

that the system of rewards for work done is in full operation at Broadmoor, and is found to work well. The Inspectors, however, decline on principle to establish an injudicious precedent on behalf of idlers well supplied with food of the best description. At the date of the report 172 insane prisoners were in the asylum, and had it not been for the unusual mortality in 1882 and 1883, averaging eight per cent., the buildings would not have afforded accommodation for the number admitted, amounting to forty-nine in the last eighteen months.

The mentally affected inmates of Union Workhouses in Ireland on December 31st, 1883, amounted to 3,726—1,488 males and 2,238 females—an increase of 15 on the year before.

As a rule the Inspectors believe them to be treated with consideration, located in detached buildings, and placed on a more liberal and nutritious dietary than that given to ordinary paupers. From personal observations they believe that their comforts, as a rule, are practically progressing. The most notable deficiencies are referable to restricted airing grounds, the want of separate day rooms, and congenial modes of occupation under responsible attendants. The Guardians of the Belfast Workhouse are, according to the Inspectors, deserving of every praise for their appreciation of the wants of the idiotic and epileptic inmates, having erected a spacious pile of buildings, with a fair acreage around, for their pauper insane.

The number of private patients in Ireland seem to have fallen off considerably. On 1st January, 1884, the inmates of private asylums amounted to 636, as against 651 on like date in 1883. Here we may again repeat a suggestion made a long time ago in this Journal, viz., that those institutions kept wholly for profit should be distinguished from the hospitals which are supported, to a very large extent, from special funds, and are not kept for any individual gain. Many of these exist in Ireland, viz., Swift's Hospital, St. Vincent's, the Friends' Retreat, and the Stewart Institution.

The Report concludes with the usual statistics to be found in the Irish Lunacy Report, omitting, in addition to those referred to in the beginning of this article, the tables giving the salaries and emoluments of officers and attendants.

Body and Will. By HENRY MAUDSLEY, M.D. Kegan Paul, Trench, and Co. 1883.

Prolegomena to Ethics. By the late T. H. GREEN. Clarendon Press: 1883.

(Concluded from July, 1884.)

We alluded in the closing sentences of the earlier part of this review to the interesting work that is included in Part III. of Dr. Maudsley's book, which he entitles the Pathology of Will. It opens with a chapter "concerning degeneration," and from that opening to the final dirge, entitled

“What will be the end thereof?” it reflects throughout a startling pessimism. The author thinks, for example, that, “in order to have a theory of cosmogony that shall cover all the facts, it has always been necessary to supplement a good principle by a bad principle, a god of creation by a god of hate and destruction.” And he is so staunch a Manichæan as to predict that it will always be so, that to believe in the survival of good over evil is as foolish as to persuade ourselves that repulsion will one day survive attraction, and that, in fact, there is always good reason to believe that “the sum of the respective energies of good and evil remains a constant quantity.” Into these dark depths of despair we decline to follow him, for indeed they are in no wise necessary deductions from his scientific data, but rather an offspring of his own metaphysics. It is of more value to follow his progressive study of moral degeneracy as it appears in actual practice. He starts, for simplicity, with the case of children *morally* but not *intellectually* defective; and he summarises the lessons of such a case in this way:—

“One might represent the stages of descent in this fashion :
 1. Absence of exercise, and through disuse decay, of the highest social sensibilities and powers, moral and volitional, in one generation: therewith lifelong unchecked exercise of the secondary or social developments of the egoistic passions in the conduct of life: consequent moral degeneration, which, by its nature, goes deeper into character than intellectual degeneration. 2. In a succeeding generation some form or other of positive mental derangement; or such a development of vice in character as falls a little short only of madness or of crime. 3. In the third generation moral imbecility or idiocy, with or without corresponding intellectual infirmity.” This is an excellent statement of the broad lesson, deducible from the whole range of hereditary degenerations in human life, that the “acquired infirmity of one generation will become the natural deficiency” of a succeeding one. Two reflections occur to us, however, when we look closely into the case as it is stated here. In the first place, does not the very possibility of “acquiring an infirmity” by moral choice and persistent repetition of voluntary acts which we know to be wrong, imply exactly that freedom of the will which Dr. Maudsley would deny? And again, is it quite true that a “natural deficiency” cannot, at least in all the lesser degrees of it, be improved out of existence by a contrary moral exercise of the will?

We pass reluctantly over Dr. Maudsley's careful discussion of the various kinds of moral perversion in disease, as in hysteria, epilepsy, injuries to the head, and alcoholism. They are a tempting subject of discussion; but it is more tempting still to consider his views on the "Moral Sense and Will in Criminals," which forms his Section IV.

"Habitual criminals," says Dr. Maudsley, "are a class of beings whose lives are a sufficient proof of the absence or great bluntness of moral sense." In spite of the great authority of the writer, this strikes one as too sweeping a generalization. It is perfectly true, of course, as he goes on to explain, that a certain proportion of them are of obviously weak intellect, and that many, perhaps most, are malformed or deformed in part or whole of body. But it seems to us not to be true that "the organization of the wicked is commonly defective." Surely some of the grandest criminals—the great swindlers and forgers, the successful villains of good society—are men of rather favourable and efficient organization, who have gone wrong because it seemed to them preferable to do so, and because they trusted in their talents to conceal their crimes and to achieve social success by what Dr. Maudsley calls "anti-social" means. In any case, it is worth notice that Dr. Maudsley protests strongly against the present methods of criminal punishment, and also that he reminds the world that "it is small profit to teach a child the distance of the sun from the earth, if he be not taught at the same time to know, and not taught to know only, but trained to feel, the distance between its higher and lower natures." It is to be regretted that he did not incorporate with this section of the work, some clear statement, as it appears to him, of the bearing of these questions upon the whole theory of a criminal law and of judicial responsibility. It is all very well to say that society must punish crime, whether it was the fault of the criminal or no. In certain cases that may be true; yet the existence of any such thing as the legal defence of insanity implies that at a certain point the doer of a criminal deed must be held to be irresponsible. Dr. Maudsley seems to drift towards a theory in which all criminals would be in justice irresponsible, since it is their organization that fatally condemns them to be what they are. It is one of the most difficult of the many matters concerning the law, as it is related to mental disease, to say how and where the boundary line is to be drawn.

In passing on to trace the relation of mental derangement

in general to Will, Dr. Maudsley discusses for a time the moral degeneracy of modern society; and his verdict will startle most of his readers. There is no hope, he says, save in revolution. Evolution, beyond a certain point, breeds an egoism, which is worse than the primitive egoisms out of the escape from which society arose, because it has itself put on a quasi-social shape. Men of evil ends have learned to find in association the best means of preying on society. Trades are organised to defraud and cajole the public. A swindle must needs be a joint-stock company, and every phase of wickedness has its own appropriate solidarity. The complexity of the social organism swamps the simple ideals and the direct aims which give "the radical principles of human association;" and it is only by the tragic events of an "uprising from below" that Dr. Maudsley sees any hope of bringing the perverse generations back to the stern realities of their existence.

From these wider discussions, however, we return at once to the fundamental point of all psychology, when the author proceeds to discuss what he styles "the disintegrations of the ego" in mental disease; and here we find ourselves again in the range of questions on which the schools represented by Prof. Green and Dr. Maudsley are fundamentally in conflict. Dr. Maudsley refers, of course, to the various cases of so-called "circular insanity" or "double consciousness," comparing them to the phenomena of hypnotism, and the conclusion he draws is that "the consciousness of self, the unity of the ego, is a consequence, not a cause—a subjective synthesis or unity based upon the objective synthesis or unity of the organism: as such it may be obscured, deranged, divided, apparently transformed, for every breach of the unity of the united centres is a breach of *it*." To those who have followed our earlier criticism, it will not seem strange that we should place alongside this dictum the pronouncement of Mr. Green (best stated perhaps at p. 85), that the "distinction by man of *himself* from *events* is essentially different from any process in time, or any natural becoming," that "it is through it that he is conscious of time, of becoming, of a personal history; and the active principle of this consciousness cannot itself be determined by these relations in the way of time or becoming, which arise from consciousness through its action," and that "human action is only explicable by the action of an eternal consciousness, which uses the process of brain, and nerve, and tissue, and

the functions of life and sense as its organs, and reproduces itself through them." In a word, Mr. Green would reply to Dr. Maudsley's phenomena of double consciousness that it is strictly and logically *inconceivable* that a man, so long as he is a man, should be anything but an ego—in the sense of an entity uncaused by, and unsubject to, the bodily processes of which the pathologist takes account. Human life and knowledge are, as the idealist offers to show, inexplicable on any other hypothesis. No "ego," so-called, which was merely "a subjective synthesis based on the unity of the nerve centres," and which was therefore a result of organic functions, and at the mercy of them, *could* ever be a conscious being at all. It is as impossible as that water should run up hill, or that the stones should speak. To ask *why*, in the constitution of the world, the ego in us, which is in itself transcendent and not a result of natural causes, should yet be limited strictly to express itself only in and through organs which *are* under the general limitations of matter, and are therefore subject to disorganization and death, is like asking why that mind, which the universe implies, should have manifested itself in a world at all? It is a question unanswerable, until we are beyond the range of all the limitations which these same organisms imply. But it is for all that an evident fact, and, being so, it must serve for the explanation of the phenomena of madness, as well as a hundred other not less difficult problems of human life. Whether it is in any sense conceivable that there may be a sane ego behind the mask of a diseased brain, is another and a very difficult question, to which perhaps some of our readers, who are interested in the ulterior problems of mental science, might help to find the answer.

There is no doubt, for example, that in many cases of aphasia the patient's mental health is good enough to enable him evidently to know what he wants to express and to be annoyed, often to paroxysms of rage, at the impossibility of getting his disorganised centres of speech to formulate in outward shape the thing he desires to say. He may be able to write and yet not to speak. He may be able to do neither, and yet may have some power of expressive gesture. All this may fail, and yet when his impatience is interpreted aright, he may show by his pleasure that his mind knew what it wanted, and could, as far as the mental effort went, have normally expressed it. If the facts, in a case where we can so closely and accurately observe them, carry us so very far,

may it not be that when other forms of mental disease are studied further, we shall find other instances in which also traces of the sane mind can be detected, in spite of the refusal of the brain organs to convey any coherent thought into expression or action, or in spite of a persistent distortion and perversion by the same diseased centres of volitional acts and impulses, whose inception, as far as the mental act went, was rational all the while?

As Dr. Maudsley and Prof. Green are at odds in their conceptions of the starting point of all philosophy, it is natural that they should differ also as to the end. The materialist closes his book with a pessimism, beautifully and powerfully, even poetically, stated, but absolute and hopeless. "The common law of life is slow acquisition, equilibrium for a time, then a gentle decline that soon becomes a rapid decay, and finally death." To this law nations and humanity are as surely doomed as any individual life. "Once the dissolution of things has got full start and way, it will be vastly quicker than the evolution has been." Humanity in its retrograde process will produce new savages, but they will no longer be the simple, childlike, relatively harmless savages of the beginning: they will be "new and degenerate varieties, with special repulsive characters—savages of a decomposing civilization." What takes place in the life of senile individuals daily "will one last, long day take place in the life of the race." The ideals of the world, ever rising till now, will not only not be realized, but will themselves decay, and "give place to ever-worsening ideals of ever-worsening states of things." Not only this, but the daring author even goes on to hint that the disillusioning process has already begun. For himself, he suggests that it is not "so certain as it is assumed to be that a higher moral evolution, should it take place, will tend necessarily to the greater happiness of mankind." For the world around him, he finds in its "maladies of self-consciousness" many forewarnings of its destiny, when it shall come to the old conclusions of Solomon and Job, but in a wider earnest, as to the vexation, and vanity, and littleness of life. And thus, by way of final conclusion, he comes down to the annihilation even of his own philosophising—for after holding that it is presumptuous to forecast the future of the world, and better to hold one's peace, he adds the words which touch the Ultima Thule of pessimistic scepticism—"But be the words spoken those of folly or of wisdom, they are in the end alike, vanity. All that which is

past is a Dream : and he that hopes or depends upon Time coming, dreams waking." To what good end then, if this be so, is any preaching, or study, or energy at all? Two courses only are open, if we may speak as if we could *choose* courses, for that also is taken from us. Yet if we *could* choose, we should either say, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die"—or we should make our quietus with a pistol or a pill. We confess that it seems to us that the very fact that a materialist theory of life and nature leads to this result is a sufficient proof that that theory is wrong from the beginning. The explanation of life which stultifies it cannot be the true explanation. There may be delusions and illusions here and there, from local and relative causes in the complexity of every life ; but life itself cannot be thought to be a delusion, any more than we can carry scepticism to the point of believing that *we* do not exist. On Mr. Green, indeed, the phenomena which discourage the optimist in the history of the world and of ourselves, press almost equally hard. But he denies that they are any real guide. He confesses (at p. 196) that "the facts of human life and history put abundant difficulties in the way of any theory whatever of human development. If it were not for certain demands of the spirit, which is ourself, the notion of human progress could never occur to us. But these demands, having a common ground with the apprehension of facts, are not to be suppressed by it. It is the consciousness of possibilities in ourselves, unrealized, but constantly in process of realization, that alone enables us to read the idea of development into what we observe of natural life, and to conceive that there must be such a thing as a plan of the world."

It is the same method of argument over again. Our guarantee of these ultimate truths is not an induction from observed facts, which are all the children of a consciousness, without which no perception can be, but is an analysis of the precedent conditions implied in knowledge, or in self, or in the world. That there should be a fact at all, is the first marvel ; and in the unravelling of all that this implies, we find the key to the mystery of the Universe. It is the only key that has yet seemed able to unlock the hiding places of selfhood and moral duty, of the present and the future life, of the Human and the Divine. It is worth a better trial than it has yet obtained in England. If it holds, all is well. If it breaks, it will be time enough for Pessimism then.

OXON.