

FOREWORD

Two sets of events in recent years have combined to make the subject of international military force one of prime importance. One was the dramatic creation of the several UN emergency forces. From the midst of the Suez crisis came the first true international force—the UN Emergency Force (UNEF); it can be seen today performing its tedious but useful patrol duty on the hot sands and dusty ravines of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Desert and in a barren corner of the Gulf of Aqaba. Two years after Suez, in the tense summer of 1958, the UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was created. And in July 1960 came the UN force in the Congo (ONUC). ONUC brought the UN to the verge of bankruptcy even as it was successfully containing the forces seeking to rend that turbulent land. None of these developments or the responses to them was precisely envisaged in 1945 when the UN Charter was written with the expectation that the great powers would themselves furnish forces to the Security Council; it turned out that forces enlisted from the lesser, non-great powers were not only the best obtainable under the circumstances but a potentially indispensable addition to the arts of peace-keeping.

This contemporary invention of a new form of military presence—the small power contributed, non- (or almost non-) fighting UN force—poses a host of questions for the student of international organization and politics. It has already stimulated some (but not enough) fresh analysis by some governments of the need for stand-by forces, as well as for improved international observation and fact-finding resources. The Congo experience alone has supplied material for permanent controversy—certainly enough to fill this volume several times over. This then is one prime meaning of the phrase “international force.”

Alongside the UN problem, another major political development has begun to pose still broader questions about the concept of international forces. Western acceptance of the package approach to “general and complete disarmament” carried with it a portentous corollary that both illuminates and bedevils the disarmament dialogue. The corollary, first enunciated by Secretary of State Herter in early 1960, has since become embedded in Western policy. Simply stated, it holds that general disarmament must be accompanied by a significant

degree of world authority which in turn must have at its disposal a military capability that would grow during the disarming process to the point where, by the end of stage III, no state would be in a position to challenge it. In a word, it calls for limited world government (without labeling it that), backed by military power at the center designed ultimately to supplant national military power.

This revolutionary concept was advanced, one suspects, without full comprehension of its implications. Initially left unanswered were questions ranging from broad and obvious ones such as the kind of political world in which a world peace force could function to the lesser but no less crucial ones about the sorts of people one could envisage serving in such a force, the kinds of real life chores such a force would probably have to take on, and such possibly decisive issues as command and location (and thus vulnerability to control or seizure by individual nations).

There are, then, two large parts to the question of international force, one involving the painfully familiar armed world of self-help, nuclear deterrence, endemic crises, and weak international authority; the other the fantastically unfamiliar one of vastly reduced armaments, *détente*, quantum increases in international authority (and, some of us argue here, nuclear deterrence and endemic crises as before).

In the conviction that this question in *both* its facets calls for serious and imaginative study, I have sought with a number of highly qualified colleagues to see what illumination might be brought to bear.

One chief purpose in commissioning the papers included in this special issue of *International Organization* was to enlist the collaboration of some men who had not particularly focused their professional attention on international forces but who *had* thought deeply in other contexts about such subjects as military strategy and logistics, police functions, and the psychology of the soldier. They share common quarters within these covers with others who have distinguished themselves in the area of international organization and politics.

Since this symposium was undertaken, several agencies of the United States government and several other governments as well have begun studies on the implications of the problem of international force, both in the present world and under the plans being discussed for disarmament. This can only be salutary; thinking about the political, strategic, economic, and psychological factors has always tended to lag behind purely military analysis. As Sir Charles P. Snow put it in his Godkin Lectures: "Military objectives are nearly always

more precise than benevolent ones; which is why military technology has been easier for ingenious men to think about.”

Thanks to the generosity of the Rockefeller Foundation, as well as to the Board of Editors of *International Organization*, we have tried to probe the benevolent objectives of international force. If others are stimulated to pursue the matter more systematically, these efforts will have been amply rewarded.

L.P.B.

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