Brisku is also evenhanded in dealing with the variety of opinions on Europe among Georgian intellectuals. His analysis of the ideas of Ilia Chavchavadze, the leading figure of the Georgian national movement before World War I, and of Noe Zhordania, the social democratic theorist, is insightful. He rightly characterizes Chavchavadze as a liberal and an admirer of Europe's cultural achievements, but he also draws attention to Chavchavadze's belief that Georgians must maintain their link to Russia as their best way to Europe. Brisku emphasizes the "Georgianness" of Zhordania's socialism, because of the politician's insistence that it conform to the rural nature of Georgia's economy and society.

Brisku proceeds with a similarly wide-ranging approach to Albanian and Georgian conceptions of Europe during the communist era. He notes, of course, the constraints on the debate imposed by both countries' communist regimes, but he also emphasizes the persistence of Europe as a focus of attention—and not just as an object of Cold War ideology. For example, he cites Enver Hoxha's assurances in the 1980s that Albanians were part of a common European civilization, and he notes the reinvigoration of Eurocentrism among Georgian intellectuals as the Soviet system came undone in the 1980s. He then shows how postcommunist aspirations in both countries were governed by the call for a "return" to Europe.

The Albanian and Georgian debates about Europeanness are valuable case studies of a general phenomenon of the time and place. Yet we may wonder at the perseverance of Albanians and Georgians in their pro-Europe stance, despite the history of the great powers' indifference to their fate since the nineteenth century. The title Brisku has chosen for his book, *Bittersweet Europe*, seems apt.

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Entangled Histories of the Balkans. Vol. 1, ***National Ideologies and Language Policies.*** Ed. Roumen Daskalov and Tchavdar Marinov. Leiden: Brill, 2013. xv, 551 pp. Notes. Index. Illustrations. Maps. $199.00, hard bound.

Our understanding of fundamental aspects of the Balkans' modern history is undergoing a slow but accelerating reconceptualization, to which this volume makes a very useful contribution. Indeed, for decades, if not a century or more, the very idea of Balkan history struggled to emerge, given the pervasive tendency to treat the peninsula's history in national terms. With a few exceptions (such as Nikolai Todorov's *The Balkan City 1400–1800* [1983]), most works nominally presenting a region-wide view ignored significant parts of its lands and peoples or failed to overcome the "this is what happened in Greece, and this is what happened in Bulgaria" episodic sequentialism encouraged by the nationcentric historiographies on which they drew. *Entangled Histories of the Balkans* represents a conscious effort to reverse such inward-looking nationcentrism and to adopt a transnational approach, exploring the huge influence exercised by groups and ideas external to the nation on the shaping of identities. The dead weight of national historiography proves very hard to shed completely and, as with most edited collections, the strength of the contributions by different scholars varies, but the book largely achieves its goal.

This volume is the first in a projected series that will apply the transnational approach to a wide range of topics in Balkan history. The book's two themes are the external influences on the development of national identities or ideologies and the establishment of distinct literary languages as a vital, legitimizing element in the assertion of nationhood. The main focus is thus the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,

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but some chapters also address earlier eras in considerable detail. In section 1, on national ideologies, for example, Raymond Detrez presents a substantial survey of prenational identities in the Balkans in which he concentrates on the several centuries prior to 1850. He argues that people then may have been aware of ethnicity but that it carried no real communal value. More important was a basic common cultural core that included the Balkan *Sprachbund*, Orthodox Christianity, and, among the literate, an elite "Romaic" culture shared through the Greek language. Constantin Iordachi and Roumen Daskalov provide chapters recounting the intimate connection of that Romaic elite culture and then Greek nationalism to the formation of Romanian and Bulgarian national ideologies, respectively. Tchavdar Marinov similarly disentangles the influences of earlier Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian nationalisms on the formation of Macedonian identity. And Alexander Vezenkov presents a particularly sharply drawn, and welcome, break with traditional historiography in his thoughtful chapter on Ottomanism, the imperial ideology which all nineteenth-century nationalisms in the Balkans had to compete with and, in some way, refute.

Focus shifts to language policies in section 2, bringing the temporal focus to the period since the mid-nineteenth century. Complementing his chapter on Macedonian identity, Marinov discusses the Serbian and Bulgarian influences on the Macedonian literary language. He concludes that Macedonian's controversial emergence as a language distinct from Bulgarian may well have been decided by politics, but that the tight connection between language and national identity makes the politicization of its standardization irrelevant today. Ronelle Alexander gives a detailed overview of the similarly oft-politicized formation and then dissolution of Serbo-Croatian. To conclude the volume, Vezenkov again gives a good account of a too often overlooked issue, recounting the drawn-out development of standard Albanian.

Most of the contributors' determination to highlight transnational influences is highly commendable and certainly makes a valuable contribution to reconceptualizing our understanding of the region's history. Yet, given the sheer mass of the region's historiography, constructed with the idealized nation as the basic building block, disconcerting flashes of traditional views show through. Iordachi's chapter is particularly prone to this, as it presents a resolutely Romanian view of the Phanariote elite in Wallachia and Moldavia; drawing heavily on works published under dogmatically nationalist regimes in Romania, and showing no apparent realization that Phanariote Greek perspectives might provide an enriching counterpoint, the chapter depicts Greek influence as both crude and wholly negative. Others' reproductions of traditional views are more episodic and nuanced, as, for example, in Detrez's retransmission of Traian Stoianovich's romanticized views of Balkan cultural values but with a subsequent acknowledgment of the suspect reliability of sources on premodern culture. On a more subtle level, most chapters in the first section show the influence of the current state of the field by placing critical importance on ethnicity, despite Detrez's valid remarks regarding its unimportance as a communal bond in the prenational era. Daskalov's treatment of figures such as Atanas (Athanase) Bogoridi as Bulgarians lacking "Bulgarian consciousness" (177) seems jarring. Moreover, with the exception of Vezenkov's contributions and Alexander's (in which the Croats play a significant role, especially as linguistic separatists), most chapters continue the deep-rooted tradition of treating the Balkans as an Orthodox Christian preserve. And as helpful as Vezenkov's chapter on Ottomanism is in treating the topic seriously, it accepts too readily the common assumption that Ottomanism was a failure. Given the volume's revisionist purpose in questioning the sui generis nature of nations and nationalism in the Balkans, seeing a willingness to question extended even further would, on various levels, have been welcome.

That there is still room for further revisionism does not negate the value of the

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collection, and subsequent volumes in this series must be anticipated as further contributions to the rethinking of Balkan history. To judge by the chapters in *National Ideologies and Language Policies*, contributors to the forthcoming volumes could benefit from less-generous word limits (most chapters seem quite lengthy, and two exceed 80 pages); but the purpose of the series, and the standard set by its first book, deserve a warm welcome.

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The Village and the Class War: Anti-kulak Campaign in Estonia. By Anu Mai Kõll. Historical Studies in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, vol. 2. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2013. xii, 283 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Photographs. Figures. Tables. $55.00, hard bound.

For Estonians living during the bleak years of the late 1940s, nothing could have seemed more permanent than Soviet power. The few choices available to them were unenviable: embrace Soviet power by committing oneself to Soviet institutions, Soviet ideology, and the Soviet system being replicated in the Baltic republics; resist Soviet power by joining the bands of "forest brothers," whose dwindling numbers suggested the hopelessness of their cause; or simply adapt to the dictates of a regime that unsparingly exacted vengeance on those suspected of disloyalty. Most survivors of the war simply adapted, returning to their farms and their labors and trying to make the best of life under an alien authority that was now attempting to impose on it one of its most notorious collective institutions: the kolkhoz, or collective farm. This had been achieved in the early 1930s elsewhere in the USSR, and now it was the Baltic republics' turn. Estonia's small, private farms would have to be collectivized, and its kulaks—an insidious term intended to suggest a rural enemy class whose destruction was essential to the success of the collectivization drive—would have to be liquidated.

Focusing on three townships in Estonia's Viljandi County, Anu Mai Kõll demonstrates how the Soviet regime, despite its shortages in manpower and lack of legitimacy among the subject population, attempted to create a new society in rural Estonia. Since interwar Estonia had remade itself in large measure by implementing one of the most sweeping land reform programs in world history—one that broke the institutional and economic power of the Baltic Germans and made rural Estonia an exemplar of extreme egalitarianism—who in Estonia could possibly be considered a kulak? Given the absence of a genuinely exploitative rural class, writes Kõll, the crucial factor was one's behavior during the German occupation of 1941–44. Traitors had to be punished, and at the time of the German invasion Estonia was a Soviet republic. The use of Soviet prisoners of war for agricultural labor, for example, was a sufficiently traitorous act for one to be deemed a kulak in 1947.

Yet this study is not only about the victims of Soviet power; it is also about the participants in the creation of Estonia's new order. Directly addressing an earlier historiography that has sometimes portrayed dekulakization in ethnic terms (Russians versus Estonians) or as a matter of locals struggling against the imperatives of the center, Kõll demonstrates that while decision makers in Moscow made the choice to persecute local populations, "the implementation and its consequences were on the other hand strictly local" (38). About this there can now be little doubt, for there was nothing secret about dekulakization: "In contrast to the secrecy of the activities of the security forces . . . the struggle against the kulaks was public, held in the open. Prac-

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