Holidays in Kazan: The Public Sphere and the Politics of Religious Authority among Tatars in 1914

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> O ye who believe! When the call to prayer is proclaimed on the Day of Assembly, hasten earnestly to the Remembrance of Allah and leave off business: that is best for you if ye but knew! And when the prayer is finished, then may ye disperse through the land and seek of the Bounty of Allah: and celebrate the Praises of Allah often: that ye may prosper.
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> —*Qur'ân* 62: 9–10.

"Strife among nations began in our Russia today," alerted Hâdî Maqsûdî (1868–1941), chief editor of the Tatar-language paper *Yûlduz*. On Friday, 28 May 1910, nearly 2,000 people assembled at the Merchants' Club in Kazan to protest against the State Duma's decision to "replace Muslim holidays with Christian ones." State deputy Sadr al-Dîn Maqsûdî (1879–1957), Hâdî's brother, explained what had happened in St. Petersburg to the angry gathering. Chairman Ahmadjân Saidâshif (1840–1912), first-guild merchant and owner of another local paper *Bayân al-Haqq*, asserted, "this law . . . does not meddle so much with our economic interest as with our religious feelings." His claim was echoed by representatives of Tatar shop assistants (*prikazchiki*). One Tayyib mullah pointed out to the audience the contradiction between the State Duma's vote against the Qur'anic imperative of the Day of Assembly, that is, Friday, and the terms of the October Manifesto of 1905 proclaiming freedom of conscience. In the end, the meeting resolved to solicit support from the chair (*muftî*) of the Spiritual Assembly in Ufa, the regional hub of Muslim-state interactions.[1] Three days later, those deputized by the meeting, featuring former and acting councilors of the city duma, sent a telegram to the State Duma chairman, Aleksandr Ivanovich Guchkov, with copies to the major Russian papers. They declared that if the State Duma's decision went unchanged, it would "invert our whole understanding of the Russians and the parliament, and

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1. *Yûlduz*, 30 May 1910, 3; *Bayân al-Haqq*, 30 May 1910, 2. On the Spiritual Assembly, see D. D. Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe sobranie v kontse XVIII–XIX vv.* (Ufa, 1999); Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006); D. Iu. Arapov, *Sistema gosudarstvennogo regulirovaniia islama v Rossiiskoi imperii (posledniaia tret' XVIII–nachalo XX vv.)* (Moscow, 2004); I. K. Zagidullin, *Islamskie instituty v Rossiiskoi imperii: Mecheti v evropeiskoi chasti Rossii i Sibiri* (Kazan, 2007).

immediately overturn the edifice of mutual trust and sympathy that had been erected by our ancestors."[2]

This meeting, unusually large for Petr Stolypin's era, demonstrates a compelling amalgamation of the long-standing manner of petitioning the imperial government and the public sphere that took shape after the 1905 Revolution. The Muslim population in the region had already invoked the state commitment to religious tolerance and the mufti's authority, with the pressure of the Great Reforms undermining their administrative separateness. There, Saidâshif had begun to play a mobilizing role.[3] The novelty after 1905 was that a wide range of local Tatar leaders were allowed to sit alongside religious scholars (*'ulamâ'*) and make their voices heard. Symbolically, the massive political meeting described above was convened at the Merchants' Club, one of the city's voluntary associations.[4] By announcing the meeting in their own newspapers, Saidâshif as well as Hâdî Maqsûdî, a Jadid (religious reformist), transformed it into an even larger event for many thousands more. Tatar representatives of the state and city dumas worked as mediators between local Muslims and the parliament and challenged the latter's decision based on the historically pledged imperial practice of religious tolerance.

This episode menacingly fit the apprehensions of the Stolypin government concerning what was happening throughout the empire: although the confessional state had stabilized imperial rule, equipping each religion with official recognition and an overseer, non-Russians now appropriated this structure to underpin their own nationalist claims to the detriment of the Orthodox, adducing the reaffirmation of religious tolerance in 1905.[5] The authorities elaborated repressive measures to tackle the Polish, Jewish, Muslim, and other "alien questions" (*inorodcheskie voprosy*), relating them to the task of restructuring the empire's confessional administration.[6] In fact, the Muslim leaders in the Volga-Urals region regarded the

2. *Bayân al-Haqq,* 1 June 1910, 2; *Yûlduz,* 1 June 1910, 1 and 6 June 1910, 4. Copies of the telegram were sent to *Rossiia, Novoe vremia, Rech'.*

3. R. R. Salikhov, *Tatarskaia burzhuaziia Kazani i natsional'nye reformy vtoroi poloviny XIX–nachala XX v.* (Kazan, 2001), 24–26. For more general information on the Muslim protests in the last decades of the nineteenth century, see James H. Meyer, "Turkic Worlds: Community Representation and Collective Identity in the Russian and Ottoman Empires, 1870–1914" (PhD diss., Brown University, 2007), chap. 2.

4. Lutz Häfner, "'Khram prazdnosti': Assotsiatsii i kluby gorodskikh elit v Rossii (na materialakh Kazani. 1860–1914 gg.)," in A. N. Zorin et al., eds., *Ocherki gorodskogo byta dorevoliutsionnogo Povolzh'ia* (Ul'ianovsk, 2000), 468–526.

5. On the confessional state, see Robert Crews, "Empire and the Confessional State: Islam and Religious Politics in Nineteenth-Century Russia," *American Historical Review* 108, no.1 (February 2003): 50–83.

6. Particularly striking is the parallel in rhetoric between the Polish and Muslim questions, associating the former with the Catholic threat and the latter with the Tatars' predominance in Islamic institutions in the Volga-Urals region. Theodore R. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914* (DeKalb, 1996), esp. 55–57, 180–82; Robert P. Geraci, *Window on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia* (Ithaca, 2001), 285–95; Paul W. Werth, *At the Margins of Orthodoxy: Mission, Governance, and Confessional Politics in Russia's Volga-Kama Region, 1827–1905* (Ithaca, 2002), 245–54; Werth, "Arbiters

reform of the Spiritual Assembly as buttressing the unity of the nation (*millat*).[7] In January 1914 at the Oriental Club, the most energetic Tatar cultural center in Kazan, Sadr al-Dîn Maqsûdî, now acting city councilor, gave a lecture on the reform of the empire's Muslim administration before 500 people. He asserted that the religious institutions should serve as "a legal framework for the development of the nation [*tarqiyât-i milliyya ûchûn qânûnî râmkalar*]."[8]

Robert Crews forcefully argues for the centrality of the tsarist state within Muslim communities in defining Islamic orthodoxy even after 1905.[9] I believe, though, that something different was happening in Kazan in this period, that an important shift in the location of Islam "from being part of the state to being part of a newly emerging public sphere" was occurring.[10] The controversy over religious holidays provides a good vantage point from which to examine the ways and extent of the state's involvement in two different public spheres: the city duma and the Tatar press. In these two areas, local Tatar leaders articulated Islamic and national concerns through vigorous debates with their Russian counterparts as well as among their fellow believers.[11] The year 1914 witnessed the intriguing intersection of these two pivotal contentions, one concerning the sanctioning of Islamic holidays in the Russian-dominant city, and the other regarding the legitimate practice of holidays within Muslim society. In the first part of this article, I address the efforts of the Kazan city duma to arbitrate between Tatar and Russian traders in fixing the day of

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of the Free Conscience: State, Religion, and the Problem of Confessional Transfer after 1905," in Mark D. Steinberg and Heather J. Coleman, eds., *Sacred Stories: Religion and Spirituality in Modern Russia* (Bloomington, 2007), 179–99; Elena Campbell, "The Muslim Question in Late Imperial Russia," in Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev, eds., *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930* (Bloomington, 2007), 332–38.

7. Christian Noack, *Muslimischer Nationalismus im russischen Reich: Nationsbildung und Nationalbewegung bei Tataren und Baschkiren, 1861–1917* (Stuttgart, 2000), 220–25, 309–10. See also Noack, "State Policy and Its Impact on the Formation of a Muslim Identity in the Volga-Urals," in Stéphane A. Dudoignon and Hisao Komatsu, eds., *Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia: Early Eighteenth to Late Twentieth Centuries* (London, 2001), 3–26; Norihiro Naganawa, "Molding the Muslim Community through the Tsarist Administration: *Mahalla* under the Jurisdiction of the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly after 1905," *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 23 (2006): 101–23.

8. Natsional'nyi arkhiv Respubliki Tatarstan (NART), f. 199 (Kazanskoe gubernskoe zhandarmskoe upravlenie), op. 1, d. 948, l. 4. His lecture was later supplemented and published in the local Tatar newspaper. *Yûlduz*, 4 May 1914, 1–2; 18 May 1914, 2–3; and 23 May 1914, 2–4. On the Oriental Club, see Madina V. Goldberg, "Russian Empire—Tatar Theater: The Politics of Culture in Late Imperial Kazan" (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2009), chap. 4.

9. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar*, 332–46.

10. On the role of religion in creating the public sphere, see Peter van der Veer, *Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in India and Britain* (Princeton, 2001), 24; see also 22–24, 27–28, 33, 43–53.

11. For the methodology addressing the politicization of nation and Islam, see Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond 'Identity,'" *Theory and Society* 29 (2000): esp. 5, 19–21, 27–28, 30–33; Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, 2d ed. (Princeton, 2004).

rest for shop assistants.[12] In the second part, I analyze the politics that arose among Muslim intellectuals in the Tatar press over who had the religious authority to define the first day of the month for the common calendar. Failure to reach agreement would have had enormous practical implications, leading to disarray in urban Muslim life, as the city would have had two different Hegira calendars. This dispute was fought in two rounds—one over the Prophet's Birthday (Mawlid al-nabî) in January and the second over the month of Ramadan in the summer, overlapping the outbreak of World War I. By deliberating about the timing and the very meaning of Islamic holidays, local Tatar intellectuals argued in the Tatar press over which conduct was Islamic and which national.[13]

Still, this article confirms that religion-based collectivity with distinct rights, as an imperial way of thinking, was deeply ingrained in the Tatar councilors' and traders' parlance in and around the city duma. In the Russian empire, religion alongside estate (*soslovie*) was not merely a category of governance but the source of the subjects' request for the state's particular treatment.[14] This accounts for the Kazan Tatars' attempt to make the Spiritual Assembly in Ufa act as a conduit for their grievances to the Russian authorities. Meanwhile, with the introduction of the city duma in Kazan by the City Regulation of 1870, wealthy local Tatars began to share the nascent public sphere with their Russian counterparts, although article 35 of the law restricted non-Christian representation to one-third of the total seats: 12 Tatar councilors in 1875–78, 16 in 1879–82, and 20 in 1883–86. The counter-reform law in 1892 further curtailed the duma's leeway and Tatar representation. It obliged the duma to comply with the directives of the provincial governor and the Interior Ministry. Moreover, it did not allow the number of Tatar councilors to exceed 16, limiting non-Christian representation to one-fifth of the total seats.[15] The Tatars' political leverage increased after 1905, however. Now, they could rely on Muslim representatives in the State Duma to serve as negotiators with the central ministries. The Tatars' use of particular legal channels based on religion, such as the Spiritual Assembly in Ufa and Muslim Duma depu-

12. Kazan historians have examined this aspect of the holiday dispute, but they have only considered it a form of commercial competition, have unambiguously presumed Muslims' devotion to the observance of rituals, and have largely ignored the motivations of diverse actors in the dispute, most notably local mullahs as religious scholars. Salikhov, *Tatarskaia burzhuaziia,* 46–48; D. M. Usmanova, *Musul'manskie predstaviteli v rossiiskom parlamente, 1906–1916* (Kazan, 2005), 352–73; I. K. Zagidullin, *Musul'manskoe bogosluzhenie v uchrezhdeniiakh Rossiiskoi imperii: Evropeiskaiachast' Rossii i Sibir'* (Kazan, 2006), 254–62, 267–71; Svetlana Malysheva, "Ezhenedel'nye prazdniki, dni gospodskie i tsarskie: Vremia otdykha rossiiskogo gorozhanina vtoroi poloviny XIX–nachala XX vv.," *Ab Imperio,* no. 2 (2009): 225–66.

13. For a comparison, see Jewish intellectuals in Kiev contending for the authenticity of Jewishness, notably concerning the observance of religious holidays. Natan M. Meir, *Kiev, Jewish Metropolis: A History, 1859–1914* (Bloomington, 2010), 166–89.

14. On the estate, see Gregory L. Freeze, "The *Soslovie* (Estate) Paradigm and Russian Social History," *American Historical Review* 19, no. 1 (February 1986): esp. 25–34; Jane Burbank, "Thinking Like an Empire: Estate, Law, and Rights in the Early Twentieth Century," in Burbank, von Hagen, and Remnev, eds., *Russian Empire,* 196–217.

15. L. M. Sverdlova, *Na perekrestke torgovykh putei* (Kazan, 1991), 37; Salikhov, *Tatarskaia burzhuaziia,* 39–48.

ties in St. Petersburg, to empower their claims hampered the city duma's authority of arbitration.

The dispute over the calendar was not new. Before 1905, the sole authority on this matter had been the Spiritual Assembly; the local 'ulamâ' had contended for the entitlement accorded by the Spiritual Assembly to determine the beginnings of holidays.[16] What was new after 1905 was that the 'ulamâ' and other intellectuals began to participate in the public sphere through the Tatar press. In order to reinforce their statements, mullahs continued to bring such state institutions as the Spiritual Assembly and the police into this burgeoning public sphere. For Crews this means that the confessional state was still working effectively. This does not mean, however, that the Spiritual Assembly increased its ability to reinforce uniformity in the interpretation of Islamic law and the timing of prayers and holidays.[17] The monopoly of the Spiritual Assembly was undermined not only by the proliferation of those speaking for Islam and the community but also by a new public forum in the press, where even mullahs subordinate to Ufa openly debated the validity of the Spiritual Assembly's decisions in order to preserve their authoritative presence within local Muslim society.[18]

The Kazan Tatars were significantly distinct from other coreligionists in the empire in their use of a variety of new possibilities born of the Great Reforms and the 1905 Revolution.[19] Thanks to the Great Reforms, local self-government, both city dumas and zemstvos, became the most practical route for a Muslim minority in the region to negotiate with their Russian neighbors to secure their communal requirements.[20] It is worthwhile mentioning that the Volga-Urals Muslims were drafted into the national army by the universal conscription decree of 1874. In their petitions to the

16. Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe Magometanskoe Dukhovnoe Sobranie,* 50; N. K. Garipov, ed., *Sbornik tsirkuliarov i inykh rukovodiashchikh rasporiazhenii po okrugu Orenburgskogo Magometanskogo Dukhovnogo Sobraniia, 1836–1903 g.* (Ufa, 1905; reprint, Kazan, 2004), 28–29, 143–48. On the efforts of a distinguished Kazan scholar, Shihâb al-Dîn al-Marjânî (1818–1889), to establish a clear definition of the months based on mathematics, see Michael Kemper, *Sufii i uchenye v Tatarstane i Bashkortostane: Islamskii diskurs pod russkim gospodstvom* (Berlin, 1998; Russian translation, Kazan, 2008), 586–90.

17. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar,* 345.

18. Based on extensive analysis of the Tatar press, Stéphane A. Dudoignon calls attention to the autonomy of the local Muslim society from the control of the Spiritual Assembly in the management of congregational resources. See Dudoignon, "Status, Strategies and Discourses of a Muslim 'Clergy' under a Christian Law: Polemics about the Collection of the *Zakât* in Late Imperial Russia," in Dudoignon and Komatsu, eds., *Islam in Politics,* 43–73. James H. Meyer also examines the competitive aspects in the relationship between emerging Muslim leaders and the Spiritual Assembly in terms of "leadership politics," that is, the right to speak in the name of Muslims after 1905. See his "Turkic Worlds," chap. 4.

19. In contrast, see the Central Asian Jadids' quest for participation in Russian political life despite their limited access. Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley, 1998), 231–44.

20. On the interactions between the Muslim population and the zemstvos in the sphere of education, see Charles Steinwedel, "Invisible Threads of Empire: State, Religion, and Ethnicity in Tsarist Bashkiria, 1773–1917" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1999), esp. 432–68; Norihiro Naganawa, "Maktab or School? Introduction of Universal Primary Education among the Volga-Ural Muslims," in Tomohiko Uyama, ed., *Empire, Islam and Politics in Central Eurasia* (Sapporo, 2007), 65–97.

authorities, they would express their loyalty by stressing that they had shed their blood alongside Russians.[21] After 1905, Muslims from the Volga-Urals played a prominent role within the Muslim contingent during the brief existence of the State Duma.[22] Moreover, the impact of the relaxation of censorship on this region in general, and Kazan in particular, was intense. In sharp contrast to the Central Asian press that Adeeb Khalid has discussed, the financial stability that publishers derived from a committed readership enabled some of the Tatar press agencies to survive for almost ten years.[23] While their Central Asian counterparts shunned politics, and focused instead on culture, the Tatar press vigorously reported events in the State Duma, in local self-government, at various Muslim meetings, and even at protest rallies, such as the one that headlines this article.

Kazan Tatars were, however, skeptical about whether the city duma was helping them address the unfairness at the local level that they saw as contravening the long-standing tsarist commitment to religious tolerance. True, local self-government as well as voluntary associations could limit the scope of the state's power and gain substantial leeway by collaborating with the state in expanding social welfare.[24] Although usually deemed liberal in contrast to the state bureaucracy, the city duma often

21. For instance, see a petition to the Kazan city head made by the Tatar employers' meeting on 5 January 1914 in *Qûyâsh,* 13 January 1914, 2. On the Volga-Urals Muslims in the Russian army, see Norihiro Naganawa, "Musul'manskoe soobshchestvo v usloviiakh mobilizatsii: Uchastie Volgo-Ural'skikh musul'man v voinakh poslednego desiatiletiia sushchestvovaniia Rossiiskoi imperii," in Norihiro Naganawa, D. M. Usmanova, and Mami Hamamoto, eds., *Volgo-Ural'skii region v imperskom prostranstve: XVIII–XX vv.* (Moscow, 2011), 198–228. On Central Asians alienated from this "national" project, see Tomohiko Uyama, "A Particularist Empire: The Russian Policies of Christianization and Military Conscription in Central Asia," in Uyama, ed., *Empire, Islam, and Politics,* 23–63.

22. Twelve out of 25 Muslim deputies in the first Duma were from the Volga-Urals, 15 out of 36 in the second, 6 out of 9 in the third, and 5 out of 7 in the fourth. On their activities, see Usmanova, *Musul'manskie predstaviteli;* L. A. Iamaeva, *Musul'manskii liberalizm nachala XX veka kak obshchestvenno-politicheskoe dvizhenie* (Ufa, 2002); Iamaeva, ed., *Musul'manskie deputaty Gosudarstvennoi dumy Rossii 1906–1917* (Ufa, 1998).

23. For the Central Asian press, see Adeeb Khalid, "Printing, Publishing, and Reform in Tsarist Central Asia," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 26 (1994): 187–200; Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform,* esp. 115–27. On the developments in the Tatar press after 1905, see Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *La presse et le mouvement national chez les musulmans de Russie avant 1920* (Paris, 1964); A. G. Karimullin, *Tatarskaia kniga nachala XX veka* (Kazan, 1974); Dilara M. Usmanova, "Die tatarische Presse 1905–1918: Quellen, Entwicklungsetappen und quantitative Analyse," in Michael Kemper, Anke von Kügelgen, and Dmitry Yermakov, eds., *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries* (Berlin, 1996), 1:239–78. Reading venues were also widely developed. In Kazan, thousands of people visited the Islamic Library every year, since its opening in 1906 as a branch of the Kazan City Library. Zavdat S. Minnullin, "Zur Geschichte der tatarischen öffentlichen Bibliotheken vor der Oktoberrevolution," in Kemper et al., eds., *Muslim Culture,* 207–37.

24. Daniel R. Brower, *The Russian City between Tradition and Modernity, 1850–1900* (Berkeley, 1990); Edith W. Clowes, Samuel D. Kassow, and James L. West, eds., *Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia* (Princeton, 1991); Adele Lindenmeyr, *Poverty Is Not a Vice: Charity, Society, and the State in Imperial Russia* (Princeton, 1996); Joseph Bradley, *Voluntary Associations in Tsarist Russia: Science, Patriotism, and Civil Society* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009).

politicized ethnic difference in social strata based on occupations, giving preference to the wealthiest.[25] In Kazan the religious tolerance that the Tatar traders invoked to gain Islamic holidays clashed with the city duma's endeavor to maintain autonomy in regulating the urban trading regime. Initially, the Russian and Tatar councilors had a common interest in maintaining the city duma's right to sanction Islamic holidays. But the state's repeated annulment of the duma's decisions for the sake of the Orthodox eroded prospects of civic negotiations. This gave the Tatar city councilors and traders a good reason to resort to the imperial principle of religious tolerance. While the Russians regarded the day-off question as exclusively economic, the Tatars emphatically highlighted it as purely religious. Thus, the public sphere within the city duma split sharply along the confessional chasm in 1914.

Contemplating the role of the press in shaping the public sphere, students of both late imperial Russia and modern Islam have paid special attention to those market-based agents challenging established authorities and disrupting the traditional path of knowledge transmission: popular writers with rural origins, news reporters, and new intellectuals independent of the 'ulamâ' with respect to access to religious texts.[26] This article addresses the intervention of the new Tatar literati in the controversy over the timing and meaning of holidays among the local mullahs. These intellectuals (*yâshlar* [the young] as seen in the Tatar press) emerged as writers and teachers under the Tatar bourgeoisie's sponsorship, distancing themselves from clerical jobs. As offspring of the preceding generation of Jadids, they drew on Islamic terms to substantiate their own arguments. But their primary concern was to make religion rational, that is, based on scientific truth, and to harness Islam as an ethical means of unifying the nation and boosting its progress.[27] Challenged by these young literati,

25. See the classic Michael F. Hamm, ed., *The City in Late Imperial Russia* (Bloomington, 1986). On Ufa, see Steinwedel, "Invisible Threads"; Charles Steinwedel, "The 1905 Revolution in Ufa: Mass Politics, Elections, and Nationality," *Russian Review* 59, no. 4 (October 2000): 555–76. On Baku, see Audrey Altstadt, "The Baku City Duma: Arena for Elite Conflict," *Central Asian Survey* 5, no. 3/4 (1986): 49–66; Firouzeh Mostashari, *On the Religious Frontier: Tsarist Russia and Islam in the Caucasus* (London, 2006), esp. 121–27; Nicholas B. Breyfogle, "Prayer and the Politics of Place: Molokan Church Building, Tsarist Law, and the Quest for a Public Sphere in Late Imperial Russia," in Steinberg and Coleman, eds., *Sacred Stories,* 222–52. On Tashkent, see Jeff Sahadeo, *Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent: 1865–1923* (Bloomington, 2007). On Kiev, see Meir, *Kiev, Jewish Metropolis;* Faith C. Hillis, "Between Empire and Nation: Urban Politics, Community, and Violence in Kiev, 1863–1907" (PhD diss., Yale University, 2009).

26. On late imperial Russia, see Jeffrey Brooks, *When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861–1917* (Princeton, 1985); Louise McReynolds, *The News under Russia's Old Regime: The Development of a Mass-Circulation Press* (Princeton, 1991). On modern Islam, see Francis Robinson, "Technology and Religious Change: Islam and the Impact of Print," *Modern Asian Studies* 27, no. 1 (February 1993): 229–51; Eickelman and Piscatori, *Muslim Politics,* esp. 37–45.

27. For their typical parlance concerning the relationship between religion and nation, see Jamâl al-Dîn Walîduf, *Millat wa Milliyat* (Orenburg, 1914), 11–12, 17, 38. See also Goldberg, "Russian Empire," chap. 3; Noack, *Muslimischer Nationalismus,* 461–73; Dudoignon, "Status, Strategies and Discourses," 57–60. For a comparison with their Central Asian counterparts, see Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform,* 175–76, 216, 222.

the local 'ulamâ' in turn attempted to secure a sphere where they could sustain their authority.

A Divided Public Sphere: Religious Tolerance and Local Self-Government

In the commercial world of Kazan, the Tatar minority held a visible presence. According to the 1897 census, there were 129,959 residents in the city, of whom 74 percent were Russians and 21.9 percent Tatars. The merchant estate numbered 2,308, with 78.3 percent Russians and 15 percent Tatars. Of the 7,976 commercial workers, 68.5 percent were Russians and 30.2 percent were Tatars.[28] About 300 businesses and joint-stock companies were counted during the period 1872–1916, and 28 percent of them belonged to Tatar merchants and entrepreneurs. Most of the Tatar merchants were rich peasants who had moved to Kazan in the 1870s and 1880s and immediately tried to register themselves in suitable merchant guilds to gain privileges. There were 15 first-guild and 71 second-guild Tatar merchants in 1870, and 14 and 94 in 1881.[29] In the 1880s, when these new Tatar merchants expanded their business, the question about which day of the week and what other holidays shop assistants would have arose on the agenda of the Kazan city duma.[30]

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the controversy over holidays became increasingly strained, as the Tatars' shops began to penetrate Russian streets. Traditionally, Kazan was bisected by the Bulak Canal: the left bank was the Tatar part and the right bank, the Russian part. The Tatar quarter consisted of the old *sloboda* (settlement) along the canal and the new one to the southwest. Its trade center, Hay Bazaar, the second-largest market in the city, was in the old settlement. The Russian part had two main commercial streets: Bol'shaia Prolomnaia, with high-class boutiques, exclusive hotels, insurance companies, and banks; and Voskresenskaia, whose view was likened to Nevskii Prospekt in the capital, lined by Kazan University, the cathedral (after which the street was named), the city library, courts, and other official buildings.[31] At the beginning of the century, Russian traders complained of the "Tatars' sway over the retail outlets of the city" and of their own substantial losses. They argued that the majority of Russian industrial workers and craftsmen were now accustomed to shopping at Tatars' shops on Sundays and other Orthodox holidays. The Russian traders griped that if they were obliged to close shop on these days and the Tatars were not, Tatar shops would even more rapidly spread into Russian streets.[32] In other words, even if Tatars stopped trading

28. N. A. Troinitskii, ed., *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii 1897 goda,* vol. 14, *Kazanskaia guberniia* (St. Petersburg, 1904), vi, 178–79, 204–5, 260.

29. Salikhov, *Tatarskaia burzhuaziia,* 16–17, 24.

30. *Zhurnaly i protokoly zasedanii Kazanskoi gorodskoi dumy za 1902* (Kazan, 1902), 492–505; Malysheva, "Ezhenedel'nye prazdniki," 241–43.

31. Sverdlova, *Na perekrestke,* 83–85, 88, 109.

32. See a petition from traders of the Arcade (Gostinyi dvor) to the governor in NART, f.419 (Kazanskoe gubernskoe po zemskim i gorodskim delam prisutstvie), op. 1, d.

on Fridays, they would suffer less than their Russian rivals, as the majority of the urban population working on Fridays were not active shoppers.[33]

To settle the holiday question, both Russian and Tatar traders invited outside forces to assist them. The most accessible was the city duma, which had to carefully balance the issue. On the one hand, taking into account the Tatar merchants' significant presence in the city market, it organized commissions comprising both Russian and Tatar city councilors to mediate the conflict of interests. On the other hand, it also had to convince the higher authorities, such as the Kazan governor and the Senate, of the legitimacy of its decisions in order to maintain the city's autonomy. In most cases, the duma was forced to make city ordinances practicable, prioritizing the Russian majority's voice, but preserving its regard for religious tolerance. A typical product of this balancing act was an ordinance sanctioned by the Kazan governor on 11 April 1905 that allowed all confessional groups to conduct commerce for only thirty minutes after noon on Sundays, but discreetly exempted the new settlement in the Tatar quarter from this rule.[34]

When the central government issued a regulation "guaranteeing normal rest" for commercial servants on 15 November 1906, a compromise between the Russian and Tatar traders looked feasible in the city duma. On the one hand, the prohibition against any trading on Sundays and Orthodox holidays triggered a long-standing protest among the Tatar population: rumor spread associating the enforcement of Christian holidays with the imminence of a baptizing campaign. On 3 February 1907, the Kazan governor had to mollify the perplexed citizenry.[35] On the other hand, the new law allowed local self-government to choose other holidays in those residential areas where the population was predominantly non-Slavic and non-Christian.[36] This emboldened the city duma to begin fashioning another ordinance based on religious tolerance, although Muslims were a minority in Kazan. On 12 November 1908, at the suggestion of B. K. Apanaev, a Tatar councilor, the duma resolved to provide both Christians and Muslims with the same number of religious holidays: the former thus gained 26 days and the latter, 23, excluding Sundays and Fridays.[37]

474, l. 19; and a petition from Russian representatives from 113 firms to the city duma in *Zhurnaly Kazanskoi gorodskoi dumy i doklady Upravy za 1914* (Kazan, 1914), 22–24.

33. Rebutting Russian traders' criticism, one contributor to the local Tatar newspaper argued that while the Russian streets were full of Tatar shoppers on Fridays, no Russian shopper was seen in the Hay Bazaar on Sundays. *Yûlduz,* 21 January 1914, 1.

34. *Zhurnaly i protokoly zasedanii Kazanskoi gorodskoi dumy za 1903* (Kazan, 1906), 47–50, 332–33; *Zhurnaly za 1914* (Kazan, 1914), 6.

35. *Zhurnaly Kazanskoi gorodskoi dumy i doklady Upravy za 1909* (Kazan, 1911), 312; *Qûyâsh,* 13 January 1914, 2. On the Tatars' protests invoking the imminent threat of a baptizing campaign in the nineteenth century, see Werth, *At the Margins of Orthodoxy,* 78, 183; Meyer, "Turkic Worlds," 77.

36. *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii,* vol. 26, *1906 g.* (St. Petersburg, 1909), no. 28548.

37. Moreover, Christians employed by Muslims were to be freed from work on Christian holidays, and Muslim employees by Christians, on Islamic holidays. *Zhurnaly i protokoly zasedanii Kazanskoi gorodskoi dumy za 1908* (Kazan, 1910), 290, 304–5.

But the provincial and central authorities were unwilling to guarantee Islamic holidays or exclude Muslims from the general prohibition against trading on Christian holidays. They were afraid that the Tatar traders would benefit if the resting Russian majority went to Tatar shops that were open on Orthodox holidays. By 1911, the Provincial Office for Zemstvo and City Affairs had twice declined the city duma's amendment of the ordinance of 11 April 1905. The duma's appeal to the Senate to reverse this decision was also in vain.[38]

The Russian and Tatar city councilors attempted to achieve a breakthrough in the holiday controversy with recourse to another outside force: the State Duma. They expected deputies from Kazan province, including Tatars, to press their interests, giving the city duma a prerogative to resolve the holiday dispute through its ordinance, thereby providing the Tatar traders with Islamic holidays. Here, the two principles of city autonomy and religious tolerance did not contradict each other. On 27 April 1910, with the settlement of the holiday dispute expected to be on the agenda of the State Duma very soon, the Kazan city duma resolved to petition chairman of the State Duma A. I. Guchkov, the minister of commerce and industry, and deputies from Kazan province to pay heed to the situation in Kazan.[39]

A negative atmosphere pervaded the State Duma's deliberations at this point in time, however. One deputy from Kursk province even complained, "forcing the Christian population to buy what they need for life in Muslim and Jewish shops was contrary to any notions of humanity and religious tolerance." Although two Russians from Kazan province supported the Muslim cause by demanding that local self-government be given the right to regulate holidays, Muslim representatives had no alternative but to walk out of the hall. They condemned the State Duma majority for "infringing upon the religious, national, and social peculiarities of the twenty million Muslims in the empire."[40]

Thus, both the State Duma and the Kazan city duma revealed their limited ability to arbitrate between Orthodox and Muslim interests, which led the Kazan Tatars to choose different tactics. After learning of the breakdown of negotiations in the State Duma in May 1910, leading Tatar merchants and intellectuals in Kazan marshaled a protest rally of 2,000 people, denouncing the State Duma for breaching the imperial practice of religious tolerance, as described above (see figure 1).[41] Meanwhile, some Tatar shop assistants had begun to feel the need for an organization defending not only Islam but also Tatars as a national entity (*Tâtâr mil-*

38. NART, f. 419, op. 1, d. 474, ll. 25–27, 62; *Zhurnaly za 1909,* 309–14, 366–71; *Zhurnaly za 1914,* 15–17, 20–21, 24–30.

39. However, the Kazan governor did not forward the petitions to the minister of commerce and industry and the chairman of the State Duma. NART, f. 419, op. 1, d. 474, ll. 66–67, 71.

40. *Gosudarstvennaia duma, tretii sozyv, Stenograficheskie otchety 1910 g. Sessiia tret'ia, chast' IV* (St. Petersburg, 1910), 547–57, 574, and *Sessiia chetvertaia, chast' I* (St. Petersburg, 1910), 2974–79, 2996.

41. Similar protest meetings took place in Orenburg and Ufa. See *Yûlduz,* 26 May 1910, 3; 10 June 1910, 1.

Figure 1. Part of the telegram sent by the Kazan Tatars to the State Duma chairman, and its translation. *Bayân al-Haqq*, 1 June 1910, 2.

latî) through their experience with Russian socialist movements. Ahmadî Îshmuhammadûf used to be a leader of a shop assistants' union integrating both Russian and Tatar comrades during the 1905 Revolution. But now he felt a certain discomfort with the socialist slogan "irrespective of religion and nation." He complained that if the union's general meeting took place on Sundays, Muslims could not leave their workplace, and worse still, most of them did not understand Russian well enough to participate in any discussions.[42]

By 1914 the city duma had reached an impasse, with its possible action restricted by the ordinance of 11 April 1905 regulating the days off for commercial workers. Taking advantage of this juridical uncertainty, some Tatar traders continued to open their shops on Sundays. Although the po-

42. Ahmadî Îshmuhammadûf, *Saudâ khidmatkârlarîning ma'îshatî wa ânlarining istiqbâlî* (Kazan, 1907), 2, 15–18, 22–23. See also G. Ibragimov, *Tatary v revoliutsii 1905 goda* (Kazan, 1926), 194–202.

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lice investigated these violators, they hesitated to take decisive measures; from 1909 to 1911, they drew up 1,214 charge sheets, but only in 195 cases did the violators pay fines, ranging from thirty kopecks to one ruble.[43] This situation so irritated the Kazan governor that he urged the city duma to resume its deliberation of a new ordinance no less than eleven times from the end of 1911 until 1914.[44] Finally, on 8 January 1914, the city duma agreed to reopen the discussion.

The first week of 1914 witnessed the collaboration of "the two usually irreconcilable groups of merchants and shop assistants."[45] On 3 January, sanctioned by the city police chief, a certain Samî' Allâh Sâlihuf chaired a meeting of 300 Tatar shop assistants at the Oriental Club in the old sloboda. The local Tatar paper *Yûlduz* reported that the participants' confessional and national emotions would never have permitted them to be content with replacing Islamic holidays with Christian ones. In the petition produced during the meeting to address Tatar councilors and the city head, the Tatar shop assistants argued that the state law of 15 November 1906, which took regional particularities into account, could provide them with their own holidays. They believed this coincided with the spirit of the October Manifesto.[46] Two days later, Tatar employers also held a meeting of 300 people at a teahouse in the Hay Bazaar, with Ibrâhîm Yahyîn, a city councilor, as chairman and Sâlihuf as secretary. Two other councilors, Badr al-Dîn Âpânâyyif and Sadr al-Dîn Maqsûdî, were also there. Those present unanimously resolved to close all shops on Fridays and other Islamic holidays and not to restrict business hours on either bank of the Bulak Canal during Orthodox holidays.[47]

On 8 January, the city duma was at the center of the city dwellers' interest. The crowd at the duma building, made up mostly of Tatars, swelled considerably, and only 75 could be admitted to the gallery since there were no more seats.[48] After the city head announced the petitions from Tatar and Russian traders, Sadr al-Dîn Maqsûdî insisted that Muslims could not consent to the denial of their own holidays, which would be equivalent to a denial of their faith itself. In the name of the "historical friendship between Russians and Tatars," he demanded that Friday be established as

43. Malysheva, "Ezhenedel'nye prazdniki," 258. This state of affairs remained unchanged until 1914. On Sunday, 8 March 1914, the police put 60 Tatar and 5 Russian traders under investigation. When indicted by the Mirovoi sud'ia (justice of the peace), the Tatars entrusted their defense to a lawyer called Bukhov. He argued that the question about trading on holidays remained open, as the city duma had not yet issued an ordinance based on the law of 15 November 1906. *Kamsko-volzhskaia rech',* 16 March 1914, 4; *Yûlduz,* 11 March 1914, 4; 16 March 1914, 4.

44. Malysheva, "Ezhenedel'nye prazdniki," 260.

45. See an observation by the local police. NART, f. 1 (Kantseliariia kazanskogo gubernatora), op. 6, d. 949, ll. 71–72. The head of the provincial gendarmerie also stated that when two Tatars met, they always talked about the holiday dispute. NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 948, ll. 17–18.

46. *Yûlduz,* 5 January 1914, 1, 4; 7 January 1914, 3; *Qûyâsh,* 9 January 1914, 2.

47. *Yûlduz,* 7 January 1914, 4; *Qûyâsh,* 7 January 1914, 3. An Orenburg newspaper Waqt also paid attention to the unity between employers and shop assistants. *Waqt,* 15 January 1914, 1.

48. *Yûlduz,* 10 January 1914, 3.

a day off. His Russian colleagues' attitude was generally chilly, however. Frustrated by the growth of Tatar commercial activity at their expense, the Russians complained that only after 1905 did Tatars begin to claim that trading on Fridays was not compatible with their religion. Âpânâyyif and Sadr al-Dîn Maqsûdî emphatically protested that the Russians were offending the Muslims' faith and that the Russians also profited from trading on Fridays. The parley between the Tatar and Russian councilors failed to resolve the question.[49]

In the course of the political struggle at the city duma in 1914, the cleavage between self-government and the imperial principle of religious tolerance deepened. Russian councilors insisted upon enforcing the ordinance of 11 April 1905 in order to maintain municipal autonomy. Their Tatar counterparts and the Tatar press, in contrast, aware of the deadlock hobbling the city assembly, proposed settling the issue by applying the laws and decrees promising religious tolerance that had been issued by the tsar. They asserted that their demands were based on more than just the law of 15 November 1906, claiming that the infringement upon Islamic holidays violated the decree of 12 December 1904 (which had promised to reconsider restrictive measures and laws against non-Orthodox believers) and the October Manifesto.[50]

The holiday dispute intensified the confessional divide on the pages of the urban press, too. A Russian paper, the *Kazanskii telegraf,* was riled enough to insist that it was the agitation of "the Young Tatars" in association with separatism in 1905 and the emergence of "pan-Islamism" that had interrupted the normal course of commercial life in Kazan.[51] The Tatar press, in general, insisted that the holiday question be understood in terms of the provision of civil rights (*ghrâzhdânliq*) for the empire's Muslim community of twenty million.[52]

The *Kazanskii telegraf* even challenged the Tatars' religious arguments pushing Friday as a day off. Citing the verse on Friday rituals from G. S. Sablukov's Russian translation of the Qur'ân, the *Kazanskii telegraf* attempted to prove that the verse neither prohibited trade before and after collective prayer nor set Friday as a day off.[53] The newspaper's statements

49. Ibid., 3–4; *Zhurnaly za 1914,* 31–34.

50. *Yûlduz,* 23 February 1914, 1–2; *Qûyâsh,* 12 January 1914, 3–4; 13 January 1914, 2.

51. *Kazanskii telegraf,* 12 January 1914. This kind of denunciation associating Tatar political activism with the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 was common among local and central policymakers, as well as among the Orthodox missionaries at that time. See Geraci, *Window on the East,* 277–95; Campbell, "The Muslim Question in Late Imperial Russia," 331–35.

52. *Yûlduz,* 12 January 1914, 1. During the deliberation by the city duma on 8 January, Sadr al-Dîn Maqsûdî also affirmed that as a former deputy of the second and third State Duma he had received petitions on this question from Muslims nationwide. *Yûlduz,* 10 January 1914, 3–4. The Orenburg newspaper *Waqt* also treated the holiday dispute in Kazan as an issue concerning Muslims throughout the empire. *Waqt,* 15 January 1914, 2.

53. *Kazanskii telegraf,* 17 January 1914, 3. G. S. Sablukov, during his tenure (1856–1863), worked out a systematic curriculum for polemics against Islam in the Kazan Theological Academy. His translation of the Qur'ân, published in 1878, was the first to go directly from the Arabic text into Russian. Geraci, *Window on the East,* 86–87.

provoked a Muslim scholar's intervention, although religious scholars were rarely visible in the political debate with the Russians. On a page of *Yûlduz,* this contributor inveighed against Sablukov's interpretation of the verse, with citation from the *tafsîr* (the Qur'ân exegesis) and the *hadîth* (the tradition of the Prophet and his companions). He also contended that the Muslim community had long reached consensus (*ijmâ'*) concerning the prohibition of trading on Fridays.[54]

As the confessional divide crystallized and widened between the Russians and the Tatars in the city duma and the local press, the Tatar papers became increasingly hostile to those fellow believers deliberately transgressing the confessional line for secular purposes. For example, some Tatar shop assistants agreed to have a common day off with their Russian comrades to be able to convene labor union meetings. Unable to find any Tatar papers ready to publish their opinions, "a group of Tatar commercial-industrial workers" sent their letters to another Russian paper, the *Kamsko-volzhskaia rech'*.[55] A local Tatar paper, *Qûyâsh,* harshly denounced this group as the "dust" left after the 1905 Revolution and as "half-cooked" socialists.[56]

The *Qûyâsh*'s endeavor to forge national unanimity among fellow believers was also eclipsed by the very Tatars trading in the Russian streets, who were unwilling to have a day off on Fridays, let alone other Islamic holidays. It was obviously disadvantageous for them to close shop on those days, as well as on Sundays and the other Orthodox holidays that Russians observed. Nevertheless, *Qûyâsh* condemned these reluctant coreligionists for being devoid of national identity (*millî âng*) and any religious sense. It strongly suggested that it was those merchants trading through their back doors on Islamic holidays for trivial profits that had had a devastating effect on the deliberations of the city duma.[57] In the Bol'shaia Prolomnaia, one Muslim entrepreneur, Qurbân 'Alî Kâshâyif, opened his shop on 26 January, the Prophet's birthday, and four Tatar entrepreneurs followed suit. According to the *Qûyâsh,* Kâshâyif always ignored Islamic holidays. Tatar entrepreneurs in the Bol'shaia Prolomnaia whispered that Kâshâyif had asked the city board to provide Tatars with Orthodox holidays.[58]

On 20 May 1914, the city duma finally approved the implementation of Christian holidays as the official days off for both Russians and Tatars; this was brought into effect by the governor's sanction on 14 July. When Russian councilors insisted that the Tatars had deliberately manufactured a connection between the day-off question and religious obligations, Tatar councilors walked out in protest.[59] Thus, the implementation of the new ordinance did not end the controversy; instead it spurred Kazan Tatar traders to take further action. On 28 July, upon the initiative of one 'Abd al-Rahman Qûshâyif, a merchant of the second guild in the Hay

54. *Yûlduz,* 21 January 1914, 1.
55. *Kamsko-volzhskaia rech',* 31 December 1913; 8 January 1914.
56. *Qûyâsh,* 2 January 1914, 2; 9 January 1914, 1–2.
57. *Qûyâsh,* 6 February 1914, 1.
58. *Qûyâsh,* 17 January 1914, 5; 10 February 1914, 1.
59. *Yûlduz,* 22 May 1914, 1–2; *Zhurnaly za 1914,* 123–27.

Bazaar, 278 Kazan Tatars signed a petition to the Interior Ministry against this measure of the city duma. Qûshâyif also persuaded Muslim state deputy Gaisa Enikeev and a representative from the Muslim community of St. Petersburg to hold meetings with the bureaucrats concerned.[60]

The beginning of the Great War might have worked in favor of the Kazan petitioners.[61] On 11 August, Qûshâyif received a telegram from the two negotiators reporting that the interior minister had instructed the Kazan governor to suspend the new ordinance pending further examination.[62] Tatar entrepreneurs opened their shops on 16 August—the first Sunday after news of the suspension had appeared in *Yûlduz*.[63] Without consulting the city duma, the Kazan governor issued a provisional ordinance allowing any merchant to trade for five hours on holidays, from twelve o'clock noon to five o'clock in the afternoon. Tatar traders in the Hay Bazaar welcomed the governor's measure. The *Qûyâsh* called for its fellow believers to respect their own holidays, despite the material losses involved in stopping trade on Fridays and for half a day on Sundays.[64]

On 23 September, the city duma confronted the problem of the interior minister and the Kazan governor interfering in municipal affairs. Notwithstanding the Tatar councilors' disagreement, the duma resolved to petition the interior minister against the latter's instructions and the governor's provisional ordinance.[65] Kazan Tatar leaders, in turn, attempted to counteract the duma's move by justifying their position in religious terms. They intended to submit to the Senate an Islamic legal opinion (*fatwâ*) demonstrating that Friday was an obligatory holiday, according to the Qur'ân and other normative books. The Spiritual Assembly had certified the fatwa's correctness according to Islamic legal tradition.[66] Thus, the public sphere within the city duma was completely divided along the confessional fault line.

Why were the two principles of self-government and religious tolerance irreconcilable? First, the higher authorities repeatedly interfered with the civic agreement between the Russian and Tatar councilors, as they were dissatisfied with the local ordinance, based on religious tolerance, that forced Russian traders to endure economic disadvantages. In turn, the city duma was obliged to pass feasible regulations: in order to maintain its limited autonomy, it had to listen to the voice of the Russian

60. Usmanova, *Musul'manskie predstaviteli,* 371.

61. Evidence concerning the impact of the war has not been found in the sources. As Tatars often asserted in the course of the holiday dispute, however, it was on Fridays and other Islamic holidays that they usually prayed for the tsar and his family, homeland prosperity, and peace. This was crucial, particularly during the war, as it would help the state augment patriotism in the rear. See Naganawa, "Musul'manskoe soobshchestvo," 217–23.

62. *Yûlduz,* 13 August 1914, 4; *Kazanskii telegraf,* 4 September 1914, 3.

63. *Yûlduz,* 19 August 1914, 4. A local Russian paper complained that Muslims had begun opening their shops on Sundays, based only on rumors that the law had changed. *Kamsko-volzhskaia rech',* 2 September 1914.

64. *Qûyâsh,* 8 September 1914, 1–2; 19 September 1914, 1–2.

65. *Yûlduz,* 25 September 1914, 3–4; *Zhurnaly za 1914,* 29–31.

66. Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv Respubliki Bashkortostan, f. I-295 (Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe sobranie), op. 6, d. 3734, ll. 1, 6, 7.

majority. Second, the imposition of an official line favorable to the Russian Orthodox cause disabused the Tatar councilors and traders of any illusion that the city duma was capable of impartial arbitration, compelling them to fall back on the imperial practice of religious tolerance. While the Russian councilors and press denied the religious nature of the holiday question, their Tatar counterparts invoked the state's commitment to religious pluralism to encourage Muslims to speak with one voice in this dispute. The Tatar press was intolerant of those coreligionists who crossed the confessional divide to gain benefits. Finally, the Russian councilors saw as another challenge to the city's autonomy the Tatars' successful attempts to involve the Muslim state deputies and the Spiritual Assembly in this local affair. Using the religion-based institutions, Tatar petitioners were clearly "thinking like an empire," anticipating the state's particular care for each confessional group.[67] But this had a devastating effect on the public sphere of the city duma.

In this contentious dispute with the Russian population, it was the Tatar traders, including rich merchants and shop assistants, and representatives of the city duma and State Duma who worked in the name of Islam and the Muslim community. These merchants and politicians seemed to have overwhelmed the mullahs as the established religious authority in Kazan. As we shall see, however, the mullahs also adjusted themselves to the new reality of the proliferation of actors speaking for Islam and the community and found their niche from which to lead Muslim society.

The Politics of Religious Authority: The Spiritual Assembly and the Public Sphere

Aside from hardening the line of demarcation between the Orthodox and Muslim communities, the holiday dispute also paved the way for urban Tatar leaders to contend for authority within their own community. Even if they could gain the right to celebrate Islamic holidays in a city with a predominantly Russian population, the question of how to observe these holidays in practice remained unresolved within Muslim society. Notwithstanding the united front of the *Yûlduz* and *Qûyâsh* against the Russian arguments, the two Kazan Tatar papers had different understandings of the best way of determining when to begin holiday prayers, that is, how to establish a common Hegira calendar for the city.

According to scriptural principle, determining the first day of a month in the Hegira calendar is based on observation of a thin crescent with the naked eye in the western sky in the evening.[68] In practice, however, quarrels often erupted about the timing of obligatory holiday prayers even between parishes in the same village or city. To eliminate ambiguity, some Tatar intellectuals, particularly around the *Qûyâsh,* attempted to introduce a common calendar, using data from astronomical observatories.

67. The phrase comes from Burbank, "Thinking Like an Empire."

68. In the Hegira calendar a day begins in the evening and runs from sunset to sunset.

True, observatories provided the precise time of the moon's conjunction with the sun. The data could conflict with scriptural imperatives insisting upon the visibility of the moon with the naked eye, however. The opponents around the *Yûlduz* argued that the Islamic world (*diyâr-i Islâm*) had reached a consensus on the naked-eye observation of the crescent and that counting a month from a completely moonless night would distort the Hegira calendar by shifting all dates to one day earlier.[69] The consequence of this dispute could be devastating, particularly for the press and the Kazan publishers selling calendars.[70] Therefore, the controversy intensified.

It is misleading to claim that the rift ran along the dichotomy between the Jadids, who supported the practical use of scientific knowledge, and the Qadims (conservatives), who placed more value in scriptures. Both the *Yûlduz* and *Qûyâsh* have commonly been labeled Jadidist organs in the historiography. The chief editor of the *Yûlduz*, Hâdî Maqsûdî, was a well-known author of textbooks on dogma, religious observances, and Arabic and Turkic grammar for Jadid schools. Accordingly, his paper propagated social reforms in religious terms and found favor with the 'ulamâ' and small traders. While the *Yûlduz* had launched its business in 1906, the *Qûyâsh* was a relative newcomer with a different readership. Founded in 1912, the *Qûyâsh* attracted big merchants and young literati oriented to "scientific" (*fannî*) knowledge; a popular writer, Fâtih Amîrkhân (1886–1926), had a commanding voice at the editorial office.[71] Thus, Tatar opinion leaders in Kazan deemed both scriptural and scientific knowledge as equally indispensable means of bringing order to Muslim life in general and to the Hegira calendar in particular.

Then what were the fault lines? Recent scholarship has significantly blurred the distinction between reformists and traditionalists.[72] Michael Kemper argues that the idea of reform (*islâh*) had been a crucial leitmotif of the entire Islamic discourse in the Volga-Urals region since at least the end of the eighteenth century.[73] Others contend that the broad accessibility of the pristine texts of the Qur'ân and the hadîth, made possible by print media, subverted the tradition in which glosses and commentaries on the scriptures were transmitted from teacher to pupil.[74] Khalid pays

69. *Yûlduz*, 24 January 1914, 1–2.

70. See *Qûyâsh's* call for the publishers to use observatories' data in *Qûyâsh*, 7 January 1914, 2. On the whole, the Kazan publishers were inclined to agree with this call. *Qûyâsh*, 18 March 1914, 5.

71. Bennigsen and Quelquejay, *La presse*, 67–69, 92–93; Dzh. Validov, *Ocherk istorii obrazovannosti i literatury tatar* (Moscow, 1923; reprint, Kazan, 1998), 120, 132–33; Salikhov, *Tatarskaia burzhuaziia*, 29, 31–32, 91–92.

72. For one of the first reevaluations, see Stéphane A. Dudoignon, "Qu'est-ce que la 'qadîmiya'? Éléments pour une sociologie du traditionalisme musulman, en Islam de Russie et en Transoxiane (au tournant des XIXe et XXe siècles)," in Stéphane A. Dudoignon et al., eds., *L' Islam de Russie: Conscience communautaire et autonomie politique chez les Tatars de la Volga et de l'Oural depuis le XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1997), 207–25.

73. Kemper, *Sufii i uchenye*, 416–20, 629–31.

74. Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, 174–75. For a comparison with north India, see Robinson, "Technology and Religious Change," 242, 244–46.

heed to the fact that the Jadids' opponents also made use of modern means, such as print media, in valorizing existing practices as the essence of "true" Islam.[75]

As I see it, the dispute between the two Tatar newspapers in Kazan arose from disagreements among various intellectuals over local leadership. On the one hand, young literati who believed in the power of science did not fail to formulate the holiday dispute as an acid test of national identity. On the other hand, divided between proponents of scriptures and science, the urban mullahs vied with each other to render a consensus with a view toward maintaining their religious authority as a whole. In so doing, each camp usually invoked the Spiritual Assembly's decision regarding the calendar.[76] This does not mean that this traditional embodiment of Islamic orthodoxy remained uncontroversial. True, when supporters of either naked-eye observation or calculation agreed with the Spiritual Assembly, one camp attempted to appropriate its decision to underscore the authenticity of their particular position and to denounce another camp. When any discrepancy occurred, however, the Tatar press criticized and discredited the Spiritual Assembly.

In 1914, the fiercest controversy yet erupted over the date of the Mawlid, the Prophet's birthday (the twelfth day of Rabî' al-awwal, the third month of the Hegira calendar). This time, the opinions of the *Yûlduz* and the Spiritual Assembly coincided on the date (26 January).[77] The *Yûlduz* published an open letter to the 'ulamâ' suggesting that the scholars make an agreement (*ittifâq*) to conform to the judgment of the Spiritual Assembly so that the holidays were not at the mercy of individual arbitrariness. Sâdiq Îmânqûlî (1870–1932), mullah of the ninth parish—the largest in the city—agreed with this call.[78] But at the eleventh mosque, headed by Kashshâf al-Dîn Tarjumânî (1877–1940), the recital of verses dedicated to the Prophet Muhammad would take place at half past nine in the evening of 24 January; the Mawlid was to be celebrated on 25 January.[79] This opinion was supported not only by the *Qûyâsh* but also by local Muslim publishers, who had made calendars based on the city observatory's data concerning the moon's conjunction with the sun.[80] When the *Qûyâsh*

75. Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform,* 11, 154. In the Volga-Urals region, the conservative group also had its own journal, *Dîn wa Ma'îshat,* which was based in Orenburg and existed from 1906 to 1918. See Rōstām Mōkhāmmātshin, *"Din vä mägïyshät" zhurnalïnïng bibliografiyase (1906–1918)* (Kazan, 2002).

76. Every year, the Spiritual Assembly provided the Department of Religious Affairs within the Interior Ministry with calendars in order to inform the army of the Islamic holidays. Zagidullin, *Musul'manskoe bogosluzhenie,* 268. But the Spiritual Assembly was reluctant, perhaps due to limited finances, to circulate its official calendar to all the mullahs under its jurisdiction. It argued that in principle the imams themselves should observe the moon and determine the beginnings of holidays and that they should contact the Spiritual Assembly as necessary. *Waqt,* 14 January 1914, 1–2; *Yûlduz,* 9 August 1914, 4.

77. *Yûlduz,* 19 January 1914, 2. The Orenburg paper *Waqt* was also of the same mind. *Waqt,* 29 January 1914, 2.

78. *Yûlduz,* 23 January 1914, 3.

79. *Yûlduz,* 21 January 1914, 4

80. *Qûyâsh,* 23 January 1914, 2–3.

found that Kazan Muslims generally celebrated the Mawlid on 25 January, it pointed out that the Spiritual Assembly, the "anti-scientific" *Yûlduz,* and Mullah Sâdiq had failed to lead the people into erroneous ways, praising the growth of national identity (*millî âng*).[81] The *Yûlduz* was forced to justify its position by giving Sâdiq a chance to present his arguments for 26 January. Sâdiq elucidated the lunar phases, that is, the degree to which the moon had to move to become visible, referring to a Persian commentary of *al-Mulakhkhas fî al-Hai'a* (Essence of Astronomy) written in Arabic by Mahmûd b. Muhammad b. 'Umar Chaghmînî in 1221.[82]

The heated debate over the date of the Mawlid was connected to the fact that it had recently became a widespread mass festival in the Volga-Urals, thanks to local intellectuals' efforts to forge it into a "national" (*millî*) event.[83] Earlier, the Mawlid had not been a widely recognized holiday, at least not in the nineteenth century.[84] In the middle of that century, a well-known Sufi leader in the southern Urals, Zayn Allâh Rasûlif (1833–1917), brought home the Mawlid after his hajj and ascetic training in Istanbul. He even attempted to popularize the festival in the Kazakh steppe. Neighboring 'ulamâ' rejected this innovation, and the Spiritual Assembly accused him of heresy and sent him into exile.[85] The religious leaders' negative reaction may be partly explained by the fact that many scholars in this region used to study in Bukhara. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the learned and the common people of Bukhara alike regarded as heresy all holidays other than the two major ones—the festival after Ramadan and that of the month of the Pilgrimage.[86] In contrast, the Volga-Urals widely witnessed evenings and gatherings with the recital of verses dedicated to the Prophet and the narration of his life. Women, in particular, were enthusiastic about using this opportunity to familiarize their children with Islam and with Muhammad as an ideal personality.[87]

The emergence of this new religious practice also involved political changes in the region's intellectual environment. Those sympathic to the

81. *Qûyâsh,* 27 January 1914, 1.

82. *Yûlduz,* 30 January 1914, 1. On the Persian commentary, see C. A. Storey, *Persian Literature: A Bio-Bibliographical Survey* (London, 1972), 2.1:50.

83. Fâtih Amîrkhân argues that it was after the 1905 Revolution that the Mawlid began to occupy an important place in mass observance. See *Qûyâsh,* 22 January 1914, 1.

84. For instance, see K. Fuks, *Kazanskie tatary v statisticheskom i etnograficheskom otnosheniiakh* (Kazan, 1844; reprint, Kazan, 1991), 102.

85. Ridâ' al-Dîn b. Fakhr al-Dîn, *Shaykh Zayn Allâh hadratining tarjama-i hâlî* (Orenburg, 1917), 8–9, 20–21, 30. See also M. N. Farkhshatov, "Zainulla Rasulev," in *Islam na territorii byvshei Rossiiskoi imperii: Entsiklopedicheskii slovar',* no. 1 (Moscow, 1998), 85; Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar,* 324.

86. See the report from Samarkand by Nûshîrwân Yâwshif, who traveled around Russian and Chinese Turkestan. *Qûyâsh,* 2 February 1914, 2.

87. See the special issue of a Kazan-based journal for women dedicated to the Mawlid: *Sûyum Bîka* 7 (1914). See also a report on the "Ladies' gathering" (*khânimlar majlisî*) in Shiqmây village of Menzelinsk uezd, Ufa province in *Yûlduz,* 4 February 1914, 2–3. On the women's role in the spread of Islamic knowledge through folk tales about the prophets, see Agnès Kefeli, "The Tale of Joseph and Zulaykha on the Volga Frontier: The Struggle for Gender, Religious, and National Identity in Imperial and Postrevolutionary Russia," *Slavic Review* 70, no. 2 (Summer 2011): esp. 379–89.

Jadids tried to replace the folk but "pagan" and extravagant festivals of Saban and Jien with more Islamic, less indulgent events.[88] These festivals were frowned upon as they were accompanied by the drinking of alcohol, games involving men and women, dancing, and music.[89] Thus, celebrating the Mawlid with music and plays remained highly controversial among the 'ulamâ'.[90] Still, some scholars did propose flexible interpretations to allow the mass celebration of the Mawlid. In his reply to an inquiry about the event's legality, the editor of the Orenburg journal *Shûrâ,* Ridâ' al-Dîn b. Fakhr al-Dîn (1859–1936), regarded it as *mubâh,* that is, permissible in terms of Islamic legal tradition.[91] The Mawlid was supported by the new generation, whose intellectual advancement no longer happened in Bukhara. The Kazan journal *Maktab* representing the young literati's voice said, "Only recently did our imams and teachers begin to respect and celebrate the Mawlid. They started it only after they went to Istanbul and Cairo to study and saw good customs there." The journal proposed that young imams and intellectuals create soulful poems and sermons for the Mawlid in their own words, rather than using the texts from Istanbul and Cairo.[92]

The second wave of controversy over Islamic practice in 1914 pertained to the advent of the ninth month of the Muslim calendar, Ramadan. The Spiritual Assembly, the *Qûyâsh,* and the *Yûlduz* had reached the consensus that the first day of Ramadan was 11 July, but since the month fell during the long summer days, it was disputable whether the obligatory fast should be strictly observed. Historically, the location of the Volga-Urals—at much higher latitudes than the Arabian Peninsula—had posed a unique normative question for indigenous Muslims: Should they strictly

88. On this replacement in Îskî Qîshqî village of Ufa uezd, see Mutahhar ibn Mullâ Mîr Haydar, *Îskî Qîshqî Târîkhî* (Orenburg, 1911), 47. The Saban took place in spring before fieldwork, and the Jien in summer, before the harvest.These pagan festivals were common among the baptized Tatars, too. Those baptized Tatars inclined to convert to Islam saw the festivals as great opportunities to find Muslim spouses. See Agnès Kefeli, "The Role of Tatar and Kriashen Women in the Transmission of Islamic Knowledge, 1800–1870," in Robert Geraci and Michael Khodarkovsky, eds., *Of Religion and Empire: Missions, Conversion, and Tolerance in Tsarist Russia* (Ithaca, 2001), 267.

89. Dudoignon, "Status, Strategies and Discourses," 66; Ia. D. Koblov, *O tatarskikh musul'manskikh prazdnikakh* (Kazan, 1907), 40–41.

90. For pictures of children's plays on the Mawlid, see *Sûyum Bîka* 8 (1915): 10 (in Troitsk, Orenburg province); 10 (1916), 181 (in Moscow). On a condemnation, see *Dîn wa Ma'îshat* 6 (1914): 94.

91. *Shûrâ* 2 (1914): 56–57. This flexibility of religious leaders toward popular Islam that resembles the cult of saints is also the case for al-Azhar in Cairo today. Aviva Schussman, "The Legitimacy and Nature of Mawlid al-Nabî: Analysis of a Fatwâ," *Islamic Law and Society* 5, no. 2 (1998): 214–34.

92. *Maktab* 2 (1914): 29–31. With the substantial increase of Islamic elements in education during the reign of Abdülhamid II, Mawlid became an important event of the Galatasaray Imperial School in Istanbul in the 1880s. Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford, 2000), 109. A famous Bukharan Jadid 'Abdurauf Fitrat also published a book on the Mawlid in 1914 after studying in Istanbul. Hisao Komatsu, "Bukhara and Istanbul: A Consideration about the Background of the *Munâzara,*" in Dudoignon and Komatsu, eds., *Islam in Politics,* 178–79.

observe the fast of Ramadan even when it meant doing so almost the whole day? And, more generally, in summer, when in the lingering evening glow should they make the fifth prayer? It was the effort to interpret such phenomena in scriptural terms that had spurred the development of Islamic reformist thought in this region.[93]

This same year, the two Kazan papers agreed to rigidly observe the fast over the long summer days. When the *Yûlduz* noted that crowds of Muslims were sitting in cafés to see relatives off to the war, it even berated them and demanded justice and penitence.[94] This position was in tune with a conservative Orenburg journal, *Dîn wa Ma'îshat*. Supporters of this journal even petitioned the Orenburg governor to punish those who did not fast. They warned that if transgressors were not chastised, apathy toward religious rituals would spread far and wide.[95] Their position was not universal among the regional learned, however. Intellectuals, including 'ulamâ' supporting the Ufa paper *Tûrmush* and the Orenburg paper *Waqt*, championed a flexible approach: postponing the fast until winter.[96]

The calendar dispute resurfaced when it was discovered that the end of Ramadan was expected to synchronize with the solar eclipse on 8 August. If observation of the crescent with the naked eye was to be the guideline, the first day of Shawwâl (the tenth month of the Hegira calendar) would be 10 August, as it would not be possible to see the crescent in the evening of 8 August. This time, although the supporters of the *Qûyâsh* agreed with the Spiritual Assembly that the first day of the festival should be celebrated on 9 August, those in favor of naked-eye observation had to challenge the Spiritual Assembly. In the pages of the *Qûyâsh*, the imam of the first mosque, Safî Allâh 'Abd Allâh, called for the Kazan 'ulamâ"s agreement (*ittifâq*).[97] This was followed by the newspaper's attack on imams observing the letter (*lafz*) of the Islamic legal tradition, rather than its spirit (*rûh*).[98] The *Qûyâsh*'s chief orator, Amîrkhân, pointed out that only superficial worship led to a deviation from scientific truth (*fannî haqîqat*). He assured that everybody could, in the name of God, witness the moment of the moon's conjunction with the sun at the observatory after five o'clock on 8 August. Neither did he fail to praise highly the Spiritual Assembly for its scientific judgment and for showing the right path to "all Russian Muslims."[99]

In order to prevent the expected division of the festival in the same city, the Kazan 'ulamâ' consulted together at the house of the *âkhûnd* (head

93. Validov, *Ocherk istorii obrazovannosti*, 57–59; Michael Kemper, "Entre Boukhara et la Moyenne-Volga: 'Abd an-Nasîr al-Qûrsâwî (1776–1812) en conflit avec les oulémas traditionalistes," *Cahiers du monde russe* 37, no. 1 (1996): 44–45; Kemper, *Sufii i uchenye*, 383–93.

94. *Qûyâsh*, 11 July 1914, 2; *Yûlduz*, 9 August 1914, 4.

95. *Dîn wa Ma'îshat* 27 (1914): 428; 29 (1914): 460–61. This journal also lamented that the number of Muslims who were unaware of times of prayers was now increasing. *Dîn wa Ma'îshat* 30 (1914): 468–71.

96. *Tûrmush*, 16 July 1914, 2; *Waqt*, 3 July 1914, 2–3; 12 July 1914, 1–2.

97. *Qûyâsh*, 30 July 1914, 2.

98. *Qûyâsh*, 4 August 1914, 4.

99. *Qûyâsh*, 8 August 1914, 1–2.

of the local mullahs), Hisâm al-Dîn Ghaffârî, and reached an agreement about their subordination to the judgment of the Spiritual Assembly: setting the first day of the festival on 9 August.[100] This decision bewildered the *Yûlduz,* which accused the mullahs of unprecedented separation from the consensus of the Islamic world.[101] On the pages of the *Yûlduz,* Muhammad 'Ârif Sâlihî, imam of the eighth mosque, demanded from the imam of the first mosque, Safî Allâh 'Abd Allâh, and his followers legal proof (*shar'î dalîl*) on counting the new moon from a moonless night. Sâlihî considered 'Abd Allâh's subjective opinion (*ra'y*) to be in opposition to the words and behavior of the Prophet and his companions.[102]

The growing number of voices speaking for Islam and the community in the Tatar press seriously undermined but did not marginalize the Kazan 'ulamâ"s authority. In the calendar controversy, all involved argued for the legitimacy of their method according to Islamic norms. The *Qûyâsh* and its main ideologue, Amîrkhân, proclaimed their leadership, advocating scientific truth and national identity. This position seemed to prevail over the *Yûlduz* championing the consensus of the Islamic world. Nevertheless, the Kazan 'ulamâ"s attempts to reach an agreement clearly reflected their aspiration to find their political niche in the changing Muslim society. Both camps in the dispute adduced the decisions of the Spiritual Assembly in order to buttress their position. On the one hand, this indicates that the Spiritual Assembly had grown deep roots in local Muslim politics by the end of the tsarist regime. On the other hand, this reveals its unprecedentedly precarious position, with its religious legitimacy widely scrutinized and questioned by the highly competitive Tatar press.

The holiday question in Kazan entailed a wide range of politics, encompassing Tatar traders' negotiations with their Russian counterparts and different levels of government, as well as competition among Tatar intellectuals for leadership in establishing the Islamic and national way of life. For each purpose, Tatars drew on a variety of channels of communication with the state. These options did not always work as hoped, however, especially when they attempted to simultaneously use the institutions of imperial governance and the public sphere to achieve their goals. The combination of municipal self-government and the imperial practice of religious tolerance failed, for example, to resolve the holiday dispute. First, the constant interference by upper state officialdom with the aim of protecting Russian Orthodox interests made the Russian majority within the city duma frame their arguments along this official line in order to preserve its legislative capability. Second, this situation, together with the legal restriction causing non-Christians to be underrep-

100. In Ufa, the âkhûnd from the first mosque, Jihângîr Âbizgildîn, convened a consultation of the three executive members (*qâdîs*) of the Spiritual Assembly and the four city imams. They also decided to follow the calendar of the Spiritual Assembly. *Dîn wa Ma'îshat* 31 (1914): 493.

101. *Yûlduz,* 9 August 1914, 5–6.

102. *Yûlduz,* 22 August 1914, 3.

resented in the city duma, forced the Tatar councilors, traders, and the press to opt to intercede directly with the state on behalf of the Muslim community not only locally but even empire-wide. They relied not only on a series of documents issued by the tsar around 1905 promulgating religious tolerance but also on the Muslim deputies in the State Duma. This expectation on the part of the Tatars that each authorized confessional collectivity would be given special treatment, clearly an imperial way of thinking, penetrated into their civic negotiations with the Russians, making compromise impossible. Third, the Tatars' success, though perhaps only temporary due to the war, in engaging in dialogue with the central officials was perceived by the Russians as another infringement of municipal autonomy. The consequent rupture of the city's public sphere along the confessional line culminated when the city duma's Russian majority protested to the Interior Ministry; the Tatar leaders attempted to invoke an Islamic legal opinion certified by the Spiritual Assembly.

The Russian and Tatar press significantly amplified the confessional cleavage in the question of the urban trading regime. Representing the Russian traders' frustration at the rivalry with their Tatar counterparts, the Russian press was sufficiently hostile to the Tatars to denounce them as "pan-Islamists." The Tatar press, in turn, fashioned the holiday dispute as a crucible for the Muslim community, calling for individuals' national identity and the conscious undertaking of religious rituals. They did not tolerate discord on the question of the Islamic holidays, be it from the union activists or the Tatar merchants operating in the Russian streets. Still, it should be underlined that the controversy over holidays also produced a common discursive space transcending the language barrier of the press. Tatar dwellers in Kazan kept track of what the Russian press said about them. The *Qûyâsh* harshly criticized the Tatar union activists who successfully made their voice heard in the *Kamsko-volzhskaia rech'*. The *Yûlduz* rebutted a challenge by the *Kazanskii telegraf* to the Tatars' religious arguments that Friday was an ordained holiday.

In addition, the increase of those speaking for Islam and the community in the press and in the Russian political arena affected the politics of leadership within Kazan Muslim society. The holiday question incorporated a broad spectrum: shop assistants, their employers, representatives of the city and state dumas, news reporters, and religious scholars. The debate over a common Hegira calendar mirrored the urban mullahs' struggle to maintain their religious authority in a competitive discursive space. Armed with scientific truth and the printed word, young literati such as Amîrkhân and other *Qûyâsh* supporters challenged the mullahs' expertise, constantly vindicating their own position based on Islam and even examining whether the mullahs' statements were legitimate. The 'ulamâ', in turn, tried to secure a domain of religion from which they could lead fellow believers to proper Islamic knowledge and practice, although what they deemed proper was controversial. Some scholars publicly denounced the spread of apathy toward religion, even threatening people with police intervention. Others forged interpretations encouraging the masses to readily observe religious practice, which allowed them to

postpone the ordained fast, moving it from the long summer days to the winter, and to familiarize children with Islam through the Mawlid. In the calendar dispute, the Kazan 'ulamâ' strove to achieve a consensus to safeguard their religious authority in urban Muslim society. In doing so, they relied on the traditional ascendancy of the Spiritual Assembly. This seems to confirm that, again, Tatars preferred to bring the imperial institution into the public sphere taking shape around the Muslim press. In fact, however, the Spiritual Assembly was vulnerable: it was entangled in a tug of war among the 'ulamâ' over its authority and was constantly subjected to the 'ulamâ"s open interrogation of its judgments in the Muslim press.

Finally, it is worth questioning whether the collision between religious tolerance and municipal self-government, as well as the friction solidifying the confessional boundary in the public sphere, is symptomatic of the predicaments to which the modernizing Russian autocracy was doomed. In fact, neither liberal democracy nor neutrality separating church and state is likely to be a panacea for religious pluralism. Could a municipality readily accept state interference in local affairs concerning the religious minority in the name of multiculturalism, without disadvantaging and incensing the majority population? Does state arbitration of local conflict not lead both the majority and minority societies to reinforce their mutually exclusive claims and to consequently speak the language of religious nationalism?[103] Could each society be tolerant of different opinions concerning its own religious practices among its members? The holiday controversy in Kazan suggests that late imperial Russia was also confronted with a profound theoretical challenge concerning the state's role in mediating within civil society any discord over minority rights as well as the understanding of religion.[104]

103. On the strains of secularism in India, see Peter van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India* (Berkeley, 1994), 10–12, 21–23.

104. On the predicaments of multiculturalism under liberalism, see Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford, 1995), esp. chaps. 6 and 9: "it is interesting to note how rarely [public holidays] are discussed in contemporary liberal theory" (114). The holiday question is topical in Russia today, as the State Duma has begun to consider the possibility of introducing Islamic holidays into the republics with sizeable Muslim populations. See "Sub"ektam RF mogut razreshit' ustanavlivat' svoi prazdniki," at www.itar-tass.com/c9/233530.html (last accessed 1 December 2011).