Recensions / Reviews

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Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics
R. Kenneth Carty, William Cross and Lisa Young
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000, pp. x, 265

The central thesis of *Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics* is that the 1993 federal election marked the collapse of Canada's third party system and the first step in the establishment of the fourth. The purpose of the book is to uncover the causes of this collapse and to identify the defining characteristics of the emerging fourth party system.

The authors begin by retracing the history of the first three party systems, outlining the main characteristics of each, and the reasons for their demise. They argue that the upheaval of 1993 put an end to the pan-Canadian focus of the third party system and left in its place "a set of regionally distinctive party systems" (34). They then proceed to describe the five main parties in the emerging system. The two newest parties, Reform (later, the Canadian Alliance) and the Bloc Québécois, epitomize the rejection of the pan-Canadian vision of the third party system, and have established several of the new system's key characteristics, namely regionalism, the democratization of internal party politics, and new patterns of interest representation. The three "old parties" have responded to these changes with varying degrees of success. The authors provide no predictions as to the likelihood of their survival in the fourth party system.

The authors then describe the ways in which three key party functions have been transformed over time. The first of these is the representation of interests. The authors argue that "a distinctive characteristic of the emerging party system is the variation in the representational practices and orientations of the parties" (85). Whereas the third party system was marked by the politics of accommodation, the fourth is much more fragmented. The Liberals, New Democrats and Conservatives are trying to maintain the accommodative practices of the old system while Reform/Alliance and the Bloc make no effort to broker cleavages of any kind. The rise of interest group activity only adds to the range of representational choices facing citizens.

The second aspect of parties to be examined is internal party democracy. Here the authors argue that "pressures for meaningful grass-roots participation and responsive leadership have affected both the shape of the new party system . . . and the internal practices of parties within the system" (109). Largely as a result of Reform's example in these matters, all parties in the new era have been pressured into adopting more democratic practices for making decisions and for selecting party leaders.

A third area of change is party finance. By the end of the third party system, basic elements of the existing regulatory regime were being called into question by the two new parties, as well as by interest groups. The Reform party was at the forefront of much of this change, challenging the regulations that govern election broadcast time as well as the very principle of public funding for parties (although it continues to accept such funding as long as the other parties do so). However, the authors conclude that major changes to the system are unlikely as long as the parties in parliament disagree on the fundamentals of electoral reform (153).

Both continuity and change are explored in the context of local and national electoral campaigning. With respect to the first, the authors contend that "despite all the change transforming other aspects of the party system, this very local dimension of political life goes on much as it has for over a century. It is here that the forces of continuity show themselves strongest" (154). While the parties in the emerging system struggle to find the right bal-

ance between local autonomy and national discipline, "the old trade-off continues to hold as a defining characteristic of our politics because it continues to be Canadian parties' organizational solution to their problem of linking a plural society to majority cabinet government" (177).

A hallmark of national election campaigns in the new party system is the "increasingly targeted and fragmented political communication that leaves little room for a national campaign dialogue" (180). While parties in the third system used mass communication to send national messages across the country, parties in the emerging fourth system target their campaign messages by region and by the socio-economic characteristics of the groups they are trying to reach. Adding to their ability to do this are new computer-based technologies such as electronic voter files, the Internet and automated telephone systems. While the authors find that the parties made relatively little use of these technologies in the 1997 campaign, they predict that they will be put to much greater use in the future, allowing parties "to enter into essentially private conversations with individual voters" (210) and thereby putting an end to national political dialogue.

Why did the third party system collapse? For the same reasons that previous party systems did: changing forms of governance and changes in Canadian society. As the linking mechanism between society and government, the third party system became "stretched to the breaking point" (218). While some aspects remain, others appear to be in the process of being irrevocably transformed. In their conclusion, the authors refrain from making definitive predictions about the emerging system, opting instead to identify its five characteristics: the advent of new parties, the increasing regionalization of party politics, the fragmentation of the electorate, greater diversity among the parties, and increased democratization within the parties.

Carty, Cross and Young do students of party politics in Canada a great service by bringing together a wide range of writings on Canadian parties, both historical and contemporary. The book combines a comprehensive overview of the history of Canadian party systems with a detailed examination of current party organizational and electoral practices. Along the way, it also provides the reader with a thorough review of the most important developments in such matters as campaign finance regulation, electoral polling practices and campaign communication technologies. For this, the book provides a valuable contribution to the Canadian political party literature.

That being said, one cannot help but wish that the authors had waited a year or two before bringing it out, in order to take advantage of the wealth of additional data made available by the United Alternative process that led Reform to become the Canadian Alliance by the 2000 election campaign. Of course, the authors could not have expected that Jean Chrétien would call yet another early election when they first embarked upon the project. Since then, the Alliance has been faced with dissension that culminated in a leadership change. Unfortunately, all this gives the book a somewhat dated appearance, less than one year after its release.

For example, the experience of the United Alternative process raises serious questions with respect to some of the authors' claims about party democratization as it relates to the Reform party. The authors seem to take Reform's grass-roots democracy image more or less at face value, underlining founder Preston Manning's "nurturing of the membership, and their resulting confidence in him" (119). However, close observers of the Reform-Alliance transformation have argued that the process stripped the party of its most important contributions to the new party system, by shifting it away from its regional and policy roots and by undermining internal party democracy. In his

analysis of the 2000 Canadian Alliance campaign under the leadership of Stockwell Day, Faron Ellis paints a devastating critique of the United Alternative process, arguing that the party leadership was able to have its way, not because of charisma or nurturing, but because it controlled all means of internal communication and had a near monopoly on public communication (''The More things Change . . . The Alliance campaign,'' in Jon H. Pammett and Christopher Dornan, eds., *The Canadian General Election of 2000* [Toronto: Dundurn, 2000]). While Manning ultimately lost control of the new entity almost as soon as he had created it, his efforts to transform the party from a regional protest movement to a vehicle for national brokerage continued unabated. As a result, the 2000 election campaign did see the Canadian Alliance focus on one region more than any other—but that region was Ontario, not the West.

It is not just the Canadian Alliance that refuses to behave as expected. The Liberal campaign also provides a number of challenges to the Carty, Cross and Young thesis. The prevalence of nationally targeted advertising and the focus on national rather than regional issues suggest that the 2000 Liberal campaign was very much in keeping with the pattern of the third party system. Likewise, the use of new communication technologies to target narrow groups of voters seems to have been no more prevalent in 2000 than in previous campaigns. Finally, Jean Chrétien's apparent omnipotence in both the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary parties would seem to undermine the contention that all parties in the new system are becoming more member-driven and democratic.

Of course, it is easy to critique, with the benefit of hindsight, a work that attempts to map an emerging and therefore changing phenomenon. Still, one cannot help but remark that for a system in such apparent upheaval, it continues to show a remarkable affinity to the past. Why, for example, in the face of so many new cleavages in Canadian society should the new party system come to be based on one that is so old—region? The authors provide no answer for this question.

Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics is a valuable resource for bringing together existing scholarship on Canadian political parties, and for attempting to map a still-emerging fourth party system. It is by no means the final word on this process, and in fairness, it never claims to be. Instead, it is an impressive opening volley in what promises to be a long and lively debate over the nature and role of parties in the Canadian political process.

MIRIAM LAPP *University of Western Ontario*

Democratic Equality: What Went Wrong?
Edward Broadbent, ed.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001, pp. xxvi, 263

As its subtitle suggests, the avowed purpose of this collection is to examine, from different disciplinary viewpoints, the fate of the relatively ample and egalitarian Keynesian welfare states that emerged in the developed democracies between the 1940s and the 1970s. Consistent with a position taken by Edward Broadbent in his introductory chapter, most contributors appear to agree that the postwar welfare state represented an important accomplishment, combining sustained economic growth with a fairly widespread distribution of material wellbeing, and an increasingly inclusive sense of citizenship. This ''golden age'' is compared very favourably with the capitalism that preceded and succeeded it.

Several of the contributions are particularly noteworthy. Bo Rothstein analyzes why Scandinavia's universal welfare states deliver more ample benefits than do the more selective ones of the Anglo-Saxon world. The main reason, he argues, has to do with procedural justice. On the one hand, selective benefits are treated as a universal citizenship right; but, on the other, their beneficiaries are defined as worthy because of some particular attribute that separates them from "ordinary citizens." In a "selective system, the moral logic of the discourse tends . . . to undermine the legitimacy of the system" (21). G. A. Cohen provides a clear and stimulating argument in favour of a socialist distribution of societal resources, arguing that "market socialist" alternatives, which leave important features of capitalism intact, are acceptable only as a feasible "second best." Dietrich Rueschemeyer contends that "social welfare policies are of critical importance for enabling and invigorating democratic citizenship and that the more comprehensive welfare states give the strongest support to broad-based and autonomous participation in the political process" (80). A healthy democracy that distributes political opportunities widely, the aspiration of much liberal thinking, is best attained, then, in conjunction with a universalist, social democratic welfare state. Jane Jenson traces the evolution of Canada's "citizenship regime" from the 1940s. While Canada's postwar welfare state was relatively liberal (and selectivist), it nevertheless was broader, and resulted in less poverty, than did its American cousin. Stressing the role of labour unions and the CCF/NDP in accounting for these differences (115), this analysis appears to depart somewhat from an argument made some years ago by Jenson regarding Canada's "permeable fordism"; such "class-based" influences were de-emphasized in that analysis. Jenson argues further that in the period of relative decline experienced by Canada's welfare state in the past two decades, policy discussions have increasingly focused on the needs of children, a preoccupation that excludes many needy citizens. Barbara Ehrenreich and Ruth Lister provide useful and (to a social democrat) depressing reviews of recent social assistance reforms in the United States and Britain, respectively. Robert Hackett's examination of Canada's largely conservative and business-friendly private news media represents a subtle and persuasive alternative to the rather sweeping claims made by Noam Chomsky. Daniel Savas compiles evidence from a wide-ranging international public opinion survey conducted by the Angus Reid Group. It reveals that Americans are much more willing than Canadians (and the citizens of most other democracies) to tolerate high levels of income inequality and to deny that government has a responsibility to redistribute income. Jim Stanford documents the extent to which wealth, especially financial assets, is still concentrated in the hands of a relatively small percentage of Canadian families, despite the alleged emergence recently of a "people's capitalism."

These contributions are very strong; they make interesting arguments in clear and crisp prose. It is not evident, however, that they represent a coherent whole. As the above summary will indicate, it would be misleading to say that all chapters dealt with "what went wrong" with postwar social democracy. Some do not address their themes in historical terms, instead developing relatively atemporal conceptual arguments; others are fairly descriptive, not offering much in the way of explanations. For the same reason, not all of the contributors clearly provide support for the argument that, as is claimed inside the volume's front cover, "the political decision-making process is of critical importance in entrenching, or battling, . . . escalating inequality . . . " (i). This causal issue is not explicitly addressed by many authors. John Richards' chapter, which includes his now familiar criticism of traditional social democracy and his endorsement of Tony Blair's "Third Way," is entirely out of step with the oth-

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ers. The volume also does not offer much sustained discussion of potential future directions for social democracy, or of a future reformist politics in general. There is a retrospective, even wistful, tone to many of chapters. If social democrats are now engaged in a vital discussion of how to renew their struggle for a more equitable and inclusive capitalism in an age of globalization, there is little evidence of it here. Yet it is precisely this type of discussion that many of this book's potential readers are likely to be looking for.

Broadbent's volume can nevertheless be recommended quite highly. Many of the contributions are cogent and offer interesting and original perspectives on the trajectory that has been traversed by the welfare state during the past half century. They provide strong ammunition for those who wish to argue that our current drift towards reduced social provision and greater inequality is neither desirable nor necessary.

RODNEY HADDOW *St. Francis Xavier University*

(Ab)Using Power: The Canadian Experience
Susan S. Boyd, Dorothy E. Chunn and Robert Menzies, eds.
Halifax: Fernwood, 2001, pp. 287

This book is based on papers given at a symposium sponsored by Simon Fraser University in 1998. The volume consists of an introduction and fifteen articles organized into five sections. The objective of the book is to provide a set of case studies that attempt "to map and explain patterns of wrongdoing among privileged members of society and to assess their impact" (19). The editors are particularly interested in examining the relationships between power and crime. The writers have applied no single theory of power although concepts of power have been drawn from a number of sources including Marx, Mills, Foucault, and feminist theory. In examining situations and behaviour not normally considered as criminal behaviour, the editors indicate that they want to challenge conventional thinking about crime and encourage the development of new value frameworks that might be applied in the discipline of criminology.

In the first section, three issues respecting the role of the state are examined: citizen participation, immigration policy and the economy. Perhaps the most insightful piece, written by Ted Schrecker, analyzes the impact of neoconservative ideology in the redefinition of the state's role in relation to the economic system. In his view, the current governance regime for capitalism has led to "obsessive concern with individual economic competitiveness . . . " (47). Consumerism and economic success may appear to have greater value than voting and political participation. As well, economic competitiveness, aided and abetted by market globalization, have seen the state act, in many instances, as an agent of national and international corporate interests.

The second section focuses on the political elite. There is a personal account by a former ministerial aide of the relations between Minister of National Defence Kim Campbell and her department and the Department of Justice with respect to the Somalia affair in 1992. Another paper reviews the fraud scandals involving the misuse of political communications funds in the Saskatchewan government of Grant Devine in 1980-1992. The paper by Stuart Farson provides a history of the development of the intelligence services in the government of Canada, raising significant questions about the accountability of security agencies whose operations are primarily covert. It also raises questions about the protection of civil liberties when the state acts to protect its secrets or to extend its authority to maintain law and order.

The general theme in the third section focuses on how globalization has enhanced corporate power, and the ability of the corporate elite to abuse that power. Laureen Snider discusses the decriminalization and disappearance of corporate crime through downsizing, deregulation and changes in legislative requirements regarding, for example, corporate mergers and acquisitions, and workplace health and safety. Another article provides an adept assessment of corporate and media manipulation of public messages around the Westray Mine Disaster in Nova Scotia in 1992. The controversy surrounding Nike, the sports manufacturer, is also reviewed in some detail. The public reaction and consumer campaigns against Nike's exploitation of workers in less developed countries provide an interesting example of how opposition can be mobilized and result in change.

In the fourth section on the professions, psychology and psychiatry are used to demonstrate how the notion of selling one's expertise as a product for consumers often compromises the ethical quality of service to clients. It is likely this type of analysis could also be applied to other professional areas. The impact of the practice of psychiatry in manipulating and victimizing women in particular is examined. In a broader context, attitudinal issues regarding homosexuals in contemporary society are poignantly portrayed. This latter paper leaves one wondering how educational curricula could be modified to address some of the criticism raised by the author, who, as a homosexual, had to deal with the "system."

The final section deals with abuses in the criminal justice system. A former inmate has written a most moving article which provides an analytic assessment of her experiences and the state of women's imprisonment. This section also includes an appraisal of the report of the Ontario Commission on Systematic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System and a review of the l975 extradition process of Leonard Peltier from Canada to the United States.

This is a book of passion and reason. Many of the authors are *parti pris* but their assumptions are clear and the analyses logically consistent. In their efforts to provoke thoughtful review of conventional analytic frameworks and power structures, the editors and the authors have succeeded. But in the face of current trends to even more globalization and consumerism, the efforts needed to operationalize change will be very great indeed.

AUDREY DOERR *Calgary, Alberta*

How Ottawa Spends 2000-2001: Past Imperfect, Future Tense
Leslie A. Pal, ed.
Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. vi, 306

This latest edition of *How Ottawa Spends*—an annual that has now run for two decades—contains nine essays and is edited by a leading student of Canadian public administration, Leslie Pal. Two appendices offer fiscal facts and trends for the 1990s, including the revenue and expenditure components of the 2000-2001 budget, and a brief calendar listing salient political developments between the springs of 1999 and 2000. Helpful are the abstracts and Pal's synopses of the main thrusts of each chapter in his introductory overview. He identifies and elaborates on political developments over the year. This is something done in similar fashion in the *Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs*, but Pal brings a heightened policy and administration sensibility to his review. Alas, there is no index. Every non-fiction book ought to have one to facilitate research and reading that cuts across subject-specific chapters.

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The most budget-oriented chapter, by Geoffrey Hale, addresses what might be done with anticipated future surpluses (of which there are already dampened expectations). Another chapter examines policy toward the financial services industry. The prospect of it going the "continentalist" way of Canada's oil and natural gas industries is given short shrift. Aboriginal issues are visited in two other chapters; one is a dissection of an obscure federal agency—Aboriginal Business Canada—which focuses on economic development, and the other is Peter Clancy's chapter on the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. "The H2 woes of the DFO" is a too-clever-by-half title. It does not deal with water quality per se and is thus misleading. The other department whose labours are reviewed has probably the lowest profile in the public's mind, Veterans Affairs, a veritable mini-welfare state. Michael Prince offers a brief intriguing connection between the department's ideological underpinnings and Gad Horowitz's fertile thesis on the tory touch in Canada's political culture. Prince concludes by asking whether a separate portfolio is necessary. This is refreshing for most authorities on a given administrative agency are too invested in it to ponder its liquidation.

The evolving transformation of the Treasury Board Secretariat, a pivotal central agency, is the subject of another chapter. TBS proved vital to the Liberals' Program Review exercise in the 1990s. Many students fail to appreciate the length and strength of its tentacles in shaping how government manages its resources. Related to the remoulding of government is Cynthia Alexander's chapter exploring a rapidly evolving concept, "e-government." In theory, it could make for more citizen-centred government. Operationally, e-government delivery services hold out the prospect of government behaving more horizontally, across departments and programs. At present, vertically stacked departments are like solitudes unto themselves when serving the public. This is a new vital area of study for we are feeling our way along as the digital revolution inevitably contributes to reshaping government.

The chapter that qualifies as this volume's think piece is Denis Saint-Martin's overarching, conjectural foray about the emerging "social investment" state. In recent years, liberals, social democrats and neoconservatives have converged programmatically in their shared focus on preparing children for the new society-market nexus. In it, human capital becomes the driving force of the new economy. This chapter is in French, and while the *How Ottawa Spends* series has never before published a chapter in French, nevertheless the author deserves the honour though many readers will require the service of translation. Beyond Ottawa's bilingual belt and pockets in New Brunswick and Montreal, the anglophone audience that has the patience or sufficient ability to grasp Saint-Martin's argument *en français* is a slim one.

Three themes that surface in Pal's introduction are the shifts, rifts and drift of the government. The first applies to policy, the second to the Liberal leadership and within caucus, and the last to the government's overall direction and disposition. Much is made by Pal of the 2000 budget's centrepiece: tax cuts. Their cumulative impact was projected as over $12 billion by 2001-2002 (77). What is underplayed is Minister of Finance Paul Martin's intentionally muted agenda of debt reduction. In 2000-2001 alone, a tremendous surplus of $17 billion was generated to help pay down the debt, which is still at over half a trillion dollars. To the Liberals' credit, interest payments on the debt are now nearer a quarter, rather than a third, of all revenues. Martin, the quintessential business liberal, provided the yang for Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's yin for social or welfare liberalism. Their astute if testy political alliance allowed the government to project an image of wholeness and soli-

darity—something for every constituency or interest group—rather than schizophrenia.

NELSON WISEMAN *University of Toronto*

The Politics of Nationalism in Canada: Cultural Conflict since 1760
David Chennells
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001, pp. x, 381

In this innovative book David Chennells offers another look at a much-studied topic: nationalism in Canada. If the book stopped at that it would be interesting in its interpretations, in its evaluation of longitudinal data (what the author and other historians would prefer to call a theoretical historical perspective), and in its selection of key periods to include in the analysis. However, the author goes much further, employing an appealing theoretical perspective as an overlay for his analysis. In this way, the presentation of nationalism in Canada is no longer viewed as just an interesting and somewhat unique case. Rather, Canada becomes a critical case study against which to test a set of theoretical propositions. These have much greater relevance to an understanding of nationalism, particularly its "exclusive" variant, and to similar processes drawn from numerous cases around the world. In that sense this book has the potential to serve as a major contribution to the literature on this ever-important topic.

Chennells confines his study to "exclusive nationalism," which he defines "as nationalist political activity (that is, political activity seeking to create a more congruent or symbiotic relationship between state and nation so as to bind the state to the nation's will and to entrust the state with sustaining the nation's way of life) of a kind that seeks to privilege one recognizable way of life over others, in the sense of imposing it and intentionally altering the balance present among adherents of various real communities of religion, language, or culture" (7). His emphasis is on the causes of exclusive nationalism and the inherent conflict between it and "liberalism." The focus logically moves to state-society relations, more precisely to the nature of mass-elite relations in the context of control of the state. Chennells hypothesizes that the "political power cleavage" coupled with the mechanisms for participation come together to produce a unique settlement in a given historical time period. This settlement is, however, not static but changes under the conflicting influences of democratization which favours exclusive nationalism and international pressures which have tended to favour liberal (inclusive nationalist) accommodations.

In essence, we are seeing a variant of classical theory of "democratic elitism" applied to nationalism. Elites tend to favour more inclusive accommodations, particularly when their external (international) referents push them in that direction. Masses on the other hand, have a greater propensity to accept an exclusive nationalist role for the state. In the Canadian context, this elite mass relationship is characterized as fitting into one of three sequential ideal types, imposed statecraft, affiliative trusteeship and ethnic delegate representation. This evolution is accelerated by the extension of the franchise to increasing numbers of citizens. Each of the historic periods covered in depth in this work is shown to have been dominated by one of these accommodations. They lead eventually to the constitutional crisis of the current era in which elites may no longer be capable of effectively managing the exclusivity of the nationalist drive.

Two shortcomings of this work should be noted. First, the rich analytic framework is probably more appropriately regarded as a framework or a useful heuristic device rather than a full-blown theory. That would require a

clearer delineation of the relationship between the phases and the mechanisms that lead to progress from one to the next. Second, in the conclusion one hopes for a discussion of the broader implications of the case (the potential for which is well laid out in the introduction) but it is primarily applied to the fairly narrow cases of Canada and particularly Quebec. One can only hope that the author in a future work will take up the challenge of applying his analysis more fully to a broader array of cases.

Overall, I like to judge a book by whether it provokes the reader to think seriously about the central topic, whether the reader learns something interesting, whether it is well researched and well written. Chennells' book passes muster on all of these counts.

RICHARD VENGROFF *University of Connecticut*

Appartenir au Québec. Citoyenneté, nation et société civile. Enquête à Montréal, 1995
Denise Helly et Nicolas Van Schendel
Québec : Éditions de l'IQRC, 2001, 242 p.

Comme l'indique son titre, ce livre se penche sur les formes d'appartenance des Québécois et cela à partir d'une enquête réalisée à Montréal en 1995. Le livre présente les résultats de cette étude empirique réalisée auprès de 84 personnes (tant des natifs du Québec que des immigrants) en distinguant les diverses figures que prend l'appartenance chez ces répondants. Ce faisant, *Appartenir au Québec* permet à la fois d'élargir le débat (très à la mode) sur la notion de citoyenneté et remet également en question certains préjugés bien ancrés sur les formes d'appartenance des Québécois.

Comme le font valoir les auteurs, ce livre s'appuie sur une conception assez originale de la citoyenneté. Le débat sur la citoyenneté a été, depuis quelques décennies, dominé par des perspectives universitaires ou des discours politiques qui tendent, de diverses façons, à insister sur la perte de sens de la citoyenneté, une perte qui s'expliquerait par l'usure du lien social national (16-17). Ces conceptions restent trop collées sur une appartenance nationale et se privent ainsi de tenir compte des formes d'appartenance qui se construisent au niveau de la société civile et des interactions quotidiennes. Ainsi, les auteurs se méfient de « la rigidité des conceptions du lien à une société qui ne prennent en compte que les relations à un État et à une nation et confondent, comme la plupart des sondages, attachement à une société, valorisation du statut de citoyen et identification nationale. La vie quotidienne au sein de la société civile, hors du cercle familial et privé, semble pourtant un facteur important de la production et de la nature d'un sens d'appartenance des individus à la société où ils vivent » (19).

L'enquête présentée dans *Appartenir au Québec* part ainsi du principe que les lieux où se forgent la citoyenneté et l'appartenance à la société sont multiples puisqu'ils incluent le nationalisme et l'identification à l'État mais aussi les relations dans la société civile (c'est-à-dire les formes de sociabilité de la vie de tous les jours). De façon intéressante, les résultats de la recherche montreront le caractère incontournable des relations dans la société civile, ou ce que Patrick Pharo qualifie de *lien civil*, dans la constitution de l'appartenance des personnes interrogées. Plus précisément, la vie montréalaise a été très souvent identifiée comme un élément important dans la construction de l'appartenance à la société québécoise ou canadienne (200).

Ce livre porte également un regard plus optimiste que d'habitude sur l'appartenance des Québécois. Les auteurs montrent, en effet, que, pour la

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plupart des personnes interrogées, c'est la vitalité citoyenne qui ressort plutôt que la crise inéluctable de la citoyenneté: « Face aux discours universitaires et politiques qui s'alarment d'un sens de vivre défaillant dans les sociétés occidentales, les résultats de l'enquête réalisée en 1995 étonnent. Seuls quelques immigrés n'ont construit aucun lien avec les autres membres de la société québécoise ou de la société canadienne alors que la grande majorité des personnes interrogées font montre d'un lien sociétal, ne manifestent aucune aliénation profonde à l'égard de l'État, québécois ou canadien, et se révèlent fort attachées aux préceptes de la démocratie et des droits individuels » (199).

Il me semble que c'est en admettant que la citoyenneté a des ancrages divers que les auteurs arrivent à ce point de vue optimiste. En élargissant le registre des lieux par où passe la construction de la citoyenneté, les auteurs se donnent les moyens de voir de la vitalité où d'autres verraient l'usure du lien national.

Cette vision transparaît bien tout au long du livre. Celui-ci est disposé de façon à mettre en évidence le fait que les Québécois natifs autant que les immigrés font preuve de conceptions multiples du lien social. Les auteurs répertorient sept figures d'appartenance (qui constituent les sept chapitres du livre) allant d'une citoyenneté de nature républicaine à une absence complète d'identification aux sociétés canadienne ou québécoise, en passant par une citoyenneté purement libérale où ce sont les droits et les projets des individus qui doivent primer. Le scénario d'une citoyenneté en perte de sens pour les individus n'est ainsi qu'une figure parmi les sept et elle rejoint un très petit nombre des répondants.

Parce qu'il présente les figures multiples de l'appartenance, ce livre fait également éclater des préjugés sur le manque d'appartenance à la société québécoise, préjugés qui ressortent à l'occasion dans le discours politique québécois. Il montre que les immigrés, pas plus que les Québécois natifs, ne peuvent être taxés d'homogénéité en ce qui a trait à l'appartenance. Tout comme les Québécois de naissance, ils sont divisés entre diverses formes de citoyenneté incluant une identification à un État québécois éventuellement souverain. De surcroît, très peu d'entre eux s'identifient davantage à leur société d'origine qu'à la société québécoise ou n'ont construit aucun lien avec cette dernière.

Appartenir au Québec montre donc de façon empirique (et de manière tout à fait intéressante) ce que d'autres ont fait valoir notamment par le biais de la sociologie et de la philosophie politique, soit l'éclatement du lien social unique et la nécessité pour comprendre la citoyenneté de l'appréhender dans ses formes multiples. Pour ceux-ci, comme pour le livre qui nous intéresse ici, l'éclatement d'un quelconque lien social unifié n'aboutit pas à la crise de la citoyenneté mais bien à son renouvellement.

GUY CHIASSON *Université du Québec à Hull*

Spirit Dance at Meziadin: Chief Joseph Gosnell and the Nisga'a Treaty
Alex Rose
Madeira Park: Harbour, 2000, pp. 248

A journalist and author of two earlier books on the Nisga'a, Alex Rose was hired in 1989 by the Nisga'a Tribal Council, as it was then called, to help explain to the public, press and politicians the 130-year-old quest by the Nisga'a people to settle their land claim and sign a treaty with the Crown in Canada. This book is a first-hand account of the final years of that quest. It is

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an account of the long struggle for Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal title as well as the making of a modern treaty for an indigenous people living in the Nass Valley, a relatively remote area of northwestern British Columbia.

The book is well written and contains a useful bibliography and timeline for reference purposes. Throughout the book are archival and contemporary photographs which help humanize the story and portray the politics, people and place of the Nisga'a nation and related stakeholders, past and present.

Despite the implication of the book's sub-title, of a biographical focus on Chief Gosnell, much of the book presents a discussion of the various actors and groups involved in the modern phase of Nisga'a treaty making, which spans the last 30 to 35 years. After chapter 1 provides an overview of the actual Treaty, the next two chapters give the reader some historical background to the issues and the relations between the Nisga'a and governments in British Columbia. The following six chapters, forming the heart of the book, in turn profile the role of the Nisga'a visionaries for change (Frank Calder and James Gosnell); the consultants, including lawyers and media advisors; the negotiators; Joseph Gosnell as the lead negotiator of the Nisga'a team: the opposition to the final agreement and treaty, including the BC Liberals and Gordon Campbell, later government and premier of that province; and the neighbours to the Nisga'a, the Gitanyow, and the issue of overlapping land claims between different First Nations. In the tenth and final chapter, Rose offers a cautiously optimistic view of the future of the Nisga'a people under the treaty.

The author regards the treaty as a profound policy development, writing "it represents the biggest shift in the relationship between First Nations and non-aboriginal people in British Columbia since Captain George Vancouver arrived here in 1792 to put this coastline onto the charts" (36). Although some readers may question how fundamental a shift the Nisga'a treaty entails, Rose is surely correct in observing that the treaty is viewed by some as a symbol of hope and triumph, while by others it is a dangerous and perhaps unconstitutional move toward racially based differentiation in governance.

For students of Canadian politics and government, the origins, process and outcome of the Nisga'a treaty offers a gold mine of issues and topics to research, teach, write and debate about. Rose's account of the Nisga'a's quest touches on matters of colonialism, Aboriginal rights and inter-cultural relations, fiscal arrangements between governments, the nature of citizenship and the place of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in modern treaties, and the role of the courts and legislatures in policy and treaty making.

Likewise, for students of public policy studies, this book, though not a conventional academic text, is a case study by an articulate, sympathetic and observant participant, full of rich insights about various aspects of the policy process. One such feature is the significance of communications, media relations and countering adverse images and stories in the press. Another is the role of forging alliances and engaging in advocacy. The politics of issue definition and the absolutely critical importance of framing the image of issues clearly emerge from *Spirit Dance at Meziadin.*

For both the fascinating account of the Nisga'a people and their achieving a treaty, and the venerable themes of politics and policy making revealed, this book is well worth reading by specialists and general readers alike.

MICHAEL J. PRINCE *University of Victoria*

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Chroniques d'une vie politique mouvementée. L'Ontario francophone de 1986 à 1996
Linda Cardinal, en collaboration avec Caroline Andrew et Michèle Kérisit
Ottawa : Le Nordir, 2001, 152 p.

L'ancien Canada français a perdu son unité normative et l'on parle maintenant de fractionnement de l'identité canadienne-française en identités régionalisées. Le Canada français se définit lui-même comme un ensemble de communautés, comme l'indique le nom même de la Fédération des communautés francophones et acadienne qui en est devenue la voix officielle. Au fil des années, le Québec a été maintes fois accusé d'avoir abandonné à leur sort les communautés francophones hors Québec, mais les choses sont plus compliquées que cela. À s'en tenir à cette explication simpliste, on suppose que le social est le produit de forces exogènes, ce qui conduit à négliger les facteurs proprement endogènes qui sont à la source du changement.

Dès leur établissement, les différentes communautés nationales changent en effet dans leur nouvel environnement. Ce fut le cas en Nouvelle-France, les nouveaux Canadiens se définissant différemment des Français de la métropole après seulement quelques générations. Il en va de même pour les différentes composantes du Canada français, comme le montrent les débats des différents États généraux de la langue française tenus au début du 20e siècle, qui ont opposé les représentants du Québec et ceux qui provenaient de ce qu'on appelait alors la diaspora canadienne-française. Gabrielle Roy décrit dans son autobiographie les nouveaux défis auxquels était confrontée la communauté française du Manitoba dans les années vingt et trente, défis différents de ceux que rencontrait le Québec d'alors. L'actuel virage communautariste du Canada français s'expliquerait donc en bonne partie par les mutations endogènes au sein des différents espaces canadiens-français.

L'ouvrage de Linda Cardinal analyse précisément les forces politiques internes, les forces endogènes au milieu ontarien dirions-nous, qui sont à la source des mutations des communautés francophones de la province voisine du Québec. Nulle part dans ce livre n'est-il question de l'abandon par le Québec des Canadiens français de l'Ontario à leur propre sort, mais l'ouvrage analyse plutôt comment les mouvements sociaux francophones ont rendu possible le développement en Ontario de services de santé et de services sociaux en français, dans un contexte législatif favorable. L'auteure adopte avec pertinence une approche qui met l'accent sur la conjonction de l'action de mouvements sociaux importants et dynamiques – et notamment des mouvements de femmes francophones – avec des acteurs politiques favorables au développement de la francophonie ontarienne.

Linda Cardinal et ses collaboratrices analysent la période qui va de l'adoption par l'Ontario en 1986 d'une législation qui accordait le droit à tous les citoyens francophones de recevoir les services gouvernementaux en français à l'élection en 1995 du gouvernement Harris, qui marque un important repli dans l'ouverture manifestée antérieurement.

L'ouvrage décrit l'Ontario francophone dans le premier chapitre, mais d'une manière trop générale cependant, sans analyse originale. Le second chapitre, qui porte sur les différentes politiques publiques visant les francophones, est mieux documenté et plus fouillé. Ce chapitre décrit les différences qui marquent les gouvernements Davis, Peterson et Rae d'un côté et le gouvernement Harris de l'autre; ce dernier est plus sensible aux réactionnaires qui s'inquiètent des mesures adoptées en faveur des francophones, mesures qui n'avaient pourtant rien de menaçant comme en témoigne l'analyse faite dans l'ouvrage . . .

L'intérêt de ce livre tient à l'étude, aux chapitres trois et quatre, des mouvements sociaux de francophones et, en particulier, à l'étude des mouvements de femmes francophones qui ont lutté pour l'obtention de services sociaux en français. Le milieu ontarien est divisé entre ceux qui préconisent des services bilingues et ceux qui proposent plutôt des services homogènes francophones. Le débat n'est pas neuf et il divisait déjà les francophones manitobains dans la province voisine à l'époque décrite par Gabrielle Roy. Celle-ci percevait dans les années trente l'importance pour les francophones de l'Ouest de devenir bilingues, et qualifiait d'utopie le projet de reconstruire dans cette partie du pays des espaces homogènes francophones. On connaît l'enjeu qui sous-tend ce débat, le bilinguisme étant considéré par de nombreux analystes et militants comme un premier pas menant à l'assimilation des francophones. Les vues opposées de Roger Bernard ou Charles Castonguay d'un côté et de Gilles Paquet de l'autre illustrent le vif débat qui divise les Ontariens francophones. Cardinal montre que le milieu francophone ontarien est divisé entre les volontaristes, qui insistent sur le dynamisme et la vitalité de la francophonie ontarienne et les pessimistes, qui déplorent les ravages causés par l'assimilation dans les rangs des francophones.

L'originalité de cet ouvrage est de montrer le lien qui existe entre, d'un côté, les mouvements sociaux et, de l'autre, les opportunités politiques, sans oublier le contexte dans lequel s'inscrit l'action de ces mouvements. Ceux-ci n'agissent pas dans un espace abstrait et le succès de leur action n'est pas indépendant du contexte politique. Cette étude minutieuse – quoique fort limitée dans son ampleur – apporte une belle contribution scientifique à la compréhension de la situation en dehors d'un parti-pris idéologique, ce qui ne signifie pas que les chercheurs ne soient pas préoccupée par la situation qu'elles étudient, bien loin de là.

SIMON LANGLOIS *Université Laval*

Building a Partnership: The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
Mordechai Kreinin, ed.
East Lansing: Michigan State University Press; Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2000, pp. xxii, 194

Yet another conference has produced yet another collection that ill deserved publication. What disappoints in the present volume is not its chapters' predictably uneven quality. More dispiriting are two apparently contradictory qualities, its messianic mission and its academic credentials.

To understand the genesis and purpose of *Building a Partnership*, one has only to read the title of the preface: "A Reunion of Trade Warriors from the Canada-U.S. Trade Negotiations." In September 1998 a conference was held to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the bilateral economic integration agreement negotiated by the Reagan administration and the Mulroney government. The tone is triumphalist. "Present at the Creation" is the plagiarized title for the first chapter, a transcription of the intervention by James A. Baker, III, whose eponymous Institute for Public Policy of Rice University co-sponsored the reunion, and who was the United States secretary of the treasury at the time of the negotiation of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA).

Memoirs can have value. The reader's first gain from perusing these pages is a reminder of the crusading spirit infusing the crusading band of trade liberalizers who seem not so much to have been negotiating against

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each other as "warring" against those unenlightened souls in the American and the Canadian public who misguidedly thought that government programmes might serve some social purpose. These guys won, and from their self-congratulatory tale-telling one can deduce something of the anthropology behind the business-school, locker-room spirit which helped bury the Keynesian paradigm and erect its neoconservative replacement.

Another value in these pages is the confirmation they give of the narrow epistemological horizons of the trade believers' worldview and the somewhat condescending assurance that their assumptions are self-evident—"winners have clearly outnumbered losers" (5)—not needing empirical justification. A notable exception is Michael Hart whose honestly evangelical prose articulates his assumptions (efficiency over equity) in a paper that uncritically sings the praises of CUFTA's dispute settlement processes.

But all this fervour has a price. Accuracy is one. Derek Burney, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's chief of staff at the time of the negotiations, claims erroneously that CUFTA's "dispute settlement provisions were replicated both in NAFTA [which actually weakened them] and the WTO agreement [which radically strengthened them]" (15).

Otherwise, it is a case of *caveat lector.* Two leading academic advocates of trade liberalization, Richard Lipsey and Paul Wonnacott, offer elementary economics primers, the first on how to differentiate free trade areas from customs unions, the second on the theory of gains from trade. A spokesman from General Motors gives a quick tour of CUFTA's significance for the Auto Pact. A Canadian negotiator addresses the conceptual and regulatory complexity of Canadian cultural policy in three necessarily simplistic pages.

This leaves us four short chapters that can claim actual intellectual value. David Schweikhardt has a solid exposition of agriculture, before and after CUFTA. Geza Feketekuty reviews CUFTA's role in the development of trade rules for services. Sylvia Ostry discusses the progression between CUFTA, NAFTA and the WTO. Gary Hufbauer and Barbara Kotschwar give a background to the prospects for the Free Trade Areas of the Americas.

The second disturbing feature of this slight book is its university press imprimatur. This has two dimensions, the more trivial of which is the slow production process which took three years to move the texts presented at the negotiators' symposium in September 1998 to the tender ministrations of this reviewer. For time-limited material, this languid pace is a sentence to perpetual obscurity for material that was written well before the WTO ministerial meeting at Seattle in 1999 brought crusading trade liberalization into general question. The reward for the long wait was not good editing: the word "principal" is spelled "principle" at least four times and as many other sentences are unclear, inverted or simply incomplete. This university press volume does not even boast an index.

More important is the danger of brand contamination. Publishing with university presses has become the benchmark for career success in the social sciences. This admittedly arbitrary norm presumes that independent, anonymous peer review guarantees the intellectual rigour of the scholarly product. If the presses of the universities of Michigan and Calgary did put this manuscript through a review process, they must have chosen assessors from the same epistemic community of neoliberal trade zealots who animated the conference. Perhaps a sufficient subsidy was offered to induce these publishers to let themselves be used for vanity publishing. Whatever the genesis of this volume, it helps undermine the premise on which much of our profes-

sional work is based, namely that university presses publish lasting books that are academically superior to the more slipshod offerings of their commercial rivals.

STEPHEN CLARKSON *University of Toronto*

Institutional Constraints and Policy Choice: An Exploration of Local Governance
James C. Clingermayer and Richard C. Feiock
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001, pp. xi, 151

Clingermayer and Feiock provide good empirical evidence of the effects of selected institutional constraints on local governance in the United States. They use data from available secondary sources about local government institutions (for example, ward versus district elections of council members) and their surveys of local officials. The attention to institutional factors of local governance is welcome. However, the work of Clingermayer and Feiock shares two limitations of many analyses of local urban governance and much contemporary literature on public management and political dynamics. First, only the dimensions of institutional performance that can be quantified over a large number of cases are analyzed. Second, no attempt is made to analyze the effects, impacts or outcomes of these institutional factors. These limitations are further developed following discussion of the book.

The typical chapter develops competing hypotheses from the urban governance literature, reports, analyzes and then discusses findings. This "article-like" format is pulled together in a final chapter extending the authors' argument for greater attention to institutions. Chapter 1 makes the case for an institutional perspective on local governance and provides an overview of the book. Chapter 2 analyzes development policy choices and adoption of comprehensive zoning ordinances in a manner that sets the pattern for following chapters. After economic conditions and mobilization of development interests—factors prior research shows to be important—are accounted for, the mayor-council form of government has statistically significant positive effects on Urban Development Assistance Grants (UDAG), business assistance plans, tax abatements and use of Industrial Development Bonds (IDBs). Partisan-ward representation of council members has strong positive impacts on use of tax abatements, UDAGs and IDBs. Thus, institutions of mayoral leadership and ward-based partisanship result in cities pursuing more visible and geographically targeted economic development policies. Paradoxically, given the reformed government biases of advocates of comprehensive zoning, early adopting cities were governed by ward-based, partisan-elected councils, who used zoning to respond to local constituent pressures.

The following chapters are developed similarly. Chapter 3 analyzes council member survey responses about citizens contacting council members regarding development policy and council member casework on development projects. In these analyses, the effects of institutional arrangements are subtler. While ward representation is not statistically significant in explaining differences, analyzing ward versus at-large representatives finds different variables explaining behaviour.

Chapter 4 analyzes leadership turnover and decisions to contract city services with external providers, finding mixed support for the expectation that the higher transaction cost will result in decreased contracting when mayoral or top administrative turnover rates are higher. Chapter 5 extends the analyses of impacts of turnover on use of long-term debt, finding modest

impacts. Chapter 6 shifts attention to external (national and state) constraints on local policy choice, finding significant effects from state constraints on annexation, externally imposed quasi-judicial standards regarding exclusionary zoning, and impacts of the federal *Tax Reform Act* of 1986 on choice of debt instruments.

In the concluding chapter 7, Clingermayer and Feiock make three main points. First, they argue that local political system variables, specifically the presence of reformed structures of at-large elections, council-manager form of government and prohibitions against council "meddling" in administration, should be treated as having contextual, not direct effects on policy choices. For example, the council-manager form of government depressed municipal borrowing and council turnover increased borrowing in council-manager cities, but not in mayor-council cities. Second, they reiterate the importance of turnover and uncertainty on increasing transaction costs and shortening time horizons and of the relevance of external intergovernmental constraints on local governance. Finally, they draw on W. Brian Arthur (*Increasing Returns and Path Dependency in the Economy* [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994]) to argue the persistence of institutions through path dependence. Once in place, institutions can be self-reinforcing because of " . . . large set-up costs, learning effects that make operating under existing institutions less costly, coordination effects that reward cooperation within existing institutional constraints, and adaptive expectations. Together, this means that institutional change is often extremely costly" (126).

As stated at the outset, the institutional perspective of the authors is laudable, conceptually well developed and the empirical evidence provided convincing of their arguments. However, by limiting attention to areas where extensive data allows statistical analyses, the authors miss examples of huge, long-lasting impacts of local institutional governance that would both bolster and challenge some of their arguments. The impacts of Robert Moses and the institutions he helped create on the New York area are well known (Robert A. Caro, *Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York* [New York: Knopff, 1974]) and the importance of the successful pursuit of water on the development of the City of Los Angeles are also well known (William L. Karhrl, *Water and Power: The Conflict over Los Angeles Water Supply in the Owens Valley* [Berkeley: University of California Press,1982]; Catherine Mullholland, *William Mulholland and the Rise of Los Angeles* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000]; Steven P. Erie, "How the Urban West was Won: The Local State and Economic Growth in Los Angeles, 1880-1932," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 24 [1992], 519-54). The Los Angeles case is particularly instructive: without success in obtaining water, the nation's second-largest urban conglomeration simply would not exist at anything approaching today's size. In contrast to the arguments of Clingermayer and Feiock that professional administrators are more cautious, in both the New York and Los Angeles cases, visionary professional administrators provided leadership. In the Los Angeles case, city professionals overcame opposition from local business interests to achieve their goal (Erie, "How the Urban West was Won"). The second weakness of the Clingermayer and Feiock analyses, shared with many others, is inattention to *effects* on the cities analyzed. What *difference* does it make if cities issue more debt, pursue UDAGs, contract more, or if council members do case work on development issues? These questions can be analyzed. In one of the earliest analyses of contracting, this reviewer and colleagues analyzed the impacts of intergovernmental contracting in the Los Angeles area on city budgets and, for police, on staffing levels and performance measures (Sidney Sonenblum, John J. Kirlin

and John C. Ries, *How Cities Provide Services: An Evaluation of Alternative Delivery Structures* [Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1977]). Data on city level economic performance, political participation and demographics are available. Clingermayer and Feiock would provide even stronger evidence of the importance of institutional factors if they extended analyses to their effects at the outcome level.

JOHN J. KIRLIN *Indiana University-Purdue University, Indianapolis*

L'expérience politique des jeunes
Anne Muxel
Paris : Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 2001, 190 p.

« Les jeunes d'aujourd'hui sont dépolitisés . . . » Cette condamnation laconique d'un groupe d'âge, voire d'une génération, ne résiste pas à l'analyse du rapport des jeunes Français à la politique. L'apport de l'ouvrage d'Anne Muxel ne se limite pas à faire taire ce lieu commun, même s'il y réussit parfaitement au détour. En effet, en étudiant sous toutes ses coutures le rapport des jeunes à la politique du point de vue de leur entrée dans l'âge de la participation politique, l'auteure livre ici une analyse fine et utile des effets de la socialisation familiale et de l'interprétation qu'en font les jeunes au gré du temps biographique et historique. L'examen minutieux des données révèle des mécanismes qui relèvent ici de la transmission des choix et des comportements des parents, là de l'interprétation de cet héritage, là encore de l'innovation.

Théoriquement, l'auteure utilise la notion d'« expérience » afin de saisir l'articulation complexe de la socialisation et de l'expérimentation dans la construction des choix et de l'identité politique. Heureux fil d'Ariane que ce concept sociologique qui permet de concilier, dans l'analyse des conduites, la liberté du sujet avec les déterminismes socioéconomiques et historiques. Il guide l'analyse de cheminements complexes et diversifiés et entraîne le lecteur à la découverte *des jeunes* et non pas d'une jeunesse réifiée ayant un comportement politique homogène.

L'analyse s'appuie sur de nombreuses enquêtes quantitatives et qualitatives, dont la quasi-totalité fut dirigée par l'auteure à partir du milieu des années quatre-vingt. L'ouvrage vient ainsi couronner près de vingt ans de recherches fructueuses, au terme desquelles Muxel dispose de suffisamment d'information et de distance critique pour saisir la manière dont se recompose le lien politique chez les jeunes. Le livre est divisé en trois parties et chaque chapitre, ou presque, renvoie à des matériaux de recherche différents.

La première partie vise à inventorier les formes du rapport des jeunes à la politique et les principales caractéristiques de ce rapport. L'auteure consacre deux chapitres à ce sujet; le premier livre quatre portraits-types du lien et des cheminements politiques des jeunes, le second s'interroge sur l'effet du récent brouillage des repères politiques, idéologiques et sociologiques, voire de la crise actuelle d'appartenance et de représentation politique, sur la construction de l'identité des jeunes. Cette toile plutôt impressionniste (les portraits sont livrés et non analysés; les questions sont celles de l'actualité politique) fait d'abord ressortir l'ombre : celle du risque d'une cassure entre jeunes insérés et non insérés du point de vue de la transmission d'une culture politique commune aux diverses générations. Ce sont effectivement les jeunes faiblement scolarisés et au chômage qui s'intéressent le moins à la politique et qui votent le plus pour le Front national. Mais cette toile montre aussi la lumière, celle d'une demande de renouvellement du lien

politique par le retour de la responsabilité et d'une certaine éthique, demande qui se profilerait dans la participation politique réelle des jeunes aux mobilisations collectives ou aux associations.

Appuyée sur des analyses nuancées d'enquêtes effectuées auprès de jeunes, la deuxième partie de l'ouvrage révèle les mécanismes à l'œuvre dans la formation de l'identité politique. L'accent est placé sur le rôle et l'importance de la famille dans la constitution d'un héritage politique et sur la manière dont les expériences politiques et le passage du temps viennent renforcer ou atténuer ce legs. On découvre ainsi au troisième chapitre que deux tiers des jeunes perpétuent les choix de leurs parents, à droite, à gauche ou « apolitiques ». Cette situation ne diverge pas de celle de leurs aînés, malgré le contexte de brouillage et de crise évoqué dans la section précédente de l'ouvrage. Toutefois, la filiation des choix politiques se présente de différentes manières selon l'insertion sociale et le niveau de formation. Les filiations apolitiques, par exemple, sont plus nombreuses parmi les jeunes faiblement scolarisés et d'origine ouvrière. Ces distinctions sociales et scolaires sont mises en évidence tout au long de l'analyse et constituent une matrice globale de lecture de l'expérience politique des jeunes.

L'étude des chemins de cette transmission montre que les parents, et notamment les pères, sont identifiés comme les plus influents dans la formation des choix politiques, alors que les réseaux de sociabilité comptent pour peu. Outre les positionnements gauche-droite, les attitudes positives ou négatives des parents à l'égard de la politique se transmettent aussi. Le fait d'être aux études ou d'appartenir à une famille catholique pratiquante augmente les chances que cette influence soit perçue comme élevée. Le contraire est vrai chez les jeunes moins scolarisés, ceux qui sont au chômage et d'origine populaire. Pour tous les groupes, l'influence parentale s'amenuise au fil des ans, au profit de discussions avec les amis et de l'écoute du discours politique. L'auteure néglige ici, et à d'autres occasions, d'analyser ces tendances en fonction des modes de vie. En effet, il est peu surprenant que l'influence parentale soit grande lorsque les jeunes sont aux études, d'autant plus qu'il y a souvent cohabitation ou, si les jeunes sont partis pour les études, une dépendance financière qui joue sur l'autonomie des choix. L'analyse des différences entre chômeurs et étudiants fait l'économie de cette question, pourtant devenue d'actualité en France et ailleurs, du fait que le départ du foyer parental devient de plus en plus tardif.

L'inscription de l'héritage dans la durée, par l'expérience politique, s'opère au profit d'une interprétation de ce legs au travers des temps biographique, générationnel et historique. Le quatrième chapitre montre d'abord l'existence d'un moratoire électoral, au début de la vingtaine, pendant lequel les jeunes continuent de s'intéresser à la politique mais font moins usage que leurs aînés de leur droit de vote (les intensités d'intérêt et d'abstention sont liées au niveau de formation et au degré d'insertion). Les jeunes font, à ce stade, « un travail d'ajustement » entre les acquis et les découvertes de l'expérimentation. Par la suite, l'étude du cheminement politique d'une cohorte de jeunes, suivie de 1986 à 1997 par sept vagues d'enquêtes suivant autant de scrutins, permet à Muxel de montrer les effets du temps historique et générationnel sur la structuration de l'identité politique. Dès le début des cheminements, près de la moitié des jeunes ont fixé leur choix politique, qui ne variera pas de 1986 à 1989. Les autres ont surtout des comportements « hésitants » ou « retardataires » avant de fixer leur choix, alors que seuls 4 pour cent sont qualifiés d'« instables » (portant leur choix à gauche et à droite de l'échiquier d'une élection à l'autre). Ces choix s'inscrivent durablement puisque, au cours de la période, très peu de jeunes franchissent la barrière

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gauche-droite. Toutefois, la mobilité des choix est de mise à l'intérieur de ces camps. Cette dynamique de l'instabilité partisane serait liée au travail de libre arbitre des jeunes, effectué sur une toile de fond de stabilité d'orientations politiques transmises de la génération précédente. Enfin, l'étude de la mobilisation collective montre, d'une part, que les jeunes ne sont pas en retrait (un tiers ont participé à une grève, la moitié à une manifestation), d'autre part, que cette forme d'implication laisse une empreinte positive sur la participation politique (notamment à gauche). La conjoncture historique de ces mobilisations, sans pour autant favoriser dans ce cas l'émergence d'une nouvelle génération marquante, a donc un rôle actif dans la construction de l'identité politique.

La dernière partie de l'ouvrage tente de répertorier les valeurs et les représentations au travers desquelles les jeunes décodent la politique. Les médias, et notamment la télévision, jouent un rôle paradoxal dans ce domaine : les jeunes sont plus informés mais par des messages complexes, diversifiés et mis en scène pour une portée médiatique maximale, ce qui en rend l'interprétation difficile. Les jeunes ne sont pas moins critiques du monde politique que leurs aînés. Perte de confiance, vanité des querelles politiciennes, banalisation de la corruption sont autant de dénonciations qui visent partis et politiciens. Ce monde est à reconstruire ou à baliser par une politique « moralisée » par la transparence, la vérité, la profondeur, la communication, la reconnaissance des différences, la conciliation des impératifs économiques et humanistes, etc. Cette redéfinition un peu utopique des « conditions du maintien du lien politique » se reflète dans les héros contemporains des jeunes Français, dont la description a été sollicitée par l'auteure auprès des 17 et 18 ans. Des valeurs morales et universalistes, mises au rang de valeurs politiques chez des héros dont la figure emblématique pourrait être Gandhi, s'associent à des comportements individuels engagés et responsables. Même si leur action est éminemment politique, les héros de ces jeunes ne sont pas mesurés à l'aune de leur intérêt pour la politique elle-même. Un paradoxe que souligne l'auteure et qu'elle juge important de considérer pour qu'une réconciliation avec la politique soit possible.

Au terme de cet ouvrage fort instructif, l'auteure conclut peut-être un peu rapidement que « entre héritage et expérimentation, le jeu se ferait donc à part égale » (174). Le lecteur, lui, garde l'impression que la socialisation « primaire » au sein de la famille et la transmission laissent aujourd'hui une empreinte profonde sur l'expérience politique des jeunes, peut-être même plus profonde qu'à d'autres époques. Doit-on parler de jeu « à part égale » ou plutôt de « jeu d'interaction » dont les issues (il faut désormais en parler au pluriel) seraient différentes selon le temps historique et générationnel que traversent les jeunes? D'autres recherches permettraient sans doute de trancher. Quoi qu'il en soit, il n'est plus possible de traiter les jeunes Français de groupe « dépolitisé » et, plus largement, de leur assigner une expérience politique homogène. De surcroît, par cette étude des dédales de l'expérience politique des jeunes, Anne Muxel offre une clé essentielle de l'interprétation de leur rapport à la sphère politique au moment même où cet univers est caractérisé par le brouillage des points de repère et de représentation. Une lecture qui devrait susciter un vif intérêt, tant chez les politologues et les sociologues que chez ceux qui jugent avant d'avoir observé . . .

MARC MOLGAT *Université d'Ottawa*

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France since 1870: Culture, Politics and Society
Charles Sowerwine
New York: Palgrave Global Publishing at St. Martins Press, 2001, pp. xxv, 505

Charles Sowerwine has written perhaps the best English-language textbook on contemporary French history for a number of years. As befits a history book, there is tremendous detail. Moreover, the prose is assured, the coverage is even and the narrative is clear. To be sure, this is a student-centred text. Only a few primary sources are cited and the language is designed to appeal to a young, streetwise audience (those who prefer their academic reading to be free from expletives should look elsewhere). At the same time, the intellectual strengths of this book make it at least as rewarding as its long-standing counterparts written by people such as Bury, McMillan and, indeed, Cobban himself. What is more, Sowerwine's book has a comparative advantage over these texts. Over and above the fact that it covers the period 1870-1999, the author makes a point of integrating issues relating both to culture and to women and gender into the body of the text. So, for example, throughout the book there is reference to literature, music and film and their relationship with wider social and political developments. Similarly, there is an ongoing discussion of public policy matters as they relate to women as well as numerous examples of the role of women qua social and political actors. The net result is a very wide-ranging, authoritative and innovative text.

Against this background, the main question is whether the book's somewhat non-traditional approach could have been extended even further. For example, the discussion of culture and the arts is always treated very well, but perhaps too often it is confined to a stand-alone chapter. It may have been more rewarding to integrate the cultural and the political rather more fully, more contemporaneously. Equally, while on occasions the text does try to individualize the narrative by focusing on the experience of particular people, a larger number of personal accounts would have been welcome. This is a book, and an approach, that cries out for "thick" descriptions of the "everyday" lives of "real" people. Currently, they are lacking. Finally, as things stand, the book stands somewhat awkwardly between two methodological approaches. For the most part, the book adopts a straightforward narrative approach. The author presents an understanding of events as he sees them and makes sense of them. However, if the book really intends to embrace an approach of this sort, then it would benefit from a broad, Stanley Hoffman-like introduction and/or conclusion about France and the French generally. How does Sowerwine make sense of the last 130 years of French history as a whole? In the absence of any overarching chapter(s), we simply do not know. At the same time, on a small number of occasions, the author does indicate that history is a contested discipline, or at least that there are conflicting interpretations of historical events and that his interpretation is just one among many. So, for example, there is a section on whether Vichy was fascist and whether the late 1800s represented the apogee of peasant France. By the same token as above, though, if the author really wishes to adopt an approach of this sort, then further debates need to be reported. Not just that, categorical statements need to be avoided altogether. Was Paul Reynaud really "right," as Sowerwine asserts, to have called for a devaluation of the franc in 1936 (153)? Probably, but others, for various reasons, may disagree. Similarly, is it really the case that from 1981 to 1988 François Mitterrand "made all the big decisions, leaving the daily crises to the Prime Minister" (382)? Well, this may be a reasonable generalization, but there are certainly other accounts of

executive politics during this period (see R. Elgie and S. Griggs, *French Politics. Debates and Controversies* [London: Routledge, 2000, chap. 2]). For my part, I would have preferred to see the author adopt the latter approach. Academics know that historical events are open to subjective interpretations, but students need to be made aware of this point as early on as possible in their education.

These points noted, it should not be forgotten that this is a rich and extremely enjoyable text written by someone who clearly revels in French history, culture and, indeed, French life generally. Students will enjoy it and academics too.

ROBERT ELGIE *Dublin City University*

The Outsider: Prejudice and Politics in Italy
Paul M. Sniderman, Pierangelo Peri, Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr. and Thomas Piazza
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. x, 218

This is an interesting and provocative study that provides an exceptionally thoughtful framework for understanding the political implications of prejudice in Italy and, by extension, elsewhere as well. Given the increasing political salience of immigration (and anti-immigrant attitudes) throughout the Western world, anything that advances our understanding of these phenomena is to be welcomed. Although a degree of methodological and statistical sophistication is needed to appreciate fully the more nuanced findings of Paul Sniderman and his collaborators, their most important arguments are accessibly and cogently presented.

The most interesting finding was not expected by the authors. Familiar with both North American and West European trends, they anticipated that race would be a more powerful predictor of prejudice than ethnicity, nationality, religion, or any other characteristic. Indeed, they were so sure that this would be the case that they designed their study to test—and, they were sure, to prove—this hypothesis (7-8). To their surprise, this was decidedly not the case, and this unexpected finding forced them to attempt to explain their findings. As the title of the book suggests, the dominant factor in accounting for prejudice was found to be the "outsider-ness," or "other-ness" of the immigrant. Italians with the strongest antipathy to immigrants overwhelmingly tend to lump *all* groups together, irrespective of whether they are Christian Europeans, Moslem Africans, or anything else.

In the opening chapters, and above all in chapter 2, the authors do a very good job of exploring the difficulties facing anyone who wants to study prejudice in systematic fashion. This nuanced and sensitive discussion of conflicting interpretations as well as methodological problems would make an excellent assigned reading for any number of undergraduate courses, whether methodological or substantive in focus. Although this discussion is accompanied by ample statistical analyses, even innumerate readers will have no trouble following, and benefiting from, the flow of the argument. The third chapter's key sections will be harder to follow for those with little or no statistical training. for it is here that the authors demonstrate how a number of key variables (economic status, education and mistrust of others) interact to produce a politics of resentment that manifests itself in anti-immigrant attitudes. One comes away from these discussions with an immense amount of respect for both the care and the ingenuity with which the authors designed and carried out their research.

The Outsider also contains numerous substantive insights. In the course of analyzing their data, the authors were struck by what they call the "ideological asymmetries" of prejudice (113f.). In other words, certain core right-wing values exert an appeal to elements of the left, whereas the opposite is much less likely to be true. Thus, as immigration becomes an increasingly salient issue in the politics of the West, the right is likely to be the beneficiary, often directly at the expense of the left. Specifically, a strong commitment to authority and order is found among many who currently self-identify as leftists, and who vote for parties of the left. The more economically insecure and less educated these respondents are, the more likely they are to blame others for their plight. Given the chronically high levels of unemployment in Europe, and increasing flows of immigration, it takes no great stretch of the imagination to see the implications of these arguments. Moreover, anyone familiar with, say, the French case will know that there is overwhelming evidence of the direct transfer of votes from the French Communist Party to the Front Nationale since the 1980s, above all in the depressed, working-class cores of previous Communist strength.

For all its methodological and substantive strengths, this volume does have its weaknesses. While it is is perfectly appropriate that a survey-based study of prejudice should focus on the intolerant respondents in the sample, it is also important to keep firmly in mind just how large (or small) this group is in relation to the overall population. Yet, aside from an initial, and rather brief, analysis (27-30), readers are never again reminded that we are, in fact, speaking of—at most—one third of all respondents. And while nearly half of all respondents agree with at least some negative characterizations of foreigners, fewer than one fifth embrace the most negative descriptions. The overall analysis would have benefited from an occasional reference to this broader context in the middle and latter parts of the volume.

Another issue that is not so much a weakness of the study as an aspect that requires further discussion relates to one of the major findings, that is, that intolerant attitudes are most frequently found in those with low levels of education. This is consistent with practically every other study of prejudice, which is nonetheless analyzed more perceptively here than elsewhere with regard to how a sense of economic insecurity reinforces this tendency. Still, it is striking that the authors appear to assume that intolerance will become increasingly important in the future, even though the Italian data, and for that matter the data for all advanced countries, show a steadily upward trend in educational levels. On its face, this should lead us to expect a steadily declining tendency to express intolerant attitudes. But since this broader demographic trend is never mentioned, the apparent contradiction is not addressed.

These are, however, minor criticisms of an important study. Specialists and reasonably sophisticated readers will learn a good deal from *The Outsider*, while even undergraduates, with some guidance, will come away from the opening chapters of this book with an appreciation of the study of prejudice that is both subtle and solid.

STEPHEN HELLMAN *York University*

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Les relations de la République populaire de Chine et de la République démocratique allemande (1949-1989)
Claudie Gardet, avec une préface de Marie-Claire Bergère
Berne : Peter Lang, 2000, xvii, 714 p.

Cet ouvrage, issu d'une thèse de doctorat écrite sous la direction de la sinologue Marie-Claire Bergère, s'adresse aux historiens intéressés par les relations inter-étatiques au sein du camp socialiste, et plus particulièrement à ceux qui se penchent sur les rapports entre le Parti communiste de Chine (PCC) et son vis-à-vis allemand, le parti socialiste unifié d'Allemagne (SED-Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands). L'étude dont il est question s'appuie sur les archives d'État de la République démocratique allemande (RDA), brièvement rendues disponibles dans la confusion qui a suivi la chute de la RDA en 1989, mais redevenues depuis inaccessibles au public, ainsi que sur celles du SED et des organisations de masse de la RDA, qui ne sont affectées par aucune prescription. L'accès à ces archives a permis à Gardet de reconstruire le système créé par l'URSS pour coordonner la politique chinoise des partis socialistes et des États du Pacte de Varsovie. La contribution de cet ouvrage consiste à mettre en relief l'existence d'une institution jusqu'ici très peu connue, du nom de « interkit » (du russe « kitai », qui signifie « Chine »). Créé en 1967, l'interkit consistait en une série de « conférences sur la question chinoise », tenues annuellement, et réunissant les représentants de sept partis socialistes : outre le Parti communiste de l'URSS (PCUS) et le SED, le Parti ouvrier unifié polonais (POUP), le Parti communiste de Tchécoslovaquie (PCT), le Parti socialiste ouvrier hongrois (PSOH), le parti communiste bulgare (PCB) et le Parti populaire révolutionnaire mongol (PPRM), auxquels se joindront brièvement des observateurs représentant les partis cubains, vietnamiens et laotiens lors des deux dernières rencontres, dont les archives ont gardé trace en 1983 et 1984.

Un des constats de cette étude est l'existence de la marge de manœuvre dont jouissait la RDA dans ses rapports avec l'Union soviétique. Les relations entre la République populaire de Chine (RPC) et la RDA, de même que les relations entre le PCC et le SED, en effet, n'ont pas toujours reflété les rapports entre le PCUS et le PCC. Cela s'avère particulièrement vrai dans les années 1950, les désaccords entre le PCC et le SED n'apparaissant qu'à la fin de 1960, plus de trois ans après le début de la polémique entre Krouchtchev et Mao à propos de la déstalinisation. Ce décalage apparaît encore dans les années 1980, le PCC et le SED entreprenant la normalisation de leurs relations trois ans avant que ne le fassent le PCC et le PCUS. L'interkit, révèle cette étude, constitue l'un des principaux instruments par lesquels l'URSS et le PCUS ont réussi à faire prévaloir leurs lignes sur la RPC et le PCC, auprès des autres partis. La division chronologique de l'ouvrage, découpé en quatre décennies, ne reflète cependant pas ces développements. Bien que l'auteure justifie son choix par l'absence d'ouvrages de synthèse détaillés sur le sujet, elle aurait pu fonder son découpage temporel sur la base des ruptures caractérisant les relations sino-allemandes, des aléas propres aux relations sino-soviétiques, si déterminants pour les rapports entre la RPC et la RDA, voire de l'évolution des interkits eux-mêmes. Si le choix de Gardet peut se justifier en ce qui concerne le contexte de l'évolution politique de la RDA, il ne recoupe pas les grands tournants de la politique domestique chinoise qui ont pesé si lourdement sur tous les aspects de sa politique étrangère: le Grand bond en avant (1958-1960) et la Révolution culturelle (1966-1969).

Dans son analyse des deux premières décennies des rapports entre la Chine populaire et l'Allemagne démocratique, l'auteure prend soin d'établir

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une distinction, sur le plan analytique, entre les relations inter-étatiques et les relations de partis. Elle justifie ce choix par la nécessité de faire ressortir les dilemmes qui se sont posés aux dirigeants est-allemands, soucieux d'éviter que les conflits idéologiques entre le PCC et le SED, qui reflétaient les divergences entre le PCC et le PCUS, ne compromettent les relations de la RPC avec la RDA, relations dont la RDA tirait des avantages économiques. Ce choix peut aussi être justifié par le fait que les rapports entre la Chine populaire et l'Allemagne démocratique, au même titre que le conflit idéologique entre l'URSS et la RPC, recouvraient des préoccupations de politiques étrangères plus traditionnelles, relatives aux intérêts nationaux de chaque pays. La Chine et l'Allemagne partageaient jusqu'en 1989 l'expérience d'une division politique de leur territoire, entérinée par les grandes puissances, qui a lourdement influencé la politique extérieure de la RPC et de la RDA, indépendamment de toute considération idéologique. Gardet discute brièvement de cette dimension des rapports sino-allemands dans sa description de l'attitude chinoise face à la question allemande, incluant les ouvertures de la Chine populaire à l'endroit de la République fédérale allemande (RFA), mais ne discute pas des rapports entre la RDA et la République de Chine basée à Taiwan. Cette omission est d'autant plus frappante que Gardet a pu avoir accès à des sources allemandes plus facilement qu'à des sources chinoises. Elle est particulièrement étonnante lorsque l'on prend en compte l'asymétrie entre la RDA et la RPC. Alors que la première est un État dépendant de l'URSS, et tout à fait incapable de rivaliser avec la République fédérale allemande (RFA) sur les plans stratégique et économique, la situation s'avère extrêmement différente de l'autre côté du continent eurasiatique : depuis les années cinquante, il était devenu clair que la RPC n'avait pas à craindre une éventuelle intervention des troupes nationalistes réfugiées à Taiwan, et avec la reprise en main de l'appareil d'État et du PCC par Deng Xiaoping en 1978, la RPC pouvait de plus en plus prétendre à une parité sur les plans militaire et politique avec l'URSS. En d'autres termes, une analyse des relations sino-allemandes devrait faire une part plus grande que ne le fait cet ouvrage à la dimension chinoise.

Les remarques qui précèdent ne doivent certes pas effacer les mérites de cette considérable œuvre de recherche. Il faut en particulier saluer les efforts de Gardet pour saisir l'occasion offerte par la mise à jour des archives de la RDA, dans un contexte de confusion considérable, de même que son habileté à surmonter les difficultés inhérentes à la « langue de bois ». La quasi-absence de sources chinoises ne peut être reprochée à l'auteure, même si elle se fait ressentir lourdement dans l'exposé de son sujet : le recours aux sources chinoises sur l'histoire diplomatique de la RPC représente aujourd'hui encore une entreprise très risquée, comme l'a appris à ses dépens à l'hiver 2002 l'historien Xu Zerong, incarcéré pour treize ans à cause des informations qu'il a obtenues sur les décisions prises par la direction chinoise avant l'intervention de l'Armée populaire de libération pendant la Guerre de Corée. Cela dit, on peut critiquer la présentation générale de l'ouvrage, qui semble suggérer un équilibre dans la présentation des perspectives adoptées par les deux pays, voire une emphase plus grande sur la Chine. En fin de compte, il aurait été plus approprié de présenter cet ouvrage comme une chronique de la politique chinoise de la RDA et du SED plutôt que des relations sino-allemandes.

André Laliberté *Université d'Ottawa*

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After the Fall: 1989 and the Future of Freedom
George Katsiaficas, ed.
New York: Routledge, 2001, pp. viii, 235

George Katsiaficas begins his edited collection *After the Fall: 1989 and the Future of Freedom* with both a sober assessment of the capitalist triumphalism of the 1990s and a spirited call on behalf of those who "believe revolutionary transformation of the modern world-system is required for freedom for flourish" (1). The contributing authors, while representing diverse perspectives, share a desire to reassess the "real existing socialism" that existed in the Soviet Union and at the same time rearticulate a socialist vision in the post-Cold War era. This kind of treatment is long overdue. The central theme is Marx's idea of freedom as full human emancipation, for as Katsiaficas suggests, [Marx's] "original vision of socialism was a society of *more* democracy and liberty—not less, as experienced by the 'socialist' societies on the periphery of the world system in the twentieth century"(4).

As Michael Parenti reminds us, even the mere existence of the Soviet alternative was a check on "Big Capital" in the West; it was both the praised and despised "other" for the Western Left. Thus almost unavoidably with the collapse of communism came premature predictions regarding the death of the Left, the end of history, or the replacement of class struggle with civilizational conflict. Bucking the liberal trend, this book raises the red flag (literally) on reinvigorating socialism as a standpoint from which to analyze history, assess current realities, theorize about, and actively engage in making societal change. For Marx, these were never separate nor distinct processes. As Daniel Singer argues in his contribution, the message that socialism is dead and buried is "pure propaganda" coming from those who not only wish to naturalize capitalism but laud its global penetration.

Katsiaficas has divided the collection into subsections: Historical Interventions; Analytical Accounts; Retrospective Views; Ethical Imperatives; Political Responses; and The Future of Socialism after Communism. The subsections are not helpful, nor particularly relevant, perhaps because the contributions are of mixed quality.

Although an uneven collection, many of the contributions are dense and detailed. Ngo Vinh Long's article on China after Tiananmen is a well-argued and incisive critique of political corruption, economic "liberalization" and the social costs of restructuring in the last 10 years. Likewise, Georgi M. Derlugian's piece on Adjaria is one of the best accounts on the *actual construction* of nationalism I have read, and is a rich and compelling narrative as well. His explanation of the ethnic composition of identity borrows heavily from Gramsci's ideas about civil society and organic intellectuals, as well as Wallerstein's world systems analysis, but his straightforward yet rigorous style is more approachable than either. Manfred B. Steger's reading of 1989 as an "ethicopolitical" imperative, drawing from the work of Václav Havel, is an important contribution. His arguments about the "reflexive divorce" of means-end rationality from discussions of power and violence undermine conventional Marxism-Leninism and today's dominant liberal paradigm. Nancy Fraser's concluding postscript on "Postcommunist Democratic Socialism" reflects too briefly on the necessity of linking democratic deficits and with the marketization of social relations and increasing economic inequality. Irene L. Gendziger's strongly argued reply to John Lewis Gaddis, although interesting to read, did not seem to fit with the rest of the collection.

Unfortunately, there are many inaccuracies and misrepresentations in this volume. John Tirman writes compellingly of citizen activism in helping to end

the Cold War, but mistakenly overplays the influence of the peace movement on both sides of the "Iron Curtain." Solidarity, Charter 77 and Hungary's democratic opposition engaged (and often disagreed) with organizations such as END in Western Europe, but their interests were, frankly, both more inward-looking and varied: the right to form free and independent trade unions, Helinski-related demands, and political and social freedoms played a more pivotal role. Egregious errors, such as the description, by Giovanni Arrighi, Terence K. Hopkins, and Immanuel Wallerstein, of the "Dubhacék" (sic) action programme in 1968 betray a lack of interest in or knowledge of what was happening in the region, and a greater tendency to focus on the left's own perceived losses in the West or the "developing" world. They are more convincing in their analysis of the Socialist Party in France or Third World "anti-systemic" movements than what was happening "on the ground" in the political laboratory of Eastern Europe. Even Bronner's essay, which for the most part ably analyzes the failures of international communism in Soviet Europe, contains annoying errors (the Slánský trials occurred in 1952, not 1948; the first Sputnik satellite was launched in 1957, not 1956; the Sino-Soviet split happened in 1963, not 1953; Enrico Berlinguer's "historic compromise" was not a response to Italy's "hot autumn," and was not announced in 1968 but in the early 1970s). Eastern Europe is too often portrayed as a construct against which both the desires and failures of socialism are continually played out, and thus it was ever so, from Luxemburg to Lenin.

Boris Kagarlitsky avoids these foibles but betrays another irritating theme: anger at the "enraged consumers" (*not* civil society) who took to the streets in the 1989-1991 period, from Berlin to Moscow. Kagarlitsky notes that the "hoodwinked masses" who supported neoliberal reforms not only "deserved" the predictable results of instability and poverty, but this was "a sort of historical retribution for irresponsible consumerist ambitions and racist contempt for the rest of the world" (58). No doubt many on the Left are embittered at the premature predictions about the death of socialism *and* the way history has unfolded, but this curious form of "blame the victim" reasoning is hardly designed to win friends and influence people.

Similarly, Hanna Behrend's article outlining her "high hopes and disillusion" following *die Wende* and German reunification is both misleading and contradictory with respect to the achievements and shortcomings of the GDR. The GDR hardly had "a living standard approximating the average of other European countries" and reunification cannot be more than rhetorically dubbed an *Anschluss*—after all, real Germans voted for reunification and they ought not to be universally condemned for its negative consequences. Her complaints about the losses of academic employment, when no mention is made about gains in academic freedom, and the ending of the "former happy marriage between the [East German] employers and the unions" when the GDR unions were not independent bargaining agents, are disingenuous at best. Behrend admirably documents the gendered effects of the reunification process specifically and the neoliberal transformation more generally, but her bitterness is aggravating: "I am just about sick of women who could be my daughters and granddaughters telling me that there has never been any emancipatory moves by women in the Soviet zone of occupation and later GDR" (87). Post- or anti-feminist denials and backlash are not unique to Germany, but are symptomatic of the larger (and perhaps generationally linked) ahistorical and postmodernist consciousness of our age. Ignorance of the actual struggles of women and men in different social and political contexts in the last one hundred years is indeed worrying for contemporary socialists.

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These criticisms aside, it should be mentioned that, unlike many of the contributors, both Kagarlitsky and Behrend have been both living the transformation as well as trying to come to terms with it critically and analytically. Harsh realities have consequences, not the least of which is well-earned pessimism.

All the authors are animated by a desire, in the words of Arrighi, Hopkins, and Wallerstein, to articulate "strategies for efficacious action in the transformation of the world" (49). The Left has not collapsed but the antisystemic and primarily state-centred ideological approaches of the nineteenth century have been exhausted. The best piece in this volume focuses on exactly this process of revisioning, *not* revisionism. Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin's article "Transcending Pessimism: Rekindling Socialist Imagination" (reprinted from the *Socialist Register*) is precisely what I would have wanted to see more of: strong arguments against the "defeatism" and "overcautious pragmatism" characteristic of social democracy's embrace of the so-called "Third Way" and the ideology of progressive competitiveness. As a means of both coping with disillusion *and* simulaneously revitalizing the grand and hopeful narrative of the socialist project, their attempt to recover the utopian impulse is laudable indeed. After all, the authoritarian variant of communism was *not* defeated by bureaucrats, policy wonks and party hacks bent on reform from within.

BARBARA J. FALK *Humber College* and *University of Toronto*

Kosovo, les mémoires qui tuent. La guerre vue sur Internet
Chantale Quesney
Québec/Paris: Presses de l'Université Laval/L'Harmattan, 2001, 211 p.

L'intervention de l'Alliance Atlantique au Kosovo, de mars à juin 1999, a constitué une autre étape dans les multiples événements qui ont ponctué, depuis le début de la décennie 1990, l'effondrement de la Yougoslavie posttitiste. Par ailleurs, la révolution de l'information, dont Internet est l'un des symboles, a également marqué d'une manière indélébile cette décennie 1990. Pour les sciences sociales et humaines, et pour l'ensemble de la communauté scientifique, Internet est devenu un instrument de travail et aussi un objet de recherche. L'ouvrage de Chantale Quesney combine ces deux éléments déterminants des années 1990 : elle cherche à comprendre la problématique particulière du conflit au Kosovo dans la perspective de la Toile. Elle propose plus précisément une réflexion sur les mémoires collectives des communautés kosovars et serbes, mémoires généralement antagonistes, et sur la « mise en forme » de ces mémoires sur Internet avant et pendant le conflit. Cette question de la mémoire est, depuis fort longtemps, un domaine dynamique et intéressant de l'historiographie française avec, entre autres, le travail de Pierre Nora. De plus, cet essai s'inscrit assez bien dans la démarche historique qui vise à multiplier les sources de l'histoire et qui considère utile d'interroger les événements contemporains récents. Même si l'auteure ne s'en réclame pas, elle partage quelques affinités méthodologiques avec l'histoire immédiate développée par Jean-François Soulet et quelques autres.

En plus d'une préface de l'ancienne procureure du tribunal pénal international et maintenant juge à la Cour suprême du Canada, Louise Arbour, l'ouvrage compte une introduction et quatre chapitres, dont le dernier fait office de conclusion. Dès sa courte introduction, Quesney établit les grands paramètres de son questionnement: aller au-delà de l'explication du rôle de Milosevic par la démagogie pour comprendre « la teneur des arguments avan-

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cés par les Serbes et les Albanais du Kosovo pour justifier les affrontements » (20). Selon l'auteure, Internet a un avantage sur les autres sources et médias: « Internet offre la possibilité à l'internaute d'interroger les discours sans le truchement d'un intermédiaire et, au webmestre, l'occasion d'exprimer ses idées exactement comme il l'entend, sans contrainte d'espace ou de temps » (20). L'analyse d'une trentaine de sites en anglais permet de constater la construction antagoniste de ces deux mémoires sur le sol du Kosovo. À titre indicatif, on trouve en annexe l'ensemble des sites consultés et les adresses correspondantes.

Dans le premier chapitre, l'auteure affirme que cette guerre est la première cyberguerre (28). Tout d'abord, la Toile a été utilisée comme instrument de propagande et d'information par les deux camps. Par exemple, les sites serbes ou kosovars ont tenté de justifier leurs positions respectives dans ce conflit. Elle constate aussi la prolifération d'informations par l'entremise des sites de discussion ou bien de courriels faisant état de la situation. Bref, il a été possible de communiquer, en temps réel, la situation sur le terrain ou ce qui était présenté comme tel. Autrement dit, on assiste à une personnalisation du conflit (38), comme par exemple dans le cas d'un correspondant à Pristina de l'Institute for War and Peace Reporting (40-42). De plus, dès 1998, les pirates informatiques des deux communautés, mieux connus sous le terme de *hackers*, ont débuté leurs attaques sur les sites Internet adverses. En raison de son intervention, l'OTAN a aussi été victime, par la suite, de ces pirates nouveau genre. Cependant, ces attaques n'ont causé aucun dommage sérieux, si ce n'est quelques désagréments. Selon Quesney, l'apport le plus significatif d'Internet a été de faciliter le repérage, sinon la recomposition, des familles kosovars déplacées par le conflit et dispersées dans différents camps et pays d'accueil, dont le Canada, à partir de banques de données construites par différentes ONG (37).

Les deux chapitres suivants, « De la mémoire à la nation » et « Se revendiquer de l'histoire », constituent le cœur de l'ouvrage. L'auteure y présente ce qu'est la mémoire et, surtout, exhorte à ne pas « confondre la mémoire d'une collectivité avec son histoire » (63). Dans ces deux chapitres, elle trace l'histoire des deux nations et de leur interaction. Elle y montre bien comment certains événements historiques sont perçus dans les mémoires des deux nations, comme la fameuse bataille de 1389. Nous sommes en présence de mémoires disputées, pour reprendre l'une des catégories proposées par Alain Brossat et al. dans leur ouvrage *À l'Est la mémoire retrouvée* et utilisée par Quesney. Elle souligne bien que « ce n'est pas (. . .) la préservation de la mémoire qui risque de faire problème autant que la manière dont cette mémoire est perpétuée » (110). Dans les sites Internet serbes ou kosovars, les modes discursifs employés tenteront de justifier les comportements et les gestes posés, d'occulter l'autre ou bien de se victimiser par rapport à l'autre. La mémoire devient un facteur constitutif de la nation et, par ricochet, elle est la négation de l'autre: « (l)e vouloir-vivre-ensemble-chacun-de-son-côté manifesté par les Serbes et les Kosovars s'est appuyé sur la nature sélective de la mémoire pour se nationaliser. La mémoire apparaît en effet comme un agent privilégié (de la construction de la nation) puisqu'elle permet de se constituer une origine commune et de se forger des ennemis héréditaires contre lesquels on oppose la mobilisation d'une solidarité toute légitime » (83). La mémoire est ainsi mise à contribution pour étayer les prétentions des acteurs. Enfin, dans le dernier chapitre, Quesney examine l'identité que les deux belligérants ont construite à partir de leur mémoire. Elle y suggère qu'Internet pourrait jouer un rôle dans la diffusion de la pluralité des intérêts et permettre ainsi la restructuration d'une identité moins centrée sur le territoire et son histoire.

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Cet essai est bien écrit et ceux et celles qui s'intéressent à ce conflit des Balkans y trouveront sûrement matière à réflexion. Toutefois, l'ouvrage souffre de quelques imperfections ou insuffisances. Ainsi, certaines notions (comme la cyberguerre) ne sont pas définies très précisément. Il devient alors difficile de désigner par le même vocable les actes des *hackers*, qui s'apparentent davantage à ce que l'on nomme le cyberterrorisme, et l'utilisation faite d'Internet par les ONG dans le cadre humanitaire. De même, l'importance d'Internet durant l'escalade du conflit au Kosovo à partir de 1998 aurait bénéficié d'une comparaison avec le conflit au Chiapas. En effet, dans cette lutte, les Zapatistes ont aussi utilisé Internet. Cette comparaison aurait permis de mettre en parallèle les éléments récurrents, mais aussi nouveaux, dans l'utilisation de la Toile dans le cadre de ce conflit. Il y a, d'autre part, quelques imprécisions historiques. Par exemple, il est abusif de parler d'empire austro-hongrois avant 1867. C'est un contresens que font habituellement les ouvrages de science politique. La dynamique dans l'Empire des Habsbourg avant et après le compromis n'est pas la même. De plus, affirmer que les Croates ont rêvé, après 1868, de former un État des Slaves du sud cadre mal avec la réalité historique. Tout d'abord, le compromis hungaro-croate de 1868 donnait une certaine autonomie à la Croatie, même si les Hongrois allaient systématiquement favoriser les Serbes de Croatie dans leur politique nationaliste. De plus, l'ouvrage récent de Jasna Adler a bien montré que la Croatie a plutôt été contrainte par les événements de la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale. D'ailleurs, l'absence d'application des accords de Genève de 1918 et l'incompréhension entre les Serbes et les Croates durant l'entre-deux-guerres en sont des éléments assez probants. Le vieux préjugé que l'Empire d'Autriche-Hongrie était condamné à l'avance est encore tenace. Pourtant même Édouard Benes, co-fondateur avec Masaryk et Stefanik de la première Tchéco-Slovaquie, soulignait dans sa thèse de doctorat soutenue à l'Université de Dijon en 1908 que l'effondrement de la monarchie était quasi-impossible. La guerre et sa continuation pendant quatre longues années sont les causes véritables de l'effondrement final de la monarchie des Habsbourg. Enfin, l'auteure ne souligne jamais véritablement un aspect essentiel qui a favorisé l'effondrement de la Yougoslavie, à savoir la problématique de la transition démocratique. Si la mémoire « disputée » a été manipulée aussi brillamment par des hommes politiques sans scrupule comme Milosevic, c'est grâce à l'utilisation efficace des ressources et du contexte spécifique de la démocratisation. C'est un aspect que Jack Snyder a bien mis en perspective dans son ouvrage *From Voting to Violence*. Loin de dédouaner les populations, ce contexte particulier et la nature du nationalisme des élites permettent de mieux saisir cette dynamique. Le fait que la population serbe ait mis fin, par des manifestations, à l'action politique de Milosevic montre bien que les élites proposent mais que les masses disposent, pour paraphraser Richard Rose. Malgré ces quelques réserves, l'essai de Chantale Quesney est stimulant et offre plusieurs pistes de réflexion sur le rôle et les multiples utilisations d'Internet dans les conflits.

Dany Deschênes *Université Laval*

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Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in Russia
Robert G. Moser
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001, pp. xi, 183

A good deal of scholarship devoted to postcommunist democratic transitions follows the neo-institutional idea that political outcomes can be manipulated by institutional design. This book represents a challenge to the strict form of that notion. In it, Robert Moser examines the effects of Russia's mixed electoral system on political parties and various aspects of party representation. Focusing on the parliamentary elections of 1993 and 1995 and the 1996 presidential election, Moser probes the connections between electoral laws and the number of parties, the effective number of parliamentary parties and the resultant ideological make-up of parliament, representation of women and of ethnic minorities in parliament, and the connections between the electoral system, parties and presidential elections. Drawing on examples from other systems, Moser shows that Russian electoral experience does not conform to extant electoral systems theory.

A well-written introduction frames the research and clearly outlines the course the book takes; the next chapter provides a detailed discussion of the research questions, theory and methodology. A thorough discussion of the literature explicates the idea that by themselves electoral systems do not shape party systems, and more, that it is district magnitude rather than winning rules that have the greater impact. This said, he proceeds to test each component of Russia's unlinked mixed electoral system (Single-Member District/plurality winner and national list PR). The research rests on his assertion that since the two components are completely unlinked, the Russian case provides a perfect laboratory for a "controlled comparison" (17) of the effects of each. While some might argue that the comparison is not controlled, Moser addresses this concern in such a way that most critics should be satisfied.

Several of his findings are, as suggested, counter to what one finds in the literature. In Russia, the SMD component of the electoral system has not driven the system toward two-partyism and the PR component has had the effect of limiting the number of parties; the SMD component of the electoral system was "friendlier" (65) to women candidates (in 1995) than PR by two to one; and minority representation was virtually constant between the two. He also found that centrists elected by the SMD component tended to balance extremists elected through the PR component, producing an ideological balance in parliament. Finally, he maintains that the SMD character of presidential elections (a two-round majoritarian system) constrained the number of presidential candidates in 1996. In the epilogue, Moser checks his findings against the 1999 parliamentary elections, where much of what was seen in 1993 and 1995 held true.

Moser explains his findings by the lack of well-institutionalized political parties in Russia. Although partial exceptions exist (the Communist Party, the Liberal Democratic Party), Russian political parties are to a large degree disconnected from a still-shifting electoral base and are still relatively underdeveloped organizations; they are, by and large, fluid, elite-based, Moscow-centred electoral organizations, still somewhat lacking in consistency and continuity. Thus, "the necessary preconditions for strategic behavior" (3) posited by neo-institutional theory do not prevail in Russia; citizens and politicians alike lack the cues and information needed to act strategically.

This reviewer is left with one very minor question about Moser's discussion of Russia's ethnic minorities. There are numerous, geographically

concentrated ethnic minority groups in Russia; in only a few regions does the titular minority constitute a majority of the population, but most groups have been to some extent constitutionally privileged, both in the Soviet Union and in the Russian Republic. It is not, however, entirely clear to me that ethnicity is as politically salient in Russia as Moser seems to imply. More to the point, I am not convinced that ethnicity serves as the basis of the various separatist movements Moser refers to that Russia has experienced in the past decade, for example, Chechnya. This point does not, in the end, detract from the work, or from his treatment of ethnic minority representation, which is extremely thorough.

Unexpected Outcomes is well researched, and though fairly technical, refreshingly well written. The book not only contributes to our understanding of contemporary Russian politics but also adds to the neo-institutional research agenda by reminding us, as others have, that context matters. Moser also strongly suggests that Sovietologists and transitologists look beyond their case(s) to the broader field of comparative politics; this, he maintains, does not contradict his assertion that the Russian experience is in many ways unique. The book is a must for students of postcommunist politics, and would work well in either an advanced undergraduate course or graduate seminar in either postcommunist politics or comparative politics.

JODY BAUMGARTNER *Miami University*

Grassroots Expectations of Democracy and Economy: Argentina in Comparative Perspective
Nancy R. Powers
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001, pp. xvi, 294

In an effort to understand at least some of the underlying foundations of the tumult in the streets of Buenos Aires and many of the provinces of Argentina in 2002, one compelling place to turn is this book by Nancy R. Powers. Against the 1990s backdrop of heightened inequality, advanced deindustrialization and severe job insecurity, Powers sets out to explain how the popular sectors of Argentine society connect (or fail to connect) their lived experiences to their political activities. What does this mean for the survival of democracy in Argentina? How is the *quality* of democratic citizenship in contemporary Argentina affected by the way poor people think about politics, democracy and the economy? These are the sorts of questions raised in this informative book on the grass roots of Argentina.

The bulk of the study "examines the material concerns of those who objectively have considerable material hardships—the less affluent members of society—and analyzes the relationship between those material concerns and their political views" (2). Powers does an admirable job elucidating the complexity of the processes through which individuals formulate and act upon their political interests. Through extensive, in-depth interviews with 41 "less affluent" citizens, numerous other shorter interviews including over 70 with political elites, and participant observation at political, civic and charity organizations, she is able to utilize concepts throughout the book "that arose in [the] citizens' own discourse" (3). Lengthy quotations from those interviews appear throughout, exposing the reader directly to these individuals' thoughts on their material and political concerns. In general, *Grassroots Expectations* is a good example of the value in careful, qualitative research.

One of the most important aspects of Powers' analysis is the emphasis she places on the role of perception and experience of material hardship

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rather than a simple identification of objective needs and interests. The *experience* of material hardship includes, "stress, exclusion, constraints on opportunities, and restrictions of choice" (88). To my mind, this closely mirrors the important insights raised by James C. Scott in *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, xi), especially in the way he privileges "the issues of dignity and autonomy, which have typically been seen as secondary to material exploitation."

The utility in Powers' approach is clearly evidenced in chapter 3, one of the best chapters in the book, that consists of a case study of housing interests of the popular sectors in Buenos Aires. While the living conditions in *inquilinatos* (rooming houses), residence hotels, *casas tomadas* (occupied buildings), and *villas miserias* (shantytowns) are consistently inhumane and insecure, they vary widely enough that the residents of these different types of substandard housing fail to identify their shared exclusion and marginalization. In short, they experience their material hardships differently. Indeed, the spatial characteristics that differentiate the lived experience in these various settings affect the identity of the residents and how they come to see each other: "This identity of place separates people with severe housing problems not only from the rest of society but also from each other" (63).

In her fieldwork Powers observed "a hierarchy in the legitimacy in housing" (63) with tenancy in hotels and *inquilinatos* at the top and *villas miserias* at the bottom. As a result, "People living higher up the hierarchy perceive their housing problems as less desperate than those living further down the list" (63). Obviously, this is a significant structural barrier to collective action. But the experience of material hardship in this sense is only one aspect of the ways in which poor Argentines connect their material concerns to their political interests. In subsequent chapters, the different "coping capacities" of individuals are also shown to influence whether and how individuals' political actions are motivated by their material experience.

Together with these experiential components, Powers focuses on the general political milieu of the society and how it influences whether individuals become "microfocused," "macrofocused," or "micro-macro linkers" in terms of their political thinking. Thus, learned expectations through exposure to political parties and social movements, the economic history of the country, the timing of material hardships, pre-existing party and class identities, the perceived viability of political and economic alternatives and party reputations, among other factors, all play a role in the likelihood of individuals making a cognitive link between their material experience and political demands. Through extended analysis of these factors Powers demonstrates the complexity of this process.

Yet she is not, in the end, concerned with this process in isolation, but in how it relates to democracy: "The genesis of this book was my concern about the effects of unaddressed poverty and impoverishment upon the stability and quality of democracy" (180). In this respect, Powers' attention to the grass roots is a laudable attempt to move away from the elite-focus of much of the contemporary literature on Latin American democratic transitions and processes of so-called democratic consolidation. The chapter on the "perspectives on democracy" of the "less-affluent" presents a persuasive argument that "democracy in Argentina has managed to maintain widespread legitimacy as a valued system of government despite its inability to produce governments that could create a decent standard of living for all" (180).

There are some shortcomings in the book, however. Among them, in my view, is the failure to address directly the poverty of liberal/procedural definitions of democracy that retain hegemony in the relevant literature. Further,

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Powers' skepticism with regard to the utility of consciousness-raising through social movements is based on very slim evidence, though she does raise some provocative questions. Also, there is no reference whatsoever to international factors such as globalization, external debt, among many others, in terms of their role in limiting economic and political alternatives, and restricting the possibilities for substantive democracy. Finally, the subtitle of the book is *Argentina in Comparative Perspective*, but there are only scant comparisons made to other countries and regions.

Nonetheless, these pitfalls are more than counter-balanced by the valuable insights into the politics of Argentina's grass roots. Students of political economy, democracy, Latin American politics, and social movements are recommended to take advantage of what *Grassroots Expectations* has to offer.

JEFFERY R. WEBBER *McGill University*

La citoyenneté multiculturelle. Une théorie libérale du droit des minorités
Will Kymlicka
Paris : La Découverte, 2001, 357 p.

D'emblée, Will Kymlicka soutient dans son introduction que, pour analyser les droits des minorités, il est important de bien faire la distinction entre les revendications d'autonomie politique issues des minorités nationales que l'on retrouve dans les États multinationaux et les droits polyethniques revendiqués par les groupes ethniques dans les États polyethniques. En effet, il affirme que la diversité peut prendre plusieurs formes et précise que, dans son ouvrage, il s'intéresse plus particulièrement à la diversité ethnique issue de l'immigration volontaire (qu'il désigne sous le terme de diversité polyethnique) ainsi que celle qui est issue de l'incorporation involontaire par suite de conquête ou de colonisation de groupes ethniques (qu'il nomme minorités nationales). Le traitement des revendications faites par chacun de ces deux groupes minoritaires, ethnique ou national, renvoie, selon Kymlicka, à deux problématiques différentes et les solutions apportées doivent donc tenir compte de ces différences dans le mode d'intégration.

Ainsi, Kymlicka définit trois types de droits que les minorités peuvent revendiquer en fonction de leur appartenance : 1) les droits relatifs à l'autonomie gouvernementale, qui visent la délégation de pouvoirs à des minorités culturelles pour assurer leur viabilité culturelle : 2) les droits polyethniques, qui visent le soutien financier et la protection juridique de pratiques particulières propres à certains groupes ethniques ou religieux : 3) les droits spéciaux de représentation, qui visent une présence garantie des groupes ethniques ou nationaux à l'intérieur des institutions centrales de l'État.

L'argumentation de Kymlicka paraît plus intéressante que celle des différentialistes radicaux pour critiquer l'éventail des positions libérales face à la diversité culturelle et religieuse, puisqu'il présente une position plus nuancée. En effet, Kymlicka justifie les droits des minorités nationales et des groupes ethniques en faisant appel aux principes libéraux. Il soutient que la valorisation de l'exercice, par un individu, de son autonomie personnelle, que privilégie la pensée libérale, nécessite que celui-ci ait le choix entre plusieurs options. Il estime que, pour se développer et s'exercer, la capacité de choisir requiert un contexte culturel viable et que la promotion et la protection d'une communauté culturelle peuvent, par conséquent, faire l'objet d'un droit collectif.

La position que développe Kymlicka dans son ouvrage repose sur le constat que la neutralité de l'État est impossible. L'État est toujours enraciné

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dans une culture particulière, si bien que les politiques – qu'elles concernent l'usage de la langue, l'enseignement ou l'immigration – qui paraissent neutres dans leurs justifications, peuvent favoriser les citoyens qui adhèrent aux convictions représentatives de l'*ethos* social majoritaire.

Kymlicka précise que, dans un État multinational, la citoyenneté est fondée notamment sur le partage, par une majorité de citoyens, d'une langue commune utilisée dans les écoles, les tribunaux et les institutions législatives, ainsi que de jours fériés déterminés en fonction des croyances de cette même majorité. C'est pourquoi il juge que les cultures minoritaires doivent être protégées, au sein des États multinationaux, des effets des décisions économiques et politiques prises par la culture majoritaire, pour qu'elles puissent offrir un contexte de choix à leurs membres. Il va jusqu'à préciser qu'elles « doivent donc disposer de pouvoirs leur permettant d'exercer leur autonomie gouvernementale ou d'un droit de veto dans les domaines de la langue et de la culture, ainsi que de pouvoirs leur permettant de limiter la mobilité des migrants ou des immigrants sur leur territoire » (183).

Pour Kymlicka, la culture joue donc un rôle important dans le développement de l'individu, puisqu'elle lui offre une gamme d'options et lui donne les instruments qui lui permettront de déterminer ce qui constitue une bonne vie pour lui. Kymlicka se démarque ainsi des autres auteurs qui se sont intéressés aux problèmes des minorités en donnant, pour étayer sa position, une définition de la culture qui s'apparente aux notions de « nation » ou de « peuple ». Il emploie l'expression « culture sociétale » pour décrire « une culture qui offre à ses membres des modes de vie, porteurs de sens, qui modulent l'ensemble des activités humaines, au niveau de la société, de l'éducation, de la religion, des loisirs et de la vie économique, dans les sphères publiques et privées » (115). La culture sociétale, telle qu'il la définit, s'incarne dans des institutions et des pratiques communes et est fréquemment concentrée sur un territoire et fondée sur une communauté linguistique.

Kymlicka apporte toutefois des nuances importantes au sujet des mesures à prendre pour protéger les cultures minoritaires. Il admet comme légitimes les mesures de protection externe qui ont comme objectif de protéger l'existence et l'identité des groupes ethniques ou nationaux en limitant les effets des décisions prises au sein de la société dans son ensemble. À l'inverse, il propose de rejeter les mesures de contrainte interne qui « limitent le droit des membres du groupe à remettre en question les autorités traditionnelles et à réviser les pratiques courantes » (60). Dans son optique, les droits spécifiques accordés à un groupe doivent favoriser l'égalité entre les groupes minoritaires et majoritaires, tout en préservant la liberté au sein du groupe minoritaire.

Parce que les droits revendiqués par les minorités insistent sur la différence, certains auteurs ont évoqué le danger que la société devienne si fragmentée qu'elle ne voit plus l'utilité d'avoir un cadre commun, ce qui menacerait la cohésion sociale. Pourtant, comme l'a montré Kymlicka, les politiques d'accommodement peuvent constituer, dans le cas de minorités ethniques issues de l'immigration (et non pas de minorités nationales), un moyen pour promouvoir et défendre l'unité sociale. À titre d'exemple, le désir des Sikhs de porter leur turban au lieu du couvre-chef traditionnel de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada constitue, aux yeux de Kymlicka, la preuve qu'ils souhaitent participer à la vie communautaire de leur pays. La revendication de politiques d'accommodement par les membres des minorités ethniques peut être ainsi l'expression d'un désir d'intégration à la société dans laquelle ils s'insèrent.

Même si la reconnaissance des minorités nationales joue un rôle important dans l'analyse de Kymlicka et qu'il soutient que celle-ci peut se manifes-

ter par des revendications territoriales, l'obtention de droits linguistiques, une répartition asymétrique des pouvoirs ou la redéfinition des frontières administratives, il pousse davantage la réflexion en s'interrogeant sur ce qui unit les individus au sein d'une société. Il fait ressortir la complexité de cette question dans un État multinational et soutient que « pour que les citoyens veuillent maintenir un État multinational il faut qu'ils accordent de la valeur à la diversité profonde en général mais surtout aux groupes ethniques et aux cultures nationales avec lesquelles ils partagent le pays » (269).

Les droits reconnus aux minorités qui sont liés à l'identité des individus incitent cependant les citoyens à se tourner vers leur groupe d'appartenance ou vers celui qui assure la meilleure représentation de leurs intérêts au sein de l'espace public. En effet, pensés comme des moyens d'intégration et des remèdes à l'exclusion, les droits des minorités doivent, dans leur opérationnalisation, passer par l'identification (certains disent la stigmatisation) de l'appartenance des individus à certains groupes pour assurer une allocation plus juste (dite aussi réparatrice) des biens. On identifie les individus marginalisés pour les intégrer. Cette identification des individus et des groupes cibles pour mettre sur pied ces politiques rend difficile toute coopération et tout échange entre les divers groupes qui sont sujets aux représentations des différents intervenants qui, dans la plupart des cas, sont en position de domination. Cette situation tend à favoriser les conflits intergroupes.

Il nous semble en effet que les accommodements et les droits qui résultent de la reconnaissance des droits des minorités peuvent poser problème puisque ces droits, étant introduits dans un contexte particulier, sont fondés sur la construction de rapports inégalitaires entre majoritaires et minoritaires et ont tendance à les reproduire. Kymlicka, tout en soulignant la marque du majoritaire sur la culture sociétale, ne nous donne pas de solution quant au processus à suivre pour déterminer la nature des accommodements qui devraient être faits au sein d'une société en regard de la diversité ethnique ou au plan de la reconnaissance des minorités nationales.

Ce livre est néanmoins très utile, car il a le mérite de présenter une typologie intéressante des diverses revendications des groupes ethniques ou nationaux. De plus, fait rare pour un ouvrage d'analyse conceptuelle, il est parsemé d'exemples concrets qui lui donnent une saveur toute particulière.

France Gagnon *Université de Montréal*

Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship
Will Kymlicka
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 383

The 18 essays collected in this volume explore the position Will Kymlicka calls "liberal culturalism" on which he claims debates over the rights of national minorities ("liberal nationalism") and of other cultural groups in liberal societies ("liberal multiculturalism") are gradually converging (chaps. 1, 2). The guiding ideas are those he defended in his important book *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) where he attacked the view that the liberal state can and should be neutral toward the cultural memberships and identities of its citizens, and argued that equal treatment of national minorities, immigrant group, and indigenous peoples demands that they be granted various kinds of minority or "group-differentiated" rights that recognize their distinctive identities. Here he responds to critics, introduces some important refinements of his position, and develops its implications through discussions of

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an impressive range of political issues, including federalism (chaps. 5, 13), indigenous rights and environmental justice (chaps. 6, 7), race relations and affirmative action (chap. 9), civic education (chap. 16), and globalization and cosmopolitan democracy (chaps. 11, 17). Only chapter 3 largely retreads old ground and, with the possible exception of chapter 12, each essay throws valuable new light on the depth and scope of his project.

One of Kymlicka's ongoing concerns is to rebut criticisms that liberal culturalist policies are in fact illiberal (for example, that minority rights provide protections of traditional forms of life and the corresponding structures of authority and power from the pressures of modernity), that they are divisive (for example, that immigrant multiculturalism hinders assimilation and fosters separatism and social alienation), or that they are mutually incompatible, in particular, that granting national minorities self-government rights would mean restricting the cultural rights of immigrants (as in the case of the Quebec language laws). As regards the latter, Kymlicka argues forcefully that minority nationalism and multiculturalism are largely compatible since the legitimate concerns they address are situated at different levels. The claims of national minorities concern the appropriate units of democratic self-government—specifically, that they should take account of national cultural differences—whereas the legitimate cultural claims of immigrant groups are a matter of securing fair terms of integration into existing liberal democracies (chap.15). Kymlicka agrees with liberal nationalists that promoting and protecting different national cultures and identities is one of the legitimate functions of the state, but denies that this entails support for the authoritarian policies or chauvinistic attitudes associated with ethnonationalism. Instead it implies that multinational federalism, rather than a culturally homogeneous nation-state, is the appropriate form of constitution for a multinational polity, a claim he backs up with a subtle analysis of strengths and limitations of federal constitutional arrangements, though he acknowledges that the kind of asymmetrical federalism required to accommodate the claims of the Québécois in Canada may foster secessionist tendencies in the long run.

Kymlicka's more sustained attention to the implications of liberal culturalism for democracy is complemented by the prominence he now accords the role of state nation-building policies in the analysis of the injustices suffered by cultural minorities and the remedies they call for. He accepts that the state has a legitimate interest in promoting the shared sense of belonging required by democratic participation but criticizes the ways in which this goal has been pursued, namely by attempting to suppress the separate identities of national minorities and coercively assimilating immigrants to the dominant national culture. While those already familiar with Kymlicka's approach will find little that is ground-breaking in these discussions, his declared methodological preference for "mid-level" theory that eschews foundational philosophical reflection and detailed policy proposals in favour of exploring the rationale of existing policies on culture in liberal democracies yields an array of insightful and richly detailed discussions.

That said, critics of Kymlicka's earlier work are likely to find some of their reservations confirmed by these essays. Although the new focus on nation-building lends greater sociological precision to Kymlicka's treatment of nationalism and culture, I for one continue to have reservations concerning his arguments for the political significance of national identity. Once again he appeals to the problematic concept of a "societal culture" (for example, 25-26, 53-54) that all but identifies "culture" with the whole institutional life of a society, with the result that his claim that "[m]embership in a societal culture is necessary to liberal freedom and equality" (53) takes on almost

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definitional status. This lends an element of circularity to one of his core arguments for national self-determination rights—that national cultural membership is essential to the exercise of autonomy—a circularity that is not mitigated by the authority he accords the policies developed in liberal democracies by legislators and jurists (52-53), since the latter of necessity work within the horizon of their national polities. Kymlicka's commitment to the nation as the appropriate unit of political self-determination leads him to question the view that globalization is gradually eroding the significance of the nation-state and to dispute the cogency of the model of transnational democracy proposed by David Held. But here, as elsewhere, it must be acknowledged that Kymlicka's criticisms set extremely high standards of rigor and even-handedness for critics of his own views.

It is impossible to do justice to the scope and depth of these essays in a brief review, and although there is inevitably some repetition, this is amply compensated for by the fact that each essay can be read as a more or less self-contained unit. Suffice it to say that this volume represents a further distinguished contribution to the remarkable recent flowering of Canadian political thought by one of its major representatives.

CIARAN CRONIN *University of Illinois at Chicago*

The Politics of Language: Conflict, Identity, and Cultural Pluralism in Comparative Perspective
Carol L. Schmid
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. vii, 21

Over the last 20 years activists have waged a sustained campaign to further an agenda that purports to ensure the hegemony of the English language in the United States. In this wide-ranging analysis of the politics of language in the US, Carol Schmid concludes that "there was never a language so little in need of official support as English at the end of the twentieth century" (178). Nevertheless, US English, whose membership has increased exponentially in the last decade, have made important advances in the political arena. Twenty-five states have official English statutes, while bilingual education programmes, provision of government services in languages other than English, the language of the workplace and more generally, rights of immigrants are increasingly assailed. Schmid's purpose, to provide a framework to make sense of language politics in the US, is competently achieved. Her earnest intention to defuse the resistance to bilingual education and intolerance toward languages other than English is unlikely to sway English-only activists. If Schmid urges Americans to appreciate that linguistic diversity is a source of social capital, she does not advocate the implementation of an official policy of bilingualism. She proposes limited concessions to minority-language groups, none of which would compromise the hegemony of the English language. These concessions are justified on grounds of the structural disadvantages under which most non-English speakers live rather than on claims of protecting the cultural particularity of linguistic minorities.

This text is a response to the fears and misconceptions exploited by US English-speakers and their anti-immigration brethren. Their campaigns trade on the longstanding American preoccupation with its ethnic balance, the race of immigrants and their ability to conform to a middle-class Anglo-Saxon norm. Indeed, language conflicts are unintelligible without locating them within the history of American nativism and its noxious twin, racism. Schmid

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goes some way toward untangling the complex relationships between race, class, immigration, language and American identity.

Alongside efforts to suppress Native American languages, English hegemony was reinforced on the ground by ensuring that territories acquired through conquest, annexation and purchase would be incorporated as states only after "Anglos" formed the majority of the population. Early in the century nativist agitation culminated in the entrenchment of an understanding of American nationality that would, by definition and by law, preclude language diversity. The ability to speak "accentless English" is an audible sign that differentiates those worthy of full inclusion in the nation. But it is the historical practice of racializing cultural differences in order to entrench the alleged superiority of the white Anglo-Saxon race that betrays the exclusionary tactics of nativists. The massive wave of "new immigrants" from southern and eastern Europe at the turn of the century were classified as non-white in much the same way as nativist Protestant opinion had previously racialized Irish immigrants. Schmid's comparison of the particular context that culminated in the national origins quota system at the beginning of the twentieth century and the contemporary situation that is a direct result of successive reforms of that system substantiates the strong links between race, immigration and nationalism. The incorporation of "new immigrants" entailed a transition from a racial to an ethnic identity that, accordingly, has created a new racial fault line between those of European and non-European descent.

Schmid makes extensive use of existing research and an array of polling data to affirm the thesis that language controversies are a proxy for other conditions that challenge the power relations of dominant groups. A comparative perspective is provided by an analysis of the differing approaches to language relations in Canada and Switzerland. The treatment of the Canadian case is driven exclusively by the need to rebut those who see Quebec's sovereignty movement as evidence for resisting bilingualism; whereas the Swiss practice of extending linguistic rights to territorially based groups allows Schmid to suggest a solution to the status conundrum of Puerto Rico. While there are serious difficulties with data on "Hispanics" (a contested and homogenizing label) and the self-reporting of language competence, Schmid marshals considerable evidence to invalidate the claim that recent immigrants are "refusing to learn English." She does not consider the significance of continued and cyclical migration patterns facilitated by the proximity of Spanish-speaking nations. More importantly, she acknowledges that Hispanic community leaders are divided over the appropriate purpose of bilingual education, but does not distinguish her position from those who make a culture-based claim for bilingual education. Her opposition to the inflammatory claims of the official English movement would have been better served if she had done so. Nonetheless, Schmid delivers a timely and solid primer on a complex and increasingly divisive issue.

Ines Molinaro *University of Cambridge*

La tradition musulmane
Ali Merad
« Que sais-je? », no. 3627
Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 2001, 127 p.

Dans le sillage des attaques terroristes du 11 septembre 2001 aux États-Unis, de nombreuses publications ont présenté aux publics occidentaux une vision plutôt rudimentaire de l'Islam faisant une place démesurée au phénomène de

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l'islamisme radical. Le présent ouvrage, écrit par l'un des grands spécialistes de l'exégèse coranique, a le mérite de remettre un peu d'ordre dans nos esprits. Ali Merad invite à considérer certains fondements religieux de l'Islam, c'est-à-dire la Tradition musulmane née autour des paroles, des gestes et des silences du Prophète Muhammad. À la différence de la Révélation (le Coran), la Tradition est le corps vivant du message que le Prophète adresse à la communauté des croyants.

L'ouvrage se divise en deux parties. La première présente le contexte historique des sources de la tradition musulmane. La seconde propose une lecture plus sociologique des grands enjeux de cette tradition, en tenant compte de l'évolution des sociétés musulmanes dans un environnement caractérisé par la tension entre mouvances religieuses conservatrices et réformatrices.

Dans un rappel historique, l'auteur présente les quatre sources de l'Islam qu'il faut considérer en ordre hiérarchique : le Coran (la source révélée), la Sunna (la tradition constitutive), l'*Ijma* (le consensus communautaire) et l'*Ijtihad* (l'effort individuel d'interprétation). C'est au niveau des deux dernières sources non révélées que l'auteur analyse les positions respectives des grandes écoles religieuses de l'Islam, entre autres, l'interprétation plus rigoriste et puriste des écoles hannafite et malikite qui relativisent les sources de l'interprétation, et le courant moderniste qui introduit une forme de rationalité dans le traitement du Texte. L'auteur établit une distinction entre Écoles classiques et modernes : les premières évoquent une *Ijma* uniquement valide dans un lointain passé, soit la vie du Prophète et le comportement de ses proches (le consensus de Médine), tandis que les modernes considèrent l'*Ijma* comme un cadre évolutif pour des sociétés politiques qui doivent constamment s'adapter à des situations nouvelles. Dans cette logique, l'*Ijma* pourrait être une voie de salut pour les sociétés musulmanes contemporaines aux prises avec des mouvements religieux qui prônent la réislamisation.

D'après Merad, l'*Ijtihad* est le processus de la raison du savoir islamique que l'on peut caractériser comme la recherche de l'opinion et du jugement devant de nouvelles situations. L'*Ijtihad* est l'élément qui peut apporter de la justesse dans l'action humaine. Sur ce point, cette doctrine rejoint la pensée socratique développée par Platon, soit le principe de l'utilité de l'opinion et surtout de sa légitimité dans l'action. L'*Ijtihad* est fortement lié à l'école moderniste qui cherchera à adapter l'Islam au monde moderne.

Merad s'intéresse surtout au parcours historique de la Tradition. Suite à la mort du Prophète, la Tradition se caractérise par un appel à l'imitation du Prophète, de sa vie et de sa parole. C'est une tradition orale qui s'appuie principalement sur les paroles des compagnons. Les débats concernant l'authenticité des sources de la tradition se développent à partir du moment où le lien de connaissance réelle du Prophète et de ses proches se dissipe. Il faut également noter que l'expansion rapide de la civilisation islamique provoque des tensions politiques et religieuses. La fixation de la Tradition au troisième siècle de l'Hégire sous la forme de deux recueils majeurs, soit Bukârî (194-256) et Muslim (202-61) devient alors nécessaire afin de stabiliser la situation. L'auteur souligne deux conséquences importantes de la mise en texte de la Tradition. Premièrement, le travail devient plus rigoureux en raison de la collecte, de l'authentification et de l'organisation des matériaux établissant l'enseignement du Prophète. Certains s'intéressent aux apocryphes, c'est-à-dire aux falsifications de la Tradition. Même le Prophète en fait mention : « celui qui ment à mon sujet, qu'il s'attende à trouver sa place en enfer » (62). Deuxièmement, la démarche d'investigation est fondamentalement critique dans le sens où existe une remise en question de la validité des sources. Comme l'indique Merad : « . . . aucune haute autorité politique ou religieuse

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n'a jamais établi qu'il faille clore définitivement les recherches en matière de traditions du Prophète » (71).

À la fin du 19e siècle, un nouveau regard sur l'authenticité de la tradition sera défendu par l'École réformiste. C'est principalement dans l'aire indo-pakistanaise que s'installent des discours concurrentiels. D'une part, un mouvement plus conservateur autour de la figure importante de al-Mawdûdî (1909-1973) cherche à contrer toute forme d'occidentalisation. Ce premier fondamentalisme religieux s'insurge, par exemple, contre les pratiques de la laïcité et de la mixité. D'autre part, on note un réveil moderniste autour d'individus qui pensent qu'il faut adopter ce qu'il y a de bon dans la culture occidentale – Afghânî (1838-1897) et 'Abduh (1849-1905). La lecture protestante des Écritures, présentée comme une façon de revigorer la pensée musulmane, exerce une certaine fascination sur les esprits. Dans cette optique, la réforme peut être caractérisée comme une revalorisation religieuse, comme un retour aux sources et surtout une lutte contre l'interprétation des milieux conservateurs. Les réformateurs musulmans s'engagent sur le terrain de l'authenticité des sources, qu'ils jugent manipulées par les milieux traditionalistes (les docteurs de la foi) portés à donner une trop grande place aux sources « humaines » et non révélées de la Tradition. Enfin, Merad note dans ce discours une forme de démocratisation de l'accès au religieux susceptible de faire plus de place au croyant.

Dans le monde musulman, l'ouverture réformatrice va plutôt laisser le terrain libre à une réalité politique bien différente, notamment un discours qui préconise le repli sur les deux sources fondatrices de l'Islam. Certains vont jusqu'à évoquer un âge d'or de l'Islam comme une façon de préserver les acquis. Comme exemple de cette tendance, l'auteur souligne l'émergence du fondamentalisme islamique des Frères musulmans égyptiens et la fascination de nombreux musulmans pour le modèle rigoriste saoudien (le wahhabisme et l'application de la loi coranique). Dans l'espace musulman contemporain, l'utilisation de la Tradition semble avoir favorisé davantage la stratégie de réislamisation prônée par des mouvements fondamentalistes. Dans plusieurs expressions politico-religieuses, on a pu noter une forme de récupération religieuse, notamment une imitation rigoureuse de la vie du Prophète et une rupture radicale avec la société ambiante jugée barbare et contraire à l'essence de l'Islam (jahiliyya). À la fin de son ouvrage, l'auteur fait une petite place à une option moderniste, nettement moins visible, qui propose de réduire le poids de la Tradition à une stricte conduite spirituelle et plutôt individuelle. Cette seconde tendance se manifeste principalement dans le sous-continent indien et vise à faire du Coran l'unique référence normative.

Bien que cet ouvrage comporte les limites connues d'un « Que sais-je? », il introduit de façon cohérente les éléments principaux des sources de la Tradition musulmane. On peut toutefois critiquer l'aspect très technique de la démonstration. Néanmoins, il a le mérite de nous montrer que l'Islam présente des solutions de réformes internes. Peut-on envisager une délibération musulmane capable de combler un besoin démocratique et ainsi contrecarrer les mobilisations plus extrémistes? Dans le contexte actuel, ce livre amène à se poser cette question fondamentale.

Chedly Belkhodja *Université de Moncton*

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Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War
Stuart J. Kaufman
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001, pp. x, 264

The timeliness of Stuart Kaufman's volume was dramatized by the events of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington. The venomous hatreds which can become encompassed in religious, ethnonational or racial identities can persuade apparently ordinary individuals to seek martyrdom in mass murder. The 1994 Rwanda genocide and other calamitous episodes of ethnic violence in the late-twentieth century further underscore how the collective psyche of a group can demonize and dehumanize "the other" to the extent that mass killing becomes an essentially banal act carried out by large numbers.

One key thesis of the book is embedded in the title: *Modern Hatreds* are not simply re-enactments of ancient antagonisms originating in the mists of a primeval past. The "ancient tribal hatred" explanation is frequently encountered in the reportage of journalists, and invariably melts away under close historical inspection. But the sturdy resilience of the "ancient hatred" theory, reappearing in each new ethnic war, itself requires explanation. The journalists are not merely disciples of the small band of academic primordialists, but derive this interpretation from interviews on the ground. Ask an ordinary Rwandan what explains Hutu-Tutsi animosities, and the "ancient tribal hatred" answer will often follow. Not the least of the merits of the Kaufman book is to make this response comprehensible: in intense conflict situations, historical mythologies acquire hegemony on the social imagination. These constructs represent contemporary rivalry as rooted in antiquity, and fueled by injustices of past centuries. In reality, however, the forms of collective consciousness expressed as ethnonationalism are distinctly modern ideologies of identity mostly taking form in the nineteenth century or later.

The point of departure of *Modern Hatreds*, then, is the essential modernity of ethnonationalism. To achieve conceptual purchase over this phenomenon, Kaufman constructs a carefully reflected interpretive grid, placing symbolic politics at the centre. The bulk of the text consists of well-documented accounts of the historical background and contemporary unfolding of several of the ethnic wars which attended the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

The choice of the symbolic domain draws heavily upon the seminal scholarship of Murray Edelman. A core component of ethnicity, argues Kaufman, borrowing from Anthony Smith, is the "myth-symbol" nexus: widely held beliefs about a shared past and its triumphs and tragedies, and powerful symbols which evoke these memories and mobilize solidarity. Perhaps the Kaufman definition of ethnicity would be usefully completed by incorporating the notion of boundary, so well argued by Fredrik Barth: consciousness is formed more by a sense of difference from "the other" beyond the communal border than by the "cultural stuff" within, subject to constant evolution and change.

In staking out his own terrain, Kaufman persuasively refutes several standard approaches to identity politics. Purely instrumental approaches, especially those tied to rational choice theory, rest on faulty premises about the capacity or disposition of the calculating, self-interested individual to operate independently of the overpowering emotional charge which communal identity may carry. In particular, escalation of ethnic rivalry into violent conflict is rarely comprehensible without grasping the fears and anxieties which may pervade group relationships, or the human tendency to find secu-

rity in group affiliation. The symbolic approach, argues Kaufman, combines the insights of the "constructivist" and the "primordialist" orientations to the analysis of cultural pluralism.

The case study chapters are elegant condensations of complex histories. The examples of ethnic warfare chosen include Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian-Azeri struggle, Georgia and its multiple communal battles, Moldova and the Transnistria Russophone rebellion, and the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian conflict over the terms of disintegration of Yugoslavia. He introduces a useful distinction between mass-driven ethnic wars in the Caucasus and elite-driven ones in Transnistria and Yugoslavia. Although the captivating detail of these chronicles sometimes obscures the conceptual message, Kaufman does persuade the reader as to the explanatory power of his framework in the contexts chosen.

He has, however, a more ambitious purpose: "A general theory of ethnic war, applicable in any region of the world." Kaufman has read widely and deeply in the comparative literature based on other regions; in this respect, he goes well beyond most of the monographic studies of former Yugoslavia or the Caucasus, which rarely search beyond the region for conceptual help. However, some reflection is needed on the particularity of these cases. Compared to ideologies of ethnic self-awareness in other parts of the world, those of the Caucasus and the Balkans are exceptionally laden with potent, often poisonous historical mythologies. Also, in recent decades they have evolved in the very particular context of ethnic federalism, an infrequently encountered constitutional arrangement in the world at large. In this "solution" to "the national question," Lenin, Stalin and Tito unwittingly provided a discourse of sovereignty and an institutional structure for its assertion when the centre decomposed. Perhaps, as well, instrumentalism is too lightly set aside as an element in ethnic conflict escalating into violence: the "fire-tenders" Paul Brass finds in Indian communal riots, quietly nurturing an infrastructure of potential violence for use when convenient, or the role that issues of distribution and domination play in sustaining ethnic rivalries, whether or not they decant into warfare.

These quibbles notwithstanding, *Modern Hatreds* is a masterful work which enters the ranks of those studies of ethnonationalism which are indispensable reading for all who have an interest in this topic. Stuart Kaufman earns our admiration for the ambition of his volume, and the degree to which it finds fulfillment.

Crawford Young *University of Wisconsin-Madison*

Le nationalisme : perspectives éthiques et religieuses
Gregory Baum
Montréal : Éditions Bellarmin, 1998, 196 p.

Théologien reconnu et auteur de nombreux ouvrages en sciences religieuses, Gregory Baum part du constat qu'il existe, selon lui, une absence de réflexions éthiques approfondies, de nature chrétienne, sur le nationalisme. Hormis les deux lettres pastorales publiées par les évêques du Québec en 1980, contribution qu'il juge par ailleurs « remarquable » (21), la théologie se serait désintéressée du phénomène national. Cette lacune, le professeur émérite de l'Université McGill entend la corriger en examinant la pensée d'auteurs qui s'inscrivent dans des traditions spirituelles différentes. Consacrant un chapitre à chaque auteur, Baum examine la pensée de Martin Buber, de Mohandas Gândhi, de Paul Tillich et de Jacques Grand'Maison. Il pense

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que l'on trouve chez eux des réflexions contribuant à une meilleure compréhension du fait national et, surtout, à une évaluation plus juste du nationalisme sur le plan éthique.

Au-delà des différences liées au contexte dans lequel chacun s'exprimait, on s'aperçoit que les quatre penseurs partageaient une même méfiance envers la modernité, l'utilitarisme et la rationalité technique. À cet égard, Baum estime que les quatre penseurs sont au diapason des thèses wébériennes sur « l'emprise de la raison technique ». Gândhi, par exemple, était contre les chemins de fer en Inde et si les Indiens devaient boycotter les tissus en provenance du colonisateur anglais, ce n'était ni pour asphyxier l'industrie anglaise, ni pour soutenir l'industrie indienne du textile, mais plutôt parce que le fait d'acheter et de porter des tissus importés était, selon lui, un « péché » (92). Pour le Mahatma, l'appel du rouet était le plus noble qui soit. Bien sûr, ce combat contre la modernité se combinait chez lui avec une conception non violente de l'hindouisme. Tous ne vont pas aussi loin que Gândhi dans la critique de la modernité. Mais, de façon générale, ils la voient comme mettant fin aux attachements communautaires dont les individus ont besoin pour s'épanouir. Ainsi, aux yeux de Martin Buber, qui se sent lui aussi profondément aliéné par la société moderne, le sionisme représente une libération lui permettant de « prendre à nouveau racine » dans la communauté. Après la Première Guerre mondiale, le philosophe religieux défend la nation selon un argument que Baum appelle durkheimien, c'est-à-dire qui valorise l'importance du cadre social pour la formation de la personnalité. Buber pensait, selon Baum, que les individus prenaient place « dans le genre humain non pas en tant qu'individu mais comme membres d'une nation. » (52)

L'idée que la préservation des identités nationales est nécessaire à l'épanouissement des individus serait également présente chez le théologien protestant Paul Tillich, celui des quatre dont la pensée est la plus complexe. Plus exactement, Baum croit que les réflexions de Tillich au sujet du socialisme et sur l'importance d'un mythe d'origine s'appliquent également au fait national. Ainsi, Tillich aurait cru que l'aliénation de l'individu au sein du monde moderne pouvait être surmontée par un retour à un « mythe d'origine », mais couplé avec un « mythe d'exigence », question de désamorcer l'aspect négatif des nationalismes extrémistes comme le nazisme. Selon Baum, Tillich proposait que le socialisme fasse place à un mythe d'origine respectant les « racines culturelles des individus ».

Aux yeux des quatre penseurs, le nationalisme était, estime Baum, une manière de combattre les forces de la modernité qui « déracinent » l'individu de sa culture d'origine et qui lui font oublier son enracinement dans une « tradition vivante », c'est-à-dire dans un passé partagé en commun. Ils seraient donc tombés d'accord, croit Baum, pour affirmer que le nationalisme est éthiquement acceptable à partir du moment où les nationalistes respectent certaines conditions éthiques, comme celles qu'ont formulées les évêques québécois dont on a parlé plus haut, et qui sont de lutter pour une société plus juste, de respecter les minorités, de collaborer avec les nations voisines et de refuser d'ériger la nation en valeur suprême.

C'est à la lumière de telles conditions, avance Baum, que le théologien et politologue (et aussi prêtre) Jacques Grand'Maison a pu affirmer que, sur le plan éthique, l'attitude acceptable pour les Québécois était, dans les années soixante-dix et au moment du référendum de 1980, de choisir la souveraineté-association alors que l'intégration au Canada et la « capitulation » devant la « techno-culture » américaine ne l'étaient pas (152). Seule la première option, celle de l'indépendance politique, pouvait garantir l'épanouissement de la collectivité québécoise, qui est nécessaire à son tour à celui de l'indi-

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vidu. Mais, se demande-t-on, cela signifiait-il qu'il était nécessairement inacceptable sur le plan éthique de voter « non » au référendum de 1980? Et pourquoi, comme le mentionne l'auteur, Grand'Maison a-t-il reproché aux évêques québécois d'alors de ne pas s'être prononcés sur l'enjeu référendaire? Si les évêques avaient exprimé leur préférence, les Québécois n'auraient-ils pas été ramenés à l'époque de Lionel Groulx quand nation et catholicisme ne faisaient qu'un? Pourtant, ainsi que le rappelle Baum, Grand'Maison a sévèrement critiqué le nationalisme de Groulx. Il est donc assez surprenant que l'auteur ne nous donne pas une clé pour comprendre ce qui apparaît comme un paradoxe dans la pensée du théologien québécois.

Le lecteur initié à la pensée libérale sera agacé par le traitement que lui fait subir Baum. En effet, selon l'auteur, tant les libéraux politiques que les libéraux économiques « tiennent l'attachement des gens à leurs racines historiques pour un obstacle au progrès humain. » Ils veulent, dit-il, « dépouiller les gens de leurs souvenirs historiques » (124 et 179). Voilà une grave affirmation qui demandait à être étayée par des preuves solides de penseurs libéraux affirmant qu'il fallait « dépouiller » les gens de leur mémoire historique. À un moment, Baum fait bien référence à une association, d'inspiration libérale, mais il ne la nomme pas (180). La pensée libérale est, me semble-t-il, plus complexe que cela. Pour s'en tenir à un exemple parmi d'autres, n'est-ce pas Lord Acton qui plaidait pour la combinaison de plusieurs nations au sein d'un même État ou d'un même Empire? Mais plutôt que d'examiner la pensée de certains piliers du libéralisme, Baum, qui s'appuie sur la pensée de Charles Taylor et de Karl Polany, offre une lecture caricaturale du libéralisme.

Cela dit, l'ouvrage est rédigé dans un style clair et limpide, et c'est pourquoi il se lit d'une traite et sans difficulté. La conclusion soulève des pistes de réflexion intéressantes, encore que certaines auraient mérité un traitement plus approfondi (je pense tout particulièrement à la question de la langue). Le mérite de cet ouvrage est de mettre le théoricien du nationalisme en contact avec des auteurs qu'il n'aurait peut-être pas examinés de son propre chef. En ce sens, l'ouvrage est une invitation à poursuivre les recherches sur les liens entre le nationalisme et la pensée religieuse, notamment en ce qui concerne l'idée que certains penseurs religieux voient dans la nation un refuge pour lutter contre les effets de déstructuration sociale engendrés par la modernité politique et la technique moderne. Voilà assurément qui demande une investigation plus approfondie.

FRÉDÉRICK BOILY *Université du Québec à Chicoutimi*

Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order
Michael Keating and John McGarry, eds.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. xii, 366

The fundamental hypothesis of this edited volume is twofold, namely "that the processes associated with globalisation, rather than undermining minority nationalism, help explain its strength" (6), but "also provide new opportunities for its accommodation and management" (11). This frames the debate, providing the arena in which seventeen contributors, including the two editors, test this hypothesis theoretically and in case studies.

Divided into two parts, the volume offers five chapters that take a primarily theoretical perspective, while the remaining ten contributions examine the impact of globalization on minority nationalism in concrete cases, all but one (Quebec) situated in Europe.

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In his chapter on "Nations without States," Michael Keating offers a broad theoretical framework for the volume as a whole by examining the dynamics of globalization and outlining how they can contribute to both the re-emergence of minority nationalism and better opportunities for its accommodation. Especially on the latter, Keating makes a number of important points with regard to the changing nature of the state in an international or regional framework in which the notion of sovereignty has radically changed: "the re-emergence of forms of qualified and negotiated sovereignty which were lost with the rise of the 'nation-state' with its monopolistic claims on sovereignty . . . lowers the stakes in the distribution of powers between states and their component territories, since many powers are now located outwith the state altogether" (39f.). In other words, the meaning of self-determination and independence has fundamentally been altered in the sense that it would be, for example, questionable how much more independent the Belgian region of Flanders would be should it ever secede from Belgium as compared to its current status.

The next four chapters in the theoretical part of the book pose similarly challenging questions. Margaret Moore argues from the perspective that globalization is primarily an economic process (44) and addresses three "misconceptions" that underlie the view that minority nationalism will be transcended both in its institutional and identity-related dimensions by globalization. Instead of subscribing to the opinion that nations are obsolete, that cultural homogeneity will solve the "problem" of minority nationalism, and that the ideal of a cosmopolitan culture is more attractive and defensible than minority nationalism, she suggests "a new view of minority nationalism, in which minority nationalism is viewed as consistent with an enlightened cosmopolitanism and with managed globalisation of the economy" (45). Will Kymlicka addresses the tensions between immigrant multiculturalism and minority nationalism, suggesting that there is an interesting dilemma: the very policies that have allowed minority nationalists to move from an ethnic version of nationalism to a civic one are in themselves illiberal, which poses a hard choice for policy makers and legislators in terms of prioritizing one ("liberal norms of individual choice") over the other ("consolidate and extend the shift to a civic form of minority nationalism") (77). These and other questions, asked by David Laitin on the role of languages and Walker Connor on the economic and political rationales in ethnic conflict in the remaining two chapters of the theoretical part, are picked up in the individual case studies on Switzerland, Catalonia, Quebec, Cyprus, Flanders, the United Kingdom, Tatarstan, Northern Ireland, South-Eastern Europe, and Latvia and Estonia.

All of these case studies have their merits, few have minor shortcomings, but it is impossible in a single review to address them comprehensively. Instead, this review highlights a few parallels and dissimilarities between the theoretical part of the volume and the case studies. First of all, there seems to be an overwhelming endorsement of the positive aspects and trends in the development of minority nationalisms over the past decade or so, and the increased capability to accommodate minority nationalism within the framework of existing states and evolving regional frameworks (Keating, Moore, Kymlicka, Laitin). Yet, the conclusion one arrives at after reading all the case studies is at best a mixed one. True, constitutional nationalists in the UK, Catalonia and Quebec provide some support for this argument, as does the engagement of the EU and the OSCE in Latvia and Estonia, but Cyprus, Northern Ireland, the Flemish parties in Belgium, and South-Eastern Europe are hardly cases in point. Likewise, one could point to the 'absentees':

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Transnistria, Nagorno Karabakh, Georgia and the Basque country also provide little evidence for post-ethnic minority nationalism or an increased level of opportunity (or willingness) to accommodate minority nationalisms.

Two further points are worth making in relation to an otherwise intellectually very stimulating account of the dynamics of globalization and minority nationalism that this volume presents. Increasingly over the past years, ethnic conflicts have become linked to a variety of "non-traditional" challenges, such as organized crime (trafficking in drugs, weapons, and humans), the role of diasporas and of the media, and more recently international terrorism as well. Clearly, these are aspects also related closely to various processes of globalization and it would have been important in my view to have a more comprehensive discussion of these aspects. The second point is that while Europe may well be among the regions most advanced in terms of globalization, the (negative) impact of the latter on ethnic relations is no less significant in Africa or South-East Asia, and a comparative examination of either or both would have fitted well in this volume and would have strengthened its overall argument.

In conclusion, Keating and McGarry have taken on an important subject and have assembled a range of able contributors to produce a valuable volume of theoretical examinations and case studies addressing the new (and old) dynamics of minority nationalism in the era of globalization. Although a concluding chapter in the traditional sense is missing, the individual contributions are held neatly together by the volume's core hypothesis. Despite the minor criticisms voiced above, this is a significant contribution to the study of ethnopolitics, which will have its use in advanced undergraduate and graduate teaching as well as in the debates among scholars and policy makers.

STEFAN WOLFF *University of Bath*

Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century
Ted Robert Gurr
Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000, pp. xviii, 402

Since 1988, Ted Robert Gurr has directed a project at the University of Maryland concerned with "Minorities at Risk." The present volume is a sequel to an initial report named after the project, which was published to great acclaim in 1993. The most important and obvious point to make about this pair of books is that they represent an extraordinary contribution: labour has been intense, coding ingenious, and the level of moral concern utterly outstanding. No review can do justice to the details of the inquiry, with this reviewer as yet being unable to work truly through the wealth of material presented—this being a book that will certainly repay the amount of time spent upon it. But if the all-important details cannot be noted here, at least the broader picture can be sketched.

The book is decidedly optimistic about world politics since the early 1990s. There has been a diminution of ethnopolitical conflict. A number of serious cases have been dealt with, and relatively few new sources of conflict have arisen. Three reasons are cited for this improvement. First, a full decade has passed since the end of the Cold War, with settlements of varied sorts being reached in most of the former Soviet Bloc. Second, states—and in particular established liberal democracies—have become more capable of managing heterogeneity. Third, international pressures upon would-be nationalizing homogenizers have encouraged accommodation. To my mind, this is the key factor. Estonia would have made life miserable for the beached Russian

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diaspora but for the pressure of the United States; equally, Vladimir Meciar's moves against his Magyar minority in Slovakia was clearly curtailed when representatives of the European Union made it clear that discrimination would prevent entry into Europe.

If the conclusions are striking, still more impressive is the political sociology that lies back of the analysis. The key element is the insistence that minorities become militant in response to the treatment accorded them by the states with which they interact. This political view so to speak triumphs again and again over the socio-economic explanations largely dominant in the literature. It is this fact, generally recognized in Gurr's view in nothing less than an emerging regime for managing heterogeneity, that allows for accommodation. Roughly speaking, the granting of voice will diminish the demands for exit, thereby creating less absolute loyalty than a world of contention and protest rather than rebellion. If this analysis comes through in chapters by Gurr on the causes of conflict, the relations between democracy and accommodation, the means for resolving ethnopolitical conflict, and the location of future risks, an equally striking part of the book is the presence of 15 sketches of varied groups at risk.

If the contribution of this research at the practical level is very great, equally important is its theoretical import. Bluntly, numbers count. It is all too easy to produce analyses of ethnic and national conflict based on the horrors that confront us on our television screens. But dogs that do not bark in the night deserve as much consideration, and Gurr's collection of data over many years allows us to take them into account. None of this is to say that we should be too optimistic. Gurr himself is surely right to stress that successful outcomes depend upon early state strategies: a liberal response to protest can prevent rebellion—at which stage the chances of accommodation are very slight indeed. Further points, going a little against his analysis, deserve to be made. For one thing, the successes of established liberal democracies in managing ethnic conflict—successes which influence his figures—come on the back of ethnic cleansing. Differently put, liberal tactics work especially well when they have little to deal with. For another, the best laid plans can come to naught in the face of political events—a key element of which remains that of paramilitary forces to so polarize a situation as to make it thereafter unmanageable. This leaves policy in a necessary but horrible contradiction: Do all you can to encourage multinational states, but abandon that policy by recognizing secessions once the cat is truly out of the bag.

JOHN A. HALL *McGill University*

Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict
Nigel Biggar, ed.
Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2001, pp. xi, 312

This compilation of essays discusses the quest for reconciliation in societies, such as South Africa or Northern Ireland, which have experienced civil strife. In fine essays by Nigel Biggar, Tuomas Forsberg, Donald Shriver and especially Jean Bethke Elshtain, the Christian doctrine of forgiveness is heralded as a way to overcome the urge for revenge that would plunge society into further violence. As Elshtain points out, Hannah Arendt saw in forgiveness a way to establish a basis for achieving restoration of community by ending "repetitive cycles of vengeance" (41).

But forgiveness is not possible without some form of forgetting. Here, as Elshtain and other writers throughout the volume show, forgetting is a partic-

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ular way of remembering. It is not that we should forget the horrendous actions of the perpetrators of torture and murder. Rather, people should remember these events in ways that enable people to restore peace and justice. To achieve these ends, people cannot remember so thoroughly that they are unable to move toward reconciliation, but people cannot forget so completely that they fail to give just due to the victims.

Indeed, a central theme throughout the book is the quest for restorative justice, which is seen as a necessary substitute for retributive justice. The latter is used to punish wrongdoers, but this approach, as portrayed in this volume, often hardens political differences and perpetuates conflict. In contrast, those who employ restorative justice seek a basis for reconciliation between victims and victimizers. This book, in emphasizing the virtues of restorative justice, devotes a good amount of space to discussions of the truth commissions in South Africa and in other nations. With truth commissions, the main objective is not punishment, but ascertaining the full record of the crimes from the standpoints of both those who committed them and the victims. Important essays by Martha Minow, Charles Villa-Vicencio, and Hugo van der Merwe provide good discussions of the challenges that truth commissions face in achieving reconciliation.

But how useful are such approaches? Marie Smyth asks in her discussion of Northern Ireland, where there is such a horrendous record of abuse, how is reconciliation possible? How can people, she asks, "forgive even if they can't forget" (128)? It would seem that as a condition for forgiveness, there must be a capacity for individuals to forget in the sense of being able to see the past events in ways that enable the society to march forward with hope for reconciliation. But for this outcome to occur there must be some way to treat the victims fairly. How is fairness possible in the context of a memory grounded in torture and monstrous violence?

The volume suggests several ways. First, there is an obligation to understand, as Brandon Hamber points out, the psychological impact of political violence, recognizing the need to explain the factual realities of violence through truth commissions, but realizing that this is only a first step toward healing. Second, there is the necessity to achieve, in the wake of the crimes of the past, a society that is fully committed to preventing human rights abuses in the future. Unfortunately, this objective has not been met in many cases. Alexandra Barahona de Brito describes Chile as a society in which the Chilean army is unapologetic for Pinochet and in which society is divided over his arrest. Rachel Sieder's account of Guatemala demonstrates that democracy and respect for human rights remains a major challenge. Similarly, essays by Terence McCaughey and Stef Vandeginste speak to the difficulties involved in attaining justice in Northern Ireland and in Rwanda, respectively. Hamber points out that South Africa still suffers from police violations of human rights.

In the concluding essay, Biggar returns to the theme of restoration by advocating forgiveness. He thinks that the tendency to associate forgiveness with religious concepts can be avoided by grounding forgiveness in a secular perspective. Taking this route would avoid mandating conformity to a religious viewpoint as a condition of reconciliation. But in promoting this view, it is necessary to spell out very carefully what is needed to achieve it. Liberal democracies are based on the memory of the civil strife that arises from intolerance. In response, liberal democracies seek to protect basic rights as a condition for securing individual autonomy and respect for difference. Two questions arise from this view. Is a liberal democratic regime always the best way to repair the problems left by civil strife, and if it is, how can it be created and sustained in the various settings discussed in this book? This important book,

while helping to frame the problem of how to bury the past also awakens many questions, such as the ones just mentioned, that cry out for answers.

Steven M. Delue *Miami University*

Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics
Sonia Kruks
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001, pp. xiii, 200

The central premise of this book, writes Sonia Kruks in the Introduction, is that "in taking the postmodern tale at face value, we have unwisely cut ourselves off from the rich heritage of existential thought. Feminist (and other social) theory would now do well to retrieve and employ it" (6). Eloquently and convincingly, in the six chapters that follow, Kruks shows just how rich a resource that heritage makes available to feminist political theory and practice.

Given the book's title, it will come as no surprise that questions about experience, subjectivity and recognition form its central threads: *Leitmotiven* that recur through Kruks's subtle and learned readings of Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Fanon and Foucault, the main figures she brings into dialogue with a truly impressive range of twentieth-century feminist texts. Nor is it any wonder that these terms would figure so prominently in a book whose project is to articulate a feminist theory and politics for the new millennium, for these, in their complexity, are among the most pressing issues for theory and activism. Yet "the postmodern tale" has tended to enlist these issues, Kruks maintains, in ways that thwart rather than promote transformative feminist praxis: a concept Kruks employs in a Sartrean sense that accords primacy to projects that "transcend . . . material conditions towards an end" (118, citing Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason*). The contrast is with postmodern thought which discounts *doing*—situated, practical engagement in materially based activities—to affirm the primacy of discourse. Thus, one of the most impressive features of the book is its engagement with postmodernity and its opposites/antagonists/detractors in critical-constructive analyses that give each facet of the debates their due, while avoiding both the immobilizing effects of false dichotomies with the forced choices they generate, and the quietism of refusing to take a stand.

"Experience" has been a highly charged term for second-wave feminist theory and practice in its interventions into a homogenized, androcentred and presumptively white social-political tradition, where women and other Others cannot readily expect acknowledgment for their own experience-based claims. Drawing on existential phenomenology's productive conception of the "lived experience" of situated and embodied subjects, Kruks shows how it affords conceptual possibilities for understanding subjectivity—and thence experience—as neither a pure social construct nor entirely self-constituting; neither free-floating discursivity, nor contained and constrained within the bounds of identities assigned or declared, and the limits of an ossified identity politics. Kruks is cognizant of the propensity of feminist and other identity politics to deflect attention from larger inequities in the distribution of power and privilege and from the injustices embedded in social institutions and larger political processes; she is wary of a tendency to enact "an excessive particularization" out of an assumed "experiential basis that is so fundamentally group-specific that others, who are outside the group and who lack its immediate experiences, cannot share [its] knowledge" (109). Yet she cautiously commends identity politics for its potential to take "radical experiential differences" (111) into account: its "demand for recognition on . . . the

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very grounds on which recognition has . . . been denied: [for] it is *qua* women, *qua* blacks, *qua* lesbians that groups demand recognition" (85). It is not helpful, Kruks persuasively observes, "to destabilize the notion of identity to the point where those difference that do still de facto divide women's needs and agendas become occluded" (83). In an illuminating reading of Franz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* as an "inaugural work of identity politics" (89), elaborating its indebtedness to Sartre's *Anti-Semite and Jew*, Kruks displays the complexity and the conflicts of a "politics of recognition" (chapter 3). Yet here, one point gives pause: Kruks suggests that a Jew can sometimes be anonymous, "but a black man is always visible as such" (99). Can this be true? I think not. Racism is in fact acutely, insidiously operative just when a black person is so light-skinned as to "pass" readily as white. In such situations the "experience of alienation in one's body, [of] self-doubling" (100) of which Kruks writes, can be even more "profound" than she allows. Kruks's larger purpose, however, is to work towards a feminism committed to developing " 'respectful recognition' of other women—women with whom one does *not* share certain core interests of identity, or even perhaps any direct interests" (154): a solidarity infused with generosity that has to translate across racial and gender lines, and other lines of division.

It is a richly conceived understanding of subjectivity that Kruks invokes to frame these analyses of experience and recognition. Arguing that neither discursive (postmodern) nor Enlightenment accounts of subjectivity take its lived, corporeal aspects adequately into account, Kruks proposes that phenomenology has more to offer in its attention to "women's embodied, lived experience" (144), enabling feminists to work from an acknowledgment that "there are ways in which we come to know, think, and act with our bodies" (144). These are no disengaged, dispassionate modes of knowing, thinking and acting, for affectivity is as central as reason in the experiences that shape human choices. Indeed, in this analysis the opposition between reason and affect dissolves, and with it any sense that affect is, necessarily, irrational. Human subjects are embodied, feeling-thinking beings whose so-called "individual" experiences are always both situated and social. Yet again, understanding such selves does not require feminists to work with mutually exclusive alternatives: to choose between a view of the self *either* as autonomous and self-constituting *or* as a discursive effect. For Kruks, these alternatives are better understood as "dialectically related poles" one of which, the explanatory pole, "explores experience from an impersonal or 'third person' stance"; the other, looking to how it is grasped or understood—to its personal meaning—"explores it from a 'first person' stance" (141). These reconceptions of subjectivity are indeed productive, yet a third modality also belongs within the frame: the "second person" stance of intersubjectivity in its addressive, concerned and respectful mode that figures so centrally elsewhere in this book, and points to relations that are deeply constitutive of selves and experiences. It is a stance that Kruks engages in her sensitive analyses of empathy, "world-travelling," and recognition: it is a crucial factor in feminist departures from the stark, self-interested individualism of the liberal, and indeed often of the postmodern, tradition.

LORRAINE CODE *York University*

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England's Disgrace? J. S. Mill and the Irish Question
Bruce L. Kinzer
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001, pp. x, 292

Believing that he lived in an age of transition, John Stuart Mill's most cherished ambition was both to discern the path of progress and to contribute to the realization of a more enlightened world. Posterity best remembers him as the author of the classic essay *On Liberty*, but his contemporary reputation rested on two monumental tomes with the formidable titles of *A System of Logic* and *Principles of Political Economy*. Those imposing works secured for his more journalistic writings a prominent place in the public debates of the day, and provided them with a sturdy foundation. For Mill never forgot the lesson he learned from his father, that it was a mark of unparalleled ignorance to postulate an opposition between theory and practice. The unity of theory and practice not only gave coherence to his otherwise disparate writings, but it also grounded his vocation as a public moralist. Victorian England was an age of public moralists, and Mill's was, as Stefan Collini noted, their master's voice. That voice was never more audible than when Mill discussed Ireland. The "English nation," he wrote in one of his early essays, "owes a tremendous debt to the Irish people for centuries of misgovernment. . . . If ever compensation was due from one people to another, this is a case for it."

Since Mill's voice is still worth hearing, Bruce L. Kinzer's excellent study of *England's Disgrace?* is well worth reading. In it, Kinzer provides the first comprehensive account of Mill's involvement with the Irish Question. That involvement spanned four eventful decades during which the most prominent issues were, successively, the admission of Catholics to Parliament, the Famine, the Irish University Question and the Fenian Challenge to British Rule. These topics are insightfully discussed by Kinzer, who is attentive to the ways in which Mill linked theory and practice. Thus the Irish University Question required Mill, then a member of parliament, not only to consider his political allegiance to Gladstone and the Liberal party, but also to keep in check his antipathy to the Catholic Church, while never losing sight of his own pluralistic conception of liberal education. Of course, Mill's views on Ireland were never popular with the British Establishment. Even when Fenianism finally shook British complacency, Mill's call for sweeping land reforms, by which Ireland's wealth would be gradually returned to the Irish, met with derision. The great bulk of the English reading public, as a contemporary quoted by Kinzer noted, received Mill's pamphlet *England and Ireland* "with feelings little short of indignation and disgust. The author's reputation has availed little to bear up the pamphlet; rather the pamphlet seems calculated to bear down the author" (191).

Eventually, Mill's interventions did have some positive effects, although not perhaps as much as he claimed in the *Autobiography*. As Kinzer shows, the Irish *Land Act* of 1870 was closer to Campbell's plan than Mill's. The 1881 *Land Act*, which Mill did not live to see, was more consistent with his aims: fair rent to be determined by a Commission; fixity of tenure provided rent was paid; and free sale of the tenant's interest in his holding. An important question remains: if Mill's proposals for land reform had been implemented in their entirety when he proposed them, would their adoption have solved the Irish Question? Kinzer treats this question cautiously, but the thrust of his answer is that measures for land reform fell short of what the Irish really wanted and subsequently attained, namely, self-government in an independent Ireland. "A final answer to the land question, when it arrived," Kinzer writes, "did not diminish the capacity of nationalist forces to sustain a

drive towards self-rule" (215). Land reform was integral to Mill's belief that the Union had to justify itself by the benefits it conferred on the Irish. But land reform and a more equitable Union were not Home Rule.

Even if Mill misjudged the future of Anglo-Irish relations, the same cannot be said about his self-understanding as a public moralist. Where Kinzer is less than fully persuasive is in his conceptualization and assessment of Mill as a public moralist. Kinzer contends that "His trenchant assaults on English parochialism notwithstanding, Mill's own perspective had an Anglocentric tilt" (6). And he concludes his study by insisting that "Mill's record on the Irish question is of uneven quality" (215). Such a view is defensible; but it can also be disputed by appealing to some of Kinzer's own evidence. For example, Mill's pamphlet *England and Ireland* was enthusiastically received by Irish nationalists. Kinzer writes: "The nationalist press in Ireland saw the publication of Mill's pamphlet as a major event" (190). Mill's earlier newspaper articles on the Famine were also warmly welcomed. Kinzer notes: "The Freeman's Journal, the most important journalistic arm of O'Connell's movement for repeal of the Union, gave Mill's Morning Chronicle series a rhapsodic reception" (73). So positive a response from Irish nationalists could not but have pleased Mill the public moralist and fervent critic of English society. And if history had turned out differently, if the Union had been progressively improved rather than oppressively maintained and then violently dissolved, Mill's ameliorist strategy and singular contribution to the Irish Question might now be viewed far more favourably both by Kinzer and by other Mill scholars. Even so, *England's Disgrace?* by Bruce L. Kinzer is the indispensable guide for all those interested in John Stuart Mill and the Irish Question.

SAMUEL V. LASELVA *University of British Columbia*

Aristocratic Liberalism: The Social and Political Thought of Jacob Burkhardt, John Stuart Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville
Alan S. Kahan
New Brunswick: Transaction, 2001, pp. viii, 242

Aristocratic Liberalism was originally published in 1992 by Oxford University Press. The new edition includes an Afterword that clarifies certain aspects of the book and also offers a general taxonomy of nineteenth-century liberalisms. Alan Kahan views his analysis of aristocratic liberalism as part of a larger discussion concerning the different types of liberalism. By focusing on three key aristocratic liberals—Burckhardt, Mill and Tocqueville—Kahan argues that aristocratic liberalism was a distinct, if somewhat marginal, discourse within nineteenth-century European liberalism.

Kahan's history of nineteenth-century European thought revolves, almost to a fault, around the French Revolution which, Kahan points out, lasted for over half a century as different groups and ideas attempted to reforge stable political and social systems. In the Afterword, Kahan identifies the "common liberal minimum program" as including private property, free trade, equality before the law, freedom of press and representative government (141). Different thinkers supported aspects of this programme to different degrees: The aristocratic liberals, for instance, typically downplayed the importance of a free press, at least while the middle and lower classes remained uneducated.

In addition to different policies, the different thinkers appealed to different accounts of human nature, of human society and of history. For Kahan,

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the primary targets against which the aristocratic liberals wrote were the interconnected rise of centralization, bureaucracy and capitalism. For many people in the nineteenth century, material well-being became the highest human goal, while mediocrity, conformity and commercialism were the keys for achieving that goal. As Mill wrote, the art of living had been "engrossed by the art of getting on" (45).

One thing that becomes clear through this discussion is the distaste that these three thinkers had for the great majority of humanity. Different liberalisms have different ideas of human nature, and not all of them are limited to or even focused on economic concerns. The aristocratic liberal is perhaps the strangest, harkening back to renaissance humanism to challenge the economic and equalitarian ideals of the nineteenth century.

The connection between aristocratic liberalism and humanism revolves around the value of liberty, individuality and diversity (98). However, according to Kahan, one of the general projects of the aristocratic liberals was the creation of "new virtues" (94). These virtues, such as enlightened self-interest, move away from the earlier humanistic virtues, but remain tied to the idea that human beings should be evaluated in terms of their capabilities. To the earlier, humanistic thinkers, the tables of virtues and vices were static, and the primary problem was whether these virtues were achieved or not. For aristocratic liberals, virtues were tied to historical change. Rather than corruption, the primary fear was stagnation (96).

While reworking the humanistic virtues and the ideal of individuality, the aristocratic liberals also appealed to the image of an aristocracy to imagine a community that could oppose modern, isolating individualism. In the aristocratic ideal, diversity and individuality could exist alongside a strong sense of community. This is not a theme that Kahan pursues to any detail, except insofar as he discusses the importance of education to create an enlightened society. One important gap in Kahan's discussion here is the almost total lack of a concern for nationalism. On the rare times that the nation is referred to at all, it is typically confused with the state. One example of this connection is when Kahan notes how the three thinkers were nationalists, and by this he means that "they devoted considerable thought to their countries' place in the European balance of power" (62). But the importance of nationalism in the nineteenth century has little to do with the balance of power between *states*. Rather, nationalism became an important way to think through social and economic struggles, both as a way to imagine a mediocre and conforming collective, and as a way to resist it through appeals to often idealized images of national identity.

The trio are used to recite typical criticisms of nineteenth-century middle-class mediocrity, with little concern for pushing the analysis of their shared conceptual space. It would have been valuable for Kahan to have also considered how these thinkers were caught in the conceptual frames offered by aristocratic liberalism, where they could on the one hand criticize the narrowing of humanity under capitalism and yet be unable to think through a solution that extends beyond appeals to education. A reading of Marx's *Jewish Question* would have been useful here, insofar as education, like religious conversion, could be understood as creating a spiritual transformation that leaves the material conditions (and the narrowness of life) intact. Kahan's discussion, in other words, never really creates a sense of interrogation.

One final limitation of the book is that the discussion does not create a sense of the larger intellectual arguments that were occurring in the nineteenth century. The aristocratic liberals worry about the rise of mass culture and mediocrity, they worry about the centralizing tendencies of bureaucracy, and they

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worry about the commodification of value, but these large-scale social, political and economic changes do not have thinkers connected to them in Kahan's discussion. Likewise, no other reactions to these changes are discussed. Other liberals, the socialists, the missionaries, and so on are almost completely absent. There was no consideration of non-European thinkers, and American thinkers in particular. One could expect, if only as a foil, to at least recognize thinkers such as Thomas Paine. While the absence of other voices helps to emphasize the shared space of these three thinkers, it also creates the sense that the debates, if they existed at all, did not extend far beyond that space.

In *Aristocratic Liberalism*, Kahan helps challenge some common preconceptions concerning nineteenth-century liberalism. For instance, while liberalism is typically represented as adopting the values of the bourgeois middle class, certain liberals appealed to aristocratic ideals as a way to challenge many of those middle-class values. The key differences revolve around differing accounts of human nature, of the progress or decline of history, and of the possibilities and goals of human community. While Kahan's work clarifies the conceptual space that was common to three important nineteenth-century liberals, the book fails to create a larger sense of the debate. The result is that the book is really only valuable when read as part of a larger library of books, many of which have not been written yet, that deal with the rest of nineteenth-century thought.

Brian Richardson *University of Hawaii*

L'illusion néo-libérale
René Passet
Coll. Champs
Paris : Flammarion, 2001, 303 p.

René Passet est professeur émérite, spécialiste en économie du développement, à l'Université Paris-I-Panthéon-Sorbonne. Bien qu'il prenne le soin de préciser que son ouvrage n'engage aucun mouvement, il reconnaît l'avoir écrit en pensant aux militants dont il « partage les convictions et les luttes » (23), notamment ceux du mouvement Association pour la taxation des transactions financières pour l'aide aux citoyens (ATTAC), dont il assume par ailleurs la présidence du conseil scientifique. Ceci dit, il importe de préciser que le livre qui fait l'objet de cette recension se situe résolument dans le registre de l'essai critique et non dans celui du pamphlet politique.

L'intention axiale qui a présidé à l'élaboration de cet ouvrage consiste à proposer une « (. . .) manière de voir et d'appréhender les transformations qui bouleversent notre époque, un effort de compréhension des interdépendances qui les relient et, si possible, de la logique qui les éclaire, pour aboutir à la recherche des stratégies qu'elles appellent » (22-23). L'auteur récuse en particulier les prétentions des nouveaux « maîtres du monde » et des « grands seigneurs de transnationales » qui se réclament des pères fondateurs du libéralisme pour légitimer leur emprise de plus en plus hégémonique sur la société au niveau planétaire. Cette domination s'effectue trop souvent au détriment de l'intervention publique et de la protection sociale à l'endroit des plus démunis. Selon Passet, ce pseudo-libéralisme s'oppose, dans une certaine mesure, à l'esprit qui animait les pionniers de la pensée libérale; il rappelle, par exemple, que c'est Adam Smith lui-même qui, dès 1776 dans la *Richesse des nations*, dénonçait l'exploitation des faibles par les puissants lorsqu'il écrivait : « [l]a rente et les profits mangent les salaires, et les classes supérieures de la nation oppriment l'inférieure » (21).

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Passet s'attache alors à faire voir que l'application sans discernement des postulats de l'économie classique et néo-classique (Smith, Ricardo, Walras), s'appuyant pour une large part sur une vision mécaniste des équilibres économiques directement issue des conceptions de la physique newtonienne, semble de moins en moins convenir, à bien des égards, à notre monde dont les repères ont changé considérablement. Il devient donc impératif de se défaire de l'emprise de diverses idées obsolètes, en particulier de celle qui stipule qu'il existe une loi « gravitationnelle» de l'équilibre naturel des prix. Si, pour moult ténors néo-libéraux contemporains, cette loi constitue toujours la meilleure promesse de réalisation du bien général, sous l'égide des vertus agrégatives des intérêts individuels rationnels s'exprimant en contexte de libre marché (32-44), il n'en demeure pas moins qu'un constat de réalité conserve ses droits : les promesses d'un monde meilleur ont été, sur bien des plans, dramatiquement perverties (121-79). Sans reprendre ici par le détail le sombre tableau (richement documenté et chiffré) que dresse Passet des effets pervers d'une logique marchande devenue envahissante, il sied néanmoins de relever brièvement quelques faits troublants qu'il a observés : « [d]ivision des peuples, fracture sociale, écart qui ne cesse de grandir entre riches et pauvres, saccage de la nature » (179). L'auteur souligne en ce sens que « ce sont les hommes eux-mêmes – plus exactement la cupidité du petit nombre des puissants ne sachant plus voir ce qui est humain – qui pervertissent la promesse, au point d'en faire jaillir l'exacte contradiction. Quel gâchis! Mais aussi quelle raison de lutter! » (178-79).

Comment les choses ont-elles pu en arriver à cette situation désolante? Toujours selon Passet, le diagnostic résiderait dans le fait que le monde tel que nous le connaissons est le fruit d'imposantes métamorphoses (sur les plans technologique, économique, social, politique, etc.) subies au cours des ans, et que les solutions d'hier deviennent souvent les problèmes d'aujourd'hui si elles ne s'adaptent pas à la nouvelle donne. Dans la perspective de l'économie libérale classique, c'est le mécanisme de l'horloge qui sert de modèle de référence et il convient alors de procéder suivant la méthode analytique cartésienne en isolant les rouages particuliers avant de les recomposer, en allant du simple vers le complexe. Le focus se trouve ainsi placé d'emblée au niveau des agents individuels que sont les entrepreneurs, les travailleurs et les consommateurs pour venir à comprendre le fonctionnement de la mécanique d'ensemble (74). Par contre, des pans entiers de la production, de la consommation, des échanges, bref des facteurs économiques parmi les plus porteurs, s'insèrent désormais dans une conjoncture autre qui s'apparente assez peu à celle qui prévalait en des temps révolus. Notre époque se distingue par la prédominance de l'immatériel et de l'informationnel sur les facteurs matériels et énergétiques traditionnels, de même que par le développement fulgurant des réseaux d'interdépendance entre les diverses composantes du système sociétal. Si bien que la représentation exclusivement mécaniste qui continue à colorer une certaine économie libérale actuelle semble pour le moins mal adaptée, en bien des secteurs d'activité, aux exigences du présent. Passet en conclut qu' « (. . .) un système économique ne peut se reproduire dans le temps que s'il est ouvert sur un environnement dans lequel il puise ses énergies et déverse ses déchets. L'individu, la firme, l'économie globale, la société, les écosystèmes, la biosphère, sont des systèmes de relations ouverts les uns sur les autres (. . .) » (74).

Que faire alors pour renverser la tendance expansionniste et hégémonique de la sphère marchande, qui semble s'accentuer pour phagocyter sans cesse davantage de secteurs de la réalité sociale, politique et humaine? Comment permettre à l'individu de sortir de la passivité dans laquelle on cherche trop souvent à le maintenir et, partant, l'amener à assumer pleinement et activement la maîtrise des principaux paramètres de son existence et à les

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défendre des prétentions démesurées du marché? Pour Passet, un renversement s'impose avec urgence, à savoir: ramener à ses justes proportions le rôle de la logique économique marchande, qui doit demeurer instrumentale et au service des finalités et des valeurs humaines. En ce faisant, les valeurs économiques perdent leur préséance et doivent en tout temps rester subordonnées (en relation avec les autres facteurs instrumentaux que sont la science, la technologie, des éléments environnementaux, etc.) à la dignité humaine intangible en ses multiples dimensions.

Une fois la primauté absolue du facteur humain restaurée, les balises se trouvent adéquatement placées, permettant dès lors d'envisager avec pertinence les grandes problématiques qui n'ont cesse de nous confronter. À titre illustratif, comment assurer un développement durable, en tout respect du développement socio-économique et des cycles naturels? Comment répartir un temps de travail réduit sous l'impact du machinisme? Quels choix sociaux effectuer afin de contrer la pauvreté et l'exclusion? Quel critère retenir pour partager équitablement des richesses rendues plus abondantes sous l'impulsion des hausses de productivité, et cela entre concitoyens, entre États, entre générations? Bref, pour résumer brièvement dans les termes de l'auteur: « [l]a norme première n'est pas le capital, ni le profit, ni la liberté réduite à celle du marchand, mais la personne, la solidarité des peuples et des générations, la vie, la biosphère, la liberté tout court. Les valeurs socioculturelles qui fondent ces objectifs ont pour corollaire la suprématie du politique – expression du choix de société librement exprimé par les citoyens – sur l'instrument économique » (183).

Passet procède ensuite à l'examen du mérite de quelques mesures concrètes, régulièrement rencontrées dans la littérature, pouvant contribuer au mieux à « accomplir la promesse » de remettre les finalités humaines au cœur de la vie en société sous tous ses angles (237-78). Il argumente notamment en faveur de mesures telles que: 1) l'annulation de la dette du tiers-monde, 2) la mise en place d'une taxe (du type de celle qu'a proposée le Nobel d'économie américain James Tobin) dans le but de civiliser un tant soit peu les flux outranciers de la spéculation financière transnationale, 3) l'instauration de conditions favorisant le partage du temps de travail afin de combattre l'exclusion sociale, 4) l'attribution d'un statut de *patrimoine commun de l'humanité* à un certain nombre de ressources que la nature nous offre en partage (exemple de l'eau), 5) la dissolution du lien traditionnel entre revenu et travail salarié, ouvrant de la sorte la voie à l'émergence d'un véritable *revenu minimum garanti* (ou revenu de citoyenneté) inconditionnel (199-266). Pour ce qui concerne plus spécifiquement cette cinquième proposition, qui commande une réforme majeure des mécanismes habituels de sécurité du revenu axés sur une panoplie de programmes conditionnels souvent ponctuels, Passet signale qu'elle s'inscrit plus globalement dans une visée nécessaire de réélaboration de la citoyenneté, mieux ancrée sur la solidarité, déplaçant l'accent de la justice commutative vers une authentique justice distributive (266-78).

En guise de conclusion à ce rapide survol, je formulerai simplement quelques appréciations d'ordre général. Premièrement, quoique l'essai qui nous occupe ne déborde guère les bornes convenues d'une littérature de nos jours foisonnante (critique des affres de la mondialisation néolibérale telle qu'elle se déploie sous nos yeux), il n'en constitue pas moins un travail académique fouillé et rigoureux pointant vers des lignes d'analyse généralement bien acérées. Deuxièmement, contrairement à une certaine mode pamphlétaire qui pourfend sans appel toute la tradition de pensée libérale qui a rythmé la construction de la modernité philosophique et socio-politique occidentale au fil des derniers siècles, l'auteur sait faire les nuances et les distinctions qui

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s'imposent (le marché reste un instrument fort utile pour la production et l'allocation efficaces de divers biens et services), tout en gardant un regard éminemment critique et dénonciateur sur les travers que révèle l'observation contemporaine. Troisièmement, il s'agit là en définitive d'une lecture accessible et utile pour quiconque souhaite, au-delà des formules simplificatrices, se familiariser avec les pourtours et les enjeux de débats très actuels, qui n'impliquent rien de moins que le type de société que nous voulons pour nous-mêmes et pour ceux et celles qui nous suivront. J'ajouterai enfin que l'intérêt actuel de cette lecture m'apparaît d'autant plus avéré que la présente réédition (en format de poche) bénéficie d'une mise à jour qui intègre certaines évolutions plus récentes au cadre analytique suggéré (285-99).

MARCEL FILION *Université Laval*

Conscience and Its Critics: Protestant Conscience, Enlightenment Reason, and Modern Subjectivity
Edward G. Andrew
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001, pp. viii, 259

In *Conscience and Its Critics*, Edward Andrew traces the history of the word "conscience," in order to, in his words, "establish whether we can glean any stable and consistent meaning from the history of its usage" (3). Andrew's interest in conscience, then, is more historical than it is metaphysical. (Heidegger's ontology of conscience, for instance, is referenced only in passing.) Andrew does not dwell on the question of the ultimate metaphysical status of conscience, that is, whether it is a construct used to access meaning or a divinely instilled voice linking God and man. Instead, he studies the role conscience plays in the most influential English political thought of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, focusing especially on relationship between conscience and reason. The result is a learned, often exciting journey through the history of ideas that should be of interest to anyone working on modern subjectivity or struggling to understand the various intellectual developments that are brought together under what have termed "the Enlightenment."

In mapping the history of conscience, Andrew draws a variety of illuminating distinctions: He distinguishes, for example, between a retrospective conscience that tends to restrain bold action (captured by Hamlet's statement that "conscience makes cowards of us all") and a prospective conscience that emboldens, making heroes of ordinary men and women. He opposes a judging, Lutheran conscience that determines guilt after the fact to a Kantian conscience that prescribes moral laws. He contrasts Berkeley's understanding of conscience as God's stamp on the human mind with Shaftesbury's freestanding conception of conscience as independent of revelation. All of these are of great assistance in understanding both conscience itself and the larger works in which conscience occupies a central position.

But Andrew's primary concern in the book is to explore the Enlightenment's appropriation of conscience, and here Andrew reveals a dark side to the Enlightenment's elevation of reason. Enlightenment rationalism, Andrew argues, could not accommodate the subjective certainty and inherent lawlessness of conscience, and so Enlightenment thinkers disciplined conscience instead, such that it could be assimilated into their doctrine of what Andrew terms "skeptical toleration." This doctrine, so often seen as a great triumph of the Enlightenment, required the subordination of conscience, Andrew maintains, even as it claimed to be exalting its rights. This moderating or taming of conscience has the unfortunate consequence of silencing a potentially

progressive force for social equality. Andrew himself endorses an antinomian, prospective conscience that he envisions in precisely these egalitarian terms. Unlike public opinion, which tends to censure and normalize, conscience protests and challenges. It can generate opposition to social inequality and the ostensibly natural laws of capitalist accumulation, as Andrew demonstrates in his discussion of the eighteenth century.

Moreover, properly understood, conscience, Andrew believes, offers a theoretical framework for attenuating enduring political problems. Conscience provides a basis, for example, for respecting the claims individuals make without degenerating into indiscriminate relativism. It can mitigate tensions between the individual and society or between autonomy and morality, as it does for Bishop Butler, for instance, whose writings on conscience Andrew treats as warmly as anyone's in the book. *Conscience and Its Critics* convincingly demonstrates the centrality of conscience to these core political problems, particularly in Enlightenment thought, such that one wonders with Andrew why conscience does not play a more significant role in works like J. B. Schneewind's *The Invention of Autonomy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) or Charles Griswold's *Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

However, there is a problem here: Consciences obviously vary from person to person. While it is true that one person's conscience may direct resistance to unjust or unequal decrees, another's may instruct subordination of women, undermine legitimate legislation, or persecute nonbelievers. As we were hideously reminded by events in the United States on September 11, 2001, conscience tells some of us to commit the most monstrous of misdeeds. For this reason, any affirmation of conscience as a source of moral authority must necessarily be a qualified affirmation. For conscience to be a progressive, moral force, it must be yoked to some independent source of morality, whether secular or theological. Butler's account of conscience is appealing to Andrew, but only because Butler understands conscience and its dictates as the divine law inscribed within us. Unless conscience is grounded in this way in a Christian (or other acceptable) theology, it loses its emancipatory potential. Though Andrew himself abstains from inquiries into the ultimate metaphysical status of conscience, the account of conscience he defends rests on controversial theological or cosmological presuppositions.

These potential pitfalls associated with conscience explain the Enlightenment's ambivalent relationship to it. Enlightenment thinkers generally designed political institutions to respect the claims of conscience while simultaneously ensuring that it does not claim too much. The Enlightenment approach to problems of conscience (which continues to be the dominant, liberal approach) was, to state the matter bluntly, to increase respect for conscience while minimizing its political claims. Andrew, by contrast, "advocates . . . constructing an institutional setting for the homeless consciences of the world" (179). He proposes, for example, expansion of the circumstances under which conscientious objectors can be exempted from conscription; he would allow taxpayers some choice as to which government services their tax money will support; and he seems (can it possibly be so?) implicitly to condone jury nullification in the trials of those who murder abortion providers. These policy preferences are controversial. Whether one shares them, however, is really beside the point. What is far more important is that Edward Andrew has improved our ability to think critically about policy questions like these and about modern subjectivity in general.

Jason Neidleman *University of La Verne*

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The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt
Dana Villa, ed.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. xvi, 304

The publication in 2000 of *The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt*, edited by Dana Villa, further confirms Hannah Arendt's canonical status in twentieth-century political thought. A noted Arendt scholar, Villa has put together a fine collection of essays, organized according to a rough chronology of the themes that dominated Arendt's working life as a political theorist.

Headed by a biographical chronology and introductory essay by Villa, the *Companion* organizes the first two contributions under the rubric "Totalitarianism and nationalism." After reviewing some distinctive features of Arendt's model of totalitarianism, including its characterization of the phenomenon as a "chaotic, nonutilitarian, manically dynamic movement of destruction" (26), Margaret Canovan affirms the value of this model in both explaining past phenomena like Nazism and warning of future dangers. Richard Beiner, the other contributor, emphasizes the limits rather than the promise of Arendt's thought. Situating Arendt's critical perspective on nationalism in the context of her analysis of the "undoing of Zionism" (47) and her claims about the pernicious effects of the "fusion of state and nation" (53), Beiner detects a serious methodological flaw in Arendt's argument: the assumption that, "a catalog of the sins committed by the twentieth-century nation-state [might] guarantee the historical supersession of this idea of the state . . . " (55).

The contributors to part 2 ("Political evil and the Holocaust") investigate different aspects of Arendt's theoretical response to the Holocaust. Taking as her starting point the controversial work, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, Seyla Benhabib suggests that the problematic aspects of the text reflect Arendt's incomplete mastery of her sorrow over not only the catastrophe of European Jewry, but also the reduction to irrelevance of once vital alternative possibilities of Jewish self determination. On this reading, Arendt's "normative 'melancholia' " finds conceptual expression in an "anthropological universalism," which assumes, without explanation, a basis for respecting the other (80-81). To take the measure of Arendt's sense of shock and loss in the aftermath of the Holocaust, Mary Dietz counter-intuitively focuses on Arendt's majestic work of grand theory, *The Human Condition*, convincingly arguing that her celebratory image of political action in that book "holds at bay" (87) the radical trauma of the Holocaust while also indirectly attesting to the extremity of its negation of human freedom.

Parts 3 ("Freedom and political action") and 5 ("Revolution and constitution") take up the promise and limits of Arendt's notion of political freedom. In part 3, Jerome Kohn's sketch of the "relation of action and political judgment to freedom" in Arendt's thought is paired with George Kateb's argument that Arendt's political vision rests on a problematic rejection of the idea that moral claims ought to count in politics. Arendt's affirmation of the autonomy of politics is best understood, Kateb concludes, as an expression of a philosophical concern to foster a life-redeeming sense of wonder at human existence. In part 5, the emphasis is more on rehabilitating Arendt's notion of political freedom. Deftly surveying the ways in which Arendt discusses the need for political structure (for example, her use of architectural metaphors), Jeremy Waldron strives to counter readings of Arendt which one-sidedly emphasize the agonism of her notion of political action. Like Waldron, Albrecht Wellmer seeks to provide a more balanced view of Arendt's theory of freedom. Contrasting (liberal) universalist accounts and (communitarian)

particularist accounts of human freedom, Wellmer argues against the view that Arendt's endorsement of councils reflected a commitment to communitarian democracy. He would treat Arendt's idea of councils as a "metaphor" by which to highlight the limits of both liberal and Habermasian accounts of democracy.

In response to critics' characterizations of Arendt as a romantic elitist whose work is irrelevant to contemporary democratic thought, the contributors to part 4 ("Arendt and the Ancients") attempt to preserve a sense of Arendt's relevance by challenging the paradigmatic status of the Athenian polis in her thought. Working at the tension in Arendt's thought between Athens ("the Greek *polis* and the Roman *res publica*") and Jerusalem ("St Augustine and the Christian idea of spontaneous new beginning"), Hauke Brunkhorst criticizes her attachment to a romanticized vision of pagan political virtue (178). He would rescue the egalitarian and universalist promise of Arendt's theory of freedom by emphasizing her Augustinian notion of natality. Rejecting the attribution to Arendt of a "certain Graecomania" (165) and noting several instances in which Arendt expressed reservations about the excessive agonism of Greek polis life, Jacques Taminaux calls attention to the vision of ancient Rome that Arendt's writings make available, a vision according to which the striving of self-aggrandizing political actors is moderated. In the most speculative of these reinterpretations of Arendt's classicism, J. Peter Euben reads Arendt through the lens of Greek tragedy. Noting how Arendt's "discussion of politics and action is diffused by the language and imagery of theater," Euben argues that Arendt returned to the Greeks not to appropriate a particular model of political organization but instead to unsettle as well as stimulate the conventional thinking of her day just as tragedy once did for polis audiences (152).

Polarities of various sorts structure the three contributions to the final section on "Judgment, philosophy, and thinking." D'Entrèves works at the tension in Arendt's unfinished theory of judgment between an Aristotelian model of prospective judgment and a Kantian model of retrospective judgment. Frederick Dolan focuses on Arendt's consideration of the contrasting requirements, aims, and rewards of politics and philosophy. Richard J. Bernstein detects an unresolved inner conflict in Arendt's endorsements of a publically oriented, Socratic model of thinking and a solitary Heideggerian model of contemplative withdrawal.

Since the early 1980s, when the books and articles devoted to Arendt's work numbered in the few dozens, the secondary literature has grown to such an extent that any editor charged with the task of commissioning essays on Arendt for a definitive general reference work for students and nonspecialists would suffer from an embarrassment of riches. A major challenge in putting together this collection was to achieve a balanced mix of contributions in which the generalist's need for broad coverage and the specialist's need for depth and nuance are equally met. *The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt* meets this challenge, offering contributions which not only provide a general map of the major pathways of Arendt's thought (Kohn, D'Entrèves, Dolan) and assess the usefulness of those Arendtian pathways on their own terms (Beiner, Benhabib, Bernstein), in relation to each other (Kateb, Taminiaux, Brunkhorst), and in comparison to the pathways opened by other students of history and politics (Canovan, Wellmer), but also alerts us to the presence of pathways in Arendt's thought previously ignored (Dietz, Euben).

ROBERT PIRRO *Georgia Southern University*

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Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Tragedy
Robert C. Pirro
DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001, pp. 224

Appearing on the heels of Julia Kristeva's psychoanalytic exploration of Arendtian storytelling (*Hannah Arendt: Life is a Narrative.* Frank Collins, trans. [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001]), one may wonder whether another such intervention is needed. Yet Robert Pirro offers a fresh rereading of Arendt's political thought through the lens of tragedy. Pirro's Arendt is "fiery and contemplative," employing Greek tragedy to revive the political imagination, to confront reality and to stimulate the courage to act.

Pirro extends the literature by situating Arendt with respect to ancient theatre and poetry, and to neglected modern influences. Pirro's account of German philhellenism illuminates Arendt's employment of ancient sources and traditions. He also substantiates Arendt's debt to Karl Jaspers and to Alexis de Tocqueville. Jaspers' hand is rendered visible in Arendt's Kantian conception of political judgment, and in her interdependent categories of thinking and acting. Here Pirro disputes the common practice of dividing Arendt's œuvre between an early orientation to action and a mature reconciliation with spectatorship. De Tocqueville's shadow is apparent in Arendt's delimitation of spheres as a precondition for the revival of politics. Pirro cites the Tocquevillian contention that the separation of church and state afforded a narrowing of political discourse (170-71). For Arendt this enabled the United States to maintain a dispassionate distance from the economic matters that "undermined" the French and Russian Revolutions.

Pirro gives also Arendt her due, where others have not, by courageously broaching the suppression of needs and longing in her work. He regards tragedy as putting the imaginary into play, enabling judgment. His Arendt values tragic storytelling as the catharsis that publicly acknowledges impulses to self-assertion and self-abnegation. Storytelling, viewed as an incitement to democratic civility, reconciles citizens to reality and to their own tragic heroism. Their derivation of significance and of immortality gives new credibility to a broken public sphere. For Pirro this individuation and sublimation generate hope, an impulse to political action.

With his accessible and eloquent style, Pirro ranges widely and then skillfully weaves the "excursus" back into the main thread. Throughout, he responds creatively to loopholes in his own line of reasoning and admirably anticipates would-be critics. He also notes the contradictions in Arendt's legacy without jumping to reconcile these.

Pirro leaves unresolved the political impact of tragedy's role in encouraging "acceptance of things as they are." Tragic empathy makes every citizen an unsung hero, perhaps going beyond democratic civility to civic docility. This is not the aesthetic renunciation of responsibility that Pirro acknowledges as a danger in tragedy (29). Rather it borders on a historical revisionism that regards the status quo as the heroic achievement of political potential. One can become self-congratulatory about voting construed as full civic participation through this "redemptive remembrance" (88)—after all, in voting each of us has taken initiative, has judged and has suffered defeat.

Yet voting can approximate the "behaviour" Arendt deplores. The public sphere may suppress rather than encourage political action and judgment. Its undue pathos may distract us from more substantive suffering—for example, Arendt's claim that the American Revolution was non-violent (79). This distancing constitutes a component of her political agenda that Pirro does not critically interrogate.

This removal is at odds with Arendt's strident defences of democracy, but consistent with her emphasis on permanence as a bulwark against "the social," history and totalitarian flux. Pirro's equation of Arendtian "acceptance" with "thinking" and "acting" with "individuation" (141) begs attention to her advocacy of *concerted* action. This is overlooked in Pirro's acceptance of individual "representative thinking" as the mark of genuine participation. Shoulder-to-shoulder in the Greek theatre, tragedy may elicit a private reconciliation rather than public solidarity—the presence of women, slaves and prisoners (167) may serve to confirm this. Despite his insightful class analysis of her appropriation of tragedy, Pirro is too generous in reading Arendt as a participatory democrat.

Pirro examine the self-display of the warrior in Greek tragedy. Interestingly, he notes Arendt's advocacy of a Jewish army as a vehicle for a political identity (161), at significant odds with her privileging of peaceful political foundation. Pirro does not recognize in the "self-display" of the Arendtian citizen-hero that of the constitutive but self/alienated subject, whose historical object remains a thing-in-itself, because dispassionate reason prohibits a more genuine encounter. Nor does he note that judgment cannot overcome this. Yet Pirro does pave the way for such insight. Coincident with the affirmation of the heroic subject, his book offers the careful reader glimpses of the negation of the social self, with consequent losses of political potential. It is apparent here how Pirro goes beyond Kristeva, by illuminating the political significance of Arendt's "who." Unlike Kristeva, Pirro points to what is lost as well as what is gained by the political sublimation of the self. *Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Tragedy* represents a welcome extension to the literature. It will be enjoyed by all who seek to deepen their previous understanding of Arendtian political thought.

Pamela S. Leach *Queen's University*

Collected Works of George Grant:
Vol. 1: 1933-1950
Arthur Davis and Peter C. Emberley, eds.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000, pp. xxxvii, 501

George Grant was, without much doubt, the most influential, creative and thoughtful Canadian Tory thinker in the twentieth century. There are those who offer Grant a resistant red light and others an inviting green light, but it is impossible to ignore Grant. David Cayley, in *George Grant in Conversation* (Don Mills: Anansi, 1995) said: "Altogether his [Grant's] contributions to the CBC probably exceeded those of any other Canadian thinker of his generation, except perhaps Northrop Frye" (viii). I mentioned above that Grant was one of the most important Canadian thinkers in the twentieth century, and Cayley is in agreement with this assessment as many others are, and rightly so. I use the word thinker deliberately and consciously for the simple reason that Grant cannot only and merely be seen as a theologian, philosopher, political theorist, Canadian nationalist, educator, economist, literary critic, legal philosopher or political activist. Grant was all of these things and more, and this was not easy in an age of specialization and blinkered disciplinary commitments. Grant was very much grounded and rooted in a much older notion of education and thinking; this approach is interdisciplinary, general, broad and humanist in the best and classical sense of the term.

The decision by the University of Toronto Press to publish, in eight volumes, the *Collected Works of George Grant* should be both lauded and welcomed. The first volume of this series covers Grant's life from 1933 to 1950,

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and it does so in fastidious depth and detail. It is in these years we can, almost, sense the DNA or genetic code of Grant's way of thinking. It is in these stripling years we can detect, and clearly see, the Grant of later years, the man who thinks in an integrated way about some of the most pressing issues before one and all.

Volume 1 is divided into five distinct yet overlapping sections, and in each section Grant's unfolding and probing insights are at work. Section 1 lightly touches down on some book reviews Grant wrote while he was doing his BA at Queen's from 1937 to 1939; we can see, at this early stage, Grant's uncanny ability to elude simplistic liberal-conservative distinctions. Section 2 walks the reader through Grant's 1942 journal that he wrote while recovering from an illness and an "Untitled Poem." Again, the intellectual and religious probing defies a too easy categorization. Section 3 takes the eager and curious reader straight into Grant's work with the Canadian Association for Adult Education (CAAE) from 1943 to 1945. Many of the articles Grant wrote for CAAE are well worth the read, and, again, these missives reveal a thinker who draws from wide sources, has a commitment to communicate in a simple, lucid style and has a passion for truth and justice. Section 4, the briefest, in volume 1, covers a few more book reviews Grant did while he was at Oxford and Dalhousie in 1948. Section 5 is, in many ways, the largest and most important part of this book. This section deals with Grant's Ph.D. at Oxford on the Scottish theologian John Oman. The title of the thesis, "The Concept of Nature and Supernature in the Theology of John Oman," says much about how Grant will integrate theology, philosophy, politics and culture in much of his later writings. The perennial debate and tension in Western and Christian thought between theology and philosophy, grace and nature, love and wisdom, revelation and reason and supernature and nature (and what belongs where and why) are embedded and embodied in Grant's thesis that was completed in 1950.

Section 5 is, gratefully so, not the end of this important book; the editors have, wisely so, added four appendices. Appendix 1 looks at some of Grant's writings while he was a student at Upper Canada College from 1933 to 1936. Appendix 2 turns to more excerpts from the CBC's "Citizens' Forum." Appendix 3 lists in detail the many radio and television broadcasts Grant has done for the CBC. Appendix 4, ever true to scholarly form, offers the inquiring reader the editorial and textual principles and methods applied in the research and writing of volume 1 of the *Collected Works of George Grant*. The introduction to the *Collected Works*, by Arthur Davis, is a fine primer and entree into the journey and life of Grant from 1933 to 1950. In fact, Davis's many insights in the introduction are a must read for those curious about the early years of Grant.

We are entering an important phase in research on and about Grant, and, with the publication of volume 1 of the *Collected Works*, this research will now be able to be taken to new depths. Arthur Davis and Peter Emberley should be highly commended for the draft horse work they have done.

Ron Dart *University College of the Fraser Valley*

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Religion and the Demise of Liberal Rationalism: The Foundational Crisis of the Separation of Church and State
J. Judd Owen
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001, pp. ix, 218

J. Judd Owen offers a provocative analysis of the challenge of anti-foundationalism to liberal rationalism, focusing most specifically on the relationship between liberalism and religious freedom. He agrees with the anti-foundationalists that the doctrine of liberal neutrality towards religion belies the centrality of non-neutral background beliefs that are themselves necessary to any such doctrine. However, Owen turns this anti-foundationalist criticism of liberal rationalism back upon itself. If, on the anti-foundationalist critique, no commitments can be ruled out, antifoundationalism can itself ground a limited defence of liberal rationalism.

Owen begins with John Dewey's faith in scientific rationalism, which was evident in Dewey's conviction that religion should surrender both factual and moral supremacy to science. Richard Rorty is correct, in Owen's view, to question Dewey's conviction that science is the only true interpreter of reality. For Rorty, believers in science *or* religion are subject to epistemological limitations. Yet Rorty's attempt to demonstrate the failure of foundationalism, Owen suggests, itself implies the objective validity of Rorty's own understanding. Moreover, although a postmodern liberalism might appear to intensify the liberal principles of religious freedom, Rorty's conviction that liberalism is particularistic and ethnocentric grounds liberalism in cultural inheritance and common tradition, rather than in any prescriptive answer to the question of why liberals should be liberals (78). "The Rortian liberal is tolerant, not because of a moral obligation, but because he lacks sufficient incentive to be intolerant" (85). In his sincere attempt to protect toleration as the core of liberalism, Owen contends, Rorty abrogates the philosophical basis for toleration.

John Rawls's attempt to accommodate diversity without transforming it is, in Owen's estimation, no more successful than Rorty's defence of liberalism. Disavowing claims to universal truth, Rawls, like Rorty, imputes the source of his political liberalism to tradition. By avoiding reliance on questions of truth, Rawls aims at inclusivity in the overlapping consensus characterizing his political liberalism. But the inadmissibility of comprehensive philosophical and religious commitments to political debate limits rather than broadens this consensus, which we might interpret as the precondition rather than the product of politics. In the end, political liberalism is itself comprehensive, though not in a way intended by Rawls, because he underestimates "the extent to which liberal principles transform comprehensive doctrines so as to establish *themselves* as the most important truth" (122; emphasis in original).

Commentators of varying viewpoints such as William Galston, Stephen Macedo, and Patrick Neal have noted that the liberal state cannot exhibit neutrality and tolerance towards every sort of religious belief, because these ideals are themselves partisan and exclusionary. For Stanley Fish as interpreted by Owen, "Liberalism is itself a competing faith, albeit a furtive one" (131). Fish holds that neutral or rational adjudication among beliefs is impossible, because their evaluation is always grounded in underlying assumptions about which we cannot reason because we did not choose them. Religious believers who accept the liberal separation of church and state as a principled "solution," rather than as temporary expedient, in fact betray their own faith. For Fish, in one sense we are all foundationalists, because we each take certain beliefs to be true; in another sense, we are all anti-foundationalists, because none of us can know that our beliefs are indeed well founded.

Fish's anti-foundationalism, suggests Owen, "mirrors the liberalism it criticizes" (151), because anti-foundationalism itself assumes a perfect neutrality to which liberalism aspires but which it can never realize. Fish mistakenly identifies neutrality or tolerance as the core of liberalism, however, when its essence instead is rationalism. Fish himself identifies rationalism not with a neutral "view from nowhere," but "with reserving full assent for what one sees for *oneself*" (162; emphasis in original). But this reservation, Owen observes, is also characteristic of liberalism. Fish's critique of liberal neutrality, Owen concludes, suggests anew the need for rational argument. "Liberal rationalism supposes that only when liberal principles are grasped with one's own reason are they truly one's own, and therefore more firmly rooted than when accepted as a mere commitment or prejudice" (166). The principle of religious freedom, then, is not a sham, but in Owen's view provides the opportunity to seek out and to discover the truth for oneself.

Owen's book is an interesting analysis of the tensions and connections between anti-foundationalism and religious belief. His chief insight, in my view, is in his identification of liberalism with rationalism rather than neutrality. I do not myself draw his bright line between knowledge and opinion, because we can never be certain that what we believe to be knowledge truly achieves that status. He is correct to maintain, however, that our opinions may be more or less firmly grounded. His limited rehabilitation of liberal rationalism explodes the idea that a liberal polity can or must always maintain neutrality. It also suggests the importance of rational deliberation and critical reflection to the formation of individuals' own opinions about truth.

EMILY R. GILL *Bradley University*

Two Faces of Liberalism
John Gray
New York: New Press, 2000, pp. 161

Seldom will one find a book packed with as much argument as John Gray's *Two Faces of Liberalism*. It is equally rare to find a work that is so iconoclastic.

The goal of the book is to make the case for a liberalism of *modus vivendi*. This face of liberalism finds its inspiration in Hobbes. The point of politics, and therefore the basis of political legitimacy, is the pursuit of "terms of coexistence among different ways of life" (33). *Modus vivendi* is thus an argument for liberalism based on the toleration borne of a desire for peace. The other face of liberalism advocates toleration merely as a strategy to facilitate the eventual convergence on universal liberal principles. American liberalism is taken to be the archetype of this alternate view, and Gray characterizes it as advocating "a fixed framework of basic liberties and human rights" (14). The essential difference between the two faces of liberalism is that the former is open to a range of political solutions for the preservation of peace, whereas the latter insists that the only fully legitimate regime is the liberal state that protects human rights. Of course, disagreements among thinkers in this camp do arise over the appropriate theory of rights.

Gray argues boldly and writes with great economy. The heart of the text is the second chapter. There Gray conducts a thorough and rigorous examination of the dynamics of the decisions that we make about human good. Many of his conclusions are startling and the reader who finds them persuasive is well on the way to accepting the concluding argument advocating *modus vivendi*. Well-being or flourishing constitutes the human good (this is the Aristotelian legacy) and vital interests that humans universally seek to secure

(this is the Hobbesian legacy) constitute essential human goods we associate with flourishing. Further, and this constitutes the philosophic motif of the book, human good can take a multiplicity of forms and human goods are equally rich (going well beyond our vital needs).

To make his case, Gray offers us an account of practical reasoning in late modern societies that reveals the immense diversity in how good lives can be achieved. He labels this phenomenon value-pluralism, and he claims it demonstrates our capacity to sort out our lives by sifting through variegated, and often incommensurable, values. Because our moral ideas are not part of a comprehensive conceptual system, we can straddle the respective contexts which give incommensurable values their meaning. These values are not mutually unintelligible to us because we can move back and forth between the various ways of life that give them their context. Not only can we comprehend different modes of well being and choose between them, but we can also embrace different ways of life at different times. In sum, in late modern societies, we live out our lives with an ethical dexterity unencumbered by theoretical consistency.

Alasdair MacIntyre's notion of the narrative unity of a human life (*After Virtue* [London: Duckworth, 1981], 204-25) would have provided a useful reference to reinforce Gray's moral phenomenology. Gray is insisting that an accurate account of the commitment to any particular conception of human good requires a rational reconstruction of the reasons behind the decision to pursue it. Here is where *After Virtue* could be helpful. It teaches us that fidelity to our moral experiences can only be achieved if such an account takes the form of a narrative. I suspect that Gray avoided this reference because MacIntyre takes Nietzsche to be hostile to this thesis, whereas Gray cites Nietzsche as an ally: "In a perspectivist ethical theory, all knowledge of the good is from a particular standpoint. It expresses particular human interests, as they are embodied in specific historical and social contexts" (62).

Once Gray has made the case for the diversity of human good, he then argues that conflicts over rights are inescapably connected to disagreements about human good (82). This undermines the claim for the primacy of a theory of rights in political philosophy. That conclusion is then translated to the political realm by conceiving of political legitimacy in terms of the way regimes resolve disputes among rival conceptions of human good. As such, *modus vivendi* is the modest face of liberalism. Rival claims of human good are invited to accept it, not because peace is an ideal, but because *modus vivendi* facilitates their pursuit of a particular human good.

Not much is left of the edifice of American liberalism when Gray is finished. Rawls, Nozick and Dworkin receive a thorough drubbing. On the European side, Mill is found to be deeply ambivalent in his thinking and Kant is found to distort the nature of ethical life. It will be interesting to see what kind of an audience Gray attracts on the western side of the Atlantic.

Brian Donohue *University of Sudbury College, Laurentian University*

The Limits of Doubt: The Moral and Political Implications of Skepticism
Petr Lom
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001, pp. 138

This is a short book by a young scholar on a subject about which much has been written. Nevertheless, it delivers original and compelling insights. Petr Lom takes seriously the ethical incentives behind skepticism and the practical implications of doubt. Like Nietzsche, he begins with the premise that skepti-

cism and dogmatism have arisen out of ulterior moral motives (17). This is a useful antidote to the abstract epistemological arguments of many philosophers. Lom also avoids the error, made by many who consider the moral effects of skepticism, of assuming that its influence points all in one direction. On one hand, there are postmodern liberals like Richard Rorty, who believe that skepticism makes people "more pragmatic, more tolerant, more liberal"(6). On the other hand, there are conservatives like Leo Strauss, who fear that if our values are merely subjective preferences, people will conclude that "everything a man is willing to dare will be permissible"(5).

By examining the views of a number of skeptics from Sextus Empiricus to Montaigne, Hobbes, Diderot and Nietzsche, this book shows that there is nothing essentially liberal or conservative about skepticism. For by itself, "skepticism is always noncommittal and ambiguous" (73). The ancient skeptics promoted the suspension of judgment as a way of achieving tranquility and internal peace. In contrast, modern treatments of skepticism often see doubt as leading to nausea and despair (43). Diderot envisions the ideal doubting thinker as challenging prejudice, tradition and authority (62). In contrast, several earlier skeptics argued that if all opinion is uncertain then we might as well adhere to custom, and if reason is powerless to arrive at truth then we need to have faith. Hobbes uses skeptical arguments to undermine moral and religious zealotry, thus clearing the way for civil peace—a strategy resembling Judith Shklar's "liberalism of fear" which casts doubt on ideology in order to focus on the desirability of avoiding cruelty (8). In contrast, Nietzsche questions the value of pity and the goal of eliminating suffering.

How can skepticism point in so many directions? It all depends on what Lom calls the "limits of doubt," that is, "beliefs, whether they be acknowledged or not, which the skeptic holds concurrently with his doubt" (75). In practice skepticism always has its limits, for it always appears as a mixture of doubt and belief. Thus, the ancient skeptics never doubted the value of attaining tranquility. Hobbes never doubted the importance of civil peace and avoiding violent death. Nietzsche never doubted his ideal of nobility and his sense of injustice at the levelling of humanity. In each case, those beliefs which survive the doubting process emerge with added prominence. For doubt undermines the beliefs and ideologies that contend with personal tranquility, civil peace, or other favoured values.

Lom concludes that it is not active evil but passive indifference that is skepticism's greatest moral and political danger. Whether skepticism encourages indifference or encourages a kind of modest and peaceful disposition depends on one's "predisposition to justice" (94). Lom suggests that both the need for internal consistency and the need for recognition by others are resistant to doubt, and that these provide a basis for justice. This seems to bring Lom within the orbit of liberal contract theory, which combines a skeptical turn of mind with belief in certain minimal ethical principles.

Ultimately, this book left me desiring to see the analysis extended further. For example, David Hume is one leading skeptical philosopher who is hardly mentioned (though I suppose his position resembles that of Diderot, his contemporary). A look at the rise of cultural relativism in twentieth-century social science also would be of interest, since it is a prime example of how doubt can be used to serve ulterior moral motives (that is, promoting tolerance and challenging Western imperialism). Lom's concluding remarks on justice also require elaboration. For justice has been theorized in so many ways by thinkers left and right that it is the most deeply contested term in political philosophy. And that which is contested is certainly dubitable. What is more resistant to doubt, I would say, is concern with our own survival, our

own basic needs, and a certain basic regard for others. Those capable of doubting this, such as suicide bombers, are very dangerous creatures indeed.

Craig Beam *University of Waterloo*

Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory
Bhikhu Parekh
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. xii, 379

Rethinking Multiculturalism is a wide-ranging and thoughtful effort to meet the challenge which cultural diversity poses for political theory. Bhikhu Parekh strives to show how we can achieve a cross-cultural, dialogical approach to questions of morality and justice.

The scope of the book is ambitious. It seeks to provide a historical account of political philosophy, to present a unique theoretical approach to the problems of cultural diversity, and to serve as a practical guide to current multicultural controversies. The first section is devoted to what Parekh sees as the two major positions in the history of political philosophy: monism and pluralism. According to Parekh neither approach is satisfactory since each rests on a mistaken assumption about the nature of human beings. Monists, Parekh asserts, are usually guilty of "naturalism," the mistaken idea that theories of morality and justice can be grounded purely in human nature, something that is universal and immune to the effects of culture. The pluralists are just as mistaken, however, since they place too much emphasis on the effects of culture, denying the possibility of moral norms that could be legitimately universal in scope. The book also critiques contemporary liberal responses to diversity, focusing on Rawls, Raz and Kymlicka. Parekh moves on to develop his own perspective, "pluralist universalism," which provides a more nuanced view of human nature and culture, arguing that neither can be seen as philosophically prior to the other, thereby avoiding the errors of naturalism and culturalism. Parekh's pluralist universalism informs the third section of the book, which engages the political problems of multicultural societies, most centrally the unity/diversity dilemma: the problem of how to respect the diversity of cultures within a society while still maintaining a sense of solidarity amongst its citizens.

Parekh's arguments and commentaries are fair-minded, sophisticated, and insightful. Unlike Brian Barry's recent diatribe on the subject of multiculturalism (where Parekh is a frequent target), Parekh is almost always charitable in discussing the opinions of those with whom he disagrees, and the book's great strength is its ability to uncover the truth in opposing arguments and see how they might best be reconciled. That being said, the book's weakness is its scope. In attempting to cover so much ground Parekh is often forced to treat complicated thinkers or arguments quickly, glossing over difficulties that might challenge some of the book's main premises and arguments. The first few chapters, for example, serve as useful introductions to many of the major figures in political philosophy, but the critiques are brief and do not break any new ground. As for Parekh's own conclusions, they are sometimes in need of a stronger defence. Parekh is keen to show the importance of culture in the formation of moral norms and values, but this leads him far too quickly to the strong assertion that no theory or philosophy can transcend its cultural origins and claim to be universal. This is apparently as true of liberalism as anything else, and much of the book is an attempt to demonstrate how Parekh's approach is different than those of contemporary liberal thinkers like Rawls or Kymlicka. The problem is that many of

Parekh's solutions seem indistinguishable from standard liberal responses to diversity. His arguments for cultural exemptions, for example, rely on the liberal idea of justice as fairness and the chance/choice distinction that usually grounds liberal theories of equality. Indeed, throughout the book Parekh stresses that culture is not a voluntary choice, but an inheritance that is sometimes as difficult to shed as some of our biologically inherited traits. This effort to equate cultural identity with chance rather than choice may appeal to some egalitarian liberals, but it is a highly questionable assertion, and weakens what is an otherwise excellent theory of multicultural equality.

Although Parekh provides a well-reasoned defence of multiculturalism, his wider conclusions regarding liberalism and cross-cultural dialogue fail to be convincing. The book is unable to show how pluralist universalism is a fundamentally different starting assumption than that used by most contemporary liberals, nor how Parekh's dialogical approach is much different than the deliberation urged by Rawls or deliberative democrats such as Gutmann and Thompson. These similarities would not be weaknesses, except for the insistence throughout the text that liberalism "represents a particular cultural perspective and cannot provide a broad and impartial enough framework to conceptualise other cultures or their relations with it" (14). Liberal principles may have their origins in Western culture, but this fact alone does not mean that they cannot not serve as guiding values in a theory of justice that is universal in scope.

JONATHAN QUONG *Nuffield College, University of Oxford*

Communicative Action and Rational Choice
Joseph Heath
Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought
Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2001, pp. xii, 363

Joseph Heath's *Rational Choice and Communicative Action* is an analytically rigorous, scholarly contribution to the literature on Jürgen Habermas. Although most of the chapters of the book have appeared previously as journal articles, what is presented here is not the far-too-usual set of loosely related pieces, but rather an intricately constructed argument that is sustained over the course of the book. Moreover, it demonstrates some serious weaknesses in Habermas' approach, makes a significant contribution to the literature, and deserves to be read by those interested in the field. Conversely, this book can be described as a rejection of Habermas' theory of communicative action that fails to demonstrate any real understanding of what the "communicative action" is for which Habermas' theory has attempted to provide an account. In effect, the book mistakes the explanation of the thing for the thing itself. Having, for good reasons, found the explanation of the thing to be problematic, it then decides that the thing—communicative action in this case—can be dispensed with as a basis for the development of a critique of everyday life in contemporary capitalist society. The book is, then, quite incisive in its analysis and its criticisms of Habermas' theory but fundamentally lacking in insight concerning what arguably ought to be its real topic of discussion; that is, how Habermas' intuitions concerning communicative action might be better explained than on the terms he himself provides.

On its own terms, however, the book is good and has quite a sophisticated structure. The first move it makes comes close to an immanent critique of rational choice theory. Heath argues here that the development of rational choice theory—from its initial, rather simple decision theory form, to its far

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more sophisticated game-theoretic contemporary manifestation—has been the result of an unfolding of its own internal logic. Game theory goes much further than decision theory in acknowledging the need to understand one's competitors' preferences and strategic alternatives, but in the end is not better at explaining how it is that strategic actors can understand their competitors. As Heath points out, its most sophisticated practitioners now admit its paradigmatic inability to explain this, in particular because it cannot account for how language works. Since this is the same conclusion Habermas reaches in relation to instrumental theories of the rationality of social action in general, Heath argues that, had Habermas examined the rational choice literature, it would have saved him the trouble of developing his theory of communicative action, the primary purpose of which was to make this same point. This is significant for Heath because he believes that Habermas' theory of communicative action is a seriously flawed enterprise. In taking rational choice theory seriously on its own terms, and unpacking it on its own terms, Heath has done critics of rational choice theory a great service by taking them through an esoteric literature in an understandable fashion.

The second move the book makes is to show the unworkability of Habermas' theory of communicative action. This takes place in the third chapter of the book, which is both the most demanding and bears the burden of most of the conceptual work for what will follow. Heath's argument is intricate and well worked out. Nevertheless, it can be summed up bluntly by saying that Heath challenges the viability of Habermas' formulation of his theory of communicative action on the terms provided by the Anglo-American analytic school, and that these terms then become the standard of adequacy against which Habermas' theory is measured. For Heath, Habermas' theory of communicative action is a way of solving the problem of social order—of solving Parsons' "Hobbes Problem"—and that, for Habermas, social action is co-ordinated through language. In using language, Habermas says, individuals raise claims to truth, and in doing so make a commitment to others to defend these claims if need be. Strategically rational actors cannot be trusted to honour these commitments because, as Heath points out in agreement with Habermas, they will always "reoptimize" or "defect" as soon as reneging on their commitments is in their interest. Heath then argues that Habermas' theory of communicative action fails because it cannot prove that this kind of commitment takes place in anything but the raising of normative claims. Since social action is not entirely co-ordinated through normative speech acts, Heath argues, Habermas' solution to the problem of the co-ordination of social action fails as a result. Heath also rejects what he calls the hierarchical relationship that Habermas claims exists between communicative action and all forms of speech acts because, according to Habermas, it is the communicative aspect of speech acts that lend them their ultimate sense.

The thrust of Heath's criticisms of Habermas' approach at this point of the argument is that it overreaches itself. He nevertheless believes that he and Habermas are on the same side politically. Like Habermas, he argues that instrumental accounts of the rationality of social action are, on their own, inadequate to the explanation of social action as a whole. Similarly, he wants to provide a way of defending the normatively rational aspects of the co-ordination of social action from instrumentalist reductionism. His solution to the inadequacies of Habermas' approach is to try to do less, but to do it better. He suggests that a more pragmatic account of the co-ordination of social action can accomplish this, and is quite frank in saying that what he is doing here is reverting to Parsons' solution of the problem of public order.

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Heath's proposed solution nevertheless draws on two aspects of Habermas' work in order to makes its case, and it is the appropriation of these that occupies the second half of the book. A Parsonian treatment of norms is susceptible to a moral relativist treatment, something which Heath wants to avoid. To do so, he draws on the proto-democratic normative underpinnings of linguistically mediated interaction that Habermas works out in his discourse ethics (Habermas' principle "D") and argues that these are necessary for the successful negotiation of shared situation definitions. This means that, from Heath's point of view, not just any norms will do when it comes to accounting for the role of discourse in the co-ordination of social action. In a related move, he quite strongly defends Habermas' quasi-transcendental, non-foundationalist account of morality in order to refute non-cognitivist moral scepticism. However, he rejects Habermas' related claim that the convergence of opinions concerning moral claims is an attribute intrinsic to these claims as such. Heath agrees that a convergence of moral issues is evident in society, but says that this is not because there is something special about moral claims as such, which is Habermas' position. Rather, he says that there are "pragmatic" reasons for the development of agreement in society on moral issues, as a lack of agreement on these is more socially disruptive than on matters of personal taste, for instance. And, in this same pragmatic vein, he argues that we engage in the use of language to develop shared situation definitions to solve a problem rational choice theory itself points out. Strategic actors, once having come to understand that they cannot operate rationally in a situation of high social indeterminacy, realize that they must occasionally abandon their strategic attitude. They then intermittently enter into normatively rational discussion long enough to generate the degree of social agreement necessary to allow them to plan their subsequent strategic operations more efficiently. On the basis of this analysis Heath concludes that Habermas' aversion to a politics of bargaining and compromise is misplaced, and introduces aspects of rational choice bargaining theory to explain what occurs in the development of the social agreements. Heath chooses to account for the motivation for undertaking these negotiations as something that is "pragmatic," not instrumental, in nature, a formulation that can be seen as somewhat disingenuous.

In the end, Heath's criticisms concerning the inadequacies of the theory of communicative action that Habermas works out on the terms provided by Anglo-American analytic language philosophy are compelling, but the conclusions he draws are troubling if he actually does see his political position as being in sympathy with a critical theory perspective. Heath's rejection of the "hierarchical" relationship of communicative to instrumental action dispenses with the basis for Habermas' dialectical critique of instrumental rationality on a language-theoretic basis. Moreover, the primary objective of Habermas' development of a theory of communicative action is not, contrary to what Heath says, to provide a solution to the problem of social order. It addresses this question, to be sure, but this is a corollary to its main point. Habermas' theory, rather, is supposed to provide a workable, non-metaphysical account of the more radical democratic intuitions of Kant and Rousseau concerning human freedom and democracy. Heath's acceptance of bargaining and compromise as limit cases in politics shows, at the least, a difference in political sensibility on this point. Similarly, the book's reversion to Parsons does not deal with the latter's often noted inability to conceptualize power in society adequately. And nowhere in the book does Heath try to explain what communicative action might be as a social and experiential phenomenon in its own right, independent of however Habermas himself may have tried to explain this.

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In the end Heath's book avoids the issues that are central to an understanding of the political dimensions of Habermas' work. It has notable merits as an explanation of the rational choice position and as an analytically rigorous demonstration of serious weaknesses in Habermas's analytic philosophy of language formulation of the theory of communicative action. However, by the time the book draws to a conclusion what it has produced, politically speaking, is a left-liberal attempt to domesticate the radically critical, social democratic aspects of the Frankfurt School project that remain in Habermas' approach.

BRYCE WEBER *Monash University*

Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations, and Critique of World Politics
Mark F. N. Franke
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001, pp. x, 265

Mark Franke has written an interesting, and interestingly flawed book. His contribution is welcome, on the one hand, since it deals with the relevance of Immanuel Kant to contemporary thinking about international relations. The book does so, moreover, by drawing on literature not usually cited, such as Kant's *Critique of Judgment.* On the other hand, the book's uniqueness in this regard may form a liability, since Franke's reading of Kant is controversial and the literature cited may not be the most illuminating.

Franke's goal is to show that Kant's thought still matters to the discipline of international relations. Of that there can be little doubt, but such is hardly a novel thesis to defend. More novel is Franke's approach: the reference to overlooked literature and the controversial tie-in to such Continental thinkers as Foucault. Franke tries to show how such latter-day ideas as hermeneutics can shed light on our understanding of Kant's political philosophy.

The Continental tie-in comes at a cost. There is more than a bit of conceptual posturing here, and an obsession with discussing the "legitimate" foundations of "genuine" thought about international relations theory. There are similar tendencies within Kant's own thought, but they do not usually count amongst his brighter moments. Telling the smart people who are most likely to read this book what is impossible, or illegitimate for them to think about international relations can, at the least, seem stiff and starchy.

Franke's preoccupation with the constitution of international relations theory—with what concepts are "core" and "periphery," what others are "legitimate" and "illegitimate"—may, ironically, overlook Kant's own convictions regarding the priority of the practical. Accordingly, this book is best thought of as a specialist work on Kant's most abstruse thoughts on international relations, as opposed to a useful guide for thinking through concrete dilemmas that international relations practitioners have to wade through.

The Kant scholarship has moments of real interest, and Franke is correct to diagnose a tension between realism and idealism in Kant's thought, and to point out how such endures as an issue today throughout international relations theory. Curiously, however, Franke does not dwell at length on the very ideas which have propelled Kant into high profile in recent years. These ideas, of course, concern his moral cosmopolitanism and the democratic (or "republican") peace thesis.

Franke prefers to stress the so-called conceptual contributions of Kant, as opposed to the more straightforwardly moral appeals. It is the epistemology of Kant's theory, and not his ethics of practice, which gets the lion's

share of attention here. Franke may make a misdiagnosis here as to what is the most important part of Kant's legacy for world affairs. Franke also surely overstates his criticism when he lambastes Kant's "doctrinaire" thoughts about international ethics for failing to live up to his *First Critique* standards of epistemological scrutiny. Everyone knows that Kant's thoughts about international relations were written at a very advanced age, but for all that they did not have much problem influencing generations of thinkers and statesmen.

Finally, Franke is right to note that Kant was one of the first major philosophers to think about international relations seriously. But does Kant's thought really urge us to think about "global politics," as opposed to "international relations" more narrowly? It may be anachronistic for Franke to suggest so, since Kant so clearly conceived of international issues first and foremost in terms of relations between states. Non-state actors, so often referred to in contemporary international relations literature, do not make it on to Kant's radar. At the same time, it is compelling to suggest that the deep structure of Kant's concern was fully global, especially in terms of how we ought to treat each other and the scope of his moral and political concern.

A mixed judgment, then, prevails regarding Franke's study. It is original and spirited, and perhaps its epistemological focus—which I found tiresome—actually counter-balances all the attention given to Kant's thoughts about international ethics. At the same time, it seems clear that international ethics is where Kant endures most strongly, and the insight derived from reading Kant in light of Foucault may be minimal. The book is an interesting attempt to blend together diverse sources and concerns, and see how they provoke further thought about international relations.

Brian Orend *University of Waterloo*

Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations
Daniel Philpott
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. xii, 339

There is an international society which has a constitution setting out who holds sovereign authority, who is entitled to be recognized as a sovereign, and what they may do with their sovereignty. Since the Middle Ages there have been two major and several minor revolutions in sovereignty: the Westphalian settlement which established the holders of sovereignty as European, Christian states and promulgated the firm norm of non-intervention is the first major revolution; the second has been the global extension of international society as a result of the establishment of the principle that colonies are entitled to proceed to statehood. Less fundamental revolutions have involved the establishment of regimes to protect minorities in Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century, and the pooling of sovereignty in Western Europe in the last years of the twentieth—the recent putative emergence of a norm of humanitarian intervention may amount to another such minor revolution. The two major revolutions—Westphalia and decolonization—were driven by ideas: the Protestant Reformation in the first case, and notions of self-determination and racial equality in the second. Such is the thesis argued at length in Daniel Philpott's stimulating and scholarly study.

This thumbnail sketch provides enough information to situate Daniel Philpott as a scholar working at what is becoming quite a crowded intersection between three interrelated themes of contemporary theory: the recent "turn" towards the importance of ideas in mainstream International Rela-

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tions theory, the emergence of constructivist work which places emphasis on the importance of norms and identity, and the re-invigoration of English School thinking with its master concept of an international society. Clearly Philpott owes debts to all three movements, although it seems that it is to the second that his primary loyalties lie, and one way of looking at this book is as a distinguished addition to the burgeoning constructivist canon. On the whole, in this context, Philpott tells a convincing story; his framework is clear and helpful (although, perhaps, his first two faces of sovereign authority could be combined without much loss) and his defence of the significance of the actual Peace of Westphalia is a useful counter to those (including me, I'm afraid) who employ "Westphalian" as a kind of generic term to refer to the changes of this period and are less interested in what actually happened in 1648. His account of the importance of ideas as opposed to structural and material factors is balanced, judicious and sensible; he recognizes and dodges all the traps associated with assigning too much importance to ideas alone, and employs explicit counter-factuals in a very helpful way, at least with respect to Westphalia. His account of British decolonization is perhaps a little less convincing, with insufficient attention paid to the importance of the loss of India, while his account of French decolonization is far sketchier. In short, this is a very good example of "middle-of-the-road" constructivist work.

An interesting question is whether the middle of the road is a safe place to be. With this thought in mind, it may be worth briefly contrasting Philpott's work with that of the arch *anti*-constructivist Stephen Krasner, whose *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) covers much the same ground. Krasner focuses on rulers rather than states, and argues that the "logic of consequences" driven by the requirements of a self-help system has consistently won out over the "logic of appropriateness" represented by the norms of Westphalia—hence the hypocrisy of a system which declares itself to be committed to non-intervention but where rulers have always intervened in each other's affairs when they thought it necessary. From Krasner's point of view whether the constitution of international society was shaped by ideas is neither here nor there; more significant is the fact that that constitution does not actually shape the behaviour of states.

Does Philpott have an answer to this critique? Here, I think, the very moderation of his approach constitutes a handicap. Krasner is quite explicitly denying that constitutive rules exist in international relations and the best, indeed only, defence against his onslaught is to assert the contrary: namely that to claim to be sovereign is to assert a claim to valid authority in accordance with rules without which international society could not exist, and that these rules, precisely because they are constitutive, cannot be treated as generalizations of state behaviour which might, or might not, be accurate, which is how Krasner treats them. On my reading at least, Philpott is unwilling to make quite so strong a claim—rather he wants to treat the constitutional norms of international society that he identifies as characteristics of international behaviour rather than as constitutive of what actions can be performed, and this, I think, leaves him vulnerable to Krasner's critique. Such is the fate of the kind of middle-ground constructivism of which this study is a distinguished example—this vulnerability, however, need not prevent us from enjoying and learning from a very valuable addition to the corpus of recent work on sovereignty and the Westphalia system.

CHRIS BROWN *London School of Economics*

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Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices
T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, eds.
Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001, pp. xi, 411

This book is the second in a three-volume series published by the Comparative Citizenship Project of the Carnegie Endowment's International Migration Policy Program. The 12 essays in the collection provide a comparative perspective on citizenship policy in different countries by looking at such issues as the meaning and acquisition of citizenship, naturalization laws and immigration policies. The discussion addresses concepts ranging from integration to gender equity to transnational citizenship. The ambitious goal of the three volumes is both to enrich the current debate on citizenship by challenging traditional understanding and adding new perspectives, and to aid policy making in this field. The essays in this volume are grouped into four parts according to the themes of comparative citizenship policies, locations of citizenship, different conceptions of citizenship and directions of citizenship policy and research.

The articles by Weil, Joppke, Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, Knop, and Jackson notice similarities between countries on different aspects of citizenship. Both Weil and Joppke see a convergence between nationality laws in liberal-democratic states, with a trend toward more liberalization. Weil examines 25 nationality laws and claims, contra Brubaker, that no causal link is discernible between national identity and nationality law. Joppke contends that globalists' and postnationalists' arguments underestimate the central role played by domestic legal institutions and constitutions in granting "citizenship rights for non-citizens." Such comparative analysis, however, incurs the dangers and limitations of positive social research and makes little attempt to evaluate the outcome, that is, how more liberal nationality laws translate into practical legal rights for migrants. Without more qualitative work, the relationship between formal policy and citizenship is difficult to predict. A policy which may look progressive on paper may not, in practice, make much difference, or may have unintended consequences.

Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer see a convergence among states in tolerating dual citizenship as legitimate. They judge this to be a rational response to the higher incidence of dual nationality due to increasing migratory flows as an inevitable feature of a globalization. Knop's original piece focuses on the link between gender equality and multiple nationality. She uses the term "relational nationality" to redefine nationality: instead of the bond between the individual and the state, Knop focuses on the effect of relationships on one's national identity. Such relationships must be protected through a common nationality that fosters family ties. She argues that equality in national law must respect some set of relationships of care and dual nationality as a way to accomplish this. Jackson, in her study of the similarities among federal systems in their treatment of citizenship, also concludes that prospects of equality are enhanced by the recognition of multiple citizenships.

The complexities of multiple citizenships and affiliations are also discussed in the context of African ethnic memberships, California's Mexican immigrant population, and Canadian minorities. Deng's study of ethnic marginalization in the Great Lakes region of Africa challenges naturalized accounts of ethnic membership and shows that the only way to address the dilemma between recognizing and disregarding multiple ethnicities in nation-building projects is through regional co-operation and the development of standards of responsible sovereignty. Paul Johnston's and Labelle and Salée's articles look at the development of citizenship among Mexican immigrants in California and immigrants and minorities in Canada, respectively. Both see

citizenship as a web of relations and point to a notion of transnational citizenship to capture the multiple identities of immigrant groups. Johnston's as well as Labelle and Salée's pieces underline the importance of taking into account the transnational aspects linked to citizenship in the everyday life of immigrants and non-nationals.

The articles by Linda Bosniak and Ford also see national citizenship as challenged by local as well as transnational affiliations. The process of globalization has de-centred the state as the exclusive actor in the international system. While Ford focuses on global cities as co-players with states in the global economy and thus as supplemental sites of citizenship, Bosniak employs the concept of postnational citizenship as a tool for questioning normative nationalism and its exclusionary practices. She proposes a "postnational ethics" which is committed to the pluralization of identities, memberships and solidarities, where national affiliation is only one of several affiliations.

The volume ends with thought-provoking reflections by Bauböck and Favell which challenge normative and political concepts that have been employed in current citizenship policy and research.

The 12 essays provide cogent analyses of different aspects of citizenship and a general acknowledgement of its contested nature as well as of its enduring importance. However, what is missing in many of them is a gender analysis, with the effect of obscuring the gendered nature of citizenship. Of particular value and interest is the overall argument that discussions of citizenship are not just theoretical arguments relegated to the academia, but have wider repercussions. As Bosniak states, the struggle over the meaning of scope and application of citizenship is both a normative and a political struggle, "a struggle over the visions of collective life that we want to embrace and enact" (239).

PATRIZIA LONGO *Saint Mary's College of California*

Les nouveaux mouvements contestataires à l'heure de la mondialisation
Isabelle Sommier
Coll. Dominos
Paris : Flammarion, 2001, 128 p.

Spécialiste des questions relatives aux luttes ouvrières, aux groupes d'extrême-gauche et au terrorisme, Isabelle Sommier est maître de conférences en sciences politiques à l'Université Paris-I-Panthéon-Sorbonne. Elle s'intéresse aux rapports entre la violence politique et le contexte socio-économique. Ses champs d'intérêt l'ont naturellement amenée à étudier certains événements et mouvements sociaux très récents, liés aux différentes préoccupations concernant la mondialisation et la globalisation des économies nationales. Malgré l'intense couverture médiatique accordée à ce que l'on nomme les mouvements antimondialisation, on sait relativement peu de choses sur ces nouvelles luttes qui remettent en question l'ordre établi. Ce renouveau de la critique sociale englobe également – notamment en France – des phénomènes aussi divers que les mouvements en faveur des sans-papiers, les mouvements antiracistes, les mouvements de chômeurs ou encore les groupes militant pour une meilleure qualité de vie. Qui participe à ces mouvements de contestation du néolibéralisme? Comment ont-ils émergé et quels sont leurs liens avec les formes traditionnelles de contestation politique? Quelles sont les ressources, tant symboliques que matérielles, mobilisées par ces nouvelles formes d'activisme politique? Quels sont les intérêts et les enjeux de ces mouvements parfois spectaculaires? L'auteure s'attaque de front à ces questions et comble ainsi une lacune importante.

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Son ouvrage est structuré en trois parties que l'on pourrait résumer ainsi : historique, instruments et enjeux. Une première étape permet à Isabelle Sommier d'explorer les origines des nouveaux mouvements contestataires. Ce faisant, elle s'attarde à cerner certaines des recompositions majeures du politique entre 1960 et 2000, tout en décrivant le vaste mouvement de redéfinition des paramètres de la critique sociale. Prenant appui sur les nouveaux mouvements sociaux qui émergent durant la seconde moitié des années 1970 en dehors de la sphère du travail (féminisme, écologie, pacifisme, mouvement homosexuel, etc.), les modes de contestation récents ramènent le conflit social sur le devant de la scène et proposent des modalités inédites de participation politique, opérant de la sorte une synthèse de plusieurs strates historiques de l'action collective.

La seconde partie explore les principaux instruments mobilisés par le militantisme associatif. Les registres d'action mettent en vedette des groupes instables, décentralisés (l'insertion locale est forte), organisés selon la structure du réseau, prenant appui sur des relations interpersonnelles fortes et orientés vers une fin précise et limitée. Le souci de la démocratie directe et le refus de la hiérarchie ou de la délégation sont des constantes. Le pragmatisme, s'éloignant des grandes questions idéologiques, permet de tisser des ponts avec d'autres organisations et fait émerger le phénomène de « multiappartenance » du militant à plusieurs associations. Les groupes s'intéressent de la sorte à des questions sociétales et animent des luttes transversales allant au-delà de leurs intérêts corporatifs. Ils s'entourent également de personnes compétentes et d'experts (avocats, juristes, économistes, ingénieurs agronomes . . .).

Les modes d'action privilégiés recourent à deux registres qui étaient jusqu'alors séparés : le coup de force spectaculaire et la stratégie classique d'influence sur le pouvoir politique. Quoi qu'il en soit des actions entreprises, les organisations veulent peser sur la formulation des politiques publiques, empêcher ou favoriser l'adoption d'une loi, éveiller l'attention du personnel politique et administratif sur une question donnée. Elles contribuent ainsi à la transformation d'une question sociale en problème politique susceptible d'être pris en charge par le pouvoir décisionnel. À cet égard, indique l'auteure, les organisations sont assimilables à des groupes de pression civiques. Cet aspect valorise d'autant plus la position des experts, afin d'établir des dossiers crédibles qui serviront lors des négociations avec les pouvoirs publics. Les nouveaux mouvements contestataires s'inscrivent aussi directement dans une mouvance de fond majeure, à savoir la « juridicisation » du politique, c'est-à-dire l'intégration croissante d'arguments d'ordre juridique dans le champ politique.

On peut également observer des stratégies d'action et de pression en direction des instances supranationales: les associations agissent localement au quotidien tout en étant insérées au sein de réseaux internationaux. L'usage militant d'Internet, ayant donné naissance au terme « hacktivisme », permet d'investir efficacement ce nouveau champ de luttes.

Par ailleurs, les caractéristiques mêmes des modes d'action de ces groupes suggèrent leurs principales difficultés : difficile conciliation entre le court terme et le long terme de même qu'entre l'action locale et l'action internationale, continuité problématique de l'action (concilier le rejet de l'institutionnalisation et le souci d'efficacité de l'action), difficultés à dégager une stratégie commune (pas de lecture homogène du monde), extrême éclatement des groupes, caractère souvent « impersonnel » de l'adversaire (le néolibéralisme, la mondialisation), instabilité organisationnelle, risques d'emprise d'une ou de quelques personnes (les plus médiatiques) sur l'organisation (ce qui est un des problèmes de la démocratie directe).

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Enfin, la troisième partie examine attentivement les principaux enjeux communs des mobilisations récentes. Il ressort de cette analyse que les demandes portent sur la reformulation des frontières entre l'espace public et l'espace privé et sont pour la plupart centrées sur la vie quotidienne, la subjectivité, l'identité et des considérations pragmatiques telles que le logement, la santé, l'environnement, l'alimentation ou la citoyenneté. Ainsi, ce qui est en toile de fond de ces diverses revendications, c'est d'abord l'exposition de soi dans l'espace public, qui s'accompagne d'un processus d'individuation et de rejet de la délégation impliquant une prise de parole des individus eux-mêmes. Ce qui est mis en relief – et l'analyse d'Isabelle Sommier devient ici particulièrement éclairante – c'est la souffrance et le statut de victime : nous sommes tous des victimes potentielles d'une injustice demandant à être réparée par l'intervention politique. Les actions sont ainsi mises en scène afin d'exposer ce statut de victime et susciter la compassion du public.

Les mouvements récents s'inscrivent de ce fait dans le vaste processus d'extension des droits et de répartition plus équitable des biens et des ressources, poursuivant ainsi des luttes entamées durant les siècles précédents. Toutefois, on observe une intégration inédite d'arguments d'ordre moral dans l'action politique, qui accompagne l'accent mis dans nos sociétés sur l'authenticité de la prise de parole à la première personne et le témoignage. Cette politisation des problèmes privés fait en sorte que de plus en plus de citoyens se réfèrent non plus à la morale civique ordonnant les relations du citoyen et de l'État, mais à l'éthique qui règle les rapports de soi avec les autres (86). Cette valorisation croissante de l'ego dans le dispositif argumentatif a également des conséquences sur l'engagement militant, puisqu'elle « transforme les relations entre organisation et militant en desserrant le lien qui les unit au profit d'une dimension plus contractuelle et sujette à évolution » (82). L'individu cherche à se réaliser et à contribuer personnellement (et non plus comme membre d'un collectif) à une cause, en utilisant son dévouement et/ou ses compétences. Une culture de l'authenticité tiraille ainsi les identités modernes entre égoïsme et altruisme, de même qu'entre les revendications immédiates (avoir un logement) et à long terme (respect de la démocratie).

Cet ouvrage d'Isabelle Sommier nous semble ouvrir sur des pistes de recherche intéressantes. Il révèle, par exemple, une forte hétérogénéité entre les diverses associations. Certains groupes se limitent à des actions de dénonciation ou d'alerte, alors que d'autres sont bien intégrés aux différents réseaux de politiques publiques et font partie intégrante de la *policy community* (au sens de William D. Coleman). Des recherches plus approfondies pourraient être entreprises dans ce sens. De plus, l'État s'avère être un acteur complexe et composite : il est tantôt adversaire, tantôt interlocuteur, tantôt allié, tantôt « fort » et tantôt « faible », etc. Bref, il importe d'être attentif à tous ces aspects au moment de l'étude d'un phénomène politique ou d'un secteur particulier des politiques publiques. Il serait également intéressant de se pencher sur les relations entre ces associations et les partis politiques. La plupart des mouvements contestataires craignent de se faire récupérer par un parti politique, mais doivent en même temps composer avec le fonctionnement politique en vigueur au sein des démocraties occidentales. De plus, la nature du régime politique (régime présidentiel ou parlementaire) et la forme de l'État (État fédéral ou unitaire) favorisent-elles (ou pas) l'émergence de ces mouvements? Une étude des organisations internationales et de leurs réactions face à ces groupes pourrait également être utile. Enfin, il serait pertinent d'effectuer une enquête approfondie du parcours de certains militants.

L'ouvrage n'est pas exempt de certaines lacunes, au premier rang desquelles son caractère un peu trop « français ». Le livre devrait d'ailleurs plus

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justement s'intituler *Les nouveaux mouvements contestataires en France*. L'auteure ne montre pas, malgré son ambition (78), ce qui fédère les luttes des « sans », des nouveaux syndicats français et d'autres associations hexagonales avec les mouvements antimondialisation à l'extérieur de la France. De ce fait, elle ignore certains éléments qui font la spécificité du mouvement à l'échelle mondiale. Une vaste recherche comparée de portée véritablement internationale reste à faire. De plus, une question semble rester en suspens au fil de la lecture et n'est jamais vraiment abordée de front : les actions de ces mouvements infléchissent-elles véritablement les décisions publiques? Il faudrait sans doute, pour cela, faire une étude approfondie de l'élaboration d'une politique publique particulière. Par ailleurs, les rapports entre les médias et ces mouvements – rapports qui nous semblent étroits et marqués à la fois par la coopération et par l'opposition – sont très peu abordés. Enfin, qu'est-ce qui distingue ces mouvements d'un groupe d'intérêt? On peut ainsi relever plusieurs « glissements » conceptuels : mouvements, groupes, organisations, associations, etc. Si ces phénomènes récents semblent constituer une synthèse entre les mouvements sociaux et les groupes d'intérêt, ne serait-il pas plus pertinent d'utiliser un nouveau terme?

Ces lacunes n'enlèvent rien à la qualité d'un ouvrage présenté de façon claire et vulgarisée, mêlant de façon heureuse la présentation des événements et une analyse scientifique de l'action collective de certaines minorités contemporaines. Un tableau synthétique présentant les principaux mouvements français, un glossaire fort utile, une bibliographie sommaire ainsi qu'une liste de sites Internet complètent ce livre. Au demeurant, le mérite premier de celui-ci est sans doute de rappeler que, dans le cadre de l'affirmation croissante de l'individu et du déclin des organisations syndicales, des partis politiques et de la souveraineté étatique, la politique est toujours là et que s'exprime, par le biais de ces mouvements, un désir de ré-enchantement du politique, c'est-à-dire de renouveau de l'engagement politique et de recouvrement par le pouvoir politique national de ses capacités d'arbitrage et de régulation sous le contrôle des citoyens. L'État ne s'est pas totalement éclipsé avec la mondialisation, mais il se trouve placé à l'avant-plan d'une société civile en demande de régulation politique. Bref, la mobilisation des minorités actives a introduit au cœur de l'agenda politique de nouveaux thèmes et de nouvelles pratiques que la science politique se doit de prendre en compte.

CHRISTIAN POIRIER *Université d'Ottawa*

The Environment, International Relations, and U.S. Foreign Policy
Paul G. Harris, ed.
Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2001, pp. ix, 276

One of the earliest foreign policy acts of the administration of President George W. Bush was to withdraw from the Kyoto climate-change process. This book provides a timely background to the factors shaping the international environmental policy of the United States over the last decade. The collection is divided into two main parts, sandwiched between comprehensive introductions and conclusions by the editor. The first revisits the concept of environmental security and examines the complex relations among environmental, foreign and security policies; the second part focuses on the policy process in the US, and steers skilfully through the interconnections between domestic and international politics, the policy preferences and strategies of agencies in the executive branch and of congressional players, and the interactions of nongovernmental and governmental organizations.

The authors in the first of these make perceptive observations on the elusive notion of environmental security. This grew out of the wide-ranging debates on redefinitions of security of the late 1980s. As deployed in some contexts it appears more as a legitimizing device for environmentalists to gain access to key policy forums. Braden Allenby, in chapter 2, argues that environmental issues have become "integral components of industrial, social, political and economic systems" (47). This characterization could have led in several chapters to a more systematic probing of the interrelations among US trade and environment policies, but the authors tend to take a more traditional foreign policy slant. The concept of environmental security remains vague in these settings—perhaps inevitably so, Jon Barnett points out in chapter 3, since it is a conflation of two terms each rich in ambiguity and imprecision (68). In practice, the concept has been subject to narrow interpretation within the national security policy community in the US (85). His chapter usefully traces the path of environmental security issues and practices, including co-operation with Canada, through the Pentagon and in the post-1996 initiatives of the State Department. Further, there are divergent environmental policy implications of the concept, and no consensus about the role it should play in guiding or aiding foreign and security policy. Douglas Blum's study of the Caspian Sea region (chap. 4) argues that US foreign policy "further polarized" (102) tensions among states in the region, and thus added to the obstacles to effective environmental co-operation on pollution, fisheries management and other topics.

The second group of chapters provides more detailed insights into the diverse environmental and foreign policy communities bearing on US international environmental policy. While the ozone-layer process often stumbled over conflicts between the European Union and the US-led environmental policy coalition, Srini Sitaraman (chap. 5) underlines the critical importance of consensus on this issue in the environmental science community as a factor facilitating regime negotiations (127). The role of the executive branch rather than Congress in internationalizing environmental policy issues is emphasised by John Barkdull in a detailed analysis of President Nixon's oceans policy (chap. 6). Ozone, climate change and biodiversity issues are the focus of Robert Falkner's analysis of business-government relations (chap. 7). This draws on and contributes to the growing IR literature on firms as international actors. Despite conflicts within the private sector, for example on the issue of CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons) regulation, he argues persuasively that business pressures have consistently constrained US policies and that business organizations have enjoyed a "privileged position" among the many groups seeking influence over international environmental policy (172). Pressures from NGOs targeting the World Bank and other multilateral financial institutions are addressed in chapter 8 by Martin Boas. He outlines the ways these organizations have acquired bargaining leverage at the international level through access points in Washington, for example in the regular informal inter-agency meetings on international projects (or in some cases through an "unholy alliance" with anti-aid Republican conservatives [191-92]).

Two final chapters focus on specific instances of environmental diplomacy. The capacity of economic sanctions to change behaviour is viewed sympathetically by Elizabeth DeSombre in chapter 9, primarily through analysis of the dolphin-tuna and sea turtles cases. Kristen Fletcher analyzes US policies in the International Whaling Commission in chapter 10. Her study points to factors that undermine Washington's ability to influence events in this area, from conflicts within the organization, to US vagueness on scientific management approaches and support for whaling by Aboriginal organizations in the US.

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Much of the volume reflects developments and agendas during President Clinton's second term, especially the rapid growth of the State Department's attention to international environmental issues after 1996. Yet the chapters also provide valuable perspectives on the significance of events since then—the election of an unabashedly ecoskeptical president, the new administration's unequivocal resistance to the Kyoto form of the climate-change process, and the grinding of the gears of international agenda-change from September 2001.

ROBERT BOARDMAN *Dalhousie University*

Moral Victories: How Activists Provoke Multilateral Action
Susan Burgerman
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001, pp. xi, 186

Initially and for many years, the United Nations subordinated human rights principles to the principle of state sovereignty. However, since 1989 the United Nations has evolved and has on occasion pushed "at the edges of sovereignty" (139). The evolutionary process "has not been consistent" (123). Sometimes intervention has been successful, sometimes partially successful and at other times it has failed.

In her first chapter Susan Burgerman lists five interactive conditions which determine the extent to which the international community will respond to human rights violations in a specific country. They also determine the degree of compliance by the target state to the changes demanded in its domestic policies. Four of the six chapters in the book describe in detail the promotion of peace and security in El Salvador and Guatemala during the years 1980-1996.

In El Salvador during the 1980s, the enforcement of human rights principles was inhibited by the consistent support the United States gave to the Salvadoran military. After 1989 the Cold War cooled and "United States strategic interests became less ideological" (80). The UN-mediated peace process began in April 1990 and led to an accord which was signed in July. In the following year a United Nations Observer Mission (ONUSAL) was deployed in El Salvador.

In 1992 the Human Rights Division of ONUSAL "was reorganized into two work units" (93). One unit received and investigated complaints, the other was concerned with institution building in El Salvador and gave technical assistance to the judicial system, the civilian police and the National Counsel for Human Rights.

In El Salvador the government of the United States had considerable leverage because the military was dependent on US supplies. This was less true of Guatemala. There the armed opposition could muster only "1,300 to 1,500 mostly poorly trained indigenous peasants" (102) and was not recognized as a legitimate opposition force until 1996. Organized civil society, led by the Catholic Church, was involved in the peace process from its earliest phase onwards and created an arena in which "diverse members of Guatemalan society met as equals for the purpose of discussion and reconciliation"(104). It was largely due to the moral concern of the international human rights movement that a United Nations Mission in Guatemala was deployed in 1994. When a domestic human rights movement first appeared in the 1980s, its members were subject to violent acts of intimidation. Later a Canadian-based organization, Peace Brigades International, "provided 24-hour-a-day accompaniment" (70) to domestic human rights activists.

The chapters on El Salvador and Guatemala were well researched and were based in part on interviews Burgerman had with 70 representatives of the United Nations and with members of nongovernment organizations, both international and domestic.

The evolutionary developments in the level of UN intervention were possible because by 1970 human rights had become a legitimate concern in international politics. When human rights were abused "large numbers of people in all regions of the world raised their voices in outcry" (1). Yet the book does not explain how and when public support was mobilized.

The Universal Covenant on Civil and Political Rights became international law in 1976 when it was ratified by 35 states. An important omission in the Covenant was the right of an individual to petition the United Nations directly. Amnesty International, from the time of its formation in 1961, was willing to receive all petitions alleging abuse of civil and political rights. Its secretariat verified the accuracy of the petitions it received, and allocated dossiers for action by one or more of its basic units. Each unit consisted of a small number of activists who wrote letters to ministers and other officials on behalf of the victims. They collected signatures on petitions, lobbied visiting state dignitaries and members of their own government. In 1975 Amnesty had 97,000 members, in 1981 more than 250,000 and by 1983 more than half a million.

These were active members. In 1996, I received 498 responses to a questionnaire sent to randomly chosen members of the Canadian Section of Amnesty International. Eighty two respondents claimed to have written more than 50 letters in the previous year. Some could not recall how many letters they had written, but those who did had sent 9,818 letters. They had received 1,136 replies: 109 from victims or their families, 561 from foreign governments and 466 from the Canadian government (Philip R. de Gruchy. "Study of Amnesty International: A Worldwide Movement to Defend Human Rights," unpublished thesis, University of Waterloo, 1997, 159). This is surely part of the story of how activists provoke multilateral action.

In her final chapter, Burgerman reviews UN human rights missions in different countries including Cambodia. She concludes that, to date "the UN human rights system has intervened most effectively when the organization is already involved in resolving the target state's internal conflict" (138) and believes there would be value in "other focused case studies" (142).

PHIL DEGRUCHY *University of Waterloo*

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