essential for maintaining and empowering Korean citizenship and democracy (pp. 205–226). *Chŏng* has also a legitimating effect in social discourses and practices according to Kim, which he demonstrates in the subsequent three chapters focusing on questions of human rights (Chapter 9), liberty (Chapter 10), and multiculturalism (Chapter 11).

Kim advises that the book can be read by moving from Part I directly to Part III, which suggests that there are in a sense two books here, a more theoretical and general work for 'East Asia' (Parts I and II) and a more specific "Confucian Democracy in South Korea" (Parts I and III) (pp. 19 fn 50). It is in this second, "Korean" book that we see why a Confucian democracy is needed. "In a sense" according to Kim, "Korean democracy is undergoing a crisis; as its civil society is rapidly being pluralized and multiculturalized, it is spending down the bonding social capital that it used to be able to draw on for sustenance" (p. 268). The dilemma seems to be a choice between Korean Confucian civility and the democracy it sustains (or can be made to accommodate), and the challenge of liberalism that threatens Korean civility. Kim's intention is therefore to negotiate this dilemma by "reconstructing" both Confucianism and democracy to meet this challenge. In essence, the book is Monstesquieuian in spirit, counselling future legislators on the need to reconcile free government with the general spirit of a nation, which is shaped by climate, religion, laws, customs, and manners. The work as a whole therefore displays the Montesquieuian virtue of moderation in formulating arguments, repudiating critics, and importantly, in showing the need for judgment or prudence in negotiating competing demands of customs and mores, and liberal rights.

The more theoretical "East Asia" version of the book also displays such virtues. The overview and engagement with contemporary Confucian scholarship is comprehensive, detailed, and fair. The reconstruction of Confucianism is nuanced and thoughtful, drawing upon classical Chinese scholarship as well as contemporary democratic theory. But this discussion, unmoored from distinctive traditions, reveals the limits of such an approach. There is little on what constitutes "East Asia" and the "habits of the heart" in each country (p. 247). What constitutes the "Confucian" tradition is also not clear. It is not surprising that Kim often turns to Mencius to reconstruct his Confucian democracy (pp. 65, 95, 137, 165, 173, 192), but if the focus is lived tradition, is it not appropriate to include, rather than repudiate the Legalists as "not Confucian," not to mention Daoism, Buddhism, and in contemporary terms, Christianity? Importantly, if Confucianism need not have such theoretical complexity and *practically* means "familialism"—respect for one's elders, family, and the common good (p. 90)—is there anything distinctively Confucian about these virtues that arguably obtain in all societies?

In a similar vein, there is insufficient theoretical examination in Part II of the precise nature of the threat to Confucian civility. Passing remarks suggest the danger is atomistic individualism and neoliberal consumerism (pp. 4, 37, 39, 70, 113). The question is taken up directly in Part III, but in the specific context of Korea's adoption of Kantian "universal personhood." Thus the "internal tension between the universalism of liberalism and the particularism of democracy" is to be solved, according to Kim, not by imposing liberal democracy but by developing it locally (p. 235). This is because "Confucian habits of the heart" mean liberalism cannot simply be implanted in Korea (p. 242). Leaving aside the question of whether this claim is descriptive (liberalism cannot be implanted) or normative (it should not), this theoretical discussion of individual rights does not attend sufficiently to political practice shaped by liberal institutions. Korean democracy is constitutionally committed to core liberal democratic principles such as "respect of human rights, political liberty, and the autonomy of civil society" (p. 279). The book therefore could have usefully explored whether and to what extent its endorsement of "Confucian" democracy, founded on the "state as family-state (*gukka*) and society as extended family" (p. 243) or the view that "in Korea *the political is familial*" (p. 266), can ever be consistent with liberal constitutionalism—that is, the rule of law, separation of powers, and an independent judiciary (cf pp. 114–116; 281). Confucianism may be made democratic, but whether it can be recast as liberal is the important question that shadows this thoughtful book.

Visions of Sovereignty: Nationalism and Accommodation in Multinational Democracies. By Jaime Lluch. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. 344p. $75.00.

— Joanne McEvoy, *University of Aberdeen*

With his book, Jaime Lluch makes an important contribution to the study of nationalism, secession, and political party systems in multinational states. Lluch offers a range of convincing theoretical and empirical arguments to account for the variation in nationalist preferences, including independentism, autonomism, and federalism. This is an extremely well-researched, convincing, and highly readable investigation of the tripartite taxonomy in nationalist movements: why some nationalist parties seek secession while others aim to establish autonomous special status within the existing state, and still others are satisfied with federal arrangements. Hence, *Visions of Sovereignty* seeks to explain an intriguing puzzle in nationalism studies whereby nationalist parties have "different visions of sovereignty"; it does so eloquently and persuasively by focusing on the range of nationalist parties in two important substate nationalist societies, Catalonia and Québec.

The book's major contribution lies in its clear presentation of a novel theory, the "moral polity thesis," to account for the variation in nationalists' institutional preferences. Lluch argues that nationalists "consider themselves to be living in a state that is a 'moral polity' where social reciprocities are expected and notions of collective dignity, the commonweal, and mutual accommodation are essential to guarantee statewide solidarity and mutual understanding" (pp. 267–68). The radicalization of nationalist preferences toward autonomy or secession can be explained when nationalists believe that their "expectations of reciprocity [with the state] have been violated" (p. 268).

This theoretical contribution hinging on norms of reciprocity between substate nationalist groups (or "stateless nations") and the majority nation in the context of the moral polity is an interesting and potentially significant theoretical departure for the field of nationalism. Indeed, Lluch argues that existing theories that hold the formation of national consciousness important for the emergence of a secessionist agenda cannot account for the variation in preferences, including secessionist and various nonsecessionist aspirations. He also refutes the utility of the existing materialist perspective and argues that the "preference-formation processes of nationalists can hardly be explained with instrumental-rational arguments, that is, as a means to a self-interested end," particularly as such an approach pays little attention to cultural and identity concerns and power relations (p. 24). He is also critical of macro-level theories and structural conditions, instead highlighting the role of agency in nationalism and the importance of discourse, attitudes, and beliefs of the various nationalist parties. His moral polity thesis will help inform the ongoing scholarly debates on majority/minority relations in multinational democracies and deeply divided societies where minority groups' expectations of mutual reciprocity with the state may be in short supply.

Visions of Sovereignty is based on intensive and extensive research in both Québec and Catalonia, with fieldwork conducted over a period of several years. Adopting a research design of within-case analysis, Lluch is interested in explaining the positive cases that express the expected outcome (independentist national parties) and the negative cases (autonomy and pro-federation national parties) in each society. With the nationalist political party as the unit of analysis, is fieldwork focused on eight national parties with analysis of party documents from 1976 to 2010, 42 in-depth interviews with party leaders, 15 focus groups with party members/militants, and a survey of party militants that produced 370 responses. The empirical chapters are based on a robust research design and a wealth of data; indeed, much of the discussion of the parties is brimming with fascinating quotes and insights emanating from the data.

As an added dimension to explaining the internal variation in nationalist movements, the book investigates how nationalist movements vary over time. To explain within-case temporal variation, Lluch explores when and how new political orientations that embody a radicalization of the nationalist movement are established. Each of the two societies under investigation has witnessed a radicalization of nationalist preferences over time and the transformation of the respective party systems: the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, which adopted a secessionist agenda in the late 1980s, and the founding of the Action Démocratique du Québec, an autonomist party, in 1994. His findings highlight the role of the "tipping point" whereby a novel political orientation in the national movement is established, explained by the interaction of four factors: preexistent ideology, central-state constitutional moment, impulse from civil society, and the formation of a new leadership (p.33).

Based on careful exploration of the genesis/transformation of the two relevant parties, the book further adds to our understanding of how national movements may shift over time and become radicalized. Bolstering his moral polity thesis, Lluch leads us to consider how constitutional moments can help shape the intersubjective relations of reciprocity between the stateless nation and the majority nation, potentially leading to the formation of a new nationalist political orientation. He develops these insights in the Conclusion, suggesting that Catalonia has more recently experienced a constitutional moment, given the tension between Spanish constitutionalism and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy (2006) and the Catalan government's referendum on secession (p. 277). As the related political developments in Catalonia continue to unfold, the book provides scholars with enhanced conceptual tools to explain the shifts and turns within this particular case.

The findings and arguments have much to say to wider debates in comparative politics on how states can manage internal diversity, often pitted as a choice between integration and accommodation in institutional design. Lluch's presentation of the spectrum of secessionist and nonsecessionist nationalist preferences further adds to our understanding of the variety of potential accommodative institutional options. Notably, the category of autonomist parties can include instrumental autonomists (whereby autonomy is viewed as a means to achieve self-determination goals but does not rule out independence at some future point) and teleological autonomists who view autonomy as their ultimate self-determination goal. Lluch also shows that substate federalists can have a strong sense of minority-nation national identification, along the same lines as substate autonomist and secessionist parties. Substate federalists also vary in terms of their preference for strongly asymmetric federalism or weaker asymmetry. There is much, then, to be understood in the internal heterogeneity within nationalist movements.

Finally, *Visions of Sovereignty* points to potentially useful policy implications. At its core, the book stresses the nature

of relations between the state/majority nation and the substate nation. Of vital concern for political stability is whether members of the substate nation/stateless nation perceive that the state treats their group fairly in a spirit of "feelings of solidarity, trust, and social unity" (p. 268). Lluch suggests that state institutions need to promote the norms of reciprocity and accommodation in the interests of stability. Overall, there is much to commend in this recent addition to the scholarship on nationalism: the presentation of an original theoretical contribution and enhanced understanding of the variation in national movements based on rich data in Québec and Catalonia. It offers a promising comparative research agenda for scholars and students of stateless nations in multinational democracies.

Politicized Enforcement in Argentina: Labor and Environmental Regulation. By Matthew Amengual. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 286p. $99.99.

Curbing Clientelism in Argentina: Poverty, Politics, and Social Policy. By Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 208p. $90.00 cloth, $29.99 paper.
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— Mariela Szwarcberg Daby, *Reed College*

These two books answer meaningful and relevant questions in comparative politics. In *Curbing Clientelism in Argentina*, Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro explains why some politicians opt out of using clientelistic strategies to mobilize voters; and in *Politicized Enforcement in Argentina*, Matthew Amengual explains variation in states' enforcement of regulations across regions, industries, and policy areas, focusing on four Argentine provinces.

To explain variation in politicians' decisions to use political clientelism in Argentina, Weitz-Shapiro examines the tradeoff of political support between poor and non-poor voters. The author argues that whereas poor voters support clientelistic candidates, the nonpoor reject them; thus, while using clientelistic strategies is likely to increase support from poor voters, it also, *simultaneously*—and therein lies the trade-off—decreases support from nonpoor voters. As a result, "it is only the combination of competition and a large nonpoor population that provides an incumbent with both the incentives and political will to eschew clientelism" (p. 151). The interaction between poverty and political competition is at the center of Weitz-Shapiro's explanation. Neither political competition nor a large middle class alone provide enough incentives for politicians to opt out of clientelism. It is only when politicians face both high levels of political competition *and* the presence of a large middle class that they will refrain from using clientelism to mobilize poor voters.

Weitz-Shapiro tests her argument by combining evidence from fieldwork, an elite survey in more than 125 municipalities in three provinces, statistical analysis of cross-municipal data, a large citizen survey, and an original survey experiment focused on the middle class. Most of the original data for the book was collected over five months in 2006 by the author and her research assistants. In addition to presenting this impressive array of qualitative and quantitative evidence, the author compares the effects of the program, the National Food Security Program (PNSA)— studied in the book, which by the time the hardcover was published had changed significantly—with those implemented in Mexico (Progresa/Oportunidades) and Brazil (Bolsa Familia). The author also makes reference to the country's new social-welfare universal program, Asignación Universal por Hijo.

Matthew Amengual's book examines how the state succeeds in enforcing regulations in some provinces and industries, but fails in others. To explain this variation in state enforcement, Amengual develops the idea of a porous state that enables some societal organizations to influence the state bureaucracy. He tests his theory by focusing on regulation in labor and the environment across different industries in several Argentine provinces.

Amengual's explanation (see Table 2.3, p. 36) is that the combination of certain quantities of resources (low and high) with different types of linkages (weak and strong) leads to different types of enforcement: no enforcement, state-driven enforcement, society-dependent enforcement, and coproduced enforcement. In order to understand variation in state enforcement, the author focuses on identifying ways in which the state was porous to different groups. He finds that even states that have limited resources, organizational flaws, and problematic state bureaucracies are still able to enforce regulations.

To test his theory, Amengual examines two separate policy areas, combining a wide array of data, including 260 in-depth interviews with bureaucrats and politicians, as well as with political, social, and business leaders in different industries; a survey of 166 labor inspectors in six provinces (collected during 16 months of fieldwork in the country in 2008 and 2009); and archival research. The description and analysis of each case shows the author's vast knowledge of each policy. It is worth noting the important role of partisanship in generating strong linkages between unions and inspectors: "Both cross-sectional comparisons of provinces and changes within provinces over time reveal that there is a robust relationship between the party in power and the way inspectors work with unions" (p.144). The author also does an excellent job in showing that the "allocation of enforcement was politically determined, not programmatic" (p.220).

The weakest point in Weitz-Shapiro's argument is its absence of a clear prediction for the effects of low competition. The theory offers predictions (see Figure 3.1, p. 64) for the combinations of high political competition and different levels of poverty, but provides no