whether female circumcision always should be illegal, or whether the right to free speech extends to cover Salman Rushdie's right to publish *The Satanic Verses*. It is difficult to avoid concluding that Parekh relies on liberal principles to resolve these questions, even while castigating liberalism for its partisanship.

This tendency to give with one hand and take back with the other is the main flaw of *Rethinking Multiculturalism*. For instance, Parekh is quick to expose the limitations and "liberal bias" of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, arguing that even values such as respect for human life and human dignity are culturally relative: "What constitutes humiliation or cruelty . . . varies with cultures and cannot be universally legislated" (p. 135). But in considering the case of China a few pages later, he is happy to condemn it for permitting, inter alia, "some of the worst forms of personal humiliation" and "disregard for human dignity." More generally, the intercultural dialogue on which Parekh relies to resolve the practical conflicts thrown up by multiculturalism can proceed only against the background of substantial agreement on basic questions of justice. There is more to be said in favor of John Rawls than Parekh allows in his brief discussion of that author.

This weakness notwithstanding, there is much to admire in Parekh's book, not least his willingness to unsettle, in the gentlest possible way, some of our complacent assumptions about issues such as religious dress, animal slaughter, and polygamy. It will no doubt provoke discussion—some of its main ideas have been forthrightly criticized in Brian Barry's *Culture and Equality* (2001)—and, like the other two books, is essential reading for students of multiculturalism.

The Covenant Connection: From Federal Theology to Modern Federalism. Edited by Daniel J. Elazar and John Kincaid. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000. 352p. $75.00.

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Daniel J. Elazar (1934–99) was a prolific scholar and is easily the single most recognized name in the area of American federalism studies. During his career, he authored or edited more than 60 books, produced scores of other publications, founded and edited the journal *Publius*, served as a presidential appointee for three terms on the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, and committed himself to professional and public service both in the United States and Israel. Between 1995 and 1998, he produced the monumental four-volume series on the covenant tradition in politics: *Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel* (1995), *Covenant and Commonwealth* (1996), *Covenant and Constitution* (1997), and *Covenant and Civil Society* (1998). He will forever be known as the author of *American Federalism, A View from the States* (1966), with its ubiquitous conceptualizations of American political cultures, but it is his work on the linkages between religious covenant thought and its sociopolitical manifestations and extensions across political history that would seem to be his own preferred scholarly legacy, if forced to choose.

Oddly enough, although this volume was just published last year, the essays collected here by Elazar and Kincaid serve in the capacity of "prequel" to the work produced at the close of Elazar's life and career, as well as to some of the very strong work of the other contributors. In 1975, Elazar established two workshops to explore the covenant tradition, one at Temple University in Philadelphia and the other at Bar-Ilan in Israel. The essays in this volume represent work done in the former setting and were to have been presented 15 years ago but for various reasons were not. The larger goal of the workshops themselves was to "restore the convenantal tradition to the same status as that of the natural law tradition in the study of political life and thought" (p. x).

The published work that followed these initial efforts over the last twenty years has certainly moved us closer to that goal, but the essays in this volume are important mostly for the promise they demonstrate of what was to come later. Although many of the contributions possess an integrity of their own, their value consists primarily as an introduction to the subject(s) and should not be used by serious students except to augment or begin their reading of the later or coterminous work of many of the authors, such as J. Wayne Baker, Thomas O. Hueglin, Donald Lutz, Charles S. McCoy, and James W. Skillen, to name a few.

Elazar conceptualizes the work at hand as a project of recovery and resuscitation of the relationship between the covenantal tradition and American federalism and constitutionalism. To accomplish this task, the authors explore both thematically and in loosely chronological order the political history, theory, and theology of early Calvinism across the Reformation to the Puritans—both English and colonial—and the relationship among their notions of a covenanted community, the social contract theorists, and American federalism. *The Covenant Connection* falls prey along the way to many of the difficulties of edited volumes in general, such as rough transitions, a degree of repetition, unevenness among chapters, intermittent thinness and thickness regarding the overall argument, and occasionally eclectic decisions regarding inclusion, but its chief and ironically unavoidable weakness is that it could not benefit from the literature of the last twenty years, much of which was produced by the authors themselves.

Others are better suited than I to judge the precision of the historical and theological exegesis regarding covenant theology and to comprehend the full meaning of passages like the following, from Charles Butler's essay: "The Reformed Augustinians—wedded like Calvin to the realist view of Adam's headship of the race—rejected Catharinus's suggestion, but as thought on the Covenant of Grace made the representative principle of covenanted federal headship more common through Christ's being so presented . . ." (p. 105). Nevertheless, the general thrust of work is very persuasive. In vastly simplified form, the argument rests on the following sort of progression. The Latin *foedus*, which serves as the root for the English *federal*, translated originally as *covenant*. Covenant discourse as opposed to, say, liberal or rights-based discourse in turn yielded what Lutz calls in its later American form communitarianism (p. 225). In its theological sense, a covenant was, according Torrance, "a promise binding two people or parties to love one another unconditionally" (p. 146).

Elazar explains the general linkage between that concept and political theory in the following manner: "Just as God limits the exercise of His omnipotence by entering into covenants with humanity, thereby endowing people with freedom, so too, does covenant limit the exercise of the boundless self, not only for the common good, but also individual freedom. Thus, while contracts tend to create relations of mutual self-advantage and limited liability, the thrust of covenant is toward the creation of communities or commonwealths animated by concern for the public good" (p. 6). Hence, the federal theology of the reformers eventually comes to undergird and animate what might have been viewed as simply a pragmatic or structural arrangement called federalism in a way that not only reconnects it with a

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richer and more profound history but also forces us to see the seemingly secular political reformers of our own tradition, such as Locke, in a vastly different light. These facts alone make the book worth the effort.

In the hands of these authors, federalism becomes something of a normative imperative and a theoretical codification for a well-ordered state. By pushing the reader to pick up what are today often neglected thinkers from the early modern period—such as Heinrich Bullinger, Johannes Althusius, and Johannes Cocceius—or to revisit the place of John Knox in the historical scheme, Elazar and company do a great service to the history of political thought and Reformation theology as well. By demonstrating its extension over time to the colonial shores and later American political thought, they force us to reconsider the genealogy of American political discourse and allow us to explore what is at least a complimentary if not an alternative conceptualization of the American political "soul." Properly used, the reorientation intended here and developed in much greater detail in later work provides a receptive reader with new tools for addressing the continuing problems of the modern liberal state concerning pluralism, tolerance, the relationship between liberty and equality, the relationship between parts and wholes, and, perhaps most important, the fundamental nature and meaning of citizenship itself. Despite the fact that much of this gets done better later by these same writers, this is no mean feat.

Globalizing Democracy: Power, Legitimacy, and the Interpretation of Democratic Ideas. By Katherine Fierlbeck. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1998. 216p. $69.95.

Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism. By Charles Jones. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 249p. $65.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.

Nomos XLI: Global Justice. Edited by Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer. New York: New York University Press, 1999. 222p. $50.00.

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The monograph by Charles Jones is both less and more than its title suggests. It is less because his book is devoted almost exclusively to global distributive justice, a topic of great contemporary importance but one that hardly exhausts the subject of global justice. (Global political justice is a distinct topic, about which we have, if anything, even less clarity). It is more in that Jones's ambitions go beyond the defense of cosmopolitanism promised in the subtitle. Hand in hand with the presentation of his own version of cosmopolitanism he offers a *tour d'horizon* of contemporary thought about international distributive justice—indeed, his book is probably the most philosophically sophisticated such account in print. This combination of advocacy and critical survey results in a work that should interest not only scholars of the subject but also those seeking an intelligent introduction to it.

Global Justice is organized around a distinction between cosmopolitan and communitarian approaches to international distributive justice. The first several chapters consist of critical discussions of three different cosmopolitan theories—those based on utilitarianism, human rights, and the form of global Kantianism defended by Onora O'Neill in *Faces of Hunger* (1986) and in portions of *Towards Justice and Virtue* (1996). Jones's own view is a form of human-rights-based cosmopolitanism. Its central idea will be familiar to readers of Henry Shue's *Basic Rights* (rev. ed. 1996). Like Shue, Jones argues that human rights are protections of important human interests, and among these rights, none is more important than the right to subsistence. Accepting for the moment Jones's conception of a human right, his argument that there are subsistence rights and that they are morally basic seems to me persuasive.

It is one thing, however, to say why basic rights should matter to those whose rights they are and another to explain why those who have duties to contribute to their satisfaction should be moved to do so. This is because the considerations that serve to ground claims of right are typically recipient oriented: They have to do with the interests of the rights holder. It is frequently not obvious why anyone else should care about these considerations—at least to the extent necessary to motivate affirmative action to satisfy their demands. Jones replies to this question indirectly. He describes an allocation of both positive and negative duties associated with human rights, and he identifies and refutes several reasons someone who is subject to these duties might resist complying. The argument is plausible as far as it goes, but some readers may think it does not go far enough. Skepticism that human rights can generate duties to act often arises from a denial that the duty holder stands in the kind of relationship to the rights holder that can explain why the duty holder should be moved by an appreciation of the rights holder's situation. Jones's defense of cosmopolitanism would be more powerful if it included an account of the moral importance of subsistence duties that connects more perspicuously with the perspective of the holders of these duties.

Jones does address a variety of other doubts about cosmopolitan theories that have been expressed in the recent literature. These include views emphasizing the special claims of compatriots, the ethical significance of nationalism, the constraints resulting from recognition of cultural differences, and the (allegedly) nonderivative moral importance of the state. The typology of anticosmopolitan positions is illuminating, and within it Jones finds a place for virtually all the leading anticosmopolitan writers of the last decade or so. Throughout, the critical discussion is thoughtful and penetrating. Indeed, Jones's formulation of views with which he disagrees is sometimes clearer than the original.

Nomos XLI contains eight contributions, some of which originated as papers or comments presented at the August 1996 annual meeting of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. It is a mixed bag. The contributions by Brian Barry, Samuel Scheffler, Charles Jones, and Hillel Steiner are free-standing essays devoted to one or another aspect of the subject of global justice. (Jones's is essentially the same as chapter 5 of his book.) Three are commentaries (two, by John Kane and Liam Murphy, respond to the Scheffler article, and the third, by Debra Satz, apparently originated as a commentary on Barry but now ranges much more broadly). The eighth item—an essay on political realism by Lea Brilmayer, a coeditor of the volume—is primarily metatheoretical: It includes a provocative comparison of the domestic and international realms but does not engage the normative problems taken up in the other articles.

The contributions by Barry and Scheffler are the most substantial of the lot. Both consider the conflict between local loyalties and the demands of global justice, but they approach the subject from different directions. Barry is interested in reliance on nationalism (sometimes, as he points out, mistakenly identified with statism) to justify resistance to requirements of global justice, particularly those involving humanitarian intervention and international redistribution. He distinguishes two varieties of nationalism: the "blood and soil" nationalism found in much of the real world and the "academic" nationalism of such writers as Michael Walzer

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