institutions or even liberal ideology—often in language that quite explicitly repudiates liberalism—amounts to much less than it appears" (p. 247).

Early in *Enduring Liberalism*, Fowler cautions that "telling a story and endorsing it have no necessary connection" (p. 23). He also maintains that "at the heart of the rebirth of liberal thought since the 1960s has been the courage to do liberal theory, rather than only tell its story or cautiously reflect on the ideas of others" (p. 57). This book is best read on both levels, as story and theory. In the conclusion, Fowler identifies his personal politics: "part Enlightenment liberal, part Burkean conservative, part Emersonian anarchist, and part religious existentialist" (p. 243). This is telling. Guiding Fowler's story of American political thought is a desire to keep hope for an enduring—and evolving— liberalism alive. Of course, the question remains for whom liberalism is the best, last hope. The story Fowler tells shows that to this question there are no easy answers.

Negotiating Postmodernism. By Wayne Gabardi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001. 192p. $42.95 cloth, $16.95 paper.

Leslie Paul Thiele, *University of Florida*

This fast-paced tour of the postmodern condition will repay readers who may not have the time for more leisurely reading and reflection. It supplies both a useful guide to the theoretical terrain and a menu of practical responses to the social, political, and cultural challenges that postmodernism presents.

Wayne Gabardi's thesis is that the polemics of the 1970s and early 1980s that characterized the initial interaction between those modernists indebted to critical theory (such as Habermas) and those postmodernists indebted to Heidegger and Nietzsche (such as Foucault and Derrida) have given way to a period of "critical postmodernism," marked by dialogue, accommodation, and synthesis. This thesis is not wholly original: It is discussed, or gestured at, in the works of Stephen White (*Political Theory and Postmodernism*, 1991), Richard Bernstein (*The New Constellation,* 1991), and others. Yet, the continuing failure of many modernists to distinguish between radical and evolved forms of postmodernism, dismissing the second on account of the excesses of the first, and the continuing failure of many postmodernists to integrate modern critical theory into their own intellectual enterprise means that these ships continue to pass unseen in the night. Consequently, the project of critical postmodernism receives less attention than it deserves.

Of course, the distinction between radical and critical postmodernism is somewhat contrived. It cannot be located temporally in any precise fashion. Aspects of radical and critical postmodernism are found in both the early and later works of all but the most extreme postmodernists (such as Jean Baudrillard). Still, a drift toward critical postmodernism is apparent, and a book that systematically charts this drift is well warranted.

Negotiating Postmodernism is part survey text, part synthetic research. Gabardi adopts a "profile and critique" approach. The first half of the book mostly provides well-crafted review summaries of the literature along with insightful, if not sustained, critiques. Spanning the intellectual world of postmodernity in less than 100 pages is a monumental feat, which Gabardi performs with admirable thoroughness and clarity. One marvels at the comprehensiveness. Yet, *Negotiating Postmodernism* provides too cursory an assessment of the literature, pitched at too high a level, to be of much help to those wholly unfamiliar with it. Those more at home with postmodern thought might sift through the review section on the basis of the promissory note that Gabardi issues in the introduction. He will chart practical options for a democratic politics informed by critical postmodern insights.

Gabardi makes a strong case for critical postmodernism as a theoretical and ideological orientation that best captures the sociocultural dynamics of late-modern times. Moving beyond the modernist pursuit of universal principles, he attends to the complex cultural pluralism and fragmented market globalism of contemporary societies. Moderating radical postmodernism, Gabardi refuses to overplay the technological burdens and aesthetic potentials of postmodern life. He is attentive to the merits of transgression in a world of pastoral power, but he also refrains from the dangerous embrace of anarcho-ethical alternatives. He sees himself as a skeptical moderate. Mixing Montaigne with (the later) Foucault, Gabardi molds a hybrid intellectual hero who deftly, if somewhat reactively, negotiates postmodern life.

The political commitments of the postmodern moderate are fundamentally democratic. Democracy, for Gabardi, is essentially about citizens' struggle for freedom. Yet, freedom today is not to be won in emancipatory revolutions. Rather, it is to be glimpsed through the cracks of disciplinary power, tasted briefly in performative transgressions, and shared tentatively through efforts to forge new ethical relationships of self and other. Gabardi calls for various forms of creative resistance. These aestheticized acts of refusal and self-invention reveal our individual and collective capacity for freedom within an otherwise enveloping neoliberal world of globalized media and market relations overseen by a "techno-oligarchy."

Foremost among the conditions that would allow the exercise of such freedom is increased leisure. Leisure allows us to take serious pleasure in the life of the mind, body, soul, and community. It is meant to foster cultural creation and critical engagement in civic life. We are urged not to use our extra free time for the increased consumption of commodities and simulated experiences (e.g., television, video gaming, Internet surfing). Apart from the pedagogical force of "leisure studies" to be added to the college core curriculum, however, we are left without much hope that people will opt for civic agonistics and high cultural aesthetics rather than more frequent trips to the mall. There is little reason for optimism. Perhaps that is why Gabardi acknowledges that those who adopt a critically postmodern approach will necessarily remain peripheral in a lifeworld dominated by production and, increasingly, by consumption.

For those who take on the challenge of critical postmodernism, the goal is to fashion the social, political, economic, and cultural conditions that allow fugitive experiences of freedom to proliferate. Despite all the talk of collective efforts, however, the creative resistance and self-care advocated by Gabardi harbor a narcissistic quality. In this respect Gabardi evidences Foucault's mentorship. Although in debt to Foucault for his genealogical perspective and strategic overview, Gabardi also relies on Danilo Zolo (*Democracy and Complexity*, 1992) for his politicocultural analysis. He accepts Zolo's chaste vision of postmodern life. Zolo foresees the "Singapore model" for democracy: a prosperous, efficient society of managed consumers living in an "antipolis." Theorists such as Gabardi and Zolo may point to Singapore as the vision of things to come. But the threat, or promise, of a Singaporean future may seem strangely out of touch, or out of reach, to the 70% of humankind living in substandard housing and unable to read, the 50% suffering from malnutrition, and the 500 million people currently experiencing the

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400400183 Published online by Cambridge University Press

horrors of war, the loneliness of imprisonment, and the agony of torture. If there is a glaring shortcoming to *Negotiating Postmodernism*, it is that abstract theorization of the most sweeping variety takes place in the complete absence of empirical reference, even when practical solutions are proffered.

Gabardi's encyclopaedic effort provides many succulent bones to chew on. Yet, little is discussed in depth or justified at length. One is tantalized but left rather hungry. For instance, we are at a loss to learn, in light of the dilemmas of postmodern life, why or how Gabardi's economic and political proposals should or could become implemented. Frankly, I believe that most of his practical proposals are good ones. But that only means he is, like me, a social democrat informed by postmodern sensibilities. People with a different ideological bent would find the author's refusal to justify many of his proposals rather irritating. They would be nonplussed by Gabardi's abrupt leap from a theoretical amalgamation of Habermas, Heidegger, Arendt, and Foucault to the practical advocacy of a negative income tax, universal child care, and a 32-hour work week.

I am also troubled by the celebration of Foucaultian-style transgression. The problem is that such performative action is too easily colonized in the postmodern world. One need only think of the performers featured on Jerry Springer and other day-time talk shows who stimulate the public's appetite for transgressive spectacles. Nietzsche said that decadence can be defined as the need for greater and greater stimulation to achieve the same level of satisfaction. Performative transgression is a facet of postmodern decadence that the media techno-oligarchy well exploits. I would think that Foucault's dallying with sadomasochism bears the same danger. Bread, circuses, and sadomasochistic gladiators—all available on pay-per-view!

To his credit, Gabardi recognizes the capacity of the postmodern world to colonize the most creative acts of resistance. Its capacity to exploit efficiently (even our subversive) desires and actions, to integrate minds, bodies, and souls into what Heidegger called the *Bestand* or standing-reserve, is perhaps the chief reason to fight for leisure. But this fight might best be waged not by spending more time free of work, but by learning how not to *spend* time, whether one is engaged in work or play, theory or praxis.

Containing Nationalism. By Michael Hechter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 256p. $29.95.

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Michael Hechter focuses on three puzzles about nationalism (pp. 3–4). Why is it only a modern phenomenon? Why is it more acute in some countries than in others? And can its dark side of horrendous violence be contained? The title suggests that his principal concern is with the last question, but the bulk of discussion focuses on the second. One can readily answer the first question by saying that nationalism is strictly modern because it is about mass mobilization. Hence, it is kin to democracy, revolution, and socialism, none of which could arise in large countries before mobilization was possible. The democratic revolutions in the United States and France were about changing the locus of sovereignty from a monarch to the people. This is not strictly Hechter's argument, but it is implicit in many of his claims, such as that nationalism requires the existence of organizations that work for the national sovereignty of their subgroup (p. 125).

This answer, of course, merely pushes the question back to ask why mobilization began to be possible little more than two centuries ago. A quick and probably partial answer is that technology, communication, transportation, and aggregation of workforces enabled mobilization as never before. A second quick answer is that Napoleon changed modern warfare and modern states by organizing vast armies, almost all of them composed of conscripts or volunteers rather than mercenaries. (The Romans, Persians, and others had mobilized large armies, but Napoleon was revolutionary in his era.) Military and factory mobilization both tended to produce people who could speak a uniform national language and thereby de facto created modern nations. The first of these nations were driven by territorially inclusive nationalism, as in the cases of France and the United States. But they provoked nationalisms that were culturally inclusive and therefore exclusionary in other respects (pp. 91–2).

Hechter has a different historical account of the reason nationalism arose only recently in Europe. His specific claim is that the world of local control was displaced by the rise of direct rule, of the intrusive state governing a large population (p. 60). When governance was highly local, the very idea of nationalism could not occur to or motivate anyone—it would have no point. State formation in Europe proceeded by the confederation of distinct solidary groups (p. 42). Later, direct rule from the center of such confederated states broke the connection between the nation and the governance unit. Nationalism was therefore a response to growing state capacity for direct rule. Earlier empires had generally ruled indirectly, with governance structures and policies that varied from one group to another throughout the diverse empire.

Hechter's chief answer to the second question is that states have a limited span of control and need to organize more or less federally to manage large populations. The rise of direct rule in large states led to opposition to the center from culturally peripheral groups. In earlier work, Hechter argues that a multiethnic state would be easier to govern because each ethnic group would enforce some behaviors on its members, who therefore would have less energy to spend on more generally directed efforts that might challenge the state (pp. 156–7). Clearly, there is a risk in this arrangement because the subunit itself may organize against the state, especially if it becomes infected with nationalist fervor. In Yugoslavia, the federal organization of politics into ethnically concentrated regions enabled Croatian and Serbian nationalism. But, Hechter supposes, the greater risk is to attempt direct rule that reduces policies to uniformity across a diverse population. He argues that decentralization of government to a cultural minority may give that minority the resources to mobilize protests. Although this may suggest that the move is destabilizing, it may simultaneously undercut demands for sovereignty and, therefore, nationalist fervor (p. 146).

Despite frequent concern with the possibilities for collective action, both in protest actions and in mobilizing nationalist groups, the argument here is almost entirely at the level of the nation and the governing structure, not at the level of incentives or specific individual motivations. As Hechter notes for particular cases, leaders often have motivations of self-interest in gaining leadership positions in a newly created state that is congruent with some nationality, and therefore they may work for the nationalist cause of separate government. The motivations of others in a nationalist movement are merely a desire for policies that differ from the larger state to which they are subject. Hechter's main addition to this simple account builds on social identity theory, as in the work of Henri Tajfel and others, who attempt to explain the commonly spontaneous creation of exclusionary groups (pp. 99–101).

If we are to identify with a group, that group must already

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