

undecided voters who eventually will drop out begin to do so. Finally, the last few days before the election are a campaign's final chance to nudge the outcome their way because bounces can be consequential if the election is very close.

If you study presidential politics or time series analyses, there is a lot to like in *Timeline*. The connection between the method and the substance is close and tight, which makes this book a great example of how the right method can help illustrate important nuances in the substance of a problem. For example, the thoughtful discussion of whether the polling time series is stationary or integrated helps illustrate the important differences between bounces and bumps. But by far, the most important contribution the book makes is to illustrate that presidential campaigns matter in *predictable* ways, and voters' intentions evolve *incrementally* over the course of the election year.

Election outcomes don't always reflect where the polls start in April, but they always begin to reflect the outcome early in the year. There are no outcome-changing gaffes, only underlying fundamentals and campaigns that help voters make sense of the state of the world around them. To be clear: for Erikson and Wlezien, presidential campaigns matter—despite the regularity of attitude change in elections, the campaigns are an (if not *the*) important catalyst in the process. Without them, the noisiness of decision-making might grow instead of shrink. The regularity comes from something—and it's unlikely that thing is just the passage of time or the proximity of Election Day.

#### **Compromise: A Political and Philosophical History.**

By Alin Fumurescu. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 305p. \$90.00.

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— Ryan Patrick Hanley, *Marquette University*

Daily life as a twenty-first-century American citizen is a continual testament to our profound need for guidance on the subject of this insightful and meticulously researched book. Its primary aim is to provide what its subtitle calls “a political and philosophical history” of the idea of compromise—or, as Alin Fumurescu elsewhere has it, a “conceptual genealogy” (p. 7) broadly conceived as an exercise in *Begriffsgeschichte*. As such, while hardly insensitive to contemporary normative concerns, it presents itself first and foremost as an effort to remedy a “lack of historical contextualization” (p. 14) and a “rediscovery of the forgotten genealogy of compromise” (p. 18), particularly as it emerged in Britain and France between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.

The main argument of the book is that compromise is today understood in two quite different senses, one positive or “commendable” and the other negative or “condemnable” (p. 19), and that the origin of this “dazzling

discrepancy” (p. 5) or indeed “radical split” (p. 8) can be “almost pinpointed” (p. 6) to the way this concept evolved in the two very different contexts of Britain and France between the late Renaissance and Enlightenment periods. The positive sense refers to the view of compromise as a political virtue that enables two distinct entities to resolve disagreements without resorting to force and violence, and it was in this sense that the concept emerged in Britain. The negative sense refers to the view of compromise as the violation of the essential integrity of one's inner self or self-conception, and it was in this sense that the concept evolved in France.

Why this difference? The author's argument is that “two different kinds of individualism” developed in France and Britain (p. 64; cf. p. 158), which he labels “centripetal individualism” and “centrifugal individualism.” What defines these are two different approaches to “the dialectic of the individual between *forum internum* and *forum externum*” (pp. 19–20). The significance of this dialectic for the project as a whole cannot be overemphasized; indeed, perhaps the work's chief aim and its chief scholarly contribution is its recovery of this “now forgotten dialectic” (p. 10; cf. pp. 24, 46, 95, 100, 116, 131, 267, 269). In brief, *forum internum* is “the forum of conscience, authenticity, and freedom, subject to no one and punishable by no one except God,” whereas *forum externum* is that “in which the individual identified himself and was identified through belonging to one of several communities” and was “liable to judgment and punishment by the community” (p. 10). With that claim in place, the book argues that the French context that privileged *forum internum* promoted the development of a negative view of compromise, whereas the British context that privileged *forum externum* promoted the development of a positive view (e.g. pp. 11, 193, 269).

Compromise is thus “a concept at the crossroads between representation and self-representation” (p. 91; cf. pp. 4, 195), and collectively the nine chapters that make up the work provide a useful road map to these interconnections. Especially valuable are its illuminations of the ways in which the concept of compromise was decisively shaped by medieval conceptions of the dialectic of the individual, as well as by the differing theories and practices of representation and contractualism in France and Britain in the early modern period.

Aside from these substantive insights, three additional strengths of the book deserve explicit mention. The first is the author's impressive erudition. This book covers a remarkable amount of ground, examining concepts from representation to individualism to sovereignty to contractualism, as well as thinkers from Aristotle to Avishai Margalit. It also makes good on its promise to provide “dozens of examples from each side” (p. 19) of the concepts of compromise it aims to illuminate. Coupled with the book's detailed and thorough coverage of the secondary literature is the amount of labor that must have gone

into this project, which is impossible not to admire. There are a few instances admittedly where readers might have wished for a bit more trimming; fewer block quotes from the secondary literature would not have hurt the book, nor would the excision of some of the more sweeping claims about what drove “the entire history of the Church” (p. 102) or “the beginning of modernity” (p. 211).

Second, *Compromise* displays a striking and welcome methodological self-awareness. The author does justice to the complexity of his concept by noting the degree to which it resists study apart from a thick web of political and theoretical developments that shaped its evolution. In this respect, his approach to his subject is guided by the conviction, expressed by James Farr and quoted here approvingly, that “concepts are never held or used in isolation, but in constellations which make up entire schemes or belief systems” (p. 107). At the same time, this approach itself raises a challenge of which the author is well aware, namely, that if concepts can be fully understood only in the context of their relationship to other concepts—which themselves are tied to hosts of other concepts—inquiry into any single concept will need to determine for itself where and how far into this panoply of concepts it needs to go. Fumurescu answers this challenge in part by usefully invoking the “tunnel history” approach that he borrows from J. G. A. Pocock (p. 196; cf. p. 234). It is a welcome move that enables him to survey Spinoza and Locke and Hobbes without allowing his surveys to become sprawling; this approach is in fact so effective that some may wish that it had been employed elsewhere as well.

Third, this book is distinguished by its theoretical acumen. The author often shows himself to be not only a meticulous historian but also an innovative theorist, and offers a host of novel syntheses that deserve further attention, even if some rest on causal chains that might be difficult for readers without the author’s erudition to assess. For example, there is the claim that in France, “increased pressure for conformity applied by absolutism on the *forum externum* had as a counterreaction a withdrawal of the individual into his *forum internum* which came to be understood—mistakenly, from a medieval perspective—as the sole repository and last bastion of uniqueness and authenticity, hence the fear of compromising one’s inner self” (p. 114), or the claim that “British centrifugal individualism and the *collapse* of the two fora into one-dimensional man, once externalized, ended up with the total *estrangement* of the political from the personal, as a counterreaction to the politicization of the personal” (pp. 274–75; italics in the original).

*Compromise* begins and ends by suggesting that the failure to recover the dialectic of the individual here being traced will result in our being “condemned to run in the same ruts over and over again” (p. 23) and, indeed, “to run

not in circles, but in a downward spiral, with frightening prospects” (p. 286). This message is likely to resonate with many, and while the book’s recovery of this dialectic is principally executed at a conceptual and genealogical level rather than on normative grounds, it deserves and will reward the attention of contemporary theorists of its core concept, as well as the attention of historians of early modern political thought more broadly.

### **Conflicting Commitments: The Politics of Enforcing Immigrant Worker Rights in San Jose and Houston.**

By Shannon Gleeson. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 2013. 272p. \$69.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

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— Margaret Gray, *Adelphi University*

Undocumented workers experience a range of labor abuses. One of the most common is wage theft: the underpayment of wages. The frequency with which this occurs speaks not only to the vulnerability of undocumented workers in the workplace but also to the fact that enforcement of labor rights for low-wage workers is often lacking. Moreover, employers do not expect these workers to make claims against them or to be successful when they do. At the same time, advocates—from both government and civil society—have played an active role in promoting the enforcement of labor rights. Despite the commonality of crimes against undocumented workers, different advocacy models have emerged across the United States.

Explaining why these differences occur is one of the main tasks taken on by Shannon Gleeson in *Conflicting Commitments*. Her argument, as you might expect, is that local political culture shapes advocates’ responses. Political culture influences the resources available to help immigrant workers and determines whether such efforts have allies or opponents. What is less predictable about this study is the author’s impressive analysis of exactly how this process occurs.

Gleeson offers a comparative study between the metropolitan regions of Houston, Texas and San Jose, California. For her comparison, she relies on 90 interviews that she conducted with advocates for immigrant worker rights in these two cities and 50 interviews with immigrant restaurant workers. In addition, she relies on primary and secondary literature to offer a national context that makes this a well-rounded study of immigrant worker rights. Gleeson not only offers examples of labor abuses and advocate remedies but also gives the reader an overview of turn-of-the-century low-wage work.

Although these cities have similar immigration histories, their political cultures differ greatly. Gleeson finds that San Jose has a strong union movement, which has friendly relations with local politicians who aim to incorporate immigrants into the community. In addition, the state of California has some of the strongest labor laws in the