

Social forces in Southern Africa: transformation from below?

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ABSTRACT

The majority of southern Africa's inhabitants are economically marginalised. Robert W. Cox's macro-theory of change suggests that the marginalised are a social force that could bring about political economic transformation from below. Other contemporary analysts also stress the importance of focusing on the marginalised as a source of social instability. The paper uses empirical data from the Afrobarometer (Round 1, 1999–2000) to investigate whether this expectation for the marginalised to act as a catalyst for change in seven southern African states is substantiated. The analysis shows that the political protest potential of the marginalised is lower than that of the economically integrated, that they are more tolerant of authoritarian political alternatives, and that they are not significantly more economically dissatisfied than other groups. They are also inclined to accord somewhat more legitimacy to the state than are the integrated. Societies where large parts of the population are poor and marginalised are thus not necessarily more prone to political instability in the form of protest actions (violent or non-violent). Those who are justly concerned about equity and greater inclusiveness must take cognisance of the need to access the profile of the marginalised.

BACKGROUND, CONTEXT AND PROBLEM¹

It is commonly claimed that we should expect pressure for social change (transformation) to take the form of political backlash (e.g. protest) from those who are economically marginalised. Using a macro-theory of change and the empirical data of the Afrobarometer survey (Round 1, 1999–2000), I argue that such assumptions and expectations must be subjected to critical analysis. Furthermore, I show that in the case of the seven southern African states included in the first round of the Afrobarometer, these assumptions and claims are generally not supported by the data. I intend to follow up the analysis presented here, through a longitudinal study of subsequent Afrobarometer rounds, to determine whether there has been any change over the following five years.

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The theory of transformation developed by the noted political economist and historian, Robert W. Cox (1987), focuses on change which emanates from the 'bottom-up'. The work of Cox has, over the years, achieved widespread recognition in the field of Global Political Economy (GPE). Cox regards the marginalised as subordinated 'social forces' because of their peripheral relationship to the dominant way in which goods and services are produced in the contemporary global political economy. They are marginalised, therefore, as a result of the nature of the production process and the resultant material 'conditions of their existence', but also because they are isolated from the creation (production) of the *ideas*, institutions and social practices which form the framework within which material production takes place (*ibid.*: 13, 403).² In developing states, he speculates, the 'potential for revolt arising out of the social relations in the production process is greater ... than in the advanced capitalist countries' (*ibid.*: 387). He also acknowledges, however, that although the marginalised are 'potentially destabilizing for the social and political order', this potential is reduced by the fact that they are mainly concerned with 'survival and adaptation'. Nevertheless, when we consider the question of whether a challenge to the present political economic order is likely, he urges us to focus on 'the possibilities of launching a social movement' and that change may be possible because of 'dissatisfaction with the prevailing order' among the marginalised (*ibid.*: 393).

Cox convincingly demonstrates the explanatory potential of his theory, by showing how the interaction (and mutual influence) between social forces, the state and world order in nineteenth-century Britain impacted on that country's state form and also on the world order of that time (*pax britannica*). The challenge of the industrial manufacturers (social forces) led to the formation of a liberal economic state and middle-class hegemony. Later, the social costs resulting from an unregulated market, and pressure from organised labour (dissatisfied social forces), required an adaptation to the welfarist state form and the political incorporation of the working class. Unrivalled in its industrial and military capacity, Britain maintained a world order based on free trade and its ability to act as a power broker on the European continent.

In the current historical context, Cox (1981: 113) argues that the potential for the transformation of state forms and world order is located in the marginalised, because: 'a very large part of the world's population in the poorest areas remain marginal to the world economy, having no employment or income, or the purchasing power derived from it. A major problem for international capital in its aspiration for hegemony is how to neutralize the effect of this marginalization of perhaps one-third of the

world's population so as to prevent its poverty from fueling revolt.' This observation, although written nearly a quarter of a century ago, remains very relevant today, when the alleviation of poverty has become one of the top issues on the global agenda. The United Nations' Millennium Development Goals aim to halve poverty by 2015, the British government's 'Africa Commission' report on strategies to reduce African poverty has recently been released, and Jeffrey Sachs (2005) argues in a new book that extreme poverty can be eradicated by 2025.

The developing world (and Africa) is viewed by Cox (1987: 387; 1996: 26–7) as particularly conducive to transformation from below. Cox makes the Africa connection through the work of Fantu Cheru (1989) to generate predictions on the possible behaviour of the marginalised. Citing Cheru's notion of a 'silent revolution' in Africa, he concludes that the marginalised are 'dropping out of the world market, and the formal structures of national economies, to seek their survival in the informal sector' (Cox 1992: 527–9). In a more recent publication Cheru (2002: 20) reaffirms that 'The problems facing leaders are further compounded by the resentment and rebelliousness they provoke in the governed. Many Africans have a sense of uncertainty and a feeling of futility. The losers in global restructuring then try to reassert themselves through organized resistance.' New opposition movements put forward their demands through, *inter alia*, 'open peasant insurrection', 'urban riots' and 'collective actions' (*ibid.*: 46).

Other contemporary analysts also stress the importance of focusing on the marginalised as a source of social instability. MacLean (2004: 2) argues that inequality has become a threat to human security and is now a 'functional' issue of public policy because '... people whose needs are not met are less likely to be productive economically and/or *they are more likely to become militantly aggressive in protesting their condition*' (own italics). Chua (2003) claims that the spread of global markets only benefits 'market-dominant' minorities (indigenous or outsiders) in developing states, and that this visible inequality fuels ethnic hatred and 'backlashes' such as appropriation of property, expulsion of minorities, 'crony capitalism' and even genocide. Moreover, she states that 'In Africa, as in virtually every other region of the non-Western world, market-dominant minorities control virtually all the most valuable and advanced sectors of the modern economy, monopolizing access to wealth and global markets, and producing seething, often unmobilized ethnic resentment and hatred among the indigenous African majority around them' (*ibid.*: 121).

Notwithstanding his emphasis on the importance of social forces related to production as a source of contradictions in society, as well as possible transformation, Cox never investigated the (aggregated) motives of those

whom he sees as a (potential) threat to the established order. His theory, in the context of southern Africa, argues that the major challenge facing states in the region is to be found in the exclusion of the marginalised. But this is a question which needs to be investigated. Does this vast underclass have the potential to act as a force for the transformation of state forms, and how do they view the state?

Is marginalisation in southern Africa, in other words, unsustainable in the longer term because the marginalised form a potential force of political protest which can bring about a transformation towards greater equity, perhaps through a more redistributive orientated state form? Or are Hobsbawm's (1962: 249) observations about the poor during the industrial revolution in England also valid for the contemporary marginalised?: 'It is no accident that the least skilled, least educated, least organized and therefore least hopeful of the poor, then as later, were the most apathetic.'

THEORETICAL DELIMITATIONS

This article will not attempt to provide reasons for the occurrence of, or variation in, collective political violence (cf. Tilly 2003) or protest among the economically marginalised. Although Cox's concept of 'social forces' could arguably be brought to bear on the concept of 'social movements', the focus here is not on social movements nor on the 'social psychology' of participation in them, the purpose of which is to mobilise a group of people around a collectively shared grievance. It is not, as Klandermans (1997: 211) states to explain his own focus, about '*how* [people] come to translate discontent into action rather than despair ...'

Nor do I try to explain why some individuals decide to participate in social movements (seemingly against the logic of their own rational interest, cf. Olson 1968) and others not, or whether a social movement will emerge among the marginalised, or how the aggregated attitudes of marginalised individuals are related to shared (collective) beliefs which are a minimum requirement for the emergence of a social movement. I do not deal with the emergence and demise of social movements, nor do I engage with the different explanations (breakdown theories, resource mobilisation, political process theory and social construction theory) of social movement dynamics (Klandermans 1997).

Instead, the more modest aim is to determine whether Cox's claim that the marginalised 'social forces' are an important potential catalyst for transformation can be substantiated from the aggregated individual attitudes of the sample population in the first round of the Afrobarometer. According to Cox, social change at the state and world order levels can be

expected to emanate from the group which is (most) excluded from the benefits of the dominant system of production. It is important to note that Cox's theory of transformation does not attempt to explain *individual* political behaviour. The explanatory focus is on how 'social forces' shape state forms and world political economic order. Social forces consist of *groups* who are conceptualised in terms of how they are related to the production of material and non-material goods. Therefore, by focusing on three hypotheses deduced from Cox's theory, the article will provide a 'snapshot' of the aggregated individual attitudes prevalent among three groups of 'social forces': the marginalised, precarious and integrated.

CONCEPTUALISING THE MARGINALISED, PRECARIOUS AND INTEGRATED

Cox's theory of transformation suggests that one way in which increasing levels of inequality can be observed and analysed is to determine how people are related, in terms of their economic status, to the dynamics (via their national economies) of the contemporary world economic order (more specifically, to its system of production). He consistently emphasises the importance of change from the 'bottom-up' which, according to him, will emanate from those social forces which are 'excluded' or 'marginalised' from the global economy.

Cox identifies three categories according to which groups of people are related to the contemporary political economic world order:

- Those who are *integrated*. They are the dominant class who are in managerial positions (state and civil society) and decide 'what is produced, where and by whom' in the *dominant* production mode of the global economy.
- Those who find themselves in a *precarious* position. These are workers who can easily be replaced because of low skill levels, demand for a particular product, and the ability of capital to relocate production to where cheap and flexible labour regimes exist.
- Those who are *excluded* or *marginalised* from global production. They include people who are not formally employed in sectors of the economy which are integrated into global production. For instance, vendors, casual labour, subsistence farmers and those who have no means of permanent income whatsoever (Cox 1999: 9).

Cox's (1999) conceptualisation of the marginalised which emphasises employment status (not employed in the formal economy), low or no education/skills, base occupations and irregularity of, or no cash income,

indicates that the majority of southern Africans (see Table 2, below) are not involved in the dominant global mode of production, nor even in the globally linked sectors of their national economies. In fact, most of them are also not formally employed in purely national modes of production for the local market. Their (indirect) link to the global mode of production approximates the form of a 'non-producer' and a lower end of the scale potential consumer, as in the vendor/hawker or subsistence farmer who owns or aspires to own a mobile telephone.

The marginalised in urban areas are unskilled workers (no formal job training and limited or no education). They are usually unemployed (in the formal economy) and earn an irregular cash income. This income is sourced through temporary, short-time jobs (casual labour) or side-walk vending and hawking. In the rural areas the marginalised are represented by subsistence farmers who have limited contact with the cash economy. Their income is usually supplemented by remittances from relatives in urban areas, the pension earnings of the elderly, and income earned from the sale of cash crops in times of surplus.

The precarious economic group is mainly found in urban areas. They are semi-skilled (with some job training and basic education). They have low status full-time jobs (in cleaning, maintenance, security, the clothing, textile, footwear and mining industries), or are temporarily employed as contract workers. The latter form the major component of the precarious, and are looking for full-time work without being able to find it. Some workers in this category are not unionised. Cox (1987: 52–5) also includes certain kinds of self-employment in this category ('most forms of self-employment are precarious in the long term'). These are commercial farmers, shopkeepers, craft market peddlers and any other form of non-professional self-employment without a regular income.

The integrated category refers to those managers and workers who find themselves in a sector of the economy which is outwardly orientated and directly connected to the global economy. They are directors and upper level management staff of globally integrated (export focused), financial services and information technology companies. The integrated also include the 'state class' (civil service managerial positions) in developing countries, particularly those who work for state agencies that are directing the process aimed at becoming globally competitive (for instance, finance, trade and industry, foreign affairs, and the prime minister's or president's office). Established full-time workers employed by these companies and by state agencies are also included in this category. They are highly skilled or skilled (usually with post-secondary education and/or training), and are found in information technology related work, research and development,

and technical supervision and support. Also included are self-employed professionals such as doctors, lawyers, consultants, accountants and engineers (see also Cox 1993a; 1996: 26–7; 1997a: 247–8; 1999: 9).

HYPOTHESES AND COMPARATIVE BASE

Of the seven southern African states listed in Table 1, four are ranked below the median of the total number of states which the *UNDP Human Development Report 2001* categorises as ‘medium human development’, and two (Zambia and Malawi) lie in the ‘low human development’ category. They are all marked by high levels of inequality. For example, the income share of the richest 20% (1987–98) in Botswana is 59% (compared to 4% for the poorest 20%); comparative figures for other southern African states are, respectively, Lesotho (60% & 3%), South Africa (65% & 3%), Zambia (55% & 4%) and Zimbabwe (62% & 4%). Although the region had an average annual growth rate of 1.7% in 1994–98 (6%–7% is required to halve poverty by 2015), the benefits of this growth have gone to some workers in the formal sector and not to the marginalised (IGD 2001: 36–7, 39–40, 58–100).

The seven states also provide us with considerable variation and sufficient similarities to serve as a base for comparison. In terms of Freedom House’s (2001) Index, three states (Botswana, Namibia and South Africa) are rated as ‘free’, and score highly in terms of their political and civil liberties indices. It is noteworthy that these states also have the highest per capita GNP. Namibia’s civil liberties score was recently downgraded because of attempts by government to restrict press freedom. Namibia and South Africa’s economies are categorised as ‘capitalist-statist’, which means they have a large market-orientated sector but also a large sector which is controlled by state or parastatal companies. Zambia is the only state which has a ‘mixed-statist’ economy, meaning that the economy is primarily government-directed but with a significant presence of private enterprises.

Of the seven states (during 1999–2000), four (Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) have ‘partly free’ status. Lesotho is regarded as ‘in transition’ to a competitive multi-party system, while Zimbabwe scores the lowest on the civil and political liberties indices. Within this sample of southern African states there are also two ‘dominant party’ type polities (Zambia and Zimbabwe). Here, although political challengers are allowed to compete, the governing party will not allow an effective change-over of power. The group is representative of countries with medium levels of development (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe)

TABLE 1
 Political and economic indicators of the 7 Afrobarometer (Round 1, 1999–2000) states^a

	FH Polity Category	FH Status	FH Economy Category	HDI 2000 ^b	Per Capita GNP 1999, US\$	Gini Coefficient 2000	HDI Rank 2001
Botswana	Parliamentary democracy + traditional chiefs	Free	Capitalist	0.57	3280	0.54	114
Lesotho	Parliamentary democracy + (transitional)	Partly Free	Capitalist	0.54	560	0.56	120
Malawi	Presidential-parliamentary democracy	Partly Free	Capitalist	0.40	180	0.62	151
Namibia	Presidential-parliamentary democracy	Free	Capitalist-statist	0.61	1890	N/A	111
RSA	Presidential-parliamentary democracy	Free	Capitalist-statist	0.70	3170	0.58	94
Zambia	Dominant party	Partly Free	Mixed-statist	0.43	330	0.46	143
Zimbabwe	Dominant party	Partly Free ^c	Capitalist-statist	0.55	520	0.63	117

^a The data and explanatory comments for this table were drawn from Freedom House 2001 and n.d.; IGD 2001; and UNDP 2001, 2002.

^b The Human Development Index (HDI) reflects the average combined score (between 0 and 1) between three quantitative indices of development. These are life expectancy at birth, the adult literacy rate (two-thirds weight) plus the primary, secondary and tertiary educational enrolment ratio (one third weight), and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (adjusted and in US\$).

^c Freedom House's (2002) 'Freedom in World 2001–2002' survey downgrades Zimbabwe to 'not free', because of 'numerous and repeated actions taken by the government to limit the ability of citizens to organize and to express themselves according to democratic norms'.

TABLE 2

The marginalised, precarious, and integrated in the 7 Afrobarometer states (Round 1)

MPI Index	LES	BOTS	MAL	NAM	ZAM	ZIM	SA	Total
Marginalised	83.2 %	56.6 %	76.3 %	66.0 %	57.3 %	57.1 %	46.2 %	61.6 %
Precarious	15.4 %	34.6 %	17.2 %	24.7 %	31.3 %	33.1 %	43.6 %	30 %
Integrated	1.4 %	8.8 %	6.5 %	9.5 %	11.5 %	9.8 %	10.2 %	8.4 %
Total	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

Note: Total N = 9368, Valid N = 8618 (92 %), Missing N = 750 (8 %).

according to the UNDP's (2001) Human Development Index, but also includes two states that fall into the low level of development category (Malawi and Zambia). All experience high levels of income inequality, and (with the exception of South Africa, see Table 2) have populations where the marginalised form the majority.

Based on Cox's theory, I have deduced a main hypothesis and a number of subsidiary hypotheses. The main hypothesis claims that position in a social mode of production is a predictor of that group's propensity to challenge the political and economic status quo. Those who are marginalised/excluded are *more inclined* to pose such a challenge than the precarious and integrated. To determine whether there is support for the main hypothesis, we will investigate the following three subsidiary hypotheses:

- (a) being marginalised correlates with being (more) inclined to political protest (Cox 1997a: 248);
- (b) being marginalised correlates with being (more) dissatisfied with the political economic system (Cox 1987: 403);
- (c) being marginalised correlates with low state legitimacy (Cox 1993b: 41; 1997b: 250; 1999: 13, 24–5).

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

The data was generated by the Afrobarometer survey (Round 1, 1999–2000). Although essentially an instrument designed to poll the extent of democratic consolidation in southern Africa, the items in the questionnaire³ cover a wide range of issues that are relevant to the main and subsidiary hypotheses of Cox's theory of transformation.

The seven national research partners which made up Round 1 of the Afrobarometer are; the University of Botswana, Sechaba Consultants of Lesotho, the Centre for Social Research at the University of Malawi, Research Facilitation Services in Namibia, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa, the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of Zambia, and the University of Zimbabwe. A multi-stage, stratified area cluster probability sample was used for the surveys.⁴ The following nationally representative samples were drawn (target sample sizes are given in brackets) for a total sample size (N) of 9,400 respondents: Botswana: November 1999 (1200); Lesotho: March–April 2000 (1200); Malawi: December 1999 (1200); Namibia: September–October 1999 (1200); South Africa: July–August 2000 (2200); Zambia: November 1999 (1200); and Zimbabwe: October–November 1999 (1200).

Based on Cox's conceptualisation of what it means to be economically marginalised, precarious, or integrated, an 'economic position' measure was constructed, the MPI (Marginalised, Precarious, Integrated) Index. Cox emphasises four aspects which determine where an individual will be located; regularity of income, skills (education), occupation and status of economic activity (employment). These economic profile items all appear in the questionnaire (the item corresponding to skills is education), and were recoded to reflect Cox's conceptualisation (see Appendix A for an illustration of how employment was recoded). Based on two methods of factor analysis, the index was constructed with the inclusion of occupation, employment status and education (see Appendix B). The factor analysis showed that there was a strong underlying dimension (commonality) which is responsible for the covariation between these three variables. The results also confirm the expectation that, based on Cox's conceptualisation of economic position, the selection of these variables and their grouping into an index instrument was theoretically and statistically justifiable.⁵ The subsequent analysis consisted of running correlations and cross-tabulations (using SPSS[®], version 11) between the MPI Index and selected questionnaire items and indices (see Mattes *et al.* 2000; Mattes & Bratton 2001), which are related to the hypotheses set out above.

Some further explanatory comments on the construction of the index are warranted. The construction of an index always involves theoretical interpretation (based on the informed judgement of the analyst) as to what should be included and what should be left out. This is in contrast to scale construction where selection and combination of items is more systematic. My interpretation and decisions on what should be included are based on a thorough reading of Cox's work that, while not entirely exhaustive, is representative. The construction of the index was undertaken with the aim

of reflecting as accurately as possible the essence of the concepts (marginalised, precarious and integrated) as they are used by Cox. However, some selections are obviously open to interpretation and this must be recognised as a limitation on the accuracy of the operationalisation. As noted above, this is a problem from which all indexes (as opposed to scales) suffer.

Based on my reading of Cox, the Marginalisation Index (MPI) is, in my opinion, justified in not treating the social position categories as separate points on a triangle (nominal categories), because they encapsulate the fundamental assumption underlying the definition of ordinal data, namely, that we must be able to say that there is more or less of a particular attribute present. The social position (associated with how one relates to the dominant production system at national and global level) of someone who is integrated (as conceptualised by Cox and operationalised in the index) means that such an individual has more education, employment and income, and is more likely to be in a particular occupation, than someone who is marginalised.

Nachmias and Nachmias (1981: 136) encapsulate this as follows: 'Consider a property such as "social acceptability". In social acceptability, all members of the upper class are higher than all members of the middle class. All members of the middle class, in turn, are higher than all members of the lower class. The equivalence relation holds among members of the same class, whereas the greater than relation holds between any pair of classes.' In the same manner we can readily (by using operationalised criteria) determine that the marginalised, precarious and integrated have more or less of a particular attribute (e.g. education), and that linearity (although not of the interval or ratio kind) is present. The index, therefore, is an imperfect measure of the underlying dimension (supported by the factor analysis and reliability test) of marginalisation.

The other indexes and scales used in the article were constructed or amended (to take account of context) from standard items (for instance on legitimacy) by a panel of experts and/or the principal researchers associated with the Afrobarometer. They have also been used in other publications which have resulted from the Afrobarometer project.

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

This section focuses on the results of the data analysis. The method of analysis involved two stages. First, a correlation matrix was created between the MPI Index and selected items in the questionnaire which are related to attitudes towards regime type, the economy, political protest

potential and legitimacy. Only those statistically significant correlations of 0.200 or stronger were selected.⁶ Gamma's correlation coefficient (γ) ranges between -1 and $+1$.⁷ A positive correlation indicates that an increase in the value of one variable is associated with an increase in the value of the other variable. A negative correlation means that an increase in one variable is associated with a decrease in the value of the second variable. The correlation matrix which was constructed correlates the MPI Index (independent variable) with selected questionnaire items (dependent variables). Secondly, a cross-tabulation (between the MPI Index and the appropriate items) data analysis was run on all the correlations of 0.160 or stronger (see tables below).

Correlations were run for all seven states (every respondent in the data set), for each state separately (all=rural and urban together), and for rural and urban respondents (all states and within each state). Where all states are included in correlations or cross-tabulations, they are referred to collectively as 'southern Africa'. 'Marginalised', 'Precarious' and 'Integrated' have been abbreviated to M, P, and I; while 'all', 'urban' and 'rural' appear as A, U and R respectively. All percentages have been rounded off.

The first category, *regime type*, deals with attitudes towards the political system, and facilitates an evaluation of the subsidiary hypothesis which states that being marginalised correlates with being dissatisfied with the political system. The questionnaire includes a number of items which attempt to measure attitudes towards and understandings of democracy. Meaningful correlations were discovered on three items. The first item (*rejection of non-democratic alternatives*) is a scale (1–5), which is aimed at determining how willing people would be to consider authoritarian options, in other words, how strongly they are committed in their expressed support of democracy as a form of governance. The question reads as follows:

Our current system of governing with regular elections and more than one political party is not the only one [country] has ever had. Some people say that we would be better off if we had a different system of government. How much would you strongly disapprove, disapprove, neither disapprove nor approve, approve or strongly approve of [six listed non-democratic alternatives] to our current system of government with at least two political parties and regular elections?

In Table 3, the range of responses to the various alternatives has been collapsed into three categories: strongly disapprove and disapprove appears as 'disapprove', strongly approve and approve as 'approve', and neither approve nor disapprove as 'unsure'. Only four states emerged with reportable correlations between the MPI Index and the 'rejection of

TABLE 3
The MPI Index and rejection of non-democratic alternatives¹¹

Attitudes to Non-Demo Alternatives	MPI Index											
	Malawi $\gamma = 0.179$ (U) $p < 0.008$			Namibia $\gamma = 0.188$ (A) $p < 0.001$			Zambia $\gamma = 0.192$ (R) $p < 0.001$			Zimbabwe $\gamma = 0.167$ (A) $p < 0.001$		
	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I
Approve	2	1	0	10	5	3	6	4	0	6	2	1
Unsure	16	8	0	29	25	14	18	21	19	16	15	11
Disapprove	82	91	0	61	70	84	76	75	81	79	83	88
N	N=305 (99%)			N=899 (76%)			N=445 (73%)			N=915 (76%)		

non-democratic alternatives' item. The majority of respondents indicated a 'strong disapproval/disapproval' of the various items. The N for urban Malawians is small and, consequently, includes no respondents for the integrated category. *Overall, the marginalised in the four states show a lower disapproval and a higher approval rate of non-democratic alternatives than the precarious and the integrated.* This is particularly noticeable in Namibia, where 10% of the marginalised approve, 29% are unsure and 61% disapprove. Comparatively, only 3% of the integrated approve, 14% are unsure, and 84% disapprove.⁸ The tendency, among these four states, is therefore that economic position is somewhat linked to attitudes towards non-democratic alternatives. The marginalised have a lower disapproval rate of these alternatives, which increases among the precarious and shows a further increase among the integrated. This tendency is most visible in Namibia and Zimbabwe, but less so for rural Zambians.

The second item (see Table 4) is a scale (1–5) which attempts to measure the opinion of respondents to anti-democratic actions by government. Are they strongly opposed to such actions, or not? The scale incorporates the responses to four potential anti-democratic actions which were categorised as 'support', 'unsure' and 'oppose'. The anti-democratic actions include: shutting down the media which are critical of government, dismissing judges who rule against government, banning political parties, and suspending parliament and cancelling the next elections.

Again, there is an association between being marginalised, precarious or integrated and tolerance for anti-democratic behaviour by government. In Namibia there is no difference between the MPI categories and support for anti-democratic behaviour (levelling out at 7% each). There is, however, a large proportion of respondents who are uncertain. The largest proportion resides in the

TABLE 4
The MPI Index and attitudes to anti-democratic actions by government¹²

Attitudes to Anti-Demo Actions by Government	MPI Index								
	Namibia $\gamma = 0.118$ (A) $p < 0.003$			Zambia $\gamma = 0.253$ (A) $p < 0.001$			Zimbabwe $\gamma = 0.240$ (A) $p < 0.001$		
	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I
Support	7	7	7	2	1	0	5	6	1
Unsure	32	20	14	7	6	3	26	18	4
Oppose	61	73	79	91	93	97	69	76	95
N	N = 951 (91 %)			N = 1004 (86 %)			N = 915 (83 %)		

marginalised category (32%), declining to 20% for the precarious and to 14% for the integrated. For this reason, the Namibian results were reported on.

The majority of respondents in Namibia oppose anti-democratic actions by government, but they form a smaller majority than in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Additionally, there is a tendency for the proportion of those who oppose such policies to increase, depending on economic position. In the marginalised category, 61% oppose anti-democratic behaviour, while the proportion increases to 73% for the precarious and to 79% for the integrated. The vast majority of Zambians pronounced themselves against authoritarian policies (above 90% for all three categories), but again there is a tendency for the proportion to increase as one moves along the spectrum from the marginalised to the integrated. In Zimbabwe, as in Namibia, there is a substantial proportion of respondents who are unsure about their reaction to anti-democratic behaviour. Again, the larger proportion is found among the marginalised (26%), decreasing to 18% for the precarious and 4% for the integrated. When it comes to rejection of anti-democratic behaviour, 95% of the integrated in Zimbabwe are on board, declining to 76% for the precarious and 69% for the marginalised. Those who are integrated are, therefore, less tolerant of anti-democratic actions by government than the marginalised.

In the next item (Table 5) respondents were asked how they would *actually* react ('what if anything would you do about it?') if the government were to undertake the anti-democratic actions which they were asked to respond to in Table 5. Based on the responses, a behavioural defence of democracy scale (1 to 5) was constructed in which 1 represents the lowest

TABLE 5
The MPI Index and behavioural defence of democracy¹³

Behavioural Defence of Democracy	MPI Index														
	Southern Africa			Botswana			Malawi			Zambia			Zimbabwe		
	$\gamma=0.223$ (A) $p < 0.001$			$\gamma=0.282$ (A) $p < 0.001$			$\gamma=0.198$ (A) $p < 0.001$			$\gamma=0.225$ (A) $p < 0.001$			$\gamma=0.292$ (A) $p < 0.001$		
	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I
1	44	30	21	41	26	19	45	30	16	21	14	11	49	32	18
2	26	31	30	24	23	13	20	27	32	37	32	23	26	30	37
3	14	19	23	13	18	21	13	19	21	16	19	29	11	19	16
4	11	12	15	13	21	33	17	18	26	18	21	16	7	10	14
5	5	8	11	8	12	15	5	7	5	8	13	21	6	10	16
N	N=8166 (87%)			N=904 (75%)			N=1161 (96%)			N=982 (82%)			N=968 (81%)		

possible form of active defence of democracy ('do nothing'), and 5 the highest (most intense) form ('join a march or demonstration').

This is the first item where a meaningful correlation occurred for the whole southern African data set, and more specifically among rural respondents. In order to simplify the analysis, the 5 point scale can be divided into three components; 1 + 2 = low propensity to act, 3 = average propensity to act, and 4 + 5 = high propensity to act. When it comes to willingness to actually do something about anti-democratic government actions there is, again, a discernible pattern between the marginalised, precarious and integrated. Furthermore, *across the board* ($M+P+I$), *the majority of respondents exhibit a low propensity to behaviourally defend democracy*: southern Africa (66%), Botswana (58%), Malawi (63%), Zambia (52%) and Zimbabwe (69%).

Focusing on the marginalised, precarious and integrated, there are notable differences when it comes to the intended intensity of behaviour to defend democracy. *Generally, the integrated are more inclined towards more intensive acts, while the marginalised and precarious are more inclined to do nothing.* For southern Africa the proportions for those with a low propensity to engage in high profile acts are as follows: marginalised (70%), precarious (61%) and integrated (51%). Moving to higher intensity behaviour, the proportions are 14% for the marginalised, 19% for the precarious and 23% for the integrated. Lastly, out of those who would consider high intensity behaviour (e.g. 'join a march or demonstration') only 16% of respondents are found among the marginalised, increasing to 20% among the precarious and to 26% among the integrated. The highest proportion of those among the integrated who indicated that they would consider high profile

acts are found in Botswana (48%) and the lowest proportion in Zimbabwe (30%). Among the marginalised, the lowest proportion who find themselves at the bottom end of the intensity scale is in Zambia (58%), and the highest in Zimbabwe (75%).

The following items attempt to measure attitudes related to satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the *economy*. A question on personal economic satisfaction produced weak correlations with the MPI Index. In other words, the marginalised were not more dissatisfied than the precarious or integrated. The question reads as follows: 'At the moment are you dissatisfied, neither dissatisfied nor satisfied, or satisfied with economic conditions in [insert country]?' Generally, substantial majorities in all the states (except Namibia, at 30%) indicated that they were 'very dissatisfied/dissatisfied' with economic conditions (for instance, 94% in Zimbabwe and 68% in South Africa) (Mattes & Bratton 2001: 6). A question on how respondents view their government's management of the economy also produced weak correlations. Overall, there were therefore no differences between how the marginalised, precarious and integrated rated their governments' performance in this area. The relevant index incorporates four issues (out of nine in the questionnaire) about which respondents were asked to evaluate their government's performance. The items are: 'creating jobs', 'building houses', 'ensuring that prices remain stable', and 'managing the economy'.

A question which focuses on how people view their economic position in relation to their fellow citizens (individual relative deprivation), produced more significant correlations for three states. It reads: 'Now let us speak about your personal economic conditions. Would you say that they are worse, the same, or better than other [citizens of the country]?' Possible responses to this question were 'much worse', 'worse', 'about the same', 'better' or 'much better'.

The results for the three states in Table 6 indicate that *in Botswana, Malawi and Namibia, the marginalised, more than the precarious and integrated, tend to see themselves as worse off (compared to other citizens)*. If we add the 'much worse' and 'worse' categories, we see that in Botswana, 59% of the marginalised regard themselves as much worse/worse off, 57% of the precarious do so, and only 28% of the integrated. The Malawian figures are comparable, except that the proportion of the precarious who think so drops to 45%. In Namibia, only 13% of the integrated think they are much worse/worse off (compared to 46% of the marginalised and 33% of the precarious). Between the three states, Namibia also has the highest number of integrated (61%) who feel that they are in 'better/much better' position compared to other Namibians.

TABLE 6
The MPI Index and individual relative deprivation¹⁴

Individual Relative Deprivation	Botswana $\gamma = 0.181$ (A) $p < 0.001$			Malawi $\gamma = 0.223$ (A) $p < 0.001$			Namibia $\gamma = 0.319$ (A) $p < 0.001$		
	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I
Much worse	22	23	5	20	17	6	13	9	5
Worse	37	34	23	37	28	22	33	24	8
About the same	23	25	33	17	19	25	22	21	27
Better	15	14	34	23	29	42	28	39	50
Much better	4	3	6	4	6	5	4	7	11
N	911 (74%)			1,204 (99%)			1,132 (92%)		

Political protest is the most active/extreme form of political participation. The relevant questionnaire item operationalises this concept in the following form: 'Here are a number of different actions people might take if government were to do something they thought was wrong or harmful. For each of these, please tell me whether you have engaged in this activity or not.' 'Yes' responses were sub-categorised under 'Once or twice', 'A few times', or 'Often'. 'No responses' under 'No, would never do this', and 'No, but would do it if I had the chance.' The following activities were listed: 'attend a demonstration or protest march', 'participate in a boycott of rates, services or taxes', 'take part in a sit-in, disruption of government meeting or offices', and 'use force or violent methods (such as damaging public property)'. The region and four states are reported on in Table 7, below.

The vast majority of respondents (marginalised, precarious and integrated) fall into the 'no' category, but approximately one-third in three states (Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe) would undertake some form of protest action if given the chance. In Lesotho, all three categories show an overwhelming rejection of protest as a form of political participation. The integrated (across the board) are more inclined to protest than the marginalised and precarious. For example, in Botswana, 54% fall into the 'no, but would' category, as opposed to 31% of the marginalised and 36% of the precarious. Also in Botswana, 6% of the integrated fall into the 'yes' category and in Zambia, 11%. The comparative numbers for the marginalised are 2% in both these states. Few people have engaged in protest activities, *but, in these states, the integrated (followed by the precarious) are more inclined to do so or to have done so.* This pattern is maintained for the region as a whole.

TABLE 7
The MPI Index and political protest¹⁵

Political Protest	Southern Africa $\gamma = 0.190$ (A) $p < 0.001$			Botswana $\gamma = 0.248$ (A) $p < 0.001$			Lesotho $\gamma = 0.285$ (A) $p < 0.001$			Zambia $\gamma = 0.229$ (A) $p < 0.001$			Zimbabwe $\gamma = 0.159$ (A) $p < 0.001$		
	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I	M	P	I
No, never	78	68	66	67	58	40	94	83	100	72	60	58	61	52	56
No, but would	18	26	27	31	36	54	5	15	0	27	36	31	25	32	37
Yes, once or twice	3	6	5	2	6	6	0	1	0	2	3	9	10	14	15
Yes, a few times	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	1	6
Yes, often	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0
N	8111 (87%)			865 (72%)			949 (81%)			997 (83%)			959 (80%)		

Mattes *et al.* (2000: 30) associate legitimacy with the consent or compliance of the governed to be governed: 'state and government legitimacy can be seen as the sense that there is no alternative set of structures or institutions' which people view as having the right 'to make authoritative, binding societal decisions'. The correlations to determine whether there are any differences between the marginalised, precarious and integrated when it comes to the issue of *legitimacy* were very low and some were not statistically significant. This indicates that there is no noticeable difference between the marginalised, precarious and integrated when it comes to attitudes on government's right to govern. As a result, no cross-tabulations were run between the MPI Index and the recoded questions on legitimacy. Interestingly, however, all the correlations were negative, indicating that the integrated tend to accord slightly less legitimacy to government than the marginalised do.⁹

The first item in the questionnaire on legitimacy attempts to measure attitudes towards government and the constitution, and consists of a question and four statements. A legitimacy scale (1–5) was constructed, with 1 being an indication of extremely low legitimacy and 5 an indication of high legitimacy. The question reads: 'Here are some things people often say about our current political system. For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree, neither disagree nor agree, or agree?' (The interviewer was asked to probe for strength of opinion). The statements are: 'our government was elected to power by accepted procedures', 'our government exercises power in an acceptable way', 'our constitution expresses the values and aspirations of the [insert

TABLE 8
The MPI Index and inclination to disobey¹⁶

Inclination to Disobey	Southern Africa $\gamma = -0.071$ (A) $p < 0.001$			Namibia $\gamma = -0.280$ (A) $p < 0.001$		
	M	P	I	M	P	I
No, never	82	82	86	63	74	83
No, but would	14	14	10	24	16	10
Yes, once or twice	3	3	2	7	4	6
Yes, a few times	1	0.9	0.7	3	3	1
Yes, often	1.3	1.2	0.9	3	2	1
	6583 (70%)			927 (78%)		

country] people', and 'our government has the right to make decisions that all people have to abide by whether or not they agree with them'.

On the legitimacy scale, Zimbabwe ranked the lowest¹⁰ among the seven southern African states, while Namibia and Botswana ranked the highest. *Overall, the legitimacy scores for the seven southern African states tend to level out towards the mid-point, indicating an average accordance of legitimacy to southern African governments by all respondents* (Mattes *et al.* 2000: 31).

The second legitimacy item attempts to measure respondents' willingness/unwillingness to obey some selected fundamental laws related to, *inter alia*, the payment of taxes and payment for services (Table 8). A scale (1–5) was constructed, based on the answers pertaining to four hypothetical actions. The question reads: 'We would like to remind you that your responses to this interview are confidential. Here is a list of actions ordinary people are taking in a political system. For each of these, please tell me whether you have engaged in this activity or not.' The actions listed are: 'claim government benefits to which you are not entitled (like a pension, maintenance, or unemployment payment)', 'avoid paying a development levy or property tax', 'avoid paying income taxes', and 'get services like electricity or water without paying for them'.

Only for the Namibian respondents did the cross-tabulation with the MPI Index show that *there is a tendency for the marginalised to be more inclined to consider disobeying government laws (tax avoidance, fraudulent benefit claims, and non-payment for basic services) than the precarious and integrated. The southern African data is included to illustrate that this tendency (that the more integrated are less inclined to disobey) holds for the region, but with very small percentage differences between the three categories.* In other words, except for Namibia, there is no significant difference between being marginalised, precarious or integrated and 'cheating'. In Namibia, 83% of the integrated against 63% of the

marginalised indicated that they have never undertaken such actions. Only 10% of the integrated state that they would take these actions if given the chance, compared to 24% of the marginalised and 16% of the precarious.



Are the marginalised more dissatisfied with the political economic system than the precarious and integrated? According to the results from the data analysis and related to regime type (attitudes to democracy), the marginalised are more inclined to approve of authoritarian alternatives. They are also more inclined to not oppose anti-democratic policies by government and not want to actively defend democracy (regionally, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Lastly, the integrated (in two states, Namibia and Zimbabwe) are more inclined to view democracy as the 'only game in town' than the precarious and marginalised. One can conclude, therefore, that the marginalised in the states reported on seem to be (potentially) more willing to discard democracy. It is important to note that this pattern does not hold for all the states and for the region as a whole. *This can be interpreted as a degree of 'dissatisfaction' with regime type and qualified support for the subsidiary hypothesis that being marginalised correlates with being (more) dissatisfied with the political system.*

On economic dissatisfaction, correlations with the MPI Index were weak. For the survey as a whole, all respondents were inclined not to approve of their governments' management of the economy, and also to feel themselves to be relatively deprived compared to others. In three states (Botswana, Malawi and Namibia), the marginalised felt themselves to be more deprived than the integrated. *The overall results, therefore, are not supportive of the subsidiary hypothesis that being marginalised is necessarily correlated with greater economic dissatisfaction.* Nevertheless, in three states the results support the hypothesis.

The political protest item correlated (moderately) with the MPI Index in four states and, collectively, for the region. The vast majority of respondents indicated that they had never engaged in this particular form of political participation. Among those who indicated that they would do so, if given the chance, the integrated have a higher protest potential than the precarious and marginalised. Nevertheless, there are significant proportions of the marginalised who would also protest (given the chance), but less so than the integrated. *There is, consequently, no support for the subsidiary hypothesis that being marginalised means being necessarily more inclined to political protest (actual or potential).*

Do the marginalised accord less legitimacy to state and government institutions than the precarious and integrated? Overall, the correlation between the MPI Index and the items on legitimacy attitudes were low, and there was little variance in the outlooks of the marginalised, precarious and integrated. In fact, the data show that the integrated are slightly less inclined to trust state and government institutions. However, the marginalised in only one state (Namibia) are more inclined to want to 'cheat' (take the 'exit-option') than the precarious and integrated. *The results, therefore, do not support the subsidiary hypothesis that being marginalised correlates with lower state legitimacy in comparison to the other economic categories in Cox's hierarchy.*

Taking into account these conclusions and what they say about the subsidiary hypotheses, *the main hypothesis, which states that position in a social mode of production is a predictor of that group's propensity to challenge the political-economic status quo, and that those who are marginalised are more inclined to pose such a challenge than the precarious and integrated, is (generally) not supported.*

Botswana, Namibia, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe emerged as the states which 'reacted' consistently on the various items and the MPI Index. Botswana, Malawi and Namibia had meaningful correlations for the items on relative deprivation. The item on political protest warranted the inclusion of the region, Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia and Zimbabwe (with the lowest correlation). South Africa, however, did not feature at all (in other words, there were no significant differences between marginalised, precarious and integrated respondents). *Except* for the relative deprivation item (in Botswana, Malawi and Namibia), and a higher tolerance among the marginalised for non-democratic alternatives (regime dissatisfaction) in Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the results were in the opposite direction to what Cox's theory anticipates. This requires more research and contextualisation on those states where some support was found for Cox's claims related to regime satisfaction and economic satisfaction (the relative deprivation item). The lower propensity for the marginalised to view democracy as the 'only game in town' could be related to their economic status.

It is interesting to note that Zambia and Zimbabwe are rated as dominant party polities by Freedom House (see Table 1) and 'partly free' and 'not free' respectively, while Malawi's political rights rating has recently been downgraded. Political protest is more likely among integrated Tswanas (Botswana scores high on the freedom index), but also more likely among integrated Zambians. South Africa and Botswana (with the highest GNP per capita, albeit with high levels of inequality) reacted the least to the MPI Index.

The Zimbabwean results warrant some additional observations and re-capping (bearing in mind that the survey was completed before the end of 1999 and the 2001 parliamentary elections, i.e. before Mugabe's land redistribution policy started to gather momentum). At this stage, Zimbabwe's legitimacy scale already fell below mid-point (Afrobarometer, Round 1). When it comes to undemocratic actions by government, 5% of the Zimbabwean marginalised indicated that they would support this and 26% were unsure. The analysis also shows that Zimbabweans (across the board) came out on top (69%) in terms of not being willing to behaviourally defend democracy. However, 50% of the marginalised indicated that they would do nothing, as opposed to 18% of the integrated and 32% of the precarious. Finally, although the legitimacy scale is low overall, 17% of the marginalised bestow high legitimacy on the Mugabe government, while 27% are unsure.

These results may be an indication of the success of the ruling ZANU-PF party's mixture of intimidation and support building strategies among Zimbabwe's poor. The continuing economic decline which was already underway in 1999 has hit all segments of the population hard, but the regime has been careful to target some relief at its support base in particularly the rural areas (for instance, through the storing and provision of external food aid). Speculating further, it could also be an indication that the Mugabe government will probably not be threatened by a popular revolt of Zimbabwe's impoverished and marginalised population. Again, it seems that even under the most arduous of circumstances, being marginalised does not necessarily translate into being more inclined to push for political and economic transformation. It may mean, however, that one is more inclined to interact with the state on a tactical basis, in order to ensure daily survival. In other words, sometimes using the 'exit-option' and at other times, 'engaging'. This is an issue which requires further investigation.

Furthermore, it also leads us to the conclusion that societies where large parts of the population are poor and marginalised are not necessarily more prone to political instability in the form of protest actions (violent or non-violent). To arrive at contextualised answers requires a (macro) historical and holistic approach, in combination with a bottom-up (micro) analysis which attempts to unpack the dynamics of social protest at grassroots level. The protest actions by the marginalised are often centred on their inability to meet the most basic needs (housing, food and water), coupled with a perception that government institutions at the local level are not providing them with (promised) basic essential services (water, sanitation, electricity).

The empirical analysis in this article has provided us with a synchronic ‘snapshot’ of the marginalised in seven southern African states. The results have shown that we cannot uncritically accept that the marginalised will act as a potential source of transformation ‘from below’. The explanation for this, I submit, is that they are excluded or on the fringes of the dominant economic mode of production (globally and nationally). It is much more difficult to mobilise and organise the extreme poor for political transformation when every day is a struggle just to meet basic needs. This means that those who are justly concerned about equity and greater inclusiveness must take cognisance of the need to access the profile of the marginalised. A ‘bottom-up’ explanation, therefore, also requires an empirical focus to determine whether a ‘push’ for transformation is actually latent among the marginalised. If the answer is a (qualified) no, then we need to cast our net wider to determine which other social forces related to production would stand to benefit from the social transformation of the liberal developmentalist state form.

Hobsbawm (1962: 262), while contemplating the failure of the Chartist Movement in industrial England (1838–48), observes: ‘What held this movement together was hunger, wretchedness, hatred and hope. And what defeated it, in Chartist Britain as on the revolutionary continent of 1848, was that the poor were hungry, numerous and desperate enough to rise, but lacked the organisation and maturity which could have made their rebellion more than a momentary danger to the social order.’

APPENDIX A

RECODING OF COX’S CONCEPTUALISATION OF EMPLOYMENT
STATUS

The third item for consideration in the MPI Index is related to whether people earn a regular income (are they on the margins of the cash economy or integrated into it?) and whether they have regular employment. The question (114) was recoded and renamed as ‘Cox Employment Status’. It reads: ‘Do you have a job that pays a weekly or monthly cash income? Is it full-time or part-time? And are you looking for a cash job (or looking for another one if you are presently working)?’ Possible responses were:

Q 114	01	No (not looking).
	02	No (looking).
	03	Yes, part-time (not looking).
	04	Yes, part-time (looking).

- 05 Yes, full-time (not looking).
 06 Yes, full-time (looking).
 07 Don't know.

The possible responses were grouped as follows:

MARGINALISED

- 01 No (not looking).
 02 No (looking).

PRECARIOUS

- 03 Yes, part-time (not looking).
 04 Yes, part-time (looking).

INTEGRATED

- 05 Yes, full-time (not looking).
 06 Yes, full-time (looking).

Note: The MPI categorisation is in accordance with Cox's premise that the marginalised are not (formally) employed, the precarious are usually employed on a part-time basis, and the integrated are established managers/workers who are full-time employed in the formal economy.

APPENDIX B

FACTOR AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS

Component Matrix^a

	Component
	I
Q119_R Cox occupation	0.777
Q113_R Cox education	0.710
Q114_R Cox employment status	0.717
Q13D_R Cox income	0.562

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

^a 1 components extracted.

Rotated Component Matrix^a

^a Only one component was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated.

Factor Matrix^a

	Factor
	1
Q119_R Cox occupation	0.725
Q113_R Cox education	0.550
Q114_R Cox employment status	0.585
Q13D_R Cox income	0.367

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

^a 1 factors extracted. 4 iterations required.

Goodness-of-fit Test

Chi-Square	df	Sig.
119.614	2	0.000

Rotated Factor Matrix^a

^a Only one factor was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated.

Reliability Analysis – Scale (Alpha)

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Cases
1 Q119_R	1.5715	0.7776	8556.0
2 Q113_R	1.3130	0.5484	8566.0
3 Q114_R	1.5975	0.8640	8566.0
4 Q13D_R	1.8700	0.7407	8566.0

Statistics for Scale			
Mean	Variance	Standard Deviation	N of Variables
6.3520	4.1718	2.0425	4

Item Total Statistics				
Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item Total Correlation	Alpha if Item Deleted	
4.7805	2.3717	0.4991	0.4908	Q119_R
5.0390	3.0432	0.4328	0.5636	Q113_R
4.7546	2.2729	0.4424	0.5405	Q114_R
4.4820	2.8561	0.3064	0.6325	Q13D_R

Reliability Coefficients

N of Cases = 8556.0

N of Items = 4

Alpha = 0.6301

NOTES

1. I would like to acknowledge and express my sincere gratitude to the research consortium involved with the Afrobarometer survey project (Round 1, 1999–2000) under the auspices of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa's (IDASA) Public Opinion Service in cooperation with Michigan State University. A special word of thanks goes to Bob Mattes, one of the project directors, for inviting me to participate as a research associate and for his assistance with the data analysis. Thanks are due also to Helen Macdonald, a colleague, for her assistance with the recoding of the MPI Index. The responsibility for the content of this article is, of course, entirely mine. A longer version of this article appears in the Afrobarometer Working Paper Series (see www.afrobarometer.org).

2. It is crucial, for an understanding of Cox's theory, to note that the potential and occurrence of transformation in the political economic order is dependent on change in *both* material capabilities and intersubjective ideas (shared understandings about, for instance, the role and nature of the state) (Cox 1981: 136–7).

3. A complete copy of the Zambian version of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix B of Leysens 2002.

4. The sample design protocol is set out in Appendix C of the SAB's *Memorandum of Understanding* (IDASA 1999).

5. The Alpha reliability analysis for the three items is 0.6301, which George & Mallery (2000: 279) regard as acceptable, but is generally viewed as a strong reliability coefficient.

6. The correlations between the MPI Index and various selected items were, generally, very low. Therefore, as a rule of thumb, all correlations which could be rounded off to 0.200 and above are reported on and were cross-tabulated with the dependent variables which are related to the stated hypotheses.

7. The level of measurement which was used to measure the attitudes of respondents in this study lies at the ordinal level. This means that we cannot conclude that a respondent who scores high (3) on a political discussion scale of three (1 = 'never discusses politics', 2 = 'occasionally discusses politics', and 3 = 'frequently discusses politics') discusses politics three times as much as someone who scores low (1). The difference in degrees of discussion can be explained in terms of 'more, less and no' discussion, but not in terms of the 'exact distance between each of the observations'. Books on statistical analysis recommend that gamma (γ) should be used to determine the association between ordinal variables (Dometrius 1992: 308–9; Fielding & Gilbert 2000: 14–15; Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias 1996: 158–63).

8. The correlation of 0.188 for Namibia, based on the total national sample, can be attributed to rural respondents (0.203) compared to 0.088 for urban respondents. Zimbabwe's correlation of 0.167 for the total sample is related to a reportable correlation of 0.210 among urban respondents. In order to increase the total N, so as to ensure a good distribution of respondents between the MPI categories, as much as possible, the total national sample (all) was used for most of the subsequent cross-tabulations.

9. The correlations were: Southern Africa (−0.095), Botswana (−0.173), Lesotho (−0.020), Malawi (−0.068), Namibia (−0.097), South Africa (−0.111), Zambia (−0.017) and Zimbabwe (−0.121).

10. The Zimbabwean survey was completed towards the end of 1999, before the parliamentary elections of 2001, and before the occupation of white farms by Zimbabwean war veterans started gathering momentum. On the legitimacy scale (1–5), Zimbabwe's mean of 2.51 falls below the midpoint of three. This figure indicates that the Zimbabwean government is perceived as not being legitimate. The other scores are: Namibia (3.72), Botswana (3.61), Lesotho (3.53), South Africa (3.51), Zambia (3.35), and Malawi (3.25) (Mattes *et al.* 2000: 32).

11. The correlations for the states not reported on in Table 4 are: Southern Africa (0.107), Botswana (0.052), Lesotho (0.079) and South Africa (0.092).

12. The correlations for the states not reported on in Table 5 are: Southern Africa (0.046), Botswana (0.148), Lesotho (0.046), Malawi (0.157) and South Africa (0.067).

13. The correlations for the states not reported on in Table 6 are: Lesotho (0.201), Namibia (0.169) and South Africa (0.128).

14. The correlations for the states not reported on in Table 7 are: Southern Africa (0.158), Lesotho (0.158), South Africa (0.089), Zambia (0.138) and Zimbabwe (0.116).

15. The correlations for the states not reported on in Table 8 are: Malawi (0.164), Namibia (0.006), and South Africa (0.051).

16. The correlations for the states not reported on in Table 9 are: Botswana (0.016), Lesotho (0.026), Malawi (0.095), South Africa (−0.016), Zambia (0.008) and Zimbabwe (−0.039).

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