THE NEW LATIN NATION

Immigration and the Hispanic Population of the United States[1]

Alejandro Portes
Department of Sociology, Princeton University

Abstract

This article presents an overview of the Hispanic population of the United States, focusing on the sources of its growth, its internal composition, its connections with the countries of origin, its role in the U.S. economy, and the emerging second generation. Intergenerational differences in outlooks and self-identities and the forces leading to the emergence of a "thick" Hispanic identity in the second generation are examined. The obstacles to successful integration faced by this youthful population and evidence of both "upward" and "downward" assimilation among its members are analyzed. Implications for the field of race and ethnic relations and for public policy toward immigrants and their offspring are discussed.

Keywords: Immigrant Labor, Border Enforcement, Migrant Transnationalism, Second Generation, Segmented Assimilation

INTRODUCTION

As of 2000, the Hispanic population of the United States (excluding the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) reached 35.3 million, representing 12.5% of the total population. Hispanics grew in numbers by 57.9% in the last intercensal period, as compared with 13.2% for the national population (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001). Without its Hispanic component, the growth of the national population would have fallen into the single digits, and a number of cities and states would have actually lost population. These facts are well-known, as is the source of this rapid growth: sustained immigration.

I will present the numbers behind this massive demographic trend, but first it is appropriate to place it in context by noting five basic facts: (1) immigrants from Mexico, and Latin America in general, have become a national presence, no longer limited to certain states or regions; (2) during the last decade, Mexico, and Latin America in general, consolidated its role as the principal reservoir of low-wage labor for the U.S. economy; (3) efforts to deter the inflow of Latin immigrants through

Du Bois Review, 4:2 (2007) 271–301.
 1742-058X/07 $15.00
doi:10.1017/S1742058X07070166

new legislation and various new enforcement programs have consistently failed, indicating the flawed character of the theories underlying these policies; (4) Latin American immigrant communities have evolved from a barely noticed presence to a major structural factor in the economic and political development of their sending countries; and (5) the Latin immigrant population is having a profound influence on the culture and politics of the cities and regions where it concentrates. However, neither the culture nor the political orientations that these immigrants bring is incompatible with integration into U.S. society.

This latter point is particularly important in the light of recent and widely publicized critiques, including those by Harvard professor Samuel Huntington, about the negative effects of the Hispanic presence for U.S. national integration. I will discuss such critiques in the conclusion.

NATIONAL REACH

While Latin immigrants, and the Hispanic population in general, remain concentrated in the South and West, where three-fourths of them still live, new immigrants have begun to migrate and settle in significant numbers in regions outside the traditional areas of settlement. In 1990, eleven states had less than 1% Hispanic population; by 2000, the number of those states dropped to just three. Georgia, for example, went from 1.7% Hispanic in 1990 to 5.3% in 2000, a 312% increase that resulted from an inflow of over 300,000 persons.

Although just two states, Texas and California, continue to account for about half of the Hispanic population, it is clear that new clusters are being created continuously by two forces: the gradual expansion of Mexican labor migration eastward, and the settlement of immigrants from Central and South America in new areas of the country. Driven, in part, by the rigors of tighter border enforcement, which has made the traditional cyclical migrant flow more difficult, Mexican laborers have become more settled and have trekked east, attracted by new and better employment. New York, Florida, and the Carolinas have been principal targets of this eastward flow, which has turned Mexican labor migration into a national phenomenon (Massey et al., 2002; Smith 1992, 1998).

At the same time, Central and South Americans, who comprise just 8.6% of the Hispanic population but are its fastest growing components, have spread around the country, targeting both traditional and new areas of settlement. There are, for example, large concentrations of Dominicans in Providence, Rhode Island, and Boston, Massachusetts; Colombians in New Jersey and Los Angeles; Salvadorans in Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles; and Brazilians in Massachusetts (Guarnizo et al., 1999; Itzigsohn et al., 1999; Landolt 2000; Levitt 1997). Such movements have turned Hispanics into a truly national presence.

HISPANIC IMMIGRANTS AS MANUAL LABORERS

The most potent factor accounting for the surge in Latin American immigration, aside from the consolidation of social networks across national borders, has been the labor needs of the U.S. economy. This huge economy, surpassing $14 trillion of GDP in 2006, generates a vast demand for foreign labor at both the high end of professional and technical occupations and the low-end of low-paid manual jobs (Bean and Stevens, 2003; U.S. Bureau of the Census 2000, p. 451). While Mexican,

Argentinian, and Colombian engineers are found in significant numbers in Silicon Valley and other areas of high-tech industrial concentration, the bulk of Latino and especially Mexican migrant labor comes to fill needs at the bottom of the U.S. labor market. With just 31% of high school graduates and 5% of college graduates, the Mexican immigrant population of the United States ranks dead last in human capital among major foreign nationalities and is separated by a vast gap from the average education of the native-born population, 84% of whom have a high school diploma and 24% a college degree. Central Americans, especially Salvadorans and Guatemalans, are not in a much better position (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999).

It is commonly forgotten that the modest educational and occupational composition of Mexican and Central American migrants is not due to unusually bad educational systems in the sending countries, but to geographic location. Other countries in Asia and Africa are poorer and have larger proportions of poorly educated peasants. However, they do not share a 2000-mile border with the world's first economy. This geographic accident has operated to turn Mexico, a large country, into the principal labor reservoir for the U.S. economy. The recruitment process started in the nineteenth century, when paid agents were sent into the interior of the Mexican republic to ship peasants north to labor-hungry ranches and railroads (Barrera 1980; Massey et al., 1987; Portes and Bach, 1985). The process never really ended and has continued, in one form or another, to this day. Establishment of the Mexican inbond or *maquiladora* program in the 1960s represented just another way to tap into the vast Mexican labor reservoir (Fernández-Kelly 1983; Gereffi et al., 2002).

Salvadoran and Guatemalan peasants were not targets of deliberate labor recruitment, at least not at the start of their massive trek north. The countries of origin were just too small and too remote for that purpose. Instead, murderous civil wars in both countries turned large numbers of their rural populations into refugees, who first escaped to Mexico and then to the United States, attaching themselves to the northward labor flow. Once in the United States, most Salvadorans and Guatemalans found themselves in conditions of disadvantage comparable to those of Mexicans—with low levels of formal education, facing discrimination by the native population, and often without papers. Not surprisingly, they joined Mexicans at the bottom of the labor market, reinforcing the characterization of Hispanics as a population of poor menial workers (Landolt et al., 1999; Landolt 2000; Menjívar 2000; Popkin 1999).

Quite clearly, this characterization does not apply to the entire Latin American–origin population. Cuban refugees, possessing higher levels of human capital and having been favorably received by the U.S. government, created a vibrant entrepreneurial enclave in Miami, propelling themselves and their children into positions of social and economic advantage. A quarter of a century after their arrival, they had taken over the city politically, controlling a large number of electoral and appointed positions (Portes and Stepick, 1993; Stepick et al., 2003). Dominicans also created an entrepreneurial enclave in northern Manhattan and operate many businesses in their principal areas of concentration along the New York–Boston corridor (Itzigsohn et al., 1999; Portes and Guarnizo, 1991). Many South Americans, coming from more distant lands, also arrive with higher levels of human capital. Colombians, Argentinians, and Brazilians often become entrepreneurs or make their way into professional occupations (Guarnizo et al., 1999; Margolis 1994). Finally, descendants of early Mexican and Puerto Rican migrant workers have also moved up the occupational ladder through higher educational attainment (Bean and Stevens, 2003; De la Garza et al., 1992; Moore and Pachon, 1985).

Yet, for all of these differences, the overwhelming size of Mexican immigration, its human-capital characteristics, and the continuation over time of these character-

istics, now reinforced by large Central American contingents, have given the Hispanic population its dominant economic and occupational profile. A clear bifurcation is currently emerging between the two main components of U.S.-bound immigration: well-educated immigrant professionals and entrepreneurs, mostly immigrants from Asia, are poised to occupy positions of increasing advantage and social rank in U.S. society. In contrast, driven by a sustained low-wage manual-labor flow, Hispanics will have to climb their way up over several generations. Even those groups with higher levels of human capital and entrepreneurial prowess cannot escape the dominant public characterization of Hispanics, which is being defined by continuing manual-labor immigration.

ENFORCEMENT POLICIES

Although couched in general language, all U.S. legislative and policy efforts at controlling unauthorized immigration have been directed mainly at one region, Latin America, and at one country, Mexico, where over 90% of the "problem" originates. Take Mexico and Latin America off the map and all the "threats" to the United States allegedly posed by illegal immigration would instantly go away. Efforts to achieve the goal of stopping this flow—implemented after endless select commissions, study groups, and congressional hearings—have come to naught and have in many instances backfired, leading to the consolidation and growth of the unauthorized population (Massey et al., 2002).

Apprehensions of unauthorized migrants declined slightly after passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), only to climb right back up in the 1990s. For every year during the last decade, over 1 million apprehensions of unauthorized aliens have been reported by the government. In 2005, the number reached 1.3 million, 98% of which took place along the southwestern border. Over 95% of apprehended migrants were Mexicans and Central Americans (Office of Immigration Statistics 2005). As is well-known, apprehended migrants try again and again to enter the United States until they have successfully entered undetected. According to the "repeated trials model," developed empirically by Espenshade, such migrants generally succeed after two or three attempts. The chance of succeeding rises to 80% by the fourth attempt. Thus, the figure for apprehensions can be read as a conservative estimate of the number of immigrants who actually manage to slip by (Espenshade 1990, 1995).[2]

The principal reason why border-control policies have failed so resoundingly, turning unauthorized immigration into a national rather than a regional phenomenon, is that they clash directly with the structural demands of the U.S. economy, as described above. The same unauthorized worker caught and turned back at the border is the one for whom thousands of U.S. employers—ranchers, farmers, landscapers, construction-crew bosses, restaurant owners—are clamoring. The fit between the widespread demand in the U.S. economy for low-wage laborers and the desire of migrants to take manual jobs as a way to improve their lot is so strong as to defy police barriers (Portes 1979; Bach 1978; Cornelius 1998a). If high fences and more agents are put in place in San Diego or El Paso, the flow just moves elsewhere, with migrants braving the desert and risking death, if necessary (Massey et al., 2002; Cornelius 1998b).

While the continuation of mass unauthorized migration leaves in its wake a series of negative consequences (to be discussed below), it should be kept in mind that responsibility for this phenomenon lies as much with the immigrants as with their employers, a point which the new nativists and self-appointed guardians of national integrity conveniently forget. To anticipate the argument concerning

Samuel Huntington's recent critique, the "alien invasion" from Mexico and elsewhere is ultimately a "made in America" product, driven by the structural characteristics of the U.S. economy.

The second reason why the unauthorized flow is unstoppable is the consolidation of social networks between places of origin and destination. These networks include not only the migrants themselves and their kin left behind, but their U.S. employers and the vast number of subcontractors that have emerged to sidestep restrictive provisions of the immigration law. Every time an employer approaches one of his Mexican or Central American workers for a referral to fill an opening, every time a large corporation asks its cleaning or landscaping subcontractors for new services, they mobilize social networks reaching back into remote corners of Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Mature migrant networks can sustain the flow across the border even in the face of fluctuations in labor demand. Once such cross-border networks become consolidated, other reasons for migration, including those involving family obligations, enter the picture, while the community itself can become a source of employment for newcomers (Portes and Bach, 1985; Massey and Espinosa, 1997; Goldring 2002). These forces have been repeatedly ignored by border enforcement efforts, leading, with equal regularity, to their failure.

For the current Hispanic population of the United States, the continuation of the unauthorized inflow has three major consequences. First, the relentless expansion of their numbers easily outstrips in relative and even absolute terms that of any other segment of the U.S. population. Second, the unauthorized inflow results in the consolidation of their objective position and the public's perception of their position at the bottom of the U.S. labor market and the national hierarchies of wealth and social status. No matter how many professionals, business people, and political figures are generated by immigrant communities from other Latin American countries, no matter how much progress descendants of earlier Mexican migrants manage to make, the relentless flow of unauthorized migrants from south of the border drives down the aggregate figures, reinforcing the image and the reality of a predominantly low-income, low-status population. This strengthens, in turn, stereotypes among the native-born about the character and the place of Hispanics in U.S. society.

The third consequence is the rise of a second generation growing up in conditions of severe disadvantage, an issue which will be addressed at length in the final section of this paper. Here, it suffices to point out that the policy of vigorous border enforcement, while failing to stop the unauthorized labor flow, has succeeded in producing an unexpected consequence for the second generation. Because workers without papers find it more and more difficult to maintain their traditional commuting pattern across the border, they opt to bring their families and settle with them permanently on the U.S. side. This leads, in turn, to the growth of an infant population which would otherwise have grown up in Mexico or Central America. Instead they grow up in the United States, as part of a second generation subject to the challenges of poverty, feeble communities, and generalized prejudice. Figure 1 graphically portrays this sequence of events. Each of these three consequences has evident implications for the current Hispanic population of the United States.

THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES

There was a time when Mexican immigrants who left their country to settle in the United States were regarded as little more than defectors. If they became U.S. citizens, they lost all rights to their Mexican nationality, and their children were



Source: Portes and DeWind (2007, p. 16).

Fig. 1. Immigration Border Control and Its Unexpected Consequences

derisively referred to as *pochos* (Grebler et al., 1970; Barrera 1980). How times have changed. Today, Mexico's president refers to his nationals abroad as *VIP*s (Very Important *Paisanos*). For no less than two decades now, the Mexican federal and state governments have devised a series of measures to court their emigrant population and retain its loyalty. Such measures have culminated in laws allowing Mexicans abroad to vote in national and state elections and permitting them to become U.S. citizens while retaining their Mexican nationality (Goldring 2002; Smith 1998).

Roberts et al. (1999) have applied Hirschman's (1970) famous typology of "exit, voice, and loyalty" to the specific case of Mexico's diaspora. They argue that Mexican emigration has had a major consequence for the status of those who went abroad: by exiting their country, these former peasants and workers, who previously lacked any voice in national or local political affairs, have acquired a powerful one, as federal and state governments seek to maintain and increase their loyalty. Today, a visit by the governor of Zacatecas or the mayor of a large Mexican city to their constituents in Los Angeles or Houston is a common event (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998). By implementing the *Tres-por-uno* [Three-for-one] program, the Mexican government, first, and some state governments, subsequently, have sought to encourage the flow of migrant dollars to their home communities by tripling each dollar sent for public works from abroad (Goldring 2002).

The transformation of the Mexican diaspora from a derided and forgotten group to an integral part of the nation has been repeated in every major country of emigration in Latin America—from El Salvador to Colombia, and from the Dominican Republic to Brazil. An extensive literature on what are now called "transnational communities" describes these linkages and the progressive integration of emigrants with their hometowns and nations (Portes 2001; Guarnizo et al., 1999; Landolt et al., 1999).

In every case, the consolidation of communities straddling national borders has resulted from the combination of two sets of forces. First, migrants themselves have sought to preserve these ties through remittances to family and kin, periodic visits home, and the creation of philanthropic and civic committees to help to improve public services and opportunities in their places of origin (Vertovec 1999; Levitt 2001). Second, new communications and transportation technologies have greatly facilitated these movements, transforming what originally were scattered individual initiatives into a social phenomenon of massive, regular, and predictable dimensions. Governments of sending countries have increasingly taken note of these transfers, and of their economic and political significance. Today, remittances sent by Latin American expatriates far exceed the foreign aid received by the region, and rival in size the sum total of foreign direct investments (*Latin American Weekly Report* 2003). In countries such as El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and even Mexico, expatriate remittances figure among the top three sources of foreign exchange, often exceeding the combined total of the country's traditional exports (Itzigsohn et al., 1999; Landolt 2001; Portes et al., 2007).

The volume of migrant remittances is not only vast, but it exhibits remarkable regularity and stability over time. These features have allowed international banks to collateralize loans to sending countries with the amount of expected migrant remittances in future years. As Guarnizo (2003) notes, the migrant worker laboring hard to support his family at home could scarcely imagine that the few dollars that he sends home every month are recorded, along with those sent by thousands of his compatriots, in the financial houses of New York and used as predictors and estimates of balance of payment accounts, national foreign-currency reserves, and aggregate growth rates.

Transnational communities carry increasing weight, not only in the economic sphere, but in the political and cultural ones as well. Political parties in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Colombia have offices and representatives in Los Angeles, Miami, New York, and other cities where their nationals concentrate. Electoral candidates in these and other countries regularly travel abroad to solicit campaign contributions and, these days, votes from their compatriots (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Portes 2001). In turn, this dense back-and-forth traffic of information,

goods, and people deeply influences the hometowns whose culture and everyday social life are thus transformed. Cities and regions are "transnationalized," with events occurring in distant North American locations being as important and as closely monitored as those taking place locally. As a young Salvadoran sociologist has put it: "Migration, remittances, and the rise of communities abroad have become the true economic adjustment program of the poor" (Ramos 2002). And, as Levitt adds in the case of Miraflores, a migrant-sending town in the Dominican Republic:

> Migration has completely transformed village life. Numerous houses have been renovated with U.S. dollars. They are crowded with the clothes, appliances, toys, and food that migrants bring back. Almost everyone in Miraflores can talk about "La Mozart" or "La Centre" or Mozart Street Park and Centre Street, two focal points of the migrant community in Boston (Levitt 2001, p. 200).

The growth of transnational ties is significantly transforming both the Hispanic immigrant communities in the United States and their nations of origin. Formerly forgotten and marginalized immigrants have acquired an increasing economic, political, and cultural presence, such that the future development prospects of their home nations and communities become inextricably linked to the expatriates' material and cultural resources. Three decades ago, theories of development in Latin America focused on issues of dependency, imperialism, and modernization, with little attention paid to emigration. No longer. Little by little, the humble activities of migrant peasants and workers have moved from nowhere to take center stage in the present situation and future prospects of their communities and countries. Figure 2 summarizes this process.

The consolidation of transnational communities has, unfortunately, added ammunition to the complaints of neonativists about the cultural and political disintegration of the United States brought about by immigration. Writing without knowledge of the facts, these critics—currently led by Professor Samuel Huntington—decry these activities as evidence that Mexicans and other immigrants do not wish to assimilate. Such arguments are contradicted by two important considerations. First, adult immigrants have always maintained an abiding interest in the affairs of their homeland, but these activities are essentially a first-generation phenomenon. Now, as in the past, their offspring promptly acculturate to their new environment, dropping in the process parental concerns about the places left behind. By the second generation, active transnationalism effectively disappears (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001).

Second, most of the transnational activities in which immigrants engage are directed at improving their places of origin *according to the standards learned abroad*—that is, in the United States. These aims include not only promoting public works and physical improvements, but infusing local politics with moral standards so as to render it less corrupt and more participatory (Landolt et al., 1999; Goldring 2002; Smith 1998). Seen through this optic, it is more likely that places of origin will come to resemble those where migrants settle in the United States, rather than vice versa (Levitt 2001; Guarnizo 2003).

It is worth reflecting, finally, on the relationship between these developments and those described above. There is more than a little irony in the fact that the masses of low-paid manual workers from Latin America, continuously pulling the Hispanic population toward the bottom of U.S. society, become so important and so celebrated in their countries of origin. At the core of this paradox are the



Source: Portes and DeWind (2007)

Fig. 2. The Rise and Impact of Immigrant Transnationalism

enormous disparities in power and wealth and the hegemony exercised by the United States throughout the hemisphere. U.S. employers can safely tap what is, in effect, an inexhaustible labor supply, and in the process recreate and redefine the Hispanic population of the United States. The wages that these migrants receive, albeit low by U.S. standards, become important in the aggregate for the survival and improvement of families, communities, and, today, entire national economies. Thus arises the paradox that the migrant, discriminated and frequently exploited in the United States, becomes an economic hero, a *VIP*, for the people and the places left behind.

DIVERSITY AND UNITY

As sociologist Douglas Massey observed a few years ago, the term *Hispanic* is problematic:

> There is, in short, no Hispanic population in the sense that there is a Black population. Hispanics share no common historical memory and do not comprise a single, coherent community. Rather, they are a disparate collection of national origin groups with heterogeneous experiences of settlement, immigration, political participation, and economic incorporation . . . the only thing reasonably certain is that the person in question or some progenitor once lived in an area originally colonized by Spain (Massey 1993, p. 454).

Indeed, there is a great deal of diversity in national origin and generation among the population classified as *Hispanic*. Contemporary immigrants from Latin America who replenish and add to this population (by having children) are themselves different in terms of human capital, modes of incorporation, patterns of settlement, levels of transnationalism, and political orientation. Table 1 presents data on the five largest Hispanic immigrant nationalities in 2000, and the respective legal immigrant flows in the following year.[3] Three things are immediately apparent from these figures. First, there is an enormous disparity in size, with Mexicans eclipsing all other groups. Mexicans are almost twenty times more numerous than Cubans, the next largest nationality, and Mexicans outnumber all other legal immigrants from Latin America by a ratio of ten to one.

Second, these figures show the very different spatial settlement patterns of these five nationalities. Cubans are, by far, the most concentrated, with two-thirds settling in Miami and its environs. They are followed by Dominicans, who cluster heavily in New York City and surrounding areas. The Mexican and Salvadoran flows are similar, being more dispersed and featuring their largest concentrations in Los Angeles. The principal secondary cluster of Mexican immigrants is, perhaps surprisingly, in Chicago, while that of Salvadorans is in Washington, D.C. Finally, Colombians are also dispersed, featuring smaller concentrations in Miami and New York City and their environs.

Third, the table also makes apparent the significant differences in the human-capital composition of each immigrant nationality. Professionals and administrators represented 62 per 1000 of all Colombian immigrants in 2001 (38% among those declaring an occupation). The figure drops to less than 50 per 1000 among Cubans and Dominicans, and then to less than 10 per 1000 among Mexicans and Salvadorans (approximately 10% among those declaring an occupation). The size of these last two groups combined dominates the averages, reinforcing the characterization of the Hispanic immigrant population as, overwhelmingly, a low-skilled work flow.

To these differences must be added those in political orientation, and in transnational ties with sending countries. As is well-known, Cuban American politics in Miami, characterized by a strong right-wing tilt and militancy, differs dramatically from Hispanic politics in the rest of the nation. Because of their spatial concentration and high levels of citizenship acquisition and electoral mobilization, Cubans have become a very influential force in local and state politics, electing a number of their own to mayoral posts, the Florida legislature, and the U.S. Congress. Because of well-known historical reasons, Cubans have aligned, by and large, with the Republican party and played an important role in the State of Florida in the 2000 presidential election (Portes 2003a; Pérez 1992).

Table 1. The Hispanic Population of the United States—Its Five Largest Immigrant Components[4]

Characteristics	Nationality				
	Mexicans	Cubans	Dominicans	Salvadorans	Colombians
Size in 2000	20,600,000	1,200,000	765,000	655,000	471,000
Percent of Hispanic Population	58.5	2.5	2.1	1.9	1.3
Legal Immigrants, 2001	206,426	27,703	21,313	31,272	16,730
Percent of Total Immigration, 2001	19.4	2.6	2.0	2.9	1.6
Principal Cities of Destination[5]					
Bergen-Passaic, NJ	—	—	1,248 (5.8)	—	—
Chicago, IL	11,165 (5.3)	—	—	—	—
Houston, TX	9,447 (4.4)	—	—	2,302 (7.4)	—
Los Angeles, CA	33,427 (16.0)	—	—	8,623 (27.6)	—
Miami, FL	—	18,425 (66.5)	—	—	2,642 (15.8)
New York, NY	—	—	9,787 (45.9)	1,478 (4.3)	2,066 (12.3)
San Diego, CA	10,558 (4.8)	—	—	—	—
Washington, DC	—	—	—	5,045 (16.8)	—
Professional/Executive Occupations per Thousand Immigrants in 2001[6]	7.4	47.2	41.6	9.2	62.0

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000) and Office of Immigration Statistics (2002).

The Mexican population is, potentially, a far more important political force, but its dispersion, low rates of citizenship acquisition, and low rates of electoral mobilization have, until recently, reduced its influence. This situation has been changing rapidly, as the Mexican American population mobilized to fight off discriminatory and anti-immigrant measures, such as Proposition 187 in California, and as Mexican American leaders conducted effective campaigns to increase naturalization and electoral registration rates (De la Garza et al., 1992; López and Stanton-Salazar, 2001; Watanabe 2003). In contrast to Cubans, Mexican Americans have overwhelmingly supported progressive political forces aligned with the Democratic party. As their political power has increased, however, sustained efforts have been made by Republicans to break into this Democratic stronghold. These efforts have so far yielded mixed results.

Colombians, Dominicans, and Salvadorans are more recent immigrant groups whose political activities are dominated by concerns with their home country or with immigration-related issues. These groups are, overwhelmingly, first-generation immigrants whose politics are not driven by the fervent anticommunism of Cubans or the struggle to overcome historic patterns of ethnic and racial discrimination, as in the case of Mexicans. By and large, the political activism of these three groups is of a *transnational* character, although there are significant differences among them. Table 2 reproduces results of a study that sought to map the extent of transnational political and cultural activities among these groups in their principal areas of destination: New York and environs, for Colombians and Dominicans; and Los Angeles and Washington, D.C., for Salvadorans (Portes 2003b; Guarnizo et al., 2003).

The study found that up to one-fifth of sampled immigrants are members of a home country political party and/or make contributions in time and money to

Table 2. Transnational Political and Civic Activities among Colombian, Dominican, and Salvadoran Immigrants in the United States, 2001

	National Origin			
Activity[7]	Colombian	Dominican	Salvadoran	Total
Political				
Member of a home country political party	18.7	22.8	14.3	18.3
Gives money to home country political party	5.1	15.8	9.8	11.5
Takes part in home country political campaigns	10.6	18.8	10.7	13.8
Civic				
Member of a hometown civic association	18.0	19.9	37.5	27.7
Member of a charity association in home country	29.9	21.6	40.3	31.4
Gives money for community projects in home country	18.7	18.4	33.6	25.4
Travels to attend hometown festivities	13.5	19.5	16.2	17.1
N[8]	311	418	473	1,202

Source: Guarnizo et al. (2003, Table 3).

electoral campaigns there. Dominican immigrants are significantly more likely to take part in these activities, an orientation that is reflected and promoted by the offices maintained by the major Dominican parties in New York (Itzigsohn et al., 1999). For their part, Salvadorans, are adept at organizing civic committees and philanthropic associations in support of their hometowns. Up to 40% of sampled Salvadoran immigrants take part in these activities, which are often explicitly defined as "apolitical." Despite this self-definition, the civic and philanthropic activities of Salvadoran expatriates can have significant influence in local and departmental politics at home, given the magnitude of the resources that they are capable of mobilizing (Menjívar 2000; Landolt 2000; Portes and Mooney, 2002).

Despite numerous differences among Latin American–origin groups, there are also signs of convergence. The emergence of a unified Hispanic population out of these very diverse origins and patterns of settlement is promoted by four mutually reinforcing forces. First, there is a common culture, grounded in language and religion. Unlike the groups classified as *Asian* who cannot understand one another, nearly all Latin American immigrants share the same language: Spanish (in the case of Brazilians, the closely related Portuguese). While a rising number of these immigrants have converted to Protestantism, they share a common religious background: Catholicism. Despite the inroads made by Protestant sects, the Catholic Church is still paramount in the daily lives of most Latino immigrants in the United States (Levitt 2003; Hirschman 2003).

Second, the power of the state is bent on turning Hispanics into a "real" ethnic minority. Nagel (1986) demonstrated some time ago that the state can manufacture ethnicities and even races by the simple expedient of cataloguing and treating people "as if" they belonged to the same group. Something of the sort is happening with Latin American immigrants and their descendants. Whether they like it or not, they are classified by federal institutions as part of the same ethnic minority; endless reams of government-issued documents and academic studies label them accordingly; and second-generation children are taught, in no uncertain terms, that *Hispanic* is the ethnic group—or even race—to which they belong (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001, Chapter 8; Massey 1993).

The enormous power of the media has also contributed to this manufacturing of ethnicity, as press articles, television programs, and films regularly dismiss national differences within the Spanish-speaking population, referring to its members by the same uniform term. There are, for example, frequent references to *Hispanic* music, films, literature, and sports, though they may originate from different countries and reflect distinct national cultures.

A third reason for convergence is the absolute numerical dominance of Mexican immigrants and their descendants in the population labeled *Hispanic*. Without Mexicans, all other Latin American-origin groups would have no more than local significance. Mexican immigration and its descendants have turned Hispanics into a truly national presence. Thus, all other groups are driven by the Mexican population as cars by a locomotive. The homogenizing pressures of the state and the media are not applied to a set of numerically comparable nationalities, but to a population dominated by a single, core group, with others as mostly local phenomena.

The fourth reason for convergence is closely related to the last and has to do with both self-interest and strength in numbers. Despite all the differences, politicians, entrepreneurs, and professionals have a vested interest in a unified Hispanic population. For politicians of Mexican and non-Mexican origin alike, this means more votes and greater clout. For entrepreneurs, it means a larger, richer market. For professionals, it means access to government and corporate jobs as representa-

tives of a large minority population; and access to a larger clientele, for those in private practice. The growth of the Hispanic population and its public image as a unified entity thus offer opportunities and paths of mobility that would not exist were its component groups dealt with as separate minorities.

For these reasons, it is quite possible that what started as a label of convenience used by census officials to group together diverse Spanish-speaking groups becomes a sociological reality. A telling indication of that trend is the fact that, in the 2000 U.S. Census, 17.3% (6.1 million persons) of those who classified themselves as *Hispanic* did not specify any national origin. This proportion was higher than that of any national group, except Mexicans. This suggests that a significant number of U.S. Hispanics have come to accept the label, having left their national origins behind (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001).

Running against this trend are the continuousness of immigration and the growing transnational ties between first-generation immigrants and their countries of origin. New immigrants replenish the ranks of those who retain strong loyalties toward their home countries and regions. Sending-country governments cannot be all that sympathetic with the emergence of a synthetic, made-in-the-U.S.A. ethnicity that undermines national loyalties. Thus, they can be expected to continue implementing programs designed to preserve enduring and exclusive country ties and commitments among their expatriates.

In the end, the emergence of a pan-national Hispanic minority in the United States is a product of assimilation and, hence, of the "race" between continuing immigration and time. New Cuban, Dominican, or Mexican immigrants do not know that they are *Hispanic* until they are informed of that fact upon arrival. It takes time for the four-fold set of forces described above to make itself felt. By and large, its weight and influence fall far more heavily on the children—with the second generation undergoing rapid acculturation to U.S. society—than on their foreign-born parents. Thus the irony that a label originally coined to refer to the Spanish-speaking immigrant population has become more real and more self-consciously accepted among assimilated descendants for whom Spanish and the countries from which their ancestors came have become a fading presence.

THE NEW SECOND GENERATION

Until recently, the study of contemporary immigration to the United States focused on the immigrants themselves, their reasons for coming, and their patterns of adaptation. Only in the last few years has this focus shifted, upon realization of the lasting importance of the second generation. First-generation immigrants have always been a restless bunch—here today and gone tomorrow; *in* the country, but not yet *of* it. By contrast, their U.S.-born and reared children are, for the most part, here to stay. As citizens, fully imbued with U.S. culture and aspirations, this second generation and their patterns of adaptation will play the decisive role in the long-term fate of the ethnic groups created by contemporary immigration (Zhou 1997; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996, Chapter 7).

Today, one in almost four Americans under the age of eighteen is an immigrant or the child of an immigrant. This proportion is growing fast, fueled by continuing immigration and the higher-than-average fertility of many immigrant groups. Although still young, a rising number of children of post-1960 immigrants are reaching adulthood; a majority of this emerging population is of Latin origin (Jensen 2001; Rumbaut 1994). At first glance, and based on the experience of descendants of earlier

European immigrants, we might assume that the adaptation process of the new second generation will be relatively straightforward: children will gradually leave foreign languages and identities behind, embrace U.S. culture, and claim and receive their rightful place in the economic and social mainstream (Gordon 1964; Alba and Nee, 1997).

While there is some truth in this "straight-line" assimilation story, there are important ways in which it does not capture reality. There are groups among today's second generation slated for a smooth transition into the U.S. middle and upper classes, riding on their parents' human capital and material resources. Their ethnicity will become optional, displayed on occasion and when convenient. There are others who will claw their way upward, despite poverty, based on family solidarity and the support of coethnic communities. For them, ethnicity and the social networks linked to it will become a key resource and a strong basis for self-identity and pride. Still others are at risk of joining the underworld of gangs, drugs, prison, adolescent pregnancies, and early death that comprise the nightmare of U.S. inner cities. For these youths, their ethnicity will be neither an option nor a badge of pride, but a sign of permanent subordination (Vigil 2002; Bourgois 1995).

These divergent paths have been labeled *segmented assimilation* to highlight the fact that integration into U.S. life and culture is not always a ticket to upward economic mobility and social acceptance (Portes and Zhou, 1993). Despite the rosy descriptions of nativists and assimilationists, the United States is not a uniform dreamland, but a complex entity marked by profound class and racial inequalities and featuring very different lifestyles and levels of opportunity. The future of the immigrant second generation largely depends on the *sectors* of this complex society toward which it assimilates. This process is, in turn, determined by how the immigrant parents are received, the resources that they bring with them, and the social and economic challenges that their offspring confront. The Hispanic second generation experiences all of these challenges, and its members can be found along each of the segmented assimilation paths. The next sections summarize the forces at play and their likely results.

OBSTACLES TO UPWARD ASSIMILATION

Racism: American Style

Many immigrants confront the reality and impact of racism only upon arrival in the United States. Still, they have the resources of their early socialization in other countries to fall back upon. This is not the case with their U.S.-born offspring, who must face the reality of American racism head on. A telling demonstration of the difference is provided by data from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), the largest study of the contemporary second generation conducted over a ten-year period in the metropolitan areas of Miami and San Diego (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001). Table 3 presents responses of Latino immigrant parents and their children to a question about their race. The question was asked during the second CILS survey, when children's average age was seventeen. The closed-response options of this survey were based on the standard census categories: *White*, *Black*, *Asian*, *Multiracial*, or *Other*. If the latter, respondents were asked to write in their racial self-definition.

As seen in Table 3, most immigrant parents did not confuse their ethnicity with their race, but many of their offspring did. Among Cubans, 93% of the parents self-identified as *White*, but only 41% of their children agreed. Of the latter, 36%

Table 3. Racial Identifications of Latin American Immigrants and their Children, 1996

Nationality	Respondent	White (%)	Black (%)	Asian (%)	Multiracial (%)	Other (%)	Hispanic/Latino (%)	National Origin (%)
Cuban	Child	41.2	0.8	—	11.5	4.9	36.0	5.5
	Parent	93.1	1.1	0.3	2.5	1.4	1.1	0.5
Mexican	Child	1.5	—	—	12.0	4.5	25.5	56.2
	Parent	5.7	—	2.1	21.6	28.5	15.9	26.1
Nicaraguan	Child	19.4	—	—	9.7	6.5	61.8	2.7
	Parent	67.7	0.5	1.6	22.0	2.2	5.4	0.5
Other Latin American	Child	22.8	1.9	—	14.7	3.1	52.9	4.6
	Parent	69.5	4.6	0.8	17.8	3.1	2.3	1.9

Sources: Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), second-wave and parental survey; Portes and Rumbaut (2001, Table 7.7).

said that they belonged to the *Hispanic* race, a figure that climbed to 62% for second-generation Nicaraguans, and 53% for others. A majority of Mexican parents self-identified as *Multiracial* or *Other*, while over 80% of their children identified themselves as belonging to the *Mexican* or the *Hispanic* race (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001, pp. 176–177).

This conflation of ethnicity and race is a clear reflection of acculturation to U.S. stereotypes and their impact on self-perceptions. By being constantly defined and treated as *Hispanic*, young people come to see the label not only as a matter of culture, language, or religion, but as a genetically transmitted phenotype. For Mexican Americans, the situation is still more egregious, as they come to identify their nationality with their biological race. The fact that the majority of the Latin second generation regard themselves as members of a racial minority is a consequence of their real-life experiences in a society where prejudice and discrimination are common and racial features paramount. In the process, the label *Hispanic* has traveled all the way from a classificatory convenience to what is regarded as a biologically transmitted trait.

It is thus not surprising that half of second-generation Latin youths and up to two-thirds of Mexican Americans report having suffered discrimination, and that one-third of the latter group believe that they will continue to experience discrimination "no matter how much education I get" (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001, pp. 38–40). The irony noted earlier—that the *Hispanic* label "hardens" among acculturated groups whose knowledge of the Spanish language and culture is increasingly attenuated—further solidifies when their ethnicity becomes identified as their race. The initially implausible but socially created belief that Hispanics are a race has definite consequences on the plans, perceptions, and actions of young people adapting to mainstream U.S. society.

Segmented Labor Markets

There was a time when children of unskilled working-class immigrants could improve their situation as skilled workers and supervisors by working in the same factories that employed their parents. This slow movement upward gave rise to the stable working-class ethnic communities dotting the U.S. industrial heartland. Descendants of Italian, Polish, and Russian immigrants lived there; they were content with a well-paid manual job; a college education was a dream that often had to wait until the third or fourth generation (Rosenblum 1973; Bonacich 1976; Edwards 1979).

No longer. The very fast process of deindustrialization beginning in the 1960s and accelerating thereafter did away with the industrial job ladders of the past during the very period when the immigration doors reopened, following the abolition of national quotas in 1965 (Bean and Stevens, 2003). The result was a progressive segmentation of the U.S. labor market into an upper tier of professional and technical occupations requiring advanced education, and a lower tier of menial, poorly paid occupations in services, construction, and agriculture. The metaphor of an *hourglass* aptly captures these developments (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Romo and Schwartz, 1995). Low-skilled immigrants from Mexico and elsewhere responded to this situation by crowding into the bottom of the hourglass. Their offspring, however, imbued with U.S. culture and values, aim much higher (Gans 1992; Portes and Zhou, 1993).

The problem is that to achieve these lofty aspirations, the children of immigrants must bridge in the span of one generation the educational gap that took earlier immigrant groups several generations to cross. The decisive role of education in

gaining access to professional, technical, and entrepreneurial opportunities means that only those who manage to stay in school and achieve a college degree or a solid vocational education stand a good chance of turning their "American dream" ambitions into reality. For others, the future looks rather grim, as they are likely to face occupational prospects not much better than those of their parents. Those who regard such jobs as beneath them have few other options and may turn toward deviant and semideviant lifestyles, leading to downward assimilation.

Second-generation youths are well aware of the importance of education. As shown in Table 4, large proportions of late adolescents aspire to attain an advanced postcollege degree, and many actually expect to achieve it. Note, however, the marked differences among nationalities. Cuban Americans attending private school in Miami are mostly the children of early middle-class exiles who arrived prior to the Mariel exodus of 1980 (Pérez 2001; Portes and Stepick, 1993). Among these youths, 85% aspired to an advanced university degree in late adolescence, and three-fourths were confident of attaining it. The proportion expecting such a degree drops significantly to about 50%, among public school Cubans (mostly the offspring of Mariel and post-Mariel exodus arrivals), Nicaraguans, Colombians, and other Latin Americans. It then drops further, to just 25% among children of Mexican immigrants.

The research literature consistently shows that educational aspirations and expectations are among the strongest predictors of educational attainment (Sewell and Hauser, 1972; Alexander and Pallas, 1983; Rosenbaum 2002). Our own findings, presented below, confirm that fact. Thus, from adolescence on, we detect a divergent pattern, where second-generation youths from some nationalities can look confidently into the future based on their own and their family's resources, while majorities of other groups disqualify themselves, at an early age, from this key instrument for upward mobility. No doubt, Mexicans, Dominicans, and other youths in this situation are probably voicing a realistic assessment of their chances, given the poverty of their families and the quality of schools that they have been forced to attend (Fernández-Kelly and Curran, 2001; López and Stanton-Salazar, 2001).

Table 4. Educational Aspirations and Expectations of the Latin American Second Generation, 1996

Nationality	Aspires to an Advanced Degree (%)	Realistically Expects to Attain an Advanced Degree (%)	*N*
Colombian	68.1	43.0	185
Cuban (private school)	84.9	75.3	146
Cuban (public school)	69.2	46.6	822
Dominican	47.4	34.6	78
Haitian	67.4	54.8	135
Mexican	48.4	24.9	599
Nicaraguan	76.9	49.5	281
Other Latin American	68.6	45.4	280
P[9]	.001	.001	
Total[10]	66.5	44.0	4,288

Sources: CILS, second wave; Portes and Rumbaut (2001, Table 8.5).

Poverty and Crime

The third and perhaps more difficult problem faced by children of immigrants and their families is the proliferation of drugs, gangs, and deviant lifestyles in U.S. inner cities. The structural origins of these mutually reinforcing social pathologies have been the subject of intensive research (Wilson 1987; Sullivan 1989; Massey and Denton, 1993). It is not my intention to review here the complex set of causes accounting for the nightmarish situation of U.S. urban ghettos, but to note that immigrants and their children confront it as a *fait accompli*. This difficult situation is, of course, one more of the issues conveniently ignored by nativists and by boosters of assimilation at any price.

Because of their poverty, many immigrant families are forced to settle in inner cities. In the mid-1990s, 89% of second-generation children aged eighteen and under lived in metropolitan areas, as compared with 75% of their native-parentage peers; only 22% of the latter lived in inner cities, while the figure among children of immigrants rose to 31% (Jensen 2001, p. 29). In streets and schools located in poor urban areas, children are exposed to conditions that are in direct opposition to parental expectations for them. The lure of gangs and drugs as a quick way to money and power, and the difficulties in dodging them for those intent on pursuing their education, are everyday facts of life on inner-city streets (Vigil 2002; Dance 2002).

Some immigrant parents have become so distraught at what they see as the permissiveness of U.S. culture and the specific threats posed by gangs and drugs that they have taken to sending their children back home to be educated in the care of grandparents and other kin. In the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and other countries, private schools have sprung up for the specific purpose of reeducating these "refugees" from U.S. streets (Matthei and Smith, 1996; Rohter 1998). The over 2500 immigrant parents interviewed in the course of the second CILS survey in 1996 voiced similar concerns. As Figure 3 shows, significant majorities (over 80%) of



Sources: Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), Parental Survey. Portes and Rumbaut (2001, Table 5.2).

Fig. 3. Immigrant Parents' Concern with Negative Influences on their Children, 1996

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X07070166 Published online by Cambridge University Press

these parents were preoccupied by the negative influences received by their children in school and by the gap between their own values and goals and those of their children's friends. These concerns were universal and were emphasized by all parents, regardless of their nationality or socioeconomic status.

A Nicaraguan father expressed his preoccupation in anguished ways, representative of comments repeatedly heard throughout the course of the study:

> Why? Why? Why should this country, the richest in the world, have such low educational standards and disruptive behavior? It is sad to see this country's children smoking grass or wearing their hair in spikes. How are these youngsters paying back for the opportunities that they receive? You can wear anything to school, you can talk in class—no one can stop you.[11]

Segmented Assimilation on the Ground

A final survey of the CILS project took place in 2001–2002, when the original respondents had reached an average age of twenty-four years. By this time, it was possible to ascertain how the combination of challenges and resources described above played itself out. While prior results of the study had documented early outcomes of the adaptation process in adolescence, results documented by this last survey are "hard" in the sense of showing real-life paths to success and failure, as experienced by these young people. Such outcomes include educational attainment, family and personal income, employment and occupation, language knowledge and use, marriage, early childbearing, and run-ins with the law in the form of arrests and incarceration.

CILS-III contains information on all of these variables. The survey retrieved data on 3564 original respondents, representing 84% of the preceding wave. There is some evidence of bias in this sample relative to the original one, but this can be readily corrected through well-known statistical methods. Table 5 presents our results for Latin American-origin respondents and for the entire sample in Miami and San Diego, adjusted for sampling bias. In terms of education, it shows the offspring of middle-class Cuban exiles who attended private school in Miami to have gone the farthest, with an average of 15.3 years of education, and with only 8% having an educational attainment of high school or less. Many of these respondents are still in school, so educational attainment can be expected to continue to rise.

Colombian Americans come next in educational attainment, followed by Nicaraguan Americans and other Latinos, among whom the number of those ending their education with a high school diploma or less increases to 26%, and the average years of education to just above junior college, at 14.4 years. The worst profile is that of Mexican Americans, among whom almost two-fifths (38%) failed to go beyond high school, and whose average educational attainment is the lowest in the sample. The pattern repeats itself with other indicators of socioeconomic status, such as unemployment, occupational prestige, and family income. On the latter variable, Cuban Americans who attended private school in Miami are the only group to have exceeded $100,000 in average family income. The figure drops to about $60,000 among public school Cubans, Colombians, and Nicaraguans, and just under $40,000 for Mexicans.[12]

Despite their socioeconomic disadvantage, or perhaps because of it, Mexican Americans are far more inclined to communicate solely in English than are other Latin American–origin groups. A sizable minority of young adults of Cuban, Colombian, and Nicaraguan origin (about 40%) prefer bilingualism, combining English

Table 5. Key Second-Generation Adaptation Outcomes by National Origin, 2002

	Education		Family Income		Employment		Children		English		Incarcerated %		
Nationality	Average Years	High School or Less (%)	Mean $	Median $	Unemployed (%)	Occupational Status[13]	Has Children	Mean Number	Prefers English	Prefers Children Bilingual	Total Sample (%)	Males (%)	*N*
Colombian	14.5	17.0	58,339	45,948	2.6	46.91	16.6	1.4	65.5	82.8	6.0	10.7	150
Cuban (Private School)	15.3	7.5	104,767	70,395	3.0	51.98	3.0	1.2	76.5	90.3	2.9	3.9	133
Cuban (Public School)	14.3	21.7	60,816	48,598	6.2	47.20	17.7	1.3	57.6	86.2	5.6	9.2	670
Mexican	13.4	38.0	38,254	32,585	7.3	38.70	41.5	1.5	93.5	88.2	10.8	21.6	408
Nicaraguan	14.2	26.4	54,049	47,054	4.9	46.96	20.1	1.4	59.5	85.8	4.4	7.7	222
Other Latino	14.4	25.5	43,476	31,500	2.2	44.59	15.2	1.7	95.7	71.1	5.7	11.0	47
Total[14]	14.4	22.3	55,642	42,166	9.0	44.85	20.4	1.4	79.5	75.7	5.9	10.9	3,324

Sources: CILS, third wave. Portes et al. (2005, Table 2).

with extensive use of Spanish. Despite these personal differences, strong majorities of *all* second-generation Hispanics express a clear preference for raising their own children to be bilingual.

The mean age of the sample is twenty-four years, an age when young people are completing their education or initiating their work careers. Having children at or before this age represents an extra burden of time and money that often hinders efforts to move ahead educationally or economically. The dictum that "the rich get richer, and the poor get children" is well supported by our results, as shown in the next column of the table. Only 3% of middle-class Cuban Americans had children by early adulthood. The figure rises to 15% to 20% among other Cubans, Colombians, Nicaraguans, and other second-generation youths. Among Mexican Americans, however, it reaches a remarkable 42%. Thus, the Hispanic minority with the lowest average education, the poorest jobs, and the highest rate of unemployment in early adulthood is also the most burdened by premature parenthood. The picture is consistent, demonstrating the cumulative effects of early parental and community characteristics along with external obstacles to successful integration.

The CILS-III survey contains information on incidents of arrest and incarceration. I report results for the latter variable for two reasons. First, unlike instances of arrests, which may be for trivial or erroneous reasons, incarceration generally entails a conviction for a serious offense. Second, the study was able to supplement self-reports by respondents with data from the Florida and California Departments of Corrections. The identity of convicted felons and reasons for their incarceration are public information which can be accessed through the internet sites of these agencies. It is thus possible to arrive at a more reliable estimate of the number of incarcerated youths than through the use of self-reports alone.

Figures in the last column of Table 5 tell the story. Compared with a crime index of 7.6% for the general population of the Miami metropolitan area in 2000, only 3% of Cuban Americans from middle-class families were ever incarcerated. The number climbs steadily to 4% among Nicaraguans, 6% each among Colombians and other Latins, and 11% among Mexicans, the latter of which doubles the sample average. These rates are for both sexes. As is well-known, incidents of arrest and incarceration are far more common among young males. The results portrayed in Figure 4 show the male incarceration rate to be approximately 10% for most second-generation nationalities and for the sample as a whole. The rate then climbs to 19% for other Latins (mostly offspring of Central American immigrants) and over 20% for Mexican Americans.

By way of comparison, the probability of having ever been incarcerated for adult Black males up to the age of forty is 27% (Western 2002). Since respondents in our sample are only in their early twenties, there is every likelihood that offspring of Mexican and Central American immigrants will match or exceed the Black incarceration rate by that age. This is the most tangible evidence of downward assimilation available in these data. The negative outcomes of the process cluster overwhelmingly among children of non-White and poorly educated immigrants, reflecting the effects of low parental human capital, racial discrimination, and a difficult external environment.

While the figures also show that a majority of young persons from the same groups somehow manage to graduate from high school, find jobs, and avoid jail, a sizable minority is being left behind. This conclusion is even more poignant when we realize that the latter group is formed by the fastest growing Hispanic nationalities, created by large and sustained immigrant flows. For example, if present trends continue, the number of young Mexican Americans at risk of downward assimilation



Source: CILS, third wave.

Fig. 4. Incarceration Rates of Second-Generation Latino Males, 2002

into poor education, early parenthood, crime, and jail will exceed the *total* of all other individual Hispanic nationalities combined, as identified in the CILS sample.

CONCLUSION

The rapid growth of the Latin American–origin population represents a phenomenon of great significance both for the United States and for the groups directly involved in the process. While the growing Hispanic presence is viewed with increasing alarm by nativist organizations, there is no intrinsic reason why this population should not be able to integrate successfully into the U.S. mainstream. Latin American immigrants share the same Western and Christian traditions as the receiving population; and their work ethic, family values, and aspirations for the future are the same. Spanish is a Western language with many affinities to English.

The barriers to successful integration are not cultural but structural, along the lines described above. The rapid growth of the Hispanic population is fueled by the continuous arrival of immigrants of generally low human capital, who come to fill a vast demand for manual labor in the U.S. labor market. Their arrival not only drives down the averages in terms of education, occupational status, and income of this population, but it recreates anew the problems and the difficulties confronted by earlier arrivals.

This is the situation giving rise to recent nativist reactions, including Huntington's (2004a) well-known article "The Hispanic Challenge." Written without any original field research, the essay sounds the alarm about what Hispanics, particularly Mexicans, can do to U.S. society, and places responsibility directly on them. Huntington's statements about Hispanic resistance to learn the English language and American ways are so contrary to the evidence that they do not deserve a response.

More on target are Huntington's complaints about the low levels of education of the Mexican immigrant population, its poverty, the low educational aspirations

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1742058X07070166 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of its youths, and these youths' propensity to drop out of school and have children prematurely. As seen previously, there is evidence to support all these tendencies, but *not* Huntington's interpretation of their causes. Mexican laborers coming in such large numbers are in the United States not only because they want to be, but also because they are wanted. U.S. employers—from mom-and-pop businesses to large corporations—benefit greatly from this inflow while neatly sidestepping its social consequences. Vulnerable and unprotected by the law, unauthorized workers are left to fend for themselves once their usefulness to the businesses that hire them runs out. The economic benefits of immigration are privatized, while the costs are socialized.

Compounding the problem is a misguided federal immigration policy that represses the unauthorized flow without actually stopping it. This has forced Mexican laborers to abandon their traditional commuting across the border and to settle farther north, bringing their families along in the process. This situation has led to the emergence of a second generation growing up in conditions of severe disadvantage. Like all parents, Mexican and Central American laborers earnestly want their children to succeed, and they go to great lengths to support them. However, neither the external environment nor their own meager material and human-capital resources provide the wherewithal to make this outcome possible in many cases. Empirical evidence, including the CILS parental survey, documents the high aspirations that *all* immigrant parents have for their children, along with their willingness to make great sacrifices in order to turn those aspirations into reality.

From his academic post, Huntington fulminates against these immigrants and their families, accusing them of all sorts of evil. The book-length version of Huntington's argument, *Who Are We?* (2004b), elaborates these denunciations. Following Centeno (2005), we may ask, *Who are you*, *Samuel Huntington* to so carelessly pontificate about matters so dimly understood? What the United States needs to do now is not to engage in another round of ethnic chauvinism, a practice that went out of style almost a century ago (Pierpont 2004). Instead, what needs to be done is to engage in a serious search for ways to produce three key outcomes: (1) to bring the unauthorized labor flow above ground and regularize it; (2) as the U.S. economy continues to depend on foreign labor, to seek ways to reestablish a circular pattern by creating incentives for voluntary return; (3) for immigrant families already settled in the United States, to find means to support parental aspirations and parental authority to fend off the threat of downward assimilation.

These are, in my view, the concerns that should occupy the minds and energies of serious scholars and responsible public intellectuals. To this end, and by way of conclusion, I offer some concrete proposals to address the third of these questions, namely the future of the second generation. The difficulties that this young population confronts indicate that this outcome of past immigration requires the most immediate attention. Sadly, state institutions, particularly public schools, have proven notoriously inept at supporting immigrant families and implementing compensatory programs. In particular, public schools have been found consistently to reinforce rather than reduce inequalities in human and social capital among their students (Coleman et al., 1982; Coleman 1993; Bryk et al., 1993; Portes and MacLeod, 1996).

In this situation, there are three types of institutional actors who can help: First, Hispanic organizations should prioritize the educational needs of their own second generation. The fact that Latin American–origin students, in general, and Mexican Americans, in particular, have the highest levels of high school abandonment and the lowest level of educational achievement should be viewed as a problem of the highest priority for them. Parents and migrant communities need assistance in the form of

after-school programs, remedial and tutorial education, SAT preparatory courses, and vocational orientation. As shown by Zhou (1997, 2004), the institutional density of Asian communities—such as Koreatown in Los Angeles—has been a key factor in preventing their children from leaving school and guiding them toward high levels of achievement. Hispanic communities, especially those where the offspring of working-class migrants grow up, are bereft of these resources. Rather than concerning themselves exclusively with political and adult-centered issues, existing Hispanic organizations should turn their attention to the issue of decisive significance: the future of their youth.

Second, churches can also play an important role in the process of institution building and educational guidance. As is well-known, the Catholic Church played the central role in ensuring the education of the descendants of illiterate or near-illiterate Irish, Italian, and Polish peasants in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The enviable educational system that the Catholic Church built—from grammar school to first-rate colleges and universities—ensured something close to parity in educational opportunities for the children and grandchildren of Catholic immigrants, thus allowing them to compete effectively in the U.S. labor market (Dolan 1975; Bodnar 1985; Hirschman 2003). In recent years, a Catholic-school education has been consistently shown to be superior to a public school education in terms of rates of high school graduation, academic performance, and college admission (Bryk et al., 1993; Coleman et al., 1982; Coleman 1993).[15]

There is no reason why the Catholic Church cannot do for the children of Mexican and Central American migrants what it did for the Italian and Polish second generations. If many of these children cannot pay for a Catholic school education, they may still be supported and guided by outreach, remedial, tutorial, and college-prep programs sponsored by nearby parishes. The Protestant churches to which an increasing number of Latino immigrants have gravitated can and should play a similar community-building role. Historically, religion has been a major instrument to ensure the survival and the integration of successive immigrant cohorts within U.S. borders (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970; Greeley 1971; Hirschman 2003). There has been no time in which the presence and activities of religion are as much needed as with the Latin American immigrants and their offspring of today.

A third and initially implausible source of institutional assistance are the governments of sending countries. We have seen how these governments have increasingly involved themselves in the affairs of their migrant communities, seeking to increase and maintain remittances, investments, and philanthropic contributions. Rather than just seeking to extract short-term gains from their expatriates, sending nations should consider ways to promote their long-term successful adaptation. Of these, none is more important than helping parents to keep their children in school and further their educational achievement. Scholarship programs, prizes for academic progress, paid trips home, free courses to promote fluency in Spanish and knowledge of the history of their parents' native homeland, are all means to motivate the second generation, sustain its self-image, and give it the moral grounding and guidance needed to succeed in a challenging environment. So far, very few of these initiatives have been implemented, despite the growing importance of transnational ties between expatriate communities and their respective home-country governments.

A final paradox of the process of assimilation is that it has seldom succeeded through a drastic unilateral shift into the English language and an equally drastic abandonment of the culture of origin. Instead, a gradual process that combines learning the language and culture of the receiving society with the preservation of

parental languages and selected elements of their culture has been shown to yield the best adaptation outcomes for the second generation (Rumbaut and Portes, 2001). This process, *selective acculturation*, can be effectively buttressed by each of the three sets of institutional actors named above. Ironically, fierce advocates of immediate and unilateral assimilation have seldom helped immigrants to assimilate. They command newcomers and their offspring to become instant Americans without providing any effective support or guidance to do this and then denounce them for failing to comply. Coethnic organizations, church-based agencies, and home government institutions may jointly do a much better job by reinforcing and legitimizing immigrants' language, culture, and self-esteem as a natural springboard for their children's successful integration into U.S. society.

Corresponding author: Professor Alejandro Portes, Department of Sociology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544-1010. E-mail: aportes@princeton.edu

NOTES

1. This paper was originally commissioned by the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute of California for its project on Latinos in the United States. I acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of Rodolfo De la Garza, Louis DeSipio, Jorge Domínguez, and members of this project. The responsibility for the contents is solely mine. The data on which the paper is partially based were collected by the Comparative Immigrant Entrepreneurship Project (CIEP) supported by the National Science Foundation, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and the Ford Foundation; and the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), supported by the National Science Foundation, the Russell Sage Foundation, the Spencer Foundation, and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.
2. Apprehension figures count the number of events, not the number of persons and, in this sense, overestimate the size of the flow. However, since the probability of apprehension in any one attempt is about one in three, and since apprehended individuals try again, these workload statistics provide a fair approximation and, if anything, may understate the size of the actual movement. See Espenshade (1990).
3. Puerto Ricans are excluded since they are not considered immigrants.
4. Puerto Ricans excluded.
5. Figures in parentheses are the percentage of total legal immigrants in 2001 going to each metropolitan area. Numbers representing less than 4% of each immigrant nationality are omitted.
6. Absolute number of immigrants declaring a professional or executive occupation per thousand legally admitted immigrants (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001; Office of Immigration Statistics 2002).
7. Regular or occasional involvement.
8. Unweighted totals. Figures in the table were computed on the basis of the sample weighted for statistical representativeness. For details, see Portes et al. (2002) and Guarnizo et al. (2003).
9. T-test of statistical significance of differences between nationalities.
10. Total sample including children from non-Latino nationalities. Source: CILS.
11. Field interview in Miami, 1997.
12. *Family income* is defined as the total income of the family with whom the respondent lives. Since a large number still live with their parents, average figures are pushed upward by the addition of parents' incomes. Figures on individual incomes show the same pattern described here although, in this case, figures are biased downward by the number of respondents still attending school.
13. Treiman Occupational Prestige Scores. Higher figures indicate higher-status occupations.
14. Total sample including all other second-generation nationalities. Source: CILS.
15. The cohort of "private school Cubans," shown to do so well in all indicators of adaptation in the previous analysis, are all alumni of private Catholic schools in Miami.

REFERENCES

Alba, Richard and Victor Nee (1997). Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration. *International Migration Review*, 31(4): 826–874.

Alexander, Karl L. and Aaron Pallas (1983). Private Schools and Public Policy: New Evidence on Cognitive Achievement in Public and Private Schools. *Sociology of Education*, 56(4): 170–182.

Bach, Robert L. (1978). Mexican Immigration and the American State. *International Migration Review*, 12(4): 536–558.

Barrera, Mario (1980). *Race and Class in the Southwest: A Theory of Racial Inequality*. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press.

Bean, Frank D. and Gillian Stevens (2003). *America's Newcomers and the Dynamics of Diversity*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Bluestone, Barry and Bennett Harrison (1982). *The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry*. New York: Basic Books.

Bodnar, John (1985). *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Bonacich, Edna (1976). Advanced Capitalism and Black-White Relations: A Split Labor Market Interpretation. *American Sociological Review*, 41(1): 34–51.

Bourgois, Philippe I. (1995). *In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bryk, Anthony S., V. Lee, and P. Holland (1993). *Catholic Schools and the Common Good*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Centeno, Miguel Angel (2005). Who Are You? Review of Samuel Huntington, *Who Are We? Contexts*, 4(1): 56–57.

Coleman, James (1993). The Design of Organizations and the Right to Act. *Sociological Forum*, 8(4): 527–546.

Coleman, James, Thomas Hoffer, and S. B. Kilgore (1982). *High School Achievement: Public, Catholic, and Other Private Schools Compared*. New York: Basic Books.

Cornelius, Wayne A. (1998a). Appearances and Realities: Controlling Illegal Immigration in the United States. In M. Weiner and T. Hanami (Eds.), *Temporary Workers or Future Citizens? Japanese and U. S. Migration Policies*, pp. 384–427. New York: New York University Press.

Cornelius, Wayne A. (1998b). The Structural Embeddedness of Demand for Mexican Immigrant Labor: New Evidence from California. In M. Suárez-Orozco (Ed.), *Crossings: Mexican Immigration in Interdisciplinary Perspective*, pp. 115–155. Cambridge, MA: Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University.

Dance, L. Janelle (2002). *Tough Fronts: The Impact of Street Culture on Schooling*. New York: Routledge.

De la Garza, Rodolfo O., Louis DeSipio, F. Chris Garcia, John García, and Angelo Falcon (1992). *Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Perspectives on American Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Dolan, Jay P. (1975). *The Immigrant Church: New York's Irish and German Catholics*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Edwards, Richard (1979). *Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Basic Books.

Espenshade, Thomas J. (1990). Undocumented Migration to the United States: Evidence from a Repeated Trials Model. In F. D. Bean, B. Edmonston, and J. S. Passel (Eds.), *Undocumented Migration to the United States: IRCA and the Experience of the 1980s*, pp. 159–181. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.

Espenshade, Thomas J. (1995). Using INS Border Apprehension Data to Measure the Flow of Undocumented Migrants Crossing the U.S.-Mexico Frontier. *International Migration Review*, 29(2): 545–565.

Fernández-Kelly, M. Patricia (1983). *For We Are Sold, I and My People: Women and Industry in Mexico's Frontier*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Fernández-Kelly, M. Patricia and Sara Curran (2001). Nicaraguans: Voices Lost, Voices Found. In Rubén G. Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes (Eds.), *Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America*, pp. 127–155. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press and Russell Sage Foundation.

Gans, Herbert (1992). Second-Generation Decline: Scenarios for the Economic and Ethnic Futures of the Post-1965 American Immigrants. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 15(2): 173–192.

Gereffi, Gary, David Spener, and Jennifer Bair (Eds.) (2002). *Free Trade and Uneven Development: The North American Apparel Industry after NAFTA*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Glazer, Nathan and Daniel P. Moynihan (1970). *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Goldring, Luin (2002). The Mexican State and Transmigrant Organizations: Negotiating the Boundaries of Membership and Participation. *Latin American Research Review*, 37(3): 55–99.
Gordon, Milton M. (1964). *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Grebler, Leo, Joan W. Moore, and Ralph C. Guzman (1970). *The Mexican-American People, The Nation's Second Largest Minority*. New York: Free Press.
Greeley, Andrew M. (1971). *Why Can't They Be Like Us? America's White Ethnic Groups*. New York: E. P. Dutton.
Guarnizo, Luis E. (2003). The Economics of Transnational Living. *International Migration Review*, 37(3): 666–699.
Guarnizo, Luis E., Alejandro Portes, and William J. Haller (2003). Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Immigrants. *American Journal of Sociology*, 108 (May): 1211–1248.
Guarnizo, Luis E., Arturo I. Sánchez, and Elizabeth Roach (1999). Mistrust, Fragmented Solidarity, and Transnational Migration: Colombians in New York and Los Angeles. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22(2): 367–396.
Guarnizo, Luis E. and Michael P. Smith (1998). The Locations of Transnationalism. In Michael P. Smith and Luis E. Guarnizo (Eds.), *Transnationalism from Below, Volume 6: Comparative Urban and Community Research*, pp. 3–34. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
Guzman, Betsy (2001). The Hispanic Population (Census 2000 Brief #C2KBR/01-3). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Hirschman, Albert Q. (1970). *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hirschman, Charles (2003). The Role of Religion in the Origin and Adaptation of Immigrant Groups. Princeton, NJ: Paper presented at the Conceptual and Methodological Developments in the Study of International Migration Conference, May 23–25.
Huntington, Samuel P. (2004a). The Hispanic Challenge. *Foreign Policy*, 141: 30–45.
Huntington, Samuel P. (2004b). *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Itzigsohn, José, Carlos Dore, Esther Hernández Medina, and Obed Vázquez (1999). Mapping Dominican Transnationalism: Narrow and Broad Transnational Practices. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22(2): 316–339.
Jensen, Leif (2001). The Demographic Diversity of Immigrants and their Children. In Rubén G. Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes (Eds.), *Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America*, pp. 21–56. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press and Russell Sage Foundation.
Landolt, Patricia (2000). The Causes and Consequences of Transnational Migration: Salvadorans in Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, Johns Hopkins University.
Landolt, Patricia (2001). Salvadoran Economic Transnationalism: Embedded Strategies for Household Maintenance, Immigrant Incorporation, and Entrepreneurial Expansion. *Global Networks*, 1(3): 217–242.
Landolt, Patricia, Lilian Autler, and Sonia Baires (1999). From "Hermano Lejano" to "Hermano Mayor": The Dialectics of Salvadoran Transnationalism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22(2): 290–315.
Latin American Weekly Report (2003). FDI and Remittances Overtake Borrowing: Expat Remittances are World's Biggest. WR-03-14, April 8: 164–165.
Levitt, Peggy (1997). Transnationalizing Community Development: The Case of Migration between Boston and the Dominican Republic. *Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 26(2): 509–526.
Levitt, Peggy (2001). *The Transnational Villagers*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Levitt, Peggy (2003). You Know, Abraham Was Really the First Immigrant: Religion and Transnational Migration. *International Migration Review*, 37(3): 847–873.
López, David E. and Ricardo D. Stanton-Salazar (2001). Mexican-Americans: A Second Generation at Risk. In Rubén G. Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes (Eds.), *Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America*, pp. 57–90. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press and Russell Sage Foundation.

Margolis, Maxine (1994). *Little Brazil: An Ethnography of Brazilian Immigrants in New York City*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Massey, Douglas S. (1993). Latinos, Poverty, and the Underclass: A New Agenda for Research. *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, 15(4): 449–475.
Massey, Douglas S., Rafael Alarcón, Jorge Durand, and Humberto González (1987). *Return to Aztlan: The Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Massey, Douglas S. and Nancy Denton (1993). *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Massey, Douglas S., Jorge Durand, and Nolan J. Malone (2002). *Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Massey, Douglas S. and Kristin E. Espinosa (1997). What's Driving Mexico-U.S. Migration? A Theoretical, Empirical, and Policy Analysis. *American Journal of Sociology*, 102(4): 939–999.
Matthei, Linda M. and David A. Smith (1996). Women, Households, and Transnational Migration Networks: The Garifuna and Global Economic Restructuring. In R. P. Korzeniewicz and W. C. Smith (Eds.), *Latin America in the World Economy*, pp. 133–150. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Menjívar, Cecilia (2000). *Fragmented Ties: Salvadoran Immigrant Networks in America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Moore, Joan and Harry Pachon (1985). *Hispanics in the United States*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Nagel, Joanne (1986). The Political Construction of Ethnicity. In J. Nagel and S. Olzak (Eds.), *Competitive Ethnic Relations*, pp. 93–112. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
Office of Immigration Statistics (2002). *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics*. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security.
Office of Immigration Statistics (2005). *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics*. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security.
Pérez, Lisandro (1992). Cuban Miami. In Guillermo J. Grenier and Alex Stepick (Eds.), *Miami Now: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Social Change*, pp. 83–108. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
Pérez, Lisandro (2001). Growing up Cuban in Miami: Immigration, the Enclave, and New Generations. In Rubén G. Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes (Eds.), *Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America*, pp. 91–125. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press and Russell Sage Foundation.
Pierpont, Claudia (2004). The Measure of America: How a Rebel Anthropologist Waged War on Racism. *New Yorker*, March 8, pp. 48–63.
Piore, Michael J. and Charles F. Sabel (1984). *The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity*. New York: Basic Books.
Popkin, Eric (1999). Guatemalan Mayan Migration to Los Angeles: Constructing Transnational Linkages in the Context of the Settlement Process. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22(2): 267–284.
Portes, Alejandro (1979). Illegal Immigration and the International System: Lessons from Recent Legal Mexican Immigrants to the United States. *Social Problems*, 26(4): 425–438.
Portes, Alejandro (2001). Introduction: The Debates and Significance of Immigrant Transnationalism. *Global Networks*, 1(3): 181–193.
Portes, Alejandro (2003a). La Máquina Política Cubano-Estadounidense: Reflexiones sobre su Origen y Permanencia. *Foro Internacional*, 43(3): 608–626.
Portes, Alejandro (2003b). Theoretical Convergencies and Empirical Evidence in the Study of Immigrant Transnationalism. *International Migration Review*, 37(143): 874–892.
Portes, Alejandro and Robert L. Bach (1985). *Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Portes, Alejandro, and Josh DeWind (2007). A Cross-Atlantic Dialogue: The Progress of Research and Theory in the Study of International Migration. In Alejandro Portes and Josh DeWind (Eds.), *Rethinking Migration*, pp. 3–26. New York: Berghahn Books.
Portes, Alejandro, Cristina Escobar, and Alexandria Walton (2007). Immigrant Transnational Organizations and Development: A Comparative Study. *International Migration Review*, 41 (Spring): 242–281.
Portes, Alejandro, Patricia Fernández-Kelly, and William Haller (2005). Segmented Assimilation on the Ground: The New Second Generation in Early Adulthood. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28 (November): 1000–1040.

Portes, Alejandro and Luis E. Guarnizo (1991). Tropical Capitalists: U.S.-Bound Immigration and Small Enterprise Development in the Dominican Republic. In S. Díaz-Briquets and S. Weintraub (Eds.), *Migration, Remittances, and Small Business Development: Mexico and Caribbean Basin Countries*, pp. 101–131. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Portes, Alejandro, William Haller, and Luis E. Guarnizo (2002). Transnational Entrepreneurs: An Alternative Form of Immigrant Adaptation. *American Sociological Review*, 67 (April): 278–298.
Portes, Alejandro and Dag MacLeod (1996). Educational Progress of Children of Immigrants: The Roles of Class, Ethnicity, and School Context. *Sociology of Education*, 69(4): 255–275.
Portes, Alejandro and Margarita Mooney (2002). Social Capital and Community Development. In M. F. Guillen, R. Collins, P. England, and M. Meyer (Eds.), *The New Economic Sociology: Developments in an Emerging Field*, pp. 303–329. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Portes, Alejandro and Rubén G. Rumbaut (1996). *Immigrant America: A Portrait*, 2ed. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Portes, Alejandro and Rubén G. Rumbaut (2001). *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press and Russell Sage Foundation.
Portes, Alejandro and Alex Stepick (1993). *City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Portes, Alejandro and Min Zhou (1993). The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants among Post-1965 Immigrant Youth. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 530: 74–96.
Ramos, Carlos Guillermo (2002). Rapporteurs' Comments. Paper presented at the Immigrant Transnationalism and its Impact on Sending Nations conference, Center for Migration and Development, Princeton University and Latin American School of Social Science (FLACSO), Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, January 19.
Roberts, Bryan R., Reanne Frank, and Fernando Lozano-Asencio (1999). Transnational Migrant Communities and Mexican Migration to the United States. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22(2): 238–266.
Rohter, Larry (1998). Island Life Not Idyllic for Youths from U.S. *New York Times*, February 20, A4.
Romo, Frank P. and Michael Schwartz (1995). The Structural Embeddedness of Business Decisions: The Migration of Manufacturing Plants in New York State, 1960 to 1985. *American Sociological Review*, 60(6): 874–907.
Rosenbaum, James (2002). *Two Revolutions in Educational Attainment Research over the Past Thirty Years: Their Impact on Public Understanding and Social Policy*. Chicago, IL: Spencer Foundation Anniversary Conference, January 24.
Rosenblum, Gerald (1973). *Immigrant Workers: Their Impact on American Labor Radicalism*. New York: Basic Books.
Rumbaut, Rubén G. (1994). The Crucible Within: Ethnic Identity, Self-Esteem, and Segmented Assimilation among Children of Immigrants. *International Migration Review*, 28(108): 748–794.
Rumbaut, Rubén G. and Alejandro Portes (2001). *Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press and Russell Sage Foundation.
Sewell, William and Robert M. Hauser (1972). Causes and Consequences of Higher Education: Models of the Status Attainment Process. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 54(5): 851–861.
Smith, Robert C. (1992). *New York in Mixteca: Mixteca in New York*. NACLA Report on the Americas, 26(1).
Smith, Robert C. (1998). Mexican Immigrants, the Mexican State, and the Transnational Practice of Mexican Politics and Membership. *LASA Forum*, 24: 19–24.
Stepick, Alex, Guillermo Grenier, Max Castro, and Marvin Dunn (2003). *This Land is Our Land: Immigrants and Power in Miami*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Sullivan, Mercer L. (1989). *Getting Paid: Youth Crime and Work in the Inner City*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1999). Profile of the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1997 (Current Population Reports #P23-195). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000). Statistical Abstract of the United States, 120ed. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Bureau of the Census (2001). The Hispanic Population, 2000. Census Brief #C2KBR/01-3. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce.

Vertovec, Steven (1999). Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22(2): 447–462.
Vigil, Jaime D. (2002). *A Rainbow of Gangs: Street Cultures in the Mega-City*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
Watanabe, Teresa (2003). The Recall Campaign: Candidates Skirt Immigration Issue. *Los Angeles Times*, September 8, A1.
Western, Bruce (2002). The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and Inequality. *American Sociological Review*, 67(4): 526–546.
Wilson, William J. (1987). *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Zhou, Min (1997). Growing up American: The Challenge Confronting Immigrant Children and Children of Immigrants. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 23: 63–95.
Zhou, Min (2004). Revisiting Ethnic Entrepreneurship: Convergencies, Controversies and Conceptual Advancements. *International Migration Review*, 38(3): 1040–1074.