terms of the overall theoretical framework, Ben-Porath argues that the state can and should structure "the landscape of choice" in such a way that the state achieves its paternalistic aims while the affected individuals retain their freedom of choice. From behavioral economics, we know that how individuals choose depends on how the options are presented to them. Thus, the state need not mandate one specific option; it can make individuals choose what it wants them to choose by structuring and framing choice. This argument is similar to the well-known argument for "libertarian paternalism" made by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler.

Many liberal arguments against paternalism refer to its coercive character, but according to Ben-Porath, this is a mistake. Following in the footsteps of Sunstein and Thaler, she maintains that, for example, default rules are not coercive and cannot be objected to as such. The idea of structured paternalism is to rely on similar forms of state intervention, which do not directly coerce citizens to choose a specific option but only "frame individual choice in a particular way or direct individuals to develop certain preferences . . . for their own good" (p. 24). But this argument ignores the fact that state regulations that structure choice are as coercive as laws that impose a particular choice. The rules Ben-Porath favors might be preferable because they enhance equality and well-being, but to say that there is no issue of coercion here is unconvincing.

The author is right to argue that in modern society, the state will always structure our choices and affect our preference formation. The pursuit of independence from state intervention is indeed a "phantom" (p. 32). But this is not quite the same as to have shown that paternalism is "unavoidable" (p. 24). It is a shortcoming of the book that it treats all state intervention under the heading of paternalism, and thus fails adequately to explain the forms of state intervention that antipaternalist liberals find justified. Ben-Porath also sometimes describes a paternalist policy merely as one that is "good for you." But few liberals would disagree "that policy makers must keep in mind what is good for members of the relevant constituency when they design policies that invite choice" (p. 145). What the antipaternalist objects to is the state that disregards my own view of what is good for me and imposes *its* view of my good on me, against my will.

If we remove the coercive element from the definition of paternalism, as well as the point that there must be opposition between the understanding of well-being with reference to which the state justifies its policy and the affected constituency's understanding of its own good, then of course "paternalism" will be less objectionable. But the question is whether Ben-Porath has amended the definition of paternalism so far from the common Kant and Mill–inspired one that it does not really make sense to present her argument as an argument against antiperfectionist liberalism. Indeed, her argument seems more relevant as a correction to the unreflective reverence for choice characteristic of the American public debate than anything argued for by liberal political theorists.

It is a common view that paternalism is objectionable only with regard to adults and not to children. One of the interesting arguments of the book is that this dichotomy is too simple, and that we must investigate more fully the relevant distinctive factors between the two groups. According to Ben-Porath, we must seek to understand what characterizes childhood and respect the equal standing of children, rather than merely looking at childhood as a preparation for adulthood. While this is a compelling argument, it seems to me that she fails to notice that children also (if not only) must be prepared for adulthood.

While *Tough Choices* is presented as a defense of paternalism, it argues against some of its most common forms. This is because structured paternalism aims to recognize individual differences and cultural diversity. Thus, in the discussion of the regulation of intimacy, Ben-Porath emphasizes "the need to protect the plurality of forms in which identity is constructed and maintained through intimate choices" (p. 58). The state must limit itself to preventing destructive choices (leading to, e.g., unplanned pregnancy or abusive spousal relations), rather than imposing a specific conception of the good. The well-being that paternalist policies aim to secure is a threshold and a civic minimum that can be enforced against citizens' own choices and preferences. The distinction between preventive paternalism that protects individuals against destructive choices and directive paternalism that mandates specific options is an important one.

Ben-Porath ties the civic minimum "to individuals' well-being, and not primarily to their autonomy" (p. 20). She shares the view of, for example, William Galston that promoting autonomy is a threat to cultural diversity. The reason is that not all cultural groups value autonomy, and promoting it, for example, through education might undermine these groups' way of life. It seems to me that Ben-Porath goes too far in her rejection of autonomy, and I am not sure it is compatible with the aim of structured paternalism, which is to give citizens "access to opportunities" and "enable . . . individuals to express their diverse preferences" (p. 40). Moreover, the book ignores the issue of education for citizenship, and thereby the relationship between democracy and paternalism. If schools do not promote autonomy, do citizens then have real opportunities, not merely as subjects of law but also for being authors of the paternalist policies?

Democratic Governance. By Mark Bevir. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. 320p. $65.00 cloth, $29.95 paper.
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This book explores the relationship between governance and government. A unifying thread in the discussion is a

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critical assessment of the role of experts and expertise in contemporary systems of government. The book's main theme is to question recent attempts to remake the state that rely still on old concepts of representative democracy. Instead, it urges thinking about ways to renew democracy without appealing to expertise and nonmajoritarian institutions (p. 4). It suggests a form of "local reasoning" (local to a web of beliefs, rather than to geography) as a way of revitalizing participatory democracy (p. 262).

Mark Bevir starts (Chapter 1) with a discussion of his approach to the subject and promotes what he describes as an "interpretive theory of governance" (p. 3). Bevir defines interpretive social science as "philosophical rather than methodological," about the logic of arguments used, the meanings used to explain actions, the social construction of policy networks, and the contingencies involved (reasoning and action could have gone in a different way). It involves a shift away from the traditional preoccupation of political scientists with institutions and organizations (p. 85). Essentially, the unit of analysis is the meaning ascribed to their actions by the relevant policymakers. Following this approach, case studies are used as illustrative of patterns, rather than as systematic evidence of formal theories. The author characterizes this approach as "postmodernist," in contrast to the neo-classical economics and rational choice theorizing of the social sciences that dominated in the second half of the twentieth century and that he classifies as "modernist" (p. 258).

The ensuing discussion is divided into three parts. The first part looks at how policy actors have responded to the new governance by bolstering representative democracy with expertise; the second looks at the challenges posed to representative democracy by the new governance and uses case studies to illustrate a constitutional perspective; and the third uses case studies to illustrate a public administration perspective.

In Part I, governance is discussed in terms of a new form of knowledge production that challenged the way the postwar state embedded expertise and bureaucratic professionalism within the state and supplanted it with the informal authority of markets, networks, and actors outside the formal authority of government (Chaps. 2, 3, and 4). The chapters cover the familiar ground of the new public management and formation of policy networks, but they aim to clarify the challenges posed to traditional concepts of representative government. According to the author, under the impact of governance reforms, the state has become both more fragmented and less open to citizen participation. At the same time, it is exercising, partly through the growth of regulation, more extensive patterns of control over its citizens. These are the challenges posed to democracy (p. 91).

In Part II, the constitutional challenge of the new governance is illustrated in relation to the Westminster model of representative democracy with its tradition of a strong centralized executive. Chapter 5 discusses what is understood by "good governance" and the responses it has evoked. The book asserts that many governments have initiated reforms that aim to empower citizens but that these have formed technocratic responses mainly concerned with the effectiveness of governance, rather than with participatory politics (p. 118). Recent constitutional changes to the Westminster model are then described. They are assessed as falling within an old model of representative democracy and failing to look at alternatives (Chap. 6). A further chapter looks at changes to the role and structure of the judiciary in the UK, ending also with an appeal for consideration of alternatives to juridification as a response to the new governance.

In Part III, the new governance is looked at through the lens of public administration. Chapter 8 discusses the formation of public policy under the predilection of the new governance for networks of experts, and this is followed by a discussion of the move in the UK to "joined up government" as an administrative response. Before concluding, the book takes a look at the case of police reform and, in particular, at community-oriented approaches to policing as an example of the need for more "bottom up" policymaking.

This book can be seen as in a line of discussion about the uneasy fit between democratic theories of government and expertise (see, for example, Robert Dahl, *After the Revolution?* 1990), as well as in a line that questions the possibly exaggerated claims of theories of governance to provide a normatively superior account of democratic functioning (see, for example, Beate Kohler Koch, ed., *European Multi-Level Governance,* 2009). The method of "interpretive social science" is useful for supplementing other political science approaches and provides a different perspective. The tables that summarize the narratives and approaches used by key actors to justify changes in political, administrative, and policymaking structures are particularly helpful.

It is perhaps a limitation of the analysis that the Westminster model is taken as the benchmark for assessing the challenge to representative democracy. A more nuanced account of representative government, for example that advanced by Eric Schattschneider in *The Semisovereign People* (1975) for which there remains empirical backing, might have provided a more robust template. (See Benjamin I. Page, "The Semi-Sovereign Public," in *Navigating Public Opinion,* ed. Jeff Manza et al., 2002). In addition, Schattschneider's use of theories of bounded rationality as applied to political participation might also have tempered Bevir's rather too dismissive treatment of rational choice theory (pp. 41–42). Principal/agent theory, given short shrift by the author (pp. 68–69), also cannot be set aside quite so quickly in any democratic system of government where there is a separation of powers and congressional oversight of the executive branch.

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The message of the book—that much more attention should be given to local reasoning as a way to revive participatory government—is an important one. However, it is essential to distinguish between the varieties of localism —as a form of knowledge or belief, as a form of political participation, and as a form of community activism that may or may not link to politics. (For a questioning of the link, see William A. Maloney and Jan W. van Deth, eds., *Civil Society and Activism in Europe,* 2010). In the UK, David Cameron's "Big Society" initiative is in part an appeal to localism and has quickly encountered difficulties in implementation. Community activists do not necessarily want to participate in politics; state funding of local initiatives may foster a client relationship with central government rather than participation; local activists may represent myopic views and beliefs, and local knowledge as a form of knowledge production is a contested concept (for a definition and positive view, see L. Failing, R. Gregory, and M. Harstone, "Integrating Science and Local Knowledge in Environmental Risk Management: A Decision-Focused Approach," *Ecological Economics* 64 [October 2007]: 47–60). The discussion in this book, based largely on the one case study of policing, is far too slender a basis to support the message of local reasoning as a way of revitalizing democracy.

Not everyone will agree with Bevir's diagnosis of the challenges facing traditional styles of representative democracy. The prescription in favor of local reasoning also needs much fuller treatment. More important, however, is the way in which he demonstrates that interpretive social science can supplement other ways of analyzing the strains placed on old styles of representative government by new forms of governance. It is to be hoped that the book will encourage others to make use of such an approach.

Plato's Political Philosophy. By Mark Blitz. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. 336p. $60.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.
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As its name suggests, political philosophy is the search for wisdom about politics. Mark Blitz's comprehensive and challenging new book makes the broader claim that politics and philosophy are intimately and inextricably interwoven. "Philosophic life," he writes, is "a transformative extension of everyday satisfaction and excellence" that remains "rooted in ordinary understanding. . . . Plato shows the mutual connection of everyday and philosophic life, not just in what we seek but also in what and how we see" (p. 273). His view is evident in an intriguing formulation by which he occasionally refers to political or everyday life: the "co-philosophical world" (pp. 17, 23, 142, 270).

Blitz develops the links between philosophic and political life as he offers an expansive survey of the Platonic corpus that includes penetrating analyses of some of the least accessible Platonic dialogues and that treats a variety of themes, such as Socrates' attempt to elevate ordinary political life, the philosopher's motivations, and the character and extent of the wisdom that philosophy seeks. It would be impossible for this reviewer to do justice to all of Blitz's careful and subtle treatments, and so instead I will try to summarize what seems to be the thematic thread that runs throughout the book. This is an inquiry into virtue; Blitz argues that the initial examination of the virtues, as they emerge in political life, not only provides the impetus for philosophy but also guides its proper path (pp. 3, 92, 269).

According to the author, Plato has two goals in examining virtue: "protecting and advancing ethical virtue" and discerning the virtues' "specific qualities and possible unity" (p. 270). Blitz shows that these goals are evident in the *Laws,* which both offers a vision of a healthier, more rational political life and points to the need for greater clarity about virtue than ordinary political life achieves. In the *Laws,* the attempt to satisfy that need most fully is to occur in the Nocturnal Council, whose members will study the unity of virtue, for according to the Athenian Stranger, "we don't know the virtues until we know their unity" (p. 112).

Why, though, is the unity of virtue a question? Blitz painstakingly shows the origins of the question in conversations that Socrates has about children's education, duties toward parents, and political ambition. Through these conversations, Socrates brings ordinary citizens to see both that virtue is important and that it needs guidance. Moderation is a "proper yielding to pleasure" (p. 79); courage must confront the "proper risk" (p. 80). The vexing problem is determining what is "proper." Reflection on this problem yields the views that virtue requires (or perhaps is) knowledge of the true human good and that "one cannot grasp any virtue without seeing its connection to the other virtues and to virtue as a whole" (p. 78). Such knowledge and insight—such wisdom—would enable us always to know how to act, whether in the face of fears (courage) and pleasures (moderation) or toward the gods (piety) and the city (justice). The virtues would be unified in that they would all depend upon the same knowledge.

Blitz argues, though, that the virtues "are not knowledge simply" (p. 105) and that they differ, "even if this difference seems harder to discern in excellence than in imperfection" (p. 262). But in what exactly does their difference consist? In Blitz's rich and nuanced account, it seems not so much that the virtues differ from each other as that they have multiple versions, depending on the wholes of which they are parts or on the several ends they may serve. For example, courage looks different in the soldier and the philosopher; whereas the soldier risks his life in defending the city, the philosopher risks "opprobrium" in questioning convention and seeking wisdom (p. 176). In this case, the existence of two different "wholes" or ends yields two different manifestations of the virtues.

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