their self-presentations, but there is no reflection on this positionality.

We can contrast this approach with Matthew Moore's 2016 book *Buddhism and Political Theory*. Although Moore also situates himself within a generalized construction of "Buddhism," he is explicit that he is presenting his own interpretive stance: he does not claim that his readings of components of Buddhist political thought necessarily reflect existing understandings among Buddhist thinkers. Comparative political theorists might still take issue with some of Moore's distilling moves, but it is clear that he is positioning himself as a theorist "thinking with" Buddhist ideas. For Long, the fact that he draws so rarely on Bhutanese texts or thinkers makes it impossible to know how the generalized principles that he lays out in the first two chapters have actually provided a foundation for the constitutional and policy choices he considers in the rest of the book.

Long's analysis is strongest when he ventures into territory that critically—even skeptically—examines aspects of Bhutan's politics and policies. The first section in chapter 6 (pp. 139–51) argues that the model for assessing GNH actually departs from Bhutan's stated emphasis on deeper forms of happiness by weighing all of the indicators equally. Instead, Long's closer look at the indicators that he aligns with "higher forms of happiness"—life satisfaction, spiritual practice, levels of stress versus positive emotions—reveals a sharp decline, even between 2010 and 2015. In Bhutan's own terms, then, the country's policies seem to be failing to reinforce its "unique" religiocultural heritage and the ends that GNH ought to promote.

But perhaps because of his sympathetic position, Long is too quick to sidestep critiques of Bhutan's policies. He notes accusations of human rights violations against the ethnic Lhotsampa population in the late 1980s and early 1990s (pp. 157–67), but also dismisses the substance of their complaints as merely an empirical policy "challenge." In extolling the stabilizing effect of Bhutan's "shared values," he neglects to fully consider the effects on ethnic and religious minorities of a system of governance (and increasingly of surveillance, in the case of GNH measurement protocols) based on the religiocultural beliefs and practices of the majority. Here it is surprising that he only mentions twice *Driglam Namzha*, the code of behavior and ethics generated from the ethnic majority culture, because it features prominently in many other studies of Bhutan (for example, Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt's 2017 edited volume, *Development Challenges in Bhutan*, which is not cited at all) and would seem to be a key component in anchoring a study of Buddhist influences explicitly in Bhutanese understandings and practices.

But there are many more potentially impactful points of theoretical engagement that are missed because the generalized approach to "Buddhism" obscures the specificity of (and, presumably, diversity within) Bhutanese Buddhist views. As one example, Long asserts that "the Buddhist philosophical and soteriological understanding of 'happiness' is what makes the pursuit of 'Gross National Happiness' unique," contrasting it with the proliferation of other developmental indicators and with both hedonistic and eudemonic approaches (p. 114). Yet throughout the chapter that examines GNH, he never considers the effects of that soteriological particularity. That is, if non-Buddhists (or Buddhists who have a different understanding of happiness from that which the guardians of a seemingly atemporal "Bhutanese Buddhist culture" espouse) do not share the Buddha's ontological explanation of the emptiness of reality, are they excluded from true happiness? Brian Young's 2015 account of living with nomadic Brokpa herders in Bhutan argues that the country's attempt to protect its dominant cultural tradition is "undermining the multiplicity of traditions and languages that have always existed in the country" ("Living with the Brokpa: Economic, Political and Social Change in Bhutan," *Anthropology Now*, 7[2], 2015). This conflict can be addressed as a policy question but deserves closer theoretical study, especially in a volume like this one.

One final point is worth mentioning, because it pertains to efforts to promote the study of "non-Western" or other marginalized traditions of thought in the academy. The final chapter attempts to defend the insights from Buddhist thinking as "scientific" by noting convergences between some work in contemporary quantum physics and neuroscience and Buddhist ontological stances on the nature of existence and the malleability of "human nature," respectively. In stark contrast to the barely cited sections of the book on Buddhist political thought, this chapter is assiduously cited, with theories and ideas attributed to particular scholars. This reflects a general lack of care in treating Buddhist sources and ideas in the same way as other work more familiar within the Western canon, and the overall effect is that the boundaries and norms of "science" remain uncontested while Buddhist political thought is rendered in generalized and still exoticized terms. Although this was undoubtedly not Long's intention, it serves as a cautionary note as to how work seeking to bring understudied traditions into political theory discussions can actually undermine its stated objective.

Out of Joint: Power, Crisis, and the Rhetoric of Time. By Nomi Claire Lazar. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019. 288p. $39.50 paper.
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Nomi Claire Lazar's compelling new book *Out of Joint: Power, Crisis, and the Rhetoric of Time* is a significant contribution to recent literature on the politics of time. In

this wide-ranging text, Lazar deftly explores how, when faced with challenges of legitimacy in times of upheaval and innovation, political leaders frame their language through the rhetoric of time. From the French revolutionaries who famously established their own calendar and clock by setting the year 1792 to Year 1, to two different preambles to the Chinese constitution in 1978 and 1982 that pursue different strategies of temporal framing and positioning, to recent populist speeches by Viktor Orbán in Hungary who seeks to reshape the past in order to shape a new future, all these attempts to establish legitimacy and cement a new order are also projects in shaping time.

The very malleability of time, what Hamlet famously bemoaned as its out-of-jointness, also provides a powerful tool for political positioning. Lazar notes that "a regime that successfully anticipates and mitigates risk, effectively manages contingency" (p. 7). Managing or attempting to order the very contingency of time establishes a sense of harmony that can provide powerful grounds for legitimation. The very finite nature of human life, its existential desire to transcend death, leads to a desire for meaning that constitutes and constructs our experience of time. She notes that "ultimately, temporal framing is effective in political speech because time drives both the demand for and the possibility of experiencing meaning" (p. 11). The temporal framing that underlines much of political rhetoric during moments of upheaval and unrest, when time is vertiginously experienced as out of joint, demonstrates how leaders can use it to create the perception of restoring order. By asserting control over the unruly past, by ordering it through revamped calendars and new iterations of clock time, they can smooth it into a future of possibility. As such, the rhetoric of time functions as a key component in the toolbox of legitimation in times of crisis and change.

Lazar argues that "all experienced time is shaped time" and professes an agnosticism about whether such a thing as time in itself exists (p. 21). This is not by itself an entirely problematic claim, because her project focuses on the ways in which the rhetoric of time can give shape and legitimacy to the political. But in drawing the contrast quite so starkly between clock time (which she correctly notes takes varying technological forms) and an objective ideal of time-in-itself, Lazar skirts a significant amount of work in contemporary political theory that fleshes out the possibilities and constraints of the lived experience of time in thought, perception, and memory. The scope of this literature is too broad to capture here, but many of these texts engage with multiple aspects of time beyond the orderliness of clock time, whether it is exploring the fastness or slowness of time and affect in shaping thought below the level of consciousness (William E. Connolly, *Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed,* 2002); the often constraining and sometimes productive role that the presence of the past plays in discussions of political memory (P. J. Brendese, *The Power of Memory in Democratic Politics*, 2014, and Smita A. Rahman, *Time, Memory, and the Politics of Contingency*, 2014); the category of the people in democratic politics as an ongoing process unfolding in time (Paulina Ochoa-Espejo, *The Time of Popular Sovereignty: Process and the Democratic State*, 2011); or the disruptive politics of the untimely or positing that a theory of time must indeed go beyond the experience of time and be linked to a theory of social formation (Samuel Chambers, *Untimely Politics*, 2003, and "Untimely politics *avant la lettre*: The temporality of social formations," *Time & Society 20*(2), 2011). Lazar's deeply researched and wide-ranging text would benefit from a productive engagement with these texts, which would push it beyond its binary approach to theorizing time as either clock time or time-in-itself. It is a missed opportunity for a text that otherwise sits comfortably adjacent to such works and indeed has important contributions to make to this literature with its layered and erudite examination of the rhetoric and technology of time across the centuries.

Lazar's careful and considered reading of the political construction of time is particularly impressive, running the gamut of texts from Plato's *Timaeus*, to Augustine and Vico, to reflections on the Mayan calendar. Her analysis of the two different preambles to the Chinese constitution is equally compelling. She carefully unpacks the eschatological patterning of the 1978 preamble in which "the period of violent struggle preceding the period of peace takes on a purpose beyond its immediate political goals, incorporating overtones of purification" and highlights the redemptive role that the present is positioned to achieve in that temporal frame (p. 54). By contrast, she notes that the later 1982 preamble does away with eschatological framing, instead positioning the constitution as part of the gradual ongoing progress of China. Each offers legitimacy at a different moment in Chinese political history, and each does so through the deft use of temporal framing. Lazar is equally convincing in her analysis of calendars and the role they play in what she calls performance legitimacy. She explores ancient Assyrian letters to note how the king's legitimacy was tied just as much to *when* he acted in certain ways as *what* he did, such that "performance was a pillar of legitimation for the Assyrian kings, and this performance was tightly bound up with temporal propriety" (p. 117). Calendars therefore also came to play a significant role in shaping and mediating the experience of time in this analysis as they in turn shape the infrastructure of risk management. Lazar writes, "Time technologies can be used to naturalize and hence institutionalize and legitimize political innovations and political orders. In this light it makes sense that the reform of time technologies is so common—and so commonly beneath notice—as times of political change" (p. 127). As such the reform of time technologies is fundamentally an exercise of power that produces knowledge, which in turn legitimates power.

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If the lived experience of time is one of vertiginous flux, where the tenses flow in and out of each other, the attempt to establish a new synchrony or a new form of clock or calendrical time becomes a strategy not just for soothing the unruly currents of time but also to establish order and shape political meaning. This deeply researched and beautifully written book therefore makes a convincing and compelling case that the desire to smoothly order and shape the out-of-joint experience of time is a powerful act of political legitimation that we cannot ignore.

Must Politics Be War? Restoring Our Trust in the Open Society. By Kevin Vallier. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. 256p. $85.00 cloth.
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We live in polarized times. In the United States, as in many Western European countries, citizens are increasingly divided over values and ideologies. The recent rise of right-wing populism and of extremist political parties and movements is only one of the symptoms of this polarization, which is also pervasive within mainstream parties and institutions. Although political scientists have dedicated numerous and extensive analyses to the problem of polarization and political conflict, political philosophers have been less concerned with these themes. Kevin Vallier's book *Must Politics Be War? Restoring Our Trust in the Open Society* therefore provides a much-needed contribution to this debate.

The book is beautifully written and rich with both philosophical insights and references to the empirical social science literature, especially that examining social norms and trust. And social trust is indeed the central theme of the book. More specifically, Vallier argues that liberal norms and institutions can contribute to guaranteeing social trust among citizens who endorse different ethical, religious, and philosophical conceptions of the good, and can thus sustain moral peace. But this, Vallier claims, is only possible if those norms and institutions are publicly justified by appealing to "intelligible" reasons—that is, reasons grounded in the values and ideals (the "evaluative standards") of each individual citizen. Only the appeal to such reasoning can ensure that citizens do not have to obey rules and institutions that are alien to their deepest values and commitments, and thus are able to sustain mutual trust among each other.

The book is divided into two main parts. The first part, comprising chapters 1–3, illustrates the evaluative pluralism that underlies deep disagreement in contemporary liberal democracies, explains the importance of social trust and social capital, and defends the intelligibility conception of public justification that, for Vallier, can help citizens to justify moral rules and sustain a system of social trust. The second part, including chapters 4–7, moves from the analysis of moral rules to that of legal and constitutional rules, which are required when moral rules alone are incapable of guaranteeing compliance in the absence of legal enforcement and sanctions. Vallier also develops an account of publicly justified primary rights (including political, economic, and civic rights) and constitutional rules; outlines a model of stability for liberal societies; and concludes by explaining how citizens behind a "thin veil of ignorance" (p. 200) would endorse liberal primary rights, despite their deeply diverse conceptions of the good.

Although the overall argument of the book is persuasive, it is not clear that it entirely vindicates the intelligibility conception of public justification defended by Vallier both here and in some of his previous works. According to Vallier, appealing to intelligible reasons is necessary to ensure that individual citizens are not compelled to obey rules that conflict with their deepest values and commitments. But a key problem with the intelligibility conception is that it also allows each and every citizen to *challenge* moral and legal rules based on his or her own intelligible reasons, thus undermining the rules' public justification and eliciting what Vallier calls the "anarchy objection" (p. 114).

Vallier is aware of this problem and, in response, argues that, alongside those grounded in their controversial religious, ethical, and philosophical conceptions of the good, "members of the public may also include among their evaluative standards the need to get along and even be reconciled to others.... In this way, a desire to live in a high-trust order can make more proposals eligible than otherwise' (p. 115). This is a plausible response and one that Vallier reasserts later in the book, when he argues that agents behind a thin veil of ignorance will recognize the importance of endorsing an extensive set of liberal rights despite their diverse conceptions of the good. One example is freedom of thought, which Vallier believes is publicly justified because it is one of those "fundamental rights of agency [that] protect the formation of coherent agent psychologies and the minimal capacity of persons to extend their projects and plans into the external world" (p. 202).

This is a persuasive view. But it is not clear whether and how it differs from alternative conceptions of public justification that Vallier rejects here and in previous works such as *Liberal Politics and Public Faith* (2014), particularly from the "accessibility" conception. According to this conception, a reason offers a suitable public justification for a state's rules if it is grounded in evaluative standards shared among all citizens. Now, this seems to be exactly what underlies Vallier's claim that "members of the public may also include among their evaluative standards *the need to get along and*