The Influence of Islamic Orientations on Democratic Support and Tolerance in five Arab Countries

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Abstract: Conclusions from empirical analyses on how Islam influences democratic attitudes in Arab countries differ widely, and the field suffers from conceptual ambiguity and largely focuses on "superficial" democratic support. Based on the non-Middle Eastern literature, this study provides a more systematic theoretical and empirical assessment of the linkages between Islamic attitudes and the popular support for democracy. I link belonging (affiliation), commitment (religiosity), orthodoxy, Muslim political attitudes, and individual-level political Islamism to the support for democracy and politico-religious tolerance. Statistical analyses on seven WVS surveys for Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia show that tolerance levels are remarkably lower than "democratic support"; the influence of being (committed or orthodox) Muslim and Muslim political attitudes are negligible however. Political Islamist views strongly affect tolerance negatively. They also influence "support for democracy," but if the opposition in an authoritarian country is Islamic, these attitudes actually strengthen this support.

1. INTRODUCTION

The call for political freedom was one of the main messages in the recent "Arab Uprisings," with the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions especially

being key events. Some argue that these protests were the first signs of a democratic wave in the Islamic Middle East, but to continue on from democratization toward sustained democracy, a deeper popular support for democracy might be crucial, and many fear the influence of Islam and Islamism will nip the process in the bud (see Blad and Koçer 2012; Spierings 2011).

Basically all studies of democratic attitudes in the Middle East deal with this theoretical, "culturalist" idea that Islam is incompatible with democracy, but most conclude that support for democratic systems is high in the region (e.g., Hofmann 2004; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Jamal and Tessler 2008; Meyer, Rizzo, and Ali 2007; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007; Tessler 2002; Tessler and Gao 2005; see also Bratton 2007; Rose 2002). When discussing the impact of more specific Islamic attitudes on this support, however, the outcomes range from arguing that more religious and more fundamentalist Muslims are less supportive of democracy (e.g., Inglehart and Norris 2003; Moaddel 2006) to findings that there is a positive relationship between Islam and democratic attitudes (e.g., Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007). Based on a closer look at the literature, several possible explanations for these differences can be suggested: the conceptual ambiguity of religion, the absence of a systemized assessment of context-specificity, and the problematic nature of measuring democratic support while ignoring the underlying civic values. This means the question central to this study remains unanswered: Do (or: Which) Islamic attitudes influence the support for democracy and for values fundamental to democracy in the Middle East?

Consequently, this study focuses on the general "support for democracy" which is the *modus vivendi* in the Middle East literature, *and* on political and religious tolerance as a civic value fundamental to democracy (e.g., Bratton 2010; Przeworski and Teune 1966; Rawls 2003). Additionally, applying insights from the more general sociology of religion, I will systematically distinguish between the impacts of five different dimensions of Islamic attitudes: affiliation, religiosity, orthodoxy, Muslim political attitudes, and individual-level political Islamism. Finally, I will compare results across socio-political contexts to assess the robustness, generalizability, and/or context-dependency of the relationship between Islam and democratic support.

Empirically, the relationships are tested by applying pooled and survey-specific regression models to World Values Survey (WVS) survey data for Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. Democratic support and

tolerance act as dependent variables, and the five religious attitudes and socio-economic and demographic characteristics as explanatory factors. It turns out that being a more committed or orthodox Muslim and holding stronger Muslim political attitudes do not consistently lead to lower political tolerance and "democratic support." The effects of these religious orientations are negligible, which undermines the culturalist thesis. Political Islamist views, however, strongly affect tolerance in a negative way. They influence the support for democracy as well, but in several cases positively. If the opposition in an authoritarian country is Islamic, political Islamist attitudes actually strengthen the support for democracy. These outcomes support the instrumentalist view on Islam and democratic support.

2. LITERATURE BACKGROUND

2.1. Islam and Democratic Support in the Arab Middle East

To date, the lion's share of studies on the support for democracy in Arab Muslim countries focuses on the influence of Islam. These studies either propose or dispute the idea that the more Islamic or religious people are, the less supportive of democracy they are. *If* the theoretical why is addressed, authors give historical and theological arguments: Islam prioritizes the collective over the individual; Islam rules over both private and public life; Islam resolves conflicts with violence, not deliberation; and Allah's will cannot be questioned, resulting in a submissive people (e.g., Inglehart and Norris 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007; Tessler 2002; Tessler and Gao 2005). Others also add that religious opposition to democracy in Middle Eastern countries might be linked to perceiving democracy as a Western concept (Fish 2011; Jamal 2012; Spierings 2014b).

Theoretical counter-arguments to this "culturalist" thesis often refer to scriptural text and religious practices as well, showing that democracy *can* fit an Islamic ideological perspective: the prophet deliberately did not appoint a successor; Islamic theology is egalitarian; and Islamic concepts underpinning democracy, such as *ijthihad* — people's duty to form their own judgment — and *shura* — the consultative deliberation in decision-making practiced by Muhammad — (Abou El Fadl 2004; Esposito and Voll 1996; Rizzo, Meyer, and Ali 2002).

These arguments are tested with various concepts of religion and the results are mixed. Religiosity and personal piety are found to have a negative impact (Meyer, Rizzo, and Ali 2007; Moaddel 2006; Norris and Inglehart 2012; Tessler 2002; also Tezcür et al. [2012] on Iran), no effect at all (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Tessler 2002), or to make people more supportive of democracy (Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007). And Islamic orthodoxy and a support for political Islam showed hardly any effect on supporting democracy (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Meyer, Rizzo, and Ali 2007; Tessler 2002; Tessler and Gao 2005; also Tezcür et al. [2012] on Iran); only Moaddel (2006, 102) finds a negative effect for the desire to introduce *Shari'a* law. Pooled analyses of Muslim-majority countries find no clear effects either (Ciftci 2010).

2.2. Measuring Democratic Support in the Middle East

While some Middle East scholars acknowledge the complexity of measuring democratic support (e.g., Jamal and Tessler 2008; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007), most empirical research is still based on general survey items such as "democracy may have problems, but it's better than any other form of government" and "having a democratic system is desirable" (cf. Hofmann 2004). Talking to people in the Middle East and taking a closer look at some of these studies (e.g., Esposito and Mogahed 2007; Jamal and Tessler 2008) suggest that these very general questions tap into a desire for modernization or elections, but not liberal democracy per se.

This observation and the incongruence between democratic support and the level of democracy in these countries (e.g., Fish 2011) has led some scholars to focus on civic values to measure the true support for liberal democracy. Applying this argument, scholars studied the impact of religion on sexual liberalization (Fish 2011; Inglehart and Norris 2003), dishonesty and fraud (Fish 2011), and social capital (Achilov 2013), with the result that Muslim affiliation and religiosity are associated with lower civic values, but inconclusively (see also Spierings 2014b). Achilov (2013), for instance, shows a positive effect of religiosity in Egypt.

Moreover, the arguably most important civic value has hardly received any attention: religious and political tolerance (i.e., the tolerance for ideologies and world views one disagrees with [Al Sadi and Basit 2013; Gibson 2013; Robinson 2010; Sarkissian 2012; Stouffer 1955;

Williams, Nunn, and St. Peter 1976). Studies on the Middle East show that tolerance can lead to democratic support (Cifti 2010) and that it can be increased by education if that focuses on similarities between religions (Al Sadi and Basit 2013, 447), but no study answers the question how religious attitudes influence tolerance, as a value fundamental to democracy.[1]

2.3. Diagnosing the Middle East literature

In sum, our picture of Islamic-religious orientations' impact on democratic support in the Arab Middle East is rather incomplete. This is partly due to the (1) lack of systematic multi-country studies; (2) conceptual ambiguity on micro-level religion variables; and (3) the absence of simultaneous assessments of general democratic support and underlying civic values, particularly political tolerance. Below, I will use insights from studies on other countries — mainly Western and democratic — to further the debate on the Middle East.

3. A CONCEPTUAL-THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Conceptualizing the Support for Democracy

Theoretically, "support for democracy" refers to democracy as the concept central to the democratization literature: the Dahlian definition of democracy (Dahl 1982) focusing on free and fair elections that influence government formation and are facilitated by freedom of opinion, press, and association, as operationalized by Freedom House and Polity. Measuring the individual-level support for liberal democracy is more problematic. "Democracy" is a contested and normative term (Bratton 2010, 106), and people's responses to general questions about the desirability of democracy might be understood quite differently across countries (Bratton 2010; Przeworski and Teune 1966; Tezcür et al. 2012), particularly in countries with little democratic history, where citizens have mixed and vacuous ideas about what democracy is (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007). In the Arab Middle East, a region with a legacy of authoritarian rule,[2] the understanding of democracy has been linked to electoral procedures (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Moaddel 2006; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007), modernity (Mernissi 2002), Westernization (Fish 2011), economic performance and development (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Tezcür et al. 2012), and satisfaction with

government (Tezcür et al. 2012; see also Bratton and Mattes 2001; Mattes and Bratton 2007).

These different associations question the validity of the results of general support questions (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007). In defense of these general survey items however, some conceptions do seem more dominant. Studies using the more detailed African barometer data have shown that between half and two-thirds of the people think of democracy as being about government by the people, elections, and electoral freedoms (Bratton 2003; 2007), and less about peace, equality, justice, and socio-economic development (Bratton 2010, 107). Still, as Gibson (1998) observed more generally, people who strongly endorse "democracy" might actually not endorse underlying elements; including unpopular dissidents' human rights or the rule of law (see also Bratton 2007, 106).

3.2. Political Tolerance

An alternative is to measure civic values that are necessary for a sustained and free democracy. Arguably most fundamental here is political tolerance (see Sullivan and Transue 1999). Political theorists since Mill (2007[1859/1863]) have highlighted the importance of political tolerance to the functioning of democracy. The accepted operational definition of political tolerance in empirical work defines it as the acceptance that citizen rights should be extended to members of groups that are considered objectionable, in other words, the acceptance that people who think and act differently have the same rights as you (e.g., Eisenstein 2006; Gibson 1992; 2013; Kim and Zhong 2010; Marcus et al. 1995; Mondak and Sanders 2005; Robinson 2010; Stouffer 1955; Williams, Nunn, and St. Peter 1976). The political theoretical definition and that of the international community is less focused on rights, but more on the general tolerance for conflicting worldviews. For instance, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's definition of tolerance encompasses "full acceptance, respect, affirmation, and appreciation of diversity in religion, ethnic opinion and ways of life" (Al Said and Basit 2013, 450). Political tolerance allows for social and political interaction (Sarkissian 2012) and is crucial to political pluralism (and thus democracy) (Furedi 2011; Moaddel 2006). In the words of Rawls: "the principle of toleration (…) lay[s] down the fundamental basis to be accepted by all citizens as fair and regulative of the rivalry between doctrines" (2003, 151–152). Without tolerance, "support for democracy" is easily diverted into an instrument solely used to gain power.

In democratic and affluent countries (mainly the United States), exposure to diversity is discussed as a main contributor to tolerance, and explanatory variables for more tolerance include education, younger age, and gender (Djupe and Calfano 2012; Gibson 2013; Golebiowska 1999; Kim and Zhong 2010; Stouffer 1955; Williams, Nunn, and St. Peter 1976). Religion is also seen as an important force and "well-trodden ground" (Djupe and Calfano 2013, 769), but there is a need for more detailed knowledge of the impact of religion on (political) tolerance in Western democratic contexts (Eisenstein 2006) and in less free Muslim-Majority countries (Sarkissian 2012, 619).

3.3. Islamic Attitudes

Different religious attitudes differently impact people's democratic support and tolerance (e.g., Ben-Nun Bloom Arikan 2012a; Djupe and Calfano 2012; Glock and Stark 1965). Starting from this larger — ongoing — debate might help understand Islam's impact in the Middle East.

First of all, the literature distinguishes between behavioral and attitudinal aspects of religion (see Cornwall et al. 1986; Fleischman 2011; Kellstedt et al. 1996; Tezcür et al. 2012). Often religiosity is measured in terms of attendance (behavioral) but interpreted as the strength of one's beliefs, also in Middle East studies (e.g., Moaddel 2006; Tessler 2002). Since behavioral religion is highly intertwined with social capital (being active in religious communities) and social pressure (going to services because it is what should be done), attendance says relatively little about beliefs and theological messages (see Spierings 2014a). From here onward, I will thus focus on the attitudinal religion.

Religious attitudes contain cognitive as well as affective elements (e.g., Cornwall et al. 1986), subjective religiosity (e.g., Gungor, Fleischmann, and Phalet 2011; Fleischmann 2011), and beliefs as well belonging (e.g., Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan 2012a; 2012b). I will first distinguish belonging or cognitive religiosity: the (strand of) religion or denomination to which someone is affiliated. Though in comparative studies this is strongly present as an instrument to contrast Islam with other religions, it makes for a very crude and an empirically flawed indication of ideology (see Spierings 2014a). "Belief" as an overarching concept seems more useful, as it relates to the type of message one adheres to, the "social theology" concerning the relationship between society, the divine, and the

individual (Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan 2012a; 2012b; Spierings 2014a). Belief in the context of Middle East literature directs our attention to a second important religious attitude: orthodoxy, the degree to which religious beliefs are related to orthodox-conservative, literal interpretations of for instance the *Quran* and the *Hadith* (see Meyer, Rizzo, and Ali 2007). Indicators are opinions on wearing a veil or beard and abstaining from alcohol. Third, subjective and affective religiosity draws attention to commitment and piety. It refers to the strength of beliefs, not the beliefs as such.

   Not part of the general literature but certainly highlighted in Middle East studies are people's attitudes toward the combination of religion and politics (e.g., Fish 2011; Meyer, Rizzo, and Ali 2007; Spierings 2014b; Tessler 2002; 2005; 2008). This dimension should be seen as part of the "social theology," but focusing explicitly on politics, not society at large. The existing Middle East studies, however, collapse an important difference under this label, and ignore the diverse ways in which the secular and religious are differentiated and fused (see Casanova 1994). Each of these diverse ways refers to Islam being a guideline for decision-making and makes Islam a public religion, but the hierarchical order of the two elements can differ: (1) is politics subservient to religion or (2) is religion delimited by the political system? The first is a typical example of a strong fusion of politics and religion, which I label individual-level (political) Islamism. The term "Islamism" here should not to be confused with the popular usage of the term or one of the specific strands of Islamism such as *Wahhabism* and the official theology of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Fundamentalist Islam is highly diverse in itself (Roy 1996).[3] Here Islamism is used more generally to indicate people who believe that political decisions should be made within the boundaries set by Islam and religious dogma, mostly orthodox interpretations of scripture (see Anderson, Seibert, and Wagner 2012, 147–148). Klausen (2007, 160), for instance, refers to Islamism if *Shari'a* defines the limits of rule by the people, and Spierings, Smits, and Verloo (2009) include reserving the position of head of state to Muslims. On the other hand, there is the combination of Islam and politics whereby the system itself is secular and accepted. Islam is a public religion then as well, since it is an ideology that provides answers to social questions and as such informs policies within the existing political (and if present: democratic) framework. However, the system itself is not Islamic. In those cases, I talk about "Muslim politics", analoguous to Christian Democracy in Europe.

3.4. Islamic Attitudes and the Support for Democracy (Including Political Tolerance)

The expectations regarding the impact of the different dimensions of religion are summarized in Table 1. As behavioral aspects of religion are not the focus here, neither table nor discussion includes expectations about them, which should not be interpreted as a claim that these do not impact democratic support and tolerance (see Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan 2012a; 2012b; Djupe and Calfano 2012; Gibson 2013; Heath et al. 2013; Strømsnes 2008).

Despite the strong focus on affiliation in studies on Islam, the larger literature regards it to be causally non-decisive as an indicator of beliefs (Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan 2012a). Concerning political tolerance, differences have been found between affiliations in democratic systems (Eisenstein 2006; Kim and Zhong 2010) and Muslims in Africa are found to be particularly intolerant (Bratton 2003), but again it is unclear whether this is due to the social theology of Islam (see Al Sadi and Basit 2013). Ethno-religious cleavages might, for instance, also be the underlying mechanism (cf. Kim and Zhong 2010). If social theology *is* the causal mechanism, the effect of belonging (measured by affiliation) should disappear after including better measures of beliefs. Based on this literature, I thus expect that *belonging* — identifying as Muslim — has no real (negative) impact on the support for democracy and tolerance.[4]

Following earlier work, Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan (2012a, 253) argue that *commitment* can dampen the support for democracy because it is associated with conservativeness and not being open to change. They however do not distinguish between commitment and the beliefs themselves (orthodoxy, Muslim political attitudes, and individual political Islamism). I expect that commitment should make no difference for the

Table 1. Expectation influence on support for democracy and tolerance

	Support for democracy	Tolerance
Religious belonging: Muslim	*	*
Commitment	*	#
Orthodoxy	*/#	#
Muslim political attitudes	0*	0
Individual political Islamism	#	#

*No effect is expected; #A negative effect is expected

support for democracy, because ideological support depends on the religious message. In line with most of the existing Western literature, though, I expect that commitment in the Middle East has a direct negative effect on tolerance. A stronger conviction in one's beliefs often implies that other people's "wrong" beliefs are valued less or that the threat perception is higher, translating into intolerance toward these different views (e.g., Djupe and Calfano 2012; Stouffer 1955). Eisenstein (2006) finds both negative and positive effects for commitment among Christians in the United States, but she collapses the concept with attendance.

Generally, religious *orthodoxy* is rather strongly associated with intolerance. Moral traditionalism and more extreme or dogmatic viewpoints lead to feeling more threatened by other viewpoints and less accepting of them (Eisenstein 2006; Golebiowska 1999; Robinson 2010). This is for instance reflected in the somewhat negative impact of interpreting the Quran literally among United States Muslims (Djupe and Calfano 2012; see also Al Sadi and Basit 2013, 451). On the "support for democracy," similar but less extensive arguments are provided. Lower support for democracy is ascribed to conservative and traditional values, which feed an appreciation of unchanging order incompatible with core democratic values (Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan 2012b; Feldman 2003; Gibson 1992). As this expectation is based on undivided beliefs in which political Islamism is not treated separately, Islamism can be expected to capture the "anti-democratic" conservative belief system better. It after all comes closer to a social theology's view on the relationship between the divine and political. Overall, Islamic orthodoxy can be expected to negatively impact tolerance and possibly also support for democracy.

This brings us to the two specific views on the link between religion and politics. Following the theoretical logic behind the impact of orthodoxy, it might be expected that attitudes more in favor of linking religion to politics are associated with lower support for democracy and political tolerance, as is also suggested (if not shown empirically) by the literature on the Middle East (e.g., Jamal and Tessler 2008; Tessler 2002). The literature's mixed results on the impact of attitudes toward religion and politics on the support for democracy might be due to not acknowledging the distinction between political Islamism and the support for Muslim politics (see above). People who prefer politicians inspired by Islam (Muslim politics) can be expected to have no objections to democracy, as they accept the political system setting the boundaries for religion. As Islam here is a possible source of guidance,

not a systematic feature, this also allows for other worldviews or ideologies to exist. I expect that Muslim political attitudes have no direct negative influence on the support for democracy or tolerance. On the other hand, if people think Islam sets the boundaries for politics — "political Islamism" — they are expected to be less democratic and tolerant. As they do not tolerate certain views, rule by the people might lead to outcomes they could not accept.

3.5. An Alternative Perspective: Context-Dependency

The expectations on attitudinal religion either point to a negative impact of stronger and more orthodox religious attitudes or the absence of an effect (Table 1), reflecting the debate in Middle East literature (see Section 2). The empirically different relations found in that literature might also suggest a context dependency of religious attitudes' influence, not only between democratic and non-democratic regimes (e.g., Schedler and Sarsfield 2007) but also among the highly different authoritarian regimes. While this has not been explicitly theorized in the literature, I build an argument on several hints that could serve as an alternative theory under the label of "instrumentalism" (as opposed to the "culturalist" explanations discussed above).

Tezcür et al. (2012) argue that religious Iranians are more politically satisfied because the regime is Islamic, and Bratton (2003, 497) suggests that in Tanzania, Muslims are less supportive of democracy because they are marginalized. Both implicitly suggest that the support for democracy is instrumental. Instrumental support is also suggested for the Middle East (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Jamal and Tessler 2008) but not clearly linked to religious attitudes. Based on these hints, the broad alternative expectation would be that the relationships hypothesized above are dependent on how the authoritarian regime is related to Islam: if Islam or Islamic politics is suppressed, it can be expected that this religion becomes linked to support for a democratic system, as it would facilitate greater political power. This also resonates with theories on minority groups stating that discrimination leads to tolerance because people want to prevent others from receiving similar discriminatory treatment (Djupe and Calfano 2012). If, on the other hand, (orthodox) Islam is allied with the authoritarian regime, greater democracy constitutes a threat to the power position of the orthodox people, and instrumentalism would thus predict a negative relationship.

4. DATA AND MEASUREMENTS

The WVS and Arab Barometer data are the only generally accessible, nationally representative data on attitudes in the Middle East.[5] Measuring complex phenomena with survey data does run into limitations (see Bratton 2007, 99), especially when the surveys are not designed with a particular study in mind: not all concepts here are optimally operationalized. Nevertheless, this study uses the same data as most other studies and spurs on the literature by presenting a comparative design and a systematic cross-country operationalization of concepts.

The empirical analyses are based on WVS survey (WVS 2009) data from Egypt (2000), Iraq (2004, 2006), Jordan (2001, 2007), Morocco (2007), and Saudi Arabia (2003). I have chosen the WVS over the Arab barometer data because the former include more usable country-years as well as religion variables that are closer to the theoretical concepts discussed above. However, similar models have been run using Arab Barometer data and these confirm the main conclusions.[6]

The countries studied here represent various political systems such as single-party regimes, family-ruled Islamic monarchies, constitutional monarchies, and parliamentary or presidential republics (Long, Reich, and Gasiorowski 2011; Owen 2004), as well as different economic systems: oil economies poor in other resources, mixed oil economies, and non-oil economies (Moghadam 2003, 11). This allows for testing the generalizability and context-dependency of the studied relationships.

Using exploratory factor analyses, indicators are selected to measure the religion dimensions. To maximize the number of surveys, a survey is included if at least one of the indicators of a dimension derived from the factor analysis is present.[7] Since models are estimated per country-year, differences due to variations in operationalization will surface. All models include standard control variables: gender, education, income, age, and Socio-economic status (SES) (online Appendix A).[8] In the pooled models, country dummies are also included. An alternative strategy would be to apply multilevel models with random intercepts and random effects of religion and cross-level interactions. Since the arguments on context-dependency are rather explorative and limited to only seven country-year observations, separate country models are preferable. Nevertheless, the pooled models have also been estimated in a multilevel setting (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences mixed procedure). The results only differing in thousandths of the coefficients.[9]

4.1. Dependent Variables

Descriptive statistics of all core variables are provided in Table 2.[10] As discussed elaborately above, the measurement of democratic support and tolerance is subject to much discussion (e.g., Bratton 2010; Gibson 2013; Mondak and Sanders 2005). Regarding the *support for democracy*, I follow the dominant practice in the Middle East literature, despite its drawbacks, for three reasons: (1) the WVS data do not allow more refined measurements, (2) now my results are comparable to those of previous studies, and (3) it allows for contrasting the results with the outcomes for tolerance. A factor analysis on six items indicates that two tap into the general support of democracy (online Appendix B): "Democracy may have problems but is better" and the desire for "having a democratic political system." Both items have similar scales (0–3), means, and spreads. If both were present, I took the average; otherwise a single score. A higher score indicates greater support.

Data on the Middle East does not include items on the toleration of specific acts or extending civil rights to disliked groups, the typical "Western ways" of measuring *political tolerance* (e.g., Djupe and Calfano 2012; Gibson 1992; 2013; Mondak and Sanders 2005). However, I can use an alternative measurement also present in other comparative or non-West studies: the toleration of neighbors with different worldviews or from different cultures (e.g., Ciftci 2010; Guerin, Petry, and Crete 2004; Hutchison and Gibler 2007; Moaddel 2006; Tov and Diener 2009). I combined the available "neighbor" items on religion, ethnicity, nationality, and language. These identities are often understood interchangeably and it has been argued that, for the

Table 2. Descriptive statistics

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Support for democracy	0	3	2.45	0.66
Tolerance	−0.73	0.59	0.01	0.30
Religious belonging: Muslim	0	1	0.98	0.15
Commitment	0	3	2.66	0.59
Orthodoxy	0	9	8.79	0.93
Muslim political attitudes	0	1	0.59	0.34
Individual political Islamism	0	4	2.88	1.05

$N = 8,332$
Source: WVS (Egypt, 2000; Iraq, 2001, 2006; Jordan, 2001, 2007; Morocco, 2007; Saudi Arabia, 2003).

Middle East, these are good indicators of tolerance, and better than using sexual liberalization (Moaddel 2006; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007). While this does not measure the tolerance of other worldviews directly, it does present a reasonable approximation given the state of the field, and the results might help identify the most important data challenges.

At least three of the "neighbor" items are included for each country (online Appendix C).[11] I have centered the indicators around the country mean and calculated the average. This accounts for differences in popularity of some groups that are not included in all countries.[12] I scaled the scores running from 0 (intolerant) to 1 (tolerant). A Pearson correlation of people's "democratic support" and tolerance scores shows that the two dependent variables cannot be used interchangeably and clearly measure separate concepts.[13]

4.2. Islamic Orientations

Theoretically, I have distinguished five attitudinal aspects of religion. The first was *belonging,* reflected in the widespread usage of affiliation or denomination in comparative studies. Given this prominence in the literature, I include affiliation here as well (1 = Muslim; 0 = not Muslim), even though only the sub-samples for Egypt and Jordan enable robust comparisons. Rerunning models without this variable or without the non-Muslims does not change the conclusions.[14]

I selected seven items possibly tapping into commitment and orthodoxy (online Appendix D).[15] The factor analysis produces two factors that are congruent with the theoretical concepts. *Commitment* — the importance of religion — includes three items: being a religious person, whether religion is important in life, and whether religious faith is an important quality for children.[16] Dichotomous versions of the variables are summed.[17] The commitment scale runs from 0 (low) to 3 (high). The two items on the justifiability of *haram* (prohibited) actions — drinking alcohol and suicide — serve as indicators of being less *orthodox*; while not ideal these items come closest to the concept or orthodox attitudes. I used the average of the available items.[18] A higher score reflects more orthodox attitudes.

Five items related to how people think about the connection between Islam and politics. A factor analysis (online Appendix E) shows two underlying factors that largely overlap my distinct theoretical concepts. Two items cluster together and resemble individual-level *political*

Islamism: the desire for *Shari'a*-based laws and for public officials with strong religious beliefs.[19] In both, political decision-making is subordinated to religious principles or ideology. Where possible, I took the average of the two five-point items (4 = highly Islamist). Two other items are used to measure the *support for Muslim Politics*; the concept in which Islam is seen as a source of inspiration, but the boundaries set by political decision-making rules are still respected (e.g., democracy). The degree to which people believe that religious institutions hold answers to social problems reflects whether they think Islam can serve as policy-making inspiration. The degree to which they prefer politicians that are religious indicates whether respondents think religion should be a source of inspiration in politics (without saying that politicians must be Muslim).[20] One is dichotomous, the other is rescaled to a 0–0.5–1 variable, and then the average is calculated (1 = fully "Muslim Political").

Evidently the different religious attitudes are correlated, all significantly ($p < 0.001$). The Pearson's correlations are however well below 0.8, which does not indicate multi-collinearity (see Allison 1999). Moreover, the regression tolerance (VIF) statistics are all well below 1.5, whereas the critical value for multi-collinearity is generally considered to be 2.5 (Allison 1999).[21]

5. EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS

5.1. Support for Democracy

Table 3 gives the results for "support for democracy." The control variables show rather consistent patterns. Older people, men, and people with higher SES and education support democracy more. Education has the greatest impact, as has been found for Muslim-majority African countries (Bratton 2007). The sex gap is not unique to this study and is generally attributed to women's higher level of traditionalism or to their fear that Islamist parties will come to power via elections and erode women's rights (e.g., Spierings 2014b). Of course, women hold fundamentalist views as well — 30–40% of Egyptian, Jordanian, and Moroccan women are estimated to be fundamentalist — but this cannot explain the sex gap, as fundamentalism is about twice as prevalent among men (Blaydes and Linzer 2008; see also Hofmann 2004; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007). Women are not found to be more Islamist in this study either.

Table 3. Regression models on the "support for democracy"

	All countries	Egypt 2000	Iraq 2004	Iraq 2006	Jordan 2001	Jordan 2007	Morocco 2007	Saudi Arabia 2003
Belonging: Muslim = 1	0.054	−0.042	0.025	−0.540	0.244*	−0.125	−0.017	0.042
	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.231)	(0.322)	(0.098)	(0.152)	(0.266)	(0.271)
Commitment (0–3)	0.002	0.002	0.014	0.038	−0.011	0.063	−0.010	−0.049
	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.043)
Islamic orthodoxy (0–9)	0.013	−0.013	−0.006	0.028	−0.018	−0.058	0.081***	0.023
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.015)	(0.036)
Muslim political attitudes (0–1)	−0.053*	−0.056	0.108*	0.091	0.082	−0.075	−0.123	−0.210**
	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.050)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.073)	(0.078)
Individual political Islamism (0–1)	−0.016*	0.082***	−0.076***	−0.065***	0.028	−0.003	0.069**	−0.145***
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.038)
Age	0.002**	0.001	0.003*	0.002	0.000	0.004**	−0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Educational level	0.015***	0.022***	0.010	0.004	0.021*	0.018*	0.039***	0.008
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.017)
Sex: Female = 1	−0.029*	−0.060**	0.023	0.021	−0.124**	−0.005	0.032	−0.029*
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.014)
Socio – economic class (0–4)	0.027**	0.008	0.030	0.052*	0.015	−0.007	−0.025	0.142*
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.064)
Income (0–9)	0.007	0.011*	−0.002	−0.002	0.007	n.a.	0.058***	−0.010
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.009)		(0.016)	(0.014)
Constant	1.698***	2.435***	2.297***	2.513***	2.128***	2.957***	1.703***	2.245***
	(0.090)	(0.147)	(0.273)	(0.358)	(0.252)	(0.351)	(0.315)	(0.451)
R-square	0.119	0.055	0.023	0.022	0.034	0.020	0.111	0.046
n	8,322	1,797	1,548	1,351	920	1,013	793	900

* <0.05; ** <0.01; *** <0.001; The standard errors are given between brackets; The coefficients are unstandardized B-coefficients. Source: WVS.

On religious belonging, commitment, and orthodoxy, the pooled and country-specific models produce clear results: they have no consistent significant effect on the "support for democracy." Only in Jordan (2001) do Muslims support democracy somewhat more than other people (belonging), and in Morocco (2007) more orthodox people support democracy somewhat more. The other 22 relationships are not statistically significant. The unexpected effect in Morocco reflects the results on political Islamism and supports the context-dependency argument (see below). Additional modeling does not indicate the religious attitudes have an indirect effect (e.g., through education) on democratic support either, further undermining culturalists ideas on Islam's negative impact.

Regarding attitudes on the politics-religion interrelatedness, an overall negative impact of Muslim political attitudes is found, but that is mainly caused by the Saudi sample and in Iraq (2004) the effect is even positive. No other significant relationship was found, and whether people want Islam to be a political source of inspiration is also largely unrelated to people's support of democracy, as was expected. Individual political Islamism, however, does impact the support for democracy in five out of seven surveys, and in those cases it actually is the most influential variable.[22] Because of the lack of a unidirectional pattern, these results refute culturalist expectations. In Iraq (2004, 2006) and Saudi Arabia negative effects are found, for Egypt and Morocco positive effects. This difference does not align with operationalization differences, but they do seem to reflect the religious-political state relations.

In Egypt and Morocco, the authoritarian regimes prohibited and suppressed Islamic parties; (consequently) the opposition was often mobilized under the flag of Islam, and it often included fighting poverty and pleading for more popular say in policies. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood even enacted social security programs (El-Ghobashy 2005). In this context, greater democracy provides Islamic groups a route to power, feeding a desire for democracy among people with politically Islamist attitudes. The Egyptian post-revolution elections (2012) illustrated how democracy empowered the Muslim Brotherhood. Whether the later intervention by the Egyptian army against the Brotherhood politicians further strengthened the call for democracy among people with strong political Islamist attitudes or made them lose faith in democratic elections has to be seen.

Contrastingly, in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, Islam and authoritarianism was an associative pair as was secularism-democracy, so Islam and democracy were linked negatively. The Saudi royal family is considered to be the

custodian of the Islamic community, and puritanical *Wahhabism* is the official Saudi political ideology (Andersen, Seibert, and Wagner 2012, 157–160; Maisel 2011, 115–116; Owen 2004, 98). In Iraq, Hussein's authoritarianism was not constantly and strongly associated with Islam, but the United States-British invasion rhetoric tied bringing freedom and democracy to an anti-Islamist stance in their "war on terror." Hence, Islamism became a force against neo-colonialism and was constructed as the opposite to "Western democracy." For more detailed analyses of anti-Americanism's role in the Middle Eastern democratization process see Jamal (2012) and Spierings (2014b).

5.2. Tolerance

The socio-demographic explanatory variables of tolerance (Table 4) only show a robust effect for education: the higher educated are significantly more tolerant. Women were less tolerant, with exceptions for both Jordanian samples. This resonates with the exceptionally high education but low employment of women in Jordan (Spierings, Smits, and Verloo 2010), suggesting that more in-depth study of Jordanian gender patterns is needed.

Regarding religion, a significant negative relationship of Muslim belonging was found for Egypt and Iraq (2004). Together with three insignificant negative relationships, this leads to a significant negative overall effect. Given the inclusion of more precise belief variables, this effect seems to draw attention to minority status. Religious minorities were most tolerant in societies with religio-ethnic tensions. Of the two countries with sizeable samples of non-Muslims, the tensions in Jordan were not very severe, whereas Egypt has been troubled by (violent) conflicts between Muslims and Christian Coptic groups throughout the last decades (Owen 2004: 174–176). Suppressed religious groups might be more tolerant because it benefits them most or because, knowing intolerance themselves, they would not want others to experience it (cf. Al Sadi and Basit 2013; Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan 2012a; 2012b; Djupe and Calfano 2012). Disentangling these mechanisms lies beyond this study's scope.

Against expectations, but in line with the results for democratic support, commitment and orthodoxy show no clear impact.[23] In Iraq (2004), however, commitment had a positive effect, and in Morocco (2007) and Saudi Arabia (2003) a negative one. The (unexpected) positive effect in

Table 4. Regression models on the level of tolerance

	All countries	Egypt 2000	Iraq 2004	Iraq 2006	Jordan 2001	Jordan 2007	Morocco 2007	Saudi Arabia 2003
Belonging: Muslim = 1	−0.058**	−0.083**	−0.194*	−0.117	0.026	−0.085	−0.086	0.018
	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.095)	(0.107)	(0.052)	(0.096)	(0.155)	(0.101)
Commitment (0–3)	−0.003	0.034	0.046**	−0.008	−0.022	0.034	−0.050***	−0.045**
	(0.006)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Islamic orthodoxy (0–9)	0.000	−0.003	0.005	−0.014	0.017	−0.002	−0.001	−0.006
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Muslim political attitudes (0–1)	−0.012	−0.009	−0.013	−0.078***	−0.001	−0.028	0.060	0.046
	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.029)
Individual political Islamism (0–1)	−0.017***	0.002	−0.019**	−0.014*	−0.027**	−0.019	0.021	−0.062***
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Age	0.001***	−0.000	0.001	0.000	0.003***	0.003**	−0.001	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Educational level	0.016***	0.013***	0.025***	0.006*	0.015***	0.024***	0.003	0.018**
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Sex: Female = 1	−0.001	−0.039**	0.000	−0.027*	0.046*	0.074**	−0.049*	−0.002
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Socio-economic class (0–4)	−0.008	−0.015	−0.024**	0.017*	−0.002	−0.001	−0.004	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Income (0–9)	0.004*	0.011**	−0.000	−0.004	0.001	n.a.	0.034***	−0.003
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)		(0.009)	(0.005)
Constant	0.069	−0.033	0.021	0.305*	−0.209	−0.157	0.059	0.272
	(0.043)	(0.103)	(0.113)	(0.119)	(0.133)	(0.221)	(0.184)	(0.168)
R-square	0.025	0.034	0.065	0.058	0.041	0.039	0.048	0.049
n	8,322	1,797	1,548	1,351	920	1,013	793	900

* < 0.05; ** < 0.01; *** < 0.001; The standard errors are given between brackets; The coefficients are unstandardized B-coefficients. Source: WVS.

Iraq might be explained by the political context again: more religious people might have become more tolerant because Hussein oppressed partly on religious grounds (e.g., campaigns against religious leaders and negative interference with the *Hajj* — religious pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina) and because the people might have experienced the foreign-installed secular "Coalition Provisional Authority" (April 2003–June 2004) as suppression. This explanation is suggestive as best though; more detailed study is needed.

A strong statistically significant negative relationship was found for individual political Islamism and tolerance. The pooled effect is the second largest one after education[24] and it was also found in four out of seven samples. Supporting Muslim Politics has no clear independent effect, but additional analyses do suggest that supporting Muslim politics should not be ruled out in shaping tolerance, as people that support Muslim politics seem more receptive to political Islamism as well.[25] The former might thus have an indirect influence on tolerance.

6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Systematic studies of the impact of Islamic orientations on democratic support in the Arab Middle East were largely lacking and theoretical and conceptual knowledge from studies on other geographic areas and affluent democracies had not been applied to the Middle East. Consequently, the reported support for democracy in the Middle East might be misleading (e.g., Hofmann 2004; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Jamal and Tessler 2007; Meyer, Rizzo, and Ali 2007; Moaddel 2006; Tessler 2002; Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer 2007; Tessler and Gao 2005) and Islam's influence misunderstood.

This study focused on support for "democracy," like most Middle East studies do, but also on tolerance as a crucial democratic civic value. This focus substantiated prior claims that Middle Eastern democratic support might be somewhat superficial or instrumental (cf. Inglehart and Norris 2003; Jamal and Tessler 2008; Norris and Inglehart 2012). On a scale of 0 to 1, the average level of tolerance here is 0.56,[26] lower in each country than in 21 major Western democracies,[27] whereas "support for democracy" levels in Arab countries are similar to Western ones. So it seems "support for democracy" is not strongly associated with tolerance towards other world views and liberal democracy in the Middle East, as has been shown for African countries before as well. Political tolerance

is crucial for a sustainable democratic system. If tolerance is not widespread, democratization attempts are undermined, as we have seen after the Arab uprisings. In this respect, it would have been interesting to see whether the level of tolerance is actually highest in Tunisia, where the revolution has led to a more stable electorally democratic system.

Democracy might thus be seen as a way to gain power (see below), suggesting that elections are more at the core of the Middle Eastern interpretation of democracy than suggested by the African literature (Bratton 2003; 2007; 2010). Such instrumentalism has also been shown for Islamic political leaders and organizations in the region (e.g., El-Ghobashy 2005; Esposito and Voll 1996; Long, Reich, and Gasiorowski 2011; Owen 2003), and deserves more attention, as it might explain both the relatively low levels of liberal democracy in the region (e.g., Fish 2002; Donno and Russett 2004; Spierings, Smits, and Verloo 2009) and the gap between that and the reported desire for democracy.

The question that generally follows the assessment of democratic support in the Middle East is how Islam influences it. The existing Middle East literature uses theoretically ill-defined conceptualizations of "Islam" and empirical results differ considerably. I applied insights from the larger literature on religion and political attitudes to provide systematic tests. Due to data limitations, this study suffers from some of the same inaccuracies as previous Middle East studies,[28] but it does provide more detailed and structured analyses for multiple countries. The results further substantiated the rejection of the culturalist expectations of Islam's negative impact (Table 1). It does not hold for belonging, commitment, orthodoxy, and Muslim political attitudes (supporting Islam as a source of inspiration for policy choices) (also Jamal and Tessler 2007; Tessler 2002; Tessler and Gao 2005).

For tolerance, any widespread Islamic influence is found absent as well. The results seem to indicate even fewer effects than found for Western countries (see Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan 2012a; Djupe and Calfano 2012; Eisenstein 2006; Golebiowska 1999; Robinson 2010; Stouffer 1955). The alternative operationalization of tolerance might be responsible for this, or it might be due to the inclusion of variables measuring more specific beliefs on the linkages between politics and religion (variables hardly used in Western countries). Using similar survey items across regions might shed light on this: questions about citizen's rights for disliked groups in Middle East surveys and about politico-religious orthodoxy (e.g., "political Christianity") in democratic and Western countries.

My strict focus on attitudes might explain why some results seem to differ from those in other studies. They often include behavioural dimensions (e.g., attendance) under labels like commitment and conclude that commitment has an influence (Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan 2012b; Eisenstein 2006; Moaddel 2006; Tessler 2002; Tezcür et al. 2012), while I only use attitudes, as attendance is not the best indicator of beliefs. This observation and the relevance of distinguishing different beliefs dimension shown here support the claim that religion is a multidimensional concept and should be treated as such when explaining democratic support (Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan 2012a; 2012b). Still, this study, like the whole Middle East literature, is limited by not including minority positions, aspects of communal and individual behavior, and threat perception. Including those is a next step in understanding the complex impact of religion.

Nevertheless, this study was the first to introduce the individual-level political attitude of political Islamism (defined as the view that Islam should be the framework that delimits political decision-making) and to distinguish it from Muslim political attitudes. Individual-level political Islamism was the most important religious factor explaining support for democracy and tolerance. On tolerance, it fitted the theoretical expectations of an overall negative impact, supporting the idea that more extreme views lead to intolerance because of a higher threat perception and greater distance to other people's views (Djupe and Calfano 2012; Eisenstein 2006; Golebiowska 1999; Robinson 2010). Future work could focus on these mechanisms, which could not be studied using the current data. Regarding "extreme views," it is important to note that extreme attitudes are not rare in this case: about 60% of the respondents in the surveys scores 3 or higher on the political Islam scale that runs from 0 to 4.

Though culturalists expect individual political Islamism to have a negative impact on support for democracy, the alternative framework of context dependency provided a better interpretation of results. While suggested by others (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Meyer, Rizzo, and Ali 2007; Tessler 2002; Tessler and Gao 2005), this study was the first to provide a systematic comparison that enabled grasping the dynamics. It seems that the linkage between Islamism and democratic support depends on whether elections help (politically suppressed) Islamists to gain political power. If so, positive relationships are found. If authoritarian rule is Islamic, (neo-colonial) secularism is associated with democracy, or democracy marginalizes Muslim populations, the relationship is negative. All statistically significant relationships could be explained by this logic (also in the AB data-robustness test). This instrumentalist interpretation presents a more precise argument for the

general idea that demands for democracy are mainly made when people become dissatisfied with authoritarian regimes (e.g., Tezcür et al. 2012).

To refine and test the context-dependency arguments put forward here, better country-level variables on the Islam-state connection are needed (see Spierings 2014a; Spierings, Smits, and Verloo 2009). As more than 25 Middle Eastern surveys will be available in the near future, multilevel models can be applied (Paterson and Goldstein 1991) — current multilevel studies compare countries across the world and are limited to rather crude country-level variables (e.g., Fish 2011; Norris and Inglehart 2012). Efforts in this direction are crucial as results from single-country studies (Meyer, Rizzo, and Ali 2007 [Kuwait]; Moaddel 2006 [Saudi Arabia]) are simply not generalizable to the Arab Middle East if one ignores the relationship between Islam, Islamic groups and authoritarian regimes.

Supplementary materials and methods

To view supplementary material for this article, please visit http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1755048314000479.

NOTES

1. Muslims are somewhat more intolerant than Christians in *non-Middle Eastern* African countries (Bratton 2003).

2. Types of authoritarianism vary greatly though (Owen 2004), and in the Arab uprisings, for instance, the monarchies turned out to be far more stable than military and one-party regimes (Paczynska 2013).

3. Popular usage of "Islamist" also includes Muslim parties functioning within a democratic system (see Long, Reich, and Gasiorowski 2011). I classify those as "Muslim politics."

4. Belonging is included as it is prominent in the literature (e.g., Inglehart and Norris 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2012). The analyses have limitations, but do lay bare the simplism of using affiliation as indicator of beliefs and culture.

5. http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/index_surveys.

6. There are six useable AB surveys (Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Yemen). I included indicators for the five religious attitudes (belonging only for Lebanon), education, sex, age, and employment (income and SES were not available). The dependent variables were similar to ones used here (exact operationalization and results obtainable from author).

The results led to similar conclusions. Most importantly, no clear negative effects were found for any of the religion variables, with exception of political Islamism on tolerance. All six coefficients were negative and three were significant ($p < 0.05$). The context-dependent link between Islamism and 'support for democracy' was also reproduced: a negative effect in Jordan and Lebanon; positive in Kuwait. In Kuwait, the government is rather hostile to Islamic political forces and very recently tried to ban their activities (Dickinson 2014). It resembles WVS Egypt and Morocco. Lebanon has a parliamentary electoral system. This partly democratic system is associated with the political "marginalization" of Muslim: 65% of the population (*Daily Star* 2013) having been allocated 45 of the 99 parliament seats. In Jordan, religious parties are forbidden, predicting a positive relationship, not the negative one found with the AB data. However, this law was enacted years after the survey (2012), and Islamism is politically well represented: there are *Shari'a* courts ruling on personal law for Muslims, and Islamists in many state institutions (al-Fodeilat 2012).

7. All Arab surveys with information on the necessary items are included.

8. I imputed missing income data (Jordan 2007), regressing income on the other four control variables.

9. Obtainable from author.

10. The pooled models are rerun using weights (1) correcting for population size, (2) weighting all surveys equally. Relevant differences are mentioned.

11. Items differ per survey, making one factor analysis impossible. Various factor analyses indicate one underlying concept (obtainable from author).

12. Mainly the Jewish neighbors (three surveys) are unpopular.

13. The correlation is 0.027 ($p = 0.015$; $n = 8,322$)

14. Obtainable from author.

15. Factor analysis on Egypt and Jordan produces similar clustering.

16. Items loading 0.3 and 0.4 are included, since they do not cross-load.

17. "Important in life: religion": 0 = "rather important"/"not very important"/"not important"; 1 = "very important." The latter includes almost 95% of the respondents. "Religious person": 0 = "not a religious person"/"a convinced atheist."

18. Comparable means.

19. Face value this formulation seems close to supporting Muslim politics as well. The factor analysis' results are however quite clear, which might be partly attributed to the use of the word "strong" in the item. Overall, it probably taps whether a respondent believes that politicians should be (devout) Muslim. This is the individual-level equivalent of "Islamist" laws that only allow Muslims to become head of state (Spierings, Smits, and Verloo 2009).

20. The item loading 0.245 does not cross-load, and is thus included.

21. Obtainable from author.

22. Based on standardized coefficients.

23. In the population-weighed model, commitment was statistically significant and negative, mainly due to the Egyptian relationship, the most populated country. Also Morocco and Saudi Arabia become more important as Iraq's impact was weighed down most. Separate analyses are thus crucial to understand the situation.

24. Based on standardized coefficient

25. As the correlation between the two concepts is only 0.221 ($p = 0.000$), this cannot be interpreted as the two variables measuring the same concept — which was also indicated by the factor analysis.

26. On similar scales, the support for democracy is considerably higher.

27. Andorra, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Serbia, (and Montenegro), Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United States.

28. Indirect measurements of tolerance; secondary data to operationalize different dimensions of beliefs; data on a limited number of countries.

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