

of the book's title from an advantage due to religious identity to one of competence in service provision that has generalizable appeal to those beyond religious ideologies (p. 149). Brooke makes this argument through a multifaceted research design that incorporates historical, ethnographic, geospatial, and survey methodologies that tell a compelling and theoretically informed story about the evolution and political success of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The book has a wide range of strengths, which should make it essential reading for anyone interested in Egyptian politics, Islamist politics, and in nonstate social service provision more broadly. Brooke goes to considerable lengths to use multiple research strategies that enable him to test his hypotheses. The questions that he asks are intrinsically difficult to evaluate because of the data-poor environment in authoritarian regimes like Egypt, but through a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods he is able to triangulate a range of evidence that makes his arguments very plausible.

Brooke provides a richer analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood's social service provision than has been done to date, particularly when it comes to the focus of his study, the Islamic Medical Association (IMA). The book includes detailed ethnographic observations, primary documents, and unique datasets on the Brotherhood's medical service provision across several distinct time periods. Particularly notable is his original evidence on the geography of medical service provision, both fixed medical facilities and mobile medical caravans. He also details a May 2014 survey experiment examining perceptions of Brotherhood facilities and the corresponding propensity of respondents to vote for Brotherhood candidates. This provides evidence for the reputational effects of quality service provision. The fieldwork was largely completed in Egypt during 2012–13; it is wonderful that Brooke was on the ground during Egypt's brief period of democratic opening, because it would be impossible to get the information detailed in the book at present.

One of the trade-offs the author self-consciously makes in this book is to prioritize internal validity over external validity. The specificity of his study (one service provider in Egypt) makes his arguments around that case compelling, but leaves the reader wanting more discussion of the ways in which those arguments may be applicable in other contexts. It would be helpful to situate the IMA within the broader context of the Brotherhood's service provision and also to more extensively situate the Brotherhood's service provision within the context of its political competitors or with other Islamist groups. One of the biggest challenges to the book's arguments actually comes in 2013 during Egypt's brief democratic opening when the Brotherhood suddenly shifts strategy to providing politicized health care to the poor (something most of the book argues that the

Brotherhood actively sought to avoid). Brooke engages with this problem by arguing that this demonstrates how the incentives of political institutions matter, but this suddenly becomes an essential argument that remains underdeveloped in the book.

Although the case study is a specific one, the implications of the book are broad. In the final chapter, Brooke highlights one of the ways it matters to the field of comparative politics: social service provision can be a way of expanding a party's constituency and escaping "the niche party trap" (p. 146). The book also has important implications for both authoritarian politics and the challenges of democratization processes. *Winning Hearts and Votes* will long remain a standard for understanding the Muslim Brotherhood's social service provision, given the dissolution of the group in Egypt's recent crackdown. It will also provoke significant debates at the intersection of party politics and political economy for some time to come.

The Internet and Political Protest in Autocracies. By

Nils B. Weidmann and Espen Geelmuyden Rød. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. 216p. \$99.00 cloth, \$27.95 paper.
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One of the persistent questions since the internet began to be widely used globally has been about the relationship between internet access and political protest. Some have argued that the internet is a powerful tool for opposition, providing new opportunities for information gathering and dissemination and reducing the friction of mobilization. Others have contended that the internet is instead a boon for oppressive governments, giving them the ability to exercise enormous control over the technology and use it to demobilize and repress opposition groups. Focusing on this question in autocracies, Nils B. Weidman and Espen Geelmuyden Rød argue in *The Internet and Political Protest in Autocracies* that neither of these perspectives captures the full nuances of the relationship between the internet and political protest in repressive regimes.

The authors instead suggest that the internet has different impacts on different phases of the protest process. They argue that, because the government is able both to control the infrastructural development of the internet and to monitor and censor information online, the internet actually serves to reduce the emergence of protest in the long term. Conversely, because government control is imperfect, once protests begin, higher levels of internet penetration should help them persist and spread. This theory differs from both the theoretical and empirical findings of much of the work on the topic to date, and so it opens up important new areas for exploration.

This book contributes to a growing literature on the relationship between new digital technologies and protest, one that has its roots in early protests of the digital age but that has exploded in recent years, particularly as social media have increased in popularity. Given the novelty of the theoretical contribution, the book would have benefited from a deeper engagement with why the authors used a different theoretical approach from other scholars, and why they think their results differed from some previous work. This deeper discussion would have illuminated the proposed mechanisms more clearly and helped flesh out in more depth the areas of agreement and disagreement.

Theorizing the relationship between the internet and protest differently for different phases of the protest process is an important new approach, and it allows for much more nuanced theorizing about how new technologies might affect the protest process in varied ways. Nonetheless, I was left with a few questions about the theoretical mechanisms that I outline here.

The book's theory rests on the idea that the government has asymmetrical control over the internet and that, for this reason, the internet should not increase, but rather decrease, protest emergence. Although this asymmetry is certainly the case, the authors do not clearly show how this control compares to that exercised over other means of organizing or communicating. If the government has control over all forms of communication in a country to some extent, the question is not only whether they *also* have control over the internet, but whether they have more, less, or the same amount of control over the internet than over other forms of communication technology that might be used for organizing, as well as what the trade-offs are. One can imagine an internet that is monitored and controlled by the government but that is still a net improvement over previous means of organizing. This impact also might vary among countries and is something that would be interesting to explore in more depth in future work.

Similarly, because this control over the internet is assumed to be a feature of autocracies, it is not engaged with or measured directly. From the perspective of the authors' theory, the protest-repressing effect should be dependent not on the state's hypothetical ability to control the internet, but on its *de facto* capacity and willingness to exercise that control (or perhaps on people's perceptions of that capacity and willingness). This is not homogeneous across the countries in the study. The Afghan or Namibian government does not have the same capacity to control the internet as does the Chinese or Russian government. The authors do use country-level random effects to try to account for country-level differences. A potential alternate explanation for the book's empirical findings, however, is that rather than the internet being associated with depressed protest emergence in general in autocracies, it

may be the case that it depresses protest emergence in cases with high government control of the internet, which is on average, but not universally, higher in autocracies. This is an important distinction, because this would suggest that the internet might increase or have no impact on levels of protest emergence in autocracies with a poor capacity or willingness to exercise control over the internet—and, conversely, might depress protest emergence in democracies that *do* exercise greater control. The authors account for the various levels of control exercised by autocratic regimes *in general* in chapter 9, but do not address the fact that this is also true of their control of the internet in particular.

Finally, to the extent that governments have both the capacity and willingness to exercise such control, it is not clear exactly why the authors believe that this will have only a long-term impact rather than a short-term impact on protest. The government in some places might actually be much more able to take short-term action as protests emerge (for example, by shutting the internet down temporarily) than they are able to exercise consistent long-term control through tactics like censorship or information operations. If this is the case, it would undermine parts of the theoretical arguments that the authors make and is a question that future work should engage.

In addition to the theoretical contributions of the book, it also has important analytical improvements over most previous work on the topic. The authors measure internet penetration through the estimation of data traffic flows rather than country-level telecom reports, which should provide a more accurate measure of internet usage. Additionally, this allows them to disaggregate their analysis to the city, rather than the country, level. Thus, they are able not only to explore the relationship between greater internet penetration in countries and the level of protest in those countries, but also to actually understand whether particular areas with higher levels of internet usage also have higher instances of protest. This is certainly an improvement over most existing large-N studies. This approach allows for a much more fine-grained comparison, which is particularly important in the context of internet usage that varies substantially within countries.

I was, however, disappointed that the period of analysis only extended from 2004–12. This is both a relatively short time period and does not cover much of the most important boom in internet usage, particularly in developing economies, which many of the countries in the study are. Although the authors largely leave aside the question of social media in particular, the widespread use of mobile technologies and lightweight social media apps has dramatically changed the way that people use the internet and has implications for the underlying theories about government control on which the authors rely. It would be interesting to know whether these results hold if

they are extended to the present day and how they interact with social media usage levels.

Overall, the book is an incredibly important contribution, both empirically and theoretically, to our understanding of how new technologies have an impact on

protest. It reveals new questions and new lines of inquiry that I look forward to seeing explored further in future work and should certainly be read by anybody with an interest in the internet and political behavior or in contention in the digital age.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Small Arms: Children and Terrorism. By Mia Bloom and John Horgan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019. 248p. \$27.95 cloth. doi:10.1017/S1537592720001462

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Mia Bloom, professor of political science and communication, and John Horgan, distinguished university professor of psychology, both from Georgia State University, are preeminent scholars of terrorism and political violence. Bloom is known for her contributions in the areas of suicide terrorism, as well as on gender and terrorism. Horgan has written extensively on the psychology of terrorism. More recently, he has developed models that depict pathways into and out of terrorism. Combining their unique points of view, they have written an excellent book on the alarming phenomenon of terrorist groups that target, mobilize, indoctrinate, and often launch children to carry out attacks on their behalf.

At the outset, the authors explain the complexity of researching and drawing sweeping theoretical conclusions on the topic. Yet, throughout the book, they offer a clear and accessible narrative. Each chapter focuses on a different aspect of the phenomenon and includes a comprehensive review of the relevant literature, along with the authors' original research and analysis.

Both Bloom and Horgan have demonstrated in the past the value of fieldwork. They have researched conflict-torn areas, including Sri Lanka in the height of the civil war, Israel and Palestine during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and Northern Ireland. In this book, they rely on many of the cases that they studied in the past and on more recent fieldwork that they carried out in Pakistan.

To circumvent the difficulties of studying the case of the Islamic State (IS), which serves as their primary case study, Bloom and Horgan devised an original methodology. In addition to using multiple secondary sources, they diligently documented the Islamic State's activities on social media. Further, they constructed a database that consists of the eulogies of children who died fighting for IS.

In addition to the significance of this topic, the book makes six major contributions to the study of political

violence. First, the authors contextualize the discussion using both temporal and spatial comparisons. They begin by comparing child involvement in warfare and political violence. Then within the category of political violence, they discuss the differences between violent extremists and terrorist groups. Finally, they describe the variety of roles that children perform within terrorist organizations, from logistics missions to suicide operations. This approach is methodologically sound, enabling the exploration of different patterns of child involvement in organized violence. Moreover, by comparing terrorist groups to other organizations that use children in the context of organized violence, the authors successfully identify the mobilization and indoctrination patterns of veteran and more recent terrorist groups including the IRA, the Tamil Tigers, Hamas, the Taliban, and IS.

Second, Bloom and Horgan diverge from past attempts to offer monocausal explanations for terrorism-related phenomena. They discuss different macro- and micro-level theories and masterfully underscore the merits of the different perspectives both as stand-alone theories and in combination with other explanations. However, without diminishing the importance of these theories, they demonstrate the inevitable shortcomings of all-encompassing theories. Their sober and detailed discussion should serve as a compass for terrorism researchers who still search for elegant and parsimonious theories.

Third, aware of the significance of the contextual settings in which the groups have operated, they discuss the concept of culture in general and the "culture of martyrdom" in particular. By reintroducing "culture" as a powerful explanatory term, Bloom and Horgan provide another important service to the scholarly community. Culture, a concept that was at the heart of the discipline, has lost its allure in recent decades. Many political scientists who study conflict and terrorism have grown frustrated by the different meanings of the term, which according to the authors' count has at least 164 definitions. As a result, in recent decades many researchers have been leaning toward more elegant economics-based theories and methods. For Bloom and Horgan these theories are insufficient. Although they are aware of the elusive and dynamic nature of the concept, they present a clear definition of culture as "a pattern of human knowledge, belief and behavior based on social learning and symbols; and a set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and