Islamism, in Sharjah. That emirate's strong financial ties with Saudi Arabia also may have squelched any potential Brotherhood movement's emergence in that emirate, with the kingdom a more likely source of religious inspiration. In Ajman, though a branch of Islah was not established, as Mansour al-Nogaidan explains, "the Brotherhood settled for subordination to Jamʿiat al-Irshad wa-l-Tawjih al-Ijtimaʿi [Association of Guidance and Social Counseling]."[89]

The organizational structure of the Brotherhood in the UAE was more complicated than in Kuwait and Qatar due to the state's federalist form. Each Islah branch was, according to Wanda Krause, "broken down according to emirate with a further hierarchy of sections and subsections, typically classified according to emirate cities and rank of members, each with different *halaqas* [religious study circles focused on Islam and the Qurʾan] having different curricula."[90] Like Brotherhood affiliates elsewhere in the Gulf, though, the Emirati Brotherhood was involved in social and cultural activities, namely sporting and charity events.[91] For instance, "internal activities include those related to Ramadan fasts, such as sponsoring and holding *iftars* (dinners to break the fast), as well as courses in members' houses for their *halaqas*."[92] In addition, Islah used its magazine, *al-Islah* (Reform), to advocate for a variety of social reforms, particularly the development of Islamic education, censorship of Western media, and encroachment of foreign businesses and culture in Emirati society.[93] Examination of issues of *al-Islah* magazine from the 1970s and 1980s demonstrates that the organization's aims were primarily social and local.[94]

Islah members also rose to prominent ministerial positions. Because Brotherhood members in the UAE, as in Qatar, came largely from among the educated classes, they were strong candidates for such government posts, particularly in a young country with a small population. As one Emirati political scientist observes, "the Muslim Brotherhood had a good understanding with government and good backing from business."[95] In fact, in the formation of the first-ever independent Emirati government in 1971, founding member of Islah from Ras al-Khaimah Shaykh Saʿid ʿAbd Allah Salman was named minister of housing; in 1977 Muhammad ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Bakr, another Islah member, was appointed minister of justice and Islamic affairs and *awqāf*—both on the recommendation of Vice President Shaykh Rashid.[96] From 1977 to 1983 Shaykh Sultan bin Kayed al-Qasimi, head of Islah in Ras al-Khaimah, oversaw curricula for the entire UAE. When Shaykh Salman became minister of education and chancellor of UAE University (UAEU) in 1979, the ministry became heavily influenced by Muslim Brotherhood ideology.[97] During his tenure, the ministry banned gender mixing

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beginning in the fourth grade.[98] Music was also prohibited, and girls could not participate in sports.[99] In addition, teachers sympathetic to the Brotherhood were hired in large numbers.[100] By the beginning of the 1980s, the Brotherhood controlled the management of curricula. In the late 1980s, after the replacement of Shaykh Salman, Islah embarked on a serious campaign opposing the non-Islamist education minister's decision to institute standardized basic education for all students entering UAEU. [101]

Brotherhood members also rose to government positions in the judicial sector. According to Mansour al-Nogaidan, "*al-Islah* members with Law studies, who were the best prepared at the time, became influential within the Ministry of Justice." He adds that "for more than 20 years *al-Islah* worked side by side [with] the Emirati government, cooperating in areas of social and cultural development."[102] In a less institutionalized way, Brotherhood organizations in the UAE influenced youth through student activities such as summer camps and scout groups. In 1982, as Chancellor of UAEU, Shaykh Salman established the Union of Emirati Students in the institution. Having done well in the elections of university student committees beginning in 1977, Islah dominated student union elections until 1992.[103] At that time, the government tried to depoliticize campuses by replacing the union in 2012 with student council polls contested by individuals rather than political blocs.[104]

By the 1990s, members of the Emirati Muslim Brotherhood had come to exert considerable influence on Emirati society through their positions in the educational and judicial systems. Around the same time, investigations by Egyptian security services allegedly proved that individuals involved in Egyptian Islamic Jihad had received monetary donations from Islah's Committee for Relief and Outside Activities, provoking government suspicion.[105] The prevailing argument became that the Brotherhood is, at its core, an international organization, "imported by Egyptians," and uses outside groups to further its ultimate aim, the establishment of a single Islamic state.[106]

During the same period, the government began investigating the influence of Brotherhood members within the education sector when promising scholarship applications from non-Islamist students were rejected. It found that the Brotherhood members largely controlled the distribution of educational awards.[107] Trying to regain control, in 1994 the government dissolved the Brotherhood's previously elected boards of directors,[108] placing them under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Furthermore, the government restricted the political activity of the Brotherhood's members, banning them from holding public office.[109] Notably, the Ras al-Khaimah branch of Islah was forced to curtail its external activities yet was exempted from ministerial control,[110] due to protection of that emirate's sympathetic ruler Shaykh Saqr al-Qasimi.[111] Until the most recent crackdown in 2012, the group remained independent, as Shaykh al-Qasimi "rejected the dissolution of al-Islah because he felt it played a role in preserving the youth."[112]

An already tense relationship between the Emirati government and the Muslim Brotherhood became more confrontational following the attacks of 11 September 2001. That two Emiratis were involved in the violence made the government eager to prove to the international community that it would not tolerate religious extremism or in fact any independent religious movement. As part of this effort, Emirati authorities increased internal security.[113] In 2002, the State Security Directorate arrested over 250 individuals on charges of terrorism, though most merely harbored Islamist sympathies and were released by 2004.[114] The government attempted to persuade Islah to disband around this

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time, but the organization refused, also declining to divulge names of its members.[115] Frustrated with its inability to use institutionalized means to voice its grievances, some members of Islah took the opportunity to foster co-operation with a growing reform movement.[116] This loosely organized movement agitating for political reform, composed of secular and Islamist groups and tacitly supported by Islah for years, became stronger and more active during the Arab Spring, as the government continued to promise (yet failed to deliver on) greater political participation to citizens.

In March 2011, a petition addressed to President Shaykh Khalifa and the Supreme Council of Rulers and endorsed by 133 intellectuals, among them Islah members, led to the most significant government crackdown on all strands of opposition. It was written following the government's failure to introduce legislation to increase the pool of voters for the FNC. The petition called for universal suffrage in an elected legislature that would have expanded constitutional powers to produce laws and supervise the executive.[117] Critically, it marked the first time that the secular and Islamist opposition came together in such a public political undertaking.[118]

In early April 2011, five of the 133 signatories of the petition (the so-called UAE5),[119] said to be its primary backers, were arrested. They were charged, as explained by Amnesty International, with "'publicly insulting' the UAE's President, Vice-President and Crown Prince in comments posted on an online discussion forum. . . . All five were convicted in November 2011 after a trial that failed to satisfy international standards of fair trial, and sentenced to prison terms of up to three years."[120] Shortly after their sentencing, the five were released through a presidential pardon due in large measure to international media attention.

Hoping to deflect attention from incidents such as the arrest of the UAE5, the government made limited efforts to respond to domestic political opposition, while boosting financial disbursements to "buy off" dissidents. For the September 2011 elections the government expanded the FNC electorate to 12 percent of the national population.[121] It also granted huge public sector pay increases (in some cases up to 100 percent) and boosted welfare benefits by up to 20 percent, in addition to signing a $2.7 billion agreement to help poorer nationals pay off outstanding loans.[122] The expansion of the FNC electorate was the sole political reform yet resulted in no substantial change: only half of the FNC is elected, the body itself still lacks legislative power, and a meager 28 percent of the eligible voters took part in the election.[123] The government's largely economic response to political opposition reflects traditional understandings of the rentier state wherein the government's primary power lies in its control of rents.

Although Islamist and secular activists worked together on the petition, the government exaggerated links between them to dramatize the danger to the prevailing system. The government charged that Islah exploited the controversy surrounding the UAE5 to increase its own influence, "using the umbrella of reform to reach their goals" of larger government takeover.[124] Now seeing Islah alongside the broader political reform movement and thus as a viable political challenge to the state, the government began targeting the organization. Islah had strayed outside of its government-granted sphere of influence. When Islah bucked against the rentier state, agitating for political rather than social reform, its existence became intolerable for the central Emirati government.

By the end of 2012, ninety-four alleged members of Islah (the UAE94) had been arrested. Attempting to justify its harsh response, in September 2012 the government

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claimed to have received confessions from imprisoned Islah members that their organization had an armed wing and aimed to overthrow the existing order to re-establish the caliphate, a claim not substantiated by any independent Islah documents or public statements.[125] Islah denied all charges, stating that the group is "pacifist, civilian and moderate and has never, and will never, choose to take up arms."[126] There is no evidence, from examination of the organization's magazine or in conversations with its members, that it has any intention to challenge the government.

Beginning in March 2013, the ninety-four arrested in 2012 were tried together, eight in absentia. In July 2013, sixty-nine of the defendants, including the eight outside the country, were convicted and received sentences ranging from seven to fifteen years, while twenty-five were acquitted.[127] The UAE94 were denied the right to appeal, and the prosecution used evidence drawn primarily from confessions allegedly obtained through ill treatment or torture.[128]

In November 2014, the government further crippled Islah, listing it and eighty-one other domestic and international organizations as terrorist groups. Although this list included violent organizations such as al-Qaʿida and ISIS, it also comprised decidedly nonviolent groups like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, in addition to advocacy groups such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations and the Cordoba Foundation in Britain.[129]

The government appears to have greatly exaggerated Islah's popularity and political aspirations to justify such a complete and rapid crackdown. During the January 2012 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) National and Regional Security Conference, then Chief of Dubai Police Dhahi Khalfan went so far as to state: "The Muslim Brotherhood is a security threat to the Gulf, and is no less dangerous than Iran."[130] Emirati Foreign Minister Shaykh ʿAbdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan similarly denounced the Brotherhood as "an organization which encroaches upon the sovereignty and integrity of nations" and called on Gulf governments to work against its expanding influence.[131] Such language illustrates the government's attempts to use fear of emerging Islamist political parties in the region as an excuse to dismiss Islah's demands for political reform.

It is uncertain how much support Islah held among nationals, especially given its organizational division by emirate. Estimates of its membership range from 400[132] to 20,000.[133] The state's crackdown on the Brotherhood, though, indicates the government's perception that the organization held more popular support than is likely. In fact, as Christopher M. Davidson notes, "Abu Dhabi's crown prince [Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed] provides a good insight into the strategy, having been recorded in a 2006 US diplomatic cable referencing a meeting with US diplomats as stating that 'if there were an election [in the UAE] tomorrow, the Muslim Brotherhood would take over.'"[134] The administration clearly considered Islah to be an existential threat, making the Emirati population more willing to accept increased central government control to counter it.[135]

Shaykh Mohammed's fears directly disprove a major prediction of rentier state theory: he found that hydrocarbon wealth could not "buy off" political competitors, particularly religious ones. The findings in this article instead support Kitschelt's prediction that "the less innovative and more immobile a political regime, the greater the risk that this inflexibility itself will trigger demands that go beyond the immediate policy issues to ones threatening the legitimacy of the regime."[136] When the Emirati Muslim Brotherhood, in

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response to increment clampdown on its independence, began to bite the hand that fed it, so to speak, by openly advocating political reform, the Emirati government resolved to move decisively against it.

CONCLUSIONS

Whereas rentier state theory anticipates that citizens will form opposition blocs only when their stake in rent income is threatened,[137] this article has shown that in super-rentier states ideology has motivated citizens to join Muslim Brotherhood affiliates, even though such states enjoy the highest rentier packages in the region. As Lisa Anderson explains, "grievances came to be cast not in terms of material demands but in the idiom of moral responsibility and ideological commitment," reflecting the opposite of what rentier state theory predicts.[138] Notably, many members of Brotherhood affiliates in the Gulf come from the educated elite whom one would not expect to join such a group out of a feeling of disenfranchisement. Economic motivations in super-rentier states, as expected, hold limited appeal in spurring political action. In fact, "under rentier conditions, loyalty to the system is the most rational course of action."[139] Only when ideology is involved are independent social movements likely to emerge in super-rentier states.

Available political opportunities undoubtedly shape how groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood operate. Rather than attempting to challenge the state by providing alternate services or running for elections, rentier Islamists seek to gain positions and influence *through* the state, for they know they will be unable to effectively challenge it and ultimately cannot survive without it. Though they have largely been removed from state positions in recent decades, today Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in Qatar and the UAE use various social networks to exert influence within the rentier framework, promoting Islamist social policies in particular. Brotherhood-run social organizations inform their members' views about a government's duty to its citizens as well as how political discourse should evolve. As explained by Quintan Wiktorowicz and Suha Taji Farouki, "rather than directly confronting the state or participating in formal politics, Islamic nongovernmental organizations are engaged in social struggle at the level of cultural discourse and values."[140] In other states in the region, this influence can be translated into institutionalized political power, yet it remains the primary mode of Brotherhood activity in Qatar and the UAE. Notably, in the UAE some members of the Muslim Brotherhood did attempt confrontation in conjunction with the reformist opposition, albeit through the uninstitutionalized means of petition, and were severely punished as a result.

As other scholars have noted, there is thus no one form of Islamism. And as my work demonstrates, Brotherhood movements behave in similar ways in super-rentiers that feature striking economic, political, and social similarities, yet have made different calculations in recent years due to those governments' varied stances towards them. While the Qatari Muslim Brotherhood chose to disband itself, the Emirati branch sought to effect political change by forming a coalition with secular political groups. Certainly, as Salwa Ismail explains, "the fortunes of Islamism as a political movement are conditioned by the structures of opportunities, and by political configurations and contingent identities."[141] Further, governments view the Brotherhood differently depending on their

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political calculations. Emirati rulers remain particularly attuned to the political capital held by their domestic Brotherhood movements and consider them an existential threat. Qatar, in contrast, has granted the Muslim Brotherhood more freedom, reflecting the authorities' belief that cooptation and containment are more effective and sustainable than crackdown.

Because they gain appeal primarily through an ideology unaffected by the presence of wealth, in the coming years Islamist organizations will not become any less influential in the wealthiest Gulf monarchies, despite campaigns against them. Rather, they will take on different forms depending on the political freedom afforded them. Because rentier Islamists do not need to provide tangible goods for their followers, they have been allowed more freedom in terms of structural appearance. And because Islamists remain rent-seeking actors in such states, they are far more gradualist in their pursuit of Islamist reforms. As Sherri Berman points out, similar to the early days of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, "societal and cultural transformation has preceded, and perhaps substituted for, political change: here 'a grassroots movement emerg[ed] from the streets . . . to transform the social structure from the bottom-up.'"[142] Rentier Islamists will continue to agitate for social reforms above all else, reflecting Hasan al-Banna's notion that broad-scale change emerges out of grassroots change.

Islamists adapt their activities to restrictive systems. Their ideology cannot be "bought off" with government disbursements, and their activities are more difficult to halt in the informal sector and due to their largely gradualist nature. By creating ideological links at the grassroots level, they amass long-term popular support. Rentier Islamists will continue to hold sway primarily through the informal sector. Their methods for garnering support are not threatened by changes to the Muslim Brotherhood's strength elsewhere in the Middle East due to the power of their ideological message and ability to adapt to different political environments.

NOTES

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[1]We consider an Islamist one who "mobilise[s] and agitate[s] in the political sphere while deploying signs and symbols from Islamic traditions." Salwa Ismail, *Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2006), 2.

[2]See, for example, Janine A. Clark, *Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004); Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928–1942* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2006); Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); Carrie Rosefky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); and Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activist: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2001).

[3]Hussein Mahdavy, "The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran," in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, ed. M. A. Cook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 428–67.

[4]For qualitative studies, see Hazem Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World," in *The Rentier State*, ed. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (London: Routledge, 1987), 49–62; Matthew Gray,

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"A Theory of 'Late Rentierism' in the Arab States in the Gulf," Center for International and Regional Studies, Occasional Paper 7 (2011), accessed 20 January 2016, https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/558291/CIRSOccasionalPaper7MatthewGray2011.pdf?sequence=5; Michael Herb, "No Representation without Taxation?: Rents, Development and Democracy," *Comparative Politics* 37 (2005): 297–317; Giacomo Luciani, "Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework," in *The Arab State*, ed. Giacomo Luciani (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1990), 65–84; and Mahdavy, "The Patterns and Problems." For quantitative studies, see Matthias Basdeau and Jann Lay, "Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 46 (2009): 757–76; Jonathan Isham, Michael Woolcock, Lant Pritchett, and Gwen Busby, "The Varieties of Rentier Experience: How Natural Resource Export Structures Affect the Political Economy of Growth," *World Bank Economic Review* 19 (2005): 141–74; Michael Ross, *The Oil Curse* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012); and Benjamin Smith, "Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999," *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (2004): 232–46.

[5]Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World," 53.

[6]We define the political as "of, relating to, or concerned with the making as distinguished from the administration of governmental policy." "Political," Merriam-Webster.com, accessed 16 April 2017, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/political.

[7]We introduce the term super-rentier to describe Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, as states with the highest per capita income, lowest proportion of nationals to expatriates, and greatest overall "rentier" package because of these dynamics in the Gulf region. This paper only deals with those super-rentiers lacking parliamentary political life.

[8]Mahdavy, "The Patterns and Problems," 428.

[9]Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World," 51–52.

[10]Ibid., 62.

[11]Michael Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?," *World Politics* 53 (2001): 334.

[12]Ibid., 347.

[13]Hootan Shambayati, "The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran," *Comparative Politics* 26 (1994): 329.

[14]Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World," 53.

[15]Ibid., 90.

[16]Justin Gengler, *Group Conflict and Political Mobilization in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf: Rethinking the Rentier State* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2015), 36.

[17]See R. Hrair Dekmejian, "The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives," *Middle East Journal* 34 (1980): 1–12; Valerie J. Hoffman, "Muslim Fundamentalists: Psychological Profiles," in *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 199–230; and Susan Waltz, "Islamist Appeal in Tunisia," *Middle East Journal* 40 (1986): 651–70.

[18]See Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London: Routledge, 1991); and Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (London: I.B.Tauris, 1996).

[19]See Mohammed Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 2008); Ismail, *Rethinking Islamist Politics*; and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, ed., *The Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

[20]Sheri Berman, "Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society," *Perspectives on Politics* 1 (2003): 258.

[21]Lisa Wedeen, "Beyond the Crusades: Why Huntington, and Bin Laden, Are Wrong," *Middle East Policy* 10 (2003): 55.

[22]Gilles Kepel, *The Prophet and Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt* (London: Al Saqi Books, 1985), 11–12.

[23]Tarek Masoud, *Counting Islam: Religion, Class, and Elections in Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 41.

[24]Hasan al-Banna, quoted in L. Carl Brown, *Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 146.

[25]Janine A. Clark, "Patronage, Prestige, and Power: The Islamic Center Charity Society's Political Role within the Muslim Brotherhood," in *Islamist Politics in the Middle East: Movements and Change*, ed. Samer S. Shehata (London: Routledge, 2012), 70.

[26]Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 174–75.

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[27] John Obert Voll, “Foreword,” in *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, xiii.

[28] Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam*, 174–75.

[29] Steven Brooke, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Social Outreach after the Egyptian Coup,” Rethinking Political Islam Series, Brookings Institution, 9, August 2015, accessed 21 January 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2015/07/rethinking-political-islam/Egypt_Brooke-FINALE.pdf?la=en.

[30] Ibid., 13.

[31] Berman, “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society,” 263.

[32] John L. Esposito, “Political Islam and Gulf Security,” in *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform?*, ed. John L. Esposito (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 71.

[33] Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” *Foreign Affairs* 86 (2007), accessed 9 September 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2007-03-01/moderate-muslim-brotherhood.

[34] For a historical account of the Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia in Arabic, see ʿAbd Allah bin Bijad al-ʿUtaybi, “al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa-l-Suʿudiya: Al-Hijra wa-l-ʿAlaqa,” in *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa-l-Salafiyyun fi al-Khalij* (Dubai: Al-Mesbar Studies and Research Centre, 2011), 7–54.

[35] Stéphane Lacroix, *Awakening Islam: Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011), 17.

[36] Ibid., 263.

[37] Ibid., 265–66.

[38] Herbert P. Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies,” *British Journal of Political Science* 16 (1986): 59.

[39] Ibid., 67.

[40] Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 77.

[41] Gwenn Okruhlik, “Making Conversation Permissible,” in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004), 263.

[42] Bahrain and Oman, the remaining GCC states, are not relevant to this study because they are not super-rentiers and do not have Sunni-majority populations among whom appeal of the Brotherhood would be strongest.

[43] The *majlis* (pl. *majālis*) is a crucial element of civil society. Such informal yet regularly scheduled meetings are hosted in private homes by rulers, as well as by private citizens. They cover topics ranging from social life to religious ideology to politics.

[44] A. Ann Fyfe, “Wealth and Power: Political and Economic Change in the United Arab Emirates” (PhD diss., Durham University, 1989), 14.

[45] “GCC: Total Population and Percentage of Nationals and Non-Nationals in GCC Countries (2010–2015),” Gulf Labour Markets and Migration, 2015, accessed 15 January 2017, http://gulfmigration.eu/total-population-and-percentage-of-nationals-and-non-nationals-in-gcc-countries-latest-national-statistics-2010-2015/.

[46] ʿAbdulla Juma Kobaisi, “The Development of Education in Qatar, 1950–1966 with an Analysis of Some Educational Problems” (PhD diss., Durham University, 1979), 122–23.

[47] David Roberts, “Pragmatism or Preference?,” *Middle East Policy* 21 (2014): 86.

[48] Ibid., 86–87.

[49] ʿAbd Allah al-Nafisi, “al-Hala al-Islamiyya fi Qatar,” *IslamToday*, 12 March 2007, accessed 1 December 2015, http://www.islamtoday.net/bohooth/artshow-19-8828.htm.

[50] Jassim Sultan, interview with the author, Doha, Qatar, 4 November 2013.

[51] ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Mahmud, “al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Qatar . . . Man Humma?,” *al-ʿArab*, 1 August 2012, accessed 5 December 2015, http://www.alarab.qa/story/166996/الإخوان-المسلمون-في-قطر-من-هم.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Al-Nafisi, “al-Hala al-Islamiyya fi Qatar.”

[54] This publication can be found in Arabic at Dakahlia Ikhwan, 2013, accessed 3 December 2015, http://www.dakahliaikhwan.com/viewarticle.php?id=19446.

[55] Amr al-Turabi and Tarek al-Mubarak, “Qatar’s Introspective Islamists,” *Asharq al-Awsat*, 18 June 2013, accessed 7 December 2015, http://www.aawsat.net/2013/06/article55306189.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Al-Nafisi, “al-Hala al-Islamiyya fi Qatar.”

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[58]Mustafa ʿAshur, "Tajribat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi Qatar," *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa-l-Salafiyyun fi al-Khalij*, 197.
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