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Is faster better? Political and ethical framings of pace and space

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Abstract

Considering the recent 'temporal turn' in International Relations scholarship, this article proposes that space and time are concepts that 'thicken' one another in several ways, with significant implications for understanding foreign policy and world politics. In the discourse of security and governance, space–time frames work together to facilitate and legitimize certain policies, actions, and reactions, and imply distinct perspectives on ethics. Drawing on the examples of United States (US) drone use, reactions to the event that has become known as 'Benghazi', and fears of the global spread of disease, this study investigates how temporal and spatial framings conceptualize effective and ethical security and governance. Arguing that space–time frames take shape from the resonance of political, theoretical, and cultural texts, four frames are elaborated including 'space–time liberations', 'space–time oppressions', 'space–time strategics', and 'space–time reflexivities'. The article concludes by suggesting that contradictions and tensions between the frames along with postcolonial and decolonial perspectives can be leveraged to interrogate and displace dominant notions of pace and space in the practice and study of world politics, and that this is a form of scholarly and political reflexivity.

Keywords: time; space; security; US foreign policy; International Relations Theory; ethics

The discourse of United States (US) foreign policy commonly assumes that 'faster is better', evident in several rhetorical devices such as 'real-time' and 'pre-emption'. However, there are also calls to slow down the pace of security decisions; in and out of the halls of government, we see efforts to take time to make sound decisions, build-in institutional checks, and include more voices and perspectives in deciding on foreign policy and security. These temporal framings are in tension. On the one hand, if policymakers do not respond 'in time' they can be criticized, as happened in the aftermath of the event known as 'Benghazi' when critics alleged that Barack Obama's presidential administration failed to prevent deaths and injuries to US personnel, or when the Obama government was faulted for not intercepting individuals entering the United States who carried diseases such as Ebola. On the other hand, if decisions appear rushed, blame follows. Opponents of US drone policies argued that the decision-making process did not gather enough information or

pause to properly consider whether targeted persons were indeed imminent threats to US security. In response, Obama and his top officials underscored and perhaps intensified the attention that each strike received in the Oval Office itself. Furthermore, space is bound up with temporality in these narratives. In US drone policies, 'Benghazi', and the specter of global flows of disease, spaces were labeled sovereign, anarchic, failed, threatened, and dangerous, with implications for who was subjected to the pace of 'strategic' and 'ethical' action. Considering these examples, this article makes the argument that spatial and temporal framings work together to establish meaning, authority, and legitimacy.

A key argument herein is that the actors of world politics, broadly conceived, ubiquitously use the language of time and space with important consequences, but do not often acknowledge or theorize time and space as concepts, nor explicitly consider them together. Among scholars, a burgeoning body of International Relations (IR) writing has sought to rectify this lack, in part, with its emphasis on temporality, time, and timing (Der Derian 2001; Hutchings 2008; Hom and Steele, 2010; Shapiro 2010; Glezos 2011; Solomon 2014; McIntosh 2015; Stevens 2015; Agathangelou and Killian 2016; Hom 2016, 2018a, 2018b; Hom *et al.* 2016). However, this literature has been, on the whole, less attentive to how time and space implicate one another, and while a 'temporal turn' appears on the horizon (Hom 2018b), it may be in danger of becoming a niche specialization in IR rather than having broad applicability. This article asserts that the language of time and space, in fact, pervade the *practice and study* of world politics, that the notion of 'space–time frames' is useful for organizing this language, and that these frames imply empirical claims about politics as well as distinct perspectives on ethics. The empirical/normative dimensions of these frames inform and facilitate policies, actions, and reactions. While there may be specifically constitutive, causal, or performative processes at work, this article focuses more generally on frames as contextual narrative devices – providing both resources and constraints for actors, and circulating and thus *resonating* among many textual products of scholarship and politics, but also media and culture. Thus, space–times frames should be treated seriously as objects of investigation by the field of IR and as reasons for scholarly reflexivity given the contributions of academics to their articulation and use.

The article begins by elaborating time and space as social concepts that can be fruitfully considered together. Describing four possible frames as 'space–time liberations', 'space–time oppressions', 'space–time strategics', and 'space–time reflexivities', I then specify their discursive resonance in a variety of overlapping and fluid dimensions – theoretical, political, and cultural. Examples primarily from discourse about US foreign policy, as just one possible site of investigation, aid this effort – attacks on a US diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya and the criticisms within the United States that followed, US drone practices in what has been posed a 'war on terror', and US commentary on the global flow of disease. In these cases, the frames of 'space–time liberations' and 'space–time strategics' are especially prominent and I discuss how they combine notions of time and space to uniquely articulate threats and problems and their ethical solutions. While the frames of 'space–time oppressions' and 'space–time reflexivities' are less frequent, I provide some examples of their expression and political potential. The article

concludes with a discussion on how the IR literature can pinpoint the tensions and contradictions among the frames as a form of critical engagement, with confrontation and commentary from postcolonial perspectives especially relevant given the racialized-spatial distribution of speed this article identifies. It may be that stories about world politics can be evaluated and reconstructed by ethical concerns about how time and space have been organized via discourses of race, gender, threat, and development/'good governance'.

Framing and interpreting space–time

Recently, IR scholars have done much to explicate how and why temporality, time, and timing are important in world politics. This literature and that of related fields, generally approaches the topic with a social lens in contrast to physicists and some philosophers who study time as having real properties and thus a nature to be uncovered (e.g. Bardon 2013). Relative to a metaphysics of time, a social lens is more attentive to how *interpretations* and *understandings* of time matter. The point is to investigate how perceptions and arrangements of time and timing are key heuristics for thinking the world and acting (Solomon 2014; Hom 2018a), narrating events and history (Barder and McCourt 2010; Lundborg 2012; McIntosh 2015; Agathangelou and Killian 2016; Hom 2016; Fazendeiro 2018), and conceptualizing accounts of ethics and change (Connolly 2002; Hutchings 2008; Hom and Steele 2010; Fazendeiro 2018) including the use of calendar time (as duration) for structuring the distribution of democratic participation (Cohen 2018) and for managing everyday activities and subjectivities of populations (Bastian 2012).

Time, in other words, is a key feature of politics and ethics, but it is also a versatile concept with multiple meanings and uses. While much of the time-related IR literature has turned a critical eye to challenging dominant temporalities – such as *chronos* and *kairos* and their interaction (Hutchings 2008), 'clock time' (McIntosh 2015), and closed (e.g. linear and cyclical) relative to open temporalities (Hom and Steele 2010) – fine-grained typologies are also being elaborated. For example, one study identifies four additional notions of time in intellectual history beyond linear time – cosmological, eschatological, instantaneity, and the flow of becoming (Holmqvist and Lundborg 2016) – and another details various 'chronopolitical logics' (or 'tendencies') in cyber security narratives (Stevens 2015). This article seeks to contribute to this literature in part by explicating how several framings of *time* are formulated and available to a wide range of actors (not just IR theorists) to interpret what is possible and desirable. Yet, this effort is inadequate without also attending to the social and political construction of *space*.

The persuasive case for time in IR as a 'stand-alone issue' (McIntosh 2015, 466) has been made, in part, on an assessment of the field as 'overly spatial' (Hutchings 2008, 11; Hom 2018a, 69) and unable to extricate itself from a view of time as fundamentally 'linear, neutral, and unitary' (McIntosh 2015, 466). This is a crucial task, for world politics is not just about territory, geopolitics, and geography, and time is conceived in a variety of ways. Yet, the view of this article is that we ought to avoid embracing the study of time at the exclusion of space for they are posed in relation to one another, as seen in the work of Valverde (2015) and Shapiro (2010) on urban cities, Blaney and Inayatullah (2010) on the reproduction

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of capitalism by associating 'savage' spaces with temporal lags, Aradau and van Munster (2012) on how time and space are co-constituted by terrorist preparedness exercises, and in the study of geography (May and Thrift 2001; Anderson 2010). As Mikhail Bakhtin puts it, 'Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot, and history' (quoted in Valverde 2015, 10). Instances abound, from the 'official court time' of the space of the court room (Valverde 2015, 17) to controversies about how space/place and timing matter for justifying violence in the just war tradition. In this article, we also see how the legitimacy of the speed of strategic action is spatialized. Another way to elaborate this 'thickening' is that spatial and temporal markers discursively anchor one another. While notions of time can indicate pace and direction, for example, spatial markers add site and scope, as will be elaborated in the frames considered here (see Table 1). In a familiar example, neorealism features the temporal notion of cycles of violence but also a world spatially organized as sovereign states. Only when time and space are joined do we get cycles of interstate violence. The analysis of this article makes the case that focusing on time or space alone misses out on key parts of ontological stories about world politics.

Moreover, while space–time frames refer to arrangements of meaning that differently situate space relative to time, these meanings are not strictly explanatory or normative, and they are present in many types of texts. Diagnosis and prescription, histories and historical lessons, practices and pragmatic approaches, and genealogies and their revaluations all blur the explanatory/normative binary. In these textual performances, framing organizes several meanings (Goffman 1974) and powerfully so when their political and ethical messages resonate in multiple dimensions (e.g. theoretical, political, and cultural). This resonance enables 'decoders' (readers) to more easily identify with and accommodate its meanings, whether they be political actors, cultural producers, or IR scholars, building on the IR literature that traces the social embeddedness of scholarship and the role of the IR expert (Der Derian 2001; Edkins 2005; Ish-Shalom 2013). Some also suggest that ambiguous phrases are especially relatable because of their 'repeatability', 'iterability', and 'instantaneity' (Oren and Solomon 2015). Uttering phrases such as WMD (Oren and Solomon 2015), globalization, 'real-time', or 'dark' spaces (in this article) over and over again give them their social effects, along with how they connect to other relatable metaphors including those that masculinize and domesticate, as in the 'technostrategic language' of nuclear weapons (Cohn 1987). Regardless of how the frames' effects unfold, the analysis here allows for space–time language to bring social objects into being, such as identity, subjectivity, nationalism, racism, and so on (Bhabha 1990; Butler 1990; Bastian 2012; Solomon 2014; Oren and Solomon 2015), and play an important role in how these concepts take on meaning in narratives that make empirical and ethical claims. To extend Hutchings' (2008, 4) characterization of time, this article is interested in 'inter-subjective, public constructions' of space and time, particularly those found in multiple dimensions of public discourse – theoretical, political, and cultural.

Spatio-temporal textual performances, however, have another kind of multiplicity – they are in competition and tension even in the same policy-action realm and can themselves be more monologic or dialogic (Valverde 2015, 7–8). Furthermore, texts can be read differently than intended or 'encoded' by their

Table 1: Dimensions of Four Space-Time Frames

	Temporal		Spatial	
Frames	Pace	Direction	Site	Scope
Liberations	Fast	Linear, and the 'not-yet' of the future	Individuals, states, organizations, global citizens	Progressively universal
Oppressions	Rhythmic (biological)	Life cycle	Body	Local
Strategics	Acceleration, speed	Future (all)	Multiple – land, water, air, outerspace, virtual	Universal
Reflexivities	Slowing	'Non-time'	'Non-space' of 'thinking'; interpersonal deliberation and questioning	Local

authors (Barthes 1970; Hall 1993), and 'decoders' can offer subversive/playful readings that manipulate the 'encoder's' preferred meaning (Lisle 2014, 167–69; Valverde 2015, 4–5). Thus, we need to be attentive to agency in how frames are navigated. In rhetorical communities with their political and cultural relations of power some actors can also more readily be speakers, lending weight to their intertextual moves – the specific texts (words, images, and symbols) referenced to construct meanings in a particular situation (Hansen 2006). For example, that Clinton administration officials and the media in the 1990s moved from texts that constructed the Balkans as tribal and backward to part of Europe and white facilitated humanitarian intervention (HI) (Hansen 2006).

Methodologically, this study references several texts (and their speakers) prominent in fleshing out and reproducing the four frames that are the focus of this article over the next several sections, but the frames themselves represent both dominant and minority narratives about space and time evident in US foreign policy discourse. While these frames cover a wide variety of views that circulate in theoretical, political, and cultural texts primarily in the United States and the US/Western academy, I do not contend that they exhaust all possible interpretations of space and time in world politics, especially when we consider postcolonial and decolonial perspectives (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010; Agathangelou and Killian 2016). Still, examples drawn from global governance indicate that the frames are not particular to the United States. Analytically, the temporal dimensions of the frames are explored via the guiding terms 'pace' and 'direction' and spatial dimensions are summarized by 'site' and 'scope', as indicated in Table 1. These terms are meant to be useful for comparing and differentiating how constructions of time and space interact in these frames, but the dimensions should not be reified for conceptualizing time and space themselves. In this vein, two specific notes are worth

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making. First, the term 'pace' is not often used in the time literature, but is beneficial here for discussing the rate of movement of actions/processes without assuming they are slow/fast or accelerating/decelerating. Second, while the term 'direction' may be considered a spatialization of time via metaphor, this typology reflects how time and space are socially articulated with fluidity and in reference to the other, indicating just how ubiquitously they 'thicken' one another in particular narratives.

Space–time liberations: advancing humanity through a cosmopolitan globalization

In 1964 Marshall McLuhan published his widely cited book *Understanding Media* in which he argued that space and time had become so compressed in an age of 'electric technology' that 'our central nervous system' extended 'in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is concerned' (1964, 3). The picture that McLuhan depicted – of a global corporeal extension of the senses so that we can see, hear, and experience what was previously difficult to access – influenced much of the globalization discourse. Advances in communication, travel, and economic production and transactions were said to have extended the agency of individual and collective action, ideas, and ideologies as never before across vast spatial expanses (Held *et al.* 1999; Friedman 2005). In this frame, linear clock time decoupled from space as technologies created social capacities and flows less inhibited by physical distance. The result was a 'global village' (McLuhan 1964) or flattened world (Friedman 2005) that transcended corporal/communal separations and therefore challenged traditional groupings of identity, economy, and borders.

In optimistic renditions of globalization, enhanced agency and desire meld seamlessly. The greater the ease of communication and travel, the greater potential to realize wealth, peace, and human connection. A cultural representation is seen in a long-running series of AT&T commercials depicting a spokesperson questioning children along with their comedic responses, prompting the truism, 'It's not complicated. Faster is better' (Fallon 2013). And, even though it has become commonplace to hypothesize that globalization provides both purpose and means for those labeled terrorists to carry out violent attacks (Cronin 2002/2003), globalization is still often positively appraised. Speaking just 10 days after the events of 11 September 2001 as Director of the Policy Planning Staff under President George W. Bush, Richard Haass (2001) lauded globalization's 'mostly positive' benefits. In total, several intellectual, cultural, and political narratives commonly assume that the enhancement of various capabilities better satisfy need and desire, in defiance of geography and in the form of social cooperation and exchange of goods, services, and solutions.

Beyond globalization's functionalism, this space–time framing also implies a *globalization of responsibility*. McLuhan (1964) believed that an 'electric' corporeal extension would change how we think about community and responsibility. Implied is that a political body's borders have become more porous and dynamic, transforming the scope of moral concern. On this logic, liberal cosmopolitan theorists (Singer 1972; O'Neill 1975; Nussbaum 1994) have urged wealthy nations (collectively and individually) to give and do more (including projects of 'development') to alleviate hunger and disease among one's fellow global citizens. Indicating

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just how much such theorists deem distance irrelevant, Singer (1972, 232) confidently stated, 'Expert observers and supervisors, sent out by famine relief organizations or permanently stationed in famine-prone areas, can direct our aid to a refugee in Bengal almost as effectively as we could get it to someone in our own block'. Indeed, there is now an elaborate system of multilateral, bilateral, and grassroots aid provision, claiming the ability to arrive 'at the scene' in a matter of days, if not hours, wherever disaster or disease may strike.

This space–time framing is linear-progressive because it implies the steady march of progress. Technologies promise to make space less relevant for liberatory improvements now and in the future (see Table 1). A variety of liberal moral–philosophical discourses including deontological (i.e. it is right to alleviate suffering) and utilitarian (i.e. alleviating suffering maximizes good/well-being) logics (featured above), but also social-constructivist theorizing (Bellamy 2009; Wheeler 2000), support far-reaching normative (or norms-based) projects premised on the *ongoing spread* of such capacities and their ideologies. They include humanitarianism, HI, democracy promotion, responsibility to protect, and peacebuilding. Also, to the extent that neoliberal theorizing has moral lessons – despite efforts to shed its normativity (Moravcsik 1997) – these scholars extol and seek to *extend* the 'benefits' of democracy and capitalism via global technocratic governance (Keohane *et al.* 2009) and administrative cooperation via globalization's capacities (Slaughter 2004, 8–18).

International organizations, NGOs, and liberal states perceive themselves as playing a key role. Haass (2001) asserted that to take full advantage of globalization's opportunities, governments and international institutions would need to facilitate by offering 'global solutions'.[1] 'American leadership' would be key, with its advantages in economics, the military, and ideas. A liberal US hegemonic order has also recognized the importance of surveillance for the spread of Western (capitalist) human rights (Steele and Amoureux 2006, 410–18). Thus, efforts to widen the coincidental goals of humanity, security, and prosperity are tied to globalization's technologies that promise to increase the rate and spread of *information*. Vast surveillance capacities deploy several information-gathering mechanisms, including NGO and media recordings and reports, but also satellites and drones. Exemplary is the recent United Nations initiative to enhance humanitarian missions' effectiveness by using drones to gather information about conflicts (Katombe 2013), with NGOs also showing interest in drones to better monitor and deliver aid in war, genocide, famine, or natural disaster. Such projects seek to advance liberal values but may also help legitimate the technology itself (including its violent uses). Drones, for example, bring the (liberal) benefit of aiding earthquake relief in Haiti and make the violence of war just through the claim that precision minimizes death of the 'innocent' (Zehfuss 2011).

Globalization, in sum, has altered our relationship to space and time to enable but also *demand* the present and future spread of a beneficial and humane global community, especially on the part of those most empowered by such a world (Mathews 1997). This includes intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and nongovernmental authorities and technocrats, but also states and individuals (Table 1).

[1]Haass 2001 noted the time–space of globalization, with its 'compression of distance and the increasing permeability of traditional boundaries to the rapid flow of goods, services, people, information, and ideas'.

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Ethical agency, then, is the individual, organization, or humanity that can and will see and do more things (aid and intervene) as space and time compress.

Space–time oppressions: penetrating, regulating, and producing life

In this space–time frame, political and economic technologies are criticized because the monitoring and governance they enable are thought to penetrate, regulate, and produce life, making us less free. In genealogical studies of prison reform, madness, and sexuality, Michel Foucault (1977), for example, argued that disciplinary techniques of power historically proliferated in a paradigm of governmentality wherein the *individual* and the body became sites of knowledge and normalization. This kind of panoptic power that produces life, Foucault thought, is more pervasive and insidious than other techniques of power that regulate death. Not only is discipline evident in unprecedented surveillance that affects our everyday behavior (e.g. street cameras, body cameras, monitoring online activities, credit reports, and so on), subjectivities follow suit as we seek to become responsible consumers, productive workers, and good or law-abiding citizens. The effectiveness and efficiency of power are thus magnified at the site of subjectivation. The body and the individual life cycle (with its rhythms), respectively, are situated as the space and time dimensions of modernity (Table 1). This framing of a technological age and its subtle oppressions is prolific in political activism and entertainment. This includes the 2011 Wall Street protests, cyberpunk/dystopic films such as *Blade Runner* and *The Ghost in the Shell*, protest art and street graffiti, and the (often playful) appropriation of technological enhancements in 'hacktivism' and fashion (Walker-Emig 2018).

If power relations have been intensified by modernity, as Foucault (1984, 48) elaborated in his widely influential scholarship, including for IR (e.g. Steele and Amoureux 2006; Debrix and Barder 2009; Death 2010; Steele 2010; Walters 2012; Zanotti 2013), it may be fruitful to further excavate modernity's space–time assumptions. For example, that a humanist–modernist agenda not only reforms the body toward normality and treats it more humanely but also maximizes individuals' ability to perform tasks by institutionalizing time itself as a regulative mechanism, exemplified by the individualized schedules of the military and factory (Foucault 1977). According to Foucault (1984), the *costs* of this agenda include a subjectivity that is more the product of others' experimentations than our own, and thus a *loss of freedom*.

Similarly, for Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000), communication and other globalized flows produce, organize, and legitimate both commodities and subjectivities.[2] Globalization might thus be shorthand for a diffuse and vast 'empire' in which 'life is made to work for production and production is made to work for life' (Hardt and Negri 2000, 32). The life cycle is defined by cycles of production and productivity. Yet, flows of globalization can facilitate historical anxieties at the *site of the body* (corporeal and political) when surveillance efforts fail. Colonial tropes portrayed rampant disease as correlated with a lack of hygiene and thus further impetus for a civilizing mission, but also an ever-present danger of contagion (Hardt and Negri 2000, 134–36), finding echo in worried contemporary

[2]Also see Hutchings 2008, 6 on the regulatory and disciplinary power of *chronotic* time.

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discourse framing the global spread of HIV/AIDS, SARS, and Ebola as threatening to spread across bodies and borders. Anxiety is magnified precisely because such threats appear to have been delivered by globalized flows such as travel, providing other reasons to be suspicious of modernity.[3] In the United States, not just those on 'the left' may find globalization's technologies oppressive.

Reorganizations of space and time through knowledge practices, in other words, can be read negatively. Another prominent example is Anthony Giddens' account of modernity as marking a widespread transition from 'traditional' to 'post-traditional' societies. Tradition is defined as chronological repetition of the past in the form of rituals, 'formulaic truths', and knowledge 'guardians' who interpret them (Giddens 1996, 8, 15–17, 51). One benefit of tradition is the control of anxiety through emotional investments in collective memories that at least *seem* continuous because knowledge, thought and action have stable temporal carriers, namely generational transmission. 'Post-traditional' societies that mark 'modernity', in contrast, reject the authority of tradition and instead make social practices provisional so that they are 'constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practices' (Giddens 1990, 38). While presenting the possibility of improvement (e.g. the scientific method), unfettering knowledge from tradition can create 'ontological anxiety'. When routines provide stability their disruption can be insecuritizing, as explored by IR scholars (Steele 2005). This prospect illuminates the occurrence of counterproductive routines, like the security dilemma in which actors become affectively attached to behaviors that foster inter-state enmity (Mitzen 2006).

It may appear, then, that societies are at the mercy of modernity. Having thrown off authority and tradition as guiding lights (Giddens 1996, 10–11), knowledge is produced for the sake of knowledge, rendering us beholden to the unwieldy and unforeseen consequences of technological advancements. As Giddens (2014) later explored, from climate change of industrialism to biotechnology and nanotechnology of postmodernity, 'indefinite time–space extensions' have ensured that such hazards are globally *existential*, or threatening to life itself. One might suspect that this way of organizing knowledge has started us down a path that will propel us 'off the edge of history' (Giddens 2014). In sum, modernity's reorganization of time and space may obliterate our (corporeal) worlds, existentially (with Giddens) or in terms of freedom and autonomy (with Foucault and Hardt and Negri). Indeed, a variety of anxieties about social control and surveillance and the unintended consequences of technological innovation animate imaginaries of foreign policy and popular culture.

Yet, this framing holds out the possibility that oppression can be challenged (Table 1). The camera of the onlooker to police activities, the protestor's hand-held drone, the whistleblower's thumb drive are all tools of technology that add up to a system of 'malveillance' (power and counter-power) (Foucault 1977; Death 2010; Steele 2010). Those feeling oppressed may be interested in Foucault's (1984, 48) question, 'How can the growth of capabilities be disconnected from the intensification of power relations?' For Foucault, experimentations and emergent possibilities

[3]Even when global systems of surveillance evince notable success, as in health policy, its objects of surveillance are often suspicious and resentful of such intrusions (Youde 2010).

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can question the normativity of the present in which 'not all is bad' but everything is 'dangerous' (Foucault 1997, 256). Attentive to the many ways in which time and space can be organized to inscribe power relations on life and the body, one may seek as a form of freedom to *rupture* these inscriptions that *continuously and locally* resurface (Table 1). As Foucault (1984, 47) puts it, 'we are always in the position of beginning again'. This is not to erase power relations, but to take advantage of their 'instability', 'ambiguity', and 'reversibility', as one IR scholar has discussed (Zanotti 2013, 295).

In one possible example of oppression and counter-power, several Pakistanis, Americans, and the French street artist JR installed a large image of a child – whose family was killed in a drone strike – in a Pakistani field (Mackey 2014). This image was intended to appeal to the conscience of drone operators and communicate that the persons they killed are more than 'bugsplats' (referring to the name given to aerial images of drone strike damage). Oppression was represented by replacing one view (the perspective of the drone) with another (the perspective of those killed or left behind to grieve). This perspectival shift could possibly work on the pilot and the US public (when the image was reproduced by the media) to challenge assumptions of a symbiotic relationship between the time and space of modernity and may result in seeing how rather ordinary uses of living space (buildings, agricultural fields) and the bodies they house are rendered uniformly dangerous from the aerial perspective and recording of the drone's camera.

Space–time strategics: the demands of war and ethics

In the frame 'space–time strategics', space is represented as dangerous. In this understanding there is an imperative to strategically reach all space as quickly as possible, even in 'real-time'. Temporally, the inability to immediately act and react in all places of the globe (including outer- and cyber-space) is strategic failure. This view is exemplified by the military doctrine of Carl von Clausewitz (1949) in which strategic terrain is altered by, among other factors, technology. One has a strategic advantage only as long as it takes others to 'catch up' in response. Wielding an advantage of speed, however, was more of an art than a science for Clausewitz because terrain is unwieldy. The battlefield and the battle are complex and unpredictable, requiring the intelligence and creativity of the commander (Lynn 2003, 196). Battle is a conflict of wills in the context of the 'friction' of war – all that could go wrong and was not predicted.

If the battlefield is 'global' as in the US War on Terror, in the Clausewitzian view any space that escapes the swift wit of military intelligence and action is dangerous because it is there and then that the enemy may gain the upper hand. One must respond as, or even before, others act. Technological deficiency is diagnosed as not being able to secure all realms through mobile and efficient means (Huysmans 1997, 350), whether that space is physical/geographical/real or informational/virtual/'hyper-real'[4] (Der Derian 1990, 2001, 2003). Geopolitics and history are sidelined, even subsumed, by an obsession with speed. Virilio (2000) noted that

[4]Simulations that are more 'real', in a sense, because not needing to be traced to an origin/original, or 'signfied'.

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we are talking about 'operation at a distance, or, the possibility to act instantaneously' which 'means that history is now rushing headlong into the wall of time', and 'geostrategy' becomes 'chronostrategy'. There need not be, then, special areas of geo-strategic concern.

Der Derian (1990, 2001) especially has drawn on Virilio (also, Stevens 2015) to investigate violence and simulation (in a chronology of 'pace over space'), but it's not difficult to see this frame elsewhere. Just as the aspiring global hegemon of neorealism seeks to pre-empt threats and hegemonic competitors in all areas of the world (Mearsheimer 2001), so too could emergent threats of several kinds be confronted with the swift extension of power. The 'tragic' element in the imperative to reach multiplying dimensions of space is that almost any state can feel pulled into new arms races and forms of warfare, such as a drones race, space race, or cyber race, and states live in fear of not developing offensive/defensive capabilities before their multiplying enemies. The imperative is not just to be fast or faster, but *faster than enemies* and thus *accelerating* ahead of them (Table 1). In Clausewitzian fashion, the United States may find itself entrenched in the pace of strategic action/reaction (Aron 1985).

Alternatively, one could point to the emergence of a 'global risk society' that identifies several mobile and unbounded threats as 'geographically universal' (Mythen and Walklate 2008, 223–24). Risk assessments and probabilities locate these varied threats in many locations regardless of borders and *before* they materialize, as in at-risk-terrorists (Amoore and de Goede 2008; Obama 2012), so that the unknown future is nevertheless always 'present' and surprise foreclosed (Anderson 2010, 783). Similarly, military studies on the emergence of 'network-centric warfare' (Cebrowski and Gartska 1998) underscore how incorporating virtual threats infinitely expands the space–time terrain on which the enemy can emerge, making the Clausewitzian task more demanding (Der Derian 2001; Dillon and Reid 2009).

This 'space–time strategics' narrative is readily available in US foreign policy discourse. The Obama administration was excoriated by the Republican Party for 'Benghazi' (the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, Libya) for its failure to identify the attack as 'terrorism'. During a hearing of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Representative Mike Kelly expressed disbelief that the administration did not immediately recognize another '9/11 event' since they had, in Kelly's words, been watching in 'real-time' (Preston 2012). This failure was described as misleading the public, but we should consider whether Republicans were instead recoiling from or at least politically mobilizing the suggestion that sound intelligence analysis could be anything other than immediately identifying, neutralizing, and eradicating emergent threats on a global battlefield. While 'real-time' became the 'gold standard of media' (Der Derian 2003, 444), it's also used to measure how well decision-makers wield technologies of speed and expanse thought to have near-instant access to space. The terrorism diagnosis, Kelly argued, should have been as obvious as witnessing the events of 9/11 *in-person*. Tellingly, though the administration 'should have known', Republicans also subsequently called for more embassy security funding to more immediately identify threats (Preston 2012).

The Obama administration also invoked this *accelerationist* frame but interpreted the threat as *viral/virtual*. If information and ideology can be deployed

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against powerful states via virtual space and pace, such states must be attune to the threats of this asymmetric digital warfare and the fluidity of virtual and physical space; hence, the administration's *quick* recognition and response to the inflammatory content of a YouTube film 'gone viral'[5] that denigrated the prophet Muhammad. In the first hours after the attack, both President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton condemned the attackers but also noted Libyan and US news reports that tied the attack to rallies protesting the US-made film. Furthermore, the US embassy in Cairo, Egypt, where there were also protests, appeared to *anticipate* in a public statement possible repercussions and reactions to the film *before* they were underway (Kirkpatrick 2012). Virtual and physical space were treated as undifferentiated *and* threatening, to be controlled via speed (Table 1). When prevention of the imminent was unsuccessful, the administration turned to obtaining justice in similar Clausewitzian space–time terms. Dismissing Libya's protest of sovereign violation, James Comey, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, declared, 'We will shrink the world to find you. We will shrink the world to bring you to justice' (Al Jazeera 2014). Indicating how thoroughly space is blurred/eradicated by speed, the United States deemed their action criminal law enforcement *and* national self-defense (Power 2014; Savage 2014), joining pre-emptive action to immediate reaction as crucial strategies for arriving to the (battle)field of action.

That information could be obtained 'in time' also informed 'enhanced interrogation' techniques, drone targeting, and domestic surveillance, and haunted US efforts to locate Osama Bin Laden. One media headline made clear just how slim the temporal margin of error for strategic action: 'American Strike in January Missed Al Qaeda's No. 2 by a Few Hours' (Gall and Khan 2006). 'Enhanced interrogation' and drone technology have been so attractive, in part, because of what they promised *not to do* – take time. Thus, they are evaluated, as in the headline above, against the metric of what Hom (2016) refers to as *timing*. Strategic technology, in other words, has staked its success on the timeliness of action, and politically and culturally there is an obsession with the possibility that some areas have not been mapped and subdued. Efforts to be timely take into account risk factors; hence, the United States engages many tactics that survey space for suspicious activity and behavior, as in 'pattern of life' analysis of drone targeting (Stanford 2012). This knowledge is thought to aid preemptive action, portrayed in the 2002 film *Minority Report*, so that terrorism, genocide, and other 'atrocity crimes' (United Nations 2014) can be anticipated. Even if enemies are regenerated, the wager is that one will arrive to more places first and thereby gain a strategic advantage in keeping others 'on their heels'. To not vigorously pursue speed and expanse through technological innovation is to be in a position of vulnerability to emerging threats, multiplying threats, and the threat of 'blowback'. Indeed, the popular television series *Man in the High Castle* portrays the imperative to ensure victory to be multiversal and thus dependent on the timing of new modes of travel (even if non-linear).

In sum, speed is so important relative to space in this framing that the importance of spatial differentiations and concepts are de-emphasized including territorial

[5]A phrase that refers to the accelerating speed of the spread of information in virtual space.

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borders, geopolitical priorities, and actual/virtual distinctions, and all contingency must be confronted (see Table 1).[6] The worry that insecurity increases absent instantaneous presence and feedback is ubiquitous in how the United States understands its agency. Relative to ethics, this space–time frame could be interpreted as either *amoral* or requiring *immoral* stratagems that serve security interests via the *raison d'etat* logic of 'ends justify the means'. It could even be a resignation to human nature that is selfish, violent and prone to a 'will to power' realized as domination. However, the end could still have moral significance, such as a community's survival (Morgenthau 1978; Gray 1999) or enabling second-order moral pursuits once first-order security interests are preserved (Hyde-Price 2009).

Space–time reflexivities: slowing down to think

The fourth space–time frame can be termed 'space–time reflexivities'. This framing features a conscious effort to slow down the pace of events or decisions, perhaps even to stretch, pause, or opt out of time (and even space), either literally or figuratively. Calendrically, it may also be to take time even when others insist on exigency and the imperative to decide. We see the latter most clearly in IR scholarship that evaluates the quality of foreign policy decision-making (Jervis 1976; Allison and Zelikow 1999) and in Political Theory that attends to the marks of good deliberation, pluralism, and democracy within political communities (Aristotle 1984; Habermas 1984; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Macedo 1999). Slowness is also sometimes valued in academia and invoked to orient its self-reflexive interventions as seen in calls to reverse an emphasis on the productivity of publication (Berg and Seeber 2016), in critiques of the university as belonging to neoliberal institutions that emphasize speed, specialization, and profit (Caraccioli and Hozic 2016), and in an academic ethos that posits slowness as a precondition for critical distance/engagement with politics.

The deliberative democracy literature (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Macedo 1999) tends to emphasize the depth and breadth of deliberative participation as crucial ingredients of democracy. This implies taking more time in the spatial context of a political community to offer arguments, deliberate, and make decisions together. While speed may be double-edged in that it offers valuable benefits that exceed a threat framework (Connolly 2002; Glezos 2011),[7] what has been termed 'social acceleration' challenges democratic institutions that have been built to take time (Scheuerman 2004). Relatedly, Cohen (2018) argues that temporal processes are central to politics and legitimacy. Deliberation and reflection are often measured in terms of duration (calendrical time) and this quantitative measurement can serve as proxy for good governance as in the 'countdown deadline' of a campaign and the 'recurring deadlines' of voting (Cohen 2018).

Turning more toward ethical judgment, slowing down can mean taking time to attend to the particulars of politics and ethics in view of complexity, contingency

[6]And perhaps politics itself, as Virilio believed (Hutchings 2008, 133–35), and as seen in the 'chrono-political logic' of real-time in cyber security (Stevens 2015).

[7]In a Nietzschean vein, embracing 'becoming' and avoiding *ressentiment*.

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and the difficulty of making good decisions, and cultivating competence in drawing on reason and affect together as in discussions of Aristotle and world politics (Lang 2002; Brown 2012; Amoureux and Steele 2014; Amoureux 2016). Hannah Arendt's view of thinking and its temporality is especially intriguing as it more explicitly adds space to time in figuring reflexive devices. Contrary to the literature in economics, psychology, and foreign policy studies, Arendt's metric of sound judgment is not objective interests (self-interest or national interest) and avoiding errors in arriving at them. 'Thinking' is instead a figurative slowing or opting out of the time and space that normally compose the pluralism of politics in order to have an internal dialogue between 'me and myself'. To emphasize the point, Arendt referred to the 'non-time' and 'non-space' of 'thinking'. This form of reflexivity is a 'two-in-one' dialogue of talking to oneself as though two selves (eme emautô):

> It is this duality of myself with myself that makes thinking a true activity, in which I am both the one who asks and the one who answers. Thinking can become dialectical and critical because it goes through this questioning and answering process, through the dialogue of *dialegesthai*, which actually is a 'travelling with words,' a *poreuesthai dia tōn logōn*, whereby we constantly raise the basic Socratic question: What do you mean when you say…? (Arendt 1978, 185).

This internal dialogue is made possible and enhanced by an 'enlarged mentality' (borrowing from Kant) that refers to our ability to summarize for ourselves the views and experiences of others. In other words, we are potentially in difference and conversation with others *and* within our-selves (Arendt 1978, 398). Difference within the self enables us to treat conclusions about how the world appears to us as provisional and is thus a hallmark of reflexivity.

This thinking is not seamless but its very seamlessness brings ethical benefits, as seen in the three similes of Socrates. Socrates, Arendt noted, did not leave a body of doctrine because he continuously sought to make thought and action problematic and unstable, both within himself and in conversation with others, giving reflexivity its political value. As an 'electric ray' that 'remains steadfast in his own perplexities', he paralyzed others by being paralyzed himself; he knew how to 'sting' and 'arouse' citizens to this continuous questioning and answering process as a 'gadfly'; and, like a 'midwife', Socrates judged and purged sterile and unexamined opinions (as 'wind eggs') (Arendt 1978, 172–73). The point of thinking, then, is to generate perplexities and contradictions; not to resolve them or reach consensus, but to grasp them and potentially change what we have been thinking and doing. When in paralysis we 'stop and think', and may also experience a 'dazing after-effect' in which we feel 'unsure of what seemed… beyond doubt' (Arendt 1978, 175). Yet, thinking is not just deconstructive – strengthening the ability to 'say no' and standing out in refusal. Thinking on a wide basis can also assist societies or individuals in avoiding regrettable outcomes such as 'political evil' (Arendt 1964), cope with the contingency of plural life, and initiate the new beginnings of political projects. Reflexive thinking, in other words, is slow, disruptive and disorienting when time and space are viewed as figural orientations rather than literal/material sequencing and space, but still fundamentally connected to political action.

Politically and culturally, the idea of slowness has a mixed record in US foreign policy. One might say that as the events of 'Benghazi' unfolded the Obama administration did seek to take the time to get it right, hesitant to call the event an 'act of terrorism' without first gathering and assessing information. They sought a measured and thoughtful response. In addition, the administration opted for taking time to decide US policy on US involvement in Syria. When questioned, senior adviser Dan Pfeiffer explained: 'There's no time table for solving these problems that's going to meet the cable news cycle speed…We'd much rather do this right than do it quickly. We tried the opposite [during the Bush years] and it worked out very poorly' (DeYoung and Balz 2014). Likewise, the Obama administration sought to deflect criticism of their drone practices by emphasizing the care and consideration that each strike received by the president himself, including the claim that he *waited* to strike until there were no children present.

To summarize, the space–time frame of 'reflexivities' underscores taking more time to deliberate/debate *in* public-political spaces, or creating critical distance *from* public-political spaces and times in favor of slow time, 'non-time', or 'non-space' to consider the complexities of situations and to re-think what we are doing (see Table 1). Perhaps the Obama administration did not fully subject thought and its consequences-in-action to the far-reaching criticism and internal dialogue Arendt imagined, but its discourse evoked taking/making time and space as constitutive elements of legitimate politics, meaningful citizenship, and ethical judgment. While the space–time framing of reflexivity as ethics might aim at avoiding error in the pursuit of 'rational' foreign-policy, a more searching reflexivity closer to Arendt's 'thinking' has been elaborated as responsive to the difference and epistemological uncertainty of world politics noted by some international political theorists (Steele 2010; Zanotti 2014; Inayatullah 2014; Amoureux 2016).

Interpreting time and space in US foreign policy

Given these space–time framings in and on US foreign policy, what can be concluded? For all four frames, recent examples were provided from scholarship, politics, and popular culture and media. In this section, the article's claims are further refined – arguing that these interpretations can be in tension but may also concatenate or combine in unique ways. Most prominent is a strained merger between 'space–time liberations' and 'space–time strategics' that spatially differentiates the speed and acceleration of action. Exemplary is ambiguity about whether the fight against terrorism need be regulated by international law and just war principles. On the one hand, George W. Bush and his officials distinguished between legitimate combatants and fighters not covered by the Geneva Conventions, implying that the latter were outside the states system and could be treated more aggressively. On the other hand, officials regularly referenced liberal values during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and backpedaled some following criticism of their interpretation of the Geneva Conventions and leaked pictures depicting abuse at the Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq. Underscoring the tension, President Bush (2006) in a single speech lauded the successes of 'enhanced interrogation' and also declared, 'I want to be absolutely clear… The United States does not torture. It's against our laws and it's against our values'.

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The Obama administration pledged to end what they judged problematic about the previous administration's foreign policy including indefinite detention and interrogation that amounted to torture, and they sought to promote respect for international law more broadly (Obama 2009). Nevertheless, they also struggled with just how universal liberal values would be, overseeing a secretive drone program that killed many civilians and some American citizens but also seemed a potent tool for acting quickly in a variety of 'dangerous' theatres without the likely failure of 'boots on the ground'. Officials addressed this issue by referencing the 'law of war', implying that battle's humane laws purified drone practices (Brennan 2012; Obama 2013).

While the intertextuality of Obama administration discourse insinuated a lack of law in the previous administration and thus moral improvement, Obama, like Bush, made crucial *spatial* and *temporal* distinctions. Seeking moral comfort in the technological capability to illuminate and reach dangerous spaces, the administration claimed they responded to threats consistent with *jus in bello* because drones as 'precise precision weapons' that make 'pinpoint strikes' (Obama 2012, 2013) by definition minimize civilian casualties.[8] What this confidence in the efficacy of weaponized technology belies and the Bush administration's spatialized concepts make more apparent (e.g. 'black sites', Guantanamo), is that not all spaces and times are treated uniformly. US drone practices (with Hellfire missiles added to surveillance drones) have also been justified with reference to Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas as remote, wild, and dangerous (Filkins 2008; Mazzetti and Rohde 2008). Such areas are considered 'ungoverned', aligning with the administration's justification of drones as warranted *where* and *when* states do not, will not, or cannot act against terrorists (Brennan 2012; Obama 2012), where there is 'unrest' (in the 'Arab world'), and in an era of 'failed states' (Obama 2013).

These distinctions that make violent interventions and their (regrettable) 'accidents' more acceptable are grounded in enduring notions of the borderland/frontier, Europe, and 'the rest' (Cha 2015), and the not-yet of the postcolonial subject who experiences a perpetual temporal lag in partaking of independence, rights, and development (Jabri 2012, 65). While the United States may find violence attractive for various reasons, it is telling that under both administrations its agents felt compelled to engage such violent practices *outside* both the homeland and 'civilized'[9] areas (marked by liberal norms enshrined in laws, constitutions, and cultural practices). These figurations support efforts to remake spaces deemed obscure, unruly, threatening, distant, and behind, through timely action and in 'a battle of wills' (Obama 2013), but they also gather 'dangerous' bodies (terrorists) in spaces ascribed with liminality and as behind-the-times (e.g. Cuba).

Bifurcations of space–time are further put into relief by the media firestorm that accompanied Senator Rand Paul's criticism of the Obama administration for allowing the possibility that a drone could be used against a US citizen on US soil (garnering extensive media coverage and culminating in Paul's time-occupying

[8]See Zehfuss 2011 for how precision is problematically measured. Obama 2009, 2013 also remarked that terrorists kill 'many more Muslims that we do', a rule-utilitarian moral evaluation.

[9]Bush used this term many times relative to terrorism including in 2001 addresses to the 107th US Congress, the United Nations, and the Citadel (US Government 2011).

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filibuster of John Brennan's appointment as director of the Central Intelligence Agency). Resistance in the United States by those who considered (consciously or not) their (domestic) space to be governed/civilized was perhaps one of the few firewalls checking the near-total expansion of the battlefield by the speed of military response,[10] though one could interpret US domestic space as a different kind of battlefield where strategy and tactics must remain more surreptitious (semi-covert 'homeland security') and civil rights balanced with security (Obama 2012, 2013).[11] In 'domestic' space, threats are mostly 'foreign' but specific (e.g. 'the terrorist', 'the Muslim', and 'the extremist'), whereas non-domestic and non-European spaces can be uniformly designated uncivilized, lawless, and not-yet-governed (well) so that even US citizens could be killed there. Tellingly, one survey found US residents largely approved of drone strikes abroad (65%) including against US citizens (41%), but fewer approved of drone strikes within the United States, whether against suspected foreign terrorists (25%) or US citizens suspected to be terrorists (13%) (Brown and Newport 2013). Obama (2013) himself made clear after the Rand Paul provocation that US citizenship would only protect citizens within US borders and could not 'serve as a shield' elsewhere. Furthermore, Rand Paul's developing position, though stricter, still featured a spatial distinction – the due process standard in targeting decisions could be relaxed outside 'American soil' (Bump 2015). Together, these positions qualify action/reaction spatially and temporally so that a more permissive global 'commons' includes ungoverned/misgoverned land in addition to sea, space, and air.[12] US capabilities can be swiftly brought to this *terra nullius*.

The 'liberations' view of time and space as more compressed may also facilitate the belief that threats from dangerous areas are becoming closer and more imminent. In this threat imaginary, we witness the proverbial 'ticking-bomb' scenario posed in cultural and political texts (like the television show *24*) in which the passage of every second in a globalized world seems to make a terrorist attack on the 'homeland' more and more likely. This point was underscored for first-year President Obama on Christmas Day 2009 when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate explosives packed in his underwear on a plane from Amsterdam to the United States (Finn 2012). This appears to have been a key moment for Obama's decision to step up the drone campaign against mid-level and not just 'high-value' insurgents/terrorists (Scahill 2013). In addition to those on a 'list' or 'baseball cards', dangerous space was surveyed for emergent threats as or before they formed, as seen in 'pattern of life' analysis and 'signature strikes' (Stanford 2012). In this regard, 'space–time strategics' was necessary for 'space–time liberations'. Relying on this logic, drone targeting has been extended beyond al Qaeda and the Taliban to the leadership of a variety of groups/individuals that help to define and are defined by dangerous and unforgiving space, including the 'Haqqani network' and al Shabaab. In the name of providing safe and

[10]Obama 2013 cited the danger of 'homegrown terrorists'.

[11]Also, a variegated battlefield that makes threat distinctions based on perceptions of race, religion, and so on.

[12]A logic seen in *Responsibility to Protect*. Posen 2003 views the 'command' of the commons as key to US hegemony.

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prosperous spaces and times (now for well-ordered spaces and in the future for those behind), certain spaces are rendered *acutely* threatening and several spaces on the verge of becoming threatening. The promise of liberal goods does not yet extend to all, despite liberalism's universalism. The spatio-temporal assumptions of these frames thus assist in identifying threat and facilitating and distributing violent action. Even better, technology promises to humanize that violence for virtuous ends.

We also see these space–time framings in US discourse that ties together disease, underdevelopment, and violence. As a key official in the George W. Bush administration, Haass (2001) noted:

> [G]lobalization always did have a dark side. The same networks that allow the free flow of commerce and communication can also carry from one continent to another drugs, refugees and illegal immigrants, diseases like HIV/AIDS, financial volatility and contagion, traffic in men, women, and children, and, as we have seen, terrorists.

US reaction to the events of 11 September 2001 contextualized terrorism as one of several threatening flows that elicit fear and anxiety and thus need to be controlled. In 'ungoverned' areas terrorists may seek 'enclaves', as Bush (US Government 2011, 406) put it in 2006, but there is also a long-standing pattern of tying other threats like disease to immigration and foreigners (Bouie 2014). Recent media events such as the Ebola outbreak of 2014 and the Central American 'caravan' of 2018 featured politicians and media commentators identifying the risk of disease and crime traveling toward the US homeland as a reason for sealing borders (land and air) from specific places (West Africa and Mexico).

These place-based threats, it is said, must be confronted in timely fashion to preclude future disaster. In the media, congressional hearings, and popular criticism that followed 'Benghazi', the language of 'real-time' was prominent but so too was preventive language of diplomacy directed at a cornucopia of region-specific threats. When Clinton (2013) testified before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, she insisted that there were 'no delays in decision making' or 'denials of support', and she cited the Accountability Review Board's conclusion that 'our response saved American lives in real time', yet Clinton (2013) also explicated the incident as having an ongoing spatial (regional) challenge requiring other time-based strategies. Stating that 'Benghazi did not happen in a vacuum', Clinton cited the 'Arab revolutions' as instigating regional instability and insecurity in how they 'scrambled power dynamics' and decimated 'security forces'. Such a place as Mali could then become 'an expanding safe haven for terrorists who look to extend their influence and plot further attacks'. In this context, Clinton (2013) urged that we 'accelerate a diplomatic campaign' on 'terrorist groups in the region'.

Haass (2001) also used pre-emptive language in characterizing terrorism as 'analogous to a terrible, lethal virus' that required 'prophylactic measures' to shore up borders and 'drain the swamps where terrorism flourishes with long-term programs to promote development and good governance'. Domestic, semi-sovereign (e.g. consular), well-governed, and 'civilized' spaces must be secured against spatially-specific threats that are multiple and analogous to one another.

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It is notable, then, that discourse about foreign aid to promote good governance, democracy, humanitarianism, development, and peace feature spatial and temporal guides for designating both threat and vulnerability, enabling a variety of actions. These actions are tied to strategic considerations to prevent certain areas from *being* and *becoming* soil for instability and extremism that may (otherwise) require military intervention, but are also tied to liberal values in that these areas can be 'caught up' (Obama 2012, 2013).

Yet, there may be some critical purchase in cultural performances that prompt publics to examine such renderings of space and time. The photo art journalist Tomas van Houtryve's (2015) installation, 'Blue Sky Days', used a drone to film the spaces of everyday activities in the United States that might elsewhere be considered drone targets (e.g. homes, weddings, public gatherings). In one poignant scene, what may appear to a US imaginary as a group engaged in prayer is instead several individuals practicing yoga in a US park. By placing US territorial space in a drone's eye view, one might thus re-imagine how the surveillance camera of the drone and the superimposed target frame of the missile system affectively produce *imminent* danger.[13] Such political art installations, alongside testimonies of everyday experiences of time and space under the specter and application of the drone (Stanford/NYU 2012), and the spatial and temporal reversal of drones' victims and would-be-victims when they arrive in the capitals of military power (e.g. Washington, D.C., London) to protest in the time of politics (Rucker 2013; Sims 2016), can be considered tactics of counter-power given meaning by the frame 'space–time oppressions'.

Conclusion

This article makes the claim that IR scholars and international political theorists would do well to consider time and space in narratives about world politics. Doing so in the context of recent US foreign policy reveals four space–time frames, with two especially prominent in a strained merger of 'strategics' and 'liberations'. They are expressed in US drone policy, the event labeled 'Benghazi', and the bundling of disease, development and US security. As detailed above, the designation of specific places as dangerous and behind-the-times facilitates the call to act/react in a timely fashion – in 'real-time' or preemptively – to secure other places viewed as liberal and well-ordered. Timely action is also framed as necessary for liberal-goods-to-come in hazardous spaces when/if they become secured and ordered. This liberal/strategic space–time framing makes sense of the popularity of Rand Paul's accusative inquiry into whether 'we are going to kill Americans on American soil' and without due process (Little 2013), as well as significant resistance in the United States to 'slow' foreign policy. When the Obama administration sought to take time to assess issues such as Syria and Ukraine in addition to 'Benghazi' in a 'reflexive' space–time framing, it faced vociferous criticism that to not immediately know and act is to fail to secure sovereign/liberal space. Obama was accused of 'herky–jerky' leadership and 'flip-flopping' (e.g. Marcus 2014),

[13]Seeing through these virtual technologies does more than keep death 'out of sight, out of mind' Der Derian 2001, xvi. It produces the affect of danger.

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two phrases that exhibited resonance in media and political discourse. In addition, the analysis of this article sheds light on how disease, criminality, and immigration have been so easily blended, portrayed as flowing from chaotic spaces in need of development, security, and other forms of assistance. Space–time meanings appear to take shape through rhetorical *repetition* of important phrases. Terms such as real-time, terrorist, immigrant, Ebola, criminal, precision-targeting, and failed states have become commonplace (not needing to be defined) in how they narrate space relative to time. And technology is positioned as promising to arrive more quickly to dangerous spaces, both 'behind' and emerging (virtual and networked).

On this reading, we may be interested in methods for creatively responding to these space–time assumptions and diagnoses. IR literature can offer incisive critiques of space–time frames by theorizing and describing their discursive conditions of possibility as well as their contradictions and tensions. For example, IR theorists have illustrated how projecting space–time dominance invokes notions of masculinity, sexuality, and race that are drawn upon when US identity engages memories of foreign policy failure that haunt its self-conception, such as the Vietnam War (Masters 2005; Steele 2008). The promise of technology's speed, precision, and dominance relative to dangerous and inferior spaces reconstructs an idealized masculinity (Masters 2005). A sense of shame about US failure to exercise its strength perhaps provoked fear in the Obama administration that its foreign policy had been, to use Bolton's de-masculinizing (and homophobic) Benghazi accusation, 'limp-wristed' all along (Rosenthal 2012). If technological bodies are attractive, then, in how they wield time to their advantage to subordinate threats, Benghazi-like situations (representing dangerous, exterior space) aesthetically demand to be confronted and prevented by these time-based technologies. From the framings of 'oppressions' and 'reflexivities', we might better understand how some live in space–times saturated with fear and discipline and that US security comes at the expense of others' security despite US aims to extend freedom and human rights. Thus, in view of the resonance of political and cultural but also (IR) theoretical texts, we especially need sustained focus on how spatial differentiations attach to temporal notions in strategic and ethical narratives about foreign policy and world politics, producing racialized, sexualized, and gendered subjects who become targets of pre-emption and immediate (re-)action. Space and time, in other words, thicken one another to create '"thinkable" materialities' (Aradau and van Munster 2012, 102), but also desirable imaginings.

This critical contextualization is a place to start, but does not necessarily promote alternative space–time perspectives. Indeed, the framings of 'oppression' and 'reflexivity' may fail to appreciate how the 'human' itself is constructed by racial and colonial violence (Howell and Richter-Montpetit 2018), and that there may be multiple or plural space–time experiences that are suppressed or ignored, even by IR scholars (Hutchings 2008; Blaney and Inayatullah 2010). As Agathangelou and Killian (2016, 1) put it, 'postcolonial studies argues temporal reformulations are pivotal to political projects interested in rupturing a present whose inflection is violence and fatalism'. Space–time multiplicity can itself be elided by a dominant space–time frame that relegates some solely to the past, as 'savage' (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010, 12). The analysis of this article suggests that as IR takes its 'temporal turn' we need to both investigate how space and time work together to create

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meaning and be curious about the multiplicity of space–time frames unfamiliar to us in our positionality.

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