An analysis of contemporary statehood: consequences for conflict and cooperation*

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What are the prospects for conflict and cooperation (and ultimately for war and peace) now that the Cold War has ended? The various theoretical perspectives come up with rather different answers. Waltzian Neorealism diagnoses business as usual: anarchy prevails; states will continue to have to fend for themselves. With the current transition from bipolarity toward multipolarity we must even expect more, not less, international conflict. Liberals are much more optimistic: international institutions and liberal democracy can pave the way for significant progress toward a peaceful world. Constructivists are also optimistic: states can develop cooperative relationships; anarchy is not a given systemic constraint. Cooperative anarchies are thus a possibility. In this article, I argue that there is an important element missing from the current debate about prospects for international conflict and cooperation. That element concerns the nature of contemporary statehood. International relations theory has tended to treat states as fixed, 'like units'.[1] They are not, of course, and the difference between the main types of statehood amounts to much more than the variation in capabilities noted by Realists and the absence or presence of liberal democracy as analyzed by liberals. There are three different main types of state in the present international system, and an identification of them is necessary in order to appreciate current and future patterns of cooperation and conflict.

I begin with a short summary of the views of Realism, liberalism, and constructivism concerning prospects for cooperation and conflict after the Cold War. Noting the lack of analysis of contemporary statehood in these theoretical perspectives, I identify the content of the standard 'Westphalian' notion of the sovereign state. I argue that there are two other main (ideal) types of state in the present international system, the 'post-colonial', and the 'post-modern' state, each with specific consequences for patterns of cooperation and conflict which are also spelled out. The analysis of variations in the characteristics of the main types of state in the present international system needs a much higher priority on our research agenda.

[1] This is the well-known formulation by Kenneth Waltz: 'so long as anarchy endures, states remain like units'. 'To call states "like units" is to say that each state is like all other states in being an autonomous political unit.' 'We abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities.' Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA, 1979), pp. 93, 95, 99.

IR theory about conflict and cooperation after the Cold War

Waltzian Neorealism characterizes the present international system as bipolarity in an altered state.[2] Bipolarity continues because militarily Russia can take care of itself and because no other great powers have yet emerged. 'With the waning of Soviet power, the United States is no longer held in check by any other country or combination of countries . . . Balance-of-power theory leads one to predict that other countries, alone or in concert, will try to bring American power into balance'.[3]

Neorealist analysis stresses that the whole balance-of-power game is severely circumscribed by nuclear weapons. These weapons reduce the scope of military competition between nuclear powers (and their allies) and dramatically decrease the probability of war between them. The emphasis moves to economic and technological competition. 'Multipolarity abolished the stark symmetry and pleasing simplicity of bipolarity, but nuclear weapons restore both of those qualities to a considerable extent'.[4]

Yet cooperation between old alliance partners will be more difficult with clear-cut bipolarity gone.[5] Anarchy prevails; states will continue to have to fend for themselves, and the balance-of-power game is more complicated and thus potentially more conflictual under conditions of multipolarity.

The main strands of liberalist analysis (i.e., republican, institutional and commercial liberalism)[6] support a somewhat more optimistic view. Democracies do not go to war against each other;[7] moreover, democracy creates domestic institutions aimed at cooperation which help pave the way for international institutions. Economic interdependence promotes transnational relations in general and creates an incentive for developing international cooperation.[8] Overall, there is a 'Zone of Peace'[9] comprising consolidated liberal democracies in the West (including Japan), gradually expanding to include new democracies. And there is a 'Zone of Conflict' where liberal democracy, international institutions, and cooperative interdependence remain in short supply.

Constructivist analysis stresses that anarchy need not lead to self-help. Whether that happens depends on an intervening variable: the intersubjectively constituted identities of state actors. Their processes of interaction need not lead to a competitive self-help anarchy; they may also lead to a cooperative anarchy, as has

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[2] Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', *International Security*, 18:2 (1993), p. 52.

[3] Ibid., p. 52–3.

[4] Ibid., p. 74.

[5] See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', *International Security*, 15:1 (1990), pp. 5–53.

[6] The strands of liberalism have been identified by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr, 'Neorealism and Neoliberalism', *World Politics*, 40:2 (1988), p. 246.

[7] Georg Sørensen, 'Kant and Processes of Democratization: Consequences for Neorealist Thought', *Journal of Peace Research*, 29:2 (1992), pp. 397–414; Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, 1993).

[8] Robert O. Keohane, 'Hobbes's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society', in H.-H. Holm and G. Sørensen (eds.), *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War* (Boulder, CO, 1995), pp. 165–87.

[9] Max Singer and Aaron Wildawsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil* (Chatham, NJ, 1993).

happened in Western Europe. Interests and identities are constructed in interaction and not exogenously given; anarchy is what states make of it.[10]

While Neorealists, liberals, and constructivists can agree, albeit for markedly different reasons, that war between the major Western powers is highly unlikely, they continue to differ dramatically in their overall outlook and analytical frameworks. The most significant difference is between Neorealists and constructivists. The former hold that 'state behavior is largely shaped by the *material* structure of the international system. The distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics. For realists, some level of security competition among great powers is inevitable because of the material structure of the international system'.[11]

Constructivists emphasize the social content of structure. 'Material capabilities *as such* explain nothing; their effects presuppose structures of shared knowledge, which vary and are not reducible to capabilities.'[12]

Both the Neorealist and the constructivist position have a problem because they fail to analyze substantial changes in statehood as well as changes in the institution of sovereignty and the consequences of such changes for relationships of conflict and cooperation. Neorealism treats the sovereign state as an ontological given and draws from it the permanent condition of anarchy which must lead to self-help facing the security dilemma and balance-of-power politics.[13] These conditions reflect 'international-political reality through all of the centuries we can contemplate'.[14] Constructivists have a hard time explaining change toward more cooperative relationships, not least because they recognize that domestic politics as well as human nature may be efficient sources of predation, that is, may generate a self-help system.[15]

Analyzing change and variation in contemporary statehood will help us get away from the misleading Realist picture of the state as a given, fixed entity. And it will provide us with some hints, direly needed in constructivist analysis, about when domestic politics will lead toward either predation or more cooperative relationships. In what follows I set forth a typology of three main types of state in the present international system. They are (a) the post-colonial state, that is, the weak and unconsolidated state on the periphery, often in an ongoing state of entropy; (b) the modern, 'Westphalian' state, a consolidated nation-state with its own structural dynamic and relative autonomy; and (c) the 'post-modern' state, a complex, trans-nationally interpenetrated entity immersed in globalization and multi-level governance.

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[10] Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, 46:2 (1992), pp. 391–425; Alexander Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', *American Political Science Review*, 88:2 (1994), pp. 384–96.

[11] John J. Mearsheimer, 'A Realist Reply', *International Security*, 20:1 (1995), p. 91. See also John J. Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', *International Security*, 19:3 (1994/5), pp. 5–49.

[12] Alexander Wendt, 'Constructing International Politics', *International Security*, 20:1 (1995), p. 73.

[13] Stephen D. Krasner, 'Realism, Imperialism, and Democracy: A Response to Gilbert', *Political Theory*, 20:1 (1992), pp. 38–52.

[14] Waltz, 'Emerging Structure', p. 77.

[15] Cf. Wendt, 'Anarchy', pp. 409–12.

Contemporary statehood: preliminary observations

Reflecting the dominance of the Realist tradition in IR, the state has rarely been a subject of investigation. States have been considered 'like units' except for one dimension, their power capabilities.[16] IR was thus left with a 'taken for granted' understanding of its most important actor, its most important unit of analysis. J. D. B. Miller was characteristically straightforward: 'Just as we know a camel or a chair when we see one, so we know a sovereign state. It is a political entity which is treated as a sovereign state by other sovereign states.'[17]

This notion of state is not very clear. Sovereignty is an institution based on norms developed by the community of states. The state may be the 'ontological given' for Realists in the way that 'sovereign states are the constitutive components of the international system',[18] but in reality there is nothing much given about states. States and borders are 'entirely artificial constructs . . . The world of independent states is a world of bounded entities, and the bounds are juridical and nothing else'.[19] In other words the one way in which states are alike is that formal, juridical sovereignty has been conferred upon them by the community of states. Even this establishment of formally, juridically like units is a relatively recent development. Third World areas had several different kinds of juridical status in the interwar period, most of them amounting to some form of semi-sovereignty.[20]

Waltz contends that states are 'like units' in that they duplicate one another's activities; at the same time, competition in the international system produces 'a tendency toward the sameness of the competitors';[21] yet the tendency has not been very strong, for both domestic and international reasons. Many sovereigns in sub-Saharan Africa have not been interested in emulating more developed states, only in lining their own pockets. Ironically, they would hardly be able to sustain statehood at all were it not for the safety-net provided by more developed states.[22] At the same time, some developed states are increasingly engaging in economic specialization and the 'pooling' of sovereignty. The counter-claim that at least the larger powers are 'like units' is debatable. Even if it were true, too many states and too many issues would be disregarded in such a view. In the post-Cold War world, exclusive focus on the great powers is no longer sufficient. A theory of IR must have something to say on violent conflict in, for example, Africa. In short, the Realist view implicitly claims that the modern, 'Westphalian', European nation-state model has been extended to the rest of the world. That is not true, as soon as we go beyond the level of juridical sovereignty.[23]

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[16] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 91–9.
[17] J. D. B. Miller, *The World of States: Connected Essays* (London, 1981), p. 16. For a similar critique of the IR discipline's lack of reflection on the state, see Fred Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations* (Vancouver, 1994), pp. 74–94.
[18] Krasner, 'Realism, Imperialism, and Democracy', p. 38.
[19] Robert H. Jackson, 'International Boundaries in Theory and Practice', paper for 15th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Berlin, 21–25 August 1994, p. 2.
[20] Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 50–82.
[21] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 127.
[22] See Jackson, *Quasi-states*, pp. 139–89.
[23] Arguments in favour of both functional and structural differentiation of units can be found in John Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis', *World*

Unfortunately, there is no easy pathway from the unproblematical notion of the 'sovereign state' to a richer concept and theory of the state. We do not have a consolidated body of state theory to build on.[24] The suggestion by Alexander Wendt, that we avoid structural monism and 'recognize the state as an inherently *social* entity, rather than as a Hobbesian primitive individual',[25] is well taken. But it leads toward a Sisyphean task of coherently theorizing at least four social structures which 'might constitute states: domestic-economic, domestic-political, international-economic, and international-political structures'.[26]

The present undertaking will have to be more modest. I seek to characterize the traditional Realist notion of the modern, 'Westphalian' state which is most often employed as the analytical point of departure in IR. I question the claimed general empirical relevance as well as the theoretical adequacy of this modern, 'Westphalian' notion of state. Against that background two additional types of state are identified.

The suggestion is thus to proceed by the way of Weberian ideal types. Max Weber defined the ideal type as follows:

An ideal type is formed by the one-sided *accentuation* of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent *concrete individual* phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified *analytical* construct (*Gedankenbild*). In its conceptual purity, the mental construct (*Gedankenbild*) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality.[27]

Ideal types are not new to IR. For example, Waltz's reflections on units and structure are based on the economic ideal types of the market and the firm. The concept of complex interdependence is an ideal type. Weber emphasized that the ideal type is 'no "hypothesis" but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses. It is not a *description* of reality but it aims to give unambiguous expression to such a description'.[28] The following discussion suggests the existence of three main types of state: the modern, 'Westphalian' state, the post-colonial state, and the post-modern state.

Politics, 35:2 (1983), pp. 261–85; Barry Buzan, 'The Idea of International System: Theory Meets History', paper for International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, March 1994, p. 23; Richard Little, 'Rethinking System Continuity and Transformation', in Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism* (New York, 1993), p. 88. My own approach differs from these in the sense that I suggest a differentiation of units for the present international system.

24 Three main theoretical approaches to the state were recently identified by Edward Greenberg; they are the liberal-pluralist 'Citizen-Responsive State Model', the 'Capitalist State Model' springing from the Marxist tradition, and the 'State-Centric Model' which sees the state as a highly autonomous entity. Edward S. Greenberg, 'State Change: Approaches and Concepts', in E. S. Greenberg and T. F. Meyer (eds.), *Changes in the State: Causes and Consequences* (Newbury Park, MA, 1990), pp. 11–41.

25 Alexander E. Wendt, 'The Agent–Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', *International Organization*, 41:3 (1987), p. 366.

26 Ibid.

27 Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, tr. and ed. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York, 1949), p. 90. Italics in original.

28 Ibid. Italics in original. Some formulations in what follows draw on Georg Sørensen, 'States are not "Like Units": Types of State and Forms of Anarchy in the Present International System', paper for American Political Science Association (APSA) Annual Meeting, Chicago, 31 August–3 September 1995.

The 'Westphalian' state: standard IR state concept

In broader historical terms the model 'Westphalian'[29] state comes out of a long process of development which includes empires, city-states, barbarian tribes, feudal systems, and absolutist states.[30] Several interrelated factors were at work in this process. In the economic sphere, the development of capitalism and industrialization helped provide the necessary resource basis for modern, 'Westphalian' statehood. At the same time, the separation of economic institutions (in the private sector) and political institutions (in the public sector) is a feature of modern, 'Westphalian' statehood; there is no such separation in earlier forms of state.[31]

Another important factor in the development of the 'Westphalian' state is the industrialization of warfare. The emerging states in Europe took shape in a long series of battles and wars. 'It was war, and the preparations for war, that provided the most potent energizing stimulus for the concentration of administrative resources and fiscal reorganisation that characterised the rise of absolutism'.[32] A final element helping the emergence of the modern state is the growth of administrative power, both in terms of increasing capacities for communication and storage of information and in terms of effective organization.[33]

In modern 'Westphalian' states, sovereignty is more than a formal, juridical label. It is substantial in the sense that the state possesses a capacity for self-government, an economic resource base, and an ability to defend itself militarily. Modern economies are thus national economies in the basic sense that economic development took place in a national space, regulated and nurtured by the state. This does not exclude a high level of exchange with other economies, of course, but the national economy is normally self-sustained in the sense that it comprises the main sectors (of means of production and distribution, and means of consumption) needed for its reproduction. The economy is also homogeneous, so that different sectors are at similar levels of development and there is a very high degree of cross- and inter-sectoral exchange.

The state has a monopoly on the means of violence, but the military capacity of the modern state is turned outward, in defence against external enemies, not inward. 'Westphalian' states are internally pacified; there is a police force, but it is not access

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[29] The emergence of states with sovereign authority over a given territory is normally tied in with the settlement of Westphalia in 1648. The concept of the modern 'Westphalian' state as employed here, however, is the product of a longer development which also includes industrialization, political modernization and the establishment of nationhood. In the present context, the 'Westphalian' state is the same as the modern state.

[30] See Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-state and Violence* (Cambridge, 1985).

[31] See T. Spybey, *Social Change, Development and Dependency* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 93–4. See also Giddens, *Nation-state and Violence*, p. 150, who emphasizes that ' "the economic sphere" should not be seen as a residual one, merely left outside the constitutional form of the modern state, as an unincorporated "civil society". *Rather, it derives from the very same sources as the sphere of sovereignty so elemental to the nature of the modern state.*' Emphasis in original.

[32] Giddens, *Nation-state and Violence*, p. 112. See also Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics* (New York, 1994), p. 298: 'By breaking down class, ethnic, gender and ideological barriers, the wars of the modern era—some of them, at least— contributed to the emergence of such positive fruits of modernity as egalitarianism and a more meritocratic and mobile social structure.' Ulf Hedetoft has explored the importance of what he calls 'the mentality of war' for national-identity building; see Ulf Hedetoft, 'National Identity and Mentalities of War in Three EC Countries', *Journal of Peace Research*, 30:3 (1993), pp. 281–300.

[33] The importance of this factor is stressed in Giddens's analysis, *Nation-state and Violence*, pp. 172–81.

to the use of force by which rulers sustain their position. Domestic law and order is based primarily on popular support for rules and norms defining deviant behaviour.[34] In broader terms, the vastly expanded powers of the 'Westphalian' state as regards domestic surveillance and control of the population tend to be accompanied by the expansion of civil and political rights of citizenship. Anthony Giddens even takes the argument a bit further and suggests that there 'are inherent connections between the nation-state and democracy (understood as polyarchy)',[35] because of the high level of reciprocity between rulers and subjects in the modern, 'Westphalian' state. In other words, internal pacification without means of violence depends instead on reciprocity between those who are governed and those who govern, and that is only possible with some measure of political democracy.

Finally, the 'Westphalian' state is a nation-state. The development of substantial aspects of the modern state came together with the development of nationhood, a 'we-ness' most often based on a common cultural and ethnic heritage, but also possible without such a basis. There is not necessarily anything romantic about the process: appeals to 'the nation' in the course of modern state development have often had ulterior motives. But the end result, in the context of a developed national polity and economy, is the nation-state, the modern, 'Westphalian' state.

The 'Westphalian' state is the implicit basis for most theorizing in the field of IR, including Realism and most liberal approaches. The assumption is, of course, that this notion of state has general empirical relevance and is adequate for theoretical purposes. I shall not dispute that a large number of states in the international system since Westphalia have roughly matched this picture of the state.

Yet, as already indicated, the 'Westphalian' state is not an empirically precise account of modern statehood, although it is often assumed to be. History since Westphalia demonstrates that in many cases the state has never enjoyed the high degree of external or even internal autonomy implied by this concept of state. The sovereignty of the state was always contested; the dominance of the Westphalian system did not end all challenges to the authority of states. 'Sovereignty has always been contested both with respect to the scope of authority exercised by states and by institutional arrangements that do not conform with exclusive territorial control.'[36]

Proof of such empirical variation is, however, not sufficient grounds to reject the theoretical adequacy of the concept.[37] We have to demonstrate that a number of 'big and important things'[38] would remain poorly understood and poorly explained without additional concepts of state which reflect changes in statehood. The purpose of what follows is to demonstrate that such additional concepts are necessary and do help to explain big and important things concerning patterns of conflict and cooperation in the present international system.

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[34] This and the following paragraph draw heavily on Giddens, *Nation-state and Violence*, pp. 181–209.
[35] Ibid., p. 201.
[36] Stephen D. Krasner, 'Westphalia and All That', in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY, 1993), p. 238.
[37] Waltz confronts the issue in discussing the dichotomy between international realms, which he defines as anarchic, and domestic realms, which are defined as hierarchic: 'Increasing the number of categories would bring the classification closer to reality. But that would be to move away from a theory claiming explanatory power to a less theoretical system promising greater descriptive accuracy.' Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 115.
[38] Cf. the remark in Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Reflections on *Theory of International Politics*: A Response to my Critics', in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York, 1986), p. 329.

The post-colonial state

The process of decolonization has helped create a type of state which is qualitatively different from the state defined by the 'Westphalian' concept. Before the Second World War, sovereignty was bestowed only on countries which were able to demonstrate a capacity for self-government. 'States historically were empirical realities before they were legal personalities.'[39]

The sovereignty regime erected around decolonization is different. Positive sovereignty, the substantial capacity for self-government, is no longer a precondition for negative or formal, juridical sovereignty. For example, most of the states in sub-Saharan Africa achieved formal sovereignty because of pressure for decolonization in the context of the East–West conflict and not because they possessed the necessary means of self-government.

State institutions are thus weak and underdeveloped in post-colonial states. In Africa, for example, there was no pre-colonial tradition of statehood, and the institutions erected during the colonial period were insufficiently viable to weather the transition to independence. State power thus became concentrated in individual political leaders in a system called personal rule.[40]

Personal rule is based on personal loyalty, especially toward the leading figure of the regime, the strongman. All the important positions in the state, whether bureaucratic, political, or in the military or the police, are filled with the loyal followers of the strongman. Their loyalty is reinforced by their sharing of the spoils of office; the strongman commands a web of informal networks, patron–client relationships, within which spoils or booty emanating from control of the state apparatus are distributed. The strongman's followers have access to the state's resources in the form of jobs, contracts, loans, licences, import permits, etc. Government administration in post-colonial states is less concerned with public goods; it is 'a source of power, prestige, and enrichment for those . . . clever or fortunate enough to control and staff it'.[41]

There is not a monopoly of violence which is vested in the state. Instead, there is an armed force personally loyal to the strongman. It may or may not control the entire territory of the state; in any case, the armed force (and the police) is not concerned with the creation of domestic order or the protection of the population in general. It is an instrument in the hands of the ruler, used to coerce or threaten opponents or to make profits in the protection market. Post-colonial states are thus characterized by domestic anarchy rather than by order; they have not solved the 'Hobbesian problem' of creating domestic order;[42] the national system is predominantly one of self-help.

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[39] Jackson, *Quasi-states*, p. 34.

[40] See Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant* (Berkeley, CA, 1982); Richard Sandbrook, *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation* (Cambridge, 1985); David E. Apter and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), *Political Development and the New Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Charlottesville, VA, 1994). The following paragraph draws on Georg Sørensen, 'Democracy, Authoritarianism and State Strength', in Georg Sørensen (ed.), *Political Conditionality* (London, 1993), p. 16.

[41] Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, 'The Political Economy of African Personal Rule', in Apter and Rosberg (eds.), *Political Development*, p. 300.

[42] See Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, 'The Hobbesian Problem and the Microfoundations of International Relations Theory', paper for APSA Annual Meeting, New York, 1–4 September 1994.

It is clear that conditions for economic growth and development are highly adverse in post-colonial states. Most personal rulers are preoccupied with personal enrichment, and 'the government ignores the people. Ordinary people sustain themselves by subsistence farming or by eking out a living in the vast informal sector of self-help production and exchange that constitutes the real economy of the country'.[43] It is misleading to speak of a national economy. There is a highly heterogeneous domestic economic space, consisting of sectors on very different levels of development with low levels of inter-sectoral exchange. At the same time, the economy is highly dependent on the world market for critical inputs (machinery, energy, etc.).

Finally, there is no developed nationhood in post-colonial states, whether in the sense of a shared common ethnic and cultural background, or in the sense of a national political community where different groups support the national political space delimited by the state's boundaries.[44] There was a nationalist movement for independence creating a domestic alliance against colonial rulers in Africa, for example, but it rapidly 'withered as a force capable of shaping postindependence politics and territorial consciousness'.[45]

Ethnic and communal divisions were exacerbated in the context of personal rule and of post-colonial borders which arbitrarily split some groups with a common ethnic–cultural background and put together other groups without one. Consequently, democratization is a very difficult task in post-colonial states because the basic precondition for democracy, namely, that of national unity (meaning that 'the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to'),[46] is missing.

As already indicated, the states in sub-Saharan African are the real-world states closest to the post-colonial ideal type. Other candidates are the Central Asian states coming out of the former Soviet Union, the least developed Central American states, and a group of least developed Asian states, including Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Post-colonial states that have acquired some of the characteristics of 'Westphalian' statehood are not bound to continue changing in that direction. They could just as easily deteriorate into fully-fledged forms of post-colonial statehood as become comprehensive 'Westphalian' states. The direction of development is not given beforehand.

The post-modern state

Since the Second World War, new forms of political organization have emerged, especially in Western Europe. These new forms are post-modern in the sense that they comprise political space organized either on a non-state territorial basis (such

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[43] Jackson and Rosberg, 'Political Economy', p. 305.
[44] I cannot pursue the large debate about nations and nationhood in the present context. See, e.g., Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1983); Anthony D. Smith, *State and Nation in the Third World* (Brighton, 1983); Ole Wæver et al., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London, 1993).
[45] David E. Apter and Carl G. Rosberg, 'Changing African Perspectives', in Apter and Rosberg (eds.), *Political Development*, p. 24. See also Smith, *State and Nation*, pp. 39–58.
[46] Dankwort A. Rustow, 'Transitions to Democracy', *Comparative Politics*, 2:3 (1970), p. 350.

as the European Union (EU)), or on a functional basis (such as international regimes in specific issue areas). For the post-modern label to apply, the new organizations must be more than mere cases of interstate cooperation; they must have autonomous power which has consequences for the sovereignty of the participating states. The most obvious example is the EU. In some low-politics areas, especially those related to realization of the single market, the EU is able to make binding rules for its members.[47]

The EU thus interferes in the domestic affairs of member states. At the same time, states continue to have a large degree of influence on the EU and on the implementation of EU measures at home; how, then, should the consequences for state sovereignty be described? Robert Keohane has suggested the term 'operational sovereignty',[48] indicating a situation where states choose to limit their substantial, operational sovereignty through international agreements. According to Keohane, this points to a situation where sovereignty 'is less a territorially defined barrier than a bargaining resource for a politics characterized by complex transnational networks'.[49]

States that engage in such procedures are called post-modern in the present context. Why do some states choose to do this? There is no single determining factor. In Western Europe, security considerations were paramount in explaining the early advances made in cooperation between Germany and France. In recent years, economic globalization has increasingly restricted the national autonomy of many states.[50] Increased supranational cooperation is thus partly an attempt to regain some of the influence lost in the national political space due to the very success of the modern state in organizing transnational economic development during the post-World War II era. Processes of globalization, meaning the intensification of economic, political, and cultural relations across borders, have made states much more dependent on each other. While some elements in globalization are merely the intensification of economic intercourse between national economies, there are also qualitatively new elements in globalization, pointing to a transnational economic system no longer based on autonomous national economies.[51]

This is the background for identifying a post-modern ideal type of state. Sovereignty is used as a bargaining chip, rendering less valid the sharp distinction between domestic and foreign affairs which characterizes modern states. Post-modern states permit a large degree of mutual interference in what was traditionally domestic affairs.[52] Their economies are different from merely interdependent

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[47] This paragraph is indebted to the penetrating analysis by Asbjørn Sonne Nøgaard, 'Institutions and Post-modernity in IR: The "New" EC', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 29:3 (1994), pp. 245–87.

[48] Keohane, 'Hobbes's Dilemma', p. 177.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Cf., e.g., Michael Zürn, 'The Challenge of Globalization and Individualization: A View from Europe', in Holm and Sørensen (eds.), *Whose World Order?*, pp. 137–65.

[51] These aspects of globalization are analyzed in H.-H. Holm and G. Sørensen, 'Introduction', in Holm and Sørensen (eds.), *Whose World Order?*, pp. 1–19. Note that forces of globalization and forces of supranational institution-building affect each other: The latter may push the former, not just vice versa; this has clearly been the case in the EU.

[52] For a similar view, see Robert Cooper, 'Is there a New World Order?', in Sato Seizaburo and Trevor Taylor (eds.), *Prospects for Global Order*, vol. 2 (London, 1993), p. 18.

national economies; at least some important sectors or areas are deeply integrated in a transnational economic system.[53]

These changes lead to a different role for the state in terms of governance. Member states remain central actors in the EU, especially as regards the 'big bangs' of decision-making setting up the basic framework of treaties (although even here the bargains made by state elites are subject to processes of ratification). Yet in day-to-day decision-making, the EU is more aptly described as a system of multi-level governance between various groups of actors in three interconnected political arenas: supranational, national, and sub-national.[54] The diagnosis set forth by Philip Cerny, of an increasing diffusion and decentralization of power both upwards to the supranational and downwards to the sub-national level, appears an adequate description of the post-modern, 'plurilateralist' realm.[55] It is important to emphasize, however, that this need not be a zero-sum game with the state in the role of the loser; international cooperation can also strengthen states.[56] The accent is on change of the state—including change of the policy networks conventionally organized along national lines—not on the state 'winning' or 'losing'.

The notion of post-modern states also indicates a change in the identity and loyalty of citizens away from 'we-ness' singularly based on nationhood and toward a more mixed palette of identities. This does not mean a transfer of identity and loyalty from one level to another. In the context of the EU, for example, there is no indication that the populations of member states are switching loyalties to the supranational level; a strong EU-European popular identity is not in the making.[57] But that does not mean that there is no change at all. James Rosenau's notion of 'sovereignty-free' individuals squares well with the picture drawn here of a post-modern world marked by the forces of globalization.[58] It could lead to what Seyom Brown has called 'a *polyarchy* in which nation-states, subnational groups, and

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[53] Some sectors of the economy will be more globalized or transnationalized than others. The financial sector is an obvious candidate for such a role. See Philip G. Cerny, 'Patterns of Financial Globalization: Financial Market Structures and the Problem of Governance', paper for International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 28 March–1 April 1994. Cerny claims (p. 52) that ' "Free Banking" is in free fall. Institutions and markets will continue to be drawn into more complex *transnational* structures of interaction—in other words, structures which cut across and link elements once seen as distinctly domestic with those once seen as distinctly international. This distinction now makes little difference to the markets . . . Without a much denser transnational regulatory order with the capacity to impose systematic controls on the financial markets—a system with not only a stabilising but also a Keynesian, pro-production rationale—narrowly financial criteria will continue to play an ever larger role in the allocation of capital across the world.'

[54] Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, and Kermit Blank, 'European Integration since the 1980s: State-centric versus Multi-level Governance', paper presented at APSA Annual Meeting, Chicago, 31 August–3 September 1995.

[55] Philip G. Cerny, 'Plurilateralism: Structural Differentiation and Functional Conflict in the Post-Cold War World Order', *Millennium*, 22:1 (1993), p. 27.

[56] See, e.g., Alan Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-state* (Berkeley, CA, 1992); and Andrew Moravcsik, 'Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation', paper presented at APSA Annual Meeting, New York, 1–4 September 1994.

[57] For a similar view, see Nørgaard, 'Institutions and Post-modernity', p. 275. Yet at the formal level the first elements of overlapping citizenship are in place: EU citizens living in EU countries other than their own have voting rights in local elections, right of work, and certain social and economic rights.

[58] James N. Rosenau, 'Citizenship in a Changing Global Order', in J. N. Rosenau and E.-O. Czempiel (eds.), *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (New York, 1992), pp. 272–94.

transnational special interests and communities are all vying for the support and loyalty of individuals'.[59]

It is the members of the EU that play the post-modern sovereignty game described in this section. This does not mean that other states are untouched by the features of post-modernity depicted here. Modern states with developed market economies take part in the process of economic globalization. They are engaged in some of the plurilateralist networks, and they are exposed to the other changes in the conditions for traditional modern statehood. It is, however, only in Western Europe that a new sovereignty mode has developed. Both the United States and Japan appear to respond to post-modern challenges with more conventional forms of regional cooperation.

Types of statehood and patterns of cooperation and conflict

The typical security problems of 'Westphalian' states are analyzed by Realists, liberals, and constructivists. Despite their various disagreements, they concur on certain basics: most importantly, the security problem is external, not internal. The threat of large-scale violent conflict including war is an external threat stemming from the security dilemma of the international system. They disagree on the extent to which this security dilemma can be mitigated. Realist pessimists confront somewhat more optimistic liberals and constructivists in this respect.

The security problem in post-colonial states is qualitatively different from the security problem in 'Westphalian' states. The most significant difference is that the serious threat to security in terms of large-scale violent conflict is internal, not external. Lack of developed statehood presents many post-colonial states with a perennial problem of domestic security. Such states are not internally pacified.

Violent conflicts in post-colonial states are responsible for by far the largest number of casualties in recent decades. Three domestic conflicts alone have each cost the lives of 500,000–1,000,000 people; they were in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. Each of the conflicts in Angola, Uganda, and Somalia resulted in 100,000–500,000 casualties.[60]

At the same time, post-colonial states' participation in interstate conflict is more an outgrowth of domestic conflict in these states than it is an effect of international structure. Copson's recent analysis of Africa's wars supports such a view in suggesting that 'the causes of every war were, at their root, internal'.[61]

The frail processes of democratization under way in many post-colonial states tend to increase, not decrease, the level of domestic conflict.[62] This is not a

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[59] Seyom Brown, *New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics* (Glenview, IL, 1988), p. 245 (italics in original).

[60] Estimates from Raymond W. Copson, *Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace* (Armonk, NY, 1994), p. 29. Copson also emphasizes that 'the roots of Africa's wars lie in what many scholars now acknowledge to be a "problem with the African state" ', p. 74. He quotes Martin Doornbos, 'The African State in Academic Debate: Retrospect and Prospect', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28 (Jun. 1990), p. 179.

[61] Copson, *Africa's Wars*, p. 103. See also Muhammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament* (Boulder, CO, 1995).

[62] Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, 'Democratization and the Danger of War', *International Security*, 20:1 (1995), pp. 5–39.

refutation of republican liberalism's argument about peace between consolidated liberal democracies. Kant's argument is clearly concerned with consolidated liberal democracies where a democratic culture of peaceful conflict resolution has become ingrained. Post-colonial states seldom reach this level of democratization; they tend to become stuck in the early phases of transition where liberalization fuels conflict between ethnic as well as other groups.[63]

African state leaders in the Organization of African Unity have joined forces with the society of states in one basic respect: support for the persistence of post-colonial borders. This has created an element of stability, but it has also fuelled conflict by keeping many ethnic groups artificially divided. The end of the Cold War has changed nothing in this respect: 'the states system is wedded, for better or for worse, to the practice of recognizing and respecting inherited juridical borders'.[64]

The external relations of post-colonial states also differ qualitatively from those of the 'Westphalian' states. Decolonization involved the creation of a set of norms which gave post-colonial states the right to exist even though they possessed very little in terms of substantial statehood. In earlier days such weak states would have gone under; 'Westphalian' state-making in Europe involved a substantial decrease in the number of states on the continent. A similar process is not at work when it comes to post-colonial states. Their legal existence is secure;[65] in that sense, the international environment facing post-colonial sates is not one of unregulated anarchy, but one of regulated order and secure legal persistence.

This peculiar external situation for post-colonial states does not give them a privileged position in the international system, of course. On the contrary: as substantially weak entities, they are often forced to take what they can get from richer and stronger countries in the North. Post-colonial states are thus frequently incapable of participating in the quid pro quo reciprocal relationships which characterize links between 'Westphalian' states.[66]

Cooperation becomes a non-reciprocal relationship between highly unequal entities: a donor at one end, formulating economic and political conditionalities as a precondition for any relationship; and a recipient at the other end, taking whenever possible while attempting to retain maximum autonomy in terms of freedom of manoeuvre.[67] This situation of secure insecurity is a unique feature of post-colonial statehood.

Let me return to the post-modern states in the EU. With multi-level governance characterizing the internal relations between EU members, the resulting political space is no longer adequately described in terms of the Neorealist dichotomy between an international realm which is anarchic and a domestic realm which is hierarchic. Both rule-making (the European Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament) and rule adjudication (the European Court of Justice) take place at a supranational level. These significant elements of trans-national political authority in the context of larger networks of political and

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[63] See Georg Sørensen, *Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World* (Boulder, CO, 1993).
[64] Jackson, 'International Boundaries', p. 9.
[65] See Jackson, 'International Boundaries', and Ayoob, *Third World Security Predicament*.
[66] On reciprocity in international relations, see Jackson, *Quasi-states*, pp. 34–47, 109–64; and Robert O. Keohane, 'Reciprocity in International Relations', *International Organization*, 40:1 (1986), pp. 1–27.
[67] On political conditionality, see Georg Sørensen (ed.), *Political Conditionality* (London, 1993); see also Jackson, *Quasi-states*, and Ayoob, *Third World Security Predicament*.

economic cooperation comprise the substantial basis for identifying the EU as a security community, that is, a realm where participant states do not prepare for, expect or fear the use of military force in their relations with each other.[68]

Cooperation in the EU in low-politics area involves, to a significant extent, political networks which qualitatively transcend the traditional 'Westphalian' standards of cooperation between states. For example, the Committee of Regions gathers representatives from regional and local authorities. The Committee interacts directly with the European Commission on regional and local development issues. The Economic and Social Committee advises the Commission and the Council in vocational matters. The Euregio is a vehicle for regional cross-border cooperation between Germany and The Netherlands; the council is active in a wide range of policy areas, including technology, education, tourism, and agriculture.[69]

Cooperation between post-modern states is not very developed in the area of high politics. In both defence and diplomacy, for example, the EU has not yet transcended the principle of unanimity. Again, this does not necessarily mean that there will be no change in that domain. Two such changes may be envisaged, one concerning the referent object of security, the other concerning what might be called post-modern military operations.

Normally, the referent object of security is considered to be the state; that is true of military as well as economic, political, and environmental security.[70] Yet political and economic integration must call such a view into question. If there is a less purely national economy, if political governance is undertaken at different levels including supranational and regional/local ones, if the environment is obviously a transnational as well as a local concern, and if the constraining effects of anarchy are felt less by liberal democracies intermeshed in complex cooperative networks, it is conceivable that a shift could take place away from an emphasis exclusively on the national security of the state and toward a combined accentuation of the larger regional system above as well as the sub-regional and local systems below the state.

In a post-modern state, institutions both above and below the state become more important as referent objects of security. In concrete terms this equals a process of Europeanization of state identities, that is, Europe becomes part of the member states' national conceptions of themselves. Ole Wæver presents an example: 'when most of the significant political forces in France try to imagine their country's future, the EU is an implicit part of that vision. Europe has become part of the meaning of France . . . the "self" already incorporates the EU'.[71] This is a concrete example of a change of identities in the vein of constructivist analysis, a change significantly influenced by the substantial changes in statehood.

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[68] The notion of security community was developed by Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, 1957), pp. 5–9.

[69] See, e.g., Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community* (Boulder, CO, 1994); Thomas Christiansen and Knud Erik Jørgensen, 'Towards the "Third Category" of Space: Conceptualizing the Changing Nature of Borders In Western Europe', paper for Second Pan-European Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on International Relations, Paris, 13–16 September 1995.

[70] But not for societal security, the referent object of which is society; cf. Ole Wæver et al., *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (New York, 1993). Barry Buzan has pioneered the study of different aspects of security; see Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Hemel Hempstead, 1991).

[71] Ole Wæver, 'Identity, Integration and Security', *Journal of International Affairs*, 2 (1995), p. 412.

The other aspect is military operations. The importance of military operations for the development of the modern, 'Westphalian' state was emphasized above; indeed, the existence of the 'Westphalian' state with its defined borders 'is accepted universally as justification for the maintenance of armed forces'.[72] In a post-modern realm, in contrast, there is a growing 'irrelevance of borders',[73] and armed forces are increasingly assigned tasks which have nothing to do with national defence in the traditional sense: for example, humanitarian intervention in domestic conflicts and the defence of basic human rights. Military activity is less and less concerned with the traditional task of national defence.

In external affairs the EU also exhibits some distinctive features. The EU is represented in some fora which are normally reserved for sovereign states; they include a number of UN organizations, including some specialized agencies. The highest external profile, however, is in the GATT/WTO where the Commission negotiates on members' behalf. The EU has also developed high-profile policies towards Eastern Europe since 1989. Intensified cooperation in foreign affairs is foreseen as a part of the Maastricht Treaty; yet there is already a high degree of coordination between member states at the informal level.[74]

In sum, relations between member states in particular, but also the external relations of EU members, have features which separate these states qualitatively from the Westphalian type of state.

Conclusion

The significant patterns of conflict and cooperation in world politics after the Cold War remain insufficiently explored. Existing contributions to the debate fail to adequately investigate substantial changes in statehood and their consequences for conflict and cooperation. The IR discipline is burdened with a 'taken for granted' understanding of states as fixed, 'like units' which vary in very few respects, the main one being relative capabilities.

I have argued that this view is misleading and that there are two other main types of state in the present international system, in addition to the 'Westphalian' states: the post-colonial and the post-modern state. Each of these types contains distinctive features which separate it from the Westphalian type of state and which entail specific consequences for patterns of cooperation and conflict.

A thorough investigation of conflict and cooperation requires the analysis of different types of contemporary statehood. Anarchy does not always lead to self-help, as claimed by Neorealists; neither is anarchy 'what states make of it' in the sense that it is infinitely malleable. Specific types of statehood set the stage for distinct forms of conflict and cooperation. The high level of domestic conflict and the secure insecurity in external relations is tied in with the specific type of post-

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[72] Spybey, *Social Change*, p. 99.
[73] Cooper, 'Is there a New World Order?', p. 18.
[74] See K.-E. Jørgensen, 'European Governance in the Field of Foreign Policy-making: The Informality/Formality Issue', paper for International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, 21–25 February 1995.

colonial statehood. And the unique kind of security community which characterizes relations between EU members is tied in with the specific type of post-modern statehood.

What about future developments of these different types of state? There is no uniform path of state development; the three types of state constitute a hierarchy only in the sense that the post-colonial and the post-modern state deviate from the modern, Westphalian type in different directions. The post-colonial state has weak and unconsolidated statehood, whereas the post-modern state is a recent phenomenon, moving toward more complex forms of governance, partly in response to economic globalization.

The direction of development of contemporary statehood is not given beforehand. States do not move in an identical pattern from post-colonial, through modern, to post-modern. For example, some states were never post-colonial; others may never be able to become anything else. The conventional claim by Realists, that states would be pressed to become 'like units', that is, they would develop the characteristics of modern, 'Westphalian' statehood, has not held up. Yet given the stage set by the three types of state identified above, some future patterns of state development are at least more likely than others.

First, modern, 'Westphalian' states will increasingly be exposed to the challenges of post-modernity. At present this is most strongly felt in the economic sphere due to the forces of globalization. It will be increasingly difficult to uphold the primarily national economy upon which the 'Westphalian' state is based. Groups favouring economic integration will prevail over groups favouring protectionism.[75] At present this appears to lead in the direction of a 'regionalization' of the world. But on the one hand, there is no determinate link between economic globalization and specific forms of cooperation; on the other hand, the leading regional states—the United States and Japan—are also global economic players.

In any case, such developments must increase the relative importance of co-operation based on the soft power resources required in complex, plurilateralist networks, and decrease the relative importance of conflict based on more traditional forms of power, especially military power. The latter form of power is less relevant for the creation of multi-level governance regulating increasingly globalized economies and societies.[76]

The standard expectation for post-colonial states is that they will gradually develop the features of modern, 'Westphalian' statehood; this is the process called development. Yet we only have to go back to the 1930s to find a completely different form of standard wisdom, namely, that many of the colonies and dependencies would never be able to stand on their own feet.[77] Ironically, the colonial legacy continues to present obstacles to development, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.

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[75] Cf. Helen V. Milner, *Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade* (Princeton, 1988).

[76] On the distinction between types of power and the importance of soft power, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York, 1990); see also David A. Baldwin, 'Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics', in David A. Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism* (New York, *c*. 1993), pp. 20–2. For a careful discussion of the choices facing foreign policy in this situation, see Robert O. Keohane, 'International Multiple Advocacy in US Foreign Policy', in Dan Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown (eds.), *Diplomacy, Force and Leadership: Essays in Honor of Alexander L. George* (Boulder, CO, 1993), pp. 285–305.

[77] Cf. Jackson, *Quasi-states*, pp. 13–14.

At the same time, the advantages accruing to post-colonial states today in terms of aid and access to modern technologies must be considered against some serious drawbacks. The main instruments used by modern states to achieve statehood—the changing of borders and the disappearance of weaker state entities altogether through warfare—are not available options for the post-colonial states. Meanwhile, a number of states in Asia and Latin America are graduating toward modern statehood. But a large number of post-colonial states are ironically, ensured continued misery and violent domestic conflict through the guarantee of the international society of states that they cannot go under, no matter what; 'the price of failure is no longer absolute'.[78]

Finally, post-modern states in the EU appear to be heading toward increased differentiation, in two ways. First, with the expansion of membership the tendency for a 'variable geometry' mode of integration will increase. That is, countries will participate in the various structures of cooperation in different ways and degrees, probably around a hard core of mostly integrated countries, including Germany, France, and the Benelux. Second, differentiation will increase inside each country, whereby some areas are winners and some losers in the larger process of co-operation. That is, integration will go hand in hand with fragmentation. Together with the problem of the 'democratic deficit' in the supranational institutions, these are the greatest challenges to the EU, in addition to the paramount challenge of keeping the integration process on the move.[79]

In sum, the smooth creation of a federal state is by no means on the cards. If more intense cooperation succeeds it will most probably be accompanied by more, not less, conflict between areas and groups in the community. At the present time, however, there is little indication that such conflict will be violent.

In overall conclusion, the patterns of conflict and cooperation revealed by the identification of contemporary types of statehood cannot stand alone. They need to go into the larger picture of overall, systemic analysis of these processes. They can supplement, not replace, the existing analytical contributions. Their specific contribution is the demonstration that distinctive types of statehood are tied in with different typical patterns of cooperation and conflict. In that way, they offer a unit-level input to the systemic analyses of the post-Cold War world. And they demonstrate, as I have argued elsewhere,[80] the dynamic interplay between international and domestic forces. System-wide processes affect unit structures, and changed units, in turn, affect the structure of the international system.

[78] Gabriel Ben-Dor, quoted in Ayoob, *Third World Security Predicament*, p. 83.
[79] See Zürn, 'Challenge of Globalization'.
[80] Georg Sørensen, 'States are not "Like Units"'.