

sector, and it pursued a path of commercialization based on SOEs, largely eschewing privatization in the face of popular resistance. Consequently, Pitcher's analysis of "reforms" in South Africa concentrates on public-sector enterprises and the opportunities they offer for the development of the black middle class through Black Economic Empowerment initiatives. Ultimately, the South Africa case says more about the party politics side of Pitcher's thesis—and the tradeoffs parties make between rules and discretion—than the economic reforms and institutions side of her argument. Overall, I found her take on South Africa to be perhaps a bit too charitable, although the narrative makes for compelling reading.

*Party Politics and Economic Reform in Africa's Democracies* makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of both parties and reform by placing these issues in a rich comparative context. Undergraduates in advanced seminars will find the book accessible. Its primary audience will be graduate students, scholars, and practitioners interested in the intersection between Africa's evolving democratic and party processes, and how party states enact (or fail to enact) crucial economic reforms such as privatization to build or reconstruct constituencies and states alike.

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**Joseph Hanlon, Jeanette Manjengwa, and Teresa Smart. *Zimbabwe Takes Back Its Land*.** Sterling, Va.: Kumarian Press, 2013. ix + 245 pp. Maps. Illustrations. Abbreviations. Acronyms. Notes. Bibliography. Index. \$26.95. Paper.

"To make an omelet, one needs to break some eggs": so might a battle-tested observer summarize and justify the land seizures that began in 2000 in Zimbabwe, although the earliest assessments of these episodes cast doubt on the quality of the omelet. With varying degrees of violence, gangs and paragonovernmental bands harassed and ejected white commercial farmers from the land. They did worse to farmworkers, killing many and immiserating many more. The turmoil undermined tobacco production and tourism, wrecking the entire economy by the mid-2000s. Against this dire picture, recent works by Prosper Matondi and Ian Scoones, among others, suggest a more positive, but still incomplete outcome—scrambled eggs, if you accept the metaphor.

Joseph Hanlon, Jeanette Manjengwa, and Teresa Smart outdo these authors by declaring that land reform created a large class of productive black farmers—that the omelet is finished. If this conclusion is true, then the three authors provide a useful corrective. The middle-scale and small-scale resettled farmers have returned the land to its 1990s level of productivity.

More people inhabit the former commercial farms than in the past, and, on average, they seem to live better. (Manjengwa herself owns a new farm.) The dollarization of Zimbabwe's economy—which occurred as Matondi and Scoones were publishing their works—has facilitated further investment and trade. Elites have benefited disproportionately, the authors admit, but this inequality follows inevitably from a two-tier approach to resettlement. Perhaps, as the authors argue, it is time to look forward, rather than back. After all, the major political actors have declared resettlement irreversible. Surely, carping from the sidelines about violence and property rights—especially when they pertain to whites—helps neither development nor reconciliation.

I hesitate to endorse this deliberate forgetting—but not because I wish to restore land to whites. Achieving “closure” and “moving on” from the drama of the 2000s does not help scholars or activists to harvest the most useful lessons from Zimbabwe's land reform. One needs to know not only that many, many Zimbabweans benefited, but also that these and other Zimbabweans also bore certain costs. How high were those costs? Hanlon and his co-authors hardly say. They do mention that two million citizens—a low estimate—left the country, mostly to South Africa. Imagine a similar program of white-to-black land redistribution in South Africa! If Pretoria were to follow Harare's timing and proportions, occupations would start next year and ultimately eject almost nine million refugees into surrounding countries. Has Zimbabwe's land reform succeeded well enough to serve as a model for its close neighbor? If Mugabe's land reform indeed worked so well, is it not worth replicating elsewhere? Because of its Panglossian premise, *Zimbabwe Takes Back Its Land* implies a positive answer to that question, one that readers should interrogate vigorously.

To do so here and briefly, I would suggest that the authors overlook the entire question of power in Zimbabwe's land reform. To dislodge the whites, the sometimes overbearing Zimbabwean state transformed itself into a full-blown dictatorship, repressing dissent with every means available. The authors suggest a false equation in which pro- and anti-government “conflict entrepreneurs” (quoting Sam Moyo) provoked each other (213). Elsewhere, the authors blame victims outright. They admit that farmworkers have not benefited, by and large, from land reform, but the farmworkers union itself—having opposed land reform and then made friends with international donors—seemingly bears responsibility for this outcome. The authors seem to recommend and expect submission before Mugabe. They fault white farm-owners for “stealing” irrigation equipment and thereby undermining the success of resettled farmers. Such a judgment misconstrues the confusion of the early 2000s. Whites—occupied, harassed, beaten up—moved and sold whatever they could. Until the government legalized the seizures in 2002, whites were *stolen from*, not stealing. Land reform, then, criminalized the state and brutalized the population. Even if the balance has been restored—which is by no means certain—this cost matters. Should South Africa undertake what Zimbabwe has survived? Perhaps it should, but its leaders should do so knowingly.

Notwithstanding the shortcomings of *Zimbabwe Takes Back Its Land* in its examination of such far-reaching political matters, the book does present useful data on resettled farmers. The authors conducted research in Mazowe District as it experienced dollarization. They also rely heavily on the excellent field work of Matondi and Scoones, as well as Sam Moyo, Nelson Marongwe, Angus Selby, and numerous field collaborators. The passages on contract farming, irrigation, and women's land rights are quite illuminative. Still, the emphasis on outcomes leaves out some detail. To what extent are resettled farmers—lacking the equipment for pumping water—now practicing gravity-fed irrigation? Are they maintaining dam walls, for instance, by preventing cattle from grazing on them? Finally, what is the quality of the tobacco being produced by resettled farmers, and how fair are the contracts under which they are selling it? By opening up space for these questions, *Zimbabwe Takes Back Its Land* contributes usefully to renewed scholarship on Zimbabwean agriculture.

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**Wale Adebawo. *Authority Stealing: Anti-Corruption War and Democratic Politics in Post-Military Nigeria*.** Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2012. xxxi + 450 pp. Notes. Index. \$55.00. Paper.

In *Authority Stealing*, Wale Adebawo details the struggles and (limited) successes of Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) under its founding chairman, Nuhu Ribadu (2003–7). The EFCC was created by an Act of Parliament at the behest of President Olusegun Obasanjo, soon after Nigeria's transition from military rule in 1999. While its establishment signaled a new commitment to fight corruption, Adebawo shows how from the start the EFCC was pitted against the political elite that created it. Separate chapters of the book deal with the EFCC's campaigns against "419" fraudsters, Nigeria's powerful governors, members of Parliament, the head of the Nigerian police, the vice president (and other would-be presidential candidates), and private bank officials. The central argument of the book is that Ribadu, driven by personal courage, commitment, and nationalism, took on the corrupt Nigerian elite in a contemporary reenactment of the David and Goliath struggle, winning several early battles but eventually losing the war as he was removed from his position by Obasanjo's successor, President Umaru Yar'Adua, in the interest of protecting the guilty. Adebawo concludes that absent "fundamental restructuring of state and society," the problem of corruption will remain unsolved, despite "the [critical] efforts of the Nuhu Ribadus of Nigeria" (396).