its execution and also highly speculative, as it is based on possible future conflicts between the Fundamental Law and the European Court of Human Rights.

The quality of the writing is also uneven, with some lapses in the use of English. That, in addition to the selection of pieces that do not quite cohere, might be a sign that the need to produce this important contribution to academic debates about the Hungarian constitution—and about the wider questions that its promulgation raises for other new eastern and central European democracies—had higher priority than the overall quality of the volume. However, these minor glitches should not detract from the usefulness of this timely publication, which combines theoretical context with insightful details illuminating Hungary's constitutional conundrum.

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Rediscovering the* Umma*: Muslims in the Balkans between Nationalism and Transnationalism. By Ina Merdjanova. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. xvi, 198 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Maps. $74.00, hard bound.

This slender, excellent book presents a broad, informative, and objective picture of Balkan Muslims, especially after the fall of communism. It also provides short but insightful glances into the Ottoman past, which helped shape the current Balkan Islam. Ina Merdjanova, now an adjunct professor at Trinity College Dublin, is a native of Dobruja, Bulgaria, and grew up partly in a village inhabited solely by Muslim Turks. In 2004–10 she was director of the Center for Interreligious Dialogue and Conflict Prevention at Sofia University, where she organized workshops and interviewed scores of Balkan Muslim leaders. Chapters 1 and 2 of her book state that the number of Muslims in the Balkans (not including Greece and Romania) is around 8.4 million, or roughly 22–25 percent of the total population of the remaining eight countries. Albania and Kosovo have Muslim majorities of 70 percent and 91.7 percent, respectively, while Muslims constitute strong minorities in Bosnia (43.5 percent), Macedonia (31 percent), and Bulgaria (12.2 percent). The languages spoken are ranked according to the largest numbers of speakers: Albanian, Slavic, Turkish, and Roma; there are also small groups of Vlahs and Greek-speaking Muslims. Turkey is not included in this table, although Thrace, which contains half of Istanbul and has about 7 million Muslims, is part of the Balkans. Yet the author repeatedly states that Islam in the Balkans cannot be studied without the Ottoman and Turkish connection.

Chapter 3, "Islam and Women in the Balkans," indicates that the public sphere, though dominated by men, offers women the possibility of participation and self-expression, mainly through the Sufi orders. The communist regimes provided women with a degree of liberation and wider participation in economic and educational activities that were subject to restrictive efforts after 1990. The last chapter deals with the question of the European Islam created by the influx of some 17–20 million Muslims into practically all the western European countries. Only about one-fourth of these "European" Muslims are probably from the Balkans, mostly from Turkey, and they consider themselves strongly European but identify more by country of origin and ethnicity than faith.

The author's main thesis is that there are varieties of Islam in the Balkans, divided by country, language, and ethnicity; the majority population is Sunni, followed by Alevi, Bektashi, Halveti, and so on. All are striving to achieve transnational ties with the titular *umma*, the imagined universal community, while remaining defined primarily through ethnic and national ties. Thus, the "national and transnational

discourses and identities rather coexist, interact and compete in intricate ways within each community" (55). World Muslims remained oddly passive toward the efforts of the Bulgarian communist government to "Bulgarize" its Muslim subjects in 1984–89, although they responded strongly to the massacres of Bosnian Muslims by Serbian and Croatian nationalists. When Salafists attempted to introduce their own brand of Islam, however, Balkan Muslims claimed that "they were Muslims in their own way and often mobilized resistance against what was seen as colonization by alien forms of Islam" (67).

In the end, it was Turkey that came to represent Balkan transnationalism, despite competition from certain Arab countries, as schools, movies, conferences, and tourism cemented Balkan Islam's identification with that of Turkey. Turkey's democratization, reconciliation with its Ottoman past, and downplaying of its secularist ethnic nationalism helped bring the Muslims of Turkey and the Balkans closer together. Merdjanova might have done well to emphasize the fact that at least 25–30 percent of Turkey's population consists of Balkan migrants (or descendants of migrants), who have maintained communication with their parents' and grandparents' countries of origin.

Balkan Islam, in addition to its ethnic, national, and linguistic differences, is marked by tolerance, freedom of lifestyle, pluralism, and openness. This strand of Islam was shaped from the 1400s to the 1800s by a free (but separate) multiethnic, multireligious coexistence that came to an end in the nineteenth century with the rise of nationalism. While Christian nationalism combined religious and ethnic identity into an exclusively national one, the process of nationalization among Muslims, who were never identified by linguistic, ethnic, or national characteristics in Ottoman censuses, took a different course. As a result, Balkan Muslim nationalism increased ethnic and linguistic self-identification, sharing some features with its Christian counterpart; however, it maintained a high degree of distinct Ottoman transnationalism, rather than an Islamic imaginary universalism. Nationalism was forced on the Ottomans, who turned it into a Muslim Ottoman nationalism that later acquired localized ethnic national forms in the Balkans, while republican Turkey made it "Turkish" and secular. But *Turk* in the Balkans is another name for *Muslim*. Merdjanova suggests that a new approach to and drastic revision of the histories of Balkan and Ottoman modernization and nationalism may be necessary and that they would challenge many of the assumptions hitherto held. A previous work on the issue, however—my *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (Oxford, 2001)—received lukewarm reception in the west. It went through several printings in Turkey but was not circulated among Balkan Muslims, who, though heirs to an Ottoman cultural and religious heritage, refuse to identify with its imperial past.

Space does not permit an extensive review of this truly original, well-documented, objective, and balanced book. Suffice to say that it is one of the best, if not the best, books on the subject and is very highly recommended.

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Places of Pain: Forced Displacement, Popular Memory and Trans-Local Identities in Bosnian War-Torn Communities. By Hariz Halilovich. Space and Place, vol. 10. New York: Berghahn Books, 2013. xviii, 269 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Glossary. Index. Photographs. $95.00, hard bound.

When Hariz Halilovich chose to study Bosnians who had been displaced from their homes in the 1990s, he became a witness to tales of horrendous suffering. Some mem-

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