shows later, these interest groups do not hold static preferences. For example, organized labor has traditionally opposed liberal immigration policies because of perceived economic threats to native-born workers. In recent debates, however, organized labor has had more of a negligible impact on immigration policy, due largely to its overall waning influence in American politics.

Chapters 3 and 4 provide historical overviews of the Hart Cellar Act and Post-Bracero immigration policy. Passed in 1965, the Hart Cellar Act eliminated the national origins quota system from the 1920s, and it had the important effect of expanding legal immigration from Asia and stimulating the movement of undocumented immigrants across the U.S.-Mexican border. Although rich in detail and useful for those interested in learning more about the vicissitudes of immigration policy, these two chapters do not compose the more significant contribution of the book.

Chapter 5 turns to more recent legislation, including the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and the Immigration Act of 1990. This chapter provides an array of statistical analyses of House votes on a variety of immigration bills. Wong only chooses House votes, even though Senate votes are arguably just as important, despite the claim that Senate votes consist of little variation (p. 111). Indeed, many of the immigration compromises have occurred in the Senate (e.g., the Kennedy-McCain bill in 2007). Nevertheless, the logistic analyses follow the same format throughout and include a wide variety of independent variables and controls. It would have been useful to have seen a more sustained theoretical discussion of the independent variables. Moreover, as Wong acknowledges, one particular problem with the foreign-born and agricultural-employment variables is that they are aggregate measures, while the rest of the variables deal with district-level observations. This produces bias in the estimates, requiring caution in interpretation. Despite this, the various statistical analyses reveal mostly unsurprising results, though there are some exceptions. For example, as concentrations of Mexican-American constituents in a district increase, policy votes move in a liberal direction. This finding is not consistent with previous research, and more discussion would have been desirable (p. 131).

In Chapter 6, Wong describes the determinants of the votes of House members on the Immigration Act of 1996. The statistical model is adapted to address the issue of a multidimensional policy space, due to this bill's amendments relating to both legal and illegal immigration. As E. E. Schattschneider (1960) and later William Riker (1986) attest, as the scope of conflict expands, coalitions tend to realign and more groups are thrust into the debate, thus changing the nature of any given conflict. As in 1990, Wong finds that unions are no longer a potent restrictionist force in the making of immigration policy. She also finds that the conservative–liberal dimension is inadequate when trying to explain some key votes, such as enforcement and privacy. Some conservatives, such as Rep. Tom Tancredo (R-CO), oppose the expansion of alien admissions and rights, while others, such as President George W. Bush, support a more comprehensive immigration reform plan, meaning the implementation of a "guest worker" program, along with a path to citizenship.

Overall, this book is an important contribution, which should be read by scholars interested in interest groups, legislative politics, and immigration policy. It is a nice complement to two recent books on immigration: Tichenor's *Dividing Lines* (2003) and S. Karthick Ramakrishnan's *Democracy in Immigrant America* (2005). Tichenor employs a historical institutionalist perspective, Ramakrishnan a political behavior perspective, and Wong an institutionalist perspective. The first half of Wong's book would be quite accessible to undergraduates in a class on immigration policy. Given the recent debates in Congress and on the airwaves about this important topic, *Lobbying for Inclusion* contextualizes the many competing voices in the immigration debate, providing policymakers and political scientists alike with the tools they need to be informed about the nuances of immigration policy.

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Ethnicity and Electoral Politics. By Jóhanna Kristín Birnir. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 279p. $85.00.

Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment. By Erin K. Jenne. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006. 272p. $45.00.

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— Brian Shoup, *Indiana University*

The literature on ethnic mobilization has benefited considerably in recent years from a wave of innovative scholarship examining such ostensibly disparate issues as ethnic party formation, the psychological and emotional underpinnings of group violence, the utility (and disutility) of ethnic appeals by power-seeking elites, and the limits and benefits of civic associations as a means of ameliorating intergroup conflict. A common feature shared by this work is its focus on problem-oriented research questions, creative research design, a rigorous application of diverse methodological approaches, and, perhaps most importantly, the willingness to develop and empirically test potentially contentious theories. Jóhanna Kristín Birnir's *Ethnicity and Electoral Politics* and Erin K. Jenne's *Ethnic Bargaining* are reflective of these qualities and make strong contributions to the field of ethnic politics. Both books make striking claims about contemporary debates in communal politics research and employ a broad array of empirical tools to test their core hypotheses. At the same time, they diverge regarding the implications of political liberalization and the greater political latitude it affords organized ethnic communities.

Birnir's book tackles the issue of electoral incentives and disincentives for ethnic mobilization and violence. Specifically, she is interested in examining the dynamics of ethnic political behavior in maturing democracies where stable party systems are only beginning to emerge. At root, she assumes that ethnic group members are not intransigent actors whose mutually exclusive interests are bound to generate conflict. Rather, she asserts that ethnic parties, contrary to expectation, are actually *good* for nascent democracies and can, under specific circumstances, give a degree of party stability over the medium term that might otherwise be unlikely. This is a particularly compelling argument given the predominant electoral theories of ethnic behavior, particularly consociationalism and centripitalism, which tend to stress the mutually antagonistic characteristics of ethnic parties. In terms of ethnic conflict, the principal contribution of the book is to suggest that exclusion of ethnic parties from the executive over the long term is the key variable that determines whether ethnic groups will seek to satisfy their demands through the formal system or through armed rebellion. Obviously, institutional design has much to say about the likelihood of such inclusion, a point noted by Birnir, who goes to great lengths to account for how divergent electoral systems and executive structures should increase or lower the overall costs associated with voting for ethnic or nonethnic parties (see, for example, pp. 222–23).

Methodologically, Birnir's book is a prime example of an increasingly sophisticated approach to the comparative politics research that has emerged in recent years. Using a "tripartite" research design that employs formal modeling, rigorously researched case studies, and cross-national quantitative tests, the author presents a powerful case for a reassessment of how ethnic political parties affect emergent democracies. Of particular note is her use of a "natural experiment" in Spain, a country where two different ethnic parties have employed divergent strategies for addressing their grievances vis-à-vis the Spanish government.

Like many theorists of ethnic political behavior, Birnir struggles somewhat with the fundamental reasons why ethnicity, as opposed to other salient cleavages, possesses the ability to generate a seemingly instantaneous political constituency. To her credit, she attempts to address this question by using extant theories of political socialization that stress ethnic and linguistic linkages and their ability to lower information costs. In her formal model, Birnir makes a compelling argument that voting for co-ethnics is always a dominant strategy for ethnic voters who are faced with two parties (one ethnic and the other nonethnic) with largely indistinguishable platforms. In such scenarios, a lower level of information variance associated with the ethnic party makes the ethnic choice more attractive. This argument is consistent not only with theories of ethnic socialization but also with social identity theories that stress the general tendency of groups to quickly emerge around the most ostensibly convenient defining categories.

Another weakness is Birner's adherence to a conventional "transitology" model of democratic development. Put simply, many "transitioning" states seem unlikely to move to fully open democratic institutions. This has important implications for Birnir's argument, which, at root, is predicated on the idea that permanent exclusion from the formal executive institutions is a key determinant of whether ethnic parties will seek their goals through violence. Some states with ethnic parties, such as Malaysia and Fiji, possess the trappings of procedural democracy, yet minority groups are roundly excluded from executive participation except in the most anodyne of ways. The very concept of democratic maturation implies some degree of openness that will permit ethnic minorities to wield executive authority in some form. It is interesting, however, that ethnic mobilization by minorities against the state is minimal in many of these cases. Indeed, in Fiji in 1987 and 1999, it was the perception that Indo-Fijian minority possessed *too much* executive power that compelled a powerful minority of ethnic Fijians to support coups against the sitting governments.

Jenne's book provides a possible answer to this issue. For Jenne, ethnic intransigence is associated with improved bargaining position. Ethnic minorities will agitate for more resources and political authority when they feel they are well situated to do so. Of particular interest here is the notion that ethnic minorities will mobilize not in the face of severe repression but, rather, in the face of liberalization that provides them with greater access for pressing their collective claims. By making minority protection an international mandate, as opposed to a purely domestic matter, transnational institutions emerging in the wake of the two world wars significantly altered how minority groups organize to achieve their goals. For Jenne, this change produces outcomes decidedly different than anticipated. Specifically, she suggests that any decision on the part of minorities to mobilize against the state is "driven by perceptions of increased power vis-à-vis the center" (p. 41).

Among the most intriguing parts of Jenne's work is the idea that an organized minority group may seek to radicalize against an otherwise tolerant and nonrepressive majority-dominated government provided that there exists some sort of external sponsor capable of reducing the costs of ethnic agitation. Indeed, her theory turns quite heavily on the existence of some sort of external patron capable of credibly signaling its support to co-ethnic minorities in host countries. The absence of a credible sponsor, even where the central government is pursuing repressive policies, is enough to eliminate the incentives for ethnic revolt. In this regard, Jenne's theory does much to add nuance to ethnic conflict models predicated on exclusively instrumental, emotional, or institutional grounds. Like many good theoretical perspectives, it does much to retain many of their basic tenets while capably pointing out precisely where they fall short.

In contrast to Birnir, who uses a mix of empirical approaches, Jenne relies on a series of case studies carefully drawn from contemporary central Europe. Of particular note is her excellent analysis of Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia who chose to radicalize in the face of a doggedly determined effort to appease them both politically and economically. Indeed, one wonders how Birnir might approach such a case given its tendency to counter her theory in key ways. For her, the credible effort on the part of majorities to protect minority interests, including preferential access to governing institutions, should be associated with low levels of antistate mobilization. For Jenne, such a scenario produces a sense of opportunity on the part of minority groups. Again, she notes the importance of an external sponsor capable of improving the likelihood of successful mobilization, something that Birnir understandably downplays given her interest in electoral incentives and party activity.

A key critique of Jenne's method lies in case selection. While she makes a strong argument in favor of her focus on central European cases, there is little doubt that contemporary issues of minority secessionism and irredentism tend to be located in the postcolonial world. Significantly, in many such contexts minority groups tend to be fragmented politically and beholden to ethno-communal entrepreneurs capable of crafting communal issues in very specific ways. The ways in which this intracommunal competition unfolds has much to do with the potential successes and failures of nation-building projects, often in decidedly nondemocratic ways. To this end, it might not always matter whether a minority group senses opportunity when a majority-dominated government concedes to communal demands. Again, Jenne is conscious of this issue and notes that any future inquiry into ethnic bargaining would do well to consider how it functions in procedural democracies as well as more authoritarian contexts. In terms of the theory's policy relevance, which is quite substantial, it is quite important to assess her triadic bargaining model in a variety of political environments.

Finally, the argument, implicit in both books, that ethnic violence is not ubiquitous is not entirely new. James Fearon and David Laitin made this claim quite forcefully in 1996, and their suggestion that academics should seek to explain ethnic peace, as well as ethnic war, has been recognized by most scholars in the ethnic politics field. That said, both books go much further than mere recognition of the phenomena of ethnic peace by creating testable theories that truly do seek to explain all potential outcomes of ethnic electoral behavior. Both texts thus represent wonderful contributions to political science.

Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space. By John R. Bowen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 327p. $27.95.

Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France. By Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006. 342p. $52.95 cloth, $22.95 paper.
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— Joan Wallach Scott, *Institute for Advanced Study*

The specter that haunts Europe these days is not, as in Marx's time, the specter of class struggle, nor is it, as it was for much of the twentieth century, the specter of communism; instead it is the specter of Islam. How should these nominally secular, historically Christian states handle the millions of people now in their midst, many of them migrants from former colonies, who identify as Muslims? Are there helpful precedents in histories of immigration or of mutual accommodation between states and religions? What are the reasonable limits of such accommodation and what are legitimate grounds for questioning the limits? What are the political stakes involved in assessments of the limits? And what does racism have to do with it?

Although the question of Muslims in Europe long antedates the twenty-first century, it has become ever more volatile since September 11, 2001. And nowhere more volatile than in France. France has the largest minority Muslim population in Western Europe, the vast majority from the former French territories of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. They number around five million—an estimate, since, in the interests of preserving national unity, French law does not permit collecting statistics on race and ethnicity. Not only is this the largest immigrant population ever to arrive in France, but it is also depicted as the most recalcitrant. While others have accepted the requirement of acculturation as the only path to citizenship, Muslims seem reluctant or unable to relinquish the signs of their difference. At least this is how the matter is typically represented by politicians, intellectuals, and the media: The Muslim problem is one of "*communautarisme*" (communalism), group loyalty taking precedence over one's commitment as an individual citizen, undermining one's primary identity as French and thus the unity of the nation-state.

Most Americans will know of French efforts to stem the tide of communalism through the controversy surrounding a law passed in 2004 that outlawed the wearing of Islamic headscarves in public schools. From our more multiculturalist perspective, the law was either unfathomable—what harm could come of a few girls