

Representing Green Radicalism: the limits of state-based representation in global climate governance

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Abstract. In recent years, the post-neoliberal bloc of Latin America countries, ALBA, has fashioned a role for itself in international climate change negotiations as representing the voice of ‘the people’. In this article I draw on innovative theorising of representation to critically examine this claim. I argue that although ALBA has sought to construct a constituency based on the malleable notion of ‘the people’, its function is better understood as ‘discursive representation’, and specifically as representation of Green Radical discourses. Such forms of representation are potentially important in global governance given the challenges of capturing the interests of all affected parties. I critically evaluate this case of discursive representation in terms of its rhetorical efficacy; accountability; consistency; and legitimacy. Although certain favourable elements emerge from this evaluation, this case also points to the hazards of transmitting a public discourse through a state-based representative in multilateral settings.

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Introduction¹

For years to come, the 2009 Copenhagen climate change summit will be remembered as a spectacular failure: despite an unprecedented level of concern and the presence of more than one hundred heads of government, the international community failed

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¹ Translations from Spanish in this article are the author’s own unless indicated as quoted in an English source.

to produce a new treaty to limit global warming. The alleged reasons for this are numerous: China's intransigence, the United States' miniscule targets, the European Union's waning influence, and the Danish host's fumbling diplomacy. Nevertheless, the Copenhagen Accord would have carried more weight had its adoption not been thwarted by a small number of states in the summit's final hours. Derisively dismissed by some as the 'Weird Left'² and the 'Marxists from the Mountains',³ several post-neoliberal Latin American states (together with Tuvalu and Sudan) denounced the Accord on procedural and substantive grounds. Breaking with the civil and predictable style of UN plenary sessions, Venezuela's Claudia Salerno drew blood as she slammed the country's nameplate against the table, demanding the right to speak despite the Danish president's best efforts to close the session:

With surprise we see that your presidency – after having made us sovereign countries wait hours in this room – has decided to throw two papers on the table ... that were created without the mandate of the Parties, in an illegitimate manner ... , after various developed countries have given press conferences to say that there is an agreement in Copenhagen, when the delegates of countries that form the United Nations system do not even know the text of these agreements, you throw these papers on the table, and then leave the room. ... International agreements, Mr President, cannot be imposed by a small and select ... group of countries.⁴

Bolivia's René Orellana echoed this anger and labelled the process 'disrespectful' and 'undemocratic'. Orellana pointed out that the 'agreed' 2°C target would endanger islands, coastal cities, and the water and food security of millions of people: 'Today we are not going to decide the lives of millions of people in one hour ... we are not going to validate this document, and our position is clear: this does not express the consensus of all those present; ... this is the document of a small group, ... representing some countries, that certainly has the political power to impose it.'⁵ In the end, their protests succeeded in demoting the status of the agreement. For these states, and many within civil society, Copenhagen will be remembered quite differently: the failure to reach agreement may be lamentable, but no agreement is preferable to an insufficient or ecologically irrational one. In this article, I look beyond sardonic dismissals and impatient accusations of blocking progress to critically assess the role of the post-neoliberal bloc, ALBA, in multilateral climate negotiations. Led by Bolivian President Evo Morales, in 2009 and 2010 the core members of ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America)⁶ fashioned a role for themselves as the voice of the 'the people' in climate negotiations. The weak status of the Copenhagen Accord was thereby presented as a victory of the people.⁷ Such a claim

² John Drexhage and Deborah Murphy, 'Copenhagen: A Memorable Time for All the Wrong Reasons?', IISD Commentary (December 2009), available at: {http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/cop_memorable_time_wrong_reasons.pdf}.

³ Comment of senior negotiator under Chatham House rule.

⁴ Author's translation. Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) resumed 12th Meeting, Copenhagen (19 December 2009), Plenary. 03:10 CET. {http://www1.cop15.meta-fusion.com/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id_kongressmain=1&theme=unfccc&id_kongresssession=2755}.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ *Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América*.

⁷ Evo Morales, 'Intervención en la Conferencia Mundial de los Pueblos sobre Cambio Climático' (20 April 2010), available at: {<http://alainet.org/active/37560>}.

by a state to represent people beyond its own sovereign borders is perhaps unprecedented in international politics. In recent years, International Relations (IR) scholars have begun to interrogate new forms of diplomacy and representation in global politics.⁸ Thus, the field is now sensitive to ‘citizen diplomacy’, ‘NGO diplomacy’, and ‘celebrity diplomacy’. Each of these practices challenges the Westphalian norm of sovereignty, which recognises the state as a unitary actor and the sole legitimate representative in international affairs. Yet, the actions of ALBA in international climate negotiations present a distinct challenge to this norm and therefore merit closer attention. Bolivia and other member-states have taken advantage of the authority and privileges bestowed by the norm of sovereignty to participate directly in multilateral consultations and negotiations. Yet, they have simultaneously attempted to defy the limitations of sovereignty by invoking a constituency that transcends their own national jurisdictions. My objective in this article is to critically examine and evaluate the post-sovereign ‘representative claim’⁹ embedded in ALBA’s actions.

The first section presents an overview of the concept of representation and its relevance for global climate governance. I argue that although ALBA has sought to construct a constituency based on the malleable notion of ‘the people’, its function is better understood as ‘discursive representation’,¹⁰ and specifically as representation of a Green Radical class of discourse. I then contextualise Green Radicalism by locating it within the broader discursive landscape of global climate governance. Section III then introduces the post-neoliberal alliance, ALBA, and its contribution to multilateral climate negotiations. Here I highlight that at the Copenhagen Summit, ALBA governments stepped up their efforts to publicise their positions and connect with international activists. This presents a potentially positive opportunity for enhancing the representation of a marginal discourse, which has both normative and rational value. Section IV evaluates ALBA’s representation by assessing whether the rhetoric employed is appropriate; whether they have made themselves accountable to those they aim to represent; and whether their representative claim is perceived as legitimate by others articulating Green Radicalism. While certain favourable elements emerge in this evaluation, they are ultimately undermined by inconsistencies that appear at two levels. Firstly, inconsistencies have occurred in purposive acts of representation in instances where members of ALBA have publicly distanced themselves from a Green Radical position. Secondly, representation also occurs as representatives perform their everyday activities, and here Bolivia and other ALBA members fail to pass a test of consistency: they fail to consistently behave in ways that reflect Green Radical discourses. As I will argue in the concluding section of this article, these two levels of inconsistency ultimately cast doubt on the capacity of state actors to represent a popular discourse that departs radically from the *status quo*.

⁸ See, for example, Brian Hocking. ‘Catalytic Diplomacy: Beyond “Newness” and “Decline”’, in Jan Melissen (ed.), *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), pp. 21–39; Terry Macdonald, *Global Multistakeholder Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Michele M. Betsill and Elizabeth Corell (eds), *NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations* (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 2008).

⁹ Michael Saward, *The Representative Claim* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

¹⁰ John S. Dryzek and Simon Niemeyer, ‘Discursive Representation’, *American Political Science Review*, 102:4 (2008), pp. 481–93.

I. Representation in global governance

Notwithstanding the increasing fragmentation of transnational authority, global governance continues to be dominated by intergovernmental relations. Sovereignty remains the most powerful ordering principle and attribute of authority in the international system, and it is the state that retains the dominant claim to legitimate representation in supranational governance arrangements. But this claim is not uncontested and in multilateral settings state-based representation exists alongside self-authorised representatives from civil society and professional organisations. The constituents of self-authorised representatives may be defined on the basis of gender, ethnicity, race, profession, and even species. These relations may be ongoing or established to achieve a short-term objective. This ‘constructed’ nature of relations of representation is perhaps most clearly elucidated in Michael Saward’s recent conceptualisation of representation as a dynamic, performative *process* of claim making.¹¹ From this perspective, representation does not simply occur when an individual or group steps in to act for a collective with pre-given shared interests and identities. Relationships of representation do not emerge organically. Instead, Saward argues, constituencies are constructed in the process of making a representative claim: ‘a claim to represent or to know what represents the interests of someone or something. It invokes ... claims that one stands for others by virtue of roles one can play.’¹² There are five elements to a representative claim: ‘A maker of representations (M) puts forward a subject (S) which stands for an object (O) which is related to a referent (R) and is offered to an audience (A).’¹³ Illustrative is the following: Alejandro Hatcher (Venezuela’s environment minister) (maker) offers ALBA (subject) as a mouthpiece of ‘the people’ (object) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)¹⁴ (audience). The referent here is ‘the actual, flesh-and-blood’ human beings;¹⁵ this is distinct from the object of ‘the people’, which is one value-laden portrayal or interpretation of who those humans are. The notion of ‘the people’ is particularly malleable; in Canovan’s assessment it has become ‘potent but hazy’ but is best understood as a ‘legitimizing myth’ due to the sense of authority it implies.¹⁶ ALBA’s specific delineation of ‘the people’ is never explicitly revealed; instead its use of this phrase invokes a universal body of citizens. However, below I argue that ALBA (led by Bolivian President Evo Morales) has actively constructed a constituency of ‘the people’ based on a Green Radical class of discourse.

John S. Dryzek and Simon Niemeyer’s theory of ‘discursive representation’ provides a useful framework for interpreting the contribution of ALBA to climate

¹¹ Saward, *The Representative Claim*; and Michael Saward, ‘The Representative Claim’, *Contemporary Political Theory*, 5 (2006), pp. 297–318.

¹² Saward, *The Representative Claim*, pp. 42–3.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

¹⁴ The UNFCCC is the primary multilateral setting for global climate governance.

¹⁵ Saward, *The Representative Claim*, p. 302. This example is based on Hatcher’s statement that ‘The peoples will have in the revolutionary governments of ALBA an official voice in the (Cancún) Summit.’ *Abrebrecha*, ‘Alba representará la voz de los pueblos en cumbre de cambio climático en Cancún’ (23 April 2010), available at: {http://www.abrebrecha.net/64275_Alba-representar%C3%A1-la-voz-de-los-pueblos-en-cumbre-de-cambio-clim%C3%A1tico-en-Canc%C3%BAn.html}.

¹⁶ Margaret Canovan, ‘The People’, in John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 253.

negotiations. If the voice of ‘the people’ that ALBA has made their own is that of a discursively-defined constituency, then ALBA’s actions are appropriately understood as ‘discursive representation’. Indeed, this is a more sincere articulation of what is actually being represented, which is not a universal ‘people’ but rather a certain way of understanding climate change. Discourse here is understood as ‘a set of categories and concepts embodying specific assumptions, judgments, contentions, dispositions, and capabilities. It enables the mind to process sensory inputs into coherent accounts, which can then be shared in intersubjectively meaningful fashion.’¹⁷ Discursive representation, Dryzek and Niemeyer persuasively argue, can be justified on grounds of rationality, ontology, and ethics. As pluralists have long argued, a decision will be more *rational* if it is subject to criticism from a range of positions. Exposing dominant positions to radical critique in a context of deliberation and justification is likely to produce more effective and fair outcomes. Dryzek and Niemeyer’s *ontological* justification for discursive representation rests on the recognition that individual subjectivity emerges from multiple discourses. As a consequence, a person cannot be fully represented by any single representative; holistic representation requires representatives for the multiple discourses that people inhabit. This recognition also informs their *ethical* justification: individual liberty is repressed if individuals are treated as ‘unproblematic wholes’ who ought to filter aspects of their subjectivity prior to seeking representation.¹⁸

The UNFCCC may be served by a discourse-based understanding of representation. The legitimacy of this regime depends on its perceived inclusivity. Despite extensive civil society presence, state-based representation remains the norm in international climate negotiations. Yet, this is a weak form of capturing the interests and preferences of all potentially affected persons, which may differ from the national interests of the states in which they find themselves. Inclusive representation may instead be secured via representation of climate discourses, which are numerous but finite.¹⁹ Green Radicalism is one such discourse that warrants representation on rational, ontological, and ethical grounds. Whether ALBA’s actions can effectively represent this discourse is the question I address below. First, however, I will provide a more complete account of Green Radicalism.

II. Discourses of global climate change

Inclusive representation in global climate governance requires identifying publicly expressed discourses. Elsewhere, Dryzek and I present an exercise in capturing the range and pattern of such discourses through analysis of applications to the side

¹⁷ Dryzek and Niemeyer, ‘Discursive Representation’, p. 481.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 482–4. While the ethical justification may suggest that discourses serve *only* as proxies for people, the rational and ontological justifications caution against such an assumption. Individuals do not embody a fixed set of discourses but rather a variable set of discourses that can alter over time, including in deliberation across discourses. Even if individuals feel represented by particular discursive representatives, this feeling may change over time. I am grateful to John Dryzek for clarifying this point in personal communication.

¹⁹ Hayley Stevenson and John S. Dryzek, ‘Enhancing the legitimacy of multilateral climate governance: a deliberative democratic approach’, *Critical Policy Studies*, 6:1 (2012), pp. 1–18.

event programme at the Copenhagen climate summit, in 2009.²⁰ We argued that climate governance discourses in the global public sphere can be classified on two dimensions: one broadly economic and the other broadly political. The economic orientation can be understood as either reformist or radical in relation to the parameters of the existing liberal international economic system. Reformists accept these basic parameters. From a radical perspective, existing economic objectives and values are themselves deeply implicated in the problem of climate change and ought to be the focus of more transformative action. The political orientation of climate discourses can be understood as either conservative or progressive. The conservative position envisages that strategies to address climate change will be designed and enacted within the parameters of existing institutions and power structures. The progressive position is that the existing distribution of power is inadequate and inappropriate. Authority for designing and enacting strategies should thus be shared with, or transferred to, presently disempowered actors at global, national, or local levels. Four classes of discourse are captured in the following typology:

		Economic Orientation	
		Reformist	Radical
Political Orientation	Conservative	Mainstream Sustainability	Limits
	Progressive	Expansive Sustainability	Green Radicalism

Table 1. *Discourses of climate change*²¹

For the purpose of this article, I am concerned only with the representation of the economically radical and politically progressive class of discourse, Green Radicalism.²²

A common assumption in Green Radical discourses is that addressing climate change requires a fundamental reorientation of economic behaviour and development models. Material growth on an infinite and universal scale simply cannot be reconciled with a safe climate and sustainable order. Such economic changes demand a redistribution of power away from presently dominant authorities. Concerns relating to human rights, justice, and equity tend to be highly salient in these discourses, and hierarchically superior to short-term economic concerns. Attention is directed towards addressing the structural causes of climate change, which are political and economic in nature. Diversity emerges within Green Radicalism in identifying the most relevant structural causes of climate change and/or providing an alternative

²⁰ This section summarises key aspects of these discourses. A complete account of the constitutive elements of each discourse, as well as the discourse analysis method employed, is presented in Hayley Stevenson and John S. Dryzek, 'The discursive democratisation of global climate governance', *Environmental Politics*, 21:2 (2012), pp. 189–210.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² A more general overview of which discourses are represented in the UNFCCC is provided in Stevenson and Dryzek, 'Enhancing the legitimacy of multilateral climate governance'.

vision for society. Our analysis pointed to three distinct discourses in this broader class.²³

Ecofeminism rejects the assumption that effective and appropriate responses to climate change can be designed within existing institutions. Climate injustice and gender injustice are connected and ought to be confronted simultaneously. The patriarchal ordering of national and international institutions is largely responsible for imposing both types of injustice. Existing governance arrangements tend to marginalise women and their concerns and experiences, including their increased vulnerability to both climate change and mitigation measures.²⁴ Adequately responding to the challenges posed by climate change requires a fundamental transformation of existing patriarchal institutions.

Radical decentralisation, ‘small is beautiful’, identifies the structural cause of climate change as an institutionalised model of development that privileges industrial-scale production. Responding effectively to the challenges presented by climate change requires replacing this inherently ecologically and socially unsustainable model with small and local scale production. Community-level development, mitigation, and adaptation can better respond to the needs of people and the environment because, unlike industrial-scale development, it is not exclusively directed towards generating profit but rather towards ensuring the welfare of a clearly defined group of people. Carbon markets and emissions offsetting are rejected because these mechanisms shift responsibility and accountability away from the local level. Decision-making processes also need to be decentralised to allow for genuine participation by marginalised and affected people, including local communities and indigenous people.

New globalism affirms that an effective and just response to climate change will only be possible if the presently unequal international system is transformed into an equitable global community. A critical feature of a new global community will be a zero-carbon economy that is socially and ecologically sustainable, and favours the fulfilment of basic human needs over and above the generation of wealth and excessive material consumption. Achieving such an economy requires a fair allocation of GHG emission entitlements. In principle, a *per capita* allocation basis may be appropriate but global equity may in some instances require preferential treatment for vulnerable and marginalised people. Governance within a new global community ought to be democratic and foster cooperation between individuals, cultures, nations, social movements, and NGOs. Existing institutions are clearly unable to deliver such a fair and sustainable economic and political order; instead, citizens and civil society are driving the transition.

III. ‘Post-neoliberal’ governments and Green Radicalism

a. Post-neoliberalism in Latin America

‘Post-neoliberalism’ as a term is growing in academic use to describe the policy developments that have accompanied the ‘left turn’ in Latin America over the past decade.

²³ Evidence of these discourses articulated in other public settings is presented in (ibid.).

²⁴ Sherilyn MacGregor, ‘A stranger silence still: the need for feminist social research on climate change’, *The Sociological Review*, 57:s2 (2010), pp. 124–40.

It is not intended to imply a clean break with neoliberalism, defined by David Harvey as ‘a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within a framework characterized by strong property rights, free markets, and free trade’.²⁵ Instead, the post-neoliberal era is characterised by various experiments in privileging social interests over economic interests via new relations between the state, market, and society.²⁶ Post-neoliberal experiments in Latin America are the result of widespread public discontent with the impacts of neoliberal policy imposed throughout the 1980s and 1990s.²⁷ The Washington Consensus of privatisation, liberalisation, and regulation was accompanied by a range of negative side effects, both social and environmental. Trade unions, the traditional base of social mobilisation, were weakened as employment became more ‘flexible’, unemployment increased, rural workers migrated to cities, and the informal economy grew while the formal economy shrunk. Although unions have not disappeared in the region, their diminished power has been offset by a plethora of social movements representing indigenous, cultural, feminist, and unemployed interests.²⁸ It is in the context of sustained mobilisation by these ‘new left’ actors that parties and leaders have come to power in numerous Latin American countries on anti-neoliberal (or at least centre-left) platforms and frequently in direct cooperation with social movements.²⁹

A significant post-neoliberal development in the region has been the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) pursued in resistance to the tide of bilateral and multilateral free-trade agreements that has swept the region. ALBA is primarily directed towards reducing poverty, and maximising social inclusion and people’s wellbeing.³⁰ The Alliance was initially proposed by Venezuelan president, Hugo Chávez, in 2001. Chávez argued that the people of Latin America would be best served not by a free-trade zone with the United States but rather by nineteenth century liberator Simón Bolívar’s vision of the *Patria Grande*, or Grand Homeland. This would be a politically and economically unified region based on principles of solidarity instead of competition.³¹ There are presently eight members: Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Dominica, Saint Vicente and the Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda. The organisational structure of ALBA comprises the Council of Presidents, the Council of Ministers, and the Council of Social Movements. The last is a recently formed space for Latin American people to gather and cooperate amongst themselves and their governments, with the overall objective of

²⁵ David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 2.

²⁶ Emir Sader, ‘Postneoliberalism in Latin America’, *Development Dialogue* (January 2009), pp. 171–9; Laura Macdonald and Arne Ruckert (eds), *Post-Neoliberalism in the Americas* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

²⁷ Eric Hershberg and Fred Rosen (eds), *Latin America after Neoliberalism: Turning the Tide in the 21st Century?* (New York: The New Press, 2006).

²⁸ Patrick Barrett, Daniel Chavez, and César Rodríguez-Garavito (eds), *The New Latin American Left* (Norwich: Pluto Press, 2008).

²⁹ Raúl Zibechi, ‘Gobiernos y Movimientos: Entre la Autonomía y las Nuevas Formas de Dominación’, in Raphael Hoetmer (ed.), *Repensar la política desde América Latina: Cultura, Estado y movimientos sociales* (Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 2009), p. 185.

³⁰ Portal ALBA ‘Qué es el ALBA?’ (2004), available at: {<http://www.alternativabolivariana.org>}.

³¹ Jeffrey R. Webber, ‘Venezuela under Chávez: The Prospects and Limitations of Twenty-First Century Socialism, 1999–2009’, *Socialist Studies: the Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies*, 6:1 (2010), pp. 14–15.

struggling for plurality and harmonious relations between people and nature not just in their own countries but across the world.³²

b. ALBA and global climate governance

Of the eight ALBA members, only five (Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, and Nicaragua) have negotiated as a bloc in international climate negotiations, and even they have often spoken only in their capacity as individual Parties. These countries attracted considerable attention during the final hours of the Copenhagen summit when they stridently rejected the Copenhagen Accord for its substance and the manner in which it was drafted. But although small states may slip under the radar of most commentators of international climate negotiations, the ALBA countries had not been silent throughout the preceding two years of negotiations. Bolivia, in particular, intervened numerous times and often to challenge economic orthodoxy.³³ The following excerpt of an intervention at COP14 in Poznan is reflective of these statements:

Since colonisation and particularly since the industrial revolution . . . competition and the thirst for unlimited profit of the capitalist system have been destroying the planet. For capitalism, we are not human beings but rather consumers. For capitalism, Mother Earth doesn't exist, but rather primary resources. Capitalism is the source of asymmetries and imbalances in the world, it generates luxury, ostentation, and extravagance for the few, while millions die of hunger in the world.³⁴

However, it was during COP15 in Copenhagen that ALBA (and particularly Bolivian) delegations' rhetoric and actions became more closely aligned with the discourses of Green Radicalism. The idea that existing authority arrangements at national and global levels would be inadequate for successfully addressing the climate challenge became much more explicit here. In Copenhagen, Bolivian President Evo Morales (known widely as simply 'Evo') sought to serve as a 'bridge' between the formal negotiations among officials and heads of government in the Bella Centre, and the social movements gathering in various settings, though perhaps principally at Klimaforum09 in a sporting complex in central Copenhagen. This 'bridging' can be illustrated with four incidents:

1. The participation of non-governmental indigenous representatives in the Bolivian delegation: The MAS party itself, which has been in government since 2006, emerged from the *cocalero* movement of indigenous coca-producing peasants, and numerous members of Morales' cabinet are former activists and intellectuals.³⁵ However, the Bolivian delegation included representatives of indigenous organisations that sit outside of Morales' *cocalero* network, including from the

³² *Consejo de Movimientos Sociales*, 'Manifiesto General de la Primera Cumbre de Consejos de Movimientos Sociales del ALBA-TCP' (16 October 2009), available at: {http://www.movimientos.org/noalca/albasi/show_text.php3?key=16092}.

³³ AWG-LCA, 4th session (3 December 2008); AWG-LCA, 5th session (1 April 2009), 10:00 (second intervention during Q&A).

³⁴ AWG-LCA, 4th session (3 December 2008). Author's own translation from the original Spanish intervention. The official English interpretation delivered on the UNFCCC webcast was uncharacteristically poor and contained errors and important omissions.

³⁵ James Dunkerly, 'Evo Morales, the "Two Bolivias" and the Third Bolivian Revolution', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 39 (2007), p. 134.

Confederación Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ), with which MAS has often had strained relations. Outspoken critic of the MAS government's copper mining contracts, Rafael Quispe, spoke freely at a press briefing of the Bolivian delegation at COP15 and explained that the positions of the social movements and the Bolivian government were one.³⁶

2. Bolivia's convening of a UNFCCC submission drafting group: Following an offer from the Bolivian delegation to present ideas from Klimaforum09 as textual suggestions to COP15, a twelve-member drafting committee was formed. One of the members was prominent environmental lawyer, Polly Higgins. Higgins explained how the diverse group spent nine hours revising the 194-page negotiating text to bring it into line with their basic shared understanding that carbon trading and profiteering must stop, values must change, and ecosystems need to be preserved.³⁷ Although it appears that the submission 'got lost in the process of the UNFCCC Secretariat', Higgins concluded that ultimately this didn't matter because of its value as a learning process.³⁸
3. Morales' attendance at a Klimaforum09 session: Here he heard comments and answered unscreened questions from members of social movements and NGOs. He told the audience: 'Politics is a science of serving the people. I live to serve the people . . . It is my duty to take your message to the heads of state here. If I make a mistake, let me know so that I can rectify it.'³⁹
4. ALBA public meeting: The Klimaforum09 organising committee collaborated with social movement and non-government organisations to demonstrate the potential for cooperation between government and the grassroots. 4,000 people squeezed into a Copenhagen sports stadium, or gathered outside, to hear Morales, Chávez, Cuba's vice president, Esteban Lazo, and Nicaragua's foreign minister, Samuel Santos, speak about the negotiations and their diagnosis of the climate change problem.

Back in the Bella Centre, delegates and leaders were less eager to hear ALBA's thoughts on addressing the structural causes of climate change. No ALBA member was among those selected by the Danish hosts to form a 'Friends of the President' group to work on an agreement that could compensate for the bracket-laden texts of the two UNFCCC working groups. Upon being presented with the three-page Copenhagen Accord that the United States, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil alone decided they could live with, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua were among a small group of countries that refused to allow its adoption as an agreement of the Parties.⁴⁰ In the subsequent wake of what many perceived as a failed conference, Evo Morales issued a call to the 'peoples of the world, social movements and Mother Earth's defenders, . . . scientists, academics, lawyers and governments that want to work with their citizens' to gather in the Bolivian city of Cochabamba for a 'World

³⁶ UNFCCC. 'Delegation of Bolivia, Press Conference' (18 December 2009), 14:00, available at: {http://cop15.meta-fusion.com/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id_kongresssession=2741&theme=unfccc}.

³⁷ Interview with author (9 February 2010).

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Quoted in Ron Ridenour, 'COP15: An Insider's Report from the ALBA Delegation' (29 December 2009), available at: {<http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/5042>}.

⁴⁰ UNFCCC, 'Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), resumed 12th Meeting' (19 December 2009), 03:10, available at: {http://www1.cop15.meta-fusion.com/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id_kongressmain=1&theme=unfccc&id_kongresssession=2755}.

People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth'.⁴¹ This call attracted approximately 35,000 people, about three-quarters of whom were Bolivian with others coming from 140 countries. Although civil society accounted for the vast majority of participants, politicians from 56 countries are also reported to have attended the conference in April 2010.⁴²

While ostensibly open to all, the framing of the call effectively constructed a constituency defined by the discourse of Green Radicalism. The following excerpts serve to illustrate this framing:

Confirming that 75% of historical emissions of greenhouse gases originated in the countries of the North that followed a path of irrational industrialisation;

Noting that climate change is a product of the capitalist system; . . .

Affirming that in order to ensure the full fulfilment of human rights in the twenty-first century, it is necessary to recognize and respect Mother Earth's rights;

Reaffirming the need to fight for climate justice; . . .

Confident that the peoples of the world, guided by the principles of solidarity, justice and respect for life, will be able to save humanity and Mother Earth . . .

The World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth has as objectives:

- 1) To analyze the structural and systemic causes that drive climate change and to propose radical measures to ensure the well-being of all humanity in harmony with nature . . .
- 5) To analyze and develop an action plan to advance the establishment of a Climate Justice Tribunal
- 6) To define strategies for action and mobilization to defend life from Climate Change and to defend the Rights of Mother Earth.⁴³

The conference was organised around 17 working groups corresponding to the various themes under discussion in the UNFCCC negotiations, as well as self-organised events. Like the conference call, the working groups' agendas were framed in Green Radical terms. For example, the mandate of Group 1 was to 'promote the analysis of the underlying, structural root causes of climate change . . . [and] reveal how . . . the rise in greenhouse gases are a product of a model of life and development under the capitalist system'. Meanwhile, the mandate of Group 15 was to '... analyze, reflect on, and elaborate proposals for confronting the dangers of carbon markets'.⁴⁴ What sets the Cochabamba conference somewhat apart from other settings where Green Radicalism is articulated, such as Klimaforum09 and the UNFCCC side event programme,⁴⁵ is the strong use of indigenous language and concepts. In this context

⁴¹ PWCCC (People's World Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth) 'Call' (5 January 2010), available at: {<http://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/01/15/call/>}.

⁴² Evo Morales, 'Discurso de Evo Morales Ayma, Presidente del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, al Grupo del G 77 + China en las Naciones Unidas' (7 May 2010), available at: {<http://cmccc.org/2010/05/07/discurso-de-evo-al-g77-en-la-onu/>}.

⁴³ PWCCC, 'Working Groups' (2010), available at: {<http://pwccc.wordpress.com/category/working-groups/>}.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ See Stevenson and Dryzek. 'Enhancing the legitimacy of multilateral climate governance'; and John S. Dryzek and Hayley Stevenson, 'Global Democracy and Earth System Governance', *Ecological Economics*, 70 (2011), pp. 1865–74.

Green Radicalism is partly being expressed in terms of *Pachamama* (Mother Earth) being wounded by exploitative modes of development promoted by the West. So carbon markets are rejected on the usual grounds that they allow the wealthy states to avoid responsibility, but also because such markets aim to turn a living being (*Pachamama*) into private property. This, from the indigenous perspective, is an ontological contradiction. It is the responsibility of the world's people to sustain the life of Mother Nature and respect her rights, and this can be best pursued by acknowledging and valuing the knowledge and customs of indigenous people themselves. This does not reflect a departure from the Green Radical class of discourse outlined above, but rather the occasional articulation of this discourse in indigenous terms.⁴⁶

While it is possible that a range of people may be attracted to the idea of engaging in dialogue with 'peoples of the world, social movements and Mother Earth's defenders', this representation of the problem will most strongly resonate with those articulating discourses of Green Radicalism. As such, the resulting 'People's Agreement' is a strong articulation of Green Radicalism. Ecofeminism is reflected in its recognition that the crisis being confronted emerges from a patriarchal and destructive model of civilisation.⁴⁷ Radical decentralisation is strongly reflected in the Agreement in references to the importance of returning to and valuing indigenous and ancestral practices and knowledge;⁴⁸ including models of agriculture that are locally appropriate and under the control of local people;⁴⁹ the denouncement of 'the way in which the capitalist model imposes mega-infrastructure'.⁵⁰ New globalism is reflected in the Agreement's emphasis on equity and solidarity among all human beings, and 'collective well-being and the satisfaction of the basic necessities of all';⁵¹ the fair use of atmospheric space;⁵² criticism of the Copenhagen Accord for attempting to 'divide and create confrontation between peoples';⁵³ the importance of welcoming climate migrants into foreign territories;⁵⁴ the importance of bringing technology under participatory control;⁵⁵ and the call to establish a global referendum or popular consultation on climate change rather than allow powerful states to decide on climate action.⁵⁶

Through their efforts to promote this document in multilateral settings, ALBA has engaged in what should be understood as 'discursive representation'.⁵⁷ The 'representative claim'⁵⁸ has been made by different actors in different contexts. Examples include the statement from Venezuela's minister Hatcher's that '[t]he peoples will have in the revolutionary governments of ALBA an official voice in the (Cancún) Summit', as cited above. Similarly, Bolivia's ambassador to the UN reassured social

⁴⁶ See 'People's Agreement', PWCCC (22 April 2010), Cochabamba, Bolivia, available at: {<http://pwccc.wordpress.com/support/>}.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 8.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 25.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 28.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, para. 8.

⁵² *Ibid.*, para. 13.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, para. 24.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, para. 37.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 44.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 49.

⁵⁷ Dryzek and Niemeyer, 'Discursive Representation'.

⁵⁸ Saward, *The Representative Claim*.

movements protesting at the sixteenth Conference of the Parties in Cancún that ‘... our voice is yours, more than ever we have to be here with you to transfer [that voice]’.⁵⁹ In submitting the Cochabamba conclusions to the UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action, ALBA governments also claimed to be ‘mak[ing] these voices our own’.⁶⁰ Others, including Bolivia’s foreign minister and a spokesperson for international peasant movements have referred to Evo Morales as the ‘ambassador’ of the people and of the Cochabamba summit, which is an unambiguous claim of representation.⁶¹ Even the UN’s own representative to the Cochabamba conference, Alicia Bárcena, claimed that Morales can represent a state and act as a ‘spokesperson’ to take the positions of civil society groups to the UN.⁶²

In discussing representation as a process of claim-making, Saward reminds us to be alert to the silencing effect that representative effects can have.⁶³ The process of constructing ‘the represented’ in terms that ‘the representatives’ wish to represent in global climate governance necessarily involves exclusion. In this case, exclusion may occur through actors failing to identify with a particular framing of the problem, but it also occurred in a more explicit fashion by denying certain voices the opportunity to establish an official 18th working group. Bolivian indigenous organisation, CONAMAQ, proposed an eighteenth working group to discuss local socio-environmental issues, and in particular the impacts of an extractionist model of development that the Morales government continues to promote. The Bolivian government rejected their proposal, arguing that the focus needed to be on reaching agreement on the main causes of climate change and the responsibility of the North.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, Working Group 18 (*Mesa 18*) established itself just outside the official venue and attracted considerable attention from the media and conference participants. The Declaration of Working Group 18 was an articulation of the ‘radical decentralisation’ discourse outlined above, but with a special emphasis on the sovereignty of indigenous people. Their declaration renounced, *inter alia*, ‘imperialism, transnational corporations, and the so-called progressive Latin American governments that promote energy projects and mega infrastructure ... especially in indigenous and protected areas – designed by banks, businesses, and private builders with a neoliberal and exploitative vision’.⁶⁵ The official People’s Agreement similarly denounced ‘the way in which the capitalist model imposes mega-infrastructure projects and invades territories with extractive projects, water privatization, and militarized

⁵⁹ Pablo Solón, ‘Bolivian ambassador to the UN addresses the Vía Campesina march’, *Global Exchange video* (YouTube) (7 December 2010), available at: {http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=49vcXk_Xrbc}.

⁶⁰ ALBA, Paper No. 18: Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic Of) on behalf of Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Cuba, Ecuador and Nicaragua. UNFCCC Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2 (30 April 2010).

⁶¹ HidrocarburosBolivia, ‘Evo será el embajador de la Cumbre en la ONU y el mundo’ (27 April 2010), available at: {<http://www.cumbrecambioclimatico.org/cochabamba/noticias/275-evo-sera-el-embajador-de-la-cumbre-en-la-onu-y-el-mundo>}; Boca de Polen, ‘Vivir en armonía con la madre tierra, la dignidad y la igualdad’ (2010), available at: {<http://www.bocadepolen.org/dialogo-climatico-espacio-mexicano>}; and CLOC-VC, ‘Evo Morales propuso un nuevo socialismo para vivir bien’ (2010), available at: {<http://www.cloc-viacampesina.net/pt/noticias-cumbre-climatica/454-evo-morales-propuso-un-nuevo-socialismo-para-vivir-bien>}.

⁶² Carlos Valdez, ‘ONU blanco de duras críticas en cita climática de pueblos’, *Associated Press* (22 April 2010).

⁶³ Saward, ‘The Representative Claim’, p. 304.

⁶⁴ Erika Loritz, ‘Ecos de la Cumbre: Gestión Ambiental de Bolivia y Sus Contradicciones’ (27 April 2010), available at: {<http://plataformaenergética.org/content/854>}.

⁶⁵ CONAMAQ (Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu) ‘Declaración mesa n° 18’ (21 April 2010), available at: {http://www.constituyentesoberana.org/3/pronunciamientos/042010/210410_1.pdf}.

territories, expelling indigenous people from their lands, inhibiting food sovereignty and deepening socio-environmental crisis'. This latter declaration, though, made no reference to the role of regional governments in promoting such projects.

Silencing and exclusion in discursive representation can also occur through incomplete representation. As we will see below, some of the nuances of Green Radicalism have been lost in ALBA's representation, especially those associated with ecofeminism.

IV. Critically evaluating ALBA's representation of Green Radicalism

The representation of diverse discourses in global climate governance is important for preventing the unchallenged dominance of any one discourse. It also offers an opportunity for ensuring inclusivity at a time when many are questioning how 192 states can possibly reach agreement through the UN system. But this raises a number of questions concerning how discourses generally articulated within safe enclave spaces can be appropriately and effectively translated to wider public and empowered spaces. In this section I evaluate ALBA's representation of Green Radicalism on the basis of four questions: Is the rhetoric used by ALBA appropriate to the task of representing a discourse? Is ALBA making itself accountable to those it aims to represent? How consistently has ALBA represented Green Radicalism? How legitimate is ALBA's representative claim from the perspective of others articulating Green Radical discourses? Reflecting on the merits and shortcomings that emerge in this evaluation, I then confront the question of whether a public discourse that departs radically from the *status quo* can ever be effectively represented by state-based actors.

a. Is the rhetoric used by ALBA appropriate to the task of representing a discourse?

The public sphere of global climate governance tends to be characterised by discrete settings in which particular discourses flourish.⁶⁶ Such enclave settings can be beneficial by allowing groups, especially marginalised or disempowered ones, to 'formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs'⁶⁷ and thereby develop distinct and coherent discourses. But representing such discourses in wider public and empowered settings requires designated individuals to effectively 'translate' ideas that make sense in a specific context to 'foreign' contexts.⁶⁸ The rhetoric employed for this translation task will affect the impact of representation. Rhetoric is any utterance made with the intention of persuading or affecting an audience. In recent years some democratic theorists have moved away from the Platonic tradition of dismissing rhetoric as inherently manipulative and have instead sought to capture its virtuous and communicative functions.⁶⁹ These theorists present a variety of distinctions for defensible and indefensible rhetoric by considering, for example, whether it advances general interests over specific interests; opens or closes opportunities to be challenged; or promotes critical reflection rather than playing to known

⁶⁶ Stevenson and Dryzek, 'The discursive democratisation of global climate governance'.

⁶⁷ Nancy Fraser, 'Rethinking the Public Sphere: A contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy', in Craig Calhoun (ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), p. 123.

⁶⁸ Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 69; John S. Dryzek, 'Rhetoric in Democracy: A Systemic Appreciation', *Political Theory*, 38:3 (2010), p. 320.

⁶⁹ For example, Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*; Simone Chambers, 'Rhetoric and the Public Sphere: Has Deliberative Democracy Abandoned Mass Democracy?', *Political Theory*, 37 (2009), pp. 323–50.

biases.⁷⁰ Perhaps the most useful distinction for evaluating the rhetoric of a discursive representative is Dryzek's distinction between bridging and bonding rhetoric.⁷¹ This distinction directs attention to the different functions that rhetoric serves for different audiences, and is helpful for evaluating the rhetoric of actors moving between a discursive enclave and a wider setting in which multiple discourses may be present. Bonding rhetoric can have the effect of strengthening ties between people who share a discourse. This may be appropriate within gatherings of similarly marginalised people whose position may be strengthened through enhanced relations and feelings of unity. Bridging rhetoric seeks to understand and reach out to those known to have other, but potentially overlapping or compatible, discursive commitments. Effectively advancing the needs and interests of a constituency will generally require a representative to emphasise aspects of a discourse that differently positioned people can potentially appreciate if not accept. The aim is to attract support for a desired outcome by appealing to ideas and reasons that differently positioned people (with a range of discursive commitments) can understand and appreciate. Bridging rhetoric is ultimately essential for effective discursive representation.⁷²

ALBA government representatives made several speeches and submissions to the UNFCCC and related fora during December 2009 and December 2010. These can be understood as acts of representation. Close reading of some of these texts can reveal explicit references to ideas and expressions that clearly resonate with Green Radicalism (bonding rhetoric), and efforts to present Green Radical ideas and demands in more moderate language that others might understand and appreciate (bonding rhetoric).⁷³

⁷⁰ For a summary of this literature, see Dryzek, 'Rhetoric in Democracy'.

⁷¹ Ibid, pp. 328–30. Dryzek explains that the 'basic terminology is taken from Robert Putnam's treatment of social capital: bonding is associating with people who are similar in social background, bridging is associating with people with different social characteristics' (ibid. p. 328).

⁷² Ibid., pp. 328–9.

⁷³ Each of the analysed acts of representation (speeches and submissions) is available online: 1. Pablo Solón, 'Intervención de Bolivia en el Grupo de Trabajo de Cooperación a Largo Plazo de Naciones Unidas', presenta los Resultados de la Conferencia Mundial de los Pueblos (1 June 2010), available at: {<http://cmpcc.org/2010/06/01/intervencion-de-bolivia-en-el-grupo-de-trabajo-de-cooperacion-a-largo-plazo-de-naciones-unidas-presenta-los-resultados-de-la-conferencia-mundial-de-los-pueblos/>}; 2. ALBA, 'Paper no. 18'; 3. Hugo Chávez, 'Discurso del Presidente Hugo Chávez: Clausura de la Cumbre de la Conferencia Mundial de los Pueblos sobre el cambio climático y los derechos de la Madre Tierra Cochabamba' (22 April 2010), available at: {http://www.debatessocialistadigital.com/Discursos/discursos_2010/abril/hugo_chavez_cochabamba_bolivia.html}; 4. Hugo Chávez, 'Discurso del Presidente Chávez durante la XV Conferencia sobre Cambio Climático en Copenhague' (16 December 2009), available at: {http://www.mre.gob.ve/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3066:discurso-del-presidente-chavez-durante-la-xv-conferencia-sobre-cambio-climatico-copenhague&catid=2:actualidad&Itemid=44}; 5. Esteban Lazo Hernández, 'Discurso en la Conferencia Mundial de Cochabamba' (22 April 2010), available at: {<http://www.5septiembre.cu/index.php/sociedad/internacional/47-noticias/6188-discurso-de-esteban-lazo-hernandez-en-la-conferencia-mundial-de-cochabamba>}; 6. Evo Morales, 'Intervención del Presidente de Bolivia en la Cumbre Climática de Cancún'; 7. Evo Morales, 'Intervención en la Conferencia Mundial de los Pueblos sobre Cambio Climático' (20 April 2010), available at: {<http://alainet.org/active/37560>}; 8. Evo Morales, 'Discurso de Evo Morales Ayma, Presidente del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, al Grupo del G 77 + China en las Naciones Unidas' (7 May 2010), available at: {<http://cmpcc.org/2010/05/07/discurso-de-evo-al-g77-en-la-onu/>}; 9. Evo Morales, 'Intervención de Evo Morales Ayma, presidente del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, en la Cumbre Climática de las Naciones Unidas, en Copenhague' (18 December 2009), available at: {http://www.ecoportal.net/Contenido/Temas_Especiales/Cambio_Climatico/palabras_del_presidente_evo_morales_en_la_cumbre_del_cambio_climatico}; and 10. Evo Morales, 'Intervención de Evo Morales Ayma, presidente del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, en la Cumbre Climática de las Naciones Unidas, en Copenhague' (17 December 2009), available at: {http://www.ecoportal.net/Contenido/Temas_Especiales/Cambio_Climatico/palabras_del_presidente_evo_morales_en_la_cumbre_del_cambio_climatico}.

Bonding rhetoric is pervasive. It is easily discerned in enclave settings of Green Radicalism, such as the Cochabamba people's summit. Here, Evo Morales' opening address appealed to common values, concepts, and language among the audience of social movements (including indigenous, environmentalist, labour, and feminist movements), and members of green, Marxist, and communist political parties from around the world. Particular emphasis is placed on juxtaposing the environmentally and socially destructive capitalist model of development with harmonious indigenous communities' modes of living; and the irrationality of Western modern thought and customs with the rationality of ancestral and indigenous thought and customs. Bonding in this context can be understood not only as strengthening ties between disparate groups within the audience but also strengthening ties between civil society and post-neoliberal governments. Illustrative are the repeated references in this address to their shared struggle, vision, and strength.⁷⁴ Similarly, Cuba's Vice-President Esteban Lazo Hernández's speech during the closing ceremony demonstrated his government's solidarity with social movements and people of the world by employing their language of 'Mother Earth', '*Pachamama*', and 'climate debt'.⁷⁵ Whereas Morales and Hernández engaged with the theme of climate and environment, Hugo Chávez's closing speech in Cochabamba can be read as an exercise in bonding the people and governments of Latin America within the wider context of ALBA's regional integration.⁷⁶ This is explicit in his closing statement: '... we have come to Cochabamba to further charge our batteries to continue the Revolution and to continue promoting Socialism in Latin America'. In a speech of more than 2,000 words, a mere five references are made to climate. Instead, Chávez emphasises Venezuela's solidarity with the people of Bolivia and likens Morales to Simón Bolívar by citing a famous poem written in homage to the nineteenth century liberator:

Just as Choquehuanca said when Bolívar arrived on these lands: '*With the centuries will grow your glory just as the shadow grows when the sun sets*', we can today say this to Evo. Evo has become, who would doubt it, not only a leader of the Bolivian people but one of the leaders of the Latin American and Caribbean people.

Chávez contextualises the climate crisis in the myriad other crises to which ALBA is a response: political, social, financial, ecological crises; the crises of capitalism and imperialism. The bellicosity of Chávez's rhetoric is perhaps unsurprising given his military background; to emerge victorious in the battle against climate change, the people must continue to be deployed and intensify the 'battle of ideas'. Chávez leaves no doubt that this is a battle between capitalism, the victorious ideology in the twentieth century, and socialism, 'humanity's salvation' in the twenty-first century.⁷⁷

Bonding rhetoric can also be discerned in wider pluralist spaces where bridging rhetoric may be more appropriate. In such cases, speeches can be understood as reaching beyond the immediate audience to a broader, outside audience.⁷⁸ Addressing the high-level segment of the Copenhagen Summit in 2009, Morales acknowledges that

⁷⁴ Morales, 'Intervención en la Conferencia Mundial de los Pueblos sobre Cambio Climático'.

⁷⁵ Hernández, 'Discurso en la Conferencia Mundial de Cochabamba'.

⁷⁶ Chávez, 'Discurso del Presidente Hugo Chávez'.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Indeed, the fact that heads of government's speeches in the UNFCCC are scheduled to coincide with television prime time in their own countries suggests that the target audience is often different from the immediate audience.

there are deep differences among the governments present: there are those who subscribe to a 'culture of life' (socialism: living well), and those who subscribe to a 'culture of death' (capitalism: living better). Those who understand climate change in Green Radical terms may immediately see this statement as legitimate, but such rhetoric is perhaps incomprehensible to those whose ontology includes such concepts as 'green capitalism' and 'green growth', that is, those who understand the climate issue in Mainstream Sustainability or Expansive Sustainability terms.⁷⁹ Moreover, the nuanced and reflective arguments articulated by many non-state actors within Green Radical enclaves are poorly transmitted when the matter is painted in such broad and exclusive terms of capitalism versus socialism. Further bonding rhetoric directed at other left governments and social movements can be found in Morales's pledge to build on their regional successes and jointly overthrow capitalism 'to save humanity'.⁸⁰ Morales concludes by expressing his lack of faith in resolving climate change under the existing arrangements, and calls instead on the 'peoples of the world to organise, become aware, unite, and mobilise to end capitalism and thereby save humanity and planet earth'.⁸¹ Speaking the following day, Morales continues to emphasise the distance between the positions of developed country governments and those of 'the people', reducing the debate to killing versus saving lives.⁸² Chávez's speech in the high level segment in Copenhagen can also be read as bonding with an external audience of protesters. Here he employs their slogans ('Don't change the climate, change the system' and 'If the climate were a bank, they would have saved it by now') and cites philosophers ranging from Karl Marx to Jesus Christ to defend the argument that capitalism and wealth are destroying the planet.⁸³

In the speeches analysed, bridging rhetoric is employed in an apparently selective manner. Speeches made by Chávez and Morales reveal apparent efforts to bridge the positions of ALBA and 'the people' with the G77 bloc of developing countries while emphasising the chasm between their positions and those of the North. Presenting the People's Agreement to the G77 plus China in May 2010, Morales acknowledged the diversity of positions within the G77 but argues that a successful outcome in Cancún would require strong unity and participation of the world's people.⁸⁴ While highlighting the responsibility and culpability of the developed countries, Morales insists that the G77 has the strength to save humanity and planet Earth, and ensure that the voice of their people is heard and respected: '*This is the strength of unity of the sardines against the sharks.*'⁸⁵ The tone and language used by Morales to address the G77 is patently different to that used within the setting of the Cochabamba meeting; both are more moderate and palatable to a wider audience. To persuade the governments of developing countries of the merits of the Peoples' Agreement, Morales first maps the points of convergence between the positions of the G77 and those of 'the peoples' before introducing those aspects of the Agreements that are less likely to attract immediate acceptance. The word 'capitalism' is uttered merely twice towards the end of the speech, compared to 24 times during the opening of the

⁷⁹ Stevenson and Dryzek, 'The discursive democratisation of global climate governance'.

⁸⁰ Morales, 'Intervención de Evo Morales Ayma' (17 December 2009).

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Morales, 'Intervención de Evo Morales Ayma' (18 December 2009).

⁸³ Chávez, 'Discurso del Presidente Chávez' (2009).

⁸⁴ Morales, 'Discurso de Evo Morales Ayma' (7 May 2010).

⁸⁵ Ibid.

Cochabamba meeting. Morales repeatedly returns to the culpability and responsibility of the North and uses the ‘climate debt’ of the North as a segue into introducing the proposed ‘Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth’, the potential effect of this is to assuage the concerns that many G77 governments may hold about the implications of such a document for their own countries.

Chávez’s speech to the high level segment in Copenhagen can also be read as an effort to bridge their position with those of other developing countries. He does so firstly by highlighting their common experience of exclusion and domination; secondly by vocally supporting the positions of Brazil, China, and India that resonate with the positions of ALBA; and thirdly by defending China against pressure from the United States and others to reduce their emissions by highlighting disparities in their wealth and per capita emissions.⁸⁶

A rare, and perhaps unique, example of bridging rhetoric directed at industrialised countries of the North can be found in Morales’s address to delegates at COP16 in December 2010. Morales used this opportunity to share the conclusions of the Cochabamba summit. Although the substance of most of these conclusions may be much more ambitious and far reaching than any developed country government could directly support, Morales cites their common democratic values and mandates to appeal to these countries to listen to the people’s voices:

If we are presidents and governments democratically elected by our peoples, we have an obligation to listen to the clamorous requests of the world’s peoples. We have an obligation to heed and adopt the decisions of the world’s peoples. And we cannot, here behind closed doors, try to impose documents that do not express the sentiment of the peoples.⁸⁷

In sum, there is ample evidence of bonding rhetoric that may assist with consolidating relations and feelings of unity among actors sharing a Green Radical discourse. Such rhetoric is articulated both within enclave settings and also in wider pluralist settings where speakers project their words beyond the immediate audience to an external one. Bridging rhetoric is essential for the effective representation of a discourse in a pluralist setting but, as I have shown, this is used sparingly and selectively. Evo Morales and Hugo Chávez have demonstrated an interest in bridging the positions of ALBA and ‘the people’ with those of the G77. But when addressing the wider gatherings of the UNFCCC, both leaders appear more concerned with widening the chasm between ‘the people’ and the developed countries rather than bridging their differences to any extent.

b. Is ALBA accountable to those it aims to represent?

Accountability in relations of representation is generally understood to require sanctioning power: the represented should be able to punish (or reward) those charged with representing their interests. However, Jane Mansbridge makes a strong argument that in relations of representation characterised by ‘self-motivated agents’ and an alignment of both parties’ objectives, close monitoring and sanctioning is not the most appropriate model of accountability.⁸⁸ Instead, such circumstances favour

⁸⁶ Chávez, ‘Discurso del Presidente Chávez’ (2009).

⁸⁷ Morales, ‘Intervención del Presidente de Bolivia’ (10 December 2010).

⁸⁸ Jane Mansbridge, ‘A “Selection Model” of Political Representation’, *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 17:4 (2009), pp. 369–98.

'narrative' and 'deliberative' forms of accountability, based on an understanding of accountability as 'giving an account'. Mansbridge writes: 'In *narrative* and *deliberative* accountability, the representative explains the reasons for her actions and even (ideally) engages in two-way communication with constituents, particularly when deviating from the constituents' preferences.'⁸⁹ A communicative style of accountability is also central to Dryzek and Niemeyer's theory of discursive representation:

To be accountable to the discourse (or discourses) they represent, representatives must continue to communicate in terms that make sense within that discourse (or discourses), even as they encounter different others . . . and even as they reflect and change their minds in such encounters.⁹⁰

There is a publicity dimension to this model of accountability whereby representatives ought to publicly justify any change in the discursive terms in which they communicate. To the extent that discursive representatives move between 'enclaves' and pluralist settings, it is reasonable to apply a communicative standard of accountability that requires representatives to: (a) communicate in terms that make sense to a particular discourse; (b) provide an account of their actions (including justification for ceasing to communicate in terms that reflect the discourse they represent) that is accessible to a diffuse 'constituency' of adherents to the discourse; and (c) engage in two-way communication with members of a discursive enclave such that all parties may pose and respond to questions. How, then, does the case of ALBA measure up against this standard?

Despite earlier claims that 'The peoples will have in . . . ALBA an official voice in the [Cancún] Summit',⁹¹ by the final night of negotiations only Bolivia remained faithful to the terms of Green Radicalism. The unified position that ALBA had maintained throughout the preceding two weeks of negotiations splintered as Bolivian ambassador, Pablo Solón, stood alone in objecting to the negotiated decisions. Solón's reasons were both procedural and substantive (including low level of ambition; absence of individual quantifiable targets; lack of clarity on provision of financial and technological resources; nominated role for the World Bank).⁹² By contrast, Venezuela's head negotiator intervened in the final session to say that although the level of ambition reached was unsatisfactory for some, the documents were 'full of hope' and offered a path forward.⁹³ Cuban negotiator, Bruno Rodríguez, called on the parties to listen to the concerns raised by Bolivia, speaking in the name of the Latin American people. He expressed dissatisfaction with several elements of the texts but nevertheless identified himself as 'a realist' and acknowledged that specific commitments would not be established in Cancún.⁹⁴ For Ecuador, the texts were a sign of progress but required improvement over the following year.⁹⁵

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 384.

⁹⁰ Dryzek and Niemeyer, 'Discursive Representation', p. 490.

⁹¹ Minister Hatcher quoted in Abrebrecha, 'Alba representará la voz'.

⁹² Pablo Solón, 'Discurso del Embajador Pablo Solón del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia' (10 December 2010), COP16, Cancún, available at: {<http://cmppc.org/2010/12/11/discurso-de-bolivia-en-cancun-10-diciembre-2010/>}.

⁹³ Claudia Salerno, 'Intervention in Joint COP16', 10th/CMP 11th meetings (11 December 2010), Cancún, available at: {http://webcast.cc2010.mx/webmedia_en.html?id=313}.

⁹⁴ Rodríguez, 'Intervención del Canciller cubano Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla en la sesión final de la Cumbre del Clima en Cancún' (10 December 2010), available at: {<http://embacuba.cubaminrex.cu/Default.aspx?tabid=12973>}.

⁹⁵ IISD, 'Summary of the Cancun Climate Change Conference', *Earth Negotiations Bulletin*, 12:498 (2010), available at: {<http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12498e.html>}.

Throughout 2010, Bolivia provided numerous accounts of its representative acts that were accessible to diffuse adherents to Green Radicalism. The website of the Cochabamba conference was frequently updated with copies of submissions and interventions to UNFCCC meetings.⁹⁶ During COP16 in Cancún, Evo Morales and Pablo Solón met with members of social movements and addressed public gatherings; and numerous press briefings were held at the negotiating venue during which Ambassador Solón explained Bolivia's position and responded to questions. In the aftermath of the Cancún negotiations, Bolivia posted an explanation for its actions on the Cochabamba conference website and Pablo Solón published an article in *The Guardian* newspaper titled 'Why Bolivia stood alone in opposing the Cancún climate agreement'.⁹⁷ Beyond statements made during the final formal meetings of the Cancún meetings, there is little evidence of other ALBA members providing an account for their actions to those they earlier had claimed to represent. Although some meetings are available for viewing on the Internet, this alone cannot be understood as an open and accessible form of public accountability.

Deliberative accountability, or two-way dialogue, is found to be weaker than narrative accountability. With the exception of the question-and-answer segments of press briefings, publicly-oriented accounts tend to be monologues with audience engagement limited to vocal displays of support. There are exceptions, however. As noted above, Evo Morales held an open dialogue with civil society at Klimaforum09 in which he sought feedback on his actions during COP15; this is a good example of 'deliberative accountability'. Other more exclusive dialogues have also taken place. The final day of the Cochabamba conference featured a dialogue between government representatives (including presidents Morales and Chávez) and coordinators of the 17 working groups.⁹⁸ However, this session was closed to the rest of the conference participants. In Cancún, small meetings between members of the Bolivian delegation and members of *Vía Campesina* also took place. One member of *Vía Campesina* said that this meeting provided an opportunity to reassure Ambassador Solón that he was not alone in his stand because he had the support of those in the streets.⁹⁹

c. How consistently has ALBA represented Green Radicalism?

Accountability in discursive representation demands consistency in communication: a representative ought to consistently communicate in terms that make sense within the relevant discourse. As observed above, only Bolivia had maintained such consistency by the end of 2010 as the other ALBA members distanced themselves from their claim to be a voice for the people. But we can also question the consistency of discursive representation during 2009 and 2010 by considering whether *all* Green Radical discourses were represented or whether representation was partial. Green

⁹⁶ PWCCC. 'World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth', available at: {<http://pwccc.wordpress.com/>}.

⁹⁷ Pablo Solón, 'Why Bolivia stood alone in opposing the Cancún climate agreement', *The Guardian* (21 December 2010), available at: {<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-green/2010/dec/21/bolivia-oppose-cancun-climate-agreement>}.

⁹⁸ Los Tiempos de la Cumbre Mundial, 'Conferencia cierra con grito de guerra' (23 April 2010), pp. 4–5.

⁹⁹ Interview with author (17 February 2011).

Radicalism is a class of discourse within which we can identify three distinct discourses: ecofeminism; radical decentralisation; and new globalism (see section II). The speeches and documents analysed above (see IV. a) reflect an uneven representation of distinct Green Radical discourses. Generally members of ALBA have tended to articulate their concerns and demands only within the broad terms of Green Radicalism. The unsustainable nature of capitalism and the international economic order, and the uneven distribution of power are the most salient ideas transferred to the UNFCCC. Of the three distinct Green Radical discourses, 'new globalism' is best reflected in ALBA's acts of representation. Examples include the emphasis on creating democratic forms of participation in global governance, such as the referendum on climate change, direct dialogue with communities, and solidarity and leadership from social movements and people;¹⁰⁰ the importance of participatory and public control over climate technologies;¹⁰¹ the possibility for humane and equal societies that equitably share atmospheric space;¹⁰² and the importance of opening up borders to welcome climate refugees.¹⁰³ Radical decentralisation makes an appearance in just four of these acts of representation, including in calls for 'food sovereignty',¹⁰⁴ and the repeated stress on valuing and returning to traditional and ancestral knowledge and practices.¹⁰⁵ The specific concerns and assumptions associated with ecofeminism were not reflected in any act of representation. The consistency of representation is then weakened by the frequent inattention to the nuances of this class of discourse. The detection of nuances and their integration in acts of representation is more likely to occur if representatives engage more in deliberative accountability than narrative accountability.

Consistency also has significance beyond purposive acts of representation. Representation also occurs as representatives perform their everyday activities, and here Bolivia and other ALBA members fail to pass a test of consistency. In other words, they fail to consistently behave in ways that reflect Green Radical discourses even when no longer inside global fora such as the UNFCCC. This inconsistency emerges largely as a result of these countries remaining tied to a model of development based on extracting and exporting natural resources, including fossil fuels. This structural dependence has strained domestic relations between 'post-neoliberal' governments and environmental and indigenous groups, especially in Ecuador and Bolivia. In 2008, Ecuador passed a new Constitution that is unprecedented in its environmental provisions; Mother Earth is granted rights (to respect and protection), and citizens are granted the right to live well in a healthy and sustainable environment. But the ink was barely dry on the new Constitution when President Correa passed a mining law considered unconstitutional. Correa's response to ensuing protests was to dismiss the environmentalist and indigenous groups opposed to the law as 'childish', 'nobodies' and 'allies of the right' who 'want to force us to remain like beggars sitting atop a bag of gold'.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁰ See note 73: acts 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

¹⁰¹ See note 73: act 2.

¹⁰² See note 73: acts 3, 4, 8, and 9.

¹⁰³ See note 73: act 8.

¹⁰⁴ See note 73: acts 1 and 8.

¹⁰⁵ See note 73: acts 2 and 7.

¹⁰⁶ Quoted in Paul Dosh and Nicole Kligerman, 'Correa vs. Social Movements: Showdown in Ecuador', *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 42:5 (2009), p. 23.

Such insults have recently been echoed in Bolivia when indigenous people have protested against the Morales Government's promotion of export-oriented hydrocarbon and mining projects. In response to their demands for 'the respect of *Pachamama* and sacred places', environmental conservation, and debate on a new model of sustainable development, Morales and his vice-president have accused indigenous people of being manipulated and bribed by environmental NGOs and US and EU aid agencies who wish to keep Bolivia in sixteenth-century conditions.¹⁰⁷ The Morales Government's inconsistent adherence to Green Radicalism has been seriously exposed in the TIPNIS conflict, which concerns their plans to construct a highway through land protected as indigenous ancestral territory and a national park, namely the Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory.¹⁰⁸ This highway project has been highly contentious within the immediate Amazonian region and elsewhere in Bolivia. Defended by Morales, government ministers, and public supporters on the grounds that it will open the region up to important social and welfare services while facilitating much needed economic development, it has nevertheless been thoroughly rejected by the majority of indigenous communal landholders. Critics argue that the highway will open the area up to exploration and extraction of oil and gas for export, expand deforestation, and accelerate a model of development antithetical to protecting the rights of Mother Earth. Moreover, they dispute the legality of the project which was developed and initiated in the absence of the free, prior, and informed consent of affected indigenous people.¹⁰⁹ The project attracted its strongest condemnation when hundreds of marching protesters were violently repressed by police and forced to return to their homelands. The incident weakened the leadership (with several high level officials, including cabinet ministers, resigning or being fired), damaged Morales' approval rating, and resulted in a moratorium on further construction of the controversial stretch of road while (non-binding) consultations are carried out.¹¹⁰

The violent repression and apparent inconsistency between Morales' rhetoric on Mother Earth rights and his government's eagerness to pursue this highway project have prompted several actors to publicly reproach the administration and question the plausibility of its ongoing representation of Green Radicalism (though not articulated in such terms). Pablo Solón (no longer serving as Bolivia's ambassador to the UN or senior negotiator in the UNFCCC) released an open letter to Morales urging coherence between words and actions and highlighting Bolivia's 'responsibility to be an example on the global stage'.¹¹¹ An open letter signed by 61 international and

¹⁰⁷ Econoticias Bolivia, 'Indígenas defienden la Amazonía y enojan a Evo' (14 July 2010), available at: {<http://www.econoticiasbolivia.com>}.

¹⁰⁸ It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed account of this situation, which remains unresolved at the time of writing in July 2012. More comprehensive coverage can be found in Federico Fuentes, 'Bolivia: Conflict deepens over disputed highway', *Green Left Weekly* 898 (2011), available at: {<http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/48959>}; and Courtney Frantz, 'The TIPNIS Affair: Indigenous Conflicts and the Limits on "Pink Tide" States Under Capitalist Realities' (16 December 2011), available at: {http://www.coha.org/the-tipnis-affair-indigenous-conflicts-and-the-limits-on-pink-tide-states-under-capitalist-realities/#_ftn29}.

¹⁰⁹ Chávez, 'Bolivia: Morales Clashes with Native Protesters'.

¹¹⁰ Emily Achtenberg 'Bolivia's controversial highway cancelled, but deeper conflicts remain', *Third World Resurgence*, 254:October (2011), available at: {<http://www.twinside.org.sg/title2/resurgence/2011/254/world4.htm>}.

¹¹¹ Pablo Solón, 'Carta abierta sobre TIPNIS a Presidente Evo Morales: Pablo Solón' (28 September 2011), available at: {<http://www.cochabamba.org.ar/?p=1879>}.

Bolivian social movements and civil society organisations similarly highlighted the ‘great responsibility’ that comes with Bolivia’s ‘pioneering work’ on issues of climate justice and indigenous rights. The letter warned that ‘Bolivia’s continued ability to press forward this vital agenda will be affected by its consistency and moral credibility on matters of human rights and environmental protection’.¹¹²

d. How legitimate is ALBA’s representative claim from the perspective of others articulating Green Radical discourses?

Cooperation between governments and social movements has often been fraught with problems and disappointments, not least in Latin America,¹¹³ so it is important to critically question representative claims that allow a government, or government-based alliance, to speak on behalf of ‘the people’. To gauge the perspective of those potentially represented by the ALBA’s positions in multilateral climate negotiations, a survey was carried out at the Cochabamba conference, and semi-structured interviews were conducted with members of movements or organisations that had supported the People’s Agreement and/or engaged in climate justice forums in Copenhagen or Cancún during climate negotiations.¹¹⁴ This section also draws on my own direct observations of these gatherings. The contested nature of the representative claim was strongly communicated through these inquiries. One axis of contestation rests on Day’s dichotomy of the ‘politics of the act’ versus ‘the politics of demand’.¹¹⁵ Social movements engaged in the former seek through autonomous action ‘to block, resist and render redundant both corporate and state power in local, national and transnational contexts’.¹¹⁶ In Holloway’s terms, they seek to ‘change the world without taking power’,¹¹⁷ and are therefore not focused on the formal negotiations in the United Nations. The ‘politics of demand’, by contrast, refers to ‘actions oriented to ameliorating the practices of states, corporations and everyday life, through either influencing or using state power to achieve irradiation effects’.¹¹⁸ The representative claim is rendered redundant by the former but may have some legitimacy for the latter. The tension between a politics of the act and a politics of demand is evident in contrasting messages directed from the Cochabamba conference to the UN. During the opening ceremony, the UN’s representative Alicia Bálcena struggled to speak over loud chants of ‘*Fuera! Fuera!*’ (‘Get out!’) coming from pockets of the audience. Others, though, have explicitly supported transferring the Cochabamba conclusions to the UN negotiations as evident in a letter signed by more than forty organisations

¹¹² Amazonwatch, Civil society letter to Evo Morales (21 September 2011), available at: {<http://amazonwatch.org/assets/files/20110921-tipnis-letter-to-evo-morales.pdf>}.

¹¹³ Verónica de la Torre, ‘De las Alternativas para las Américas, de la Alianza Social Continental a la Alternativa Bolivariana’, *Argumentos*, 22:59 (2009), pp. 187–214.

¹¹⁴ 49 English- or Spanish-speaking participants were randomly surveyed in Cochabamba. Twenty telephone interviews addressing this topic (partly or exclusively) have been carried out by the author. In some cases these individuals spoke in their capacity as politically active citizens (who may be engaged with numerous movements), but here I will use ‘social movements’ as an umbrella term for those interviewed/surveyed.

¹¹⁵ Richard J. F. Day, ‘From Hegemony to Affinity: The political logic of the newest social movements’, *Cultural Studies*, 18:5 (2004), p. 733.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ John Holloway, *Change the World Without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today* (London: Pluto Press, 2002).

¹¹⁸ Day, ‘From Hegemony to Affinity’, pp. 733–4.

that called on delegates at the UNFCCC negotiations in Tianjin to consider the Cochabamba agreement.¹¹⁹

Beyond this broader contextual legitimacy lies a spectrum of perspectives concerning the legitimacy of social movements being represented by members of governments. At one end of this spectrum is complete support for the efforts of Evo Morales and/or ALBA to represent ‘the people’ in multilateral climate negotiations; at the other end is rejection of the notion that civil society can be represented by an intergovernmental body. In between these two poles are those who see some merit in using state instruments to achieve short-term gains, while nevertheless maintaining a focus on movement-building for the long-term; and those who see it as inevitable that governments and the UN need to be engaged while still pushing for better opportunities for civil society to represent themselves. While the balance of opinion was tilted in favour of representation, trust was evidently a major concern at the Cochabamba conference. Many felt that trust between people and governments was non-existent on the issue of climate change because trust has historically been broken; because governments/politicians are always trying to serve their own, generally short-term, interests; and/or because governments are weak against big business. Some did, however, perceive Morales as an exception because he is a product of social movements and is making an effort to continue working with them. This itself was also evident in the chants of ‘*¡Evo, amigo, el pueblo está contigo!*’ (‘Evo, friend, the people are with you!’) repeated throughout the Cochabamba meeting.

Interviews were conducted before the TIPNIS conflict escalated and the violent police repression attracted heightened attention. However, interviewees were invited to comment on the potential charge of hypocrisy against governments espousing Mother Earth’s rights while remaining tied to a model of development based on extracting and exporting natural resources. This prompted a range of responses. A few were critical of what they perceived as a ‘double discourse’ being articulated by Morales and/or other members of ALBA. At the other end of the spectrum were a few who directed their criticism towards outsiders who focus on the domestic record of these Latin American states instead of on their stated intentions. From this perspective, the domestic situation is being used as a red herring by those ignoring the inevitable constraints imposed on states by the global capitalist system in which they remain involuntarily embedded. Between these two polar positions many were ambivalent: while they recognised the importance of moving beyond extraction economies and fossil fuel consumption, they were unsure about the implications of these for the credibility of state-based representatives.

Conclusion

In light of existing shortcomings in the inclusivity and legitimacy of the global climate regime, alternatives to traditional state-based representation need to be considered. Following Dryzek and Niemeyer,¹²⁰ we can find rational, ontological, and ethical reasons for pursuing ‘discursive representation’ in global climate negotiations. It is

¹¹⁹ CJN! (Climate Justice Now!) ‘CJN! members call on governments to support Cochabamba proposals’ (7 October 2010), available at: {<http://www.climate-justice-now.org/cjn-members-call-on-governments-to-support-cochabamba-proposals/>}.

¹²⁰ Dryzek and Niemeyer, ‘Discursive Representation’.

beyond the scope of this article to offer a general account of discursive representation or propose a comprehensive architecture for its effective implementation. Instead, here I have sought to examine and evaluate a single case of discursive representation, namely ALBA's representation of Green Radicalism. This case generates useful insights for a wider project of discursive representation in the UNFCCC, perhaps principally concerning the question of whether a public discourse that departs radically from the *status quo* can be effectively represented by state-based actors. The structural constraints imposed on states by the international system clearly undermine their capacity to consistently represent an economically radical and politically progressive discourse. This is evident at the international level where pressure to comply and preserve norms of multilateralism saw all ALBA members except Bolivia endorse the set of decisions emerging from Cancún, despite the fact that these ignored the demands of the Cochabamba agreements. It is also evident at the domestic level where dissenting activists have been dismissed, insulted, and occasionally repressed by government actors.¹²¹ Irrespective of whether state actors genuinely subscribe to Green Radical discourses, their political position dictates working within the confines of the *status quo*, while potentially making incremental reforms. Bolivia's Morales Government, for example, has inherited a set of historical and contemporary conditions from which it cannot immediately disentangle the country: Bolivia is a poor, landlocked country dependent on the extraction and export of natural resources for its survival within a capitalist global economy. The critical voice of Green Radicalism is crucial, yet it seems unlikely that it can consistently be echoed by state actors who are unavoidably attached to the *status quo*. This suggests that improving the inclusivity of discursive representation requires constructing innovative platforms for civil society to engage directly with those authorised to negotiate global agreements on climate change.¹²² Representation by civil society is, of course, not without problems and weaknesses. But the potential for consistent discursive representation is potentially higher if representatives are drawn from civil society, given their relative freedom from the domestic and international structural constraints experienced by state actors. This remains, though, an open question for future investigation.

¹²¹ Of course, structural constraints are no justification for violent repression. Given that Morales has denied directing the police crackdown on TIPNIS protesters, this may be better explained by the weakness of the Bolivian state and its lack of control over the police force (see Bolivia Information Forum 2011:2).

¹²² One such proposal is elaborated in Stevenson and Dryzek, 'Enhancing the legitimacy of multilateral climate governance'.