system based on the rule of law. The people's identity weaves together shared values but in a way that is somewhat inconclusive and open to different interpretations. Thus, the idea of integrity is not sufficient guidance for determining the best public policies. There are multiple policies that are consistent with a liberal identity that has integrity. Just as an individual person who has integrity can deal with a difficult or messy moral situation in a dignified way, liberal people can do the same. But there are policies that cannot be consistent with the idea of integrity under any interpretation. The idea of the people's integrity can provide guidance for which policies should never be pursued and how to address complex situations. For example, even though a particular policy, such as providing loans to corrupt but friendly leaders, might appear excusable in the context of policies related to international development, it cannot be consistent with a whole set of other values that are central to a liberal identity and therefore cannot meet the standard of integrity.

The idea of the people's integrity is supplemented by the idea that the nation's property ultimately belongs to the people as a collective agent. The institution of private property is not a natural or primordial arrangement but a social convention that should be viewed as made by the people in a manner consistent with their identity. In this context, Nili is not interested in deriving any redistribution implications from this idea (one may wonder why not—are significant economic inequalities consistent with the idea of the people's integrity?). Rather, the idea of private property as a social convention serves as an additional lens through which to assess and weigh imperfect public policy options in the real world. This is particularly relevant in dilemmas related to the ousting of corrupt leaders. In these cases, it may appear tempting from a consequentialist future-oriented perspective to just let them go away without insisting on recouping the money they have stolen. The people's property perspective cautions against such calculations, because in creating the impression that leaders are somehow entitled to privately benefit from proximity to public resources, they undermine the very principle of the people's property.

In his book, Nili applies the ideas of the public's integrity and the public's property to a variety of policy issues related to domestic and international politics. In my view, the path from abstract normative principles to concrete policy issues is often more complicated and contentious than Nili makes it out to be. However, there is no doubt that Nili's masterful use of real-world examples is helpful in grounding the discussion and making it easier to disagree with him. Rather than belaboring questions about specific policy claims, I want to raise a more general question about the theoretical framework used to arrive at these conclusions. Sharing Nili's liberal inclinations, I find the idea that the government should be of the people appealing. Still, I wonder whether the notion of a liberal people with a singular identity that is based on a shared story can—and should—have traction as a moral ideal in our global and deeply pluralistic political world. Would a demand for integrity end up prioritizing one narrative of peoplehood, however benign and inclusive it appears, and marginalizing other plausible liberal identities? To make the point slightly differently, in contrast to Lawford-Smith, Nili takes the "people" and their liberal identity as given without any discussion of the processes—democratic or otherwise—through which the individuals who happen to reside in a territory are constituted as a people. I believe that fleshing out the procedural dimensions of people-making would make the reliance on "integrity" as a moral standard more difficult.

It is difficult to do justice in the context of a short review to the richness and sophistication of the analyses of these two books. However, given the focus of this review on their general approaches, I want to point out that both books choose to address questions of responsibility by bringing together moral and political theory without dealing with questions of social theory. Both books treat moral wrongs as a fact of life that needs to be reckoned with. They have almost nothing to say about the social conditions in which these wrongs are done as possible factors in our moral judgment. The main characters in Lawford-Smith's account are individual citizens, officeholders, and government employees in various state agencies; for Nili they are the people (understood as a collective agent), politicians and bureaucrats, and corrupt leaders. Neither author discusses in any sustained way thicker social factors such as domestic and global social hierarchies, investments and multinational corporations, international power dynamics, the media environment, and the like (Nili's discussion of group conflicts in Israeli society considers some deep social divisions but in a fairly stylized form). Again, it is debatable if social theory is relevant for our moral judgment and, if so, how. My intention here is not to fault these books for failing to take social theory into account but only to point out the choices their authors have made as food for future thinking on this important topic. Regardless, both books are highly valuable in their own right and are recommended for anyone who is interested in questions of collective moral agency and responsibility.

The Caliphate of Man: Popular Sovereignty in Modern Islamic Thought. By Andrew F. March. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019. 328p. $45.00 cloth.
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— Arash Davari , *Whitman College*
davaria@whitman.edu

Andrew March's latest monograph, *The Caliphate of Man: Popular Sovereignty in Modern Islamic Thought*, speaks at

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once to scholars of comparative politics concerned with democracy formation in Muslim-majority states, scholars of international relations concerned with the limits of the world system, and scholars of political theory concerned with popular sovereignty. It also offers valuable insights for historians of the modern Middle East, intellectual historians of utopia, and students of Islamic and constitutional law.

On a certain register, *The Caliphate of Man* is political theory as obituary. March reconstructs the history of an idea, "Islamic democracy," whose demise began with the onset of the Arab uprisings of 2010–11. Where secular imaginaries might read death as an irretrievable passing, and thus indicative of our limited claim to sovereign control, nonsecular imaginaries less enamored by these pretensions find new life in death. An obituary can signal not only a passing but also a passage—loss and birth at once. On this score, March's book elaborates ideas first explored in his article, "Taking People as They Are: Islam as a 'Realistic Utopia' in the Political Theory of Sayyid Qutb" (*American Political Science Review,* 104 (1), 2010), interpreting Islamic democracy as ideal theory. With the rise of nation-states in the Middle East after World War I, modern Muslim thinkers developed the idea of Islamic democracy in earnest to contend with secular notions of sovereignty. National sovereignty won the ideological battle, but it may have lost the geopolitical war in the long run. That is, *The Caliphate of Man* introduces readers to an intellectual tradition situated to think beyond politics as they are, after the prospective collapse of sovereignty.

An Archimedean point animates March's interpretation. The text opens and closes with Tunisian philosopher Rachid Ghannūshī's articulation of the "caliphate of man": the viceregency of the *umma*, the Muslim community, as God's deputy. Ghannūshī repurposes the exalted position reserved for human beings in Islam—endowed with a will to choose between right and wrong, the capacity to construct worlds, and an obligation to pursue God's charge—to explain popular sovereignty as an Islamic construct. Looking backward, Ghannūshī represents the culminating point in an historical line woven throughout modern Islamist thought since the 1920s. In reconstructing that line, March brings to the fore unexpected points of convergence between expressions of divine and popular sovereignty in the "high utopian Islamism" of Abū'l A'lā Mawdūdī and Qutb. Looking forward, the caliphate of man informs Ghannūshī's turn to moral pluralism after the Tunisian uprising. In either case, Islam promises to offer more robust solutions to existing problems: a more democratic democracy, a more pluralist pluralism.

That promise goes unfulfilled. In lieu of offering solutions in the wake of its failure to materialize, *The Caliphate of Man* concludes with an aporia, asking whether sovereignty is anathema to Islamism. Are divine and popular sovereignty irreconcilable? Islamism presumes "a pre-political law…binding on Muslims and constraining of political life." We are left to choose between, on the one hand, consensus through moral pluralism (undercutting claims to divine sovereignty) and, on the other hand, relinquishing the modern state altogether (undercutting claims to popular sovereignty; p. 227).

If Ghannūshī represents the apex of "high utopian Islamism," the aporia March delineates haunts all Islamist encounters with the paradox of popular sovereignty. In Rousseau's account, a yet-to-be virtuous citizenry must ascribe to itself a law evincing the attainment of virtue and citizenship before a political order predicated on that law can cultivate virtue and citizenship in those who fall under its purview. Rousseau resolves the paradox through the Lawgiver—a fictional foreigner, an idol-like demigod able to compel transformation with a noble lie. Contemporary political theorists call this decisionism, pointing to the undemocratic underbelly of popular sovereignty. Modern Islamist thinkers tackle an iteration of the paradox specific to a theological imaginary, seemingly sidestepping decisionism. Islamism addresses a political community that only exists through self-identification with divine law. The law the *umma* gives itself precedes particular manifestations of the people, thereby precluding the need for a Lawgiver. But the *umma* cannot choose to reject Islam and still be the *umma*, revealing a different kind of undemocratic conceit. Divine sovereignty stands in for natural and human rights as constraints on constituent power. *The Caliphate of Man* meticulously reconstructs this paradox, where most turn away in deference to clichéd tropes about political violence. March's work is valuable precisely because it is not apologia or revisionism but a sustained and uncompromising engagement with Muslim thinkers as thinkers, warts and all.

The book raises two unaddressed questions. The first concerns judgment. Who is to judge when the *umma* acts in accordance with divine law? If we answer that experts should make this assessment, then Muslim thinkers offer no theory of popular sovereignty. For Ghannūshī, experts only wield authority through the *umma*, which in turn bears a timeless capacity for disobedience. Readers would be correct to recall John Locke and his assumption of a pre-political capacity to judge rights. Judgment is determined by contingent real-world experiences. According to March, modern Islamism—Ghannūshī's concept of "dispersed sovereignty" especially—relies on a capacity for judgment when faced with the features of historical experience left out of Islam's founding doctrine. In its most expansive sense, this pragmatism accounts for the possibility that anything can happen. But *The Caliphate of Man* does not explore that possibility fully, perhaps

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because of March's commitments to Rousseau and Rawls. "Taking the people as they are" puts a limit on indeterminate judgment. It certainly does not entertain the prospect that anything can happen beyond the confines of this world. In this regard, March's remarkable ability to demonstrate overlaps between modern Islamism and a Rawlsian notion of liberalism also reflects the very limit confronting Muslim ontology in the modern era. Can the Muslim exist on terms illegible to "us"?

The second question concerns revolution. March wrote *The Caliphate of Man* in the shadow of the Arab uprisings, when Islamists felt threatened by the appearance of indeterminate popular sovereignty. Constrained by their commitment to divine sovereignty, these Islamists could not imagine their project in the face of unthinkable social change. But there are other definitions of the state; for instance, Weber's monopoly of violence or Foucault's governmentality. What if modern Islamism fails to cohere with the modern state precisely because it attempts to cohere with popular sovereignty? Is modern Islamism actually a counterrevolutionary force consistent with these other definitions of the state?

Another version of modern Islamic thought is possible. Contra Islamist fears of popular sovereignty, Michel Foucault read Iran's 1979 revolution to suggest indeterminacy and spirituality at once. If, like Foucault, we listen to lived revolutionary experience (and not post-revolutionary power struggles), we may notice convergences between divine and popular sovereignty unthinkable when we "take the people as they are." In this sense, modern Islamic thought may not be as dormant as presumed. As recently as a decade ago, the prospect of revolution in Arab states seemed a dead letter. Today, uprisings and the specter of state collapse make headlines. Reports of the death of Islamic democracy may be greatly exaggerated. Islamic popular sovereignty may still exist—albeit, like other iterations of the phenomenon, as an extraordinary constituent moment, perhaps as a revolution against any effort to fuse Islam and the modern state.

No single monograph can address every question. *The Caliphate of Man* addresses many important ones. It is a path-breaking book that should shape debates in numerous fields for years to come, because it is thoroughly grounded in primary and secondary Arabic-language sources, lucidly written in a style accessible to readers without prior expertise, and replete with insights responsive to the immediate context shaping the intellectual formations it reconstructs and the contours of debate more conventionally associated with theories of popular sovereignty. March has written an indispensable text for comparative scholars of political thought and beyond.

Our Great Purpose: Adam Smith on Living A Better Life.
By Ryan Patrick Hanley. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019. 176p. $17.95 cloth.
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— Michael L. Frazer, *University of East Anglia*
michael.frazer@uea.ac.uk

In *Our Great Purpose*, Ryan Patrick Hanley offers a practical guide to human life. One might be tempted to say that this book is written for a nonacademic audience. To do so would be to forget that academics are human beings, with lives to lead outside their narrow research agendas, lives that can go as well or badly as any others. As such, it would be better to say that this is a book for everyone.

The idea that moral and political philosophy should direct our everyday existence has both a proud lineage and many reputable defenders today. Unfortunately, guides to life have acquired something of a bad reputation of late, and rightly so. This tension is illustrated in Hanley's first two footnotes. After expressing his debts to Alexander Nehamas and Pierre Hadot in his first note, Hanley then goes on to acknowledge the inevitable comparisons his book will draw to Jordan Peterson's best-selling *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos* (2018) in his second.

In form, though not in content, Hanley seems to have modeled his work on evangelical pastor Rick Warren's even better-selling *The Purpose Driven Life: What on Earth Am I Here For?* (2002). Both consist of a long series of very short chapters, each expounding the practical implications of an epigraph. In Hanley's work, Adam Smith substitutes for scripture; *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (henceforth *TMS*) is the source for all but three of Hanley's epigraphs, with two of the others from *The Wealth of Nations* and one from Smith's letter on the death of his friend David Hume.

Smith is as good a candidate as any for a canonical philosopher who can help guide our lives today. Many have noted Smith's extensive debts to the Stoics and Epicureans. As religious rituals cease to structure our increasingly secular lives, many find themselves turning to practices explicitly modeled on Hellenistic ones; think only of the role of the current Stoic revival and its influence on cognitive behavioral therapy. Smith's revisions to Hellenistic ethics, detaching their principles from metaphysical foundations and applying them to life in early modern commercial societies, mean his ideas speak even more directly to our current predicament.

Smith has already been put to this purpose in Russ Roberts's *How Adam Smith Can Change Your Life: An Unexpected Guide to Human Nature and Happiness* (2014). An economist, Roberts read *TMS* for the first time shortly before writing about it. His story about uncovering this

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