

book's language is clear, even elegant. Eschewing pretentious terminology, this study convincingly demonstrates that a simple, often colloquial, writing style offers the best medium for discussing the most complex of concepts in a fruitful manner.

But what of the book's whole? We discern four major points. First, the study aptly shows that the meanings of modern political values such as equality, fairness, and excellence—and the relationships among them—are not fixed but contingent and path dependent. Indeed, they exhibit “indispensable fictions” that are profoundly conventional and controversial and that get settled in ever new ways. Second, the book demonstrates that political norms always involve struggles and competition in civil society. Here is the locus in which ideals such as equality of opportunity emerge, become contested, and are (re)defined. While, as LaVaque-Manty argues, a stable democratic state makes it easier to raise claims to political and human dignity than a weak or undemocratic one, it can never make people autonomous and stipulate their respect-worthiness; this requires human agency. Third, the study informs us that we must pay attention to the scope of constraints set by “nature.” It is clear that natural constraints exist, but their exact nature remains forever part of political controversy (gender struggles being a case in point). There certainly exists no neutral boundary between the natural and the human side of sports. Fourth, the author does suggest that modernity's cherished, yet often conflicting, ideals of equality and excellence can coexist. They are not zero sum but can be mutually reinforcing. Excellence in sports and elsewhere is necessarily positional, as competition and difference are part of its constitutive norm. But equality also furnishes one of the most compelling preconditions of excellence.

All good and fine—but is this all there is to the fascinating arguments that this book displays? We find it simpatico not to be bombarded by prefabricated omniscience, and we agree that it is not the role of the contemporary political theorist to act as a philosopher king. Abstaining from thick normative prescriptions is a good thing. LaVaque-Manty deserves much praise for relativizing our modern concepts and ideals without being a political relativist. Yet precisely because of the book's overall quality, we were a bit disappointed by its circumspection about getting at least some normative clarity as to where the author stands on some of these important issues.

For example, we detect LaVaque-Manty's faint melancholic praise for the idea of “honor,” which in our contemporary world no longer has much cachet as a political ideal. But he never delineates with his otherwise impeccable clarity what exactly honor—or any of the other qualities highlighted in this book—means to him (and should mean to us) in the here and now. Likewise, he states that women's excellence as athletes shows that “emas-

culatation” does not entail any “dumbing down” of quality and competition, and that some laments about such are deeply problematic. But he fails to draw further consequences from these insights. Also, he finds claims that ignore the inherently competitive nature of sports “politically unfortunate.” However, we would like to learn what the author values about meritocracy. True enough, things are contingent, much in flux, and we appreciate any scholar's normative modesty. Yet precisely because we find LaVaque-Manty such an insightful thinker, we would have appreciated reading his views on these matters with a bit more boldness. In a way, he is aiming too low: In light of the exciting material presented, we view the cautious goal to “better understand our own values” somewhat dissatisfying.

The work's strength also constitutes its weakness. Still, this is a rich book. LaVaque-Manty takes the study of sports from the margins to the center of political theory. His work initiates a new dialogue about the tensions of modern democracy's ideals. He thereby moves the way we think about politics literally into different public arenas.

Gaming the World: How Sports Are Reshaping

Global Politics and Culture. By Andrei S. Markovits and Lars Rensmann. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. 368p. \$29.95. doi:10.1017/S1537592710003749

— Mika LaVaque-Manty, *University of Michigan*

If your friends' Facebook behavior is at all like that of mine, you will find the conclusions of *Gaming the World* compelling. Facebook status updates during the recent soccer World Cup, regardless of the location of one's friends, seemed to confirm that in “postindustrial societies today, professional team sports are not just a crucial part of (global) popular culture but also significant agents of cultural change and global communication” (p. 26).

Consider this: By watching Facebook status updates, you could tell that the soccer World Cup does grip the world's attention, as Andrei S. Markovits and Lars Rensmann argue. Moreover, one can tell that fandom can be local and simultaneously cross national and ethnic boundaries (Chapter 2). That many Americans seem to breathe and eat and live soccer during the World Cup but *not* at other times, however, supports their argument that soccer's current status in North America is still merely “Olympianized.” That means it is an object of immense interest every four years but not at other times (Chapter 3). And, finally, that one can make these observations on Facebook is inextricably tied to the authors' argument that this is a phenomenon of “the second globalization” (p. 26): It is fostered by the economic, political, and technological developments of the last couple of decades. It is significant, though, as the book shows, that this kind of globalization is a *cultural-political* phenomenon and not reducible to political economy.

There are two ways of thinking about sports in a broader social and political context. One is to see them as a *reflection* of broader forces and trends, and the book offers a valuable contribution to this perspective. For example, students of comparative and international political economy will recognize in Markovits and Rensmann's account patterns familiar from the so-called convergence–divergence debates. That is, if we ask whether globalization will make institutions around the world more similar or whether there will remain discernible local variance, the book answers “both.”

First, Markovits and Rensmann argue that globalization is not merely an American phenomenon (as it is often portrayed, particularly by the critics of globalization): In sports, soccer is the true global hegemon, they argue. Yet local exceptions, large and small, persist, the relatively marginal role of soccer in the United States being the most obvious example. This American exceptionalism was the topic of Markovits's (2001) *Offside*, coauthored with Steven L. Hellerman; in *Gaming the World*, soccer has made significant inroads into American “sport space” but remains Olympianized. In another example of convergence–with–divergence, Markovits and Rensmann discuss the ways in which the politics of gender in sports cultures have both differed and resembled each other on both sides of the Atlantic: The second wave of feminism had a significant impact on women's participation in sports in North America and Europe, but the contours have been significantly different and the status of women's sports varies greatly. This is most obvious in the degree to which women's soccer is appreciated as an (at least occasionally) important spectator sport in some countries where men's soccer has not been particularly significant. Similarly, the cultural significance of college sports makes the United States exceptional, even unique, from the perspective of the rest of the world. These are, the authors argue, examples of the limits to globalization.

The other way of thinking about the relationship between sports and politics is to see the former as intrinsically political. As the quotation at the start of this review suggests, Markovits and Rensmann argue that sports are in themselves a *causal force* in the shape that globalization takes. People disagree vigorously on the value of globalization in economic terms, but the authors' argument helpfully cuts across debates between the so-called neoliberals and critics of globalization. One way of reading the book is to see that sports offer—at least potentially—a bridge between the empirical phenomenon of globalization and the normative ideal of cosmopolitanism. Where the former is often seen as a unidirectional development, with multinational capitalism at its source and assimilationist tendencies as its result, the latter imagines a genuine diffusion and integration of cultures, attitudes, and values. In this way, the overlapping tendencies of both convergence and divergence—global cultures with local varia-

tions and interesting exceptions here and there—are neither a conceptual paradox nor a political problem. Instead, they are proof positive that at least on some occasions, it is possible to have the world come together and share an appreciation for a common cultural phenomenon, whether it is the World Cup or Michael Jordan, and, importantly, have this happen despite cultural differences and even disagreements.

The key mechanism is, at least metaphorically, linguistic: Soccer provides a common language that unites people who speak different languages and have different values, Markovits and Rensmann argue. It is worth noting that Rensmann is, among other things, a Hannah Arendt scholar, although she is never mentioned in the book, and that the development described is consistent with a kind of Arendtian cosmopolitan vision. One almost wonders whether the Union of European Football Associations consulted Markovits and Rensmann in its production of a 2010 television commercial in which a European soccer league is advertised with the slogan “28 countries, one language.”

The reader will not have to wonder what the authors think of this kind of cosmopolitan globalization. Although their purpose is explanatory, not normative, they celebrate the cosmopolitan effects of sports. The book does not hide its appreciation for the way sports can help undermine xenophobia, racism, and sexism. Their preferences notwithstanding, Markovits and Rensmann are not naively Whiggist, and they devote an entire chapter to the way sports also serve as a forum and a vehicle for the expression and even exercise of racist and xenophobic animus. They think, however, that soccer hooliganism and racist taunts likely are ugly vestiges and death throes of a kind of world order that won't be sustainable. At the same time, they are less sanguine—if we agree with them, as I do, that the integrationist trends are positive—about a significant transformation in the way sports appreciation is gendered. Perhaps the evidence they adduce suggests that sports lag behind other social practices when it comes to gender equity. But given that they show us interesting global variance on this score, the causal mechanisms would be particularly interesting to explore.

This gets us to general issues of method. *Gaming the World* makes its argument with descriptive inference: The claims about a causal mechanism in which soccer is a force in global change are made on the basis of descriptive data, both qualitative and statistical. Some of the data are historical, some economic and sociological, some even from the authors' personal experiences.

Because of this, some political scientists may well find Markovits and Rensmann's thesis intuitively plausible and still wish for a more systematic presentation of evidence and a more systematic analysis. In a way, the authors invite such a wish: they explicitly call sports “an independent variable” (p. 13) in global change, but they don't

operationalize it or their dependent variable, global change, in a way that would immediately allow either systematic statistical testing or the consideration of alternative hypotheses.

I raise this merely to acknowledge that one could go about uncovering some of the causal mechanisms of globalization in a different way, even in the domain of such cultural phenomena as sports. But in a methodologically pluralist discipline such as ours, methodological critiques are frequently the scoundrel's last refuge. Descriptive inference can get at causal mechanisms, as historians demonstrate every day, and the authors' deep knowledge—as well as their unabashed love—of their topic helps them adduce such a rich variety of descriptive evidence that a purely methodological challenge won't cut against their argument.

Markovits and Rensmann's love of their sports might invite another kind of challenge, however. To be sure, we should all study topics we care about (why bother otherwise?), but as someone who does not share their enthusiasm for either team sports or spectator sports, I would have wanted them to go beyond professional team sports more than they do. No book can do everything, of course, and I am thoroughly convinced of their claim—and that of many other people—that soccer is the true global sports hegemon. But the book has little to say about individual professional sports, some of which are globally significant. Just think of the different kinds of questions that golf and tennis, on the one hand, or motor sports, on the other, might raise. Are their effects on global culture consistent with those of soccer, say? And what about varieties of participatory and recreational sports, whose diffusion around the world and integration with local cultures seem inextricably linked to the second globalization, just as their spread in the first globalization was tied to nationalism?

The point is not that Markovits and Rensmann should have written an even richer and more wide-ranging book; rather, at issue is the *relative significance* of “the soccer effect” on globalization. Of course, even to ask this question requires one to have read and appreciated their book.

Joseph A. Schumpeter. By John Medearis. London: Continuum, 2009. 176p. \$130.00.
doi:10.1017/S1537592710003750

— Jeffrey Edward Green, *University of Pennsylvania*

Joseph Schumpeter made lasting contributions to multiple disciplines, yet has few adherents today who would call themselves Schumpeterians. Part of this no doubt stems from the idiosyncratic nature of Schumpeter's ideas. But part, too, stems from the fact that Schumpeter's influence, even when sizeable, has tended to take the form of appropriations that emphasize a particular and discrete element of his work, rather than embrace a larger, more comprehensive Schumpeterian system. Economists and students of business, for example, know Schumpeter for his defi-

nition of capitalism in terms of “creative destruction,” his critique of equilibrium economics, his distinction between the businessman and the entrepreneur, and his prediction that capitalism would ultimately give way to socialism. And virtually all students of democracy relate to Schumpeter's model of “competitive elitism” in some way, usually either in support of Schumpeter for paving the way for a value-free, descriptive account of democracy or in protest of his unduly minimized rendering of democracy's meaning. While Schumpeter's relevance to economics and political science is clear, John Medearis is surely right when he observes that the tendency of most today is to engage Schumpeter with a “scalpel” (p. 105), taking what one wants and discarding the rest.

It is the virtue of Medearis's book that it moves on both fronts, reviewing with depth and sophistication the principal discrete ideas that have made Schumpeter famous, but also endeavoring to comprehend the entirety of Schumpeter's work as a single organic structure. In this latter regard, the book presents Schumpeter as a conservative thinker, albeit one whose conservatism, as Medearis nicely demonstrates, departs in significant ways from dominant strands of conservative thinking today. For example, even if Schumpeter preferred capitalism to socialist alternatives, he did not profess the market utopianism espoused by many economic libertarians. Unlike Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, Schumpeter “did not believe that free markets and free enterprise were embodiments or expressions of individual liberty for most participants,” since Schumpeter interpreted consumer behavior less as “a free expression of uncoerced, spontaneous desires” than as something “often tradition-bound . . . and manipulated by marketing and advertising” (pp. 138–39). Likewise, while Schumpeter had Catholic sympathies, Medearis persuasively argues that he was not a religious conservative in a way “likely to be serviceable to contemporary conservatives of that description” (p. 140). Further, in contrast to the neoconservative confidence that liberal capitalist democracies should exert military force in defense of their interests, Schumpeter decoupled capitalism from imperialism, arguing in his 1918 essay, “The Sociology of Imperialisms,” that imperialism ought to be understood as the disposition to fight wars without rational basis, that most wars in human history arguably had been waged without sufficient cause, and that the irrational will to expansion was an atavistic remnant from earlier epochs of human history that was likely to die out. In these respects, Schumpeter's account of imperialism seemed to have more in common with Melville's quip that “All wars are boyish, and are fought by boys” (“The March into Virginia,” 1861) than with neoconservative militarism of today.

What conservatism meant for Schumpeter was not preserving some well-established set of values (free markets, religious truth, global dominance) but rather what Medearis calls the “rearguard” project (pp. 13, 94, 130, 141–42) of