

Census and Sensibilities in Sarajevo

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During the latter part of the twentieth century, there was a country called Yugoslavia. Built on the ruins of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the post-World War II Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia was an ethnically diverse state comprised of six republics, which, by the 1960s, was committed to a foreign policy of non-alignment and to the domestic programs of worker self-management and “brotherhood and unity” among its peoples (see, e.g., Banac 1984; P. Ramet 1985; Shoup 1968; Zimmerman 1987). Like most other European states, the decennial census became a defining feature of Yugoslavia’s sovereignty and modernity (Kertzer and Arel 2002: 7).

Yugoslavia’s first census was taken two years after the formation of the state, and published a year later in 1948. The results of its second census came out in 1953. Thereafter, from 1961 until its demise, Yugoslavia counted its population every ten years. Its census reports displayed, among other things, positive health indicators, economic growth, and increasing amounts of education with each subsequent age cohort. Most important, in scrupulously documenting nationality, the decennial censuses “nominat[ed] into existence” (Goldberg 1997: 29) and conferred official state recognition to groups whose constituents numbered less than 1 percent of the population as well as to Yugoslavia’s majority peoples, demonstrating *bratstvo i jedinstvo* [brotherhood and unity] within the multiethnic citizenry.¹

Acknowledgments: Research for this article was supported in part by grants from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) with funds provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the United States Department of State through the Title VIII Program, and the IREX Scholar Support Fund. None of these organizations is responsible for the views expressed. In Sarajevo, the Institut za istoriju and its director Husnija Kamberović provided me with an affiliation and technical support. Ernest (in 2002) and Melisa and Amila (in 2004) offered humor and good cheer along with expertise as my research assistants. The kind people at the Matični Ured of Centar Općina opened their archive to me, and even offered assistance with the tedious work of recording entries from marriage registration forms. Back at Ben-Gurion University, Daniel Maman miraculously turned my raw data into meaningful statistics. Most of all, I am grateful to the scores of Sarajevans whose stories of belonging are related in this essay and to Michael Herzfeld whose steadfast encouragement was critical to this project. My thanks, too, go to three anonymous *CSSH* reviewers who offered incisive critiques.

¹ “Nationality” in this context is often glossed as “ethnicity” in English. In her prescient article on nationality categories in multicultural Bosnia, Tone Brinja distinguishes between ethnicity, as “mainly related to self-definition” and nationality, which “is about to which group the state

Accompanying the seemingly egalitarian inclusiveness of Yugoslavia's census categories was a clustering among them that revealed an implicit hierarchy of belonging. Indexing their prime status as the indigenous "constituent nations" of Yugoslavia, the census list began with Montenegrins, Croats, Macedonians, [Bosnian] Muslims,² Slovenes, and Serbs.³ In 1991 fourteen additional eponyms followed: Albanians, Czechs, Italians, Jews, Hungarians, Germans, Poles, Roms [Gypsies], Romanians, Russians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Turks, and Ukrainians,⁴ forming among them a cluster of peoples whose ancestral homelands lie beyond the borders of Yugoslavia. Mediating between the two clusters was the citizenship-based category of Jugoslaveni (Yugoslavs), neither an autochthonous category of belonging nor an ethnic group but a flexible hybrid identity that indexed identification with the socialist state's ideological goals and/or provided an alternative to forcing a single choice among individuals with mixed ethnic backgrounds (Woodward 1995: 36; cf. Sekulic, Massey, and Hodson 1994). The final four slots on the census accounted for persons declaring an affiliation beyond those listed ("others" and "regional affiliation"), those who did not declare an ethnicity, and those whom the census takers did not know how to categorize ("undeclared" and "unknown"). These slots provided the state with ways to document those who chose not to fit with its representation of collective identities while also giving citizens legitimate options for rejecting the state's categorical grid (see Table 1).

The decennial Yugoslav census regularly confirmed that grid while bolstering both constitutional decree and commonsensical knowledge that Slovenes are the majority nation in Slovenia, Croats in Croatia, Serbs in Serbia, Macedonians in Macedonia and Montenegrins in Montenegro. It was also consistent in documenting that Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH)⁵ was unlike the other republics because it alone held no majority population; Serbs, Croats and Muslims together made up over 90 percent of the population, but no one group ever comprised the majority (see Table 1).

decides one belongs" (1993: 81). The present endeavor shows, however, that such a self-state distinction is far from dichotomous.

² It took until 1971 for Bosnian Muslims to earn recognition on the census as the *Muslimanska nacija*, or the Muslim nation. This issue will be explored later in the essay.

³ They are listed in Serbo-Croatian alphabetical order. See Table 1.

⁴ These are also listed in Serbo-Croatian alphabetical order. Albanians and Hungarians were accorded a Yugoslav homeland in the Serbian autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, respectively. Jews and Gypsies—Europe's quintessential diasporic peoples—did not qualify as "nations" according to Marxist-Leninist and Wilsonian doctrines of the self-determination of nations and were not granted a "national" territory in Yugoslavia. The remaining national groups represent the legacy of earlier colonialism (Germans and Turks), propinquity (Italians), and/or movement among the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe.

⁵ Bosnia-Herzegovina is called *Bosna i Hercegovina* in the local Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian language, which is abbreviated to BiH [pronounced *Bikh*].

TABLE 1
*The Last Yugoslav Census: Bosnia-Herzegovina's 1991 Population
 according to Ethnicity*

<i>Category</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
TOTAL	4,377,033	100
Crnogorci (Montenegrins)	10,071	0.2
Hrvati (Croats)	760,852	17.4
Makedonci (Macedonians)	1,596	0.1
Muslimani (Muslims)	1,902,956	43.5
Slovinci (Slovenes)	2,190	0.1
Srbi (Serbs)	1,366,104	31.2
Jugoslaveni (Yugoslavs)	242,682	5.6
Albanci (Albanians)	4,925	0.1
Česi (Czechs)	590	0
Italijani (Italians)	732	0
Jevreji (Jews)	426	0
Mađari (Hungarians)	893	0
Nijemci (Germans)	470	0
Poljaci (Poles)	526	0
Romi (Gypsies)	8,864	0.2
Rumuni (Romanians)	162	0
Rusi (Russians)	297	0
Rusini (Ruthenians)	133	0
Slovaci (Slovaks)	297	0
Turci (Turks)	267	0
Ukrajinci (Ukrainians)	3,929	0.1
Ostali (Others)	17,592	0.4
Undeclared	14,585	0.3
Regional affiliation	224	0
Unknown	35,670	0.8

SOURCE: Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine 2003b, p. 61.

Every ten years BiH emerged as the most ethnically mixed republic in Yugoslavia with the largest number of nationalities in the population and the highest percentage of citizens who identified as Yugoslavs (5.6 percent in 1991). These tendencies toward heterogeneity and hybridity intensified when moving from villages to towns and from towns to cities. In Sarajevo, the republic's capital, 10.7 percent of all residents declared themselves Yugoslavs in the last census.

In 1991, as that census was being compiled, Yugoslavia broke apart. In June the republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared themselves independent states, and the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) headquartered in Belgrade, took military action to prevent their secession. Casualties in Slovenia, tucked into

Yugoslavia's far northwest corner and the most ethnically homogeneous republic in the Federation, were kept to a minimum because the JNA gave up the fight there in a matter of weeks (see Woodward 1995: 166–68).⁶ But hostilities were brutal in Croatia, especially in its eastern border region where Serbs comprised a significant portion of the population (see Grandits and Promitzer 2000). Less than a year later, from 29 February–1 March 1992, the citizenry of Bosnia-Herzegovina voted in favor of a referendum to declare independence from rump Yugoslavia, and after 6 April, when independent BiH received recognition from the European Union, Sarajevo fell victim to a strangling siege. Hundreds of persons and places throughout the new state were violently attacked.⁷

There is disagreement among Western analysts as to the prime cause of the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia (see Stokes et al. 1996). Some point to long suppressed ethnic hatreds boiling over with the final collapse of Tito's communism (e.g., Cohen 1995: 246–47; Kaplan 1994). Others cite the rise of political elites or megalomaniacal leaders in Serbia and Croatia “who had nothing to gain from the transition” (Silber and Little 1997: 25) and remobilized the Yugoslav population into ethnic communities (Gagnon 2004) where nationalist myths were manipulated into violence (Donia and Fine 1994; Malcolm 1996; Perica 2002). Still others blame the actions and inaction of the European Community and the United States following the structural collapse of Yugoslavia's unique multicultural society and political-economic position at the end of the Cold War (Campbell 1999; Woodward 1995). But nearly everyone agrees in their assessment of how the war was conducted.⁸ Military campaigns were fiercest and civilians faced the harshest brutality in areas where people had lived together as friends and neighbors, crossing, blurring, and sometimes dissolving ethnic divides (Bringa 1995; Denich 2000; Maas 1996; Sudetic 1998). In the intermixed cities of Mostar and Sarajevo in BiH, and Dubrovnik and Vukovar in Croatia, armed aggressors destroyed centuries-old cultural landmarks, incinerated

⁶ It should be noted that Slovenia, bordering on Austria and Italy to the north and west, only shared an internal Yugoslav border with Croatia and never housed a significant Serbian minority.

⁷ Many Bosnian Serbs who wished to remain part of Serb-dominated rump Yugoslavia insisted that secession was illegal and protested the referendum by not voting. Use of the passive voice reflects how so many Sarajevans described first the onset of and then the ongoing siege against them and their city. Many referred to the gunmen in the surrounding hills as “the aggressors,” often stopping when they said, “the Serbs” because they know that not all Bosnian Serbs participated in these heinous acts. In fact, a Serb by birth from Belgrade was initially second in command of the Bosnian army (Dizdarević 1994: 28).

⁸ A variety of reasons are advanced by Bosnians. Many Sarajevans agree that the violence against their city was caused by paramilitary Serbian aggressors setting up in the hills and firing down on civilians. Most Bosnian Serbs who had fled into Serb-held areas east of Sarajevo in the Serbian Republic told me in 2002 and 2004 that Bosnia's declaration of independence from Yugoslavia was illegal, and that they feared the barbaric slaughter that accompanies Muslim fundamentalism. Some Sarajevo and Mostar Croats told me a milder version of that story: the Bosniacs wished to establish the Bosnian Islamic Republic, and they fought to remain Christian Europeans.

one-of-a-kind manuscripts, cut off water, communications, and electricity, and maimed and murdered civilians in their attempt to blot out centuries of cultural diversity and hybridity. The policy of ethnic cleansing reversed a taken for granted social order of multiplicity and overlaps documented for decades in Yugoslavia's census reports, and strove to, if it did not ultimately, make "existing heterogeneous [communities] unimaginable" (Hayden 1996: 783).

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina finally ceased toward the end of 1995 after the highest elected representatives of its now ethnically unmixed peoples—Franjo Tudjman, Slobodan Milošević, and Alija Izetbegović, the presidents of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro (at the time still called Yugoslavia), and Bosnia-Herzegovina, respectively—agreed under international pressure in Dayton, Ohio to inscribe the Bosniacs, the Croats, and the Serbs as the constituent nations of Republika BiH (see Holbrooke 1999; Chandler 2000: 43). Although Bosnia-Herzegovina remained after the war the same sovereign territory on which it had gained international recognition in 1992, the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement and the Constitution that derived from it divided that state into two not-quite-equal "entities": the Bosniac-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH—51 percent of the territory, further divided into ten ethnically dominated cantons), and the Republika Srpska (the Serbian Republic, RS—49 percent of the territory). With this intra-state partition, more governing power was granted to the entities than to the common state, and the land, language, history, polity and culture of the Bosniacs, the Croats, and the Serbs were each affirmed as equal, independent, and incommensurable (see Bose 2002 and Stroschein 2003 for discussions on partition and its alternatives). In addition, the cardinal principle of a state's oneness and indivisibility has been undermined by BiH's continuing reliance on "the international community"—the UN, NATO, OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), the European Union, the United States, and several additional governmental and non-governmental organizations—for peace-keeping and stabilization, economic reconstruction, and political cooperation within and between the entities (Herzfeld 1997: 21; cf. Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 992).⁹ In Sarajevo, citizens grumble that their two-entity, tripartite nation-state is a bureaucratically top-heavy "insufficient state" (Aretxaga 2003: 396), while political analysts abroad call Bosnia "a polity on the brink" (F. Friedman 2004) or "a dysfunctional state" (Moore with Buechschuetz 2004).¹⁰

⁹ Since assuming office on 27 May 2002, Lord Paddy Ashdown, High Commissioner of BiH through January 2006, had been applying pressure on the entities to cede power. See the December 2004 Final Report on the Work of the Police Restructuring Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/preso/pressr/doc/final-prc-report-7feb05.pdf>.

¹⁰ Chandler (2000: 191) concludes, "Bosnia has become a parody of democratization." Among BiH's citizens, different groups subscribe to different solutions to these problems. Bose (2002: 3) and Stroschein (2003: 8) both note that Bosniacs overwhelmingly favor a unitary state, but most Bosnian Croats and Serbs oppose a state without entities or an ethnic key.

For years FBiH officials followed messy procedures for resettling internally displaced persons and repatriating war refugees (Stefansson 2003), allocating funds and personnel for reconstruction while awarding or returning residences to their rightful owners, and then demanding that they undergo the further bureaucratic procedure of privatization. But in 2002 the government decided that the time had come to document its citizenry and called for a census. During the month of August posters announcing a “Federation-wide social mapping exercise” were plastered onto walls all over the city of Sarajevo—on buildings recently renovated, on those that were bullet-scarred and windowless, and over the skeletal hulks of what had once been apartment buildings, department stores, and government complexes. Among the physical rubble and the fresh paint that combined to evoke memories of the recent war, these posters presented a scene of domestic tranquility. The posters featured a family seated around the dining table, and iconically declared: ‘The war is over. We are at home with our loved ones, normalcy has resumed, and the time has come to do what we have always done every ten years.’ The poster’s text appealed to the citizenry to open their doors to “our interviewers” and participate in the project: to be counted—and count—in the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹¹

Toward the end of 2003, the results of that first post-war population count were published in ten modest black and white brochures, one for each canton of the Federation (Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine 2003a). Remarkably, in the census, instead of the twenty-five categories used in 1991 to count the inhabitants of Yugoslavia, the FBiH population was now grouped into four categories only: Bosnia-Herzegovina’s three constituent nations—the Bosniacs, the Croats, and the Serbs—and a residual category of Others. All the smaller named nationalities that had always been part of Bosnia’s ethnoscape simply vanished. So too did the Yugoslavs, who were no longer a categorical possibility since Yugoslavia had ceased to exist, and no pan-ethnic or citizenship-based Bosnian category was offered to give them an alternative in the new state. The Muslims also disappeared, but unlike Bosnia’s ethnic minorities and the Yugoslavs, reconstituted under the new categorical label of Bošnjaci

¹¹ A year earlier, Drazen Simic (2001) wrote that “BiH is the only European country which has not and will not organize a population census this year,” and he cited the “official explanation” as lack of funds. Unlike the decision taken in 1994 by the Council of Europe and the European Union to fund an extraordinary census in Macedonia (see V. Friedman 1996), the Office of the High Representative did not insist on (or pay for) a statewide census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the population has not been counted in the Republika Srpska. Following up after fieldwork, I sent an email inquiry to the Serbian Republic’s statistical office, and a kind clerk replied on 8 October 2004 that the “last census was 1991.” On 18 October 2004, the European Commission’s Delegation to Bosnia-Herzegovina published a statement declaring that “there must be political consensus within the country” if a statewide census were to be successful, and added that before a population count could take place “the BiH Statistical Agency must become fully operational” (<http://www.delbih.cec.eu.int/en/worddocuments/wo-d293.htm>).

TABLE 2
FBiH Enumeration of Cantons, 2002

<i>Total</i>	<i>Bošnjaci</i>	<i>Hrvati</i>	<i>Srbi</i>	<i>Ostali</i>
2,318,972	1,690,280	504,717	101,518	22,457
100 percent	73 percent	22 percent	4 percent	1 percent

SOURCE: Aggregates from the 10 FBiH pamphlets *Kantoni u Brojkama 2003*, Federalni Zavod za Statistiku, Sarajevo 2003, "Nacionalna Struktura Stanovništva." (Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine 2003a) This table is not comparable with Table 1 because only the inhabitants of FBiH are counted in the census.

(Bosniacs), they emerged from the count stronger than ever. Comprising 73 percent of the population, the Bosniacs, together with the Croats (22 percent) and the Serbs (4 percent) combined to form 99 percent of the Federation's inhabitants. The fourth option, Ostali, those Others who would not or could not be counted as Bosniacs, Croats, or Serbs, accounted for a mere 1 percent.

These census data, aggregated and presented above in Table 2, support several social scientists' findings that, as a result of the 1992–1995 war, ethnic segregation now characterizes regions that were once multi-ethnic and multi-confessional (see Cattaruzza 2001; Chaveneau-Lebrun 2001; and Robin-Hunter 2001 *pace* Hayden 1996). Within Bosnia itself—in parliamentary debates and disseminated to the public via the media—the census makes a strong demographic case for maintaining the entities. In the Bosniac-Croat Federation, Bosniacs hold a clear majority and Croats account for almost one-quarter of the population. At the state level, in demonstrating that the Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs (henceforth B-C-S) comprise 99 percent of FBiH's population, the census bolsters the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and affirms the state's tripartite national divisions.

This reading of the census, plausible though it may be, fails to consider the socio-political dynamics behind the count. Analyses of nation building and state-formation in colonial and post-colonial settings reveal that no "facts," not even the seemingly hard data of maps and population statistics, speak for themselves (Anderson 1991; Appadurai 1996; Cohn 1990; see also V. Friedman 1996). As several recent studies have shown, state bureaucracies hold the means to name, refuse to name, count and categorize their populations, and the power to discipline them into thinking of themselves along the very lines of these categorical ways of counting (Goldberg 1997; Kertzer and Arel 2002; Scott 1998; Urla 1993, *pace* Foucault 1977, 1990). Yet even in what had been termed totalitarian societies, state power is neither automatic nor absolute. John Borneman's (1992) study of competing German belongings in divided Berlin, and Francine Hirsch's (2005) history of the Soviet Union as a multi-national "work in progress" present compelling evidence that state

officials often devise national nomenclature and census categories from ethnographic and folk knowledge to encourage the development of national subjectivities linked to the ideology and governmental structure of the state. Likewise, this article suggests that the FBiH population survey, administered under government auspices only six years after the end of a war waged on the principle of ethnic cleansing, pushed familiar but slippery notions into fixed categories so that citizens (were) identified in the census along the exclusivistic, tripartite scheme agreed upon by their national(ist) leaders and inscribed as the constitutional base of the state.

Informed by Aihwa Ong's (1996: 738) designation of cultural citizenship as "a dual process of self-making and being made by the state," my ethnography of Bosnia's first post-war census examines how its simplified population categories and the more complex, experientially based views of real people—ethnically marked and marking actors in Sarajevo—are dialectically locked in an ongoing struggle. The B-C-S scheme often emerges in their narratives of belonging, but alongside and sometimes replacing that scheme we will also meet residents of FBiH expressing themselves and acting *off-census* as multicultural Sarajevans and hybrid Bosnians.

The analysis that follows illustrates the workings of these complicated and contentious processes of citizens conforming to and resisting the national demands of state by concentrating on three key features of the FBiH census: (1) the transformation of Muslims into Bosniacs; (2) the insistence that each person identify as Bosniac, Croat, or Serb; and (3) its refusal to recognize multiple belongings or hybrid identities. At the essay's end, I will re-present the FBiH census and its practical results as both "normal" simplification strategies that characterize all state projects of governmentality (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Scott 1998), and as extraordinary measures aimed at the goal of "normalizing" the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina from an illegible, mixed (-up) population-at-war to a peaceful tri-national European state where everyone knows who everyone else is, and is not. The concluding discussion addresses the vexing issue of hybridity and looks at how its pleasures and dangers continue to lurk in Bosnia, even as they are minimized and masked by the nation-building demands of a state-imposed social reality based on the establishment of categorical boundaries that divide one "constituent nation" from the others. But first a background note on Sarajevo and the methods I used to conduct research there.

A NOTE ON METHODS

My analysis of the FBiH census and its sensibilities is based on three field visits to Sarajevo, made in August 1997; August 2002, and March through July 2004. Fieldwork strategies included participant-observation within the networks of several key hosts, and interviews with representatives of major cultural organizations (Bosniac, Croat, Serb, Slovenian, Jewish, and intercultural) and

political parties. I also attended public forums of the Bosniac Intellectual Congress and of two independent intellectuals' discussion groups—Krug 99 and Među Nama—and joined in various festivals and commemoration services.

Toward an understanding of how Sarajevans are both confirming and contesting BiH's tripartite national scheme in their daily lives, I engaged in conversations with and among a wide range of individuals aged twenty-one to eighty. Many of my conversation partners were young people—students, teachers, sales clerks, museum workers, NGO staff—but my closest Sarajevo friends were considerably older. Most of the representatives of the cultural organizations and political parties with whom I met were middle aged and university educated, and all but two were men.

In addition to the official FBiH census, an end product in which citizens' responses may be perturbed to fit its categorical grid, and people's spontaneous identity stories that often disregard, dismiss or mock state imperatives, a few months into fieldwork I looked for a way to capture how Sarajevans declare their ethnic identity when engaged in interactions with the state. When I was granted access to the marriage registry of Sarajevo's Centar Općina (Center District) I saw that the state forms request, among other things, that brides and grooms indicate their *nacionalna pripadnost* (national, or ethnic, belonging). Unlike the census, which requires citizens to reply orally to a field interviewer, applicants to the marriage registry write in the requested data—name, address, profession, national belonging, etcetera—as they wish. I recorded the *nacionalna pripadnost* entries of the 4,826 brides and 4,826 grooms who registered their marriages in the Centar Općina from the beginning of 1996 through the end of 2003.¹²

As I have already stated, most of the ethnographic data for this study were gathered in the early years of the twenty-first century, but my interest in Bosnian ethnicity, heterogeneity and hybridity dates back to my first visit to Sarajevo in 1983. I was then, and continue to be, amazed by the city's diversity: its ancient stone buildings and arched bridges alongside the ornately sculpted facades of late nineteenth-century Central European architecture abutting massive structures of socialist modernity, all surrounded by spectacularly wooded mountains. The centrality of the city's Catholic and Orthodox cathedrals and their proximity to several Turkish-style mosques and a neo-Moorish synagogue spurred me to learn more about Sarajevo and its history.

It is not just Sarajevo's architecture that demonstrates a cultural norm of diversity and blendings. Noel Malcolm, for example, introduces his history

¹² *Općina* can be glossed as community or county, and the city of Sarajevo is divided into five of these. According to the 2002 census, the Centar Općina is home to 17 percent of Sarajevo's residents. Thanks to Amira Hadžiosmanović, Jasna Beba, and Amer Ahmić for their kind hospitality and efficient assistance.

of Bosnia by explaining, “The great religions and great powers of European history had overlapped and combined there: the empires of Rome, Charlemagne, the Ottomans and the Austro-Hungarians, and the faiths of Western Christianity, Eastern Christianity, Judaism and Islam” (1996: xix). These overlaps and combinations continue on in Sarajevans’ everyday life. In commonsensical alternation between noting the differences that define each group and divide one from the other, and crossing, if not ignoring, ethno-religious boundaries, daily practices and cultural products attest to a kaleidoscopic dynamism, or what Mahmutćehajić (2000: 46) calls Sarajevo’s “religious pluriformity.” Accompanying the distinctive traditions that manifest on city streets and in private homes, a tangible “third space” of Bosnianness (after Bhabha 1990: 211) pervades Sarajevo—in language, in the arts, in fashion. The all-embracing hybrid style and fluid identity encourage the uniqueness of each of BiH’s religions and ethnicities, even as they blend with them; the third space does not and cannot stand alone (Karahasan 1993). Bosnia’s culture of multiplicity and blendings is inherently dependent on porous inter-group boundaries.

During the 1980s Sarajevo was Yugoslavia’s hub of multicultural creativity; it was home to the popular and provocative rock band, Bjele Dugme, several avant-garde theatrical troupes, and scores of innovative artists (see Lampe 2000: 337; S. Ramet 1999). In the Baščaršija, the old town bazaar, copper coffee sets, brightly patterned wool carpets, and aromatic grilled meats vied for attention with up-to-date leather goods, contemporary paintings, and bookstores (see Tahmišević 1970). An extra air of excitement hung over the city as it anticipated hosting the 1984 Winter Olympic Games.

Less than a decade later Bosnia was in the throes of war. Sarajevo was mercilessly shelled and held under siege. Most of its landmarks, including new sports arenas and the Olympic Village-turned-apartment complexes, were shattered, and thousands of Sarajevans had fled, been maimed, or murdered.

A year and a half after hostilities ceased I flew into the unlit crater that was once Sarajevo’s airport. In the city center men were still playing chess, but the parks now did double-duty as playgrounds and cemeteries. Abruptly reminding passersby of recent deadly sniper fire, shiny crimson colored concrete splashes, called the “roses of Sarajevo,” disrupted the gray monotony of the sidewalks. Everywhere one saw troops and vehicles of SFOR (NATO-led Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Jan. 1996–Dec. 2005).

Against the backdrop of this bombed-out city, brightly colored umbrellas bearing the logos of German beer and American soft drinks signaled re-opened cafés where men and women gathered to sip a thick, sweet coffee and smoke a cigarette. Most conversations that I overheard were about finding the means to fix up homes and put lives back in order. Whenever I inquired, “*Kako ste*” (How are you)? Sarajevans of all ages dully responded, “*Bio je rat. Biće bolje*” (There was a war. Things will be better).

When I returned to Sarajevo in 2002 the cityscape had changed again; the airport was brightly lit and computerized; many streets were renamed (see Robinson et al. 2001); several buildings were repaired or in the throes of reconstruction, and two new gigantic mosques now dominated the residential neighborhoods on Sarajevo's outskirts.¹³ The SFOR troops that had been ubiquitous in 1997 held a much lower profile, and Sarajevans were now quite gregarious. I heard jokes about everything—from the “Rolling Stones amplifiers” and the “Pershing missile minarets” on the new mosques, to the reams of paper needed for privatizing apartments, to corrupt politicians and indicted war criminals. But the dazed optimism of 1997 was gone as well. Many people voiced disappointment with the sluggish and uneven rates of economic development that accompanied their country's bizarre political system. Several expressed nostalgia for the heyday of Yugoslavia and regretted the passing of multicultural Bosnia (see also Markowitz 1996: 4). Almost everyone reminded me that their favorite Olympic peaks were still mined and mentioned fear of another war.

When I came for full-time fieldwork in March 2004 my plan was to investigate the effect of Sarajevo's multiple legacies on the current state-building project by participating in the daily life of the city and engaging in face-to-face conversation with a variety of ethnically marked and marking Sarajevans. Yet, remembering the posters I had seen in August 2002, early on I visited the Federation's statistics bureau where I went through Bosnia's censuses and documented the post-war ethnic breakdown of Sarajevo's population (Table 3).¹⁴

Informed by Cohn's (1990) findings that census categories in colonial India quickly became entrenched as objective “social groups” and Urla's (1993) analysis of the power of numbers to strengthen Basque claims for autonomy in Spain, when I saw the changes in national categories and the percentages of population that each claimed, I decided to make the 2002 FBiH census the fulcrum of my ethnography.

FROM MUSLIMANI TO BOŠNJACI: REMEDYING MUSLIM MISNAMING

... the Muslims seem finally to have become a neat ethno-national category its neighbors and the international community can deal with and understand. They have been forced by the war and the logic of the creation of nation-states to search for their origins and establish a “legitimate” and continuous national history (Bringa 1995: 36).

When visiting Bosnian refugees waiting out the war in Israel during 1994–1995, I often heard them refer to themselves and to BiH's president, Alija

¹³ The boundaries of Sarajevo had been redrawn to place Sarajevo canton within the FBiH. Those eastern parts beyond the city limits in the Republika Srpska are informally (but contentiously) called *Srpsko Sarajevo*. To demonstrate its Serbian character, a big, elaborate Serbian Orthodox cathedral was erected in the late 1990s.

¹⁴ Actually, before I found my way to the Federal Statistics Bureau I sought in vain for that of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. See note 11.

TABLE 3
FBiH Enumeration of Sarajevo, 2002

<i>Sarajevo</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Bošnjaci</i>	<i>Hrvati</i>	<i>Srbi</i>	<i>Ostali</i>
TOTAL	401,118	319,245	26,890	44,865	10,118
	100 percent	79.6 percent	6.7 percent	11.2 percent	2.5 percent
Centar	68,151	52,151	4,737	8,945	2,318
	100 percent	76.5 percent	7.0 percent	13.1 percent	3.4 percent

SOURCE: Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine 2003a, *Kanton Sarajevo u Brojkama 2003*, Federalni Zavod za Statistike, Sarajevo, 2003, "Nacionalna Struktura Stanovništva," p. 10.

Izetbegović, as Bošnjaci (Markowitz 1996).¹⁵ I was familiar with the word Bosanci, which means Bosnians, and *Muslimani*, which means Muslims, but since Bošnjaci was a new word for me I asked my hosts what it meant. "Oh, you know, Muslimani," Omer replied. "This is a new, more nationalistic word for the same group. That is, Bosnians with a Muslim family background as a national group, without all the stress on religion. Like Catholics are Croats and the Serbs are Orthodox, we [Bosnian] Muslims—and most of us are secular like the Jews in this kibbutz—are calling ourselves Bosniacs."

Although I did not know it at the time, Omer's words echoed a decision taken at the end of 1992. During the siege of Sarajevo, a group calling itself the Congress of Bosniac Intellectuals (*Vijeće Kongresa Bošnjačkih Intelektualca*, VKBI) voted to replace the eponym Muslimani with Bošnjaci, "a term for ethnic Muslims that avoids the specifically religious implications of *Muslimani*" (Hayden 1996: 792). During my first visit to the VKBI in 2002 its secretary general offered a fuller explanation: "Until 1992, the term Bošnjak did not officially exist. It was used during the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire but was eliminated in the two Yugoslavias. We chose Bošnjaci over Muslimani because the term Muslims holds the connotation [in Europe and the United States] of terror and fundamentalism. Or, if not that, it is just a religious term. We didn't want a purely religious label, but a national one."

The VKBI's recommendation was later accepted by the Izetbegović-headed government, and its ruling Party for Democratic Action (the SDA, or *Stranka demokratske akcije*) "took over the label 'Bosniak' (in place of Muslim) from [its] rival party" (Woodward 1995: 315). From 1993 onward the term Bošnjak began circulating with regularity, and in the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995, the

¹⁵ In the Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian language, a Bosniac man is a Bošnjak, a woman is a Bošnjanka, and the plural makes them all Bošnjaci. "Bosniacs" is the English version of this eponym.

Bosniacs were inscribed along with the Serbs and the Croats as the constituent nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Following that decision, the VKBI, among other institutions, published a wealth of books aimed at convincing readers that the Bosniacs are indeed an indigenous Slavic people with their own history, language, and culture. Some of these publications explicitly state that the designation *Muslimani* had been a deliberate misnaming of Bosnia's most original people (see, esp. Imamović 2000), and that within the group the term *Bošnjak* has always been used despite suppression from without. Adil Zulfikarpašić, the millionaire founder of the Bosniac Institute, writes, "I never heard my father use anything but the word 'Bosniak' for his national identification: 'I am a Bosniak,' 'my father is a Bosniak,' 'we are Bosniaks'" (1998: 48; see also Mašović 1998: 145).

By the time I began visiting post-war Sarajevo, the eponym *Bošnjaci* had officially replaced *Muslimani* in the government and in the media. Moreover, all the Bosnian Muslims I met referred to themselves as Bosniacs. Nonetheless, the VKBI continued to stress through its publications and in public forums the necessity of declaring the Bosniacs a nation and differentiating that nation, along with its language and traditions, from those of the Croats and Serbs (see esp. Isaković 1992). Representatives of Bosniac political and cultural organizations, linguists and historians, artisans and taxi-drivers all narrated to me incidents from the recent war to demonstrate just how fragile and misrecognized the Bosnian Muslims had been. These horror stories were usually supplemented with the reminder that until the Yugoslav census of 1971 they were denied the status of a national group. According to F. Friedman (1996: 159), official recognition as the *Muslimanska nacija* [Muslim nation], "in a position of equality in terms of rights and privileges with the other five nations of Yugoslavia," occurred only at the Fifth Yugoslav League of Communists Congress in 1969.¹⁶ Plying me with statistics from Yugoslavia's first population counts, in 1997 an eminent emeritus professor of political science at Sarajevo University told me what he and thousands like him did until the census of 1971: "One year I'd choose Serb, the next year Croat, and then Yugoslav" (see also Bringa 1993: 86; Woodward 1995: 36).

Official government misrecognition notwithstanding, several analysts of Bosnia's Muslim population noted that ethnic distinctiveness had always been evident as it manifested in Bosnia's uniquely multicultural settings (e.g., Lockwood 1975; Bringa 1995). They noted, too, that in Titoist Yugoslavia the Muslims themselves were reluctant to insist on a tightly bounded national designation, preferring instead to enact their identity through cultural practices

¹⁶ Susan Woodward (1995: 36) indicates an earlier date: "The political identity of Muslims as a nation (as opposed to the ruling stratum under Ottoman rule in the Balkans) was not recognized until the 1963 constitution." The constitution referred to here was that of the socialist republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

and shared experiences (e.g., Bringa 1995: 21, 30; Malcolm 1996: 22). “Bosnia has a 500-year tradition of its own Islam,” said the acting director of the National Museum of Bosnia-Herzegovina to me in 2004. “It has its own traditions as a democratic religion . . . traditions, symbols, more than religion or nation.” That liberal and flexible interpretation of Islam and an accompanying lack of nationalist aggressiveness, she insisted, are the Bosniacs’ key cultural characteristics (see also Mahmutćehajić 2003; Simmons 2002; Weine 2000). Yet these are the very traits that some twentieth-century Serbs and Croats have pointed to as they “regard ‘Muslim’ as an invalid or invented term that hides a deeper seated identity for the Muslims as either ‘Serbs’ or ‘Croats’” (Robinson et al. 2001: 962, citing Saltaja 1991; Bringa 1993: 86), and to bolster the assertions of nationalist leaders in Croatia and Serbia that (parts of) Bosnia and its inhabitants were “really” theirs (Malcolm 1996: 152). Both arguments, although rooted in opposite political agendas, converge on the idea that the “Muslim” label fails to denote a historically deep and distinct people.

I would suggest that prime among the reasons for this failure is that “Bosnian Muslims” is a multivalent term that conjures up a prior existence-as-Christians at the very moment that it indexes present-day adherents, or lapsed adherents (Gellner 1983: 72), of Islam. Unlike Bosnian Croat Catholics and Bosnian Orthodox Serbs who can assert the *longue durée* of their nations via a seemingly seamless history of Christianity, during the fifteenth through eighteenth centuries thousands of Bosnians abandoned Christianity to become Muslims (see Donia and Fine 1994; Pinson 1994; Malcolm 1996; cf. Zulfikarpašić 1998). The historical shallowness of Islam vis-à-vis Christianity places contemporary Muslims at risk of being viewed as opportunistic and treacherous individuals who changed religions to gain social and economic advantages, rather than as a primordial ethnic group.¹⁷ That risk is further compounded because in their association with Islam, a foreign and threatening “Turkish” or “Asiatic” faith, Muslims—even if of Slavic “blood”—are construed as out-of-place in Europe (see esp. Ballard 1996; Mašović 1998: 148). Indeed, several Bosniacs took the opportunity of our conversations to insist that during the 1992–1995 war, “Europe” refused to assist the Bosnian army because they viewed it as a band of armed Islamic fundamentalists.

As opposed to the term Muslim, which indexes Islam, the eponym “Bosniacs” makes a direct link to Bosnia, which, although situated in the peripheral Balkans, is certainly part of the European continent (Todorova 1997). It is the hope of many that in the years ahead Bosnia’s liberal and tolerant version of

¹⁷ Several Bosniac writers (e.g., Karahasan 1993; Mahmutćehajić 2000; Tanović-Miller 2001; Zulfikarpašić 1998) imply or assert that the similarities in belief and practice between the heretical Bosnian church and Islam resulted in a “natural” process of conversions, thereby establishing for Bosnian Muslims a *longue durée*. Nonetheless, under Ottoman rule several advantages accrued to Muslims that were denied to Christians and Jews.

Islam will gain positive recognition *as European* and that BiH will ultimately move from Europe's periphery into its center through integration in the European Union. After all, by the early twentieth century, after its annexation by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Bosnia-Herzegovina and its inhabitants became part of Central Europe.

The term *Bošnjak* itself seems to be a relatively recent European (re)invention; in the nineteenth century it was the Austro-Hungarian-German-Slavic word for *all* residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁸ The people of Bosnia, however, seemed to think about themselves primarily in terms of place: "We are from here" (Bringa 1995: 33–35, *pace* Gellner 1983: 62). Over and beyond identification with their towns or villages, Bosnians were officially categorized, and categorized themselves, by religion: Christians of the Orthodox or of the Latin (Roman Catholic) church, Jews, and Muslims.¹⁹ Only in the middle of the nineteenth century, with the rise of European nationalism and aspirations on the part of neighboring Croatia and Serbia for independence, did Bosnia's Catholic and Orthodox populations begin to call and then think of themselves as Croats and Serbs (Malcolm 1996: 149; see also Glenny 2001: 254–72).

In reaction to the rise of this nationalism, the Hapsburgs, who had gained Bosnia from the Ottomans with the 1878 signing of the Treaty of Berlin, devised the policy of *Bošnjastvo* to attract Bosnians of all faiths to identify with the crown territory of Bosnia, and not Croatia or Serbia (see Donia and Fine 1994: 97–99). Despite the opening of the magnificent Land Museum in Sarajevo, which houses a collection of artifacts that demonstrates the historical and cultural unity of all of Bosnia's people, *Bošnjastvo*, or Bosnianness, failed in its time to catch on as a pan-ethnic, territorially-rooted identity. But if *Bošnjastvo* was unsuccessful in attracting adherents during the latter part of the nineteenth century, at the end of the twentieth Bosnian Muslim elites picked up on this by now historically salient term—that had never been used in a Yugoslav census—while transforming its meaning from "all Bosnians" to index only one segment of them, the Muslim national group.

¹⁸ Mašović (1998: 145) asserts that, "to the end of the eighteenth century, they were all called '*Bosantsi*' [Bosnians, or in Turkish *Bosnevi*]," but there seems to be some disagreement among other sources as to whether the generic term was *Bosanci* or *Bošnjaci*. Malcolm (1996: 148) notes that the Turks "used a word meaning 'Bosnians' (*bosnakler*) to refer to all those who lived in Bosnia; but in Serbo-Croat the only people who had traditionally called themselves 'Bosnians' (*Bošnjaci*) were the Bosnian Muslims." Branka Magaš (2003: 19) notes that by the end of the fourteenth century the medieval Bosnian state transformed into a nation, and "Bosnianness had taken root in the wider population. For them, the term *Bosniak* transcended the original meaning of 'being from Bosnia.'" According to Skok (1971: 191) the form *Bošnjak* is attested from the fifteenth century, while *Bošnjanim* appeared in the fourteenth.

¹⁹ Historians have noted the porousness of boundaries between the Christian faiths and between Christianity and Islam. Conversions back and forth were common until well into the eighteenth century. Jews entered Bosnia in significant numbers after the Spanish expulsion at the end of the fifteenth century. Sarajevo's Jewish population peaked at 10,000–12,000 in the 1930s. Over 90 percent of the community perished during or emigrated immediately after the 1941–1945 Nazi occupation.

TABLE 4
Ethnic Composition of Sarajevo, Pre-War and Post-War

<i>Pre-War</i>					
<i>Total</i>	<i>Muslimani</i>	<i>Srbi</i>	<i>Hrvati</i>	<i>Jugoslaveni</i>	<i>Ostali</i>
527,049	259,470	157,143	34,873	56,470	19,093
100 percent	49.2 percent	29.8 percent	6.6 percent	10.7 percent	3.6 percent
<i>Post-War</i>					
<i>Total</i>	<i>Bošnjaci</i>	<i>Hrvati</i>	<i>Srbi</i>	<i>Ostali</i>	
401,118	319,245	26,890	44,865	10,118	
100 percent	79.6 percent	6.7 percent	11.2 percent	2.5 percent	

SOURCE: 1993, Nacionalni Sastav Stanovništva, p. 7 (based on 1991 data from the last Yugoslav census) and 2003, and Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine 2003a, Kanton Sarajevo u Brojkama 2003, p. 10. Note the pre- and post-war data are not entirely comparable because the Sarajevo city limits and the census categories have both changed.

Revitalization of the Bosniac eponym has put the Muslims on par with the Serbs and Croats by filling a troublesome gap in the terminological table. Now that Bosniacs are to Muslims as Croats are to Catholics and Serbs are to Orthodox, Bosnia's Muslims-as-Bosniacs have gained recognition as a political force as well as a "culture." During the negotiations that led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords it was the Bošnjaci—and not Muslimani—who along with the Serbs and Croats were inscribed as Bosnia-Herzegovina's constituent nations.

It is not surprising, then, that the 2002 FBiH census eliminated Muslimani as an affiliative option and installed Bošnjaci in their place. But as Table 4 shows, the Bosniacs did not merely replace the Muslims; they superseded them. In 2002 the Bosniacs came first on the list of BiH's nationalities, both in numerical strength and according to alphabetical order.

A simple comparative reading of the 1991 and 2002 census data for Sarajevo shows a dramatic demographic shift. The Muslims, who in 1991 comprised slightly less than half of the city's residents, when turned into Bosniacs in 2002 have become the city's dominant ethnic group. At the same time, the numbers of Serbs and Others have greatly diminished, and the Yugoslavs have disappeared.

What is not clear from this comparison, however, is whether the state acted by fiat to turn Muslims (and perhaps Jugoslaveni and Ostali) into Bosniacs, or if its citizens through *their* self-declarations made that switch in identity.²⁰

²⁰ Part, though by no means all of the change can be explained by the in-migration of Bosniacs and out-migration of Serbs (Ramet 1999: 292; UNHCR 2001).

TABLE 5
Solidifying Bosniac Identity

	1996	1998	2000	2003
Bošnjaci	24.7 percent	36.3 percent	41.7 percent	52.8 percent
BM/MB ^a	5.2	5.2	3.8	1.6
BOS/BiH B,M ^b	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2
Muslimani	43.6	25.2	20.2	12.4
TOTAL of all registrants	73.9	67.0	66.0	67.0

SOURCE: Matični Ured, Marriage Registration Bureau, Centar Općina, Sarajevo.

Notes: ^aBosniac-Muslim or Muslim-Bosniac; ^bBosnian Bosniac or Bosnian Muslim, or BiH Bosniac or BiH Muslim.

In 2004, twenty-one-year-old Amar, a journalism student at Sarajevo University, explained his decision: “I am a Bosniac. That’s what I call myself these days. My family is from a village outside Sarajevo, and my great-grandfather was a *hodža* [imam]. My mother is pretty conservative, but my brother and I don’t observe [Islamic law] at all, like most Bosniacs. Look, until a few years ago I went around telling everyone I was a Bosanac [pan-ethnic Bosnian] until I realized that this category is illegal; it doesn’t exist in our Constitution. So I thought about it and decided that I wanted to count as one of the constituent groups of my country. And now, I feel like, yeah, I’m a Bosniac.”

Data gleaned from the marriage registration bureau of Sarajevo’s Centar demonstrate a clear trend to abandon the Muslim label for that of Bosniac (see Table 5). In 1996 some 44 percent of all brides and grooms registered as Muslimani while a quarter called themselves Bošnjaci. That same year 6 percent used a combination of terms to declare their national belonging as Bosniac Muslims, Muslim Bosniacs, BiH Bosniacs or BiH Muslims. By 2003, less than 2 percent of the brides and grooms used combination terms, and only 12 percent defined themselves as Muslims. Contrarily, well over half the people who registered their marriage that year designated their national belonging as Bosniac.

The decision made by an elite group at the height of the siege of Sarajevo to call the Muslims of Bosnia Bosniacs was adopted by the state via the Dayton Peace Agreement to reify a people whose national diffuseness put them at risk. As rumors regarding a secret pact between Franjo Tuđman, the president of Croatia, and Slobodan Milošević, the leader of Serbia, to conquer and divide the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina between their states were confirmed as fact (see Woodward 1995: 172), and when the grisly details of the mass murders at Srebrenica became public, the dangers of the Muslims’ flexible,

culture- rather than nation-based identity were laid bare.²¹ Solidifying loosely defined Muslims into a Bosniac national group responded to people's fears and desires, and since the end of the war this Bosniac ethnopolitical identity has become fixed as fact. The state category and citizens' sensibilities have been working together to shape selves that correspond to the constitutional mandate of a Bosniac people.

What remains hidden in this analysis, however, is that even if we add up all the variously self-designated Bosniac and/or Muslim residents of Sarajevo's Centar district who registered their marriages in 2003, these comprised only 67 percent of the total. That proportion is almost 10 percent less than the 76.5 percent Bosniac figure reported in the census for the *općina* and offers a provocative hint that the lessons of the recent war notwithstanding, not all Bosnians of Muslim background always choose to identify as members of the Bosniac national group. The next section discusses the administrative apparatuses and public pressures that push people who might prefer to identify as flexible, multiply constituted hybrids or with one of the now unnamed minority groups into one of the three Bosniac-Croat-Serb constituent nations.

“BUT WHAT ARE YOU REALLY?” ONE SLOT FOR ONE AND ALL

The fiction of the census is that everyone is in it, and that everyone has one—and only one—extremely clear place. No fractions (Anderson 1991: 166).

As we have seen, the FBiH's first census counted its citizens according to three named categories only: the Bosniac, Croat, and Serb constituent nations. People who declared to the census-takers that they were Yugoslavs, Albanians, Ruthenians, or Slovenes may well have been placed into one of the B-C-S categories anyway. Or, if they insisted that they were *really* neither Bosniac, nor Croat, nor Serb, they ended up within the tiny undifferentiated category of Ostali.

Who are the Ostali and what is the logic behind the constitution of that category? By collapsing specific ethnic, regional and religious identities into one residual category of Others, the BiH state is erasing what had been seen and enacted in Yugoslavia as significant ethnic boundaries. As absurdly confounding and inherently logical as the Chinese encyclopedia entry for animals made famous by Foucault (1973: xv) that blends “embalmed” with “tame” and “frenzied”; “sucking pigs” and “stray dogs” with “sirens,” and all of these with “that from a long way off look like flies,” the un-naming of longstanding ethnic minorities imposes a new legibility on the population by highlighting their common otherness vis-à-vis the B-C-S triad. Now, when census-takers (and people on

²¹ Ramet (1999) estimates that 2,000 to 5,000 unarmed Muslims were killed in Srebrenica in July 1995. Glenny (2001: 650) lists the figure as 8,000, while spokespersons at the VKBI place the figure of murdered men, women, and children as high as 10,000 to 15,000.

the street) ask, “What is your national belonging?” they are *really* asking: Are you Bosniac, Croat, or Serb? All who do not fit into the triad are Ostali because they fall outside the nation(s) of the nation-state.²²

While the facts of the census confirm the B-C-S triad as Bosnia-Herzegovina’s constituent nation(s)—after all, 99 percent of the population was counted as Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs—this categorical logic vies with a prior order and practical multiplicity that once did and perhaps still does inform sociability in Sarajevo. It is important to remember that in the 1991 Yugoslav census 14.3 percent of the city’s population declared themselves members of ethnic groups that ranged alphabetically from Albanians to Ukrainians (3.6 percent) and Yugoslavs (10.7 percent), whereas in 2002, when no Yugoslav category appeared in the census, only 2.5 percent of Sarajevans were counted as Ostali (Table 4). If, as Foucault (1973: 53) claims, “Establishing discontinuities is not an easy task for history,” how might we account for the disappearance of so many non B-C-S Sarajevans?

One answer is emigration, but it fails to account for everyone. Another possibility is that a matter of years after a horrible war waged on the principle of ethnic cleansing, BiH citizens may not wish to reveal to the organs of the state that they represent cultural or biological blendings through parents or grandparents in mixed marriages (see, e.g., UNHCR 2001: 27). A third and related possibility is that Bosnian citizens who just a matter of years ago declared their affiliation with a state-recognized minority group now, refusing to be categorized as Other in their own country, accede to the demands of census-takers to place them within the constituent nations. Although they may keep alive an alternate off-census identity among family, friends and work-mates, by allowing themselves to be counted as Bosniac, Croat, or Serb they end up conspiring with a state that renders their ethnic affiliation too insignificant to count in the new scheme of things. Two examples of how this works follow:

Asja, who spent most of the war as a university student in the United States, returned to Sarajevo in 2000. Two years later she was visiting a friend when “the census-taker came. My friend’s mother answered the question about national belonging by saying, ‘I am a Czech.’ The interviewer told her, ‘I have no Czechs on my list. Czechs are Catholic. I’ll put you down as a Croat.’ And my friend’s mother did not object.”

I have heard similar stories about the making of Serbs from Montenegrins or Macedonians, and of Bosniacs from Albanians and Muslim-professing Gypsies. But most of the tales that emphasized being pushed to declare, “who you really are” as Bosniac, Croat or Serb were narrated to me by

²² The BiH constitution parenthetically recognizes “and others” after listing Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs as the constituent nations of the country, highlighting the ambiguity of citizens who do not belong to the nation(s).

people whose national belonging had always been Yugoslav, but who now proclaim, “I am a Bosnian.” Amila: “When the census-taker came to my house she talked to my Mom. Mom answered the question about national belonging by saying what she always says, Bosnian. ‘Yes,’ replied the census-taker, ‘we are all Bosnians in Bosnia. But what are you really?’ My Mom insisted that she really *is* Bosnian. The census taker then asked another question: ‘What is your family’s religion?’ My Mom said that she and my Dad are not observant, but that both her parents and his parents are Muslims. ‘Aha,’ said the interviewer, ‘then you are Bosniacs,’ and that is how she completed the form.”

Susan Woodward (1995: 271) notes that during the war those who refused “to accept an ethnically defined political loyalty [were] reclassified as enemies of their people. . . . Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina who identified themselves as Bosnians rather than side with Bosnian Serb or Bosnian Croat nationalists were all classified with the enemy and vulnerable to treatment as traitors.” In August 2002, Nebojša, whose first name marks him as a Serb but whose hyphenated surname along with his service in the Bosnian army keeps everyone guessing, implicitly concurred with Woodward as he pointed out that the Dayton Accords and the FBiH’s census demands reflect earlier wartime practices. He explained that during the war stating and demonstrating a specific ethno-religious identity was often the only route for gaining the humanitarian aid—foodstuffs, medicine, blankets, clothing—distributed through religious organizations. Nebojša, who had always identified as Yugoslav, but since Bosnia’s independence in 1992 has insisted on calling himself “undeclared,” mused, “If, during the war, I had declared myself as a Serb, life would have been at least 20 percent easier because I could have gotten humanitarian aid from Dobrotvor. Only ADRA of the Adventists and La Benevolencija of the Jewish Community were open to and helped everyone. Otherwise, Caritas only gave to Croats and other Catholics, Dobrotvor to the Orthodox, and don’t get me started on Preporod and Merhamet that only serviced the Muslims.”

Since the end of the war, individuals whose belongings place them outside the B-C-S triad often have the hardest time landing jobs in government institutions, finding state-guaranteed mortgages, student loans and scholarships. They cannot be elected to the BiH presidency and are ineligible for many other state and entity offices. Bosnia’s constitution, as McMahon (2004: 202) points out, “emphasizes national identities and downplays individual rights.”

Important as they may be, instrumental reasons for conforming to state-imposed demands for self-definition via the tripartite B-C-S scheme tell only one part of a wider, more complicated story. Several people from ethnically mixed families told me that for emotional or ideological reasons they identify only with one side. Sonja, the daughter of a Jewish father and a Croatian mother, tells me that she had always identified as Yugoslav. In the

early 1990s, she and her Jewish husband, Miroslav, certain that the war would be over in a matter of months, remained with their son in Sarajevo. After two years of service in the Bosnian army, Miroslav convinced the family that they should flee to Israel. At the end of four years abroad, where Miroslav, a trained economist, worked as a forklift operator, and Sonja, an English teacher, held an unskilled factory job, they returned to Sarajevo and picked up the thread of their pre-war lives.²³ Sonja credits the years in Israel for giving her the self-confidence she needed to tackle BiH's intimidating bureaucracy, speak her mind, and take an active role in Bosnian politics. Today, while continuing to attend events at the Jewish Community with her husband, Sonja wears her mother's gold cross, declares her nationality as Croat and has joined the Croatian New Initiative Party (HNI), whose liberal platform and multinational vision for Bosnia-Herzegovina best express her own.

Politics of a different sort play a role in the personal identity decisions of Damir, Mak, and Azra. Thirty-year-old Damir, whose father is Bosniac and whose mother is Serbian Orthodox, tells me that he is first and foremost a Bosnian, but when pushed to declare who he "really is" he will say Bosniac, "because I fought in the BiH army during that war" and, admitting to a patri-lineal bias, "I feel closer to that side of my family." Likewise Mak, who at age twelve barely escaped imprisonment and worse at the hands of irregular Serb forces when he and his Croat mother were part of a convoy fleeing besieged Sarajevo, identifies with his father as a Bosniac. Azra, however, wears a medallion of the Virgin Mary and calls herself a Croat although her deceased father was a Muslim and her surname, like those of Damir and Mak, indexes her as Bosniac. But Azra, who, under the pretext of an employment opportunity in Italy was sold into prostitution by a Bosniac family friend, now disavows that identity.

Dr. Branko Horvat, president of the Sarajevo branch of the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), generously spent several hours with me one fine summer morning in 2004. After informing me how his views differ from those of his party-mates in Herzegovina (they want to secede from BiH and join the Republic of Croatia whereas Horvat advocates "100 percent rights for [our] 10 percent of the BiH population"), he told me about his family, Croats on both sides (Horvat is the Hungarian version of *Hrvat*, or Croat). Unlike most Bosnian Croats he knows, Dr. Horvat remained in Sarajevo throughout the war where he continued to work as head of a neurology clinic in which just about all his colleagues were, and remain, Bosniacs. In fact, as he told me with a smile, he was then married to a Muslim woman. That marriage

²³ But all was not smooth and easy. A Bosniac woman and her son had taken over their apartment and fought bitterly to retain possession of it. Ultimately Sonja and her husband won their long and costly lawsuit. Meanwhile, Miroslav reentered what was now the Federation's tax bureau, while Sonja sought and found a new position teaching English at a technical high school.

ended and he married again; this time his wife is a Serb. “*Tako je kod nas*” (That’s how it is with us).

I asked about his children. He told me that he is raising his sister’s daughter. “My sister was married to a Muslim man. At age five or so, their daughter came to us and asked, ‘What am I?’ I asked her what she wants to be. She said ‘I want to be like grandma,’ that is, like my mother, a Croat. And that’s just fine. According to our constitution she can be like her mother, or like her father, but she cannot be both. Funny, isn’t it? We are allowed two passports (i.e., dual citizenship) but not dual nationality. That’s not possible. *Tako je kod nas.*”

Despite long established social practices of intermarriage and cultural hybridity, the 2002 FBiH census has confirmed what many have been groping to say: To count and be counted in contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina means being either a Bosniac, a Croat, or a Serb. Declaring a minority identity or refusing to conform to (state) pressures for exclusive B-C-S belongings invites assignment to a tiny residual category of Others who lack membership in the constituent nations of the Bosnoherzegovinian nation-state. That almost 100 percent of FBiH’s population was counted as Bosniac, Croat, or Serb suggests that citizens—and census-takers in particular—have accepted the state’s identity demands and avoid the *Ostali* label whenever possible. Representatives of several ethnically based cultural and political organizations reinforced that interpretation when they declared to me that to combat fears of assimilation and split loyalties, just about everyone in Bosnia has stopped marrying across ethnic lines.²⁴

Data from Sarajevo’s Centar marriage registry, however, suggest otherwise: Of the 4,826 couples who married between 1996 and 2003 the ethnic designations of bride and groom differed in 20–25 percent of the cases. That proportion is lower than the 30–40 percent intermarriage rate for Bosnia’s large cities prior to 1991 (Donia and Fine 1994: 6); but it is significant that after a war based on ethnic cleansing and in a country that demands uni-category belongings so many men and women persist in finding life partners from across the ethnic divide.

More important for the present inquiry is the finding that hundreds of Sarajevans acted off-census when they recorded their national belonging on state marriage registration forms. While the great majority of those who married in the Centar Općina did identify as Bosniacs, followed by Croats and Serbs, far more ethno-national categories were declared in the registry than the B-C-S triad (Table 6).

As the marriage registration data show, some Sarajevans actively chose to declare their national affiliation with specifically named ethnic groups that

²⁴ Of all the people with whom I spoke, the geography professor who represented Napredak, the century-old Croatian cultural organization, and the two representatives of the Pale (Republika Srpska) office of SDS, the Serbian majority nationalist party, were most adamant on this issue.

TABLE 6
*Insisting on Recognition: Naming National Belonging. Centar Općina
 Marriage Registration Data by percentages*

Category	1996	1998	2000	2002	2003
Bosniacs ^a	73.9	67.0	66.0	62.0	67.0
Croats	5.2	3.6	4.6	5.6	6.0
Serbs	3.1	2.5	2.8	3.3	2.5
B-C-S subtotal ^b	82.2	73.1	73.4	70.9	75.5
Albanians	—	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.7
Czechs	—	—	—	0.1	0.1
Germans ^{c*}	0.6	0.5	1.6	2.5	2.1
Hungarians	0.1	—	—	0.2	—
Jews	0.1	0.1	—	0.1	—
Macedonians	0.1	—	0.2	0.1	0.1
Montenegrins	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1
Roms	—	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.7
Slovenians	0.2	—	—	0.2	0.1
Turks	0.2	0.2	—	0.3	0.3
Yugoslavs	0.1	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.3
Other FN ^{d*}	1.3	1.8	2.0	2.4	1.8
“Ostali” subtotal	2.9	4.1	4.5	7.1	6.3
TOTAL	85.1	77.2	77.9	78.0	81.8

^a“Bosniacs” here represents the sum total of Bosniacs + Bosniac-Muslims + Muslim-Bosniacs + Muslims (see Table 5).

^bCompare with the B+C+S total for the Centar Municipality in the FBiH 2002 census of 96.6 percent.

^cIncludes Austrians and Germans.

^dOther Foreign Nationals, includes citizens of Anglo-American countries (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia), Western Europe (European Union plus Norway and Switzerland), Eastern Europe (including the states of the former Soviet Union), the Middle East (e.g., Egypt, Iran, Lebanon) and the Far East (e.g., Indonesia and the Philippines).

*Note: It is impossible to tell from these data how many are members of the “international community” temporarily employed in Sarajevo, how many are BiH nationals, and how many returnees to Sarajevo who are claiming the nationality of the country where they resided during the war and may have gained citizenship.

the state, via the census, has un-named. But as we have already seen, those who act off-census at the county registry do not necessarily refuse to comply with census-takers’ decisions to categorize them according to the B-C-S scheme. When they fill out their forms in the *općina*, no one asks them, “But what are you really?”

When census-takers, university registrars, court clerks and people on the street do ask, “But what are you really?” they are not probing for authenticity. Instead they are demanding that those who call themselves Albanians, Bosnians, Macedonians, or Ruthenians drop what the powers-of-state have

determined to be insignificant and bothersome belongings. “Think again,” they are told, “Are you a Bosniac, a Croat, or a Serb?”

Yet not everyone is willing or able to forego a multiple or hybrid identity. Although it has never held a place in the census, the unifying label, *Bosanci*, remains alive as a salient symbolic category that indexes attitudes and behaviors that blur Bosniac-Croat-Serb-Ostali boundaries, whether the state and its census like it or not.

INSISTING ON A STATE OF HYBRIDITY

Hybridity is a journey into the riddles of recognition. Take any exercise in social mapping and it is the hybrids that are missing (Nederveen Pieterse 2001: 220).

During our hour-long conversation in July 2004, the president of Preporod, a major Bosniac cultural and philanthropic organization, reiterated to me that the Bosniac nation has existed for centuries. Stressing that it is his and all Bosniacs’ cultural responsibility to ensure their nation’s continuity, the Preporod president observed that although they were named and misnamed differently over time, today’s Bosniacs are the same people and practice the same traditions as Bosnian Muslims throughout history. Towards the end of our conversation, when I advanced the idea of pan-Bosnian hybridity, he said that yes, there is much common culture among the B-C-S groups, but those minimal differences—in painting, in literature, in cuisine, in language—must be preserved. He repeated what I had been reading and hearing for months, that the Muslims’ carefree way of being in the world had put them at risk from their expansionist Serb and Croat neighbors and ended our discussion by insisting that, like every other nation, the Bosniacs have the right to define themselves as they see fit, take every opportunity to proclaim that identity, and insure it for future generations. Then he handed me a large picture book as a parting gift. Published by Preporod, the volume’s title, *Bosanskohercegovačka grafika*, as well as the pictures displayed between its covers, testifies to the cultural overlaps and blendings that manifest, at the very least, in the ideas and images of the ethnically varied artists of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Mehmet Zaimović, one of Sarajevo’s most renowned artists, describes himself as Bosnian. The curvaceous shapes and muted colors that make his artwork so remarkable derive from the landscapes of Bosnia, the green villages of his youth, and war-torn Sarajevo of his middle years. When we met in his atelier in June 2004 Zaimović was reconstructing a bullet-riddled painting that he had completed before the war, but my immediate reaction to that punctured canvas was that it depicted the war. “No,” he told me after describing the sniper fire that had shattered his windows and ripped his pictures, “that is not my way. It is not the Bosnian way.”

Mehmet Zaimović’s name tells those who wish to know that he is “really” a Bosniac, but Zaimović himself insists that he is “really” a Bosnian, a product of

the region, its multiethnic history, and intercultural blendings. So too do Hasan and Mirzana, a middle-aged couple with deep roots in Sarajevo. During my visits they described the reality of *bratstvo i jedinstvo* in socialist Yugoslavia, where their wide circle of friends and family once included—and still includes—people from every religion, ethnic group, and walk of life, “all Yugoslavs, all Bosnians.” Since 1992 they have voted for the Socialist Democratic Party (SDP). Considered the heir to the Yugoslav League of Communists, the SDP eschews ethnic nationalism and distributes a portrait of Tito with its yearly calendar. Hasan, who served all four years as a front line soldier in the Bosnian army, and Mirzana described that war as a tragedy: “Look, the same coalition of (nationalist) parties that brought us into that war in 1992 are in power today.” For them, the only logical solution to Bosnia’s woes is to embrace the region’s rich, culturally mixed past and build a BiH state of all its citizens.

Haris Silajdžić is not as sure, although the political party that he leads, Stranka za BiH proclaims that very goal in its name. Silajdžić had been a university professor until he joined Alija Izetbegović’s government and served as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. A year after the war’s end, Silajdžić broke with Izetbegović’s SDA and formed his own Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina. When in 2004 I asked him why, he replied that he did not want to live in an Islamic state. He did not leave it at that; Silajdžić explained in long and passionate detail that he is a Bosniac and that Bosniacs are Europeans who have always embraced a very tolerant, almost secular form of Islam. “I am a Bosniac, a Bosnian and a European,” he continued. “Could these identities be ranked or nested one inside the other?” I asked. Silajdžić refused the idea of ranking, but he did agree that they could be viewed as increasingly large circles of belonging.

Silajdžić was not optimistic, however, about the chances of a unified Bosnia in the short run. He had been chastened by “the Americans” in 1996 for forming his Party for BiH and advocating one state without the entities too soon after the hard-worked-for Dayton Accords, and it seems that he has come to accept as expedient the solution of an ethnically split Bosnia-Herzegovina. Several other not-nationalist politicians from the SDP and the Citizens’ Party moved back and forth like Silajdžić in their use of the terms *Bošnjak* and *Bosanac* as they too expressed longings for Bosnia as a unified state of all its citizens, while accepting the current situation as the lesser of evils.

On 6 October 2001 an article reporting similar ambivalence over official recognition of the Bosnians appeared in the newspaper, *Oslobodjenje* (Kalamujić 2001). At the SDA party congress, Izetbegović and several supporters moved to recognize the Bosnian nation to reflect the sentiments of many BiH citizens. While, as the article reported, such an initiative might call for a slight amendment of the Dayton agreements, inclusion of the Bosnians as a nation of BiH would not change its terms or sabotage the national identities

of Serbs, Croats, or Bosniacs. Following this first paragraph, the rest of the article was filled with comments from three prominent scholars whose names mark them as Bosniac, Serb, and Croat. They each warned that the establishment of what was provocatively called in the headline, *Nadnacija Bosanaca*, a ‘supernation’ of Bosnians, was premature and dangerous. The commentators implied that, coming as it did from Izetbegović’s ruling party, this Bosnian nation initiative was reminiscent of earlier communist, ideological maneuvers. Decision-makers in the government agreed, and the *Bosanska nacija* was not nominated into existence on the 2002 FBiH census.

Lack of a pan-ethnic Bosnian category leaves many Sarajevans frustrated, including those whose names lead others to define them as Serbs and Croats. Twenty-six-year-old Asja declares: “I’m Bosnian. . . . When that interviewer came I told her that I am Bosnian. Then she asked, ‘But what are you really?’ I told her that this is who I am. Really. ‘And if you can’t put me down as Bosnian, then list me as American—I lived there for six years. If I can’t be Bosnian,’ I told her, ‘American is second best in saying who I am and what I stand for.’ Just because my great-great-great-great-grandparents came centuries ago from Serbia doesn’t make me a Serb.” Rejecting “blood” or genealogy for the traditions of place, Asja identifies with a history and territory that demonstrate the blending of traditions. Asja, like Amila and her parents, insists that the religion of her ancestors should not and will not determine her own belongings.

Natasha, who spent the war years in Israel where she earned a prestigious university degree, passionately maintains that she can only identify as Bosnian. “I am Bosnian: My Mom’s father was a Jew, and his wife was a Croatian Catholic who helped him when he was exiled during World War II to the island of Hvar. My father is a Bosniac. I am everything—and that’s what Bosnia and the Bosnians are all about. I have some friends who ignore one side and just declare themselves Bosniac, or Croat, or Serb. How can they do that? It’s betraying who you really are.”

Having returned to contribute the knowledge and experience she gained abroad to rebuild Sarajevo, Natasha is frustrated that the Bosnianness that, as she describes it, pervades the air that she breathes, the language that she speaks and the way by which she thinks of herself, is not officially recognized. In defining herself as much more than the sum of her parts she claims that neither she nor her country can be reduced to the categorical demands of state.

Over the course of the post-war years, beginning with 15.3 percent in 1996 and peaking at 22.4 percent in 1999 and 2000, some 20 percent of those who married in Sarajevo’s Centar Općina refused to pinpoint any one ethnicity to describe their belongings. Instead, they left the *nacionalna pripadnost* space blank or drew in a slash, wrote themselves in as Bosnians or BiH, insisted on an “undetermined” ethnicity, modified the B-C-S designations with

TABLE 7
Refusing National Belonging, Insisting on Hybridity. Percentages of Marriage Registrants in Centar Općina

<i>Designation</i>	1996	1997	1999	2000	2002	2003
Left blank or —	8.3	11.0	13.0	12.5	12.2	10.7
Bosnian or BiH	5.9	7.6	8.0	8.2	8.3	6.1
Bosnian/BiH + B-C-S	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.4
Undetermined	0.1	0.4	—	0.5	0.5	0.5
Other label	0.1	—	0.3	0.2	—	—
<i>Ostali</i>	—	—	—	0.2	0.1	—
Catholic	0.1	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.3
Orthodox	0.2	0.3	—	0.1	0.1	—
Other religion*	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1
TOTALS	15.3	20.2	22.4	22.4	21.4	18.1

*The religions listed were Islam (indexing religion rather than ethnicity), Hinduism, Evangelism, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Seventh Day Adventists.

Bosnian or BiH, or declared a religious or place-based affiliation. A few, signaling ironic acceptance of that insider/outsider category, wrote in their ethnic affiliation as *Ostali*; while a few people simply wrote “a-national” or “*čov[j]ek*” (human being)²⁵ (see Table 7).

Since at least the 1960s, many men and women have identified with a particularly Bosnian way of being in the world, but the Yugoslav, and now the Bosnian state has never recognized that identity in the census (Woodward 1995: 36). Despite expressed sentiments for a unifying citizenship-based category of belonging, in 2004 no political party, member of the BiH presidency, or parliament has put forth a suggestion to amend the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina to include Bosnians. Reacting to the idea of a Bosnian nation, representatives of Croat and Serb cultural and political organizations told me that such so-called hybridity is only a romantic masking of Bosniacs' desires for domination, and they insisted ever more strongly on the tripartite B-C-S divisions.

Combined, Tables 6 and 7 show that the proportion of Sarajevans who rejected the B-C-S triad at the Centar marriage registry peaked in 2000 and declined thereafter. Offering a unifying Bosnian alternative to the tripartite division that ended the war could upset this increasingly accepted and acceptable social reality. Yet in song and story, Bosnians remain salient as the result of all the biological beings and cultural products that have drifted

²⁵ One person wrote the word with a “j” as do most Bosniacs and Croats, the other without the “j,” in conformity to the Serbian Ekavian dialect.

through, stayed, merged with, and changed over the centuries in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1975, Yugoslavia's premier rock band, Bjelo Dugme, sang, *Tako ti je mala moja kad' ljubi Bosanac!* These words and their catchy tune are frequently played on Sarajevo radio stations even today: "That's the way it goes, my little one, when a Bosnian kisses!" Combining and overcoming what seem to be intractable national boundaries, Bosanci, like the Yugoslavs of an earlier time, embody the threat and promise of a Muslim-Christian-Jewish-Bosniac-Croat-Serb point of convergence in the heart of Europe. Thus, they persist on the streets, in prose and in song, even as they remain off-census and uncounted.

CONCLUSIONS: THE CENSUS, GOVERNMENTALITY, AND PRACTICAL HYBRIDITY

The very concept at the heart of the nation, 'the people,' becomes an object of fear and violence that wants to have absolute control of a nation it is at once dividing and destroying (Aretxaga 2003: 397).

During the second millennium Bosnia emerged twice as a state; first in the Middle Ages and then late in the twentieth century. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, consolidation of the Bosnian state seems to have preceded Bosnian national identity, but on the eve of the Ottoman conquest, there was "no doubt about the existence of a specifically Bosnian nation" (Magaš 2003: 19).²⁶ Over the next four hundred years a territorially unified and unifying Bosnia fell in importance to the religious affiliations by which the Ottomans classified their subjects, and by the end of the nineteenth century, each major religious group in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Catholics, Serbian Orthodox, Muslims, and Jews) had formed separate philanthropic institutions and cultural organizations. At the same time, Bosnia's Catholic and Orthodox populations, influenced by nationalist movements in neighboring Croatia and Serbia, increasingly found themselves identified and identifying as Croats and Serbs. Following World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires, the multi-confessional, culturally pluralistic, and hybrid land bridge linking Croatia and Serbia was incorporated into the first independent Yugoslavia, but its Bošnjaci and Bosanci were overlooked in that Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

Yugoslavia was resurrected and reunited as a federation of socialist republics under the rallying cry, "brotherhood and unity" after the brutalities of World War II. Yet it took two censuses to offer its citizens an all-embracing Yugoslav identity and three for Muslims to be given visibility and legitimacy as a

²⁶ Magaš refers her readers to Mladen Ančić, *Jajce: Portret srednjevjekovnog grada* [Jajce: Portrait of a medieval city] (Split, 1999: 56). Yet it is important to add that in modern terms (late nineteenth century to present) it is highly unlikely that any "nations" existed in medieval Bosnia, or in all of Europe for that matter.

constituent nation. Despite ideological preferences for eliminating ethnic subdivisions and steady rates of intermarriage across the republics (Botev 2000), the Yugoslav category failed to claim the allegiance of more than 5.4 percent of the total population (Sekulic et al. 1994), and a Bosnian option of belonging was never offered.

In contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly in FBiH, the Muslims-turned-Bosniacs have gained in prominence and power; the Yugoslavs have officially disappeared, and the state has yet to advance the idea of an inclusive Bosnian nation. Hybrids, especially as narrated in myths of nation building, are dangerous. They blur the legibility of who is who, threaten the certainty of boundaries, and conjure up alternate ideas of being and acting in the world (Bhabha 1990; Gilroy 2000). During the war, Bosnia's Muslims were told to accept who they "really" were—the descendants of Croat or Serb forefathers—or be expelled or eliminated. The Muslims complied in declaring who they really were, but in announcing the Bosniac nation, they rejected the demands of nationalist Serbs and Croats. As they fought against armed aggression, and sometimes became aggressors themselves, the Bosniacs articulated a narrative that links their version of Islam with the schismatic Christianity practiced in the medieval Bosnian state and thereby substantiated claims to being one—indeed, the most autochthonous—of Bosnia's three nations.

Children of mixed marriages, however, have not fared so well; they must choose one national belonging, for dual nationality is not tolerated in BiH (UNCHR 2001: 27). To keep the peace in politically shaky, post-war Bosnia, the population has been legally divided into three separate nations, each vested with equal and inalienable rights vis-à-vis the others. There is no room for hyphenated or hybrid individuals or traditions in this juridico-moral scheme where multiculturalism is based on incommensurability (see Werbner 1997: 239; Markowitz 2004).

Although historically unsubstantiated, the increasingly accepted and acceptable separation of BiH's population into three distinct nations and the division of its territory into ethnically dominated entities and cantons support a pragmatic program of governmentality. To stay out of trouble, to avoid another war, the people(s) of Bosnia were hewed apart, and those who represented the cultural, if not biological result of blendings were forced to choose—to be one thing or another. Bosnia's constituent nations thus look less like primordial groups and more like the "things" that when disposed of in the right manner result in "an end which is 'convenient' for each of the things that are to be governed" (Foucault 1991: 95). Those who resist the triad are placed in the parenthetical, uncertain category of *Ostali*, united only in their annoying persistence in acting off-census. These Others are discouraged from insisting on their belongings, not only by census-takers but also by constitutional decrees that preclude them from top government positions.

State policies and systems of nomenclature exert their influence in census counts, which often result in shaping citizens' subjectivities (Cohn 1990; Kertzer and Arel 2002: 2; Uvin 2002) and solidifying national belongings (Borneman 1992; Hirsch 2005). "The state" in the figure of the FBiH census interviewer, reminded 99 percent of the population that to count and be counted meant declaring one's national identity as Bosniac, Croat, or Serb. Even in (what was once) multi-ethnic and inter-cultural Sarajevo, only 2.5 percent rejected these categorical demands. But we have also seen that "the state" in FBiH is not a monolith that consistently exerts its presence and power. Although off-census, the terms *Bosaniac*, *Bosanka*, and *Bosanci* remain salient, and there is often slippage in everyday speech between Bosnians and members of specific nations. Even in organs of the state, citizens declare unrecognized national belongings, as did 20 percent of those who registered their marriages in Sarajevo's Centar Općina. Some go so far as to reject, with a slash or by leaving a blank space on their form, the state's right to demand ethnicity; others assert that they are Bosnians to the very state that refuses to name that belonging, while still others identify with groups that the state has un-named.

This analysis of census and sensibilities demonstrates that the supposedly ethnically clean territories and populations that resulted from the 1992–1995 war (Hayden 1996; Cattaruzza 2001; Chaveneau-Lebrun 2001; Robin-Hunter 2001) are murkier than what facts and figures suggest. In Sarajevo there are still those who call their city *Evropski Jeruzalem* (Koštović 2001) and speak in multiple, hyphenated and hybrid terms that capture the ongoing vitality of biological and cultural overlaps. Despite state simplification practices designed to make tri-national Bosniac-Croat-Serb BiH experientially real as well as politically viable, the people of Sarajevo continue to engage dialectically with state-defined population categories as they question their own subjectivities and enact practical hybridity in their daily lives.

State census categories do not speak for themselves. They do not necessarily reflect longstanding cultural practices, forge commonsensical social categories, or present an objective picture of the ethnic distribution of the population. In seeking to make legible who is what, the state via the census tells people who they should and should not be. And although this analysis reveals that the power of states to name and un-name categories of belonging is not absolute, it has also shown that the BiH state project of governmentality has created its own logic that breeds complicity. The census results "prove" the (near) monopoly of the constituent nations in the population, strengthen the constitutional rights of these nations, and give all the more reason to disregard the hybridity that has characterized the Balkans for centuries.

The fact of the FBiH census, which demonstrates the failure of the unitary BiH state to count the entire population, as well as its facts, could ultimately be rallied to bolster efforts for the dissolution of that shaky state. Taking the

B-C-S scheme to its logical conclusion, most of Republika Srpska would then join Serbia, much of Herzegovina would be incorporated into Croatia, and an isolated Bosniac-Bosnia would be left to fend for itself. Yet it behooves us to consider what Bose (2002: 264) has suggested in regard to the 1992–1995 war; just because the “worst case scenario did prevail does not mean that this was the only possible outcome.” If partition and dissolution are possible futures for Bosnia-Herzegovina might it not also be that the Yugoslavs-turned-Bosnians, who once embodied state-declared goals of brotherhood and unity but are now unrecognized Bosnians, can rally the symbolic power of a once and future utopia? *Tako ti je mala moja* . . .

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