

## REVIEWS

ROBERT PHILLIPSON, (ed.) *Rights to language: Equity, power and education*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000. Pp. 310. Hb \$69.95, pb \$29.95.

MIKLÓS KONTRA, ROBERT PHILLIPSON, TOVE SKUTNABB-KANGAS, & TIBOR VÁRADY (eds.), *Language, a right and a resource: Approaching linguistic human rights*. Budapest: Central European University Press. Pp. xii, 346. Hb \$49.95, pb \$23.95.

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These two books are indeed similar in that they cover related topics, have overlapping contributors, and bear the unmistakable stamp of the linguistic rights duo, Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Robert Phillipson. *Rights to language* is a Festschrift to mark Skutnabb-Kangas's sixtieth birthday. It parades a star-studded list of contributors, particularly in the field of sociolinguistics; however, as with most books of this genre, the contributions are uneven in quality and scope. The 47 chapters in the book are contributed by 51 authors, and, according to the editor, 20 other invited scholars were unable to contribute. This ambitious goal – to include as many of the honoree's friends as possible – has had the unfortunate effect of making several authors produce brief, less than adequate expositions of their topics.

The book is unusually varied, comprising poems, dialogues, personal reminiscences, chapters interlarded with proverbs, quotes from the honoree's works, and conventional papers. As the editor observes, the book "is largely in the academic genre of scholarly papers, but the use of a variety of types of text – some integrating the personal and the professional, poems, narratives, simulated or recorded dialogues – demonstrates that the different genres capture an intensity that is often absent in scholarly works" (p. 264). Anyone familiar with the writings of some of the well-known contributors cannot but conclude that what they have written here is mainly in the lighter mood. Notwithstanding this, the reader is presented with a range of topics and views that reflect Skutnabb-Kangas's lifelong interests in language rights and minority education. For her relentless advocacy and her outstanding contribution to the intellectual underpinning of these rights, she richly deserves the honor this Festschrift represents.

The second and more conventional book, *Language, a right and a resource*, is a collection of scholarly papers presented at the Linguistic Human Rights Conference and Workshop for NGO Representatives held at the Central European University Conference Center in Budapest in 1997. With a focus on linguistic

human rights (LHRs), the collection seeks to situate LHRs in the context of sociolinguistic realities, international law, and market forces. The main goal is to clarify what LHRs are, what they can and cannot do, and what their implications are in bilingual and multilingual contexts. To achieve this goal, a multidisciplinary approach is adopted, with experts in law, economics, and sociolinguistics contributing insights peculiar to their disciplines. This multidisciplinary approach is both informative and rewarding, serving not only to clarify concepts but also to clear away misconceptions and reveal limitations of the scope and strength of LHRs. In this regard, the book is a major contribution to the literature in this field and a worthy complement to Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1995.

In this book, LHRs are characterized in terms of ecology, linguistic diversity, correctives to free market forces, and state responsibility. A common, though misleading, comparison is that between preservation of species and preservation of languages. Hence, we are admonished that “perpetuation of linguistic diversity is . . . a necessity for the survival of the planet” (189). The major difference is that for species, whether animal or vegetable, their preservation can be externally motivated, whereas for language, safeguarding and preservation depend to some extent on the speakers. Although governments must be encouraged to do all that lies in their power to safeguard languages as a heritage, unless speakers of a language show a similar commitment, language shift and language death may be inevitable.

In arguing for linguistic diversity and human rights, the editors make the claim that “minimally two languages (bilingualism) or all languages (in multilingual situations) are necessary and needed, for ALL groups” (17). There is some clumsiness in the way this claim is formulated; it is vague in conflating availability and tolerance of languages and language proficiency. What is intended is that monolingual groups should endeavor to learn another language and so become bilingual, while multilingual groups should also learn two or more languages. In either case, no one should be denied a right to his or her own language. This clarification is necessary to counter the idealism often associated with the LHRs approach – for example, as represented in Article 24 of the Barcelona Declaration of Linguistic Rights, 1996: “All language communities have the right to decide to what extent their language is to be present, as a vehicular language and as an object of study, at all levels of education within their territory: preschool, primary, secondary, technical and vocational, university, and adult education.” Obviously, it is unrealistic to expect ALL languages to be used at ALL levels of education any more than all languages can be used for all purposes.

In his contribution, François Grin illustrates how the laws of demand and supply may act to raise or lower the value of languages, showing, in the process, that “in general, minority languages have no MARKET VALUE” (180). Given that a free operation of market forces is unlikely to favor minority languages, it is proposed that LHRs should act as CORRECTIVES TO THE FREE MARKET (101, 197, 201). The question is: What is the economic or political mechanism for achieving

such an end? Even Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, who in her contribution makes an impassioned plea for such correctives and proclaims with authority that “language rights are needed to remedy language wrongs” (201), has no answer to this question.

Whose responsibility is it to enforce LHRs? The assumption is that it is the duty of the state to do this (109, 202). This assumption is not unreasonable (since it is the state that makes and enforces laws), but it is important to draw attention to the role of interest groups, including the speakers of the languages concerned. Just as a bureaucratic approach in language planning is inadequate, enforcement of LHRs has to become a task for both the state and the likely beneficiaries of the measures.

Legal instruments for enforcing human rights include constitutional provisions, national laws, international laws, treaties, and declarations. The chapter by Fernand de Varennes, which sets out existing rights recognized in international law, is at once encouraging and disheartening. It is encouraging that so many existing rights are already provided for in international law, but disheartening that such rights are not really definitive since, quite often, failure to observe them “can be” or “may be” a violation of international laws (118, 130, 135). Besides, several of the documents on which LHRs advocates rely are “not legally binding documents. They are either in the nature of political statements which may have impact on the interpretation or evolution of legal standards, or are documents prepared by experts in order to clarify existing or emerging rules” (142). One cannot but agree with the author when he says, “Moral or political principles, even if they are sometimes described as ‘human rights’, are not necessarily part of international law. They are things governments ‘should’ do, if they are ‘nice’, not something they ‘must’ do” (118). And governments are not particularly noted for being “nice.”

Although legislation in the enforcement of human rights (including language rights) is useful in that it establishes a norm of behavior, the real problem is that violation does not easily attract penalties. This is particularly the case with international laws, conventions, and charters, which are often violated with impunity. For example, in the 1997 Report of Amnesty International, released on 17 June 1998, the information is given that the Human Rights Declaration is ignored in as many as 141 countries of the world. As CNN reported recently, based on a report by Amnesty International, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 50 years ago, remains all but meaningless for tens of thousands of people worldwide.” If such a high-profile convention can easily be violated, what is the hope for lesser declarations on language rights?

In discussing the multidisciplinary nature of LHRs, the editors point out that LHRs are interwoven with education, linguistics, medical diagnosis, sociolinguistics, and psycholinguistics (15–16). One glaring omission in this list is politics. Underlying most of the concerns for language rights are questions of politics and ideology. Although nowhere in the book is this expressly stated, there are

several references to political and ideological issues – for instance, in relation to the World Bank and the IMF’s policies in Africa (29), capitalism and globalization (192) (the latter is referred to humorously as “McDonaldization,” 27, 28, 39, 193), world economic order, and the “criminalization of poverty” (200), etc. It seems that advocates of LHRs should admit that, in addition to being scholars and analysts, they are also political activists.

Two other issues crucial in the enforcement of LHRs are power and political will. The chapter by Mart Rannut (99–114) is an excellent illustration of the role of power in language policy decisions. No matter how loudly we proclaim LHRs, their enforcement will depend largely on the power elite, whether characterized in terms of a majority or an influential minority (such as an English-using elite in an African country). This power elite will mainly want to take decisions that will ensure its continued dominance, and minorities will have to negotiate ways of ensuring an adequate role for their own languages. Lack of political will is also a major barrier to the enforcement of LHRs (199), and it can be linked to the power question. If those who are charged with enforcement of certain rights do not believe in those rights, or if they do not consider them to be a matter of priority, this will be reflected in lack of action by the state. It is no wonder, then, that many of the so-called legally binding international instruments and conventions remain mere paper provisions.

Although the title of this book might lead one to believe that “right” and “resource” as attributed to language are complementary, the emphasis is clearly on “right” because of the major preoccupation of the authors with the language rights of minority groups. No one needs to teach disadvantaged groups the lesson of learning a dominant language as a resource. The real problem is in getting dominant groups – and, quite often, even minority groups themselves – to accept that the so-called minority languages too are worthy of being developed and empowered.

Robert Phillipson’s chapter makes a good case against the hegemony of the so-called international languages (especially English) in the quest for monolingual globalization. In this connection, the editors cite with approval South Africa’s policy of 11 official languages, which includes hitherto marginalized African languages in addition to English and Afrikaans (7–9). It is therefore surprising to see Phillipson’s critique of the European Union’s identical 11-language officialization policy on the grounds that it is “cumbersome” from the point of view of translation and interpretation, and that, in effect, this cumbersomeness is working in favor of the hegemony of English (37). I believe the same arguments can be used against the South African official language policy. Why should 11 official languages be right for South Africa and wrong for the EU? The romanticization of Esperanto as a medium worthy of adoption as “a genuinely neutral international language” (31–32) may be said to favor “language as a resource,” but it also inadvertently provides a very powerful argument for the hegemony of English, which now has more nonnative than native speakers. Indeed, Ulrich Am-

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mon, in the Festschrift for Skutnabb-Kangas reviewed above, makes a case for the recognition and acceptance of nonnative English norms.

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- DANA KOVARSKY, JUDITH DUCHAN, & MADELINE MAXWELL (eds.), *Constructing (in)competence: Disabling evaluations in clinical and social interaction*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1999. Pp. vi, 381. Hb \$89.95.

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The 15 articles in this book focus on the evaluation of competence in clinical, educational, and other contexts in which people are regularly judged as incompetent. Several focus on interactions involving adults and children with communication disorders; others present issues of competence and incompetence in foreign-language learning, educational assessment, the discussion of medical diagnoses between medical staff and clients, and psychotherapy sessions. Although there is no single prevailing research methodology used throughout, a consistent theme is that competence and incompetence are socially constructed within interaction, and that the evaluation of (in)competence is central to the creation and negotiation of social identity in everyday life.

The book is divided into four parts. Part I consists of an Introduction by Duchan, Maxwell, & Kovarsky. Here they outline a distinction, which recurs as a theme in other contributions, between competence as containment and competence as “constructed by situated selves in situated contexts” (p. 20). They note that the former is a common view in the human sciences. Within this framework, a decontextualized assessment of competence can be undertaken, for example, using standardized tests. Therapeutic or educational programs based on such assessments are often also based on the containment view of competence and thus aim to improve the person’s competence “level.” The other view, supported by the data in the book, instead focuses on “how competence gets constructed, evaluated and revised in the course of everyone’s everyday life experience” (p. 20).

The six essays in Part II, “Hidden factors influencing judgements of competence,” focuses on some less obvious aspects of interaction that can be seen to affect evaluations of speakers’ competence. In Chap. 2, for instance, Robert Stillman, Ramona Snow, & Kirsten Warren discuss the effect on recipients of certain

interactional behaviors of children with pervasive developmental disorders (a term covering several types of developmental conditions, including autism, in which the ability to interact socially is impaired). Speech and language pathology students who were working for the first time with children with these types of behaviors were interviewed about their responses to the children. Behaviors of primary concern to the students included lack of eye contact, a preference for focusing on objects rather than on the student, and unpredictable behavior. Although the students were aware of the possible neurological and neuropsychological reasons for these actions, interestingly, they still interpreted them as signs of personal rejection by the child. Stillman and colleagues argue that these reactions by students and other professionals are troubling because they may affect the quality of the professional care given to such children.

In Chap. 3, Jeffrey Higginbotham & David Wilkins focus on interactants whose ability to use spoken language is compromised by their physical difficulties, and they investigate the effect of nonspeech modes of communication used by these interactants on time and timing in interaction. Using the work of Clark 1996, they note that there are normative requirements concerning time in everyday interaction, many of which cannot be fulfilled by these interactants using nonspeech modes of communication. The woman they describe in their case study, for instance, uses two alternative means of communication: a communication board on which she averages 19 words per minute, and a computerized device with which she averages 6.5 words per minute. Such constraints mean that both the interactant with the communication difficulty and the conversational partner have to adapt to an alternative temporal order. Higginbotham & Wilkins provide useful interactional data and discussion of those data, showing how such participants adapt in specific ways. These include the use of guessing by the nonimpaired speaker to complete the message, and the use of repetitions of messages by the interactant with the communication difficulty in order to initiate and carry out repair. Despite these positive strategies, there are many difficulties related to problems of timing in these interactions, such as frustration, failed understanding, and inattention by the addressee. As the authors note, despite the fact that many of the difficulties arise from the nature of the communication technologies or the inability of addressees to attend to or process the message, it is the augmented speaker who is regularly stigmatized for the communication difficulty.

The five chapters in Part III, "Diagnosis as situated practice," investigate the links between diagnoses and evaluations of competence. In Chap. 8, Douglas Maynard & Courtney Marlaire extend their previous analysis of testing as a collaborative achievement (Marlaire & Maynard 1990). Through careful description of the administration of one subtest from a psychoeducational battery, they analyze how test scores are arrived at through reliance on a series of practical actions by the tester and child. Even though these actions are not themselves being tested, they are necessary for the "official" business of the test, and indeed

“may be a factor which interferes with the proper standardization and, hence, validity of testing scores” (172). It is noted that some of the “mistakes” made by both the child and the tester during the test may not be signs of incompetence, but rather may reflect particular interactional competencies involved in “bringing off” the test as an official activity.

The relationship between diagnosis and competence is explored from a different angle by Ellen Barton in Chap. 12. Here, interactions between two families and medical staff are analyzed, with a particular focus on the links between the two families’ display of understanding of the medical diagnosis and the medical team’s treatment of these families. In the first case, the medical staff’s positive judgment of the family’s competence and understanding of the medical diagnosis appears to be linked to a subsequent cooperative and respectful relationship between family and staff. In the second case, the medical staff treat the family as unknowledgeable and incompetent in regard to the medical diagnosis, and the subsequent care this family receives appears relatively perfunctory. Barton suggests that an implication of this work for medical professionals is that it highlights the unconscious expectations they may hold about the knowledge of the medical model of disability they expect families to have.

The three chapters in Part IV, “Intervention as situated practice,” explore how competence and incompetence are constructed through the process of therapeutic intervention. These authors raise important clinical questions about the validity of much current therapeutic practice and the respective roles of “therapist” and “patient” in the therapeutic encounter. In Chap. 13, Kovarsky, Michael Kimbarow, & Deborah Kastner analyze communication therapy delivered to a group of adults with traumatic brain injury (TBI). They argue that the memory task focused on in the session may be of limited use in changing the everyday functioning of these individuals because it assumes linguistic and cognitive skills to be internal, mental processes that can be worked on decontextually, irrespective of the personal experience of the individuals being treated. Such tasks can also contribute to the “construction of incompetence” (307) because they do not allow these individuals to produce other contributions which, while competent and relevant in themselves, are outside the rules of the activity.

In Chap. 14, Nina Simmons-Mackie & Jack Damico analyze a striking example of role negotiation and conflict between a person with aphasia and her speech and language pathologist. During the recorded therapy session, the person with aphasia attempts to shift her role from “patient” to “consumer” by referring to her lack of progress and questioning the worth of the current therapy tasks being undertaken. The therapist, however, treats this lack of cooperation in the task as a lack of linguistic competence rather than as the display of social and pragmatic competence it is. Thus, while the person with aphasia attempts to move to a different social role within the therapy session, the therapist continues to treat her as a patient who is linguistically incompetent. Simmons-Mackie & Damico suggest that such interactions raise important questions about traditional therapy. In

particular, they ask, “Does the institution of therapy over-enforce nonegalitarian role casting as a means to mediate communication change?” (334).

This book is likely to be of most interest to practitioners in speech pathology and other helping professions. As such, it makes a welcome addition to work that explores how concepts often treated as relatively static and psychological, such as language competence and incompetence, can alternatively be viewed from a social and interactional perspective. Several chapters also touch on the implications for social change embodied in this perspective. As Duchan et al. state in their Introduction, “The ultimate hope is to design ways to convert institutional and clinical practices that result in negative evaluations and interactive dependencies to practices that are positive and more empowering” (24).

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JAMES PAUL GEE, *An introduction to discourse analysis: Theory and method*. London and New York: Routledge, 1999. Pp. viii, 176. Pb \$24.99.

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The book under review is the most comprehensive introduction to discourse analysis that I have ever read. It consists of seven chapters and an appendix, covering a wide range of both macro and micro issues related to discourse analysis.

Discourse, as we know, is a universal socio-cultural phenomenon. Since discourse involves the use of language, the communication of meaning, and social context, discourse analysis becomes an interdisciplinary enterprise. We need to explore not only the interaction of the function of language and the encoding and decoding processes of the language user, but also sociocultural context and the role of cognition. Currently, there exist five major approaches to discourse analysis: the structural, cognitive, sociocultural, critical, and synthetic approaches. What Gee presents is a synthetic approach, intending to study how language is used to enact social and cultural activities, perspectives, and identities, and to balance talk about the mind, interaction and activities, society, and institutions (5).

Gee stresses the importance of a theory of the nature of discourse, which he defines as language-in-use, both written and spoken. To communicate information is generally thought to be the primary function of human language. However, in his Introduction, Gee singles out two connected primary functions of language:



to scaffold the performance of social activities, and to scaffold human affiliation within cultures and social groups and institutions (1). It is true that speakers and writers, by using the resources of grammar, show their political perspectives on what the “world” is like.

Gee notices the dialectical relationship between language and social context. Although language plays a role in discourse, social activities and identities are rarely enacted through language alone; they always involve the interaction of language with extralinguistic elements. What deserves our attention is the distinction made by Gee between “Discourse” with a capital *D* and “discourse” with a lower-case *d*. By using the term “D/discourse analysis,” Gee implies that discourse analysis cannot be limited to language alone but should rather be extended to the analysis of how language is “fully integrated with all the other elements that go into social practices” (9–10). Furthermore, Gee touches on an important and related property of language: reflexivity. Because of reflexivity, language both creates and reflects the contexts in which it is used. According to Gee, when we are producing a text, we always simultaneously construct six areas of “reality”: the meaning and value of aspects of the material world, activities, identities and relationships, politics, connections, and semiotics (12).

One characteristic of this book is the concept of “tools of inquiry” for D/discourse analysis. Without tools and strategies for applying them, we have no idea of how analysis can be done. Gee develops here several useful “tools of inquiry” that are meant to help us study how the six building tasks are carried out, and with what social and political consequences. These tools and strategies are based in a theory of language-in-use in culture and society, and they are relevant to how we build and recognize identities and activities. These include situated identities, social languages, Discourse, Conversations (see below), situated meaning, and cultural models. Throughout this book, Gee discusses, with many examples, the specific tools of inquiry that are part of the overall method and strategies for using them.

The approach introduced in this book gives special attention to the sociocultural domain of language-in-use and the human mind. Situated meaning and cultural models exist both in the mind and in the world, and they are closely related to each other. According to Gee, situated meanings are what we negotiate “on the spot” in and through communication in a given context. They, in turn, “construct experience as meaningful in certain ways and not others” (49). It is social languages, situated meanings, and cultural models that enable people to enact and recognize different Discourses. Cultural models involve our “first thoughts,” or taken-for-granted assumptions about what is “typical” or “normal” (59), and they mediate between the micro level of interaction and the macro level of institutions (58). Furthermore, the human mind is viewed as a “pattern recognizer” rather than “rule following logic-like calculator,” and it works primarily to recognize patterns related closely to the experiences from which they are extracted. Gee also notices the importance of the intertextual potential of Discourses by using

the capitalized term “Conversation” to refer to “(historic) conversations between and among discourses” (34).

The question of validity and related interpretive enterprises has become a central issue in D/discourse analysis. Gee shows that validity consists primarily in how our various tools of inquiry work together. The validity of an analysis is not a matter of how detailed the transcript is, but a matter of how the transcript works with all the other elements of the analysis to create a “trustworthy” analysis (88–89). To Gee, validity for discourse analysis is based on four elements: convergence, agreement, coverage, and linguistic details.

Next comes the application of tools of inquiry in discourse analysis. Gee integrates tools of inquiry into an overall model of discourse analysis that stresses the six building tasks, because an ideal discourse analysis, according to Gee, involves asking questions about those tasks. He realizes that we should take into account some linguistic details about the structure of sentences and of discourse. Thus, in Chap. 6 he offers a set of closely interrelated linguistic concepts: function words, content words, information, stress, intonation, lines, macro-lines, and stanzas. Lines and stanzas constitute the microstructure of a discourse. However, a discourse also has macrostructure that consists of large pieces of information with their own characteristic, high-level organization. Gee analyzes the example of a child’s story as containing setting, catalyst, crisis, evaluation, resolution, and coda. Lines, macro-lines, stanzas, and macrostructure represent “how speakers marry structure and meaning” (117). It is true that, in doing analysis, we often try to identify units, patterns, and links within and across utterances in order to form a hypothesis about how meaning is constructed and organized in the text.

With the help of interview data, Chap. 7 is an extended example of D/discourse analysis, using some of the tools and strategies developed in this book. As we can see, actual discourse analyses do not fully realize an ideal model. Some tools may be used more thoroughly than others. We are reminded by Gee of the fact that there is not any “lockstep” method to be followed in doing a discourse analysis (119); however, this example inspires us to engage in our own discourse-related reflections.

Finally, Gee realizes the need for a grammar that can be used to describe and explain verbal communication and social interaction. For this, Gee recommends (in an appendix) the systemic functional grammar developed by M.A.K. Halliday. Using Halliday’s approach, he discusses the experiential function, the interpersonal function, the textual function, and the logical function of language, as realized in the clauses of his sample text. Here the significance of systemic functional grammar in discourse analysis is brought into prominence.

To sum up, by incorporating analyses of discourse and socio-cultural practices, this book is successful in proposing the idea of language as a site where social activities and identities are enacted. It shows us three important things: first, how language works with nonlanguage content to shape a D/discourse; second, how language creates and reflects the contexts in which it is used; and

third, how D/discourse can be analyzed by using various tools of inquiry and strategies. This is a valuable resource for students and researchers in discourse analysis or in other areas, and for those who are interested in language, culture, and institutions. It is also beneficial to those who are new to discourse analysis to start their further investigations. It is not an overstatement to say that this book presents a more socially oriented and synthetic approach to discourse for the twenty-first century.

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GARY B. PALMER AND DEBRA J. OCCHI (eds.), *Languages of sentiment: Cultural constructions of emotional substrates*. Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1999. Pp. vi, 272. Pb \$34.95.

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One of the reasons why the area of language and emotion attracts many of us lies in the continuing endeavor – whether implicitly or explicitly conducted – to overcome our own persistent assumptions concerning such dichotomies as nature vs. culture, individuality vs. society, and emotion vs. cognition. In other words, our focus on language and its constitutive role in the creation of what seems to be so “natural” and “individual” has led to the deconstruction of our own epistemology, as well as contributing to our better understanding of how people’s emotive meanings are situated in the midst of complex social relations and interactions. *Languages of sentiment* can be located within this long intellectual engagement. Although its contributors particularly explore Asian languages of sentiment, illustrated by Tamil, Bangla, Javanese, Japanese, and Tagalog cases, the aim of the book is not to essentialize “the” Asian sentiment. Instead, all the chapters try to capture the pragmatics of language and emotion that interact with global politics as well as with local social relations and interactions.

This volume originated from the session “Languages of sentiment” at the 1996 Annual Meeting of American Anthropological Association. In terms of theoretical orientation, the articles can be divided into two groups, those using a social-constructionist approach and those using a cognitive approach; however, the ultimate goal of the book is to illuminate the actual convergence of these two perspectives. This theoretically important point is emphasized in the Introduction by the editors, Gary Palmer & Debra Occhi. Emotion is both pragmatically and cognitively constructed, and at the same time (in accord with the anthropological heritage of the editors) it is seen as in dynamic tension between the culturally specific and the universal dimension. This dialectic aspect of emotion is discussed in the last, theoretically focused chapter, by Zoltan Kövecses & Gary

Palmer. The authors argue for the importance of synthesizing experientialist accounts of emotion based on pan-human psychobiological constraints, on one hand, and social constructionist accounts potentially open to a diversity of culture-specific variations, on the other.

Informed by the theoretical concerns just mentioned, the rest of the chapters offer socially situated studies on language and emotion, based on such methodologies as participant observation, questionnaires, interviewing, and analysis of popular romance novels; some are ethnographically oriented, others less so. The first three, by Harold Schiffman, Jim Wilce, and Laine Berman respectively, take the social constructionist approach and illustrate ethnographically rich case studies. Furthermore, they are distinctive in this volume in that they deal explicitly with the political aspect of language and emotion, particularly in relation to gender, ethnicity, nation, and global capitalism. For instance, Schiffman's study, "Language, primordialism and sentiment," focuses on the emotive aspect of primordialism applied to language: Certain sentiments are evoked when a language – here, Tamil – is threatened. Based on what he calls "linguistic culture," Schiffman discusses how language can be objectified by users themselves as the "essence" of ethnicity, which is often overwhelmingly of an emotional nature.

In line with Schiffman's work, Wilce's "Transforming laments: Performativity and rationalization as linguistic ideologies" also illuminates the intricate interplay between emotion and politics, but from a more global perspective: the worldwide spread of referentialist ideologies of language and the worldwide disappearance of ritualized performances of emotion. By focusing on the way Bangladeshi lamentation rituals have been undergoing change, Wilce looks at the ideological significance of urbanization and Islamization, or modernization processes contextualized in South Asia, while he draws our attention to similar phenomena outside South Asia. Taking a Foucauldian approach, Wilce talks about how modern historical forces – among which he assigns the ideology of capitalism a central significance – have been transforming local cultures of expressivity. Here, Wilce's discussion on the interrelation of a global scale, though never monolithic, among history, politics, economy, linguistic ideology, consciousness, and emotion is particularly stimulating for future studies.

Unlike Wilce's essay, in which the issue of gender is rather backgrounded, Berman's study, "Dignity in tragedy: How Javanese women speak of emotion," deals with the interaction among language, emotion, and gender more directly. By looking at Javanese women's narratives of personal abuse, Berman discusses how their display of emotion is reframed or even silenced according to the Javanese values of being *alus* (refined, calm, and smooth). Such values are linked to social hierarchy and power. Thus, even when they tell about painful experiences, the narrators construct themselves as ideal Javanese women who behave themselves, stay calm, and may challenge their victimizers, but without challenging the social system that oppresses them. What is interesting among Berman's findings is these Javanese women's use of narrative-external evaluation as their involve-

ment index. As she points out, this is the opposite of what Labov found in his American narrators' evaluation strategies. Suggesting further investigation to be conducted, Berman turns to the social constraints affecting these narrators, who strategically avoid internal evaluation and distance themselves from the narrated world. Here, Javanese narrative language may be contextualized, or relativized from a perspective on the interaction between society, self-concept, and genre (i.e., narrative).

Let us now turn to three chapters on Japanese emotive language. The study of Japanese language and society has been often based on the assumptions that the society is group-oriented and hierarchically ordered, and that the language spoken there reflects such structural features. Closely associated is the assumption of a sharp boundary between a private situation – *uchi* (in-group) – and a public situation, *soto* (out-group), to which particular emotive states are supposed to correspond. However, recently several pragmatically concerned scholars have been uncovering the interactional processes in which Japanese individuals negotiate and construct emotive as well as social meanings through a variety of indexical strategies. In this sense, Cynthia Dunn's "Public and private voices: Japanese style shifting and the display of affective intensity" successfully illustrates such negotiative processes, in which Japanese college students shift their public and private voices by dynamically (i.e., indexically) shifting their speech styles. The continuum – not the dichotomy – between *uchi* and *soto* is well demonstrated here. The same situation can also be a locus of both voices, and corresponding emotive states. This kind of survey surely contributes to the deconstruction of past false assumptions concerning the relationship among Japanese society, culture, language, and self.

In contrast to Dunn's essay, which takes the social constructionist approach, the other two studies, by Janet Smith and Debra Occhi, take the cognitive approach to Japanese language of sentiments. Smith's "From *hiren* to *happi-endo*: Romantic expression in the Japanese love story" looks at the different ways "true love" is conceptualized in Japanese romance novels and translated Harlequin novels. According to Smith's analysis, not only are the metaphorical principles surrounding "love" (*ai*) different; social scenarios surrounding the concept are also found to differ. Occhi's "Sounds of the heart and mind: Mimetics of emotional states in Japanese" discusses the emotional aspect of mimetics, which permeate Japanese people's everyday use of language as well as literature, advertising, and many other familiar realms. By focusing on the so-called *gizyoogo*, or mimetics of emotive states in particular, Occhi explores the evocative power of such terms, which are both collectively and individually experienced with bodily as well as psychic sensations. In addition, her discussion of the linguistic ideology of native Japanese linguists, who perceive mimetics as the direct expression of "natural" states, is inspiring. Finally, as Occhi points out, it would be exciting to see in future analyses how such mimetics are actually used and embodied with grammatical and interpretive variations in natural language data.

“Busting with grief, erupting with shame” by Gary Palmer, Heather Bennett, & Les Stacy looks at Tagalog metaphors and metonymies of emotion. By exploring which Tagalog metaphors and metonymies are shared with English and which are language-specific, the authors make another contribution to the realm of cross-linguistic comparison of emotion as well as emotive language. In accordance with theoretical positions taken by Kövecses and Palmer, the authors demonstrate a well-balanced approach under potential tensions between the culture-specific aspects of emotion and the universal aspects of emotion, and between the social constructionist and the cognitive perspective. The article by Howard Grabois follows the same line.

A decade ago, Ochs and Schieffelin 1989 significantly reminded us that “language has a heart.” Today, we know language does not only have a heart; language creates a heart, dynamically mediating the construction of emotional meanings in our everyday life. A range of human social realms cannot exist without emotion, which is semiotically mediated through language use. In this sense, this volume deepens our understanding of the constitutive power of emotive language.

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ANDREA DE JORIO, *Gesture in Naples and gesture in Classical Antiquity*. Translated by Adam Kendon. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. Pp. cvii + 517. Hb \$49.95.

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Andrea de Jorio’s rich and precocious *La Mimica*, written in 1832, is now translated and set into a larger context by Adam Kendon. Highlighted by Kendon’s introduction and footnotes, this refurbished work offers us a unique and valuable insight into a perspective on language and culture that prevailed during an era when national interests were directing a new kind of attention to both.

Kendon devotes the bulk of his attention to de Jorio’s linguistic insights and to the manner in which he used them to respond to ethnographic and archeological questions. De Jorio, a canon of the cathedral in Naples, had pursued archeological studies for years; he was particularly intrigued by the problem of interpreting the gestures of figures on vases, bas-reliefs, frescos, and paintings produced by ancient artists of Greece and Rome. His descriptions of contemporary Neapolitan gestural practices served to ground such interpretations. De Jorio argued that if one could learn the meaning of gestures in contemporary life, and if one could confirm a cultural continuity between contemporary Naples and ancient Rome,

then one could provide a systematic interpretation for the persistently enigmatic expressions that appear in the archeological record.

The genius of this work, as Kendon sees it, lies in de Jorio's willingness to set aside the assumption that all gestures spring directly from human emotions and faculties, a view that was common in his day and remains attractive even in our own. Alternatively, he approached Neapolitan gestures as products of regional culture, and therefore different in both form and meaning from gestures found in other nations. His project, in short, was a gesture ethnography, no precedent for which existed in his era.

Every gesture, de Jorio contended, is a physical action paired with a meaning or signification. His working principle – that contrastive gestural actions signal meanings that are distinct – was to appear much later as a mainstay in the Saussurean concept of language sign. Accordingly, when de Jorio applied this principle of the “double aspect” of gesture in his ethnographic study, the resulting description seems uncannily modern. For example, de Jorio demonstrated that gestural actions are sometimes juxtaposed, and even superimposed on each other, to create significant combinations. In the same vein, he indicated that gestural expressions can be sensitive to social context so that identical gestural actions can signal distinct significations in different social circumstances. As Kendon points out with respect to these observations, de Jorio anticipated many of the advances made by twentieth-century linguistics.

Ahead of his time linguistically, de Jorio was equally precocious in his approach to organizing and classifying gestures, a matter that will be of interest to semioticians and intellectual historians. While the bulk of the book consists of Neapolitan gestures listed by name and then described and interpreted, de Jorio took great pains to transform this work from a mere list or dictionary into a revelation of gesture as a multidimensional phenomenon, the significance of which we are only now beginning to understand. He supplied five indexes to assist readers in using his work, including an index of gestures according to their name, an index organized according to their manner of articulation, an index of their meanings, an index of references to the interpretations of classical monuments that his gesture study makes possible, and an index to gestures in appended paintings that illustrate contemporary Neapolitan expressions. His indexes attest to his awareness of the intertwining of different temporal and cultural dimensions, and they bear witness to his unwillingness to conceive of the gestural quasi-language as *sui generis*, self-contained, and rooted in essences. His project is less a dictionary of gestures than an encyclopedia of Neapolitan culture, understood as a labyrinth with no beginning, no end, and no ground. In Kendon's mind, the multidirectional and nonlinear organization of the work anticipates our notion of “hypertext” (p. lix). De Jorio's commentaries on gesture, language, and culture are indeed thrilling, and Kendon rightly celebrates them as ideas ahead of their time. However, it is important to make clear that Kendon does not turn de Jorio into the central figure in a Whig history of gestural studies. He avoids using his author's precociousness to confirm the im-

portance of contemporary approaches to gesture. Instead, Kendon presents de Jorio as a man of his era and in tune with his times, as if the air around Naples in 1830 were already thick with the ideas that are now too often attributed exclusively to post-Saussurean linguistics. De Jorio just breathed in that air.

The intellectual air in Naples was thick in the early nineteenth century partly because of political developments. It was a era in which nationalist movements were being enthusiastically pursued, each new state vying with others to demonstrate its unique heritage and unquestionable legitimacy. Language figured into these movements, owing in part to the fame of Johann Herder and his epigones. All across Europe, intellectuals and artists were addressing language anew, especially in the southern provinces of Italy and Spain. Here, poverty and oppression laid communities low during the eighteenth century, only to have them become tourist attractions in the nineteenth – De Jorio made frequent reference to foreigners in Naples, and indeed seemed to cultivate them as the audience to be persuaded of the importance of Neapolitan culture. In short, language descriptions enabled these new and erstwhile marginal nations to rewrite their souls.

Interestingly, however, these language descriptions devoted an increasing amount of attention to phenomena that lay outside and beyond the concerns of philologists, who, during this same era, were approaching spoken languages by way of written transcripts. A new breed of intellectuals was eager to consider aspects of languages that seemed more sensual and corporeal, and that therefore served as warm, moist complements to the cold, dry, quasi-mathematical units of conventional philology. Thus, at the same time that conventional language studies were gaining attention, so too were studies of the “languages” realized in mothers’ mouths, in dancers’ hands, in wordless songs, and in common gestures like those found in Naples. Descriptions of all these spontaneous, dynamic, frequently female-centered, and often disdained expressive practices of common folk played a significant role in the invention of traditions and the construction of nationalities.

De Jorio’s work is of a piece with this movement. As Kendon observes, he was eager to celebrate the common and sensual aspects of Neapolitan culture (Ixix), just as nation-minded intellectuals were attending to similar expressions of untutored cultural life all across Europe – witness the *costumbrismo* that was captivating Spaniards during the same era. His enthusiasm for the common life of Naples is particularly evident in his commentaries on 16 paintings that depict the simple everyday interactions that occurred in the streets and homes of Neapolitans; these paintings were specially commissioned for this work and produced in the *bambocciate* style by Gaetano Gigante (319–463). In his commentaries on these paintings, we can detect de Jorio’s eagerness to understand and appreciate the sensual aspects of Neapolitan culture. Women – their hands, their bodies, and their inner voices – play leading roles in 14 of Gigante’s 16 frames. Almost all the players are macaroni-eaters, fig-sellers, and similarly common folks, who produce gestural actions that de Jorio describes as graceful and subtle enough to



serve as evidence of Neapolitan respectability. De Jorio's comments on these paintings never shy away from opportunities to praise "the dignity of Neapolitan action and feeling" (lxix).

Such praise might strike one as puzzling, given that at least half of the paintings depict scenes of Neapolitan disreputability, including drunkenness, thievery, brawling, deceitfulness, and idleness. However, such scenes of disreputability, together with de Jorio's interpretations of them, constitute an early form of structural nostalgia according to which the persistence of antinomian practices among a people bears witness to their collective yearning for a mythic time-before-law. The implication is that if their halcyon days could be realized anew, then, paradoxically, this people could enjoy life with laws that respect their culture-before-law.

On the whole, and as Kendon suggests, de Jorio's account of gesture and culture in Naples reveals a great deal about the climate of opinion in early nineteenth century Europe. Modern linguistics and semiotics were anticipated in de Jorio's characterization of the "double aspect" of gesture, in his descriptions of the inflections and juxtapositions of gestures, in his consideration of contextual conditioning, and in his labyrinth-like organization of cultural materials. In addition, one can detect in his writing an early turn toward the sensual and female-centered dimensions of language, which figured prominently in nineteenth-century nationalist thinking. Kendon deserves great credit for pursuing this unlikely scholarly project. His eye, well known for its ability to discern the subtleties of contemporary communicative practices, is here shown to be equally sharp and keen in discerning the importance of de Jorio's vintage and long-ignored gesture ethnography.

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MUHAMMAD HASAN AMARA, *Politics and sociolinguistic reflexes: Palestinian border villages* (Studies in Bilingualism 19). Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1999. Pp. xix, 261. Hb \$87.00.

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Amara begins his study of language variation in Palestinian border villages in Israel and the West Bank with three main premises: (1) researchers have not paid enough attention to the sociolinguistics of what he calls "radical political situations," of which the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is an example; (2) the connection between macro-sociolinguistic issues, such as language planning and language attitudes, and micro issues, such as variation in use of linguistic structures, has not been explored enough; and (3) socio-political events and changes affect (i.e., change) patterns of use of linguistic structures. On the third point, Amara pre-

dicts, "When a society is divided, we should expect to find a reflected linguistic division; when two societies share common cultural or political values, we should expect to find some reflection of this in their languages." Amara sets out to investigate this prediction for three villages on the border between Israel and the West Bank. Two of the villages, Zalafa and Western Barta'a, are situated in the area of Israel called the "Little Triangle," which designates an area that Jordan agreed to cede to Israel in the armistice agreement following the Arab–Israeli War of 1948. The armistice line drawn between Israel and Jordan in 1949 divided several Palestinian villages and cities, including Barta'a. The third village in Amara's study, Eastern Barta'a, is situated in the West Bank. Western and Eastern Barta'a were reunited in 1967, when Israel took control of the West Bank.

In the first chapter, Amara gives a brief sketch of the political history of the Little Triangle, as well as an overview of the sociolinguistic patterns found in the various studies reported in the book. The next five chapters describe in greater detail the socio-political situation of Palestinian villages and cities in Israel and the West Bank, focusing on changes in the divided village of Barta'a since the establishment of Israel in 1948. Amara refers the reader to his previous work (Amara 1989) for a similar description of the Israeli Palestinian village, Zalafa.

In Chaps. 7–12, Amara presents the findings from sociolinguistic and social-psychological studies of the three villages. He begins in Chap. 7 with an account of the history and current picture of the status of Arabic varieties, as well as English and Hebrew, in Israel and the West Bank. Chap. 8 describes preliminary ethnographic studies of the three villages conducted by himself and his colleagues, from which Amara developed his hypotheses about language variation and change in Palestinian border villages. As a result of the preliminary studies, Amara hypothesized that linguistic variation in Palestinian border villages is correlated with level of education, occupation, religiosity (in relation to Islam), age, gender, and contact with Jewish Israelis and with urban varieties of Palestinian Arabic and Modern Standard Arabic. He also hypothesized that speakers in West Bank villages would use more features of Standard Arabic than would speakers in Israeli Palestinian villages, while speakers in Israeli Palestinian villages would use more Hebrew features than speakers in West Bank villages, and that there would be no difference in the use of English features. The preliminary studies also served to provide data on language use in what Amara proposes as the two most informal speech styles, "casual style" (following Labov 1966) and "intimate style" (following Joos 1968). I am pleased to report that Amara used ethnographic methods to get at casual and intimate speech styles, rather than attempting to elicit these styles through manipulation of topic and setting in the sociolinguistic interview, a method that is limited in its results, as Amara himself notes.

After the preliminary ethnographic studies, Amara and his colleagues conducted structured sociolinguistic interviews in order to investigate the use of certain phonological and morphological features of Palestinian Arabic varieties and Standard Arabic, as well as the use of lexical features from Hebrew and

English. They also elicited speakers' attitudes toward their own and others' speech, and speakers' self-classification in terms of national, religious, and local identities (i.e., village orientation and kinship). In Chaps. 9 and 10, Amara details the findings of his quantitative analysis of phonological, morphological, and lexical variation, according to social and style variation, in the villages. He found that, in all three villages, young men who are observant Muslims and highly educated lead in the use of Standard Arabic features. He also found that Eastern Barta'ans lead in the use of Standard Arabic features over speakers from the Israeli Palestinian villages, particularly in more formal (following Labov 1966) styles. In more formal styles, use of Standard Arabic features tended to increase for all speakers, which Amara attributes to a diglossic relationship between Standard Arabic and Palestinian Arabic varieties, and the use of Hebrew lexical items tended to decrease in formal styles. Higher use of Hebrew items was found in the Israeli Palestinian villages than in Eastern Barta'a, as well as among speakers who had the most contact with Jewish Israelis. Use of English lexical items proved not to be correlated with any particular social variables.

In Chap. 11, Amara discusses quantitative correlations between speakers' language attitudes and the social demographic variables used in the analysis of linguistic variation. He found that young, highly educated students and professionals in both villages were most likely to have negative attitudes toward their own speech and toward their village's variety. In Chap. 12, Amara presents findings with regard to accommodative linguistic behaviors between the interviewers (including himself) and the interviewees in his studies. He reports that the greatest convergence, as evidenced in a higher use of features of the local variety of Arabic by both interviewer and interviewee occurred in interactions between the Barta'an interviewers and Barta'an interviewees. The lowest use of local vernacular features by both interviewer and interviewee, occurred when Amara, who is not from Barta'a, interviewed Barta'ans. In these cases, both Amara and his interviewees used more Standard Arabic features.

In Chaps. 13 and 14, Amara brings together his socio-political discussion from Chaps. 2–6 and his sociolinguistic and social psychological findings from Chaps. 7–12. Chap. 13 presents multiple regression and factor analyses of associations among social demographic variables, social psychological variables (national, religious, and local identities and language attitudes), and sociolinguistic variables. Chap. 14 presents Amara's interpretations of these associations in terms of changing language use among Palestinians. He argues that, among Israeli Palestinians, there is a tension between Israeli identity – as indexed by the increasing use of Hebrew lexical items – and Arab Palestinian identity, as indexed by the increasing use of features of Standard Arabic. He argues that, among Palestinians in the West Bank, the processes of “Palestinization” and “Islamization” encourage the use of Standard Arabic features, but that English is the most important foreign language in the West Bank (based on findings from a separate study in Bethlehem).

Based on his findings in the studies reported in this volume, Amara disputes the claim “that sociolinguistic variation is either the cause or the result of social variation, or that both are the result of something else.” Instead, he argues, “the demographic, social psychological and sociolinguistic variables form a unified, consistent if complex set of patterns that in fact CONSTITUTE the community under study” (204, emphasis added). However, two sentences later, he characterizes a stagnant relationship between language variation and social variation in which the community under study has been constituted but remains fixed: “The sociolinguistic pattern is A REFLEX of the historical development [of Palestinian border villages], PRESERVED also in the current demographic pattern and in the social psychological values and attitudes” (204, emphasis added). Despite his emphasis on changing patterns in the last chapter, Amara’s quantitative analysis, while elegant in its subtle account of the complex interplay of locally relevant sociolinguistic, social demographic and social psychological variables, captures the patterns of variation and change as if in a snapshot, static and still.

I would like to see Amara combine his quantitative analysis of isolable tokens of linguistic features with qualitative analysis of those features in the context of emergent interaction, as exemplified, for instance, in Mendoza-Denton’s (1997) use of ethnography, Conversation Analysis, and quantitative variation analysis to investigate the linguistic construction and negotiation of identity among Chicana/Mexicana high-school girls in California. Amara has already collected ethnographic data, including recordings of naturally occurring speech, that would facilitate such an analysis. Language as an emergent resource is the focus of several current topics in sociolinguistic research, including gendered language use (e.g., Eckert & McConnell-Ginet 1992, Bucholtz, Liang, & Sutton 1999), codeswitching (e.g., Gumperz 1982, Zentella 1997, Woolard 1998), and style shifting (e.g., Coupland 1980, Bell 1984, Mendoza-Denton 1997).

An analysis of discursive patterns of codeswitching seems particularly useful for Amara’s research setting, in which English and Hebrew supplement multiple varieties of Arabic as part of the local linguistic repertoire. Though Amara includes the dimension of speech style in his analyses, he relies on a unidimensional measure of style drawn from Labov’s (1966) account of style as attention paid to speech. In fact, Amara examines audience-driven style shifting, though he frames this behavior as speech accommodation rather than as style shifting. The two are closely related, as seen in the work of Coupland 1980 and Bell 1984, both of whom Amara cites in his discussion of speech accommodation. Coupland and Bell have led a rethinking of style shifting behavior that focuses on the range of contextual factors – such as audience, topic, and situation – that influence intra-speaker variation.

Finally, current research on language ideology (e.g., Woolard & Schieffelin 1994) has much to offer Amara’s work. The rubric of language ideology provides a useful framework for theorizing the connection between macro and micro lev-

els of sociolinguistic analysis – for example, the interplay among patterns of linguistic variation, emergent linguistic practices, social psychological phenomena such as language attitudes, and social institutional phenomena such as language policies and education.

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JOHN BAUGH, *Beyond Ebonics: Linguistic pride and racial prejudice*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. vii, 149. Hb \$29.95.

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The foundation of the Ebonics controversy (EC) was laid centuries before its December 1996 debut. The EC was not about the name “Ebonics,” but about a legacy. In the Introduction, Baugh writes: “This text attempts to clarify several of the issues, misconceptions, and educational policies that emerged from the Ebonics controversy while striving to view them within the broader context of the linguistic legacy of American slavery and to address the linguistic prejudices that tend to inhibit improved race relations” (xiii). Within this context, Baugh clarifies how the EC happened, and why.

Baugh aims to “dispel uninformed and divisive myths about the linguistic consequences of the American slave trade” (xii); to “inform rational discussion

on how best to educate students for whom standard English is not native [SENN]” (xiii); to delineate why the US should redress the linguistic consequences of American slavery for African slave descendants (ASD); and to take the first step toward healing the nation through linguistic tolerance for all. Finally, Baugh wants readers to know that he is unequivocal in his position on the EC: “African American English [AAE] is a dialect of English, and not a separate language” (47).

Though Baugh says that “readers should know that I care much more about the educational welfare of students who lack standard English proficiency than I do about contentious squabbles over moot linguistic terminology” (xii), throughout *Beyond Ebonics* (BE), he stresses “the scholarly and educational perils of attempting to adopt Ebonics as either a technical linguistic term or as an educational philosophy, at least as long as multiple and contradictory definitions for Ebonics continue to exist. Just as a house that is divided cannot stand, linguistic terminology that alleges to have scientific validity cannot survive with multiple definitions” (86).

BE contains nine chapters, each a detailed and urgent exegesis of a problem or question. Chap. 1, “Linguistic pride and racial prejudice,” lays the foundation for Baugh’s primary aims and their importance to him personally and professionally. In this chapter, Baugh best expresses his conviction for achieving those aims: “Until such time as leaders in positions of political authority have the collective courage, vision, and wisdom to redress the linguistic legacy of American slavery within the context of providing equal educational opportunities to all children, we will never be able to fully overcome our long history of race-based inequality” (12–13).

Chap. 2, “Ebonic genesis,” parses definition of the term “Ebonics” as articulated by its primary creator, the psychologist Robert Williams, in 1975. Baugh also contextualizes the definition within Williams’s area of expertise and his agenda, which was to confront racial bias in testing.

Chap. 3, “A contentious global debate,” relies on anthropologist John Ogbu’s distinction between voluntary (e.g., European colonizers) and involuntary (e.g., African slaves and their descendants) immigrants to address an issue fundamental to the US’s getting beyond Ebonics: “Are African Americans [AAs] linguistically similar or dissimilar to other immigrants who came to the U.S. speaking languages other than English? . . . . As we know, the linguistic history of ASD is unique and not truly comparable to any other voluntary group of immigrants” (36).

Chap. 4, “Oakland’s Ebonics resolutions,” is a very critical exegesis of the intent and implications of the Oakland Unified School Board’s Ebonics resolutions. Baugh maintains that the resolutions failed to yield a better education for AA children because of their position that the language of ASD is an African language, which is in opposition to Baugh’s view that it is an American English dialect.

Chap. 5, “Legislative lament,” focuses on the EC in the US Senate hearings and in debates in various state legislatures. It also critiques the role linguists played in the EC. For example, Baugh chides the Linguistic Society of America’s 1997 resolution supporting the Ebonics resolutions because, even though linguists misinterpreted a term that was not theirs (Ebonics), they could have clarified their position about their own terms – “dialect” and “language” – at a time when a nation was willing to listen and language policy and planning in the US could have benefited greatly. Baugh points out that “from the standpoint of educational policy . . . the difference between a dialect and a language is substantial; it’s the difference between access to Title VII funding or not” (51).

Chap. 6, “Legal implications,” spotlights California’s Standard English Proficiency program, which resulted from the decision by Judge Charles Joiner in *Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children et al. v. Ann Arbor School District Board* (1979). Judge Joiner recognized AAE as the language of many AA children, and the need for teachers to understand AAE as a way to combat their linguistic prejudice, which interferes with successfully educating AA children.

Chap. 7, “Disparate theoretical foundations,” details the problems of divergent definitions of “Ebonics” among Afrocentric proponents and the impact of those definitions on getting beyond Ebonics. The four definitions are:

- (1) Ebonics is an international construct, including the linguistic consequences of the African slave trade.
- (2) Ebonics is the equivalent of black English and is considered to be a dialect of English.
- (3) Ebonics is the antonym of black English and is considered to be a language other than English (Oakland’s position).
- (4) Ebonics refers to language among all people of African descent throughout the African Diaspora. (74–75)

Baugh also considers here “the relevance of corresponding educational debates regarding linguistic-cognitive differences versus linguistic-cognitive deficits in connection with poor academic performance among low-income and minority students” (85).

Chap. 8, “Racist reactions and ebonics satire,” surveys Ebonics “humor.” Baugh broadly segments this into two groups: “(1) mean spirited, overtly racist attacks that were akin to any of the worst racist discourse ever produced in American history and (2) benign linguistic prejudice toward vernacular AAE, based on combinations of false linguistic stereotypes” (87).

Chap. 9, “Beyond Ebonics: Striving toward enhanced linguistic tolerance,” examines the rhetoric and ideologies portrayed in the narratives of prominent AA men as they reflect the primary aims of the volume. Baugh analyzes these linguistic narratives within the context of the history of education of AAs before *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) and the rise of racialization in schools after it, as well as addressing the current controversy regarding “the potential benefits of educational resegregation for black students” (109) in grades K–12. Certainly,

in connection with racialization and resegregation, the excerpt from reflections by Richard Wright of Howard University while a guest on the Gordon Elliot television show in January 1997 is one of the most powerful in Baugh's book:

I wanted to make a statement that the whole problem of black children going to school and not learning standard English is a relatively recent phenomenon. It is not the case that black people used to go to school came out the way they went in, okay? I went to school during the 1940s and 50s. We didn't go to school as speakers of black English. We went to school understanding that the purpose of school was to clean up whatever you took in. . . . Since desegregation you've had to deal with the weight of color. When we went to school, we just went to school. You didn't go to school as a black child, you just went to school as a child. . . . The weight of race is something black people have to carry today. When I went to school I did not carry the weight of race. . . . During the period of segregation there was not such a thing in your mind as you were going to a black school. . . . You were simply going to school and the assumption was that you were going to school to learn because you had something to do there you couldn't do away from school, and that's learn something (110).

I think the above excerpt best reinforces a recurring message Baugh is trying to send: This nation will not heal and cannot move forward educationally, socially, or politically until it redresses not just the linguistic consequences of slavery in America, but all its consequences. The sign-off I heard once on a National Public Radio program emphasizes this idea that we fail or succeed together: "If it's important to Latinos (ASD, descendants of Chinese railroad builders, survivors and descendants of Japanese internment camps, etc.), it's important to America."

With tenacity, conviction, and eloquence, Baugh achieves his goals. He attacks uninformed and divisive myths about AAE by providing a detailed elucidation of the EC sociohistorically, educationally, and legally. He provides a conceptual model for how best to educate SENN students. He provides compelling arguments for why the US should redress the linguistic consequences of American slavery for ASD. He is steadfast in his plea for linguistic tolerance.

Although *BE* is very short and intends that its audience span "the entire political spectrum" (xiii), its style, tone, and vocabulary make it a book unsuited for a general audience (as indicated by the reactions of my graduate and undergraduate students who read the book during Fall 2000 in a course entitled "Language use in the AA community"). Nevertheless, *BE* deserves attention and reflection. It informs us about the EC in an intellectual and dispassionate way, which is a far cry from what we got in the midst of the controversy. With Baugh's book, sanity has finally arrived.

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JACK B. MARTIN & MARGARET MCKANE MAULDIN, *A dictionary of Creek/Muskogee, with notes on the Florida and Oklahoma Seminole dialects of Creek* (Studies in the anthropology of North American Indians.) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, in cooperation with the American Indian Studies Research Institute, Indiana University, Bloomington. Pp. xxxviii, 357. Hb \$60.00.

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From the 1930s through the 1970s, the Muskogean languages of the southeastern US were virtually the scholarly preserve of the late Mary R. Haas, and no modern grammars or dictionaries were available for them. In more recent years, it has been a pleasure to witness increasing work in this language family by Pamela Munro at UCLA – and her students, and her students’ students – and by Karen Booker and her associates at the University of Kansas. The present volume is the third major Muskogean dictionary to appear in the past few years.

The Creek (Muskogee) language was spoken, at the time of first contact with Europeans, in what is now Georgia and Alabama. In the early nineteenth century, under the impact of Anglo invasion, part of the Creek moved to Florida, where they were known as Seminoles (from Spanish *cimarrón* ‘untamed’); later, Creeks in Georgia and Alabama moved to the Indian Territory of what is now Oklahoma, where they were joined by part of the Florida Seminoles. The language is now spoken in three dialects: Muskogee proper, Oklahoma Seminole, and Florida Seminole. (However, some of the Florida Indians called Seminoles speak another Muskogean language, called Hitchiti or Mikasuki.) Martin, a former UCLA student, has studied the language since the 1980s; Mauldin, a native speaker of Creek, teaches it at the University of Oklahoma.

The book has two main sections, a Creek–English section (1–154) and a fully detailed English–Creek section (185–351). Forms are cited in a traditional roman orthography developed by a nineteenth century missionary, in which ⟨c⟩ is [č], ⟨r⟩ is [ʃ], ⟨v⟩ is [ʌ], ⟨i⟩ is [ey] (originally [ay]), ⟨e⟩ is [i], and ⟨ē⟩ is [i:]. This is accompanied by a phonemic transcription adapted from that of Mary Haas; thus we have *rvfo/ʌfó/* (i.e. [ʌfó]) ‘winter’. Morpheme boundaries are indicated by hyphens in the phonemic transcription, but the component parts of words are usually not given explicit identification; thus, inexperienced users can analyze *Rvfo-Rakko* ‘December’ by looking up *rakko* ‘big’.

An unusual feature of the volume is two sections on placenames: one on native Creek toponyms (167–71) and the other on English placenames of Creek origin (171–83). The first of these gives not only currently used geographical names but also the hereditary groups called *etvlwv* /itálwa/ (‘tribal town’ or ‘band’, 41, 167), which correspond to earlier towns in Georgia and Alabama. The data here are interesting in relation to the view, often expressed by students of placenames,

that American Indian toponyms tend to be “descriptive,” like Algonquian *Mississippi* ‘big river’, in contrast to monomorphemic European placenames like *Rome* or *London*. In rebuttal to that view, it is of course easy to think of American English placenames like *New Haven*, *Grand Rapids*, or *Little Rock*. Among American Indian languages, it is true that descriptive names often predominate, especially where certain language families are involved (e.g., Athabaskan); but the names of Creek tribal towns show a different pattern. Martin & Mauldin list 55 such names. Of these, 5 are “modified” derivatives of simpler names, such as *Yofalv-Hopayē* ‘Eufaula-distant’, comparable to English names like *West Virginia*. There are 16 clearly descriptive names, like *Tvlv-hasse* ‘town-rancid’ (Tulahassee in Oklahoma, Tallahassee in Florida), plus 5 that can be analyzed only in part. But 17 names are monomorphemic and etymologically opaque, mostly consisting of only three syllables – for example, *Apehkv* (Eng. ‘Arbeka’), *Helvpe* (‘Hillabee’), *Kasihta* (‘Cussetah’), *Osuce* (‘Osochee’), and *Taskēke* (‘Tuskegee’). We may hope that future dictionaries of American Indian languages will also include sections on placenames, to give us further insights into Native naming patterns.

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