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A. Plautius' Campaign in Britain: An Alternative Reading of the Narrative in Cassius Dio (60.19.5–21.2)*

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The problems surrounding Cassius Dio's account of the Roman entry in force into Britain have received considerable attention in the last fifteen years. This has, in the main, concentrated on the presumed route taken across Ocean Stream by the Roman fleet, the possible areas of landing, and the likely line of march to the Thames.[1] Other matters have come up for discussion, including the sources of Dio's history, which are thought to have been Roman senatorial writers of the sixties and seventies A.D., and Dio's own remoteness from the events of the invasion by some 150 years. It has also been suggested that the narrative contains a doublet (the same episode recounted twice with different details): the battle on the first, unnamed, river and the varied hostilities beyond the Thames have been supposed to be the same event, culled from different Latin authors, and consolidated into Dio's Greek text.[2] It is also true to say that the concept of a Roman invasion of a largely untouched 'barbarian territory' having taken place in A.D. 43 has been called into question; a sort of creeping Roman influence, traced in southern Britain through the previous decades, has increasingly been argued to be the background to the event.[3] Such influence, in economic and material/cultural terms, is clearly undeniable, though it need not negate the fact of a large-scale Roman military and political intervention, when Rome's interests required it. The hostile stance of the main British dynasty, the Catuvellaunian, seems to have provoked it, and immediate annexation of part of the island did follow.[4]

THE STRUCTURE OF CASSIUS DIO'S NARRATIVE

As the only surviving account in any ancient historian, the sequence of events told by Cassius Dio has barely been questioned.[5] However, it has to be accepted that he is far from being a primary source for them. He will have used one or more historians of Neronian or Flavian date (Fabius Rusticus, Cluvius Rufus, the Elder Pliny), such as Tacitus says were available to him.[6]

* I should like to thank John Manley for his helpful comments on the topic in correspondence over several years and for reading this paper in draft. I am also grateful to the anonymous readers of *Britannia* for suggestions for improvement to the text and for items of recent bibliography. None of the above is necessarily to be held to agree with the views put forward here, and errors remaining are, of course, my own.

1 Salway 1981, 81–3; Hind 1989, 1–21; Webster 1993; Frere 1999, 49–50; Black 1998, 306–7; 2000, 1–10; Bird 2000, 91–104; Sauer 2002, 333–58; Todd 2004, 44–9; Peddie 2005, 66–88; Mattingly 2006, 94–100.

2 Black 1998, 306–7; 2001, 415–28.

3 Creighton 2000; Manley 2002, 42–50, 143–6; Creighton 2006, 14–69; Manley and Rudkin 2005, 55–100; Dannell 2005, 14–82.

4 Webster 1981, 24–7; Frere 1999, 55.

5 Black 1998, 306–7; 2001, 415–28.

6 Tacitus acknowledges using these historians in the Claudius/Nero books of the *Annals* (13.20; 14.2; 15.61). Millar 1964; Black 2001, 417–19, 424–6.

Dio does not himself seem to have used Tacitus' *Annals*. Within this general acceptance of the account there have been three disputed details. One arises from his mention of the Bodunnoi (usually identified as the Dobunni of Gloucestershire); one concerns the meaning of the Greek word ἐνταῦθα ('there', spatially, or 'thereupon', in time);[7] the third suggests a plural rather than a singular form of the participle of ὑποστρατηγέω, 'serving as a general under him', referring to the relative position of the two Flavian brothers under the commander of the expedition, A. Plautius.[8] Apart from these minor points in understanding of the text and the attempt to suggest that two episodes (operations on and behind the two rivers) are actually doublets, taken from different sources of the same event,[9] all modern reconstructions follow Dio's text as a series of detailed items, following one on the other in succession. My own translation and earlier attempt at tracing the invasion geographically do so, and so does that of Manley, which is the most recent study of these events to date.[10]

After reaching Britain (I omit here the events in Gaul and during the crossing),[11] the expedition of A. Plautius is recounted by Cassius Dio in the following stages: the Roman landing met no opposition, because the Britons were not expecting them to come; even after the landing, they held back in the woods and swamps, hoping to drag out the time so that the army would give up, re-embark, and sail away, as Julius Caesar had done (60.19.4–5). After some time Plautius found the leading kings among the Britons, Caratacus and Togodumnus, sons of Cunobelinus, who was by then dead, and defeated them one after the other (60.20.1). They were in flight after these events, and then he received the voluntary submission of a part of the Bodunnoi tribe; leaving a garrison there, he moved on (60.20.2). When they came to a certain river, which the Britons believed could not be crossed without a bridge (they had therefore camped on its bank carelessly), the Celtic auxiliaries (Batavi) swam across and disabled the British chariots, and endangered their occupants (i.e. the leading Britons), by shooting down their horses. On two successive days three Roman generals, Vespasian, his brother, and then Hosidius Geta, also crossed the river and killed many of the Britons. Geta, after getting into difficulties and almost being captured, extricated himself and won the *triumphalia ornamenta* in recognition. It is implied that this victory of Geta, coming after the previous phases of the battle on the river, was decisive in the campaign (60.20.2–4). In retreat the Britons fell back to the Thames and no further resistance was offered until the Roman army also reached it, 'where the river nears the Ocean, and a lake is formed at high tide'. Here the Britons were able to cross by fords and firm ground, but the Roman army failed to find them and the pursuit stalled (60.20.5). Those auxiliaries skilled at crossing rivers again swam across, and other troops crossed by a bridge a little way upstream. Between them they attacked the Britons from several sides and killed many. However, in following up the remaining Britons, they fell into marshes that they found difficulty in making their way out of and lost a number of men (60.20.6). About

7 Hawkes 1961, 56–62, followed by Frere and Fulford 2001, 48 n. 22; 52 n. 50. The latter link their interpretation of this word, 'there'/'thereupon', with the whole broad understanding of Plautius' strategy (but see below and n. 43).

8 Birley 1981, 224; Frere and Fulford 2001, 46.

9 Black 1998, 306–7; 2001, 415–28. This theory, that the battles on the two rivers are doublets of the same event, has only been espoused by its author, so far as I know. It can hardly be rendered plausible, since every detail, at the two rivers, as related by Cassius Dio is different (60.20.2–4 compared with 5–6), except the crossing by Keltoi, which is said to have been done 'again' at the Thames. This theory found its origin in the supposed difficulty of finding a suitable 'first river' on the route from Sussex to the Thames. Bird (2002, 261) takes a different line: to play down all the military operations described by Cassius Dio and to deny the need to look for any 'first river'.

10 Hind 1989, 6–8; 15–18; Manley 2002, 54–64. Only here are analyses of the whole text of Cassius Dio attempted. The text and translation are offered, though without commentary, by Birley 2005, 17–19.

11 The sea-route taken was discussed in my 1989 article. The difficulties of a route Boulogne–Solent have been stressed above all by Grainge (2005, 111–40), but the possibility of use of the route Seine–Solent seems still distinctly possible (Grainge 2005, 33; 164–5).

this time, when Togodumnus *also was dead/destroyed* (see below), the Britons, far from giving in, banded together all the more to avenge him. Plautius' reaction was to advance no further, hold under occupation what he had overrun, and send for Claudius; according to his original orders, he was to do this if he met any particularly stiff opposition. Cassius Dio adds that large-scale preparations had been made for a second, reinforcing, expedition to be led by the emperor himself. When this arrived it eventually dealt with the Britons north of the Thames (the Catuvellaunians in their heartland), and occupied the capital, *Camulodunum* (60.21.1–2).

This narrative, as I now understand it, is not the sequence of consecutive events that it seems. It has a somewhat more complex structure. This may be occasioned by the knitting together of the text from more than one Latin source, but it is also likely to be occasioned by the common practice of ancient historians of prefacing an account of affairs in and beyond the provinces with a sort of headline sketch of the geographical and political situation. A good example of this is Cassius Dio (61.1.1–2) outlining the general course of the Boudica rebellion and the omens accompanying it, before giving a more detailed account. Many others appear in Cassius Dio and Tacitus.[12] In the present case the introductory political and topographical sketch (60.19.4–5 and 20.1–2) is followed by a more detailed account of the events already headlined, now circumstantially, personally, and somewhat anecdotally related (60.20.3–21.2). The result of this reading of the text is that two items (the victories over the two, named British kings and their flight) can be eliminated as separate events, since they are simply early headline, preliminary, mentions of the two successive sets of engagements on the two rivers, subsequently told more fully. This explains why the two victories are referred to so early, and, in putting the kings to flight one after the other, seem to be decisive in that respect, though no details are given. By contrast, in the description of the hostilities at the two rivers a great deal of significant detail of the resistance to the Roman army of Plautius is offered, but no mention is made of either of the two kings by name, probably because the focus is on the deeds of the Roman generals and contingents of troops — on these events from the Roman point of view. Togodumnus only reappears momentarily, as no longer living, or combatant. This interpretation will also remove a historical difficulty: how the Britons could have fought on so successfully, after the defeat and flight of both their king-overlords, still opposing the Romans at or behind two successive river barriers; the answer is that at these stages they were still led by those kings, as the mention of Togodumnus north of the Thames suggests. We are also relieved of the need to explain why two early victories over the British kings, sometimes now explained as 'skirmishes', had little influence on events compared with the later two series of battles; in fact they were the very same as those battles. There is, finally, the geographical and chronological aspect of the matter; we no longer need to allocate time and space after Plautius' landing for these two defeats of the kings, again because they were the same as those related in the fuller narrative.[13] The congestion of events in Plautius' campaign is much relieved. Nor do we have the odd situation in which two slight early engagements saw off the opposition of the two major kings, while serious resistance still awaited the Romans from leaderless Britons on the two rivers (only after these does Togodumnus reappear

[12] For the standard nature of this structure of text in the narrative of foreign affairs, see elsewhere in Cassius Dio: 62.1.1–2 and 2–12 (Boudica); 64.8.3 and 65.4–7 (Jewish War); 68.6.1–2 and 8–9, 68.10.3–4 and 11–14 (Dacian Wars); 69.12.1–2 and 12.3–14.3 (Jewish Revolt); 77.11–12 and 13–15 (Severus in Britain). Tacitus writes similarly: *Ann*. 1.55 and 56–70 (Germanicus); 12.15 and 16–21 (events in the Bosporus); 13.34–5 and 36–41 (Corbulo against the Parthians); 14.19 and 30–7 (Boudica). I am grateful to one of the anonymous readers of this journal for the addition of 'Britannia perdomita et statim missa' (Tac., *Hist*. 1.2), a summary, where the detailed account is lost.

[13] Collingwood and Myres produce some speculative detail out of nothing (1937, 82). Frere and Fulford describe these battles as skirmishes, but are silent as to why they led to the flight and effective elimination of the two British king-overlords (2001, 48). Burn also thinks that Caratacus may have led the Britons on the first river (1953, 113) and that Togodumnus got his fatal wounds there (1953, 107).

as 'dead' or 'lost'). A whole series of problems with the narrative melts away, if those two initial victories did not exist as separate events from the later more detailed ones.

One further item that can be seen differently, when assigned to the introductory section (it comes immediately after the defeat and flight of the two kings), is the submission of the Bodunnoi/Dobunni, Plautius' despatch of support for them and planting of a garrison 'there' (60.20.2). This episode no longer has to take place after two early, (non-existent) battles, but the item in the text can be seen to be another of the general political consequences of Plautius' successes, summarised in this opening section. It may well have taken place after the demise of Togodumnus, at a time when part of Plautius' army was beyond the Thames, but much of it was surely south of it along the line back from Staines–Silchester. Plautius' army is said to have still 'been moving on' from the garrison among the Bodunnoi (60.20.2.), but somewhat later, after some reverses north of the Thames, he resolved 'to move no further forward' (60.21.1). By this time the army was engaging the enemy in separate contingents and it may have been one of these which responded to the call of the Bodunnoi. In the light of this later re-scheduling of the Bodunnoi episode, we may now more confidently translate the phrase 'and *there* leaving a garrison …', allowing the meaning to refer to place (among the Bodunnoi), as is most natural in the context.[14] The alternative, to translate the phrase, 'and thereupon leaving a garrison', is to remove the action from any known people or area. As the Bodunnoi/Dobunni can be seen to be very accessible to the Roman army by this later stage of the campaign, there is no reason here to strain to give the Greek its less common, less natural, meaning.

TOGODUMNUS AND CARATACUS IN THE PAGES OF CASSIUS DIO AND TACITUS

The two kings appear very fleetingly in Cassius Dio, as we have seen; they are the sons of Cunobelinus, rulers over other British tribes, the main opponents of the Roman invasion; they are defeated separately and flee; of Caratacus we hear nothing further in this passage of Cassius Dio.[15] Of Togodumnus we hear literally one more word, φθαρεντὸς, meaning 'perished', 'ruined', which is taken to mean that he had died (perhaps of wounds) after some action on the first river, or around the Thames crossing. The 'demise', however, is completely unexplained by any circumstantial detail, such as Dio commonly provides when using this unexplicit word. It is strikingly followed by the statement that 'the Britons did not only not give up, but they united all the more to take vengeance for him' (60.21.1). Another feature of this sentence is that it is introduced as though it is an insertion in the text and refers back to another person's 'ruin' or 'demise' — 'when Togodumnus too perished' (καὶ ὁτι καὶ …). Perhaps this is a reference back to the defeats, first of Caratacus, then of Togodumnus, and their flight after the two major sets of engagements, as we interpret them on the two rivers, which involved many British casualties.[16] A similar usage can be found in Cassius Dio, where he has 'most of an army of the

[14] It was the argument of Hawkes (see note 7) that the word ἐνταῦθα should here mean 'thereupon', a less common usage than 'there' (see *LSJ Greek Lexicon*). When used with some idea of sequence, it seems to be a sort of emphatic 'then and there' (Herodotus 1.61, 62; Cassius Dio 51.5.5; 11.1; 20.8; 23.4).

[15] Tac., *Ann*. 12.33–8. Modern versions of Caratacus' career, down to his capture, appear in Webster 1981, 28–39; Frere 1999, 65–7; Bird 2000, 93–4, 97–8. In a later, unconnected passage retailed in the epitomes of Cassius Dio's text Caratacus is mentioned as 'a certain leader of the Britons', who had been captured and taken off to Rome, and who, when pardoned and liberated, expressed himself amazed that the Romans, who had such splendour in their city, nonetheless coveted the Britons' poor huts (Cass.Dio 61.33.3c).

[16] The need to explain the force of the second 'and/also' in this insertion was pointed out to me by Professor Keppie (pers. comm. 10/9/2001), for which I am grateful. It is this seemingly minor point, which led to the expansion of this paper from a consideration of Togodumnus into a more detailed look at the narrative structure of Cassius Dio's account. For the Greek historian's use of the very general word φθείρω for casualties in large numbers, see 51.24.3; 53.29.4; 61.30.1–2; 62.11.3; 64.19.3; 64.4.6; 68.24.5; 71.2.1; 78.2.4.

Romans destroyed' (φθαρῆναι) in Arabia Felix, but there he characteristically gives details of the sickness responsible (53.29.4). Perhaps it was Togodumnus' resistance and his own retinue that was brought to an end rather than his life. Other Britons nonetheless continued the fight, 'as though to avenge him'. It seems that the report of Togodumnus' 'death', unspecific as it is, rested rather on assumption on the part of Cassius Dio than on detailed knowledge. Neither Caratacus nor Togodumnus appears in action in Britain in the *Roman Histories* again. This is not to be wondered at. Writing some 150 years later he was interested in large-scale history, which meant the personal intervention abroad of the Caesars and major disasters like the rebellion of Boudica so far as Britain was concerned.[17] It was his aim to avoid insignificant detail (53.21.2), and routine expansion in a province would have fallen into this category. At any rate, the continuing resistance of Caratacus among the tribes of the West does not appear in the text of Cassius Dio.[18] We owe knowledge of it to Tacitus (*Ann*.12.33–5). It seems likely that Cassius Dio understood both kings, Caratacus and Togodumnus, to have 'perished' after their successive defeats and flight, and allowed them to disappear from his narrative — a closure indicated by his word φθαρεντὸς and his comment about the reaction of the Britons.

Remembering that Cassius Dio's Greek is a compilation from two or more original Latin versions of events, we may look for a word likely to have been used by Roman historians for the destruction of troops and leaders. Such words are to be found, used in the comparable form (abl.abs.) to correspond to the Greek gen.abs.; *deleto*, *perdito*, *defuncto*. While the last is commonly used of an individual's death, the first two are more ambiguous as to the extent of the 'destruction' or 'ruin'. Caesar reported that once many in his army thought that he and his force had been destroyed ('deleto exercitu et imperatore', *BG* 6.37). When being more specific he distinguished between 'killed', 'captured', and 'wounded' ('interfectis et captis'; 'interfectis et vulneratis', *passim*). A very interesting passage occurs in Sallust's *Jugurtha*, using another word, *amissis* ('lost', from *amittere*). The king has lost his friends through having killed them off or having them defect to the Romans and to King Bocchus ('amissis amicis', *Jug.* 74). All lost to him, but not all killed. This word *amissis* is a standard one for military losses, and the reference to 'lost in large part' ('magna parte amissa', Hirt., *BG* 8.43) is clearly a parallel to Cassius Dio's report of the loss of a large part of the Roman army in Arabia in 24 B.C., mentioned above, where the Greek φθαρῆναι is used. As Cassius Dio must have translated some Latin word into Greek to convey Togodumnus' fate, we may conclude that there is a strong chance that that word was *amisso*, and if that was the case, the original had less of a hint of 'death' in it than the Greek word chosen to translate it. Thus our understanding that Togdumnus was dead may hang on nothing more than an over-translation by one word with more definite connotations in Greek. We may then propose that Cassius Dio's Latin original had some such phrase as 'et Togodumno amisso' (60.21.1), and that this referred back to the defeat and flight (perhaps 'victi et fugati' for 60.20.1) of first one and then the other brother's forces.

The other brother-king, 'missing, presumed dead', from Cassius Dio's account, after his defeat and flight, is Caratacus. But we know from Tacitus that he survived to fight a famous guerilla-type war for a further eight or more years.[19] Here a curious word-echo occurs in Tacitus' tale

[17] 39.53; 40.1–4 (Julius Caesar); 49.38.2; 53.22.5; 53.25.2 (Augustus' threat to invade or bluff); 59.25.2–3 (Caius' abortive moves); 62.1–12 (Boudica rebellion); 60.20.1–2 (fleet of Agricola, an exception, because of the existence of the *Agricola*); 72.16.2; 73.8–9 (the Antonines and Ulpius Marcellus); 75.5.4; 76.11.13; 15.1–2 (Septimius Severus).

[18] The only incident which appears in Cassius Dio purporting to take place in Britain in the years following the invasion is one involving Titus saving Vespasian's life in a British attack (61.30.1–2). But this probably did not take place in Britain at all. Even so it illustrates the tendency of Dio to follow the personal fortunes of emperors or future emperors.

[19] *Ann*. 12.33–8; 40. Tacitus generally does present the doings of mere governors in the provinces, and gives much more circumstantial detail — especially of Caratacus.

of Caratacus' eventual 'removal' from the scene of resistance in Britain. The word *amoveo* ('move away', 'take out', 'make disappear') is used to describe Caratacus' removal to Rome after his capture, after which the Britons 'through sympathy for so great a king, burned all the more fiercely to avenge his removal' ('amoto Carataco miseratione tanti regis acrius ad ultionem exarsere' (12.38)). The whole sentence closely recalls the later Greek text of Cassius Dio, which relates the, chronologically earlier, loss/demise of Togodumnus.[20] At the very least we may suspect some conventional use of terms and ideas among the Latin historians who acted as the sources of Tacitus and Cassius Dio. The reactions of the Britons are presented in a remarkably similar way; only from the much more circumstantial account in Tacitus can we see that they were infuriated not by a death, but by a Roman-engineered 'disappearance' of the whole Caratacus family (*Ann*. 12.35–6). If Togodumnus and Caratacus were said to be *amissus* in the initial battles by the historians in the early Latin tradition, then we may understand how a much later historian, writing in Greek, could have come to the conclusion that both kings had made their exit at the time of the invasion. But it is quite certain that one had not, and possible that neither had.

THE FATE OR FUTURE OF TOGODUMNUS

If Togodumnus survived the battles of A.D. 43, even though his part in the resistance did not, it may well be that he had a future under the Romans. Imperial policy routinely gave defeated kings a second chance, playing a diminished role in their reduced kingdom or transferred to a nearby region. Examples of the former treatment were Mithridates VI, Eupator, 'the Great', after his first war with Rome, and of the second, Juba of Mauretania, installed there from nearby Numidia. Most striking is Decebalus, king of the Dacians, who was allowed to keep his kingdom after his first war with Rome, A.D. 101–2 (Cass. Dio 68.9.5–7, epitome of Xiphilinus).[21] If Togodumnus proved more compliant with the Roman presence than his brother did after their first defeat, there was every chance that he would be used by them in the political settlement imposed by Claudius. The emperor was in fact just the man to follow the spirit of Rome's mission laid out in Vergil's *Aeneid*, 'to spare those subjected and war down the proud'. He himself argued in the Senate for citizenship to be offered to former enemies (Tac., *Ann*. 11.24). Togodumnus might, for instance, have been one of the British chiefs (left nameless) who were taken as offering their submission (*ILS* 217).

There is such a compliant royal figure in Britain who has been known to us all along, but in a form of disguise. This is the Cogidumnus of Tacitus (*Agricola* 14), also the Cogidubnus of the inscription from Chichester (*RIB* I^2, 91). In the *Agricola* he is said to have had several *civitates* (tribal areas) given to him as king ('Cogidumno regi donatae') at some date soon after the invasion. There has been some debate as to whether he was a king already among the Britons or was made one at the point where he was set over the *civitates*. However, it seems most in tune with Roman policy to use an existing king, if one was available, and this scenario might fit best with the following statement of Tacitus that Cogidumnus was an excellent example of the

[20] 'The Britons … banded themselves together all the more to avenge him…' This would bring to an end the sequence of events — defeat of Caratacus, defeat of Togodumnus, and flight of both, i.e. their loss to the British cause. The theme of the British desire for revenge, found in the Latin historians, may have led to Cassius Dio's presentation of Togodumnus as 'dead', and to his presumption that Caratacus was as well. However, other provocations than the death of one's leader could arouse this desire for revenge.

[21] For the retention of Mithridates in his (reduced) kingdom (Hind 1994, 161–4); Polemo was moved around into the Bosporus, and Cotys in the same direction from Thrace (Sands 1908, 141–5). Also Juba II was given neighbouring Mauretania in compensation for the loss of his ancestral kingdom of Numidia in 25 B.C.

way the Romans used even kings as instruments of their power. In the inscription Cogidubnus is given the *nomina* of a Roman citizen, and, according to the most acceptable restoration of a partly erased section, he was called 'Great King' in Britain.[22]

Cogidumnus/Cogidubnus is seen to be one individual under the same name, operating in the years soon after the invasion, and in the south-central part of Britain. His client kingdom is usually believed to have been based in Chichester, but perhaps also embraced Winchester, Silchester, and parts of Gloucestershire/Somerset around Cirencester and Bath — so including the Regini, Atrebates, Belgae, and Dobunni. We may now go further than this and suggest that our Togodumnus, son of Cunobelinus, is none other than Cogidumnus/Cogidubnus.[23] The fact is that neither the name in Tacitus' text nor that presented in the inscription is secure beyond challenge. Indeed it has recently become accepted that the name in Tacitus' *Agricola* should be read Togidumnus, and, if so, that in the inscription should read Togidubnus, since the first two letters are missing and have been restored to agree with the name of the king according to Tacitus.[24] This is confirmed by the observation that the name-forming element *Togi–* is frequently found in Gaul, whereas *Cogi–* is found hardly at all (e.g. in the obviously Latinised names, *Cogitatus*, *Cogitatinius*).[25] Perhaps the name was changed in the text of the *Agricola*, because *cog–* seemed more familiar than *tog–* to a copyist in Latin.

Togodumnus in the narrative of Cassius Dio bears what is undoubtedly the same Celtic name, the second 'o' appearing after the 'g' by assimilation to the first vowel, because Greek abounds in the sound combination *ogo* (as in *logo*). The name is the same, the place (Britain) and the date (in or soon after A.D. 43) the same, and in both cases they were kings. Considerations of historical economy would suggest that they were the same individual. If we had not falsely 'known' that Togodumnus was 'dead', and if we had known that Tacitus' *Agricola* was falsely presenting the king as Cogidumnus, this identity would have been suggested long ago.

When the character, origin, and role of Cogidumnus have been discussed, two, not mutually exclusive, suggestions have been put forward: that he was a junior member of the Atrebates royal dynasty (a younger relative of Berikos/Verica), or that he was a scion of some noble family in Gaul (from the Atrebates on the Continent), who had been brought up in Rome to appreciate things Roman.[26] Either of these is possible, but pure speculation. A third possibility actually has some basis for its construction. The name Togodumnus is the same as Togidumnus/bnus. The king, son of Cunobelinus, has prematurely been written off as dead on the strength of one word, dubiously derived, in the text of Cassius Dio. It was Roman practice to employ defeated, but compliant, kings to rule their own states or neighbouring ones as 'friendlies' (*reges et amici)*. Cunobelinus, the father of Togodumnus, was referred to by Roman writers as 'king of the Britons', and Caligula chose to claim the submission of Britain when another brother, Adminius, fled to him (Suet., *Cal*. 44.2). Cassius Dio too refers to the sons of Cunobelinus as overlords of other tribes (60.20.1). Tacitus also makes the same comment about the greatness of Caratacus as heroic war-leader nearly nine years later; his vassal chiefs and the victories to his name are referred to, raising him far above other British kings. The Britons too are said to have been inflamed at the fate of 'so great a king' (*Ann.* 12.36; 38). If the inscription dedicated for Togidubnus in Chichester is correctly read as giving him the title REG MAG IN BRIT ('Great King in Britain'), as is now generally agreed, then it is easier to see this applied to a newly

22 Bogaers 1979, 243–54; Barrett 1979, 227–42; Braund 1984, 39–40; *RIB* 1^2 91; Frere 1999, 55.

23 Russell 2006, 41–3, comes to this conclusion independently.

24 Murgia 1977, 330; Henig 2002, 27–62; Birley 2005, Appendix, 466–8; Coates 2005, 359–66.

25 Holder, 1896 *sv* Togi–. Barrett (1979, 228 n. 5) had already stated that he only adhered to Cogidumnus 'by convention'.

26 Frere 1999, 55. The view that Togidumnus was from the royal family of the Atrebates is put boldly, even in part fictionally, by Henig 2002, 22; 37–8; 47–67. It is followed also, though more guardedly, by Manley 2002, 65.

reconciled son of Cunobelinus than to a lesser member of the Atrebates dynasty or to a chieftain from Gaul, who had no previous importance in Britain. The emperor Claudius, and the king's subjects in his region around Chichester, can be seen to be recognising a certain pre-eminence in Britain of the Catuvellaunian king, reduced though he now was to client status.

There remains the fact that Tacitus in the *Agricola* mentions only Togidumnus, and in the *Annals* traces the career only of Caratacus. In the first work he has his sights solely on the collaboration of the one king with Roman rule; in the other he tells of the other's dogged resistance to Rome, winning the respect of the emperor. In neither case does he make a reference to the one king taking the opposite stance to the other, even though they were contemporaries active in the same province. As he does not point up their contrasting roles, we need not be surprised that he has no hint that they were brothers. After all, he introduces Caratacus purely as the greatest war-leader among the Britons, with not a word about his father being Cunobelinus (*Ann.* 12.33). It seems that Tacitus had not picked up from his sources that Togidumnus and Caratacus were brothers, nor that they both descended from the Catuvellaunian dynasty.

One further thing to note is that the activities of these two brothers, after the death of Cunobelinus and before the Roman invasion, are usually thought to have been directed against the south-coast kingdom (Atrebates), and towards subjugation of the Bodunnoi (Dobunni of Gloucestershire). Some scholars have supposed that Caratacus may have based himself in this conquered region, perhaps at Silchester.[27] Berikos/Verica, the exile and professed cause of the Roman invasion, came from the area, and probably sailed to Roman territory from the Selsey Bill coastal township. During the actual crossing the Roman fleet was making for the 'West', when held back (by tides?) but then, heartened by a shooting star in that direction, they succeeded in making that destination (60.19.4). All these details, some derived from Cassius Dio, some from coin finds of the British tribes, and some from archaeological study of British oppida and defensive earthworks, combine to suggest that the Roman invasion of Plautius was designed to secure the Southern Kingdom of Britain (the Atrebates in the *maritima pars* of the island). Place-names, listed in Ptolemy's *Geography* and in the *Antonine Itinerary*, and certain topographical descriptions in Cassius Dio's narrative reinforce this impression.

TOPONYMS AND DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA IN THE ROMAN WRITERS

A number of place-names in Ptolemy and in the *Antonine Itinerary*, when set alongside the description of the campaign of A. Plautius given by Cassius Dio, seem to me to give pointers to the direction chosen by him for the invasion. These toponyms were referred to in my earlier article, but interspersed in the rest of the argument. For this reason, perhaps, their significance has been under-played, so it is worthwhile considering them together, and with some additional points in support.

The first place is 'Great Harbour' (*Magnus Portus/Megas Limen*, Ptolemy, *Geogr.* 2.3.3).[28] This is thought to have been one of the harbours behind and to the east of the Isle of Wight. Uniquely described as 'Great' among the coastal features of Britain, it might have been such a harbour as would attract an invasion fleet. In fact there is a string of large harbours on this coast, including Southampton Water, Portsmouth, Havant, Chichester, Bosham and Fishbourne. That at Fishbourne may have been relatively small, though used early. That overlooked by Portchester

[27] Frere 1999, 35; Boon 1974, 173–210; Frere and Fulford 2001, 44; Manley 2002, 90–1. Finds of the relatively few known silver coins of Caratacus are from the Surrey area, south of the Thames — at Wanborough and in the Guildford area (Hobbs 1996, 143).

[28] Rivet and Smith 1979, 136; 408.



FIG. 1. Map showing proposed stages of Plautius' campaign.
(Drawn by H. Buglass)

(Late Roman Saxon-Shore fort), named *Portus Adurni* in the *Notitia Dignitatum*,[29] might be the *Megas Limen* of Ptolemy, a haven very suited to a large fleet even in modern times.

A little to the east of *Megas Limen* the geographer places his only river on this coast between the Isle of Wight and the eastern tip of Kent. This river is *Trisanto*, the present River Arun, the former (Celtic) name of which was Tarrant.[30] The name is the same as that of the Trent; *Trisanto* meant 'the much flooding river'.[31] The Arun, no less than the Trent, answers well to this meaning. It is the largest river in Sussex, has the broadest flood-plain, and at Pulborough, just below its confluence with the River Rother, which flows into it from the west, it is notoriously prone to flooding. Defences against summer inundation of the low-lying ground were repeatedly renewed during the 1960s, but reported ineffective down to 1978. Most recently the valley at Pulborough still filled up alarmingly in January 2003.[32] This river, then, is well qualified to be the first river in Cassius Dio, which the Britons thought would be impassable without a bridge, but which the

29 ibid., 219; 441–2.
30 ibid., 136; 442.
31 ibid.
32 Cunliffe 1973, 4; *Sussex Environment* 1983, 74; *The Guardian* 2 Jan. 2003. This notable susceptibility to floods of the River Arun, which is crossed by the eventual Roman road from Chichester to London, serves to counter the statement that it is 'unsuitable' to be considered Cassius Dio's first river. Nor can it be said to be too close to the landing point of Plautius' army (Frere and Fulford 2001, 52–3), since the battle there can be seen to be the first military engagement of the campaign after leaving the coast.

Batavians could cross without difficulty, being used to the 'strongest currents'. The Arun is said to have, after the Severn, the fastest flowing current of any river in England. Seen in this light, it would be quite as much an obstacle as the Medway on the route from Richborough,[33] and its crossing would indeed be on an up-country route to the Thames as Cassius Dio presents it, not close by the Thames estuary itself, as the presumed crossing of the Medway is situated. The Arun, the 'Flooding River', may have found its way into Ptolemy's *Geography* as the only river in south-east Britain precisely because it was remembered as the first significant barrier before the Thames. At a slightly later date, when Roman Chichester and London were being developed (*c.* A.D. 45–50), the road known as Stane Street was constructed; following first a north-easterly and then north-north-easterly direction to the Thames and London, it crossed the Arun marshes, probably by causeways, and reached the high ground to the north at Pulborough.[34] Here may have been the ground chosen by the Britons, behind the first river, which they 'guarded carelessly'. How they came there we are not told, but they may have retreated from the coastal area after the Romans landed or they may have come in from the west along the South Downs to take up this position.[35] Either way, their intention may have been to draw the Roman advance up towards the Thames via the barrier formed by this river (Arun and Rother confluence) and on by the difficult clay-based country of the western part of the Weald. Such a route might be designed to keep the Roman army away from the major British centres at Winchester and Silchester, and from the road to the crossing of the Thames at Staines, where there may have already been a bridge in place before the invasion (see below). The route leading directly from the south coast to the Thames via the South Downs, Weald, and North Downs would have given the Roman army the prospect of a 56-mile march compared with one of over 70, if the army was to reach the London stretch of the Thames from East Kent after a landing at Richborough.

The existence of the Weald forest on the central leg of the route from Chichester to London (later Stane Street) has been made by some scholars into a major obstacle in the way of accepting a Roman advance by this route from the coast. However, there are a number of arguments against the objection. Firstly, this was not the 'High Weald' of East Sussex and West Kent, between London and Brighton, where early nineteenth-century travellers would bewail the rigours of the journey.[36] Some trackways certainly existed across the Weald in Roman times, as well as engineered roads from the coast to the Thames, of which Stane Street is said to have been the earliest;[37] also Ptolemy seems to place London directly north of Chichester (though it is north-north-east), perhaps influenced by the existence of the linking road, Stane Street.[38] Then it is reasonable to suppose, as has been suggested above, that the Britons deliberately chose some difficult woodland to retreat through; Cassius Dio says it was part of their general strategy to make themselves hard to find in woods and marshes (60.19.5). Lastly, it seems unlikely that a Roman army, fresh from a victory on the first river, would be deterred from following up

[33] This was the observation of Manley, when looking at the supposed crossing-points of the two rivers, Arun and Medway (Manley 2002, 141). There are warnings of the speed of the river-flow at Pulborough. For its comparison with the Severn see Harrison 2004, 29.

[34] *VCH Sussex* III (1935), 38–9 (SE Winbolt); Margary 1967, 66.

[35] Frere and Fulford (2001, 53) raise a scenario that is a *reductio ad absurdum*. The Britons would not have to reach the Arun from the east, but from the west and north-west, or possibly fall back on it from the south-west. Plautius would be approaching from the south-west (the coast), not making for the inexplicable east, but to cross the Arun, making northwards for the Thames. For the road-system between Hardham and Pulborough and the Arun crossing see Cunliffe 1973, 69 fig. 21.

[36] Woodcock, 1967, 163; Bird 2000, 95; Frere and Fulford 2001, 53; Manley, 2002, 91.

[37] Margary 1948; 1967, 64–7; Jones and Mattingly 1990, 192–3; Gardiner 1990, 33–53; Frere and Fulford 2001, 54; Manley 2002, 131, 133, 137–8; Manley 2003, 290–8; Brandon 2003, 38–9, 178–80.

[38] Rivet and Smith 1979, 115, 117; Davies 1998, 2 and n. 9; 3 fig. 1; 8. Davies suggests that what was operative in the alignment chosen for Stane Street was the need to find a route across the South Downs. He has nothing to say of the Weald and its difficulties.

a defeated enemy by the prospect of one or two days march to the Thames, even if forest lay before them for part of the way. We may consider in this regard the Roman record in Germany. The disaster to Varus' army in A.D. 9 is often remarked upon, but subsequent Roman successes occurred in A.D. 14, 15 and 49. Armies traversed the *Caesia silva* across the Rhine, and the *Saltus Teutoburgiensis*, between the Rivers Ems and Weser several times. They were not averse to using by-ways, and they even penetrated 'trackless regions' immediately after viewing the depressing sight of the place where Varus was defeated. On one occasion the famous German king, Arminius, used a side-route to outmanoeuvre the Roman column, but the Romans still won a victory. Several generals of Tiberius and Claudius operated in the great German forests to considerable effect (Tac., *Ann*.1.50; 61–3; 12.28). Only two years before the invasion of Britain, a general of Claudius, Gabinius, had won a decisive victory over the German Chauci, who lived by the Ocean stream (Cass. Dio 60.8.5). There seems no reason to think that Plautius could not have used his legionaries to clear a preliminary way through a part of the Weald in the fashion of Caecina and Germanicus in the German forests in A.D. 14/15 ('obstantia silvarum amoliri' *Ann.* 1.50: 'to clear away the part of the woods that stood in the way'; 'cedentem in avia secutus', 1.63: 'following him as he retreated into trackless places').

The next topographical clue is that the Roman army, following up their victory on the first river, came upon the River Thames 'at a point where it enters the Ocean and, at full-tide, forms a lake' (60.20.5). This could hardly have been further upstream than the future site of London; it has been suggested that it might be the area around the present Pool of London,[39] but in theory it could be anywhere in the lower Thames reaches subject to tidal flooding.[40] If the approach was from the south coast and Chichester, then the Southwark area of London would be the natural part of the Thames to arrive at first. It may be noted here that, if the army had followed the Britons to the Thames from Richborough, they would have been following first the Ocean, then the Thames estuary, and finally the Lower Thames itself at a distance of no more than a few miles, looking for a convenient ford. In fact, Cassius Dio says that they followed the Britons in retreat, and came across the Thames at a tidal reach, implying that it was a surprise and an inconvenience to meet the river as they found it. This seems to fit a march inland from Sussex better than one from a landing at Richborough where Plautius' scouts would have informed him that the sea, estuary, and river lay on his right flank from Faversham at the latest, and long before the Medway.[41]

The Keltoi (Batavians) swam across the River Thames, as they had done across the first river, and others crossed by a bridge a little way upstream (60.20.6). They then combined to attack the Britons from two sides and defeated them. It was perhaps now that Togodumnus was defeated (north of the Thames defending his kingdom), and fled. Later it became clear that he was 'out of the picture' as a main opponent of the invasion-force, but probably exaggeratedly pronounced 'dead' by the Greek historian. A final place-name becomes relevant here. About twelve miles upstream from London, on the north bank of the Thames opposite Egham and Richmond is Staines, a place named *Pontibus* 'At the Bridges' (*Ant. Itin. VII*. 478.4).[42] This name suggests

[39] Merrifield 1965, 33. But there are difficulties in determining how far up the Thames the tide would have reached in Roman times, and where a tidal lake might have formed.

[40] Cassius Dio suggests that there were places where the river could be crossed, but perhaps not obvious fords, for the Romans were not able to find the 'firm and easy passages' (60.20.5–6).

[41] Reports of a possible early ford much lower down the Thames (near Tilbury) have appeared (Thornhill 1976, 119–28; Hutchins 1988, 289–90). Frere and Fulford (2001, 48) propose that this may have been used in A.D. 43. But the Romans did not find a ford; and where was the bridge 'a little way upstream'?

[42] Rivet and Smith 1979, 166, 441. Cassius Dio must surely be referring to a pre-existing bridge over the Thames not to a military pontoon. Only a short while before the Britons had trusted in the fact that no such bridge existed over the first river (60.20.2). For the suggestion that a pontoon bridge may have been constructed by Roman engineers across the Thames see Webster 1980, 102.

that a bridge across the Thames may have already existed here, for the crossing at Staines lay on the main route between Silchester and Colchester, two oppida of major importance to the British dynasties south and north of the Thames.

The Greek phrase used by Cassius Dio, to refer to 'the bridge upstream' is διὰ γεφύρας 'by a bridge' (probably singular 'bridge', since ἄνευ γεφύρας, 'without a bridge', is certainly singular (60.20.2)). However, this singular form is not really a problem, as it is normally used so in Greek. It seems highly unlikely that there would be one bridge across the Thames not far upstream of the tidal-pool reach and another quite different bridge in the same area later, under the name *Pontes*, clearly connecting several pre-Roman centres of power (oppida). Probably a portion of Plautius' army marched round to the Silchester route to the Thames (via Guildford and Bagshot?) and so used the Staines crossing.

At this stage Plautius' army was clearly divided, with a group or groups beyond the Thames, fighting and beating Togodumnus' men, then hearing of his flight and 'elimination'. The army south of the Thames was free to support and garrison a part of the Bodunnoi/Dobunni, as we have seen, and move on. But after some losses in the marshes (of the Colne and Lea?), Plautius halted and waited for Claudius. His separate, advance, mission was accomplished.

The second, reinforcing, army of Claudius was destined to cross the Thames in style, defeat the British remnants decisively, and hold a 'durbar' of defeated chieftains at *Camulodunum* (or at the alternative site *Caesaromagus*/Chelmsford?). Claudius had reserved for himself the annexation of part of southern Britain and, in all probability, the conferment of the kingship of the other part on Togidumnus. Only the emperor could make such long-term arrangements for the island. This has implications for the strategy suggested recently for A. Plautius' strike-force. He must, it has been argued, have aimed to strike first at the Catuvellaunian brothers and only later to restore Verica to his kingdom.[43] But a landing in Kent or in Sussex would have had the same effect from his point of view — to draw Caratacus and Togodumnus out south of the Thames, fighting in defence of their dependent peoples, and to defeat them thoroughly in that *maritima pars* of Britain. It is true that the future client-kingdom would be occupied in the process, but also true that the Catuvellaunian kingdom itself was reserved for Claudius' arrival. The strategy was for Claudius himself to occupy their heartland — the territory of what the Romans were pleased to call the 'kings of Britain'. The actual handing over of the client-kingdom (its constituent *civitates*) may have been something done by Plautius, following Claudius' wishes, after the emperor had been and quickly gone again.[44] One cannot deduce the direction taken to enter the island (via Kent as opposed to West Sussex) by assuming that defeating the hostile kings took priority over restoring the exiled Verica. It may well have done, but the British High Kings were to be, and were in fact, induced to fight decisive battles first well outside their own territory, south of the Thames, and then by its northern bank.

The place-name evidence, and that from Cassius Dio concerning the topography, the tribes and

[43] Frere and Fulford 2001, 51. However, it may be noted that Roman sea-borne expeditions often made for a landing on the coast of allies or potential allies. Armies sent to north-east Spain repeatedly landed at Emporiae (Livy 21.60.1; 26.19.9; 34.8.3–7) in 218, 211 and 195 B.C. Scipio Africanus landed at Utica, when directing himself against Carthage (Livy 30.10.3).

[44] According to Suetonius (*Div. Claudius* 17) the emperor spent only a very few days in Britain; Cassius Dio gives the more precise figure of 16 days (60.23.1). These days must have seen his 'victory without loss' north of the Thames and the submission of a number of chieftains. One question which has not been touched on in the text is the role of Sentius Saturninus, who is said by Eutropius (*Brev*. 7.13) to have defeated Britain along with A. Plautius — 'eaque devicta per Sentium et A. Plautium' (Birley 1981, 360–1; Black 2000, 1–10). One wonders whether he led a portion of Claudius' force as *legatus* (with *imperium*), not as a mere *comes*. He might have organised the victory north of the Thames for Claudius, and so could have been thought to have won Britain for him. He need not have headed some portion of A. Plautius' earlier force. Indeed later in the same passage Eutropius mentions only A. Plautius and his many deeds.

individuals involved, seems to suggest that the invasion took place into the south-central part of Britain rather than its eastern tip. The alternative reading of Cassius Dio, suggested above, hardly touches the Greek text at all, but, in proposing that the initial defeats of Caratacus and Togodumnus are preliminary references to the later British defeats on the two rivers, it somewhat clears the course of a congested campaign. It also tends to show that Togodumnus, just like Caratacus, may have had a future — one, contrasting with his brother, as a collaborator; for we may take the report of his death in Cassius Dio's Greek translation to be somewhat exaggerated. Where activity of the brothers is attested south of the Thames it is concentrated in the area around Silchester, and Chichester, and in Gloucestershire, occupied by part of the Bodunnoi (Cirencester?).[45] One might well expect that Caratacus and Togodumnus would seek to defend their recent gains (made at the expense of the Atrebates) somewhere in this south-central region, just as Plautius' aim may have been to get them to fight there, where they could not depend on the total loyalty of the local Britons.

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[45] My own earlier suggestion (Hind 1989, 16) that a flying column sent by Plautius may have reached the Dobunni and Cirencester is rendered unnecessary by this new perception of how Cassius Dio structures his account. Frere and Fulford (2001, 51) rightly point out that Dio does not hint at so early a division of the army; also Bird 2000, 94. In a later article Bird places the 'garrison' in the same region, though not nearly so far west as I do — at Silchester (2002, 259). However, according to Ptolemy, Silchester was in the territory of the Atrebates, not the Bodunnoi/Dobunni.

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