prepared to cast his net wider than many when looking at trends in ethical reflection. He is keen, for example, to include poets and dramatists at least as signs of the times, if not active contributors to the discussion. G. has also made a brave attempt to tell the story of an ethical idea through most of antiquity which, for the most part, bypasses Plato and Aristotle, the two philosophers with whom much modern study of ancient ethical thought begins and ends.

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METAPHOR AND ALLEGORY

G. R. Boys-Stones (ed.): *Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition. Ancient Thought and Modern Revisions*. Pp. x + 305. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Cased, £45. ISBN: 0-19-924005-1.

Emerging from a seminar on metaphor and allegory held at Corpus Christi College Oxford in 1997, this collection of eleven essays plus introduction is considerably more than a commemoration of that event. It proposes to 'contribute to a fairer picture of classical approaches to language' and to do so 'by considering philosophical approaches to allegory next to rhetorical discussions of metaphor, and by placing studies of classical theory alongside analyses of literary practice that draw on the terms of contemporary theory' (pp. 4–5). This summary goes a fair way toward characterizing the disparate but fascinating contents, hinting as well at the editor's agenda. It also points to some real differences that qualify, if they do not spoil, the apparent symmetry of the book's two parts, one devoted to metaphor and the other to allegory.

Metaphor and allegory, if they belong together at all, do so as two tropes, that is, two strategies of self-consciously ornamented texts, as variously defined by ancient rhetoricians. Metaphor (the seminal discussion of which in Aristotle antedates its definition as, and reduction to, a rhetorical trope) has, thanks in large part to Roman Jakobson, had a rich history in twentieth-century theorizing about literature and about language itself. Allegory, on the other hand, was a trope from the day the term was coined (probably in the first century B.C.E.). The term was virtually never, in the polytheist traditions of antiquity, used to refer to the allegorical *interpretation* of texts—which may legitimately be said to be co-extensive with the interpretation of texts *tout court* (see e.g. Laird, p. 174)—and which, as Mark Edwards discreetly observes, 'had no dominant affinity with metaphor' (p. 236). It is allegory in this last sense that is the subject of all of the essays in the second section of this book. In contrast to metaphor, allegory (both the trope and the strategy of interpretation that invokes it) has in fact generated little memorable theorizing, ancient or modern—the major ancient (polytheist) exception to be found in the Neoplatonist Proclus, and a twentieth-century exception perhaps in the young Walter Benjamin.

Boys-Stones in his introduction insists that we must especially beware of the narrow, reductive treatments of allegory in the rhetorical writers, because theorizing on allegory 'began with the philosophers', while allegory itself 'always remained . . . a philosopher's tool' (p. 3). This claim strikes me as indefensible, and in fact it is undermined by at least one of the contributions to this collection (Donald Russell's—see below). It is consistent, however, with the view of ancient philosophical tradition developed in B.-S.'s *Post-Hellenistic Philosophy* (Oxford, 2001; see the review by Harold Tarrant, *BMCR* 2002.02.03). That view is in turn characterized by an

https://doi.org/10.1093/cr/54.2.427 Published online by Cambridge University Press

inclination to focus relentlessly on the peripheral and the irrational—admittedly, elements of later polytheist philosophy more colorful than the training in math and logic, the hard intellectual discipline that never ceased to be the basis of the credibility of school philosophy. The philosophical schools of the Roman empire notoriously incorporated into philosophical education modes of pursuing the truth that must strike us as violations of any conceivable commitment to reason and to logic. We need, though, to keep those new modes of inquiry in perspective and B.-S. seems bent on destroying precisely that critically important perspective. When we are told, for instance, that the later Stoics' discovery of comparative mythology was an insight whose importance 'cannot be exaggerated', generating 'an approach to the allegorical exegesis of mythology which had been adopted into the heart of Platonism within two generations of Cornutus' death' (pp. 203–4), hyperbole is (despite the explicit denial) the dominant trope. If Plotinus represents mainline Platonic philosophy a century after this 'adoption'—the 'heart of Platonism' seems to be the second-century Pythagorean Numenius—no further demonstration is needed of the weakness of this account of the development of middle Platonism than Plotinus' indifference to allegory and to myth.

The first essay, by Doreen Innes, 'Metaphor, Simile, and Allegory as Ornaments of Style' (pp. 7–27) is a valuable survey of just what the editor's introduction would seem to exclude here: the specifically rhetorical stylistic treatment of the two tropes.

'Part I: Metaphor' opens with Christopher G. Leidl, 'The Harlot's Art: Metaphor and Literary Criticism' (pp. 31–54). Leidl realizes one of the book's stated goals by rejecting traditional rhetorical definitions of metaphor in favor of modern 'metaphorology', with its contextual expansiveness. His contribution is sometimes eloquent, but in the end distressingly provisional, with a final paragraph incorporating no less than six questions, to close with an assertion of the impossibility of any 'single comprehensive theory' of metaphor. E. E. Pender's valuable contribution ('Plato on Metaphors and Models', pp. 55–81) brings recent theorizing on the cognitive dimensions of metaphor to a discussion of the status of *eikones* and *paradeigmata* in Plato. She concentrates on the issues raised in *Statesman* 277–9, contextualizing, but ultimately backing away from, M. S. Lane's assertion that Plato here implies 'that example constitutes a path from true belief to knowledge' (*Method and Politics in Plato's* Statesman [Cambridge, 1998], p. 63). Paul Crowther's 'Literary Metaphor and Philosophical Insight: The Significance of Archilochus' (pp. 83–100) consists of two awkwardly joining parts: a meditation on the phenomenology of metaphor (demonstrating nicely Merleau-Ponty's relevance here), followed by a discussion of Archilochus fr. 196a West, which fails to deliver a payoff commensurate with its theoretical introduction. In 'The Problem of Metaphor: Chinese Reflections', (pp. 101–14), Geoffrey Lloyd turns with characteristic lucidity to ancient Chinese thought as a field in which to attack the notion that the literal/metaphorical dichotomy (here viewed as Aristotle's 'invention') has the universality commonly attributed to it. Michael Silk's 'Metaphor and Metonymy: Aristotle, Jakobson, Ricoeur, and Others' (pp. 115–47) closes the section on metaphor with an assault on a long tradition of theorizing. The failure of Jakobson's and Ricoeur's theories of metaphor, whose inadequacies are rooted in Aristotle's failure to make essential distinctions within what he designated as *metaphora*, is closely bound up with the three thinkers' willingness 'to trade on poetic usage, and yet to ignore poetic usage as well' (p. 146).

There is food for thought and something to be learned from all of these richly theoretical essays on metaphor. By contrast, 'Part II: Allegory' is a little disappointing.

Andrew Laird ('Figures of Allegory from Homer to Latin Epic', pp. 151–75) starts from the Augustans (Virgil included) on Homer to demonstrate that 'Homer can be

intelligently and automatically [?] conceived as allegory' (p. 165). Further, allegory 'boils down' to interpretation, while 'interpretation amounts to allegorization' (p. 174), observations which, while quite defensible, do not get us much closer to a clear understanding of just what constitutes allegory. Finally, an undeveloped citation of Benjamin brings us to the conclusion that 'allegory is . . . an essential feature of *any* text' (p. 175). The nature of that 'essential feature', however, is left vanishingly vague.

Dirk Obbink follows with a new and somewhat misleading claim on behalf of a much-abused late-fourth century B.C.E. document of considerable notoriety: 'Allegory and Exegesis in the Derveni Papyrus: The Origin of Greek Scholarship' (pp. 177–88). His conclusion that 'the earliest form of scholarly exegesis in the Greek tradition' (p. 188) is to be found in the Derveni commentator's deconstruction of Orphic poetry exaggerates the importance of an accident of preservation.

The editor's contribution ('The Stoics' Two Types of Allegory', pp. 189–216) reopens an issue raised by A. A. Long in his 1992 essay 'Stoic Readings of Homer' (reprinted in his *Stoic Studies* [Cambridge, 1996], pp. 58–84). Long distinguished 'strong' allegory (Spenser, Bunyan) from 'weak' allegory (the story of Pandora's box in Hesiod), and did so along the lines of authorial intention. He did this in the service of showing that the early Stoics (contrary to hostile testimony and received opinion) did not treat Homer as a 'strong' allegorist. B.-S. explores Cornutus for evidence and clarification of both of these 'types', ingeniously proposing that Posidonius' revision of Stoic anthropology might have marked the watershed. Specifically, if primitive man might be seen as needing (and so, producing) philosophers, then the prehistoric 'mythoplasts' might be seen as philosophers encoding messages. The real difference between his paper and Long's, however, lies in the shift of emphasis I pointed to earlier. Whereas Long set out to refute allegations of Stoic intellectual dishonesty (or naivety) stemming from their supposed misuse of ancient poetic texts (a matter of peripheral interest in Stoic philosophy, but conspicuous in anti-Stoic polemic), B.-S. sees in the embracing of the reading of early poetry as 'strong' allegory a shift fundamentally altering the relationships of Stoics—and in turn Platonists—to these texts. In the process, he would have us believe, something essential to the nature of their philosophizing changed as well.

But where, then, are the philosophical allegorists or allegorizing philosophers so central to Stoicism and Platonism? B.-S. presents Cornutus as exhibit number one, and it may be unfair to note here that the work in question was written for a *paidion* (1.1). Donald Russell's contribution, 'The Rhetoric of the *Homeric Problems*' (pp. 217–34), helps to put the rôle of allegory in ancient intellectual culture into clearer perspective. He proposes to ask whether the Heraclitus of the *Homeric Problems* is to be read as a grammarian, a rhetor, or a philosopher. Russell's survey of the rhetorical strategies and ornaments of the essay will leave few readers in doubt. This collector of allegorical readings, who passes (for lack of more vigorous intellectual competition) for a major ancient theorist of allegory, writes as a denizen of the schools of rhetoric rather than philosophy.

The collection closes with Mark Edwards' dazzling attempt to take seriously and to integrate into a sympathetic reading of Origen the theologian the 'one point' that 'hardly any scholar or theologian finds it possible to approve of' (p. 235), namely his scriptural exegesis ('Origen on Christ, Tropology, and Exegesis', pp. 235–56). Structurally, then, Edwards' project recalls A. A. Long's defensive analysis of Stoic hermeneutics, with the caveat (mine) that theology, like rhetoric, is something other than philosophy. Edwards' discourse—as that of a Christian theologian addressing theologians about theology—is inevitably isolated in this volume, but he delivers an

intellectual *tour de force* that may be admired from beyond the pale delineated by its fundamental postulates.

That this essay should conclude this volume says a great deal about the challenge of B.-S.'s agenda to the received accounts of the evolution of ancient philosophy. A philosophical tradition that had in fact undergone the sort of transformation he describes, and had embraced as a central commitment the elucidation of truths couched in the enigmatic language of old stories and poems, would be a tradition ripe for absorption into the scripturalism and irrationalism of the monotheisms. That, however, is another story, and one that needs to be assessed on its own merits.

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ANCIENT ETHICS

S. EVERSON: *Ethics. Companions to Ancient Thought 4*. Pp. vii + 300. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Paper, £15.95 (Cased, £45). ISBN: 0-521-38832-5 (0-521-38161-4 hbk).

This book follows the general formula of the Cambridge Companion series, and nicely supplements the other 'Ancient Thought' volumes edited by Stephen Everson (*Epistemology*, *Psychology*, *Language*). It contains scholarly treatments of the most recent noteworthy issues in the professional study of Ancient Greek ethics. It spans the Pre-Socratic, Classical and Hellenistic periods, with articles on Pre-Platonic Ethics, Plato, Aristotle, Epicureans, Skeptics, and Stoics. The contributors are pre-eminent in their respective fields, and include, along with E., Charles Kahn, C. C. W. Taylor, John McDowell, David Sedley, T. H. Irwin, Julia Annas, and Susan Suavé Meyer. There is no pre-established unifying theme to the book—topics range over happiness, justice, metaphysics, human nature, psychology, physics, and responsibility—but there is some concentration around themes to be found in Aristotle, who is the focus of three of the book's nine chapters. The emphasis on Aristotle is representative of current trends in ancient philosophy: Aristotle is seen as the culmination of classical ethics, a philosopher who draws together the diverse strands of previous popular and philosophical tradition and systematizes them (as far as possible) into a single ethical outlook. Although the Hellenists (Sceptics excepted) augment and innovate, particularly in the area of moral psychology, the fundamental place of virtue, *eudaimonia*, and knowledge in their ethics cannot be fully understood except in the light of Aristotle. E.'s *Ethics* presents a sample of the specialized secondary literature in ancient ethics, and is suitable primarily for graduate students and academics.

The introduction of the book concerns the relation between morality and ethics, and the question whether the ancient Greeks had a concept of morality or not. There are two comparisons of special interest here, one between ancient ethics and (a form of) Kantian moral theory, and the other a comparison between ancient theories of motivation and Hume. E. argues that the ancient Greeks did have, and were better off for having, a concept of morality (as identifiable in categorical moral reasons and altruism). He then further argues that the Greeks had a more nuanced view of motivation than some moderns, according to which reason can be seen as involved in proposing ends and not simply calculating means of action. These discussions represent current debates in Ethics generally, and readers will find plenty to argue about. E.'s choice to focus on themes relevant to contemporary ethics reflects an

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