Turkish Jews alternate between articulating their difference as Jews and their sameness as Turkish citizens. Turkish Jews as collective present a public display of cosmopolitanism geared toward foreigners and Muslim Turks at official, choreographed events and sites celebrating Turkish tolerance. But individual Turkish Jews display patriotism in daily life, doing everything to erase their Jewishness in order to pass as unmarked citizens. They appear to disappear, so as not to invite physical danger, social discrimination, and to ensure communal cohesion.

Brink-Danan convincingly argues that Turkish Jewry publicly promotes a nostalgic vision of past Ottoman tolerance as a prescriptive means, a utopian vision of a time when the tiny, dwindling minority would not have to live in fear. Allowing themselves to be instrumentalized by the Republic in this way also allows this marginal group a viable public presence. Making itself useful to the government—promoting positive PR internationally—makes it relevant.

Jewish Life in 21st-Century Turkey would be an outstanding study if it only explained the dichotomies of an understudied group. But Brink-Danan's book will appeal to a much wider, interdisciplinary readership, for it solves the riddles of Turkish Jewish culture by offering a critical contribution to the discussion of cosmopolitanism.

Successfully challenging tenets of recent scholarly debates, Brink-Danan demonstrates how, for Turkish Jews, lived cosmopolitanism is neither an individualistic pursuit nor a choice or ethical orientation. For cosmopolitanism in this case is ascribed rather than achieved, which makes Turkish Jews into eternal guests and foreigners, preventing them from being able to convince others of their being local.

Deploying performance theory, the author successfully demonstrates how cosmopolitans not only possess the ability to know about different ways of being, but most crucial, know when to perform or disavow cosmopolitan identity. This "cosmopolitan knowledge" is the key to Turkish Jewry's "outward performance of sameness and inward maintenance of difference" (163). Displaying remarkable semiotic awareness, they learn "what to say, how to say it, to whom, and when" (94).

———Marc David Baer, University of California, Irvine

Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, *The Religious Question in Modern China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011, pp. xii + 464.

doi:10.1017/S0010417513000339

This book, coauthored by a historian and an anthropologist, provides an impressive synthesis of the burgeoning literature on religion in China. The narrative ranges from the late nineteenth to the early twenty-first centuries and

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417513000339 Published online by Cambridge University Press

encompasses mainland China as well as other parts of the "Chinese world" such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Throughout, the authors foreground a diversity of practices that are possible candidates to fall within the category of "religion." In imperial China, this diversity existed by reference to the "religio-political state" as its "ordering center of gravity" (p. 3), holding the power to distinguish between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. The book starts at the moment at which this center of gravity is fracturing, and shows how the various successors of the Middle Kingdom and their religious communities have tackled the process of rebuilding mutual relations under ever-shifting political conditions.

In their treatment of the late imperial and republican periods, Goossaert and Palmer present the emergence of the category of religion, and opposing terms such as "superstition" or "heretical teachings," but not as a simple transposition of Western categories. Rather, they trace the complex dialogue in which Chinese intellectuals crafted their understanding of Western modernity and what it required of China, sometimes mediated through other Asian powers such as Japan, where the neologisms for religion (*zongjiao*) and superstition (*mixin*) came from (50). In the Chinese Republic, the need to build independent institutional structures to replace the imperial center and to prove the moral usefulness of various religious teachings led to the establishment of national associations of Taoists, Buddhists, Muslims, Catholics, and Protestants, foreshadowing the religious denominations that would be recognized in communist China.

Moving into the Maoist period, the authors show the Communist Party as a contradictory actor, committed to destroying religious life but also finding itself put in the position of arbiter of true and false religion. This continues in post-Mao mainland China, where religion is integrated into that country's unique blend of capitalism and communism: religious organizations are treated as analogous to work units (*danwei*) and expected to be economically self-sustaining (318–19), religious leaders hold positions in people's congresses of various levels, and body cultivation practices at the edge of religion and medicine, such as *qigong*, had wide popular followings before Falungong was banned in 1999 (337–42). A 1991 state council directive presents a hilarious example of how the communist state, by allowing religion to function publicly but continuing to regulate it tightly, is increasingly forced into a role of religious arbiter somewhat like that of the emperor. In reference to the institution of reincarnate lamas in Tibet, the council decrees, "Reincarnation is allowed, but not all can be reincarnated" (365).

By crafting a compelling narrative out of a vast number of specialized studies, the authors offer a point of entry into China's many "religious questions" that will be useful to area specialists and also to readers interested in China for purposes of comparison. To someone versed in Soviet religious history, this book is striking for the many similarities between the strategies

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417513000339 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of both ruling parties. For instance, both parties initially were more tolerant of religious expression among ethnic minorities whose loyalty they needed to secure, sometimes through the help of religious leaders. But there also seem to be some common historiographical challenges to accounting for the effects militant anti-religious policies had on everyday practices. Like scholars who work on the early decades of the Soviet Union, Goossaert and Palmer largely tell a story of popular resistance to state-imposed anti-religious measures: elderly patients refuse to visit urban hospitals to avoid compulsory cremation laws (232); peasants bury their ancestral tablets, but recite the family genealogy while bowing to the portrait of Mao that has taken their place (165). This makes state measures seem superficial, with their impact fading once repressive enforcement stops. However, a fascinating chapter on "Filial Piety, the Family, and Death" ends with the tantalizing observation that with the one-child policy the traditional order of deference and veneration has been reversed, and grandparents have become "servants" of their grandchild (238). This hints at changes that run deep, and may tell us that when we work to account for secularization processes that occurred in socialist societies, religious policy is not always the most revealing place to look. Family policy, education, medicine, gender relations, and geographical mobility may be important areas through which to understand how initial resistance can turn into lasting change.

———Sonja Luehrmann, Simon Fraser University

Ayşe Zarakol, *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

doi:10.1017/S0010417513000340

Turkey's, Japan's, and Russia's experiences of defeat against the West and their efforts of modernization have received a fair amount of attention from historians, sociologists, and political scientists, but few studies have compared the three countries' relations with the West in the last century. Ayşe Zarakol's enquiry is a timely addition to international relations literature. A major argument she puts forward is that after their respective defeats—the Ottoman Empire in World War I, Japan in World War II, and the Soviet Union in the Cold War—the defeated realized their backwardness vis-à-vis the West. In order to overcome their inferior status in the international system, these states "believed Westernization to be a goal that a state could achieve by trying hard enough, and saw it as a solution that might allow them to recreate their past privileged position in the new normative universe" (p. 10). However, since their reforms and modernization policies ended in failure, Zarakol asserts, they were stigmatized in both their own minds and the minds of others, which created an ontological insecurity for all three.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417513000339 Published online by Cambridge University Press