

standard view is that young, low-educated men with anti-immigrant and anti-EU attitudes are especially supportive of radical right ideology, the interaction models in Chapter 4 show that “women, association avoiders, those who do not routinely help their neighbors, those who feel positive about their neighbors, and individuals who are not so openly anti-immigrant, who are distrustful of the EU, and who place themselves in the center to center-left are the most likely to be motivated by their local attachments to support radical right parties” (p. 83).

The country-specific chapters on Switzerland (Chapter 5) and France (Chapter 6) add interesting highlights to the localist argument. Using Swiss Household panel survey data, Fitzgerald shows not only that the Swiss People’s Party’s (SVP) support increases among those with strong local attachments, but also that their support is especially high in electorally empowered localities and in those where the localities recently lost independent authority by a merger of municipalities.

Chapter 6 on Marine Le Pen’s support in France is to me the strongest in the book. By combining survey data with fieldwork interview notes, Fitzgerald bolsters her main argument that local ties are important for Le Pen’s support. In addition, she shows that this effect is particularly strong in deeply cohesive communities that also experienced a process of intercommunality, through which certain powers of individual communes are reallocated to intercommunal councils.

The final empirical chapter (Chapter 7) asks a broader question about why radical right parties are successful in some countries and not in others, and examines how localism can account for these differences. Using different local authority indices and election data, Fitzgerald shows, first, that the higher the local authority, the higher the radical right vote across countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and second, that this vote is higher when the local elections are held temporarily in close proximity to national elections.

Fitzgerald’s localist argument to explain radical right support is sound and interesting, and the results stay robust through cross-national tests and country-specific analyses. Yet there are also questions that are not satisfactorily answered and empirical choices that are at times dubious.

The main criticism concerns the directionality of the relationship between local attachments and radical right support. While there is evidence for positive correlation, it is not clear whether a directional relationship exists. Does localism increase such support, or is it possible that support for the radical right positively affects local attachments? Or is it possible that there is a third and unidentified factor that strengthens local attachments and also increases support?

One other question that is not answered is who gets hurt when localism helps radical right parties? One would

assume that it is the center-right mainstream neighbors of the radical right that suffer electorally as the far right makes electoral gains. Yet the Swiss chapter shows that there is not a statistically significant difference between Christian Democrats and the Swiss People’s Party support in terms of how local attachments affect votes (Table 5.2). It would be interesting to explore this question further.

Finally, there are some empirical concerns. First, for most empirical analyses, the dependent variable is the survey question asking respondents to indicate their vote choice. But we know that the vote choice question has significant reporting problems, particularly when it comes to indicating support for extreme parties. It would be good to show how the results change when we replace the vote choice dependent variable with questions on the propensity to vote for or feelings toward radical right parties. Second, most of the interaction models are not statistically significant, which raises doubts about the conditional findings, especially about those presented in Chapter 4.

These issues aside, Fitzgerald presents an interesting argument about the rise of the radical right in established democracies, and *Close to Home* is an important contribution to the study of radical right politics. While the empirical results are at times complicated for a lay audience, Fitzgerald does a good job of explaining the results. Hence, the book not only contributes to a growing political science literature but is also accessible to journalists, political parties, and party strategists who want to learn more about the relationship between local ties and the rise of the radical right.

Security at the Borders: Transnational Practices and Technologies in West Africa. By Philippe M. Frowd. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 226p. \$99.99 cloth. doi:10.1017/S1537592719000914

— Iginio Gagliardone, *University of the Witwatersrand*

Politics in an era of rising nationalisms is increasingly focusing on the definition and redefinition of “borders”: Borders are being boldly remarked and reaffirmed, as in the case of Donald Trump’s wall between the United States and Mexico, or reclaimed, as in the UK’s plan to withdraw from the European Union. Elections are now won or lost by proposing different imaginaries of how a nation’s borders will be managed and made more or less effective in screening those who want to cross them.

In *Security at the Borders*, Philippe M. Frowd offers a very original contribution to the debate on the changing nature of borders by focusing not on the obvious cases, those where the borders and the work they do are the most visible—such as in the case of the lines enclosing the European Union—but on those spaces where borders are silently externalized.

Mauritania and Senegal, the two countries at the core of this study, have progressively become outposts of practices of control promoted by actors in the Global North, seeking to expand their gaze toward places where migration originates, rather than simply trying to harden the lines when crossings occur. Instead of adopting a normative approach—flagging these practices as more or less problematic, or seeking to attribute different labels to the actors pursuing them—the author engages in an empirically grounded exploration of how these practices emerge and morph, and of the consequences they produce, with very rich results.

Frowd successfully combines personal accounts, such as those from the journey he embarked on from Nouakchott to Nouadhibou in Mauritania as part of his fieldwork, with theoretical reflections making sense of incidents and events. The multiple checkpoints encountered along the way become an opportunity to remark how “borders may be referential of geopolitical lines, but they can be exercised across territory” (p. 29). Elsewhere, the participation in trainings sessions organized by international and regional organizations (e.g., the International Organization for Migration or the European Union) is used to vividly illustrate the banality of the ways in which practices of control are proposed and adopted, as well as how “workshop fatigue” sets in among small communities targeted by programmes seeking to ensure compliance with new standards and practices (p. 137).

By engaging in a complex array of encounters with individuals and organizations involved in “borderwork” in Mauritania and Senegal (inspired, as Frowd honestly remarks, by ethnographic sensibility, rather than amounting to a long-term ethnographic work), the study offers a rich account of the complexity of the networks that define and redefine borders. Formal and informal actors cooperate and compete to affirm their authority, international organizations and governments in the Global North seek to introduce new practices, but it is uncertain how these practices can be deployed in remote areas that are out of reach of the most basic infrastructures.

As the analysis of biometric policies in Senegal illustrates, the overlap of different actors, interests, and motivations and the need to demonstrate that actions are being taken can lead to paradoxical outcomes. The most sophisticated technologies and controls are not necessarily introduced where they are the most needed, but where they are the most visible, such as Dakar Airport, where irregular migration presents the lowest risks. Similarly, the analysis of the deployment of a Personal Identification and Registration System (PIRS) in Mauritania illustrates how complexity may not be resolved by selecting a procedure or technology that appears to be the best fit for responding to a specific challenge, but by “buying time”—by delaying the need to make important decisions. Among different software products available,

a piecemeal package was chosen to record entries and exits because of its ability to allow the inclusion of new features at a later stage, to comply with new demands and regulations. As Frowd illustrates, such decisions may temporarily respond to requests to act and innovate, even when it is unclear to what extent the chosen technology is able to solve a specific problem, or that a clear assessment of the “problem” itself has not been made, but at the same time they create a relationship of dependency with specific actors and visions of how border controls should be performed.

One of the most significant contributions of the author is to take into account and analyze how both human and technological actors connect and operate in enforcing different types of injunctions. Couched within the framework offered by Actor Network Theory (ANT), Frowd presents a strong case for technology that has become an essential component in expanding control not just at the borders but also in the myriad spaces where different forms of authority are attempting to extend their gaze: from European states seeking to map a growing population of potential migrants, to African governments strengthening their capacity to control and surveil their own citizens.

The power that technology exerts by making itself visible and invisible at the same time is vividly mapped through the interplay of numerous cases—from 4 x 4 vehicles donated by European governments and boats with EU flags moored in Senegalese ports to thermal imaging binoculars, e-passports, and sprawling databases with biometric information. Technology is analyzed for its ability to incorporate and automate functions previously performed by human agents, as well as for its capacity for introducing new possibilities to extend the legibility of a specific space or a population. But it is also considered for its symbolic potential, and for its power to send messages about changing regimes of control. Failures are also analyzed—even if the reader is sometimes left wanting for more details and reflections on their meanings and consequences. Fascinating cases of hybrids are presented where local practices have to be brought back, reinvented, or reconfigured to fill the gap left by a malfunctioning technology or one whose promises failed to materialize when deployed on the ground.

When the power of technology to be an actant in the coproduction of new security regimes is discussed, the language sometimes gets a bit apologetic, preempting criticism that embracing ANT does not mean attributing agency to objects. References to the history or technology tradition, and to how technological artifacts can perform different types of agency, depending on the regimes they become parts of and on their level of “closure,” could have helped in resolving this tension. They could also have provided a framework for analyzing, with greater nuance, the circumstances under which an

artifact—or an assemblage—is more or less able to perform a specific function.

Security at the Borders holds promise to become an important reference for those interested in more complex understandings of how borders function (beyond reporting on the numbers of crossings, rejections, or expulsions): how they not only structure the relationship between the

Global North and the Global South but have also become a tool for reorganizing power balances within states. A possible continuation of Frowd's work could offer a much-needed account of the ways in which citizens and migrants perceive and work through borders, and how they may accept some elements of new border regimes while resisting—or seeking to escape—others.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Jihad & Co.: Black Markets and Islamist Power. By Aisha Ahmad. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 336p. \$29.95 cloth. doi:10.1017/S1537592719000628

— Anne Stenersen, *Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)*

The Arab Spring revolutions in 2011 led to an upsurge in Islamist or “jihadist” state-formation projects, the most infamous of which was the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). While a number of books have been written about the origins and rise of ISIS, there has been little scholarly focus on the Islamist proto-state as such. And while there is abundant literature on civil war, relatively little has been said about the link between civil wars and state formation.

Aisha Ahmad's study seeks to fill both of these gaps by conducting a comparative case study of two Islamist proto-states that were formed during civil wars: the Taliban in Afghanistan (formed 1994–96) and the Islamic Court Union in Somalia (formed in 2005–6). The puzzle that she seeks to explain is the following: Why did the Islamists succeed in creating order when groups based on tribal, clan, or ethnic identities failed? The answer, Ahmad argues, lies in the nexus of business and Islamist interests that has emerged in contemporary civil wars. Simply put, for Ahmad the local business elites helped the Islamists come to power because the Islamists were in the best position to protect their business interests. Behind the sudden and unexpected rise of an Islamist proto-state—which may take on mythical characteristics—she argues that there is in fact a hidden, economic logic.

Diving deeper into the author's argument, there are two mechanisms that explain the sudden rise of an Islamist proto-state: “the long-term Islamicization of the business class and the short-term strategic support for Islamists from the business elite” (p. xxiii). Over time, business elites adopt an Islamist identity because it increases trust and is good for their bottom line. Then, the business elites start buying protection services from the Islamists, because the Islamists can offer better protection services at a lower price than their competitors can. While the first dynamic lays the foundation for business–Islamist interaction, the second contributes directly to a sudden rise in Islamist power. The two dynamics reinforce each other, and

together they explain not only why Islamist proto-states emerge but also the timing and place of their emergence.

Jihad & Co. will undoubtedly have broad appeal among area experts, political scientists, and policymakers. First, the book presents two empirically rich and highly detailed case studies on Islamist groups in Afghanistan and Somalia, which are welcome contributions to the area studies literature. Second, it presents a new hypothesis on the rise of Islamist power in volatile areas, which will be of interest to scholars of civil war and state formation. Third, the book taps into ongoing political debates on how the international community should deal with contemporary Islamist proto-states.

The main strength of the book is that it is based on unique empirical material, gathered through the author's lengthy fieldwork in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kenya, and Somalia. Ahmad has used a “mixed-methods approach that included interviews, survey questionnaires, and participant and nonparticipant observations” (p. 204). Her research methods are exemplary; in fact, the methodological appendix is in itself a field manual for conducting research in security-challenged areas. Another strength of the book is the originality of the author's approach. Existing studies of militant Islamists and why they rise to power tend to emphasize ideology and external support as the main explanatory variables. To my knowledge, Ahmad is the first to do a systematic analysis of the connections between militant Islamism and local business elites. Her analysis does not distinguish between legal and illegal businesses, because as she pragmatically puts it, “it makes little sense to talk of illegality in lawless societies” (p. xxiii). A nugget worth adding here is that she found “no clear evidence that involvement in criminality made businesspeople any more or less inclined to support Islamists over other factions” (p. xxiii).

This core assumption about the nature of business in conflict areas sets her book apart from much of the terrorism studies literature, which tends to talk about the existence of a “crime–terror nexus” rather than a business–Islamist one (e.g., see Steven Hutchinson and Pat O'Malley, “A Crime-Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality, *Studies in Conflict Terrorism*, 30[12], 2007). Regarding the old debate on whether criminals and terrorists are distinct or overlapping groups, Ahmad posits that “business and jihadist interests are highly distinct” (p. 6)—thus aligning