

A Gender Gap in Party Congruence and Responsiveness?

Benjamin Ferland 

University of Ottawa

Congruence and responsiveness between the policy preferences of citizens and elites are considered key characteristics of democracy. Although these relationships between citizens and elites have been thoroughly examined, little attention has been devoted to differences in the representation of women and men in studies of congruence and responsiveness. Herein, I evaluate the presence of a gender gap both in terms of party congruence and party responsiveness with respect to the relationship between female and male supporters and the party they voted for. In addition, I examine whether the presence of elected women in parties decreases the gender gap in party congruence and responsiveness. My analyses of the data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and several national elections studies indicate that parties are generally as close and as responsive to the preferences of male supporters as to those of female supporters on the left–right ideological scale. However, the presence of elected women in parties favors women’s representation and may thus reduce inequality in gender representation.

Keywords: Women’s representation, party congruence, party responsiveness

Congruence between the policy preferences of citizens and elites is considered a key characteristic of democracy (Pitkin 1967; Powell 2000). Scholars have thus devoted a great deal of attention to this aspect of representation and to the factors that may favor good correspondence between citizen preferences and those of elites. Importantly, whether citizens are adequately represented can be examined at different stages of the democratic process, for example, in the party system, the legislature, the government, as well as enacted policies (Golder and Ferland 2017).

Four years ago, I completed a PhD at McGill University under the supervision of Elisabeth Gidengil. To thank her for her invaluable support and dedication during this project, I made the promise at that time to work on an aspect of the gender gap in politics – a question at the heart of her academic commitment. I am now proud to fulfill this promise with this publication. Thank you, Elisabeth. I also thank Matt Golder and the journal reviewers for their helpful comments.

Published by Cambridge University Press 1743-923X/19 \$30.00 for The Women and Politics Research Section of the American Political Science Association.

© The Women and Politics Research Section of the American Political Science Association, 2019
doi:10.1017/S1743923X18000818

Moreover, the concept of congruence can be examined from different perspectives, such as the correspondence between the preferences of citizens as a whole or a group of citizens (e.g., party supporters) and those of individual representatives, parties, or governments (Golder and Stramski 2010).

Among the different approaches to congruence, here I have considered the relationship between voters (i.e., supporters) and the party they support given a party's crucial role of integrating and representing citizen preferences throughout the policy-making process. Many scholars have examined the correspondence between voter preferences and their party positions and have found generally reasonable levels of congruence (Costello, Thomassen, and Rosema, 2012; Dalton 1985, 2015). Although congruence between citizens and elites is considered an important criterion for assessing the quality of democracy, it represents mostly a static picture of the connection between citizens and elites. Indeed, citizens and parties may change positions. For this reason, scholars have also considered the dynamic relationship between the preferences of citizens and parties and have found parties (mostly mainstream parties) to be responsive to changes in public opinion (Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow et al. 2011; Ferland 2018; Lehrer 2012). Studies of congruence and responsiveness thus depict mostly positive functioning of representative democracies, wherein party positions are generally close to those of their supporters and parties respond to changes in the preferences of the latter.

Little attention has been devoted to the study of gender inequality in terms of the congruence and responsiveness between citizens and elites (Bernauer, Giger, and Rosset 2015; Dingler, Kroeber, and Fortin-Rittberger 2018; Homola, 2017). Several studies on gender representation have examined the descriptive (Kittilson 2006; Krook and O'Brien 2015; Tremblay 2008) and substantive (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Swers 1998; Thomas 1991) representation of women. These gender studies, however, do not directly compare women's and men's positions on policy issues and the corresponding positions of elites. Rather, they generally consider whether the presence of elected women influences the policy agendas or the implementation of female-oriented policies. Although these are important issues with respect to women's representation, they do not directly indicate whether a gender gap exists in terms of party congruence and responsiveness.

This article addresses this gap in the literature with an evaluation of the presence of a gender gap both in terms of party congruence and party responsiveness, that is, the relationship between *female and male supporters* and the party they voted for. This approach is different than

considering the relationship between parties and the *median voter*. I sought to determine whether there is a relationship between the descriptive and substantive representation of women. Building on gender research and the politics of presence (Phillips 1998), which claims that the presence of women is necessary to represent women, I expect women to be generally less represented by political parties both in terms of congruence and responsiveness given women's lack of descriptive representation in political institutions (Kittilson 2006; Krook and O'Brien 2015; Tremblay 2008). However, I expect this gender gap to decrease as the proportion of elected women in a party increases. To test these claims, I used data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and several national elections studies to locate the positions of citizens and parties on a common left–right ideological scale in 16 advanced democracies over the 1973–2013 period. Ultimately, the presence of women in a party favors women's representation. In cases with a small proportion of elected women, parties seem closer and more responsive to male than to female supporters. As the proportion of elected women increases, however, this gender gap disappears and even turns toward the women's advantage. On average, parties are generally as close and as responsive to the preferences of male supporters as to those of female supporters. No inequality in the party representation of men and women across parties is apparent, even if a gender gap exists in some parties.¹

PARTY CONGRUENCE AND RESPONSIVENESS

This analysis begins with the conceptualization of party congruence and responsiveness discussed in the associated literature. As underlined by Golder and Stramski (2010), congruence between the preferences of citizens and elites can be examined from different perspectives. Here, I focused on the relationship between citizens (i.e., supporters) and parties. An alternative, for example, would be to examine the relationship between citizens and governments (Blais and Bodet 2006; Ferland 2016; McDonald, Mendes, and Budge 2004; Powell 2009) or even individual representatives (Gerber and Lewis 2004; Stadelmann, Portmann, and Eichenberger 2012). Party representation is important to consider given the important role of parties in parliamentary democracies in structuring and integrating citizen preferences into the democratic process (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011). Parties

1. Replication data are available at the Harvard Dataverse (<https://dataverse.harvard.edu>).




FIGURE 1. Party congruence and responsiveness.

provide the choice set from which citizens choose their representatives. Parties have the task of representing these preferences whether in the opposition or in government, and they are often conceived as delegates of their supporters in models of representation (Powell 2000).

Figure 1 depicts a scenario of perfect congruence (1a) and incongruence (1b) between the positions of a party (P) and its supporters (S) on a policy dimension (S represents the average or median position of all party supporters).² Figure 1a illustrates a scenario of perfect congruence in which the preferences of supporters is perfectly represented by the party (i.e., the party cannot better represent its supporters in terms of its policy position). Figure 1b illustrates a scenario of incongruence in which there is a distance between the positions of each actor (i.e., the supporters and the party have different preferences). Scholars generally assume that the greater the distance between the supporters and the party, the smaller congruence and representation. Studies of congruence between party and supporters generally find adequate levels of congruence between parties and their voters. However, there are some variations across policy issues. For example,

2. Another perspective on citizens–party congruence is the relationship between citizens *as a whole* as conceptualized by the *median voter* and each party. The studies on party system congruence often focus on the role of electoral systems in fostering congruence between the median voter and all the parties in a party system (see Dow, 2011; Ezrow, 2011; Calvo and Hellwig, 2011; Matakos, Troumpounis and Xefferis, 2016).

levels of congruence on the left–right ideological scale appear to be higher (Dalton 1985, 2015) than those on cultural and European dimensions (Costello, Thomassen, and Rosema 2012; Mattila and Raunio 2006).

I have followed this approach to party congruence in this analysis. However, instead of measuring the average preference of all supporters of a party, I distinguished between the average preference of female and male supporters and assessed their distance from their party (i.e., the party they voted for), respectively. To my knowledge, no study has examined gender representation in those terms. Bernauer, Giger, and Rosset (2015) similarly examined the congruence between *an individual* and her *closest party* on the left–right ideological scale. In particular, they expected that women would be less represented than men on average but that the gender gap would be less important in proportional representation (PR) electoral systems given that this electoral system favors the representation of the diversity of citizens' preferences. Overall, they found few differences between the representation of men and women, and their results did not indicate that the gender gap is smaller under a PR electoral systems (i.e., that women are generally as close to their closest party as men). This article extends the work of Bernauer et al. in examining the correspondence between the positions of female and male *supporters* and their party, respectively. This analysis includes the possible relationship between the descriptive and substantive representation of women, which was not examined by Bernauer et al.³

Figure 1c displays an example of responsiveness in which party (P) adjusts its position in response to the shift in the position of its supporters (S). In the opposite shift, supporters move toward the party position, and the latter parallels this shift. Moreover, responsiveness could be initiated whether the party and supporters are congruent (Figure 1a) or not (Figure 1b) following a shift in the position of the supporters. This is the standard conceptualization of responsiveness in this discipline (Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow et al., 2011; Schumacher, De Vries and Vis, 2013). Importantly, however, even if party responsiveness favors congruence with the supporters (as in Figure 1c), this may not always be the case.

3. Rather than examining party-supporters congruence, Dingler, Kroeber and Fortin-Rittberger (2018) examined legislative congruence. This corresponds to a many-to-many conceptualization of congruence (Golder and Stramski, 2010) in which the distribution of citizen preferences is compared to the distribution of all individual MPs composing a legislature. Surprisingly, their results did not confirm the presence of a gender gap and even showed that women tend to be slightly more represented than men (except in two policy fields: environment and multiculturalism). Moreover, their results did not indicate that the proportion of elected women in legislatures favors women's representation, but they indicated that levels of women's turnout do so.

Whether responsiveness fosters congruence depends on the direction of the change in the position of the supporters (away from or toward the party) and the adjustment the party brings (or not) to its position (for a detailed discussion of the different mechanisms of party responsiveness and their effect on congruence, see Ferland 2018).

Studies of party responsiveness have considered this dynamic relationship between citizens and parties. In particular, scholars have examined whether parties change their policy positions when public opinion (i.e., whether the median voter or party supporters) changes position. These studies generally offer an optimistic picture of the functioning of representative democracies given observed patterns of party responsiveness (for a review, see Adams 2012). For example, Adams et al. (2006) showed that mainstream parties adjust their position accordingly with changes in the position of the median voter, whereas Ezrow et al. (2011) showed that niche parties respond more to shifts in the positions of their supporters. Ferland (2018) also recently showed that mainstream parties actually respond to both the median voter and their supporters when the latter move away from the party position. Homola (2017) extended these studies and examined whether parties are as responsive to changes in men's and women's preferences and whether the proportion of elected women in a legislature conditions this relationship. Overall, Homola (2017) found that parties respond to men's and women's preferences but that parties are slightly more responsive to men's changes in preference than to women's changes. His result also indicates that the presence of women *in parliament* does not affect party responsiveness. In the following sections, I build on these works on party responsiveness. In particular, I examined whether parties respond similarly to changes in the preferences of female and male supporters. Importantly, I tested the relationship directly between the presence of elected women *in a party* on party responses to changes in women's and men's preferences. This is a more valid test of the relationship between the descriptive and substantive representation of women (i.e., Phillips's theory of the politics of presence, see below) than Homola's strategy of examining the effect of elected women *in parliament*. Indeed, if the presence of women influences parties' responses to women's preferences, it is mainly because women *within* a party may influence the policy positions of their corresponding party, that is, their possible influence on the policy positions of the other parties is unlikely.⁴

4. In the subsequent empirical analyses, I verified this possibility and did not find any substantive effect associated with the proportion of elected women *in parliament*.

A GENDER GAP IN REPRESENTATION?

Although few studies of party congruence and responsiveness have examined gender representation, inequality in the representation of men and women has been an important topic in gender studies. Most studies on gender representation have examined the descriptive and substantive representation of women (for a review, see Wängnerud 2009). Many studies have highlighted the existence of a gender gap in terms of descriptive representation; that is, the proportion of women in political parties, in legislatures, or as cabinet ministers is smaller than the proportion of men (Kittilson 2006; Krook and O'Brien 2015; O'Brien 2015; Tremblay 2008). This lack of descriptive representation may also have substantive implications given that female legislators seem to behave differently than male while in office in emphasizing different issues (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Swers 1998; Thomas 1991) and holding different policy positions (Gidengil et al. 2003; Wängnerud 2000). Clayton and Zetterberg (2018) even recently showed that in countries where the proportion of women increased significantly due to quota adoption, spending increased in public health while military spending decreased. Overall, these studies support Phillips's theory of the politics of presence (Phillips 1998), which argues that the presence of women is necessary to represent women's interests given their shared experiences and common interests.

A problem with this approach to gender representation, however, is that it does not directly capture men's and women's preferences and their respective correspondence with elite positions. Actually, these studies have developed independently from the concepts and approaches proposed in the congruence and responsiveness literature. The implicit assumption is that some policies or issues are female-oriented, and thus, the implementation of the latter favors women's representation. However, this does not permit the testing of claims about inequality in substantive representation *per se*,⁵ that is, the comparison of men's and women's preferences on policy issues with elite positions. In this research, I have used the concepts and research designs of the congruence and responsiveness literature to test expectations developed mostly in gender studies.

5. For example, men may share the same policy preferences than women in these studies.

Expectations

This section presents my expectations with respect to the representation of female and male supporters in terms of party congruence and party responsiveness. Building on results from gender research on representation and the politics of presence (Phillips 1998), I have assumed that female supporters will generally be less represented than male supporters by their party, that is, the party they voted for.⁶ In particular, I expected female supporters of a party to be ideologically more distant from the position of their party than male supporters. The combination of two empirical findings supports this claim. First, elected women are generally underrepresented in political parties (Kittilson 2006; Tremblay 2008). Second, women in elected office and in the general public hold different policy positions than men on average (Gidengil et al. 2003; Thomas 1994; Wängnerud 2000). Consequently, the underrepresentation of women in elected office should make party positions better reflect male policy positions than female policy positions. However, as the number of elected women increases in a party, presumably, party stances will be influenced, and accordingly so with female supporters. Moreover, women are more likely to vote for female candidates than male candidates (Cook 1994; Dolan 1998; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Zipp and Plutzer 1985). Therefore, women may be more likely to support parties that better reflect their preferences when more women represent these parties.⁷ Overall, I expect the two following hypotheses in terms of the gender gap in party congruence:

H₁: Levels of congruence between party and supporters are greater among men than female supporters.

H₂: The gender gap in levels of congruence between party and supporters decreases as the proportion of women elected in a party increases.

I also expected parties to be more responsive to shifts in the positions of male supporters than female supporters. Homola (2017) emphasized that

6. The relationship between descriptive and substantive representation is somewhat contested in gender studies (Dahlerup 1988; Kanter 1977), and scholars therefore consider the role of critical actors who could be men or women in promoting women substantive representation (Celis et al. 2008; Childs and Krook 2006). With this limitation in mind, the importance of the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation in gender studies appears as the natural starting point for examining the state of gender representation from a congruence and responsiveness perspectives.

7. This is an untested expectation that represents one of the mechanisms supporting my expectations. Future works should consider examining whether women are indeed more likely to vote for more congruent or closer parties as the number of elected women in parties increases. For the moment, our empirical findings support this possibility.

parties should generally be more responsive to men than women “because men are, on average, more politically active than women, earn more, are more highly educated and more likely to act as opinion leaders within their respective social contexts all characteristics that have been shown to lead to higher party responsiveness” (e.g., Adams and Ezrow 2009; Bartels 2008; Enns and Wlezien 2011; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Gilens and Page 2014; Gilens 2012; Nir and McClurg 2015). Although we expect parties to be more responsive to male supporters than female supporters, this gender gap should decrease as more women are elected in parties given that they hold policy positions that differ from their male counterparts and act differently in office (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Swers 1998; Thomas 1991). Thus, I propose these two hypotheses with respect to the gender gap in party responsiveness:

H₃: Parties are more responsive to shifts in the positions of male supporters than to those of female supporters.

H₄: The gender gap in party responsiveness decreases as the proportion of women elected in a party increases.

DATA AND MEASUREMENTS

To test these hypotheses, I first located the positions of citizens and parties on a common policy dimension using survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) to measure citizens' and parties' positions on a left–right ideological scale. To increase the number of observations, I added all national election studies in which respondents were asked to locate themselves and parties on the same left–right scale (see Table A1 in Appendix for the list of countries, elections, and parties). In these postelection surveys, respondents are generally asked the following question: “In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?” Respondents are also asked to indicate which party they voted for in the election. Based on this information, I calculated the median position of the female and male supporters for each party, respectively.

Importantly, respondents are also asked to locate each of the main political parties on the same left–right ideological scale. A party position is measured by taking the median position as perceived by all respondents.⁸ Notably, survey-based measures of party positions correlate

8. A small endogeneity issue given that party supporters, men or women, may tend to locate themselves closer to their party. As the number of male or female supporters increases in a party, this

highly with expert-based measures (Dalton and McAllister 2015). This association indicates that citizen perceptions of party positions are not biased when aggregated and may represent valid measures of party positions. How party congruence and party responsiveness were measured for testing our hypotheses is discussed below. Overall, the analyses covered 129 parties and 95 elections in 16 countries between 1973 and 2013 (see Table A1 the Appendix for the list of countries and elections).

Any examination of gender representation on the left–right ideological scale has some limitations. First, levels of congruence are greater on this ideological dimension than on other policy dimensions (Costello, Thomassen, and Rosema 2012; Mattila and Raunio 2006), which could mask greater inequality in men’s and women’s representation across other policy issues. Second, although the left–right ideological scale has been the main dimension of political competition for many years, new dimensions have appeared (Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012; Kriesi et al. 2008). Therefore, examining representation from a left–right ideological perspective may no longer be entirely sufficient to capture and summarize citizen’s preferences and whether they match party positions.

Scholars have attempted to address these issues in examining the congruence between party and supporters from a multidimensional perspective. The empirical strategy consists of combining citizens’ self-placements on different policy dimensions (e.g., from the European Social Survey) and expert placements of political parties (e.g., from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey dataset). The main problem with this approach, however, is that the question wording, the scale, and even the level of measurement of the questions generally differ across citizen and expert surveys. This heterogeneity raises a problem of differential item functioning, given that we cannot know whether a given score in citizen surveys corresponds to the exact same score in the expert surveys. Notably, the CMP-survey approach, which consists in locating party positions based on measures from the Comparative Manifesto Project and citizens’ positions based on surveys, suffers from the same dilemma (e.g., Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow et al. 2011; Homola 2017). This is highly problematic for measuring the distance between the positions of party supporters and a given party (see below). Overall, some of the limitations of using the left–right ideological scale are easy to recognize,

tendency might favor men or women party congruence, respectively. To account for this possibility, I also computed party positions as perceived by all respondents except party supporters and found a very high correlation (0.98) between these measures. Moreover, the results in Tables 1 and 2 are substantively the same with regard to this alternative measure.

but for the moment, data are limited. Considering this limitation, the left–right ideological scale remains one of the main dimensions of political competition in advanced democracies and an important determinant of vote choice (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011; Jessee 2012; Joesten and Stone 2014). It is also the main political dimension used in previous works on congruence and responsiveness (Adams et al. 2006; Blais and Bodet 2006; Ezrow et al. 2011; Ferland 2016; Golder and Stramski 2010; Powell 2000). Although it will be important to replicate studies of congruence and responsiveness based on several policy issues in the future, the necessary data do not currently exist, and the left–right ideological scale still represents a crucial dimension structuring the political competition in the countries under examination.

EXAMINING THE GENDER GAP IN PARTY CONGRUENCE

This section presents my analysis with respect to the gender gap in party–supporter congruence. I expected female supporters to be generally further away from their party than male supporters. To examine this claim, I first computed the absolute distance between a party position and the median position of its female and male supporters, respectively. Then, I calculated *gender difference in congruence*, which is the difference between these two measures of female and male supporters' congruence. Negative values of gender difference in congruence indicate that women are closer than men to their party, whereas positive values indicate the opposite. For example, a score of -0.3 (0.3) indicates that the median position of female supporters is closer (further) to the party position by 0.3 points than the median position of male supporters. To support our hypotheses, we expected the average of gender difference in congruence to be positive (H_1) and the proportion of elected women in a party to have a negative impact on gender difference in congruence (H_2). The proportion of elected women in a party was gathered from different national sources (e.g., National Parliament websites, websites of political parties, etc.).

Figure 2 shows the distribution of gender difference in congruence. The distribution of gender difference in congruence appears to be symmetric, and most of the scores center around 0, indicating no gender inequality in representation on average. Overall, the average score of gender difference in congruence is approximately 0.02 and is not statistically different than 0. These results do not support H_1 .




FIGURE 2. Distribution of gender difference in congruence.

I tested H_2 with respect to the impact of the proportion of elected women in a party on the gender gap in party congruence (Table 2). Notably, even if the previous results do not indicate the presence of a gender gap on average, it is still possible that the proportion of elected women in a party favorably influences the representation of female supporters. For example, parties with a small proportion of women may better represent male supporters, and parties with a greater proportion of women may better represent female supporters. When aggregated, these inequalities in representation would cancel out, as indicated by the average score of gender difference in congruence (0.02).

Table 1 displays the results of OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is gender difference in congruence and the independent variable is the *proportion of elected women* in a party. Three sets of results are presented. Column one lists the results of the pooled data; columns two and three present the results of fixed-effects modeling at the election and country levels, respectively. All the models adjust the standard errors for clustering at the party level; not doing so might increase the likelihood of committing a type I error. The advantage of the fixed-effects model is

Table 1. Gender Gap in Party-Supporters Congruence

	(1) <i>Pooled</i>	(2) <i>FE Elections</i>	(3) <i>FE Country</i>
Proportion Women	-0.004 (0.002)**	-0.006 (0.002)**	-0.004 (0.002)*
N	562	562	562
R ²	0.022	0.197	0.061

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Table 2. Gender Gap in Party Responsiveness

	(1) <i>Women</i>	(2) <i>Men</i>	(3) <i>Women and Men</i>	(4) <i>% Women</i>
Δ Woman	0.16 (0.07)**		0.17 (0.06)***	0.06 (0.11)
Δ Man		0.16 (0.09)*	0.18 (0.09)**	0.13 (0.18)
% Women (t-1)				0.01 (0.00)**
% Women (t-1) × Δ Woman				0.00 (0.00)
% Women (t-1) × Δ Man				0.00 (0.00)
Δ Party position (t-1)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.09)
Constant	-0.02 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.30 (0.15)**
Observations	61	61	61	61
R ²	0.134	0.101	0.189	0.284

Clustered Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Country dummies are not displayed.

that it can be used to assess the within effect (at the election or country level) of proportion of elected women and to control for unobserved heterogeneity at each level (e.g., the electoral systems, number of parties in competition, turnout of women, proportion of elected women in legislature, etc.).⁹ Overall, the results in Table 1 confirm H₂ and indicate that as the proportion of elected women in a party increases, the gender gap in party congruence decreases. The magnitude of the effect

9. The use of a fixed-effects model allowed the claims, for example, that within a country or within a given election, parties with a greater proportion of elected women are closer to women's preferences.

is also consistent across the three models. On average, an increase of 1 point of percentage in the proportion of elected women decreases *gender difference in congruence* by approximately 0.004–0.006 points.

To appreciate the substantive impact of proportion of elected women on the gender gap in party–supporter congruence, Figure 3 displays the predicted values of gender difference in congruence as proportion of elected women increases based on the results of column two in Table 1. The results show that an increase in the proportion of elected women decreases the predicted values of gender difference in congruence. The results show that for parties with less than approximately 16% of elected women (25% of the observations), male supporters are closer to the party than female supporters (i.e., gender difference in congruence is positive). On the other hand, for parties with more than 45% of elected women (20% of parties), female supporters are more represented than male supporters, and the difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Finally, for parties with more than 16% and less than 45% of elected women (approximately 55% of the parties), the difference in female and male party–supporter congruence does not appear to be statistically different than 0.

Overall, these results indicate that even if the data do not support the claim that women are generally less represented by their party than men, the proportion of elected women in a party influences female (and male) representation. When very few women are elected, male supporters are closer to parties than female supporters. As the number of elected women increases, however, this gender gap disappears and even turns toward women’s advantage when more than approximately 50% of elected representatives of a party are women. The next section presents my analysis of whether parties respond similarly to change in women’s and men’s preferences and whether the presence of women in parties conditions this relationship.

EXAMINING THE GENDER GAP IN PARTY RESPONSIVENESS

To test H_3 and H_4 , I examined the effect of a change in the position of female supporters and male supporters, respectively, on a change in a party position between two elections.

To examine these relationships, I used panel data to locate the same respondents in consecutive elections and, therefore, to track the positions of female and male party supporters at election t and those same female




FIGURE 3. Predicted values of gender difference in party congruence.
 Note: The results are substantively the same when we exclude from the analysis the parties ($N = 4$) with 100% of elected women.

and male party supporters at election $t + 1$. The use of panel data prevents the positions of party supporters at an election to be influenced by new voters who may have switched their vote toward the party as a result, presumably, of the party moving toward their position.¹⁰ The data from the CSES and most national election studies used in the previous section consist of cross-national data and do not include a panel design. Among the 16 countries studied, only four conducted a sufficient number of panel studies for this section of the analysis: Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Sweden (see Table A2 in the Appendix for the list of elections and parties).

The main variables of interest were measured as described previously, but in this section of the analysis, I investigated the change between two consecutive elections. The dependent variable in Table 2 is the change in a party position between two elections (Δ *party position*). Thus, Δ

10. For example, a party located at “5” may move to “7” between elections. As a result, voters located at “7” may decide to vote for this party at the next election given that the party becomes closer to their positions.

women represents the change in the position of female supporters between two consecutive elections. Positive values indicate that female supporters move to the right between elections, and negative values indicate a shift to the left. The corresponding variable for male supporters (Δ *men*) was also included. To support **H₃**, I expected the effect of Δ *men* on Δ *party position* to be greater than the effect of Δ *women*. To test **H₄**, I interacted Δ *women* and Δ *men*, respectively, with proportion of elected women measured at election *t*. I expected the difference between the effect of Δ *women* and Δ *men* on Δ *party position* to decrease as the proportion of elected women increased.

Importantly, this empirical strategy did not allow the distinction among changes in party positions motivated by a vote-seeking or policy-seeking strategy. As argued by Ferland (2018), when parties adjust their positions in response to shifts in public opinion away from their position, they are generally motivated by a vote-seeking strategy. These adjustments ultimately foster congruence (and representation) with public opinion (as shown similarly in Fig. 1c). On the other hand, if parties adjust their position when the public moves toward their position, they are moving closer to their preferred policy position (i.e., ideal point). These latter adjustments, however, do not foster congruence with citizens nor enhance representation, given that parties will generally move away from the public when moving closer to their preferred position. The multiple interactions required to test such claims (see Ferland 2018), combined with the small number of observations ($N = 61$), made the data inadequate to distinguish these different mechanisms of responsiveness. Consequently, while the next analysis may indicate whether parties adjust their position accordingly with changes in male or female supporters, it cannot indicate whether a vote-seeking or policy-seeking strategy motivated these party adjustments.¹¹

Given the time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) structure of the data, I used country fixed-effects model to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the country level. This adjustment controlled for omitted variables such as the

11. In addition, I did not examine whether parties respond to the median woman's position or the median man's position. Parties generally have vote-seeking incentives to follow the median voter (Adams et al. 2006; Adams 2012). Consequently, we might think that parties with more women will also tend to be more responsive to the median woman's position than median man's position. Moreover, a tension between these two forms of responsiveness may exist. Presumably, some parties may have greater incentives to respond to their female supporters (e.g., niche parties), whereas other parties may have greater incentives to respond to shifts in the median woman's position (e.g., mainstream parties) (Ezrow et al. 2011). These are all important issues that should be considered in future studies.

electoral systems or the party systems. The models were estimated using Prais-Winsten regressions and panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) at the party level, given that observations are not independent within parties. The models also adjusted for first-order autocorrelation, given that Wooldridge (2002) test of autocorrelation for panel data rejects the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation.¹² In addition, I followed previous studies that included as a control variable the previous change in party position ($t - 1$), given that parties may have electoral incentives to shift their position in the opposite direction than their previous shifts (Budge 1994).¹³ Finally, these results were substantively the same when I controlled for the congruence between female (and male) supporters and their party at election t .

In columns one and two of Table 2, the effects of a change in the position of female and male supporters on a change in party positions are presented separately. The results in column one show that parties adjust their position accordingly with changes in the positions of female supporters. When female supporters move left (right) by one unit on the left–right ideological scale, parties adjust their position on average to the left (right) by approximately 0.16 units. The magnitude of the effect is rather small, but it is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The results in column two indicate that parties are also responsive to changes in the positions of male supporters given the coefficient of 0.16, which is statistically significant at the 0.1 level. Column three presents the results of the model regarding the simultaneous effect of a change in the position of female and male supporters. There appears to be no correlation between Δ women and Δ men (0.03). The results do not support the claim that there is a gender gap in party responsiveness (i.e., H_3). The effect of Δ women (0.17) is positive and statistically significant, whereas the effect of Δ men equals 0.18 and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The Wald test indicates that the difference between these coefficients ($0.18 - 0.17 = 0.01$) is not statistically significant. Overall, parties are, on average, as responsive to women's preferences as to men's preferences, but the magnitude of party responsiveness is also small.

Column four of Table 2 displays the results of the interaction of Δ women and Δ men with proportion of elected women, respectively. To

12. This is estimated with the command *xtpcse* in STATA and the options *correlation(ar1)* and *independent*.

13. I also controlled for the previous change in a party position ($t - 1$) interacted with the party's vote share at the last election, which is the main alternative specification in studies of party responsiveness. The results are robust to this alternative specification (see Table A3 in the Appendix).




FIGURE 4. Party responsiveness to female supporters.

better demonstrate the substantive effects of this interaction model, I followed the recommendation of Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006); the average marginal effects of Δ *women* are presented in Figure 4. Party responsiveness to female supporters was expected to increase as the proportion of women increases in a party. Figure 5 displays the average marginal effects of Δ *men* over values of *proportion of elected women* given that the latter may also affect, presumably, party responsiveness to male supporters.

The results in Figure 4 show the effect of Δ *women* on Δ *party positions* as proportion of elected women increases in a party. These results support partly our prediction even if the interaction effect is of modest magnitude. The effect of Δ *women* is not statistically different than 0 for parties with fewer than about 20% of elected women. On average, these parties do not change their position when female supporters are changing their position, which is approximately 25% of the parties. On the other hand, the results indicate that parties are responsive to female preferences when parties have more than 20% of elected women and that the effect of Δ *women* increases slightly as the proportion of elected women increases.

Figure 5 displays the corresponding results for party responsiveness to male supporters as the proportion of elected women increases in a party. The results




FIGURE 5. Party responsiveness to male supporters.

do not indicate that the presence of women in a party conditions the effect of Δ *men* on Δ *party positions* (i.e., the line is mostly horizontal for all values of % *women*). Importantly, the average marginal effects of Δ *men* are not statistically different than zero for most values of % *women*, except values between 30% and 45%. Overall, the results in Figure 4 slightly support the expectation that the presence of elected women in parties may affect how parties respond to changes in the preferences of their female supporters and may ultimately reduce the gender gap in representation.

DISCUSSION

In this research, I examined whether a gender gap exists in party congruence and responsiveness, and I sought to verify whether the presence of women in parties attenuated this gap. To do so, I built on previous works of congruence and responsiveness that locate citizens and elites on a common left–right ideological scale. Although several studies have examined the relationship between supporters and parties from a congruence and responsiveness perspectives, few studies have considered whether inequality in gender representation exists in those terms.

Building on works in gender research and on Phillips's theory of the politics of presence, I expected to find a gender gap in party congruence and responsiveness. Moreover, I expected this gap to decrease as the proportion of elected women in a party increases. Overall, the results partly support these expectations. On the one hand, the results do not indicate the presence of a gender gap in party congruence nor in party responsiveness (i.e., parties are on average as close to the preferences of their female than male supporters). Moreover, parties seem to adjust their positions accordingly with male and female supporters likewise. These results do not support H_1 and H_3 . On the other hand, the results support the claim that there is a link between the descriptive and substantive representation of women (H_2 and H_4). Female supporters are closer to their party than male supporters as the proportion of women increases in the party. In addition, I identified a similar effect with respect to party responsiveness to female and male supporters. These results are important because the few studies of congruence and responsiveness that have considered this relationship between the descriptive and substantive representation of women did not find any effect (Dingler, Kroeber, and Fortin-Rittberger 2018; Homola 2017). One reason for this difference is that I directly examined the presence of elected women *in parties*, whereas previous studies examined instead the effect of the proportion of women elected *in legislature*, therefore masking some heterogeneity in the distribution of elected women across parties.

Overall, this study represents a first step toward examining inequality in gender representation from a congruence and a responsiveness perspective. Many avenues are possible to extend this work. First, it will be important to compare the results of this study to future studies examining women's and men's preferences on different policy issues. Second, the preferences of men and women may differ, but how much they value each policy issue may also be important to consider and may actually widen the gender gap if incorporated to congruence and responsiveness measures of representation. Finally, the congruence between citizens and elites may be examined at different stages of the representation process (Golder and Ferland, 2017) and from different perspectives (Golder and Stramski, 2010). All these different approaches to citizens–elites congruence merit further investigation to determine whether inequality in gender representation exists and to better understand the factors that might attenuate it.

REFERENCES

- Adams, James. 2012. "Causes and Electoral Consequences of Party Policy Shifts in Multiparty Elections: Theoretical Results and Empirical Evidence." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15:401–419.
- Adams, James, and Lawrence Ezrow. 2009. "Who do European Parties Represent? How Western European Parties Represent the Policy Preferences of Opinion Leaders." *Journal of Politics* 71:206–223.
- Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow, and Garrett Glasgow. 2006. "Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of Western European Parties' Policy Shifts, 1976–1998." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3): 513–529.
- Bakker, R., S. Jolly, and J. Polk. 2012. "Complexity in the European Party Space: Exploring Dimensionality with Experts." *European Union Politics* 13 (2): 219–245.
- Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bernauer, Julian, Nathalie Giger, and Jan Rosset. 2015. "Mind the Gap: Do Proportional Electoral Systems Foster a More Equal Representation of Women and Men, Poor and Rich?" *International Political Science Review* 36 (1): 78–98.
- Blais, André, and Marc-André Bodet. 2006. "Does Proportional Representation Foster Closer Congruence Between Citizens and Policy Makers?" *Comparative Political Studies* 39 (10): 1243–1262.
- Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder. 2006. "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses." *Political Analysis* 14 (1): 63–82.
- Bratton, Kathleen A., and Kerry L. Haynie. 1999. "Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race." *Journal of Politics* 61 (3): 658–679.
- Budge, Ian. 1994. "A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty, Ideology, and Policy Equilibria Viewed Comparatively and Temporally." *British Journal of Political Science* 24 (4): 443–467.
- Calvo, Ernesto, and Timothy Hellwig. 2011. "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives Under Different Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (1): 27–41.
- Celis, Karen, Sarah Childs, Johanna Kantola, and Mona Lena Krook. 2008. "Rethinking Women's Substantive Representation." *Representation* 44 (2): 99–110.
- Childs, Sarah, and Mona Lena Krook. 2006. "Should Feminists Give Up on Critical Mass? A Contingent 'Yes'." *Politics and Gender* 2 (4): 522–530.
- Clayton, Amanda, and Pär Zetterberg. 2018. "Quota Shocks: Electoral Gender Quotas and Government Spending Priorities Worldwide." *The Journal of Politics* 80 (3): 916–932.
- Cook, Elizabeth Adell. 1994. *Voter Responses to Women Senate Candidates*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Costello, Rory, Jacques Thomassen, and Martin Rosema. 2012. "European Parliament Elections and Political Representation: Policy Congruence between Voters and Parties." *West European Politics* 35 (6): 1226–1248.
- Dahlerup, Drude. 1988. "From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian Politics." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 4:275–298.
- Dalton, Russell J. 1985. "Political Parties and Political Representation: Party Supporters and Party Elites in Nine Nations." *Comparative Political Studies* 18 (3): 267–299.
- . 2015. "Party Representation across Multiple Issue Dimensions." *Party Politics* 23 (6): 609–622.
- Dalton, Russell J., David M. Farrell, and Ian McAllister. 2011. *Political Parties and Democratic Linkage*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Dalton, Russell J., and Ian McAllister. 2015. "Random Walk or Planned Excursion? Continuity and Change in the Left-Right Positions of Political Parties." *Comparative Political Studies* 48 (6): 759–787.
- Dingler, Sarah C., Corinna Kroeber, and Jessica Fortin-Rittberger. 2018. "Do Parliaments Under-Represent Womens Policy Preferences? Exploring Gender Equality in Policy Congruence in 21 European Democracies." *Journal of European Public Policy*. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2017.1423104.
- Dolan, Kathleen. 1998. "Voting for Women in 'The Year of the Woman.'" *American Journal of Political Science* 42:272–293.
- Dow, Jay K. 2011. "Party-System Extremism in Majoritarian and Proportional Electoral Systems." *British Journal of Political Science* 41 (2): 341–361.
- Enns, Peter K., and Christopher Wlezien. 2011. "Group Opinion and the Study of Representation." In *Who Gets Represented?*, 1–25. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011.
- Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. MacKuen, and James A. Stimson. 2002. *The Macro Polity*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Ezrow, Lawrence. 2011. "Reply to Dow: Party Positions, Votes and the Mediating Role of Electoral Systems?" *British Journal of Political Science* 41 (2): 448–452.
- Ezrow, Lawrence, Catherine De Vries, Marco Steenbergen, and Erica Edwards. 2011. "Mean Voter Representation and Partisan Constituency Representation: Do Parties Respond to the Mean Voter Position or to their Supporters?" *Party Politics* 17 (3): 275–301.
- Ferland, Benjamin. 2016. "Revisiting the Ideological Congruence Controversy." *European Journal of Political Research* 55 (2): 358–373.
- . 2018. "Party Responsiveness to Public Opinion and Party Supporters: Revisiting the Mechanisms and Motivations." *Party Politics*. doi: 10.1177/1354068818777889.
- Gerber, Elisabeth R., and Jeffrey B. Lewis. 2004. "Beyond the Median. Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation." *Journal of Political Economy* 112 (6): 1364–1383.
- Gidengil, Elisabeth, André Blais, Richard Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte. 2003. "Women to the Left? Gender Differences in Political Beliefs and Policy Preferences". In *Women and Electoral Politics in Canada*, eds. Manon Tremblay and Linda Trimble, pp. 140–159. Don Mills: Oxford University Press.
- Gilens, Martin. 2012. *Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gilens, Martin, and Benjamin I. Page. 2014. "Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens." *Perspectives on Politics* 12 (3): 564–581.
- Golder, Matt, and Benjamin Ferland. 2017. *Electoral Rules and Citizen-Elite Ideological Congruence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Golder, Matt, and Jacek Stramski. 2010. "Ideological Congruence and Electoral Institutions." *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (1): 90–106.
- Homola, Jonathan. 2017. "Are Parties Equally Responsive to Women and Men?" *British Journal of Political Science*. doi:10.1017/S0007123417000114.
- Jessee, Stephen A. 2012. *Ideology and Spatial Voting in American Elections*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Joesten, Danielle A., and Walter J. Stone. 2014. "Reassessing Proximity Voting: Expertise, Party, and Choice in Congressional Elections." *Journal of Politics* 76 (3): 740–753.
- Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 1977. "Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life." *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (5): 965–990.
- Kittilson, Miki Caul. 2006. *Challenging Parties, Changing Parliaments: Women and Elected Office in Contemporary Western Europe*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

- Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheos Frey. 2008. *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Krook, Mona Lena, and Diana Z. O'Brien. 2015. "All the Presidents Men? The Numbers and Portfolio Allocations of Female Cabinet Ministers." *Journal of Politics* 74 (3): 840–855.
- Lehrer, Ron. 2012. "Intra-Party Democracy and Party Responsiveness." *West European Politics* 35 (6): 1295–1319.
- Matakos, Konstantinos, Orestis Troumpounis, and Dimitrios Xeferis. 2016. "Electoral Rule Disproportionality and Platform Polarization." *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (4): 1026–1043.
- Mattila, Mikko, and Tapio Raunio. 2006. "Cautious Voters-Supportive Parties." *European Union Politics* 7 (4): 427–449.
- McDonald, Michael D., Silvia M. Mendes, and Ian Budge. 2004. "What Are Elections for? Conferring the Median Mandate." *British Journal of Political Science* 34 (1): 1–26.
- Nir, Lilach, and Scott D. McClurg. 2015. "How Institutions Affect Gender Gaps in Public Opinion Expression." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 79:544–567.
- O'Brien, Diana Z. 2015. "Rising to the Top: Gender, Political Performance, and Party Leadership in Advanced Industrial Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (4): 1022–1039.
- Phillips, Anne. 1998. *The Politics of Presence: The Political Representation of Gender, Ethnicity, and Race*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- . 2009. "The Ideological Congruence Controversy: The Impact of Alternative Measures, Data, and Time Periods on the Effects of Electoral Rules." *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (12): 1475–1497.
- Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2002. "Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (1): 20–34.
- Schumacher, Gijs, Catherine De Vries, and Barbara Vis. 2013. "Why Do Parties Change Position? Party Organization and Environmental Incentives." *Journal of Politics* 75 (2): 464–477.
- Stadelmann, David, Marco Portmann, and Reiner Eichenberger. 2012. "Evaluating the Median Voter Model's Explanatory Power." *Economics Letters* 114:312–314.
- Swers, Michele L. 1998. "Are Women More Likely to Vote for Women's Issue Bills than Their Male Colleagues?" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 23 (3): 435–448.
- Thomas, Sue. 1991. "The Impact of Women on State Legislative Policies." *Journal of Politics* 53 (4): 958–976.
- . 1994. *How Women Legislate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tremblay, Manon. 2008. *Women and Legislative Representation: Electoral Systems, Political Parties and Sex Quotas*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wängnerud, Lena. 2000. "Testing the Politics of Presence. Women's Representation in the Swedish Riksdag." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 23 (1): 67–91.
- . 2009. "Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12:51–69.
- Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. *Econometric Analysis of Cross-Sectional and Panel Data*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Zipp, John R., and Eric Plutzer. 1985. "Gender Differences in Voting for Female Candidates: Evidence from the 1982 Election." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 49:179–197.

APPENDIX

Table A1. Data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and National Election Studies

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Elections</i>	<i>Political parties</i>
Australia	1984, 1987, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013	Liberals, Labor, National, Green
Austria	2008, 2013	BZO, FPO, GREENE, NEOS, OVP, SPO, STRONACH
Canada	1979, 1984, 1997, 2004, 2008, 2011	Bloc, Green, NDP, PCC, PLC, Reform, SC
Denmark	1987, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2007	SD, Conservative, Venstre, Radical Venstre, Dans Folkeparti, Krist, Centrum Democrat, Enhedslisten, SF, New alliance
Finland	2003, 2007, 2011	SDP, Kesk, KOK, Vas, RKP, Green, KD, PS
France	2007	RPR/UMP, Verts, PS, PC
Germany	1976, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013	SPD, CDU, CSU, FDP, Green, PDS, Pirate
Iceland	1999, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2013	Alliance, Progressive, Independence, Left Green, Liberal
Ireland	2002, 2007, 2011	Bright, Civic, Pirate
Netherlands	1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010	FF, FG, Labour, Green, SF, Labour, Progressive
New Zealand	1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011	PvdA, VVD, D66, PPR, CPN, CDA, SGP, PSP, GPV, Groenlinks, SP, CU, Centrum, LPF, PVV, RPF
Norway	1973, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009	Labour, National, Alliance, NZ First, Act, Green, United, Progressive, Mana, Maori
Spain	1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008	NKP, Senterpartiet, Progress Party, Venstre, Labour, Kristelig, DNF, Hoyre, Red Electoral Alliance, Socialist Left Party
Sweden	1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006	Izquierda Unida, Partido Popular, PSOE, Rep. Left, Union Progress
Switzerland	1999, 2003, 2007, 2011	Convergencia, Coalicion Canaria, Basque Nat., Partido Nacion.
United Kingdom	1983, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010	Centerpartiet, Folkpartiet, Kristdemokraterna, Miljopartiet, Moderata, Socialdemokraterna, Vansterpartiet
		Christian, Social Democrats, Swiss People's, Green, Conservative, Freethinking, Green, Liberal, Protestant, Radical-dem.
		Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrats, SNP, Playd Cymru

Table A2. Panel Data from National Election Studies

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Elections</i>	<i>Political parties</i>
Germany	2002, 2005, 2009, 2013	SPD, CDU, CSU, FDP, Green, Die Linke
Netherlands	1982, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1998	PvdA, VVD, D66, PPR, CPN, CDA, SGP, PSP, Groenlinks
New Zealand	1990, 1993, 1996, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014	Labour, National, Alliance, NZ First, Act, Green, United, Maori
Sweden	1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 2002, 2006	Centerpartiet, Folkpartiet, Kristdemokraterna, Miljöpartiet, Moderata, Socialdemokraterna, Vansterpartiet, New Democracy

Table A3. Gender Gap in Party Responsiveness

	(1) <i>Women</i>	(2) <i>Men</i>	(3) <i>Women and Men</i>	(4) <i>% Women</i>
Δ Woman	0.16 (0.07)**		0.17 (0.06)***	0.04 (0.11)
Δ Man		0.14 (0.09)	0.18 (0.09)**	0.06 (0.19)
% Women ($t-1$)				0.01 (0.00)***
% Women ($t-1$) \times Δ woman				0.00 (0.00)
% Women ($t-1$) \times Δ man				0.00 (0.00)
Δ Party position ($t-1$)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.09)
Δ Vote share ($t-1$)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Δ Party position ($t-1$) \times Δ vote share ($t-1$)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Constant	-0.02 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.32 (0.15)**
Observations	61	61	61	61
R ²	0.169	0.133	0.221	0.323

Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Country dummies are not shown.