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The long intervention: continuity in the Balkan theatre

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Abstract. Great Power intervention in the Balkans since the late nineteenth century shows a striking continuity in motivations, methods, and consequences. The article proposes that current intervention practices are largely a response to the Balkan theatre in the 1990s and thus institutionalise this continuity more than arguments about normative and institutional change since 1990 suggest. Three continuities are emphasised: the concept of a 'turbulent frontier' to explain an unintended dynamic of nearly continuous intervention, the importance of local actors' interests (the pull of intervention) alongside those of major power interests (the push), and the primary influence on domestic orders and cause of the 'turbulence' of economic relations.

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It is difficult to imagine our current understanding and practice of international intervention without the Balkan theatre in the 1990s. Normative debates on the right – and even duty – to intervene; the fundamental additions to the protection regime for refugees of a right to stay (at home) and the rights of internally displaced persons; the idea that the international use of force could be illegal, defying the UN charter and international law, but nonetheless legitimate; a new international doctrine of intervention, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)[1] – all were responses to the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, above all the Bosnian war, 1992–5, and then the 1999 NATO military intervention (a 78 day bombing campaign) in Serbia. Institutionally as well, the concept of a 'preventive deployment' of peacekeeping troops (sent in 1992 to monitor the northern border of Macedonia and act as a tripwire against Serbian military action), then of 'peace enforcement' (the coercive implementation

[1] In response to the debate on the legality of the NATO bombing of Serbia, the Canadian government established a commission on 'international intervention and state sovereignty'. It recommended a new doctrine of R2P, which the UN General Assembly adopted in 2005: *World Summit Outcome Document* (25 October 2005), in particular pp. 138–9.

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of a peace agreement by otherwise peacekeeping troops), the oxymoronic concept of a humanitarian war (justifying the NATO bombing campaign), the international governance of territories with 'transitional administrations' (first in Eastern Slavonia [Croatia] and then Kosovo), and the nearly unending list of internationally defined domestic economic and political reforms that is now standard in all postwar interventions – all begin there. At the same time, the mandates and capacities of all institutional actors – national powers and regional and international organisations – were also transformed in the process. Perhaps the most novel result of all historically was the change in intervention's image: the intentions as well as aims of the intervening external powers are now overwhelmingly considered benevolent and positive – for human and minority rights, democracy and liberal economies, and regional and international peace.

The common explanation for this raft of innovations is the changed international context with the end of the Cold War. This belief in newness is so strong that those who propose lessons from history to improve the results of contemporary practice (for example from the Marshall Plan[2] or the League of Nations[3]) are dismissed out of hand, if acknowledged at all. This article challenges that perspective, arguing that the current regulatory regime is largely only an institutionalisation of patterns of international practice in the Balkans since the late nineteenth century. As for its current favour, the readier willingness now to mandate and use military force but without altering the flawed, temporising approach of the major powers that unleashed in each case a chain of reaction and new problems requiring yet another intervention – discrete but nearly continuous – should give pause.

The history of international intervention in the Balkans since the 1880s, the subject of this article, suggests three revisions, moreover, in our analyses of intervention. First, while accepting the definition of intervention guiding this Special Issue, as coercive interference by one or more states in the domestic jurisdiction of another that is conceptually distinct from other 'modalities of violence', reflects a 'will to order' (and to spread modern social relations), and aims to be temporary, discrete,[4] this description of the Balkan experience cautions about too great an emphasis on conscious motivations. I will propose that John Galbraith's analysis of a dynamic of unintended colonial expansion in the nineteenth century based on the concept of a 'turbulent frontier' and the operational aspects of intervention is particularly useful in the Balkan cases. Second, explanations of intervention must also add the pull from local actors and the dynamic interaction between external and local actors. Third, while most attention on Balkan interventions is given to the diplomatic (and occasionally military) actors and activities, the more intrusive (and even coercive) actions of domestic ordering and the politics of this dynamic interaction have been economic.

[2] See, for example, Richard Kozul-Wright and Paul Rayment, 'Post-Conflict Recovery: Lessons from the Marshall Plan for the 21st Century', in Richard Kozul-Wright and Piergiuseppe Fortunato (eds), *Securing Peace: State-Building and Economic Development in Post-Conflict Countries* (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, in association with the United Nations, 2011), pp. 189–210.

[3] Susan Pedersen's review of recent reassessments has many examples: 'Back to the League of Nations', *American Historical Review* (October 2007), pp. 1091–117.

[4] John MacMillan, 'Intervention and the ordering of the modern world', introduction to this Special Issue.

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The concept of intervention in the Balkan cases

Situating the Balkan theatre historically at the center of any study of intervention does, however, create an empirical problem. How, in the course of the nineteenth century, does one distinguish intervention from imperial rule, conquest, occupation, or the new (commercial) imperialism, when all aim at domestic reform and all are occurring at the same time and tend to blend together? For example, at the start of the century, the region was ruled by empires – Habsburg, Venetian, and Ottoman. But the first change – replacing Venice with an occupation (Napoleonic) – looks far more like an intervention as we know it in the twenty-first century: temporary, substantial domestic reordering, and widely considered (then and now) as progressive (such as bringing the rule of Roman law, education, and roads).

In addition, whereas intervention proper is conceived as a mode of managing the modern tension between transnational forces and territorially fixed sovereignty, the primary interventions of the Great Powers in the Balkans from 1878 to 1918 (and again in 1990–2008) were focused on the latter, decisions on recognition (or non-recognition) of sovereignty and fixing those boundaries. Although clearly an exercise of unequal power, the targets of such decisions actively sought these interventions in their favour (against rivals in the neighborhood). They also sought the foreign loans and investment in support of their new statehood that entangled them in the transnational aspect of this tension. To add to this, the focus of the literature on a process of nation-state formation out of empires wrongly characterises it as unidirectional. Although these interventions may have been viewed as a tool of containment against the revolutionary pressures of nationalism, the national independence movements in Serbia and Greece that begin the Balkan process were part and parcel of a simultaneous process of nation-state formation within the Ottoman Empire and the complex pattern of autonomies and reforms, varying across the empire, that the Porte rolled out.[5] Although the Habsburg empire ends through defeat in war in 1918 rather than attempts at internal reform, its complex management of national aspirations throughout the century also was a dynamic interaction between reforms in the imperial capital (including the compromise of 1867) and provincial autonomies (including the occupation in 1878 and then annexation in 1908 of a new province, Bosnia-Herzegovina).

Although finding a moment when one could characterise the actions of the Great Powers as intervention pure and simple is fruitless, the politics of intervention in both intervening and target states looks remarkably contemporary by the 1870s: the important roles of newspapers (thus journalists), public opinion, refugees, 'massacres', and humanitarian organisations and arguments (former British prime minister Gladstone's pamphlet, 'The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East', of 6 September 1876, is often cited even now as a precursor to R2P). This article focuses instead on the empirical regularities of external interference in the Balkans from the 1870s to the twenty-first century, including even the primary focus on the dissolution and recognition of states and the refixing of territorial borders. This choice is reinforced by the conceptual difficulty posed by the Cold War era, when world war and occupation are first followed by intense competition between the US and the USSR

[5] Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), ch. 8, pp. 264–96, is particularly insightful on this process.

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to shape Communist Party rule in Yugoslavia, but then by four decades of what would appear to be remarkable non-intervention until the old pattern resumed in the late 1980s. Yet, the political and economic system of socialist Yugoslavia was shaped fundamentally by its international position under a foreign policy aimed, albeit, at national independence and neutrality between the blocs.[6] Was Josip Broz Tito's skill at keeping both powers at bay while exploiting their rivalry for domestic benefit a rare case of the conditions that can prevent intervention, or a strategy of survival on the periphery whereby domestic politics and policy were so penetrated by foreign conditions and options that territorial sovereignty has an entirely different meaning?

Motivations and means in the 'turbulent frontier'

German Chancellor Bismarck famously referred in 1878 to the Balkans, in the context of the history-defining decisions of the Congress of Berlin, as 'places of which no one ever heard before this war'.[7] Under public pressure to intervene militarily in the Bosnian war, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher repeated Bismarck's sentiments in 1993 in describing Bosnia as an 'intractable ''problem from hell'' that no one can be expected to solve ... less as a moral tragedy ... and more as a tribal feud that no outsider could hope to settle'.[8] When in 1992, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, the senior military official of the United States, reputedly said to Madeline Albright, then US ambassador to the United Nations, who was pressing for military intervention into Bosnia, 'we don't do mountains', signifying not only its strategic insignificance but also the appropriate role for the kind of military forces, doctrine, and qualifications he commanded, it was easy to hear echoes of Germany's Chancellor Bismarck, telling the German parliament in December 1876 that the Balkans were not 'worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier'.[9] Yet the major powers did intervene, over and over.

In trying to explain such repeated involvement in an area the major powers considered of little strategic interest, whether in 1876 or 1992, the concept of the 'turbulent frontier' used by John S. Galbraith[10] to explain 'the paradox of a British society reluctant to imperial expansion beyond areas commercially profitable, and the historical fact of an expanding British Empire'[11] in India, Malaya, and South Africa in the mid-nineteenth century is helpful. 'Part of the explanation lies', Galbraith suggests, 'in the pull exerted by ''turbulent frontiers'' adjacent to the area of Imperial authority and in the wide powers exercised by imperial viceroys' who, as 'governors charged with the maintenance of order, could not ignore disorder beyond

[6] For a detailed analysis, see Susan L. Woodward, *Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945–1990* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[7] Misha Glenny, *The Balkans 1804–1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers* (London: Granta Books, 1999), p. 139.

[8] Cited in Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 307.

[9] Glenny, *The Balkans*, p. 143.

[10] John S. Galbraith, 'The ''Turbulent Frontier'' as a Factor in British Expansion', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 2:2 (January 1960), pp. 150–68.

[11] Khatchik Der Ghoukassian, 'Instability in the New Imperial Periphery: A Conceptual Perspective of the ''Turbulent Frontiers'' in the Caucasus and Central Asia', *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, 2:3 (Summer 2008), p. 149.

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their borders.' Annexations 'to eliminate the disorderly frontier', however, 'in turn produced new frontier problems and further expansion'.[12] The only difference now, Der Ghoukassian argues in his analysis of instability in the Caucasus and Central Asia, is the label: 'if we replace "expansion" or "annexation" by "intervention" then the "turbulent frontier" metaphor could be useful to shed light on certain security dynamics in the post-September 11 world',[13] as the US in the Caucasus and Central Asia or in Latin America, where global-local dynamics of both push and pull, not strategic interests, are the driving force.

The immediate pull of turbulence in the late nineteenth-century Balkans to which Bismarck is reacting above – the 1875 rebellion in Bosnia, the 1876 uprising in Bulgaria, the declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire in 1876 by Serbia and Montenegro 'taking advantage of a turbulent situation'[14] – was the 'Eastern Question': Great Power efforts to create order out of the process of dismantling the Ottoman Empire. Integral to this process, however, were requests for assistance from local actors who were seeking advantage in their domestic power struggles. The result, 'the great disaster of 1878' in Misha Glenny's description of the Congress of Berlin, was that:

> The great powers had now linked their imperial interests to the aspirations of emerging Balkan states.... The new elites on the Balkan periphery learnt the lesson beaten into them at the Congress: the consolidation and expansion of the state could best be achieved by finding a mighty sponsor, not by cooperating with one's neighbours.[15]

Integral to the push-pull dynamic also was a new force: public opinion. Using the new tool of newspapers in the early 1870s, romantic nationalists and liberals in western Europe sought to rally public opinion against the forced population migrations and 'atrocities', as the newspapers reported, in support of 'Balkan Christians' while the same groups in the Ottoman Empire called for support to Muslims in the Balkans.[16] In 1874–5, Catholic clergy in Bosnia-Herzegovina appealed to the Habsburg army commander in Dalmatia for help, while in 1873–6, Russian benevolent societies together with other voluntary organisations such as the Russian Red Cross raised hundreds of thousands of rubles for fellow 'Slav' refugees from Bosnia fleeing into Serbia, Montenegro, and border areas of the Habsburg empire.[17]

The Eastern Question was about more than disorder on the periphery, of course. The primary push for intervention were the territorial rivalries among the major powers; in the Balkans, this meant an ever more powerful Germany, Austria (after 1867, including Hungary), Russia, France, and Britain (and in 1918, Italy). The choice in the Balkans of state creation rather than violent state death (occupation, annexation), which, as Fazal shows, was the more common outcome between 1816 and 1945 for buffer states caught between rival powers,[18] actually neutralised their competition in a kind of checkmate, as Stavrianos writes; none could annex new

[12] Galbraith, 'The "Turbulent Frontier"', pp. 151, 168.
[13] Der Ghoukassian, 'Instability', p. 151.
[14] Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 7.
[15] Glenny, *The Balkans*, p. 149.
[16] Ibid., p. 105.
[17] Ibid., p. 124.
[18] Tanisha M. Fazal, *State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

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territory so their competition shifted to influence over the foreign relations of each new state ('decisively' Stavrianos adds).[19]

The primary method of responding to turbulence while managing Great Power competition was, then and now, multilateral diplomatic conferences: the 1878 Congress of Berlin, the 1918–19 Paris Peace Conference, the 1991 European Community (EC) ('Carrington') Conference, the 1992 London Conference and the 1992–5 standing International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) co-chaired by the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) at Geneva that London established, the 1995 Dayton conference for Bosnia-Herzegovina and its side negotiations at Erdut for Eastern Slavonia in Croatia, and the 1999 Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo.

In each of these cases, the major-power actions were a response to a similar package. It begins with entreaties from local actors for assistance and major-power reticence, especially to act militarily. Already in 1987, the US made clear to the Yugoslav prime minister seeking aid to keep the country together that its fate was no longer of strategic importance;[20] so, too, did all Western powers at the annual NATO conference in November 1990 and the US and USSR at the same month's meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), despite intelligence forecasts of impending violent collapse. For more than two years before they declared independence in June 1991, Slovene and Croatian officials sought advice and support in Western capitals and used public relations campaigns to win support for independence (secession), particularly from middle powers staking independent positions from the US and USSR as the Cold War was ending. Early diplomatic support from Austria, Switzerland, and Norway, military aid for Croatia from Hungary, and an aggressive newspaper campaign in Germany that produced parliamentary support there by spring 1991 then provoked Italian and EC involvement. Declaring 'the hour of Europe' in seizing EC leadership of the impulse to restore order in June 1991, the Dutch foreign minister leading the EC negotiating delegation, Jacques Poos, meant *in place of* the United States.

At the same time, public opinion was being rallied by newspaper journalists and human-rights activists in Britain, France, and the US but also in Muslim countries from Malaysia to Turkey in reaction to the growing violence and rival claims of atrocities to insist that governments 'do something' – in 1991–5, to save Muslim victims of Serbian aggression in Bosnia, stop the 'ethnic cleansing', and protect the refugees and internally displaced, and in 1998–9 to intervene in defence of Kosovo Albanians' human rights. Even in Russia, the constitutional crisis of 1993, though primarily between Yeltsin and the parliament over economic reform, included such pressure to act in support of Yugoslavia (and later Serbs) that Yeltsin chose to dissolve the parliament, sending in tanks to remove the sitting members – only to face the very same pressures from the new one.[21] These external campaigns are difficult to separate, moreover, from the public relations campaigns increasingly mounted by Bosnian

[19] Leften S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958), p. 199.

[20] Yugoslavia had been a Cold-War client of the US and of great strategic consequence for NATO, but with the change of Soviet policies under Gorbachev beginning in 1985, the US changed its policy toward Yugoslavia (and even its corresponding classification and bureaucratic location within the Department of State) as just another southeast European (peripheral) country, no longer of significance.

[21] Conversations with Yelena Guskova, Russian specialist on the Balkans and member of my Analysis and Assessment Unit for UNPROFOR, in Zagreb, February–June 1994.

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Muslim leaders (using the US private firms employed earlier by Croatians) and later also Kosovar Albanians, to gain Western intervention through parliamentary/congressional pressure.

Pulled by an emerging *fait accompli* of actions and decisions produced by a process not so different from that of Galbraith's imperial viceroys, the major powers (France, Germany, Britain, reluctantly the US) could no longer stay on the sidelines, in competition with these middle powers and with each other to intervene. At the same time, in regard to each of these conferences beginning in 1878, the mounting pressure to act and the interested positions of individual governments did not alter the diplomatic pattern. Each was driven by one major power that claimed itself disinterested, thus neutral, impartial – Bismarck's Germany in 1878, Wilson's United States at Paris in 1918, the European Union and the United Kingdom in its chief negotiator, Lord Peter Carrington, in 1991, followed by the UK at London in 1992, the EU and UN for the standing ICFY at Geneva, and the US at Dayton, Erdut, and Rambouillet. The participation of other powers was not a sign of multilateralism, in the sense of asserting influence over the outcome of the negotiations, but about an equally or more important component of recognition, having *their* major power status recognised, and, in turn, their acquiescence to the decisions taken, as if such cooperation was necessary.

In each case, also, invitations to the Balkan parties to participate were issued by the organiser and were discriminatory. Misha Glenny's description of the Congress of Berlin in 1878 where the 'shabbiest treatment' was reserved for Serbia, whose foreign minister was excluded even access to the Congress while 'Persians' were even allowed to make a presentation,[22] has echoes in the decision by the US negotiators to include at the Dayton peace negotiations only one of the Bosnian parties, the Muslims/Bosniaks represented by the leader of their main wartime political party, Alija Izetbegovic (treated as president of Bosnia, even though his mandate had ended before the war began, in the spring of 1992, when the constitutional rule of annual rotation among the members of the collective presidency should have transferred the chair to the Croat in December 1991, and then to the Serb at the end of 1992, and back to the Muslim, and so on). The Americans insisted that both Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs – the other two parties to the war – be represented by the presidents of neighboring Croatia and Serbia instead. At Paris in 1918–19, too, the victorious major powers barely tolerated attendance at some meetings by the victorious Balkan governments (Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia) and outright excluded the defeated states (Germany, the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria and the successor states of the Habsburg Empire, Austria, and Hungary).

Also common to this diplomatic form, it appears, is that the powers made most decisions in advance, making the diplomatic meeting itself only symbolically about negotiations and, especially, limiting any active role by the targets (the Balkan actors) themselves. Negotiators commonly have also been impatient: Bismarck, Glenny writes, 'made no secret of the fact that he wanted the Congress to complete its work as soon as possible'[23] because it forced him to postpone his annual holiday; the conference lasted exactly one month, 13 June to 13 July. Negotiators at Dayton were

[22] Glenny, *The Balkans*, p. 142.
[23] Ibid., p. 139.

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given a deadline of 19 days (November 1–20), and at Rambouillet, only two weeks (February 6–20, then extended three more days to 23 February).

Finally, it is striking how many of these diplomatic conferences were a response to failed diplomatic initiatives earlier on the same issue, from the Three Emperors' League (Germany, Russia, and Austria) aiming to find a peaceful solution through negotiations to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1875–6 to the limited scope of the Brioni Accord negotiated by a joint EC-CSCE team in July 1991, dealing with Slovenia only (though choosing to send military observers to Croatia), that then required the Carrington conference that September; then the 1992 London conference in response to the failure of the Carrington conference and the EU's Lisbon negotiations of March 1992 on Bosnia-Herzegovina; and multiple attempts by the Contact Group for Bosnian peace in 1994–5 because ICFY was having no success (in part for reasons of obstruction by some members of the Contact Group, as was the case with Lisbon also). The 'great disaster' of 1878, in Glenny's assessment, was to create as much confusion, resentment, and dashed aspirations, or more, as were issues and borders settled. Each subsequent conference was to resolve a problem created, or left unfinished, by the previous. The Balkan Wars of 1912–13, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 and World War I, the 'extreme interwar unrest and bitterness'[24] caused by the terms and justifications of the Versailles treaties that prevented political stability, the assassination of Yugoslav King Alexander Karadjordjevic in Marseilles in October 1934 (along with the French foreign minister),[25] the fascist National State of Croatia (NDH) during World War II (generally called a German 'puppet state', but going so much farther in its extermination policies toward Roma [Gypsies], Jews, and Serbs that the Nazi authorities even protested), and the World War II alliance of Kosovo Albanians with fascist Italy – all can be seen as reactions to preceding international decisions on statehood and territorial borders. In regard to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the effect of the EC's Brioni Accord of July 1991 to concede Slovene independence (with a three month moratorium, granted also to Croatia) without addressing the consequences for the rest of Yugoslavia, above all Bosnia-Herzegovina, was horrific war (and was widely predicted).[26] The 1995 Dayton accord for Bosnia created an unresolved political stalemate there that remains today and ignored the Albanian question in both Kosovo and Macedonia. The result was the subsequent insurgencies in 1996–9 in Kosovo and 2001 in Macedonia led by the Kosovo Liberation Army/Albanian National Army; the NATO bombing campaign against Belgrade; and two more partial settlements, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 1999 that postponed any decision on autonomy or independence for Kosovo and sent a 'transitional administration' to govern the unsustainable non-status, directly responsible for the massive revenge attacks to displace minorities and explosions of violence from frustrated Albanians, and then the EU-US negotiated Ohrid Agreement for Macedonia

[24] Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, p. 122.

[25] This incident exemplifies the complex global-local dynamic: seeking greater French support when Germany and Italy are becoming more assertive and French influence was waning, the King is assassinated by a Macedonian revolutionary under the instigation and pay of the fascist (pro-independence) movement in Croatia under Pavelic and of Mussolini in Italy.

[26] Most notably by the letters written in November 1991 to German foreign minister Genscher from UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, UN negotiator and former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and EC negotiator Lord Peter Carrington; see *Balkan Tragedy*, pp. 183–4.

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in 2001 that only created greater political fragility and inter-ethnic antagonism and separation between Albanians and Macedonians.

Sovereignty with conditions

It would be easy to sympathise with the Great Powers in 1878 and 1918–19 and the major powers today, however, because the principle of national self-determination to define statehood and borders in an area so thoroughly mixed nationally (physically and in terms of historical claims and myths) has no stable, uncontestable outcome in itself. Although they made the decisions and used this argument themselves, the powers acknowledged as much in each case. Yet their proposed solutions to this problem, embedded in the resulting treaties, appear to have always made matters worse. As Ivo Lederer writes about the Paris Peace Conference ending World War I:

> Given the impossibility of drawing sound ethnic frontiers throughout Eastern Europe, the great powers hoped to forestall irredentism and future territorial revisions by a system of 'minorities conventions'. These were to be applied to all the successor states and were intended to guarantee, under League [of Nations] protection, the freedoms of speech, press, religion, etc., to all the minorities.[27]

The problems can be seen already in the obligations the powers imposed at the 1878 Congress of Berlin on all Balkan states in regard to equal rights and protected privileges for non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire and the freedom of religion ('liberty of conscience') clauses required in the constitutions of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro. This was not, as Martha Finnemore argues, either the beginning of humanitarian justifications for intervention in political response to enraged publics or a 'sole focus' – she goes so far as to say, on who was 'qualified as human' and thus 'deserving of humanitarian protection' – on 'European Christians'.[28] A better explanation, Stoianovich argues, is the 'new imperialism': 'The business culture of the nineteenth century required the talents of the people of the Book. The Congress of Berlin (1878) therefore obliged the Balkan states to abolish all legal restrictions against Jews.' The consequence, he argues, was that where Jews were already 'entrenched in business' as in Romania, they also 'advanced in the liberal professions', but both there and where 'there were no Jews in the villages and few Jews in the towns', as in Serbia, 'there was an upsurge in anti-Semitism'.[29]

The new states' reaction was even stronger to the minorities conventions of 1918–19. Again, contrary to the current wisdom that these conventions represent a significant stage in the evolution of transnational human rights norms, recent scholarship on the League of Nations, which was tasked to monitor and enforce the conventions,

[27] Ivo J. Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study in Frontiermaking* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 239.

[28] Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 58–66, 83. Her argument that 'massacring Christians was a humanitarian disaster; massacring Muslims was not' (p. 59) also requires a surprising limitation on who counts as intervening actors in the nineteenth century, for example that Russia in Bulgaria counts but the Ottomans there do not, or that intellectual and religious agitation in Britain or Russia for intervention counts but not that in Istanbul.

[29] Traian Stoianovich, 'The Social Foundations of Balkan Politics, 1750–1941', in Charles and Barbara Jelavich (eds), *The Balkans in Transition: Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics since the Eighteenth Century* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 326–7.

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is that 'the preeminent goals were political and not humanitarian, with the task of defending the 1919 settlement', and 'a concern to protect the fragile peace' (in this case, finding most petitions involving Macedonia, given both Yugoslav and Greek denial of a 'Macedonian' identity, as 'not receivable'), and secondly, to protect 'the prestige of the League'.[30] 'The plan,' however, 'was bitterly resented by the Czechs, Poles, Rumanians, and Yugoslavs as an infringement on their national sovereignty'.[31] First, they all 'complained at being forced to sign minorities conventions to which the great powers would not adhere'.[32] Second, as the government in Belgrade made clear, they 'had reason to fear a system of international obligations and League controls that could in the future lead to foreign interference' (such as, in the case of Serbia, external manipulation of 'the Italian, German, Magyar, and Albanian minorities'), a fear that proved justified throughout eastern Europe in the 1930s.[33] Lederer finds it surprising, in fact, that after focusing so much of their time and effort on their territorial claims, both in 1878 and 1918–19, it was the minority treaties that the parties seeking national independence and recognition most opposed.[34] He cites the Yugoslav telegram to the ceremonies for the Treaty of St. Germain (deciding their fate): 'Explain to Americans the problem is not the rights of minorities [which we accept and recognise] and there is no need to push us on this and dictate to us. The question is our sovereignty which is being violated without reason.' And then, in further instructions, explain to French premier Clemenceau, 'the Yugoslavs were willing to guarantee all minority rights through domestic legislation. But they would not submit to a limitation on their sovereignty from outside.'[35]

Nonetheless, reflecting the power imbalance at the conference, the Commission on New States and Minorities established at Paris for this purpose 'decided to ignore' the pleas made by the Yugoslav government and delegation that they had already committed in prior treaties and honored those commitments toward Macedonians, Albanians, and Muslims in general.[36]

There is little different in the exercise of unequal power in relation to the Yugoslav disposition in 1991. Although warned formally in July 1991 in a COREU (confidential telegram among EC member states) by the Dutch foreign minister holding the presidency of the EC troika, Hans van den Broek, that any peaceful break-up of Yugoslavia on the principle of the right to national self-determination required a negotiation of new borders for the resulting states that would respect as much as possible the ethno-national composition of territory, the other 11 members ignored this sage advice and insisted that the existing federal borders of socialist Yugoslavia become the new international borders. Then, fully ignoring also the constitutional status of nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia by calling Serbs in Croatia and Albanians in

[30] Pedersen, 'Back to the League', p. 1102. See also Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 93, that the prime motivation for the international protection of minority rights was peace and collective security.

[31] Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference*, p. 239.

[32] Ibid., p. 239.

[33] Ibid., p. 247.

[34] It did not help for Serbia and Romania that the obligation of minorities protection applied not only to the postwar areas but also those acquired before 1914, even though, as Lederer writes, 'minority treatment in Macedonia was already regulated by the Treaty of Berlin (1878) and Bucharest (1913)' and 'all [the Allies] agreed that Serbia had "fully carried out both the letter and the spirit" of the Treaty of Berlin'. (Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference*, pp. 239–40.)

[35] Ibid., pp. 244–5.

[36] Ibid., p. 249.

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Serbia 'minorities',[37] they insisted on territorial autonomy within those new states. This autonomy solution was no more acceptable to presidents Tudjman of Croatia and Milosevic of Serbia than it was in 1918, but in 1991 it also led, as van den Broek and many others predicted, to brutal and multiple wars by those who did not want to be discriminated minorities in the new states and by the majorities who wanted them gone. Applying the same effort as in 1919 to square the circle of externally imposed borders and national rights in a multinational space to Bosnia (the Dayton peace accord and its constitution) and Kosovo (the Ahtisaari Plan) created such complex administrative structures that public resources will always fall short, transformed the two wars into continuing constitutional conflict but no solution, and have been held together only by forceful international intervention and *de facto* protectorates.

In sum, has anything changed between 1878 and 1995–9 except the labels we use? The Congress of Berlin of 1878 agreed to the Austrian request that it occupy Bosnia, yet Austrian troops were surprised to find resistance. Arriving in July 1878 with 'a symbolic show of friendly force' of 72,000 soldiers, the Austrian army had to escalate within days to 268,000, one third of the entire imperial army, to quell the Bosnian rebellion.[38] Having been unwilling in the fall of 1991 to deploy ground troops to prevent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and then only agreeing in 1992 to do so to protect humanitarian deliveries during the war (the United Nations Protection Forces [UNPROFOR]), the major powers (led in this decision by the United States) found themselves increasing its numbers over and over, though they were never sufficient to do the tasks the Security Council mandated. From an initial 50 military liaison officers, then 100, to 7,700 troops in early March 1992, reinforcements brought the number to 13,240 a month later, to 30,655 in March 1994, to 38,130 in November 1994, and its full strength of 38,599 in March 1995.[39] When even the US agreed to join other NATO powers in a ground force to implement the Dayton peace accord after December 1995, the troop deployment jumped to 60,000 and then 80,000, declining only in 2002 to 12,000.

In 1903, five years before Austrian annexation of Bosnia, Aida Hozic reports, a 'correspondent of the *Chicago-Record Herald* and a seasoned world traveler', one William Eleroy Curtis, referred to the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia 'as the "remarkable example of administration" over an alien race'.[40] Hozic continues:

[37] Once the Europeans applied the right to national self-determination to justify recognising Slovene and then Croatian independence, they viewed citizens in those new states who were not Slovene or Croatian ethnically (and eventually, Albanians in Serbia by the same logic) as minorities even though the constitutional status of these Serbs and Croats were as nations with equal rights to all nations in Yugoslavia, regardless of their local numbers, and Albanians as nationalities who had political rights to autonomy, if not equality. Most of the war in all three places was to prevent becoming a minority (losing one's equal legal status) in someone else's nation-state. This faulty numerical principle created particular havoc in Bosnia-Herzegovina where all three of the constituent nations were fewer than 50 per cent. Pedersen ('Back to the League', p. 1100) writes in her review of the newest literature on the League of Nations, after its failure in the 1930s in protecting the minorities regime, 'it was assumed, protection of individual human rights would make minority rights irrelevant. The Balkan crises of the 1990s showed how wrong that assumption was.' Acknowledging this flaw in the major-power approach to the Balkans, she does not, however, appear to recognise the very thorny problem of national, not minority, rights in a regime based on national self-determination.

[38] Glenny, *The Balkans*, pp. 160–2.

[39] Data collected for me by Jason Harle in 2007 from multiple UN documents, primarily Secretary-Generals' reports, all available online.

[40] Aida A. Hozic, 'The Paradox of Sovereignty in the Balkans', in Douglas Howland and Luise White (eds), *The State of Sovereignty: Territories, Laws, Populations* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), p. 243.

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Before the arrival of the Austrians, said Mr. Curtis, the population, which contained a much too high proportion of Mohammedans and Turkish outlaws, was 'not fit for liberty, and if it had been granted to them by the Berlin Conference, as they demanded, it would have been a curse instead of a blessing'. Just a few short decades earlier, according to Mr. Curtis and the German sources that he had relied on, Bosnia was a dangerous land where 'brigandage was a recognized profession'; where 'murder was not considered a crime' and 'robbery was as common as lying'; and where people, if they 'were compelled to travel', 'went in large parties, fully armed, or ... accompanied by an escort of soldiers'. However, wrote Mr. Curtis, thanks to the near-dictatorial powers of the Austro- Hungarian administrator, Count von Kalay, and the 'forbearance and tact shown by [Austrian] officials', to-day human life in Bosnia is as safe as in Illinois.[41]

Yet, Stoianovich argues, Austrian counterrevolutionary policies favouring 'the old Muslim landowning class as landowners [against the 1875 alliance of 'rural and semi-urban Orthodox merchant class' and 'Christian peasantry'] and relegating the functions of administration to a new official class of non-Bosnian origin' frustrated 'both the economic and political ambitions' of that merchant class and its liberal ideas. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 'was the most spectacular expression' of their first of two goals, to 'remove the new official class from power' (the second being to prevent restoration of the 'ancient authority' of the old official, landowning class).[42] The assassination in Belgrade in 1903 of the Serbian king, Milan Obrenovic, was also aimed at his 'Austrophilism' and his opening to 'Germano-Western' capital without any national safeguards.[43]

In 2003, drawing a parallel between the EU-led, UN-mandated administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina to implement the imposed peace agreement and nineteenth-century British rule in India, Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin wrote,

the similarities of style and substance are astonishing. Vast ambitions, the fervent belief in progress, the assumption that outsiders can best interpret the true interest of a subject people – all these are hallmarks that the international administration in Bosnia shares with the British East India Company and the Utilitarian philosophers who staffed it in the early nineteenth century.[44]

Bosnian obstruction since December 1995 has not gone as far as political assassinations, but violent local resistance against international policies requiring refugee return to their prewar homes and leaders' systematic and effective lack of political cooperation with most external demands (which, admittedly, rose continually) have prevented any real movement forward for 18 years, justified a continuing large military presence, and, over time, revived fears of a return to war. The external criticism that now accompanies most international interventions has chastised both the interveners and the locals for delays in arresting indicted war criminals (by the International Criminal Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia at the Hague), the local politicians for rampant corruption, and the widespread activities of organised crime, but many locals, Hozic argues, react just as in the late nineteenth century, seeing banditry and smuggling as 'an expression of patriotism ... against foreign invaders'.[45]

[41] Hozic, 'The Paradox', p. 243.
[42] Stoianovich, 'The Social Foundations', pp. 314–15.
[43] Ibid., p. 327.
[44] Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, 'Travails of the European Raj', *Journal of Democracy*, 14:3 (July 2003), p. 62.
[45] Hozic, 'The Paradox', pp. 244, 252.

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The German bombing of Belgrade in March 1941 within hours of the air-force-led *coup d'état* against the Prince Regent for signing the Tripartite Pact with Hitler's Reich was correctly considered an act of war, with an Axis ground invasion following within days, and the first stage of multiple occupations of Yugoslav territory by Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Italy. NATO called its bombing of Belgrade (and Serbia more broadly, including its province of Kosovo) in March–June 1999 a humanitarian intervention (though it, too, led to an occupation, though temporary, of Kosovo under UN authority and initially 50,000 NATO-led troops),[46] but most Serbian citizens, whatever their views on the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, the counterinsurgency in Kosovo, or the responsibility of their president, Slobodan Milosevic, stood together in opposition to the bombing and in daily demonstrations against it.

The League of Nations has been widely criticised for failing to implement the minority treaties by the mid-1930s, overridden Krasner argues by major powers for whom 'power asymmetries' meant that 'outcomes were the result of power and interest' rather than principles.[47] Yet, the monitoring activities of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), created at Brioni in July 1991 to prevent escalation of the violence in Croatia into fully-fledged war, failed from the start; ECMM reports (they were eventually deployed throughout the former Yugoslavia and in Albania) were duly sent to Brussels regularly but were never even read, according to credible sources. The OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities failed to prevent violent conflict in Macedonia as did the OSCE monitoring mission sent to Macedonia in preparation for the Kosovo operation in October 1998.

Economic relations

To focus solely on the new lines drawn on maps and the formal recognition (or non-recognition) of sovereignty at these diplomatic conferences or even on military interventions to implement those decisions would be to miss a far more consequential major-power motivation in 1870–1919 in terms of these new states' domestic orders: to protect their banks, obtain the infrastructure for their expanding commercial interests, and impose trade agreements benefitting the major power. The economic relations between the major powers and Balkan governments, and their consequences, also best explain the causes of the disorder and turbulence that they intervened to staunch.

Treaties not only drew borders and required minority protections but also imposed economic conditions on new states, beginning with the obligation to repay foreign debts. Although these debts were to private banks, the powers at each conference represented the interests of 'their' banks in being repaid. Their primary method was to assume control and administration over the countries' finances, including requirements on specific government revenues (such as the state tobacco monopolies in all the Balkan states 'imposed to help repay European debts' with the consequence of restricting 'the development of an otherwise promising agricultural industry')[48]

[46] The deployment was reduced to 39,000 in 2002, then 26,000 by June 2003, 17,500 at the end of 2003, and in December 2012, numbered 5,565. Available at: {http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm} accessed 15 January 2013.

[47] Krasner, *Sovereignty*, pp. 93, 96.

[48] John R. Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson, *Balkan Economic History, 1550–1950: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 639, fn. 24.

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that had to be pledged for debt repayment. In 1881, the Great Powers created an Ottoman Public Debt Administration (PDA) to assume extraordinary European control, especially by Britain, France, and Germany, over Ottoman finance so as to ensure that its revenues first pay Western creditors, then the shareholders of the PDA, and only then into the Ottoman budget and finally Ottoman producers. The PDA continued to manage Ottoman debt up to World War I as a fiscal consortium so as to protect European investments in the empire.[49]

The same treatment was given Greece after its failed intervention in Crete in 1898: 'as part of the peace treaty, Athens was forced to hand over control of its budget to a great- power commission'.[50] The new states also had to assume new foreign loans to pay for the treaty obligations to build railroads for the European powers. The terms of Serbian independence after Berlin, for example, required it to pay an Austrian contractor to build a railway from Belgrade to the Macedonian border, to cooperate in constructing another line to Bulgaria and Turkey, and to agree to an Austrian plan for regulating navigation along the Danube.[51] Some of the loans were also taken to buy out European owners of the country's railroads in the interest of greater independence, but Lampe and Jackson argue that 'the loans served not so much to introduce direct European influence as to push Balkan state budgets into permanent reliance on further loans'.[52] Debt repayment totalled one third of Serbian government expenses by 1887; by 1898, its total European loans had risen sixfold, nearly all of which between 1902 and 1912 was underwritten by major Paris banks 'at the urgings of the Foreign Ministry for diplomatic advantage rather than on their own initiative for maximum profit'.[53] The 1919 peace treaty then required the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to repay the imperial debts of both the Ottoman and Habsburg territories it acquired, on top of the fiscal requirements of creating a new state and repairing war damage.[54] By the end of the 1920s, 82.5 per cent of the Kingdom's national debt was foreign loans.[55] By 1934, it had to default on its foreign debt (as did all Balkan countries)[56] and chose to accept clearing agreements with Germany and ever greater exposure to German economic penetration, the Balkans being the cornerstone of Hitler's policy of *Grossraumwirtschaft*, what one contemporary called a 'bloodless invasion'.[57]

The diplomatic conferences also imposed rules on these countries' foreign trade that 'forbade them to erect protective tariffs' in the face of competition from European manufacturers at the same time that the countries' limited domestic capital for industrial development was 'exhausted' in the treaty obligation to build European railroads.[58] The Congress of Berlin required all Balkan states to sign a treaty of

[49] Glenny, *The Balkans*, p. 184; Barkey, *Empire of Difference*, pp. 275–6.
[50] Glenny, *The Balkans*, p. 195.
[51] Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1493*, pp. 449–50.
[52] Lampe and Jackson, *Balkan Economic History*, p. 208.
[53] Ibid., pp. 211, 230, 233.
[54] Nicolas Spulber, 'Changes in the Economic Structures of the Balkans, 1860–1960', in Jelavich and Jelavich (eds), *The Balkans in Transition*, p. 356, fn. 11.
[55] Glenny, *The Balkans*, p. 425.
[56] Spulber, 'Changes', p. 359.
[57] Glenny, *The Balkans*, p. 428. The German use of foreign trade for political domination in south-east Europe was so compelling to the later renowned economist and economic historian, A. O. Hirschman, that he wrote his doctoral dissertation on the subject, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1945).
[58] Stoianovich, 'The Social Foundations', p. 319.

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commerce with Austria (that when finally negotiated in 1881 amounted to a virtual customs union of 'most favored nation' trading status with Austria and 'almost servile foreign policy conditions'),[59] yet by 1895–6, Budapest had persuaded Habsburg authorities to violate the treaty so as to impose a ban on live Serbian hogs (protecting Hungarian producers), then again in 1906, and from 1906 to 1911, a devastating five year Austrian tariff war, the so-called 'Pig War' considered a prelude to World War I.[60]

Intervention in the economies of these sovereign states did not end, of course, with diplomatic negotiations and treaties. All of 'the powers strove to gain their diplomatic goals in the Balkans' with what one might call continuous interference if not intervention: 'from troop crossings of the Danube and blockading of ports, to closing of markets to Balkan exports and granting or withholding of loans'.[61] At the same time, political independence, whether in 1878, 1912–13, or 1919, entailed major new budgetary expenditures for state administration and territorial defence. All primarily agrarian and poor countries, these new states' primary sources of finance were foreign trade and foreign loans. Although all aimed at economic independence and domestic industrialisation, the vast military budgets (between 34 and 50 per cent of Balkan states' budgets after 1918)[62] and state expenditures only increased their dependence (total, for Albania)[63] on foreign loans and trade. The result was repeated cycles of fiscal crisis, further dependence on foreign loans and terms of repayment, and onerous tax burdens on the population (still largely peasants).

This pattern takes us to the second important aspect of the economic relations of intervention: the initial causes of the Balkan turbulence to which the Great Powers responded in the 1870s. The dissolution of the Ottoman empire was provoked by a long fiscal crisis, managed by the Porte's ever greater governmental resort to foreign loans, with a growing dependence on and indebtedness to foreign banks, 1854–74. Efforts at economic and political reform to obtain sufficient revenues internally by increased exactions through tax farming on peasants[64] explain much of the revolt, then general rebellion, in Bosnia-Herzegovina beginning around 1871. The global economic crisis of 1873–96, when many of the foreign banks in Istanbul collapsed and new financing dried up, compounded the problem. What Stavrianos labels the 'new imperialism' of 'intensive Western economic penetration'[65] in the Balkans from the late nineteenth century led to increasing 'impoverishment of the Balkan peasantry and artisan class',[66] a 'recrudescence of brigandage' and 'violent way of life'[67] that fed into the nationalist politics of the age (from guerrillas and terrorist organisations to the Balkan wars of 1912–13) and even, in Austrian-annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, 'a sharp rise in prostitution in Sarajevo'.[68] The next global economic crisis, beginning

[59] Glenny, *The Balkans*, pp. 149–50.
[60] Lampe and Jackson, *Balkan Economic History*, pp. 175–6; also Glenny, *The Balkans*, pp. 149–50.
[61] Stavrianos, 'The Influence of the West on the Balkans', in Jelavich and Jelavich (eds), *The Balkans in Transition*, p. 199.
[62] Glenny, *The Balkans*, p. 396.
[63] Lampe and Jackson, *Balkan Economic History*, p. 388.
[64] Barkey, *Empire*, pp. 226–63, on the significance of this tax farming policy and why it failed under the Ottomans in contrast to similar policies in Britain and France.
[65] Stavrianos, 'The Influence of the West', p. 415.
[66] Stoianovich, 'The Social Foundations', p. 319.
[67] Ibid., pp. 324–5.
[68] Glenny, *The Balkans*, p. 295.

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in 1925 in the Balkans with the collapse of world agricultural prices before the 1929 crash of global finance, led British and French banks to abandon the Kingdom to German economic penetration after 1934 but, already in 1929, according to their governments' policies toward Germany (considered appeasement by many), to remove any constraints on the King's declaration of dictatorship and an end to the liberal constitution.

The politics of the 1920s were already infused with partisan conflict and political revolt over growing foreign dependence. As Barbara Jelavich describes it, after World War I the 'participation of foreign financiers, businessmen and technicians' in all of the Balkan states was widespread and criticised. Whereas some of their contributions were positive, the one area 'that was subject to massive foreign influence was the state loans', including 'foreign supervision over their finances', while the 'loans were often attached to political considerations, and the European governments used them to achieve objectives in foreign policy'.[69]

Looking backward, it is worth noticing that among the many protest movements in Yugoslavia in the 1920s–1930s against these economic and political dependencies was the decision of many intellectuals to join the Yugoslav Communist Party and to develop its political strategy.[70] AustroMarxist in their orientation and obsessed with Marx and Engels' distinction between historic nations which had a right to self-determination (statehood) and Slavs who were 'nonhistoric nations', 'relics of peoples', who would disappear with the march of global capitalism, they analysed their conditions as confined to a petty bourgeois peripherality in Europe, a land of 'vagabonds, travelling salesmen, smugglers' and a stunted indigenous bourgeoisie based on increasing state dependence on foreign connections and capital to keep itself in power. To escape this peripherality, they strategised, the Communist Party should become a substitute bourgeoisie, beginning with a change in popular consciousness against the cultural hegemony of the Great Powers, then political emancipation, and ultimately economic emancipation.[71] Though originating in the northwest of Slovenia and Croatia, this argument was of great appeal to the broader national front forged by the Partisans (Communist-led) during World War II against the Axis occupations and also after the war, in the struggle for international recognition – first from anti-communist Western powers led by the US in a policy 'to undermine the new regime with economic collapse'[72] and then, unsuccessfully, from the Soviet Union over quarrels on foreign and development policy.

Yet, in keeping with the argument of this article that intervention is a push-pull dynamic, it is difficult to say whether the liberal constitutions adopted by all the new states after World War I were imposed by assertive imperial powers, particularly Britain and France as conditions for foreign loans, or whether they were the choice of new, liberal-oriented economic and political elites, or of governments eager to

[69] Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, pp. 22–3.

[70] Not all became communists; some, such as Rudolf Bicanic, the important postwar Croatian economist, became a radical populist after discovering the effect of the depression beginning in 1925 on the lives of the peasantry; the pamphlet of this political awakening is *Kako Živi Narod: Život u pasivnim krajevima* (*How the People Live: Life in the Less-developed Areas*) (Zagreb: Tipografije, 1936; reissued, Globus, 1996).

[71] Silva Meznaric, 'A Neo-Marxist Approach to the Sociology of Nationalism, Doomed Nations, and Doomed Schemes', *Praxis International*, 7:1 (1987), pp. 84–6.

[72] Woodward, *Socialist Unemployment*, pp. 80–3.

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attract foreign capital. Equally, economic historians agree that the policies of financial orthodoxy (cutting expenditures and increasing taxes to balance budgets) that were adopted in the 1920s to address their fiscal crisis and debt repayment obligations, then the consequences of agricultural depression and then great depression, 1925–32, were totally inappropriate and a direct cause of the worsening living conditions of the population.[73] But did they adopt these policies because foreign creditors required them or because they either believed in them or believed they were necessary to attract more foreign capital and loans (as Lampe and Jackson write, 'they hoped thereby to reopen the flow of long-term European credit')?[74]

The parallels, once more, of this story and the one leading up to the interventions of the 1990s are very strong. The dissolution of Yugoslavia was, like the Ottoman empire, a consequence of a long fiscal and especially foreign debt crisis, financially orthodox policies (this time explicitly required by the International Monetary Fund [IMF] in exchange for stopgap funding, from 1979 through 1987), and, also required in IMF conditionality, constitutional changes that generated system-destroying political conflict. The cost of the strategic independence won in 1949 from the two Cold War rivals, as discussed above, had been dependence on foreign debt (largely from the IMF and World Bank) that drove all economic and political reforms for forty years even if negotiated and, thus, by consent. Against Macedonia, trying to remain at peace and achieve independent statehood in the morass of the Yugoslav collapse, Greece imposed two economic blockades, making conditions much more unstable and eventually violent, just as did Austrian treatment of Serbia from 1906 to 1911. The UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Serbia (and then Serb-claimed areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia) beginning in May 1992 through 1999, with the effect of increasing resort to smuggling and what Stoianovich had called 'the violent way of life' in the economy and politics in the late nineteenth century. External efforts to influence local authorities were, as then, port blockades, closing of markets to Balkan exports (repeatedly after 1975 by the EC), troop crossings (plus no-fly zones, maritime blockades, and 'close air support' to the UN troops on the ground, that is, bombing), and withholding of aid to influence behaviour (for example, for two years after the peace agreement against one of the two Bosnian entities, the Serb Republic) and rewarding others. Peace treaties, too, now require repayment of foreign debt, although the process is now institutionalised in a negotiated agreement with the IMF as a precondition of any new foreign borrowing (public or commercial). That agreement, as with all subsequent IMF loans, require the same orthodox financial policies ('macroeconomic stabilisation') that did such damage in the 1920s. The organisation of creditors is now more institutionalised – the Paris and London Clubs for banks, the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD for development donors, the World Bank through its reconstruction programmes and donors' conferences for peacebuilding interventions – but the oversight, conditions on the use of funds, accounting procedures, limits on public expenditures, and major reform of economic and political institutions, all for the purpose of eventual repayment, may even be more intrusive than the Ottoman Public Debt Administration.

[73] Spulber, 'Changes', p. 357; Lampe and Jackson, *Balkan Economic History*, pp. 330, 376, 382.
[74] Lampe and Jackson, *Balkan Economic History*, p. 376.

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Conclusion

The current era of intervention has more tools than in the late nineteenth century or the first decades of the twentieth century. These are both normative – accepted justifications for overriding sovereignty and procedural norms for such legitimate intervention – and operational – a vast array of organisational capacities and new institutional actors to do the work of intervention. Although these innovations did occur in the 1990s, they were largely a response to the Balkan theatre, this article argues, and those responses reveal a remarkable continuity with the practices and motivations (or more accurately, weakness of motivations) of major-power actions there since the last quarter of the nineteenth century. To argue that the current system of intervention is due to changes in the international system after the Cold War requires identifying what was peculiar about the Cold War period, not what has changed since then. This article has only hinted at that answer for the Yugoslav case, which may well have been an exception – a political movement emerging in the 1920s–1930s in response to the consequences of intervention that was hyper-nationalist in its defence of Yugoslav sovereignty, during World War II and after. Yet the simultaneous strengthening of the norm of sovereignty and its correlate of non-intervention in the United Nations Charter and what Fazal calls a US-enforced norm against conquest after 1945 appears to have simply changed the nature of interference for domestic ordering, with less overt coercion and more emphasis on the target's at least formal consent, as the deep penetration of internationally required reforms of the Yugoslav system from 1949–90 reveals. The second of the three characteristics of intervention which this article has urged is thus on display, the role of a pull from the targeted state as well as the push from the intervening powers. The third is even more blatant, the role of economic aid and trade in that ongoing process of internationally attuned or obliged domestic reforms. While the liberal use of Chapter VII authorisations (a threat to international peace) since 1990 increasingly aims to override the need for consent for intervention, it is most striking in its role in giving free rein to economic interference. As Kristin Boon writes, the 'Security Council has become an institutional enabler' for the dramatic increase in the role of the IMF and World Bank in domestic reconstruction that 'can border on the legislative'.[75]

What then about the first of the three characteristics, that the major powers' interference in the Balkans was always driven by a compulsion to respond, as great powers, to disorder on their frontier and that their very lack of strategic interest, pulled rather than intended, provided no incentive to find solutions that might last such that each intervention provoked the need for another? Robert Jervis argues that the key change since 1990 is the absence of territorial conflicts among the major powers and a corresponding change in values, rejecting war as an instrument of policy. 'The motor of international politics', the possibility of war among the great powers, has become unthinkable, and they are now more focused on defending those values against challenge in the South, leading them (particularly the US) to act more

[75] Kristin E. Boon, '"Open for Business": International Financial Institutions, Post- Conflict Economic Reform, and the Rule of Law', *International Law and Politics* (2007), pp. 39, 515. In East Timor, for example, the World Bank 'assisted in reforming "laws governing land ownership, conflict resolution, investment, business transactions, and commercial arbitration as well as civil and criminal laws"', p. 528.

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like imperial powers.[76] If there were two motivations for the Great Powers to intervene in the Balkans, their own territorial rivalries and the impulse to manage a 'turbulent frontier', then the end of the former should only strengthen the second. Of course, that does not excuse the role of the US and European powers in the territorial conflicts of the Yugoslav dissolution and the push-pull dynamic of their intervention; their lack of balancing constraint may have even made it worse.

A different constraint on the major powers, some argue, now comes from the enhanced system of international norms. Neil MacFarlane, for example, argues that intervention occurs 'increasingly in a multilateral context', and that such UN authorisation creates a 'need to build support within such organisations [which] in turn requires a greater degree of sensitivity to, and accommodation of, the perspectives of other states' and that the 'need to justify in terms of normative principles that are generally accepted ... narrows the behavioural parameters of states'.[77] Neither gains support from the Balkan theatre. Both the US and European states (as the EU or individually) repeatedly took actions without consulting the UN Security Council at all. When they did go to the Security Council, they regularly ignored the perspectives of the majority; when majority support was unlikely, they took their decision in concert outside the Security Council (and UN Charter), including on the use of military power.

Finally, those who do the work of intervention must be added. For Galbraith, the mechanism of expansion lay in the wide powers exercised by imperial viceroys charged with the maintenance of order. Today, there is an immense network of Western (primarily US) military bases and assistance missions, UN officials from all operational UN agencies, and country offices for the IMF and World Bank whose task is to respond to disorder, as each defines it. Although some temporary Balkans interventions have been a success, such as Operation Alba, the European military deployment to Albania in June 1997 to restore order when the collapse of a pyramid scheme provoked the collapse of the government and widespread run on state armories, or the UN military observer mission for the Prevlaka peninsula, 1992–2002, and the UN 'transitional authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium' (UNTAES), January 1996–January 1998, to award Croatia these territories against, respectively, Montenegro and Serbia, they are the exception in a pattern of longstanding.

[76] Robert Jervis, 'Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace', Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 2001, *American Political Science Review*, 96:1 (March 2002), p. 2.

[77] S. Neil MacFarlane, *Intervention in Contemporary World Politics*, Adelphi Paper no. 350 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), p. 11.

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