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Hegel's Subjective Logic as a Logic for (Hegel's) Philosophy of Mind

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Abstract

In the 1930s, C. I. Lewis, who was responsible for the revival of modal logic in the era of modern symbolic logic, characterized 'intensional' approaches to logic as typical of post-Leibnizian 'continental philosophy', in contrast to the 'extensionalist' approaches dominant in the British tradition. Indeed Lewis's own work in this area had been inspired by the logic of his teacher, the American 'Absolute Idealist', Josiah Royce. Hegel's 'Subjective Logic' in Book III of his *Science of Logic*, can, I suggest, be considered as an intensional modal logic, and this paper explores parallels between it and a later variety of modal logic—*tense* logic, as developed by Arthur Prior in the 1950s and 60s. Like Lewis, Prior too had been influenced in this area by a teacher with strong Hegelian leanings—John N. Findlay. Treated as an *intensional* (with an 's') logic, Hegel's subjective logic can be used as a framework for addressing issues of *intentionality* (with a 't')—the mind's capacity to be intentionally directed to objects. In this way, I suggest that the structures of his subjective logic can clarify what is at issue in the 'Psychology' section of the *Encyclopaedia* Philosophy of Subjective Spirit.

I start from the assumption that any attempt to locate Hegel's philosophy within the area of philosophy of mind must address two fundamental desiderata. Most obviously, it must be able to give an account of the types of individual cognitive capacities and activities, such as judging and inferring, as well as features of subjective experience, such as the 'phenomenality' or 'what it is like' of conscious experience, that are conventionally thought of as providing the subject matter for a philosophy of mind. But, in particular, it must also be able to do this while conceiving of any finite individuals so-minded as being *essentially* related to others in conformity with Hegel's account of *spirit*. Since conventional philosophies of mind are typically approached in *individualist* ways, it can seem difficult to know how to engage with Hegel's approach from such a perspective. On first thought, an obvious place to start within Hegel's corpus might seem to be the section 'Psychology' of 'The Philosophy of Subjective Spirit', within volume 2 of the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*. But it can be difficult to work out exactly what

Hegel is trying to do there. For example, it is difficult to get a picture of any *distinctly* Hegelian conception of mindedness without having taken into consideration issues such as the possession of language that would properly find a place only in subsequent sections of the *Encyclopaedia* in the context of *objective* spirit.[1]

Here I want to suggest a way forward—one that starts by looking to the section 'Subjectivity' in the 'Subjective Logic' making up Book 3 of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, interpreting it as a basically *intensionalist*, rather than *extensionalist*, logic. Broadly, I mean this as an approach that focuses primarily on relations between contents that are conceived as essentially mind-related—*conceptual* contents—rather than on the relations between the *extensions* of those concepts—that is, the entities *of which* those concepts are deemed *true* or *false*. Indeed, I will be arguing that Hegel's subjective logic is a particular kind of intensional logic, an irreducibly *modal* one.

Qua mind-related, intensionalist logic might be thought to be an appropriate way to address issues of the logic of *psychological* contents—a feature that is made explicit in the oft-commented-upon relation between the, apparently etymologically unrelated, notions of 'intention' (with a 't') and 'intension' (with an 's'). While the former derives from medieval approaches to Aristotle's philosophy of mind, and was revived by Brentano in the nineteenth century, the latter was the English translation used by Sir William Hamilton for what the Port Royal logicians had called the '*compréhension*' of a term (Arnauld and Nicole 1996), and which they opposed to its '*étendu*', translated by Hamilton as its 'extension'—the range of objects to which the term applies (Kneale 1968: 84).[2] Thus we might, like the modal logician Arthur Prior, regard the *psychological* notion of intentionality as a species of the wider *logical* notion of intensionality (Prior 1968: 91), thereby providing a route from intensional logic to intentional psychology—in this case, a route from Hegel's *Logic* to his *Philosophy of Spirit*. To this end I'll be exploiting some striking parallels between Hegel's subjective logic and modern modal logics, especially that of Prior, in terms of their respective approaches to mental or 'intentional' contents.

The broad outlines of this approach will be sketched below in a number of stages. First, I will briefly consider recent approaches to modal logic and the central idea of translations between the sentences of *intensional*, modal and *extensional,* non-modal, so-called 'classical', logical languages. In the second section, I will relate this distinction to a similar one that Hegel draws between two different kinds of *judgment*—those treating predication in terms of the notion of 'inherence' and those treating it in terms of the notion of 'subsumption'—in his Subjective Logic. In the final section I'll turn to the topic of how we might start to think of Hegel's subjective logic, now explicitly thought of as a variety of modal logic, as providing a framework for a philosophy of mind, in which the

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individual mind is to be understood as embedded in a larger context of *spirit*, *qua* network of interrelated individual minds. Prior to all this, however, and to ward off the charge that this approach involves the retrospective and anachronistic projection onto Hegel of concepts from contemporary logic, a few words on the history of modal logic will be appropriate.

First, the idea of modal logic goes back to Aristotle, but the distinction between *intensional* and *extensional* approaches to logic seems to have first appeared in the seventeenth century with the Port Royal logicians' distinction between a term's *compréhension* and its *etendu*. Leibniz had exploited the distinction, affirming his own logic to be basically *intensional*, but also thinking that there were *translational equivalences* between intensionally and extensionally interpreted sentences *within* that fundamentally intensional logic (Lenzen 2004: 11–12). The distinction is present in Kant (see here, especially, Anderson 2015), and from his comments on Leibniz in the Subjective Logic, it is clear that Hegel was familiar with these features of Leibniz's logic, most probably through the influence of the authority on logic at Tübingen in Hegel's student years, Gottfried Ploucquet, a follower of Leibniz. Hegel too, as we will see, exploits the idea of translation between *intensionally* and *extensionally* interpreted forms.

In the mid-nineteenth century, the modern explicitly *extensionalist* approach to logic began in earnest with the work of George Boole, and this approach become standard within the analytic tradition with works such as the *Principia Mathematica* (1910–13) of Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell and the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921) of Ludwig Wittgenstein. For its part, the modern approach to modal logic, while first mooted by C. S. Peirce, grew out of C. I. Lewis's criticisms of the extensionalist approach to *logical implication* found in Whitehead and Russell's *Principia*.

Lewis had been critical of what Whitehead and Russell called 'material implication', an approach to implication that analysed the statement '*p* implies *q*' in terms of the truth-values of those propositions: '*p* implies *q*' is treated as equivalent to the negation of the conjunction of *p* and *not q*. For Lewis, this is simply not what we *mean* by the notion 'implies', and he opposed to *material* implication his idea of *strict* implication in which it has to be *impossible* (and not simply false) for *p* to be true and *q* false (Lewis 1918: ch. 5). To capture the sense of *impossibility* involved in inference he thus invented a system of logic with the *propositional operators* of 'necessary' and 'possible' that could be applied to a proposition *p* to get 'It is necessary that *p*' or 'It is possible that *p*'. But the *non*-truth-functionality of these operators made Lewis's modal systems awkward, as the assessment of logical laws relied upon intuitions that were often unclear.[3] Nevertheless, Lewis's work in logic addressed a lacuna in the new logic deriving from Russell: its perceived inability to address issues concerning necessary and possible truths.

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Lewis was well aware of the idealist heritage of his explicitly intensional modal logic, having himself been strongly influenced by the American 'absolute idealist', Josiah Royce, his teacher at Harvard.[4] Indeed, Lewis characterized 'continental' philosophy in general as having worked with intensional approaches to logic while 'the British' had, especially from the period of Boole, conceived of logic in 'extensional' ways (Lewis 1930: 31). The idealist heritage of this early phase of modern modal logic is clear enough, but an Hegelian heritage can also be discerned in its next phase—that of the development of *quantified* predicate modal logics in the 1950s and 1960s. Here Hegel's influence, I suggest, can be seen via the role played by the New Zealand logician-philosopher Arthur Prior.

From the 1950s, Prior worked on a logic for *tensed* sentences—a tense or 'temporal' logic (Prior 1957 and 1967)—and his early efforts had provided a model for Saul Kripke's development of a *quantified modal predicate logic* in the 1960s (Kripke 1963; Copeland 2002). Prior had been first drawn to the topic by a paper published by his former teacher in New Zealand, the South African-born philosopher John Niemeyer Findlay (Findlay 1941). Read superficially, Findlay's paper reads as a type of exercise in 'therapeutic' ordinary-language philosophy, Findlay having been influenced by Wittgenstein in the 1930s, as acknowledged in the paper. More importantly, however, Findlay had, from his earliest days, harboured deeply Hegelian leanings (Findlay 1985: 4). But he expressed these only explicitly later in the 1950s (Findlay 1955–6; 1958), when he challenged the anti-Hegelian sentiment of contemporary analytic philosophy, and did so from a perspective that drew upon post-Russellian logic, especially the later work of Wittgenstein.[5] To add to this, in the 1941 paper Findlay adapts a distinction between different conceptions of time put forward earlier by the British Hegelian John McTaggart (McTaggart 1908).

Prior had called Findlay the 'founding father of modern tense logic' (Prior 1967: 1), and given the relations between tense and modal logic, it may not be an exaggeration to think of Hegel as the unacknowledged grandfather of tense logic and modern modal logic in general. Given this background, we should not be surprised to find similarities between the way that modal logic is discussed today, and Hegel's treatment of formal logic in Volume 2 of the *Science of Logic*, parallels I will sketch in the next two sections.

I. Contemporary modal logics

A recent textbook on modal logic by Blackburn, di Rijke and Venema commences with three 'slogans' concerning the nature of 'modal languages': 1. Modal languages are simple yet expressive languages for talking *about* relational

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structures; 2. Modal languages provide an internal logical perspective on relational structures; and 3. Modal languages are not isolated formal systems but are related to other branches of symbolic logic, among which is the 'classical' language of the type of first-order quantified predicate logic of Frege and Russell (Blackburn *et al.* 2001: xi–xiii).

It might be thought surprising that this general account does not explicitly mention modal logic *qua* the logic of *necessary and possible propositions*, but this is because the term 'modal logic' has now come to be thought more generally to incorporate various logics other than the logic of necessity and possibility. Besides tense logic as mentioned, modal logic as broadly conceived now includes the logics of belief and knowledge (doxastic and epistemic logics), the logic of obligation (deontic logic), 'dynamic logic' and various others. Blackburn *et al.* attempt to capture this generality with the idea that what all these modal languages have in common is that they 'provide an internal logical perspective', that is, a perspective from particular points *within* various logical structures, for talking *about* those structures. The tense logic as anticipated in Findlay's 1941 article provides a useful model.

In the context of examining various 'puzzles' about the passing of time, Findlay notes that it is built into the semantic rules of our language that we talk of events that *will happen*, that *are happening*, that *have happened*, and so on, and that *regular patterns* exist among such locutions. Here, our conventions 'are so well worked out that we have practically the materials in them for a formal calculus', and, he adds, this 'calculus of tenses should have been included in the modern development of modal logics' (Findlay 1941: 233 and 233 note 17). This is the starting point of Prior's 'presentist' development of tense logic, in which *all* tenses are treated as implicitly containing a reference to the *present*. For example, referring to an event as in the future is to imply that *in the future* it *will be* present. Similarly, a past event is understood as *having been* in the present. One might say that from Prior's perspective, references to past and future times are *centred in* the present. And as what is 'present' must always be in relation to *some subject* whose 'present' it is, such references must be thought of as 'indexically' centred in some subject located at some point of time.

That the *truth values* of statements so centred are dependent on the time at which they are uttered is a point with which any Hegelian will be familiar from Hegel's discussion, in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, of the sentence 'now is night [*das Jetzt ist die Nacht*]' (*PhG*: §95). As Hegel points out, were such a sentence true when said, if written down it would at some later point become false.[6] To counter this phenomenon, as Findlay notes, we desire 'to have in our language only those kinds of statement that are *not* dependent, as regards their truth or falsity, on any circumstance in which the statement happens to be made'. The allusion here is to sentences in which the time is stated explicitly with, say, a date. This seems to free

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some time referred to (say, 'yesterday' or 'three hours ago') from its relatedness to a (changing) 'today' or 'now', and from some specific subject for whom it is *today* or *now*. But, Findlay adds, this 'aspiration which all our language to some extent fulfils' we are 'at times inclined to follow to unreasonable lengths' (Findlay 1941: 233).

Part of the background of Findlay's discussion here is McTaggart's distinction between the *tensed* and the *tenseless* ways of referring to temporal relations—his well-known 'A' and 'B' series of temporal relations (Prior 1967: 1–8). Thus Findlay interprets the internal relations of McTaggart's A series in the way that Blackburn *et al.* talk about *modal languages*. When using a tensed sentence, I am speaking about a world structured temporally from some point *within* it, a point we designate as 'now', and *from which* I refer to events located at other times—as having occurred 'yesterday', as will occur 'tomorrow', and so on. Thus we utilize various devices such as names, and so on, to overcome the ways in which the truth of such tensed statements are so conditioned, and transpose our statements into the different logic—that of McTaggart's 'B series'. When sentences are taken to refer to events against the background of the objective temporal points of the B series, the sentences are being understood *extensionally*. But Findlay is pointing to the limits of this process with the idea that we might endeavour to follow it to 'unreasonable lengths'.

In Prior's development of Findlay's point he notes the tendency for logicians to assume that a tensed sentence, say, 'it is raining' is *incomplete* in such a way that it could be *made complete* by adding an explicit reference to the time at which it is raining—'it rains *at a*'. Here 'a' names some specific point in time, with the resulting sentence becoming *tenseless*. In Prior's analysis, this amounts to the interpreting of the original sentence as a predicate, and predicating *it* of that point in time named with the 'a' (Prior and Fine 1977: ch. 1). This is a type of translation. A whole sentence '*p*' is now translated as a predicate of a further sentence: '*p*' is translated as '*p*a'.[7]

This translation is an example of what Blackburn *et al.* talk of as the translation of a simple intensional modal sentence into a sentence of the *extensionally understood* 'classical' quantified predicate logic. But we are now faced with the question of how to understand this translation. Which 'language', the (intensional) modal or the (extensional, truth-functional) classical, is the more basic? In the Russell-influenced analytic tradition it has been assumed that the *extensional* is basic, with the modal language understood as translatable into it so as to render it 'complete'. (In the jargon, the extensional language is the 'meta-language' into which the 'object language' is translated.) However, Prior followed Findlay's suggestion that this assumption reflects an 'aspiration' taken to 'unreasonable lengths'. Thus Prior opposed the conventional view, and treated 'first-order predicate calculus [as] … an artificially expanded modal logic or tense

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logic' (Prior and Fine 1977: 54). Prior gave as his reasons for this the 'Platonism' inherent in the conventional answer:

> I find myself quite unable to take 'instants' seriously as individual entities; I cannot *understand* 'instants', and the earlier-later relation that is supposed to hold between them, except as logical constructions out of tensed facts. Tense logic is for me, if I may use the phrase, *metaphysically fundamental*, and not just an artificially torn-off fragment of the first-order theory of the earlier-later relation. (Prior and Fine 1977: 37)

Nevertheless, to Prior it was clear that tenseless logic still had capabilities that had yet to be accounted for in tense logic, and so he sought to expand the resources of tense logic to match it.

With names for times, as with '10.32 am, September 14, 1933', the tenseless system can specify *when* some event took place, but the basic modal tense system seems to lack this. To this end Prior saw the need to *extend* the resources of tense logic to include an analogue to the 'naming' of singular points. Such naming could not be conceived as primitive, as this cedes the extensionalists' point, so Prior attempted to refer to specific points in time from the resources of the relational tense system itself, the result being what now is known as *hybrid logic*.[8] Basically, this meant treating sets of propositions that are *uniquely true* of some 'point' in time as equivalent to 'names' for those points.[9] With these moves, Prior thus challenged the 'British' tendency to deal with conceptual relations *extensionally* by way of a 'continental' tendency to treat them, primarily, as *intensional*, that is, in a mind-dependent way, but to supplement simple intensional logics with these 'extensional' translations understood in a new way.

We need not go further into the subsequent developments of modal logic and modal metaphysics from the 1960s onward. As mentioned, on the model of Prior's tense logic, Saul Kripke took this form of analysis as a way of treating the traditional *alethic* modalities of possibility and necessity: rather than thinking of sentences as true at different *points of time*, sentences were thought of as true 'at' different *possible worlds*. With this, C. I. Lewis's *non-truth-functional* treatment of 'necessarily *p*' could be replaced with a properly *truth-functional* one. On the model of a sentence (an 'eternal sentence') said to be true at *all times,* a sentence said to be *necessarily* true could now, following Leibniz, be said to be one that was true *at all possible worlds*. The resulting 'possible-world semantics' precipitated a huge debate over the existence of possible worlds, but for our purposes, the important points concern the ways in which these temporal and alethic modalities exhibit similar types of context-sensitivity by being 'centred' on, or having their sentences true or false 'at', some 'location' in a logically articulated structure (a particular *point of time*, a particular *possible world*, and so on), but as 'translatable' into

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extensional equivalents. It is with this that the *intensional* can be applied to the realm of the *intentional*, as found in the doxastic *logic of belief*, for example (Hintikka 1962). There, a sentence *p* will be treated as not true or false *per se* but true or false in the context of *the beliefs of a particular subject*. A certain belief content will be treated as true or false, 'at' Jane, for example, simply if it is one of Jane's beliefs. But then the more general question arises: in which direction are we to think of the translation involved? For the *extensionalist*, the purported translatability of such modal judgments will invite the idea of the complete *elimination* of the 'subjectivity' of such belief contexts, but the 'Findlay-Prior' attitude will oppose this as taking the goal of extensionality to 'unreasonable lengths'.

In the final section of this paper I will examine the significance of this Findlay-Prior attitude to modality in relation to issues in Hegel's philosophy of subjective spirit. For the moment, however, we have glimpsed enough of the landscape of modern modal logic to allow us to appreciate how similar distinctions emerge in Hegel's Subjective Logic—distinctions that can then be applied to his philosophy of mind.

II. The mediated logical dualism of Hegel's Subjective Logic

That Hegel's 'subjective' logic of judgments and syllogisms in the *Science of Logic*, Book III, is an explicitly modal logic is made clear by the difference between what he calls an *Urteil* or judgment and a *Satz*, by which he seems to mean here something like a *sentence* considered in the context of a simple *reporting* usage.[10] Thus, considered as a mere *Satz*, the sentence 'Aristotle died at the age of 73 in the fourth year of the 115th Olympiad' will have a structure in which *both* subject and predicate are considered as name-like singular terms: 'what is said of a singular [*einzelnen*] subject' says Hegel, 'is itself only something singular (*nur etwas Einzelnes*)' (*SL*: 553; 12: 55). Considered as something like the juxtaposition of two *names*, Hegel's '*Satz*' looks something like what Wittgenstein in places in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* also calls a '*Satz*'—that is, a *Satz*-sign [*Satzzeichen*] considered 'in its projective relation to the world' (Wittgenstein 1922: 3.12). For Wittgenstein's extensionalist approach, the *relata* here were, on the one side, the configuration of the simple signs in the *Satzzeichen*, itself considered as a *state of affairs* and, on the other, 'the configuration of the objects in the state of affairs' *pictured* by the *Satzzeichen* (Wittgenstein 1922: 3.21). While Wittgenstein says that one configuration '*entspricht*', corresponds to, the other, Hegel talks of 'the agreement [*Übereinstimmung*] of representation with the subject matter' (*SL*: 562; 12: 65).[11] However, for Hegel the *Satz* considered in such a projective way is itself neither true nor false, but simply *correct* (*richtig*) or *incorrect* (*unrichtig*), and as the capacity for being *true or false i*s the mark of a judgment, a *Satz*, considered in

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this way, is not a judgment. In short, judgments cannot be fully understood extensionally, in terms of relations among the designata of their referring parts.

For a *Satz* to count as a proper judgment, an *Urteil*, it must be used in more than in a simple reporting sense: specifically, it must form part of a larger piece of inferential reasoning: 'There would be in it an element of judgment', writes Hegel,

> only if one of the circumstances, say, the date of death or the age of the philosopher, came into doubt … In that case, the figures would be taken as something universal, as a time that, even without the determinate content [*bestimmten Inhalt*] of Aristotle's death, would still stand on its own filled with some other content or simply empty. (*SL*: 553; 12: 55–56)

It is in relation to *this* function that the judgment must contain universals,[12] the clear suggestion being that we must be able to think of the predicate 'happening in the fourth year of the 115th Olympiad' not as simply 'naming' a point in time but as an abstract universal capable of being true of (Hegel will say 'subsuming') *diverse* events, allowing it to mediate evidentiary relations among judgments. For Hegel, then, truth and falsity seem to be bound up with inferences, and, as we will see, modal notions, at the most elementary level. But this does not mean that for Hegel there is no place at all for judgments understood extensionally or truth-functionally, as this is what is strongly suggested by the role Hegel gives to judgments that have a 'reflective' structure.

The idea that for the *Satz* to function as a judgment *one* of its terms must express an inference-articulating universal is further exploited in Hegel's treatment of the types of judgment. Hegel first distinguishes judgments of *determinate being* (or 'thereness [*Dasein*]') (*SL*: 557–68; 12: 59–71) from judgments of *reflection* (*SL*: 568–81; 12: 71–84), it being clear that this is a distinction between perceptual and inferentially elicited judgments. The judgment of determinate being in its initial form as a *positive judgment* with two juxtaposed terms seems to approximate a mere *Satz*, but with one of its terms now a universal. Hegel's analysis here, however, is surprising. While we typically think of judgments like 'Gaius is learned' or 'the rose is red' on the model of the predicate expressing something general, *being learned* or *being red*, about some *singular* existent, such as Gaius or some rose, Hegel adopts the opposite analysis. Here the *subject* is 'determined as universal by the predicate' and so *becomes* universal, while the predicate is 'determined in the [singular] subject' and 'is therefore *a singular*' (*SL*: 560; 12: 62).

The singular predicate of the positive judgment of determinate being, such as 'the rose is red',[13] acts in a name-like way to pick out the *particular* redness *inhering* in *some specific rose*—we might say, pointing to a rose before us—*that rose's* particular way of *being* or *looking* red.[14] With the predicate *as* a singular, we will be

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tempted to think of it as expressing something like a Kantian intuition, the referent of which is conceived as an *individual, concrete property instance—this* instance of redness *inhering* in *this* rose. But as predicated *of* the subject, the predicate 'red' *cannot* be simply thought of as semantically simple in that way; it has an *internal* structure that emerges on consideration of the judgment's negative form. The positive judgment 'is *not true* but has its truth in the negative judgment' (*SL*: 562; 12: 64). When one says, for example, 'the rose is *not* red', negation here will only be taken as applying to the *determinateness* of the predicate, such that in saying that the rose is *not* red one does *not* imply that it is not *coloured*.[15] Rather, 'it is … assumed that it has a color, though another color' (*SL*: 565; 12: 68).[16] If a rose *is* red then it is *not* yellow, *not* pink, *not* blue and so on, and if it is *not* red, then it is either yellow *or* pink *or* blue, and so on.[17] This shows that the *meaning* of the predicate in the simple judgment 'the rose is red' cannot be given simply *demonstratively*, nor independently of an account of the types of inferences of exclusion into which that judgment can enter. Moreover, it has modal properties: if some rose *is* (uniformly) red, it is not possible for it to be (uniformly) yellow, or pink, etc. The predicate 'red' at first seemed to function as a type of name or singular term, but it cannot be analysed in this way—it too must be understood as a universal.

Consider now the corresponding subject term of the original positive judgment of determinate being, which was treated as a universal:[18] 'it is thereby posited as the *concrete* – according to the category of being, as a something *of many qualities*; or as the concrete of reflection, *a thing of manifold properties*, an *actual of manifold possibilities*, a *substance* of precisely such *accidents*' (*SL*: 559; 12: 61–62). Again, it is the possibility of the judgment's negation that establishes its status as a proper *Urteil*. When, say in a dispute, one denies that the rose is red, and thereby implies that it is *another* colour, one is tacitly appealing to essential properties of *roses*. In contrast, to deny that the *number two* is red is clearly *not* to imply that it is *either yellow, or pink, or blue*, and so on. The universal *sortal term* 'rose' appearing as part of the subject term here functions to control the array of possible contraries relevant for the predicate, further demonstrating the type of reciprocal determination of subject and predicate terms once they conjoined in the act of judging. This implicit universality of the subject will become explicit later in the *judgment of necessity*, which will be thought as being *about the kind* that had been appealed to in determining the concrete subject term of the judgment of determinate being. To get there, however, we must pass through the opposing form of judgment, the judgment of *reflection* (*SL*: 568; 12: 71).

Judgments of reflection are *subsumptive* judgments, and here the conventional singular-subject, universal-predicate order has been restored, in that the property predicated of the subject is now considered a universal in the standardly abstract sense, that might be *truly said* of a *variety* of different things *across* different

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genuses. 'Red' is truly said of *this rose* just as it is said of a London bus, and beside abstracting away from the *kinds* involved, it abstracts away from the particular *ways* in which the things of which it predicates 'red' instantiate redness. The irrelevance of kind terms in subject place here will mean that its subject term will have the characteristics of a 'bare' singular, allowing a domain of singular unqualified things to be classified under *different* abstract universals with the use of explicit quantification (*SL*: 570–75; 12: 72–77). Via reflective judgments we could thus make judgments such as 'some red things are plants', 'all red things are coloured' and so on. Here predication is conceived along the line of class membership and so is *extensional*. All this, as we have seen, is dependent on some kind of *naming*.

This distinction between judgments characterized by the different *inherence* and *subsumption* forms of predication is now repeated at higher and higher levels, generating an array of increasingly complex judgment types, and ultimately types of syllogisms. In the judgment of necessity, the kind term in the subject dropped in the judgment of reflection now returns as the *explicit referent* of the subject term. Such judgments will be about *essences*. One might say that 'the rose *as such* is a plant' or 'the rose is essentially a plant'. This series of increasingly complex judgment forms will eventually lead to a complex judgment form, the *apodictic judgment*—the final sub-form of the *judgment of the concept*—which is shown to be an implicit syllogism (*SL*: 585–87; 12: 87–89; Redding 2007: 188–89), and Hegel's treatment of judgments thereby transits to his treatment of inferences or syllogisms. With this, the inherent 'inferential' characteristics of the predicates applied in judgments are made explicit.[19]

What we are witnessing in this passage through judgment forms involves a type of alternation back and forth between what Blackburn *et al.* would understand as sentences of simple modal languages on the one hand and their extensional 'classical logic' translations respectively. Hegel seems to envisage this as achieved by a process of *reversing* the relations of subject and predicate. This logical manoeuvre is by no means unknown, Ramsey, for example, noted that 'Socrates is wise' can also be expressed as 'Wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates' (Ramsey 1925: 404), and this manoeuvre can be used by extensionalists as a way around problems within extensionalism. For example, it can be a puzzle how to think of the meaning of sentences about non-existent objects from an extensionalist point of view, as there are no things the properties of which can determine the truth or falsity of the predicate. But by reversing subject and predicate, for example, as with translating 'unicorns do not exist' into, say, 'existence is unicorn-free', there is something ('existence' or the universe) the properties of which can determine the truth or falsity of the judgment.

As in modern modal logics, Hegel thus allows translations to be made between two types of logical structures, but this seems to be done without the

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conception of one of those languages as an ultimate meta-language, as in the conventional Russell-derived analytic approach to modality. Translation is always, we might say, a local affair, and as intensionalism is often defined negatively as the denial of extensionalism, we can consider Hegel to be an intensionalist whose intentionalism accommodates a type of extensionalist dimension within it. And this logical intensionality can now provide him with the logical resources for an *intentional* psychology.

III. Hegel's intensional logic as the infrastructure of his intentional psychology

The paragraphs on Psychology in the *Encyclopaedia* 'Philosophy of Spirit' form the third part of a series of three approaches to the mind, following Anthropology and Phenomenology of Spirit, and, we might ask, *what exactly* is psychology meant to study beyond the phenomena treated in the first two sections? The section 'Anthropology' (*EM*: §§388–412) presents a type of 'externalist' approach to the embodied and located 'natural mind' or 'soul' (*Seele*)—mind 'in itself or immediate' (§387). The orientation is broadly Aristotelian rather than centred on subjective facts of consciousness as in early modern approaches. Next, Phenomenology of Spirit treats spirit as 'for itself' or 'mediated', and formally covers, in an abbreviated way, sections 'A, Consciousness', 'B, Self-Consciousness', and 'C (AA), Reason' from the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*, although 'Reason' here is reduced to a mere two short paragraphs. Hegel describes Phenomenology's subject matter as 'spirit in relationship, or particularization' (§387). Finally, Psychology, in contrast, treats 'spirit as such' (§387Z).

In his commentary on Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Michael Inwood suggests that because the 'natural conclusion' of the 'reason' section of the Phenomenology will be 'socio-political' issues treated in the 1807 *Phenomenology*'s section 'BB: Spirit', Hegel breaks off the *Encyclopaedia* Phenomenology at this point, enabling him to transition to 'the investigation of the mind of the individual that occupies the section on Psychology' (Inwood 2007: note to §438). One might wonder about what exactly is meant to differentiate an approach to *Geist* in its particularity and a study of 'the mind of the individual', and indeed, Inwood notes the 'uneasy relationship between "phenomenology" and "psychology"', also commenting on the role played by consciousness in the latter, while supposedly being the domain of the former. I will suggest another way of understanding the study of 'Psychology', however, that draws a firmer distinction from the topic of Phenomenology and that underlines the *logical* character of Psychology.[20]

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Rather than looking at psychology as concerned with 'the individual mind', we might treat it as focussing on the logical characteristics of the types of 'intentional' capacities dealt with in that section. Here, just as with the progression from the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* to the *Science of Logic*, the consciousness-centered perspective of the former is meant to be left behind, but the continuity with the *Encyclopaedia* Phenomenology's focus on the issues of consciousness and self-consciousness will make *subjective* rather than *objective* logic the relevant framework.[21] As I have suggested, the relations of the subjective logic are specifically *intensional* ones, and as such 'mind' is still *immanent* within these structures, as providing the relevant *centres* from which logical relations are to be grasped. Regarded in *this* way, the relationship of Psychology to the study of natural mind in the Anthropology becomes clearer: where certain features of mindedness appear in the natural world they will obey a logic that is appropriate to nature, and so that is fundamentally *extensional*, but where the same features appear in psychology, they will obey a logic that is primarily *intensional* and subject centred. We can see this at work in relation to the topic of sensation, *Empfindung*, which appears in both sections.

Consider, for example, what seems to be Hegel's version of Aristotle's account of the mind's acquisition of content from the perception-based process of induction (*epagoge*) as sketched in *Posterior Analytics* Book 11, ch. 19.[22] Both Aristotle's and Hegel's treatments crucially involve considerations of temporal processes of retention of sensory material originating in nature, but understanding Hegel's account in terms of his subjective logic allows certain problems in Aristotle to be addressed.

Aristotle states that all animals have perception, but in some animals—clearly humans are meant—percepts are retained in the soul. To capture this he introduces an analogy in which the formation of enduring ideas from transient percepts is modelled on the actions of a group of soldiers who come to 'take a stand' in the context of a rout in a battle. The soldiers are fleeing, but a common stand eventually comes about, first by one soldier taking a stand, then another, then the next, and so on, until 'a position of strength is reached' (Aristotle 1984: 100a1–14). The retreating individual soldiers represent the flow of individual percepts in time, and when the stream of percepts comes to make *its* collective stand in this way 'there is a primitive universal in the mind (for though one perceives the singular [*to kath ekaston*] perception is of the universal—e.g. of man but not of Callias the man)' (Aristotle 1984: 100a15–b1).[23]

In Aristotle's imagery, the fleeing individual soldiers are a disorderly rabble, but they assume a type of collective agency when 'taking a stand'. The group is thus meant to be understood as some kind of concrete universal, and this allows the story to serve as a model for how *a universal* can be formed in the mind from the stream of single percepts from which perception starts. The metaphor is far

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from explanatory, however. There is no real attempt to say why, while it is *singular things*, like *this* man Callias, that are perceived, perception is nevertheless seemingly about universals. Hegel's account of judgments and syllogisms in the Subjective Logic, I suggest, is intended to provide the basic logical materials for such types of explanation, and to this end it will involve positing crucial steps missing but needed in Aristotle: the conversion of the contents of immediate perceptual judgments *qua* naturalistically conceived singulars into elements of *judgments* that can thereby be related to *other* judgments—a process, that, as in the Logic, in turn allows the *development* of the contents of those judgments into properly Aristotelian universals.[24] All this will involve the peculiar 'translations' of judgments into ones of a different logical form, and to see how this might be possible, let us compare Hegel's account of the role of 'recollection' (*Erinnerung*) in the *Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit*, section on Psychology.

There something akin to Aristotle's fleeing percepts coming to take a 'collective stand' is recognizable in Hegel's treatment of the formation of *intuitions* from sensations considered in terms of their *temporal* relations of '*successiveness*, of *arising* and *vanishing*' (*EM*: §448Z). At this sensory starting point in the formation of intuition we are, Hegel says, first '*outside ourselves*, in *spatiality* and *temporality*', '*immersed* in the external material'. This alludes to that naturalistic dimension of sensation that had been treated earlier in the Anthropology. Conceived as occurrences in a body conceived merely as a piece of nature, such sensations simply arise and vanish, but in the context of spirit, they must be somehow *retained*. Here, spirit 'posits the intuition *as its own*. It pervades it, makes it into something *internal*, *recollects itself in it*' and 'by this withdrawal into itself, intelligence raises itself to the state of *representation*' (*EM*: §450Z).[25]

A number of things are clear from Hegel's account. First, Aristotle's fleeing percepts—sensations *naturalistically* conceived—are not to be thought of as, somehow, arresting this flight, regrouping and taking a stand simply *by themselves*, as they are, for example, in the modern idea of the 'association of ideas'. To think of a mental 'representation' as formed in this way would be to think of it as explainable on the basis of the natural features of its parts, and this prioritizes the logic of extensionality over that of intensionality. Rather, the contents must be *posited by spirit* 'as its own'—that is, must belong to an internally related intensional set of relations centered on a subject. 'Intuition is *sublated* in mind, not *vanished,* not *merely passed away*' (*EM*: §450Z). But, next, it becomes apparent in the succeeding paragraphs in the section 'Representation' that central to any individual mind's capacity to retain and, especially, *achieve voluntary control over* past contents in the form of retained *images*, is the capacity to retain a very specific *type* of intuition, *the intuition of names*, which suggests that any individual subject possessing such a capacity already belongs to a linguistic community. 'Sound articulating itself further for determinate representations, speech, and its system,

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language, give to sensations, intuitions, representations a second, higher reality than their immediate one, in general an existence that carries weight in the *realm of representation*' (*EM*: §459). Thus when Hegel says that 'Intelligence … in filling itself with the word, receives into itself the nature of the thing', he has made the linguistic capacity to use names a *condition* of the Aristotelian process of the incorporation into *nous* of a thing's essence or nature in perception—a process that Aristotle seems to treat as a type of natural and immediate taking in.

Given the structure of Hegel's *Encyclopedia* it is difficult to integrate issues that properly belong to *objective spirit*, such as language as a social phenomenon, into the discussion of *subjective spirit*, and this is where it can be advantageous to focus on the specifically *logical* level—to approach the intentional from the point of view of the *intensional*. With this we are able to play on the *modal commonalities* between the *temporal* dimension of Aristotle's army-in-rout model, the metaphorical *explanans*, and the specifically *mental* context of the *explanandum*. Thus we might think that linguistically articulated 'reflective judgments' provide the appropriate means *to link* contents across *different* subjectively construed centres of experience and belief, as found in modern *doxastic* logic, in much the same way that they can be used to link contents across *different temporal contexts,* as in tense logic, or properties across different *kinds* in reflective judgments. It is at this point that we can see the problems being borne by Inwood's assumption that what is being discussed in 'Psychology' is 'the mind of the individual'. Adopting a more explicitly logical focus, we are able think of 'individual minds' as positions or centres within a logically structured set of contents, such that some kind of regular account of the relations between these contents can be thought of in ways analogous to those which we use to think the relations among various times when conceived in the 'intensionalist' way.

Of course there are features of Hegel's Psychology that predispose it to the type of individualistic orientation that Inwood suggests. As we have seen, Hegel transposes material from Anthropology—sensation, for example—to Psychology, resulting in a seemingly 'mentalistic' language suggesting a typically 'Cartesian' or early modern 'subjective' approach of a mind's cognition of its own mental contents. However, the account of the role of 'recognition' in spirit in the preceding 'Phenomenology' has, just as in the 1807 version, radically undermined the idea of any single subjective consciousness understandable in abstraction from its relation to other such consciousnesses. Any 'Cartesian' interpretation of 'subjectivity' here would presuppose a type of *extensional* logical interpretation of the elements of mental processes as fundamental: as in Descartes or Locke, the mind would be thought of as in immediate epistemic contact with a quasi-spatial realm of its own thing-like 'ideas'.

In contrast, we may now approach such intentional notions as 'intuition' from the point of view of logic. From the perspective of one particular centre

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that a subject occupies at any one time, sensory content will come in the form of 'intuitions'—when observing *this rose*, its distinctive *way of being red* will be presented to me in an apparently immediate, and seemingly 'nameable' way. But for a subject with the appropriate cognitive capacities, this experience will be able to be 'translated' into reflective form—a form in which it might be communicated to, or simply attributed to, other subjects, who are not 'here'. But the same translation might make the content available 'later' to myself when I'm no longer able to consult the immediate experience of this rose. That is, the 'intuition' of the rose corresponds to that initially name-like 'singular' predicate that can nevertheless become a universal *via* Hegel's peculiarly iterated *reversals* of subjects and predicates. In short, it is not the contents of an individual mind that are being examined in 'Psychology' but a dynamic field of mind-related phenomena that already include other 'centres' of consciousness.

Here we must be careful, however, as it can appear that with this model we are aspiring to a type of universal God's-eye view of this 'field' with its various subjective centres—a view from nowhere in particular *within* the field. Once more this would seem to revert to a type of extensionalist understanding of the logical relations involved.[26] A better way to understand such an analysis of these logical structures, I suggest, is from within the perspective of what Prior called an 'egocentric logic'. That is, we are to understand the relations within this structure as becoming explicit *from* a point of view which is that of one of the centers or nodes within it.

Prior exemplifies the primitive judgments of such an egocentric logic with the judgment that is an extreme version of a contextualized modal judgment such as 'It is raining'—his example is '*It is paining*'. Just as the tensed expression contains an implicit reference to the 'now' of speaking, the egocentric one contains an implicit reference to the sensory state of the speaker. And just as 'It is raining' can be translated into a tenseless form in a series of steps that goes, say, from 'It is raining' to 'It is raining *now*' to 'It is raining *at time* t^1', so too an analogous *egocentric* judgment might be translated into a non-egocentric one. 'It is paining', might be thought as going to 'It is paining *at me*'—that is, '*I* am in pain', which in turn could be translated to 'It is paining *at a*'—that is, '*Paul* is in pain'. And just as the meaning of 'now' in the tensed sentence could only be understood (as in Hegel's 'determinate negation') in opposition to both past and future 'thens', 'I' might be thought as able to be understood only in relation to an analogous set of oppositions: 'you', 'her', 'we', 'they' and so on. That is, with this system of distinctions between first, second and third 'persons', we might say with Findlay that 'we have practically the materials in them for a formal calculus', allowing a similarly orderly set of transpositions. Thus just as an 'is' becomes a 'was', an 'I' becomes a 'you' when the original 'you' (the spoken to) becomes an 'I' (the speaker), and so on. Moreover, 'I' can become a 'he' or 'she', or the

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referent of a proper name, when spoken about from within some *other* I–you dialogue to which the original 'ego' does not belong.

With this we might now appreciate what is involved in the transition from understanding predicates that *inhere* in grammatical subjects (of judgments of determinate existence) to ones that *subsume* their subjects (of judgments of reflection). In short, one must be able to grasp the equivalence of the egocentric sentence 'I am in pain' said by me, and the assertion 'you are in pain' said *of me* by *you* or 'Paul is in pain' by someone else. But it cannot be simply that when I come to grasp the determinacy of 'I am in pain', I am merely coming to learn something that is true *of me* prior to and independently of my coming to grasp it.[27] To think that the allocentric third-person 'Paul is in pain' captures the *proper meaning* of the original egocentric assertion, that is, captures it in a non-egocentric metalanguage, is akin to thinking that the *non*-tensed 'Socrates is sitting at noon' captures the complete meaning of the simple *tensed* sentence 'Socrates is sitting'. Prior had refused the metaphysical idea of time as a sequence of self-subsistent temporal entities that can come to be named and subsumed under abstract universals, and similarly we might think of Hegel as having rejected the analogous assumption of a *pre-existing self-sufficient cognitive subject* (an 'ego') with determinate contents waiting, as it were, to be similarly named and described.[28]

Nevertheless, as Prior had realized, there is a need in egocentric logic to achieve an analogue to the 'naming' of temporal points in tense logic. Just as some way of referring to individual points of time had prompted the creation of *hybrid logic*, similarly, he had hinted at the possibility of egocentric logic being analogously extended to incorporate the means for individuating and 'naming' subjects considered as *reflected out of* the relational system to which they otherwise belonged, including their relations to specific others. Of course, spatio-temporal *bodies* can be named, but we need a way that links this naming to a conception of such bodies as 'centres' of subjective points of view.

Prior had explicitly linked this latter idea to Leibniz's notion of the *complete concept* of an individual—an idea he interpreted as the totality of beliefs true *only* for that person: 'Each person is identified by a set of propositions which describe the world as it is from his point of view, i.e., by the set of propositions which are true when said by him; by any single proposition which is true *only* when said by him' (Prior and Fine 1977: 59). If a person could in principle be so identified, this of course allows that person herself to conceive of herself 'objectively' as the singular being she takes herself to be, in abstraction from the relations in which she stands to others, on the one hand, and her merely bodily spatio-temporal particularity, on the other.

All this, I suggest, is something like what we might expect from the perspective of Hegel's account of the recognitive conditions of self-consciousness found in the *Philosophy of Right* (*PR*)—an expanded version of the treatment of

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'objective spirit' in the *Encyclopaedia*. Here the 'inherence' and 'subsumption' modes of predication would correspond to the different ways in which an 'I''s could belong to a 'we'.[29] Such relationality, in which *the I* first achieves a perspective from 'within the relational structure', might be thought of as that of the family—the context within which humans first acquire cognitive contents (*PR*: §§158–81). There, any role-switching personal pronouns would work *within* a network of holistically defined relationships such as 'father of', 'sister of', 'son of' and so on. In immediate forms of objective spirit like the family, an individual's beliefs will always presuppose a common background of shared beliefs. But there is another force working towards the dissolution of such fixed relationships (the dissolution of 'immediate *Sittlichkeit*') and towards their replacement by a different system centred on the subject conceived abstractly in terms of being bearers of *their own* individual theoretical and practical beliefs. This is the system typified for Hegel by the form of recognition found in modern *civil society* (*PR*: §§182–88).

In the sphere of civil society, the person appears abstracted from their relations to others in their family. Here the *metaphysical* idea of a person is more likely to appear as something like an *individual* bearer of particular epistemic and practical 'commitments', the contents of which that person can be judged to be rationally entitled or unentitled.[30] So identified a subject here appears as an individuated analogue of Kant's 'transcendental unity of apperception'. But in Hegel's logical approach, interpreted on the model of Prior's 'hybrid' extension of egocentric logic, this way of conceiving of an individual self will be *an outgrowth* of some earlier, *relationally constituted* self, rather than that self's ahistorical essential nature. And the individual self's reflective commitments will always be understood against a background of those immediate forms of pre-reflexively shared contents that have their home in the family-like networks to which they must also belong.

I started with the idea that any attempt to reconstruct Hegel's philosophy of mind must face two desiderata: that of giving an account of the types of cognitive capacities and experiences that Hegel thinks are achievable by the mind, and that of conceiving any individual mind as in some way determined by the position within which it exists within the larger context of spirit. Using some of the tools of modal logic might allow us to think of minds in terms of their intentional contents, contents that can be linked to the world only via the means that allow them to be linked to other minds that can share them. But this should not be surprising, given the fact that Hegel himself seems to use just such tools in his own subjective logic.[31]

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Notes

[1] As is often noted, Hegel nowhere develops any systematic 'philosophy of language', but were he to do so, it would presumably best be treated in the context of objective spirit. However, as will be seen, it seems clear that Hegel takes belonging to a linguistic community as a condition of the possession of the capacities discussed in the context of *subjective* spirit.

[2] For a systematic consideration of the *intensional-intentional* relation relevant to philosophy of mind, see Zalta 1988.

[3] This occurred especially with the interation of operators, requiring intuitions about *the possibility* of *the possibility* of such and such, and so on.

[4] In his logic, Royce had been influenced by Peirce.

[5] Findlay would later describe himself as having been 'pushed by Wittgenstein's influence in directions that he [Wittgenstein] would not have sanctioned, but which coincided in part with my own original Hegelianism' (Findlay 1985: 32).

[6] In the Subjective Logic Hegel effectively classifies this judgment as an instance of the 'positive judgment' of determinate being, which is really a *Satz* rather than a judgment. His example there is 'now is day [*jetzt ists Tag*]' (*SL*: 562; 12: 64. With all references to *SL*, the numbers following initial page number are to volume and page of Hegel's *Gesammelte Werke*.) Abbreviations:

PR = *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. A. W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

SL = *The Science of Logic*, trans. G. di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

PhG = *Phenomenology of Spirit,* trans. A. V. Miller, with analysis of the text and foreword by J. N. Findlay. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

EM = *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind,* translated from the 1830 Edition, together with the *Zusätze* by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller, with revisions and commentary by M. Inwood. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

[7] Thus '*p*' in the new sentence is not a proposition capable of truth or falsity, but a *predicate* or, what Russell called a *propositional function*.

[8] Of particular relevance here is the paper 'Tense Logic and the Logic of Earlier and Later' in Prior (2003: 117–38). On the topic of hybrid logic, see Blackburn *et al.* (2001: ch. 7.3). The equivalent development from Hegel's perspective concerns the recognition of the inadequacies of the traditional Aristotelian syllogistic, limited to picking out individuals as *particular* instances of kinds, to a syllogistic enhanced with the resources of *singular terms*, as they had been added in the medieval period. It is only thus that Hegel can treat the 'moments' of the concept as 'universal', 'particular' *and* 'singular'. Cf. Hegel's discussion of the three moments of 'the concept' (*SL*: 530–49; 12: 33–52).

[9] This is akin to thinking of a definite description as functioning as a name. Cf. 'The day on which a human first stood at the South Pole'. This effectively is analogous to the way that medieval Aristotelians used the universal form of judgment to work as an analogue for the singular judgments that had no real place in the Aristotelian syllogistic, a device later exploited by Leibniz.

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[10] Hegel's use of '*Satz*' is often translated as 'proposition', and while the German term can be translated in either way, at least here Hegel seems to mean the linguistic item.

[11] Here Hegel is referring to the initial form of the judgment of existence, the positive judgment, which is as yet not truly a judgment, but only a *Satz*.

[12] Cf. 'It can also be mentioned in this context that a *sentence* [*Satz*] can indeed have a subject and predicate in a grammatical sense without however being a *judgment* [*Urteil*] for that. The latter requires that the predicate behave with respect to the subject in a relation of conceptual determination, hence as a universal with respect to a particular or singular' (*SL*: 552–3; 12: 55; translation modified). For Hegel it is a *sentence* that has a subject and predicate, not the thought or judgment it expresses.

[13] Hegel switches between the examples 'the rose is red' and 'the rose is fragrant'. For simplicity's sake, I will keep to the former. No logical point hangs on the difference between examples.

[14] Cf. '"The rose is fragrant". This fragrance is not some indeterminate fragrance or other, but the fragrance of the rose. The predicate is therefore *a singular*' (*SL*: 560; 12: 62).

[15] 'From the side of this universal sphere, the judgment is still positive' (*SL*: 565; 12: 68).

[16] Here Hegel draws on features of the logical structure of perceptual judgments later pointed out by the Cambridge logician and Russell-critic, W. E. Johnson, when he called such predicates the *determinants* of some general *determinable*. Johnson 1921: Ch. 11). Prior notes the non-extensionality of this relation in Prior (1968: 94–95).

[17] Moreover, what counts as a determinable of any entity depends upon what *sort* of entity it is. While numbers can be characterized as either odd or even, but not as either red, or blue, or yellow, or …, roses can be characterised as either red, or blue, or yellow, or …, but not as either odd or even.

[18] The rule that one of the terms of the judgment must be universal means that *if* the *predicate* is treated as a singular term, then the subject *must* be treated as a universal. Otherwise it would be a mere *Satz* rather than an *Urteil*.

[19] See especially the work of Robert Brandom—for example (2014).

[20] Inwood also maintains Wallace's earlier translation of *'Geist'* by 'mind', adding an individualistic gloss to the whole discussion.

[21] It may be significant here that the *Encyclopaedia* Phenomenology of Spirit breaks off at the point that, according to Eckart Förster, Hegel had initially intended to terminate the 1807 *Phenomenology*—the intended work to be named 'Science of the Experience of Consciousness' (Förster 2012: 354–56).

[22] For a fuller examination of this see Redding (2016).

[23] While the translators give 'particular' here, I follow Whitaker who claims that 'Aristotle's own terms, "singular" [*kath ekaston*] and "partial" [*en meresi*], are used clearly and consistently' (Whitaker 1996: 89).

[24] I have examined this in greater detail in Redding (2016).

[25] As Findlay had put it in his book on Hegel: 'In the Time of Nature, [Hegel] holds, only the present moment is real: only in the Time of Spirit can the Past be spread out in memory, or the Future projected in expectation or hope' (Findlay 1958: 275).

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[26] This, I suggest, is somewhat like Leibniz's view of God's knowledge.

[27] Thus Wittgenstein pointed to different object-determining and subject-expressing uses of the first person pronoun (Wittgenstein 1958: 66–67).

[28] This non-reducible character of the egocentric sentence is stressed in Prior (2003: 27–37).

[29] I have argued for a version of this thesis in Redding (1996: ch. 9).

[30] The model is, of course, that of being entitled to the things *one owns*. This is the way that Brandom tends to think of a subject's relation to their theoretical and practical beliefs.

[31] An earlier version of this paper was presented to the *Hegel Society of Great Britain* conference in Oxford, in September 2015. I'm grateful to the many helpful comments and criticisms received there, in particular from Katerina Deligiori, Markus Gabriel and Stephen Houlgate. I also benefited from helpful feedback from Eckart Förster and Terry Pinkard as well as from two anonymous readers for the Hegel Bulletin.

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