

and eight others. Many asylums have no pathological laboratory or staff to work therein, but combinations of groups of asylums might yield valuable clinical observations, if working on a systematic basis. When the medical staff of the Board of Control overtakes its routine work and has any spare energy, this might be well employed in considering the numerous clinical problems which demand solution, and in suggesting the methods by which they could be attacked.

Information concerning all that affects the health of the nation will probably be greatly in demand when the war is over, and such questions may come to occupy popular and Parliamentary attention in place of the squabbles of party politics, which have so long led to the neglect of these and many other important national needs.

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*An Introduction to Social Psychology.* By WILLIAM McDougall, F.R.S.Lond. Methuen & Co. Ninth edition, 1915. Pp. 431. 8vo. Price 5s. net.

The interest aroused by this volume is sufficiently shown by the fact that it is now in its ninth edition. It was originally published in 1908, and several of the subsequent editions have been revised, the present one containing an additional chapter on the sex instinct. The work is that of an original thinker, and it has been successful in stimulating a good deal of discussion, and it has undoubtedly exerted a considerable influence upon contemporary psychological thought.

The aim of the author is indicated in the introduction. He wishes to present psychology—in a living and practical form—from a standpoint which may serve as a firm foundation for the study of the various social sciences. It is obvious that for these latter to be of any value, they must be based upon an adequate knowledge of the working of the human mind. Unfortunately, however, in some instances elaborate systems of philosophy have been erected upon entirely false psychological assumptions, and in others the writers have made the frank avowal that no knowledge of psychology is necessary for an understanding of these subjects. This indifference towards, or ignorance of, psychology has been undoubtedly in some measure due to the academic and lifeless treatment of the subject in the past, so that the current literature has been of but little assistance to students of the allied sciences. The mere classification of conscious states throws but little light on those social sciences which deal with human conduct, in so far as such a method largely ignores the ultimate motives by which such conduct is determined. Dr. McDougall urges that for psychology to attain the position of a positive science it should not be purely introspective and descriptive, but it must be an “evolutionary natural history of the mind,” and it must, above all, deal with those innate fundamental tendencies of the mind which regulate human activities.

The main thesis of the author, a thesis vigorously and convincingly maintained throughout the book, is that human conduct is determined by innate conative dispositions (instincts), and that the intellect acts only in the service of these instincts as a means of attaining the ends to which they are directed. Such a thesis is, of course, directly opposed

to that intellectualism which regards man as an essentially reasoning and logical animal. This school would maintain that the intellect is an active tendency, an innate independent impulse in man, and practically an instinct itself. It is hardly the function of the reviewer to discuss the merits of these opposing schools of thought, but certainly those who are acquainted with modern developments in the sphere of morbid psychology would find considerable difficulty in the following teaching of intellectualism. It is interesting to note how morbid psychologists, approaching the subject from a different angle to Dr. McDougall, have been able to demonstrate to what a great extent thought, judgment, conduct, and belief, in both normal and abnormal persons, are controlled by primitive undercurrents of feeling of which they are entirely unconscious.

The chapters devoted to a consideration of the nature of instincts, and their classification, are particularly clear, and the author presents the subject from an original point of view, which is a marked advance on that found in most discussions upon it. Instinct is regarded by most writers as an innate tendency to certain kinds of action. Dr. McDougall, however, thinks that instincts are more than this; he regards every instinctive action as the outcome of a distinctly mental process which includes, like every other mental process, cognitive, conative, and affective elements. An emotion is no more than the affective side of the instinctive process, and each instinct has a specific emotion—primary emotion—as, for instance, the instinct of flight and the emotion of fear. This threefold treatment of instincts renders the subject free from confusion and ambiguity. The relation between instinct and emotion had not previously been stated in this explicit manner. Even James, who recognises the intimate relation between the two conditions, is somewhat perplexing as to the exact connection between the two. He says: "Emotions, however, fall short of instincts, in that the emotional reaction terminates in the subject's own body, whilst the instinctive reaction is apt to go farther, and enter into practical relations with the existing object." Thus the student gains a vague opinion that an emotion is almost an instinct, but not quite. This clear definition of the nucleus which determines conduct is important, as it enables the reader to follow its development without difficulty. The cognitive aspect expands into the developed intellect, the primitive conative impulse exhibits itself in increasing complexities of conduct, and the emotions develop into organised systems or sentiments.

Having defined and enumerated the various instincts, consideration is given to certain innate tendencies which, though of great importance for social life, cannot properly be classed as instincts, as their modes of action are of a varied character and are not directed towards any specific ends. The most important of these non-specific tendencies are sympathy, suggestion, and imitation,—processes of special importance to social life as they contribute so largely to the formation of the collective mind of organised society. This question of collective mental processes is discussed more fully in the second part of the book. The theme is difficult and elusive, but one of great interest and importance. The present epoch should afford abundant material for a detailed

study of this question. The notion of a national consciousness, implying the existence of a national will to pursue common ideals, has now presented itself, as never before, in a particularly clear-cut manner. One may, perhaps, hope that Dr. McDougall, who is so prominently associated with the theory of the "Collective Mind," may at some future date enlarge on this notion with special reference to antagonisms of national minds.

The remaining chapters of Part I are devoted to a study of the development of these primitive instincts into more complex forms. The author traces the organisation of emotional dispositions into sentiments, and demonstrates the importance of these for the character and conduct of individuals and societies. He next passes to a consideration of the growth of self-consciousness, tracing the effect of the social environment upon instinctive conduct, how it becomes modified into conduct regulated by notions of rewards and punishments, then conduct controlled by anticipation of social praise and blame, and lastly conduct based on a personal ideal of right and wrong. Finally he presents the question of volition in an original and striking form.

The second part is devoted to a consideration of the principal ways in which the instincts play their part in shaping the social life, and in determining the forms of institutions and of social organisations. These chapters deal with problems of vital importance to social life of the present day. As an instance, the section devoted to the reproductive and parental instincts may be mentioned, in which the writer deals with the weakening of these instincts by increased culture and the habit of independent thought and action. This and other questions are dealt with in an illuminating and instructive manner which merits the attention of all those interested in social sciences, either from a practical or an academic standpoint.

In the first supplementary chapter the author expresses in a more explicit form the theory of action which underlies his exposition of instincts and their development, and he combats the theory of psychological hedonism upon which the Utilitarian system of ethics has been founded. He thus develops his main thesis that conduct is not determined by the motive of avoiding pain and increasing pleasure, but, rather, springs from primary tendencies rooted in man, and in the remote ancestry of the race.

The chapter on the sex instinct will be read with interest in view of the prominence which has recently been given to this subject. It contains a criticism of Freud's sexual theory.

Altogether this book is the work of an acute and original thinker. The subject is one of considerable interest and importance to the psychiatrist, and its treatment in this volume might well form the groundwork for a study of the problems of mental disorder. Instances, indeed, might actually be cited in which the application of Dr. McDougall's conceptions have been productive of interesting studies in individual cases of insanity.

H. D.