

3,000 Teubner pages (or the same ratio of text to commentary as that on the Myth of Er in the *Republic*, roughly 33–35 pages for a page of text). Kutash, however, argues convincingly that Proclus has ‘come full circle’ in reaching the subject of man as microcosm, and adduces the organization of the *Elements of Theology* in support of the idea that we have his *Commentary on the Timaeus* largely complete, and that what we have constitutes a coherent whole (231).

This is the first organizing principle, derived from the text itself, and it serves the author well. There is a second idea shaping Kutash’s book: in good Iamblican fashion, her interpretation is organized around a *skopos*, a single target or theme: ‘Proclus stipulated that the ultimate *skopos* of the *Commentary on the Timaeus* is to study nature “insofar as it is produced from the gods” (I.217.18–28)’ (177). That this is not precisely what the passage in question says is less important than Kutash’s assertion, which does indeed give a concise account of her view of the commentary.

After a general introduction (chapter 1) and a historical one (which unfortunately is based on scholarship from the 1960s and 1970s, and could have greatly benefited from the more recent synthesis by E.J. Watts, *City and School*, Berkeley, 2006) (chapter 2), the next four chapters deal with the ‘physical gifts’. By this point, a defensive note has repeatedly been sounded, along with an assertion that a special sort of reading is required to do justice to Proclus’ prose. At one point, Kutash maintains that the application of ‘any kind of analytic standards would not be true to Proclus’ intentions. To truly appreciate Proclus’ vision, incredulity must be put aside in favour of a more holistic approach ... [O]ne must acclimate to the fusion of the divine and the scientific if one is to be a truly competent reader of Proclus’ (137–38). Kutash tests various comparanda in the search for a satisfactory description of Proclus’ original modes of thought, from Kant (120, 206), to relativity (166, 169), to the ‘symmetrical logic’ of the late Chilean psychoanalyst Ignacio Matte Blanco (208). She seems determined to reconcile ‘the disappointed “philosopher” who reads the *Commentary*’ to Proclus’ lapses into ‘metaphor and gnomic oracular utterance’ (214), but I fear that the goal is a remote one, as is that of demonstrating that Proclus’ ‘theory of time stands on its own and is a solution to philosophical *aporiae* native to a Platonist vision of the whole’ (160) rather than constituting an outgrowth of contemporary developments in religion (as E.R. Dodds,

*Proclus, Elements of Theology*, Oxford, 1963, 228–29 maintained) (159–60).

Kutash’s chapter on time (chapter 8) is nevertheless one of the most rewarding parts of the book, as are the two chapters that follow, dealing with the human condition and Proclus’ apparent conviction (in contrast to earlier Neoplatonists) that the soul, once descended, is held fast in the bonds of matter. Her discussion of Proclus’ theurgical activities benefits from a willingness to accept his chains of divinities as an integral part of his world view and to enter into that world view sympathetically. Again, I doubt, however, that she will win over her ‘disappointed “philosopher”’ with her closing exhortation to ‘put away Occam’s razor and bask in the varicoloured light that Proclus casts on the secrets of nature’ (251).

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SORABJI (R.) *Ed. Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science* (2nd edition). London:

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Sorabji is well known as the editor of a vast and growing number of translations of ancient commentaries on Aristotle and the editor of several excellent collections of studies on the Aristotelian tradition, among other things. John Philoponus’ philosophical outlook and his impact on later theology and especially on later philosophy and science have been central to many of Sorabji’s studies and projects. Philoponus, a sixth-century Christian thinker who was originally trained as a Neoplatonist, is best remembered today for his attack on Aristotle’s ‘physics’; his – direct or indirect – influence on subsequent theories, for example dealing with the concept of impetus, and implicitly his role in the re-evaluation of Aristotelian science and natural philosophy are indeed remarkable.

The first edition of *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science*, published in 1987 (incidentally, the year when the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle project was just being launched), has been a landmark in this field. The second edition includes a new two-part introduction written by the editor of this volume. The goal of its first part is to explore the significance of recent archeological discoveries – such as the

lecture rooms of the sixth-century Alexandrian school – and, to a lesser extent, to provide new insights into the interaction between Greek paganism and Christianity in connection with Philoponus and his milieu. The second, and longer, part of the ‘Introduction’ is a very helpful survey of new findings reported in the rapidly expanding scholarship on Philoponus (partly stimulated by the many translations published since 1987 and reflected in the bibliography to the second edition of this book). It is organized thematically, with studies on transmission, the chronology of Philoponus, his methodology, his approach to astronomy, his views on prime matter, concept formation, etc.

The core of this book consists of 12 chapters. It starts with a comprehensive map of Philoponus’ thought, where Sorabji gives due emphasis to the main tenets of his natural philosophy and theory of matter, outlined against a twofold background – Aristotelian and Christian. The second chapter, by H. Chadwick, investigates the religious foundation for Philoponus’ rejection of crucial aspects of Neoplatonism and for his critical stance regarding Aristotle. It also offers an impressively vivid depiction of religious life in Alexandria during the fifth and sixth centuries and a clear account of the differences between Philoponus and various theological authorities of the time (for example with respect to the three *hupostases*). P. Hoffmann provides a ‘vindictive pagan’ perspective by considering Philoponus from the angle of Simplicius’ critique in his commentary on the Aristotelian treatise *De caelo* and embarks on a delightful analysis of Simplicius’ imaginative and occasionally vitriolic language. Chapter 4, by M. Wolff, is the first of two studies devoted here to Philoponus’ impetus theory and its *Nachleben*, cautiously assessing, for instance, the filiation of Galileo’s grasp of impetus as well as the relation between Philoponus’ view and other (Hellenistic and late ancient) theories on natural motion. F. Zimmermann’s chapter is a complement to the preceding one; it is still concerned principally with Philoponus’ theory of impetus, but stresses its importance in the formation of Avicenna’s, Ghazali’s and other Arab thinkers’ theories of motion. The sixth chapter is, as its title indicates, D. Furley’s ‘Summary of Philoponus’ corollaries on place and void’, and is centred on Philoponus’ claims that place is three-dimensional extension and that there is such a thing as void extension. It also serves as a convenient introduction to D. Sedley’s illuminating discussion about the

arguments used by Philoponus (for example having to do with the distinctions between spatial extension and bodily extension, between space and vacuum) in his refutation of Aristotle’s notion of space. Self-awareness is the pivotal concept in W. Bernard’s examination of Philoponus’ commentary on Aristotle’s *De anima*; the latter’s ambivalent position exposes him to (fair and unfair) criticism on various levels. Chapters 9, 10 and 11 form a triptych on the creation of the world, on its destructibility and on a number of adjacent topics. Sorabji discusses Philoponus’ defence of the Jewish and Christian dogma that the world had a beginning; his arguments regarding infinity undermine the Aristotelian view of a beginningless universe and call into question the merits of the Stagirite’s handling of the notion of potential infinity. L. Judson writes about Philoponus’ comments on Plato’s account of the creation of the cosmos and inspiredly uses several modal distinctions (the key words in his title are ‘generability’ and ‘perishability’) to emphasize differences between Philoponus’ interpretation and the orthodox Platonist approach to the *Timaeus*. In chapter 11, C. Wildberg re-evaluates the significance of the sixth-century thinker’s *De aeternitate mundi contra Aristotelem* and produces compelling arguments regarding its structure and its place in the chronology of Philoponus’ oeuvre. The final chapter (belonging to C. Schmitt) is largely an account of Philoponus’ considerable contribution to a gradual divorce from Aristotle’s authority in the major centres of humanism during the 16th century.

This collection remains one of the most reliable and wide-ranging introductions to Philoponus’ views and influence, and anyone interested in late ancient philosophy and its interactions with Christian thought will find this to be a most valuable guide.

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KING (R.A.H.) and SCHILLING (D.) *Eds.* **How Should One Live? Comparing Ethics in Ancient China and Greco-Roman Antiquity.** Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2011. Pp. viii + 343. €79.95. 9783110252873. doi:10.1017/S0075426913001298

It is an unfortunate fact that ‘Sino-Hellenic studies are almost invisible to Classicists’ (J. Tanner, ‘Ancient Greece, early China: Sino-Hellenic