

“orthopraxis,” to use Madsen’s term, than with orthodox belief. This has allowed Judaism to define itself as the “religion of reason” (p. 96). Meena Sharify-Funk highlights the same focus on orthopraxis in many strains of Islam. Sharify-Funk clarifies the various trajectories of Islam today: secular, progressive, revival, radical, and neo-traditional, with the first two providing the easiest path to “multiple loyalties” between Islam and the liberal state (p. 155). Madsen and Noscoe elaborate on how Confucianism and Buddhism, respectively, encourage loyalty to the state. We also learn how political exigencies and the Western construct of “religion” helped consolidate dispersed traditions, as Murphy describes in the case of Hinduism and Madsen in the context of Confucianism.

The first several chapters fit somewhat uncomfortably with the rest, tackling the political and intellectual traditions of liberalism, Marxism, and natural law. Tom Angier’s chapter is captivating from the perspective of natural law and political theory, but its inclusion in this volume feels forced. It would be rare, I think, to find a believer whose professed ethical tradition was natural law. Rather, this intellectual discourse informs church edicts, which in turn constrain everyday ethical behavior. Of course, natural law theorists wish to provide an alternative to Rawlsian public reason by demonstrating that natural law is non-revelatory and available to all. But its tight relationship with the Catholic Church (which maintains the authority to discipline scholars like Charles Curran when their theories run afoul of church doctrine) only further highlights the commitment of these theorists to reach foregone conclusions. Natural law theory is no stand-in for liberalism. Levine’s account of Marxism, and particularly its political variants, is similarly fascinating and, as a chapter in this book, confusing—a tension not lost on Levine. Like natural law theory, Marxism is neither a substitute for liberal accommodation of worldviews (being inconsistent with most views), nor is it an ethical tradition that guides the lives of adherents, so much as it is an intellectual toolkit.

William Galston’s chapter on liberalism is a better fit with the imputed purpose of the book, as the very point of liberal politics is to accommodate a wide range of worldviews. As Galston posits, “[t]o be a twenty-first century American is to accept the liberal creed, at least for civic purposes” (p. 22). This may have struck a different note at the time of writing, but as I watch illiberal politics unfold around the world and in the U.S. presidential campaign season, it seems unjustifiably optimistic. Walzer sounds this optimistic tone even more loudly when he opens his afterword with the bold statement: “We are all liberals now.”

This does not seem to be a moment in which we can make such claims. Can this book help put us back on the right path, or, at least help us gain our bearings in a world where both intra- and extramural ethical conflict are on the rise? Levine laments that world religions continue to thrive as they become “more anti-modern, violent, and

extreme. . . [while] Marxism is a memory almost everywhere” (p. 51). This is the rub: The Enlightenment’s progeny—reason, liberalism, and Marxism—appear to be losing ground to the most intolerant trains of modern religion. This makes this series, and this particular book, all the more important. But it also raises the bar very high. It is not enough to bring us access to comparative lines of argument—we need to know how these various traditions are shaping the citizens of tomorrow. Nancy Rosenblum once offered the tempting claim that all associations—even the most illiberal—help prepare citizens for liberal civil society (*Membership and Morals*). But I have my doubts. So how can humanity learn to get along when it is housed in so many different traditions? The comparative groundwork provided in this series is a noble first step that will undoubtedly take up as much shelf space as Max Weber’s efforts did a century ago. It is disheartening that Weber’s words ring true today: “Not summer’s bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness” (“Politics as a Vocation”). As he elsewhere exhorts, however, “[w]e must work while it is still day” (“On the Situation of Constitutional Democracy in Russia”). *Dissent on Core Beliefs* is a good place to start.

Nietzsche’s Culture of Humanity: Beyond Aristocracy and Democracy in the Early Period. By Jeffrey Church.

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 278p. \$88.44.
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— Vanessa Lemm, *University of New South Wales Australia*

The overarching goal of this book is to rescue Nietzsche’s concept of culture from postmodernist appropriations and their critiques of modern subjectivity in order to reconcile it with the modern idea of the autonomous subject and the political principles of liberalism. On Jeffrey Church’s account, through his ideal of culture, Nietzsche sought to promote liberal conceptions of equality and liberty. Church argues that the politics that best supports Nietzsche’s vision of cultural renewal is a liberal conception of the state based on the rule of law and the protection of individual rights. While *Nietzsche’s Culture of Humanity* is impressively clear in its writing and in the general presentation and development of its argument, the main thesis of the book is ultimately unconvincing.

Church argues that Nietzsche’s commitment to classical liberalism becomes clear when we situate his views in the “right philosophical context” (p. 5) and read him against the backdrop of Kant’s cosmopolitan and Johann von Herder’s nationalist conceptions of culture; and furthermore, it becomes clear when we turn to his early period as it offers a “much clearer statement of his view” on politics (p. 4), in contrast to Nietzsche’s later reflections on politics that tend to be “elliptical, ambiguous and hence open to divergent interpretations” (p. 207). Church’s rather ad hoc choice of discursive

context and texts may explain why *The Birth of Tragedy*, a book which Nietzsche himself described as “un-German” (*Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 1988, 6: 310), lacking “logical cleanliness,” and “odd and rather inaccessible” (*Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 1988, 1: 11) plays only a minor role in Church’s reconstruction of culture and politics in the early Nietzsche.

For Church, Nietzsche envisages culture as a new form of community dedicated to the advancement of human excellence that is distinct from politics, where human excellence consists not in the perfection of nature but in the realization of our freedom, and which finds its highest example in “geniuses” (p. 2). The idea that for Nietzsche culture consists in the promotion of the self-determining individual is highly contestable, in particular because it presupposes a clear-cut separation between culture and nature in his thought. For example, Church thinks (p. 30) that Nietzsche’s reference to the wisdom of Silenus—that it is better for human beings “never to have been born” and second best to “die soon” (*Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 1988, 1: 35)—shows that for Nietzsche, nature has no value and that natural human existence is not worth living. While it is true that for Nietzsche nature is indifferent to human individual concerns, and even that nature has no teleology or purpose, this does not mean that nature does not have any value or meaning for human beings. Rather than following Kant and Herder, Nietzsche seems to remain faithful to the Greeks and adheres to their conception of culture as the imitation and perfection of nature.

The question of Nietzsche’s debt to the Greeks is not at stake in Church’s argument, however. Instead, the goal of *Nietzsche’s Culture of Humanity* is to move “Beyond Aristocracy and Democracy” as the subtitle indicates. Church holds that Nietzsche’s conception of culture as the promotion of self-determining individuals is meritocratic, and as such, he believes that it allows us to move beyond the unresolved debate between aristocratic and democratic interpretations of Nietzsche’s political thought. In reality, it is unclear whether meritocracy is just one possible way to try to harmonize aristocratic and democratic demands or whether it constitutes a real move beyond the distinction between aristocracy and democracy. While on Church’s meritocratic account Nietzsche sees human excellence as the goal of politics and culture, he rejects the aristocratic view of a natural order of rank of human beings, as well as the view that politics is for the personal good of the few (p. ix). The meritocratic view judges excellence not in terms of natural inequalities but in terms of human effort possible for all human beings. Conversely, Church holds that Nietzsche adheres to the democratic belief that all human beings are capable of achieving human excellence and that community is for the good of all (p. ix). But unlike the democrat, he does not believe that everyone can become a “genius” (p. 4).

The problem is that Church imputes to Nietzsche a “liberal” construal of the idea of genius, and only because of this does it seem to follow that Nietzsche supports a liberal political system as best oriented toward the flourishing of genius. Let me say something about meritocracy, and then about liberalism.

Meritocracy is the idea that, given equal conditions of opportunity, individuals deserve whatever rewards they can get based on their greater ability, talent, and effort. Underlying this view seems to be a Protestant story about the role of personal responsibility in individual salvation, where personal success is a sign of increased worthiness. We are here at the antipode of the Greek conception of responsibility, where responsibility is carried by the individual in virtue of being individual. Furthermore, one can argue that there seems to be little relation between merit and genius in the first place. Genius is both much more democratic and aristocratic than merit: We typically associate genius with a gift that no one has “merited,” so that literally anyone, from any social background, could turn out to be a genius. Moreover, there is no connection between the achievement of genius and the amount of effort and toil. And also the products of genius are not things that can be “graded” on the kind of scale that considerations of merit invoke. On the contrary, in Nietzsche’s view, it is the geniuses of cultures who first offer any idea of standard on the basis of which we can then speak of merits or demerits. These standards are not “good” because they are so judged by the people who adopt them, but, conversely, the people are “good” to the degree that they espouse these standards. If the agreement of everyone is needed to make a standard into a standard, then there would be no standard of what is good: Nietzsche seems to follow Plato’s aristocratic view that democratic free speech is a freedom to say both what is true and what is false, what is good and what is bad, and that is why he opposes democracy to a “good constitution,” that is, a political system that favors those who speak and act according to what is really good.

With respect to the second point, namely, that only a liberal state can maintain the priority of culture over politics because a liberal state limits political power in order to favor geniuses of culture, this seems to underplay the complicated connection between genius of culture and political power that Nietzsche has elsewhere established. For instance, in *The Greek State* Nietzsche suggests that the more dominating the political sphere is, the more genius will flourish at the cultural level. In other words, for Nietzsche there seems to be an inverse relation between genius and political freedom—which again points to an aristocratic idea of genius that is opposed to democracy as the rule of the many. It is also not clear why Church believes that Nietzsche’s geniuses of culture—artists, saints, and philosophers—are themselves “liberal” rather than “political,” that is, individuals who desire to impose a certain set of values and a certain way of life as normative

for all. After all, this is the tyranny of genius: that an entirely unique and idiosyncratic form of life or value demands to be the value or form of life for all and for all time; anything less is not genius but merely achievement.

Freedom and Solidarity: Toward New Beginnings.

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It has been the signature of Fred Dallmayr's major intellectual inquiries over the past 50 years or so not only to critique fundamental aspects of the paradigm of transatlantic modernity but also to reassess those of its values which lend themselves to integration into a humanistic democratic vision. In earlier publications, Dallmayr predominantly focused diasapprobation on philosophical knowledge formations excessively organized around the Cartesian concepts of individual rationality in order to philosophically overcome the dualistic separation of mind from matter, the subject from the object, culture from nature, and thought from spirituality. Thereby, he had critically assessed the limits of the beliefs in the virtues of the scientific control and manipulation of nature, of secularism, and individual liberalism. Over the past 20 years or so, he has predominately inquired into ways in which Western ethnocentricity, a major pillar of the paradigm of modernity, can be overcome by practices that involve nongovernmentally organized intercivilizational dialogues with important leading intellectuals from practically all global regions.

The publication under review is, from my perspective, nonetheless unique among Dallmayr's intellectual accomplishments to date in that it constitutes his most interdisciplinary approach to modernity's scarred relations between freedom and solidarity, on one hand, while simultaneously participating in the construction of a global coalition of intellectuals for assessing the conditions of possibility for reconciliations between Eastern and Western experiential forms of freedom, solidarity, and spirituality, on the other hand. Through this humanistic coalition, which includes leading figures such as Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, Mahatma Gandhi, John Dewey, Ashis Nandy, Henry David Thoreau, Albert Camus, Leo Tolstoy, Raimon Pannikar, Tu Weiming, and the so-called renaissance traditions from within Islamic thought (Al Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Ruschd), Dallmayr explores the construction of solidarious relations on a global scale in order to overcome the traditional tensions between individual freedom and solidarity embedded in Western mainstream political, social, economic, and cultural thought.

Both Dallmayr's *critique* of modernity and the *construction* of a global intellectual and spiritual coalition on the subject of

conciliatory relations between freedom and solidarity is framed by fundamental philosophical assumptions derived from Martin Heidegger's famous inquiries on the *Seinsfrage*, or on the question of *Being*. In this context, where one reaches out toward the meaning of *Being*, one cannot but share one's freedom through collective existence, or *Mitsein*. Here, the Cartesian separation of ego from society, of the subject from the object, of the *res cogitans* from the *res extensa*, of mind from spirituality, of culture from nature, no longer holds. It can be overcome. The assumption of such a Heideggerian position lends itself to a critique of the laissez-faire market triumphalisms of neoclassical and neoliberal macroeconomics, respectively symbolized by the twentieth-century Austrian and Chicago schools of economics. In addition, the author argues that to the extent to which oligarchic corporate and financial elites attempt to control and manipulate the political, social, and cultural conduct in the daily lives of the masses of the people, democracy has turned into a fragile system. When, furthermore, politicians are purchased by the highest bidder, or when citizens are predominantly valued on account of their individual buying power, then Dallmayr recalls Karl Polanyi's unexampled analysis of the dangerous separation of the economic sphere from culture, history, and ethics, while observing the simple fact that only individuals with the means to participate in consumerism exercise individual choice. Finally, Dallmayr critically addresses the pervasive cultures of violence by confronting them with a promotion of cultures of nonviolence, as evidenced by an entire series of public intellectuals and writers from the East to the West over the past two centuries. Central in this context are the reappraisals of Gandhi's practices of nonviolent disobedience, Camus's rejection of violence as part of the human condition, Tolstoy's holistic view of the multiple relations between human communities and their environments, and Dewey's pragmatic design on the relations between the self and society.

Under the impulsions of such diverse traditions, all pointing in various degrees to foundational reassessments of the predominant Western conceptions of the relations between individual freedom and solidarious practice, Dallmayr concludes that a paradigm shift is impending (p. 111) in that a consciousness rooted in individual self-interest, secularism, and anthropocentrism is increasingly poised to allow for greater ethico-religious considerations. Hinduism and Buddhism in particular lend themselves for exploring a liberation of the self from forms of Western rationality tied to utilitarian and individualistic pursuits. Combining so many traditions from all corners of the globe enabled Dallmayr to design the contours of a relational concept of "person" as the ensemble of multiple social, spiritual, and cosmic relations. But it also enabled him to offer to his readers an extraordinarily rich and productive text.