prose text, the *Laws*, offered for the education of ordinary citizens, as Cleary claims in '*Paideia* in Plato's *Laws*' (2003).

A problem that particularly interested Cleary is ἀκρασία, the impotence to do the right or good thing although one is fully aware what the right or good thing to do is. While a Socratic moral intellectualism precludes the possibility of ἀκρασία – a claim that is in somewhat strong opposition with our everyday experiences – Cleary, in 'Cultivating Intellectual Virtue in Plato's Philosopher Rulers' (2007), sees Plato's introduction of the tripartition of the soul in the *Republic* as an attempt to explain this phenomenon. Ἀκρασία occupied Cleary in two additional articles. In 'Socratic Influences on Aristotle's Ethical Inquiry' (1991) Cleary discusses Aristotle's rejection of the Socratic denial of the possibility of ἀκρασία. This rejection does not, however, lead Aristotle to reject moral intellectualism altogether; inquiring into the essence of virtues is not useless, but Socrates' failure was to neglect to ask whence and how they come to be. Finally, in '*Akrasia* and Moral Education in Aristotle' (2008) ἀκρασία is presented as a problem that serves 'as a starting-point for examining how Aristotle discussed the process of moral education in his ethical writings' (p. 131). Cleary concludes that Aristotle's views on moral education 'are best understood in terms of the type of character that it is intended to produce' (p. 149). Ἀκρασία is best handled not by the self-controlled person, who tries to suppress his passions, but rather by attempting 'to persuade them to cooperate with practical reason' (p. 149). This, of course, cannot mean rational persuasion – since the passions are not rational – but rather, Cleary suggests, a process of habituation. Thus, Cleary relates ἀκρασία, too, to the general topic of παιδεία, adding an aspect that in the secondary literature is usually neglected in favour of a focus on (meta-)ethical explanations.

This carefully edited volume invites scholars of ancient philosophy to re-read Cleary's better known articles that continue to influence the research in the history of metaphysics, mathematics and epistemology and to discover those essays that are perhaps less well known. Cleary's breadth of interest and his precise style of presenting his arguments and findings will certainly continue to be of great value to the scholarly community.

KU Leuven PHILIPP STEINKRÜGER
philipp.steinkrueger@hiw.kuleuven.be

IN REPEATED DEFENCE OF SOCRATES

GIANNOPOULOU (Z.) *Plato's* Theaetetus *as a Second* Apology. Pp. x + 205. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Cased, £35, US$55. ISBN: 978-0-19-969529-4.
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Can we distinguish and in turn defend Socrates and his philosophy, particularly as accounted for in the *Apology*, from the sophistry displayed by some of Socrates' contemporaries? In this volume G. answers with a resounding 'yes'. Where do we turn, apart from the *Apology*, for help in carrying out such a task? According to G., we turn to the *Theaetetus*:

> [the] *Theaetetus*, Plato's most systematic enquiry into the nature of knowledge, is a philosophically sophisticated elaboration of *Apology* that successfully differentiates Socrates from the sophists … Reading the two dialogues side by side yields a picture of Socratic philosophizing in word and deed. (p. 2)

G. argues that Socrates' defence speech in the *Apology* serves as the subtext which grounds Socrates' inquiry into knowledge in the *Theaetetus*; that Socrates' remarks in the *Apology* about what is worth knowing, as well as the importance of leading an inquisitive life, are 'reflected in the [*Theaetetus*] and illuminate it' (p. 3). G. is quick to clarify her view on the precise connection between the two dialogues (pp. 3–4): the *Apology* is not meant to be interpolated wholesale into the *Theaetetus*; the latter dialogue is meant to serve as a distinct Socratic *apologia*, echoing, when appropriate, Socrates' first defence (sc. *Apology*). All the same, the close relation between the two must not be overlooked. In particular, we should be mindful of the fact that Socrates' trial and execution frame both dialogues; that via these two dialogues 'Plato bids farewell to his teacher and offers an account of his philosophical practice' (p. 5).

G. argues that, upon recognising the close relation between the *Apology* and the *Theaetetus*, certain otherwise opaque aspects of the *Theaetetus* become clear. The aporetic terminus of the dialogue, for example, need not entail that it is only on account of the interlocutors' failure to bring Platonic Forms into the dialogue that no positive account or definition of Knowledge as such is found. In keeping with the *Apology*'s view of philosophy as a constant *pursuit* of wisdom, the *Theaetetus* ends just as intended: viz., as an elenctic-driven investigation that concurrently aims to rid a patient of falsehoods and better him morally (cf. pp. 8, 180–1).[1] Indeed, the failure of each definition of knowledge examined in the *Theaetetus* is, according to G., perfectly understandable in light of Socrates' acknowledgement of his own epistemic limitations: Socrates in the *Theaetetus* does not possess genuine wisdom. Accordingly, he cannot personally arrive at a positive account of Knowledge as such in Plato's second *apologia* (see esp. pp. 37–51). On a related note, G. believes that recognising Socrates' epistemic limitations helps us, as readers, to elucidate the relation between the intellectual midwife and the *koruphaios* ('pre-eminent') philosopher in the *Theaetetus*' digression: Socrates is both like and unlike the pre-eminent philosopher. He is like him in so far as he too recognises the gods' supreme wisdom, yet he is importantly unlike him in so far as he cannot provide a positive account of the things which he seeks to understand (cf. pp. 90–101). G. adds that Socrates is ultimately 'succeeded by the "divine" philosopher of the *Sophist* and *Statesman* [sc. the Eleatic Visitor]' (p. 101), the Visitor being in some way (G. is unclear on this point) connected to the pre-eminent philosopher of the *Theaetetus*.

Apart from the introduction and conclusion, the volume is divided into four main chapters. There is also a bibliography and index. Each main chapter is named after, and naturally centres on, the four distinct definitions of knowledge that are presented in the *Theaetetus*. Thus Chapter 2 analyses the definition that knowledge is simply a list of sciences and crafts, whilst Chapter 3 analyses the definition that knowledge is perception. Chapter 4 focuses on the definition that knowledge is true judgement, and Chapter 5 examines the definition that knowledge is true judgement with an account. Each chapter is not strictly focused on the relevant definition of knowledge. For instance, almost every chapter addresses the running tension in the *Theaetetus* between, on the one hand, Socrates and his *raison d'être* and, on the other, Protagoras and his sophistic practices (see esp. pp. 10–12, 56–7, 108–9, 165–6).

[1]G. does ultimately suggest that we readers bring in 'Platonic Forms' (no discussion of the precise metaphysics of Forms is given in her book) in the hope of arriving at a positive account of knowledge in the *Theaetetus* (pp. 13, 101). Curiously, she does not say where, if anywhere, these Forms feature in the *Apology*.

In general, G.'s book strikes a nice balance between exposition of and critical reflection on the *Theaetetus*. G.'s style of writing is clear and engaging, which certainly assists the reader with grasping some of the more philosophically difficult parts of the *Theaetetus*. Sections 3.2–3, 3.5, 3.9, 4.2–3, 4.5–6 and 5.1–4 are especially noteworthy for their lucid and insightful comments on the relevant passages in the *Theaetetus*. A decent amount of secondary literature is engaged with in the book. And G. is mindful of explaining just how she stands *vis-à-vis* a number of other notable scholars on certain key aspects of the *Theaetetus* (cf. pp. 12–15). All this makes the volume a respectable addition to the (admittedly already sizeable) list of commentaries on the *Theaetetus*.

This is not to say that G.'s project is free from criticism. I restrict myself to making just a few comments here. G. recognises a difference between Socrates the midwife and the pre-eminent philosopher of the digression; Socrates is 'a lesser philosopher' (p. 94) by comparison (see her 3.7). Yet I do not believe G. is fully aware of the tension that such a noted difference brings to the foreground. If the two philosophers in the *Theaetetus* are in some notable way different from each other, and the pre-eminent philosopher is seriously treated as the topmost philosopher for Socrates and so Plato in the *Theaetetus*, then the *Theaetetus* evidences a notable departure from the *Apology* with regard to Plato's conception of philosophy. In the *Apology*, philosophy is straightforwardly construed as a lifetime of elenctic examination of oneself and others; Socrates denies engaging in the activities of, in particular, natural scientists and mathematicians (19b–e, cf. 18b–c, 23d). By contrast, the *Theaetetus* (173e ff.) incorporates these disciplines into the greater genus of philosophy. Indeed, the dialogue suggests that such disciplines – and notably not the elenctic art of intellectual midwifery – form part of the upper echelon of philosophy. How are we to square these two accounts of philosophy? This is a question that G. should directly answer, particularly in light of her overarching aim (sc. to highlight the purported close connection between the *Apology* and the *Theaetetus*). Yet, from what I can tell, she does not do so.

Furthermore, it is safe to say that the *Theaetetus* shares an affinity with multiple dialogues on a number of different points. G. acknowledges this (see e.g. pp. 185–6). So an important question that we ought to be asking is what specifically about the *Apology*, and only the *Apology*, makes that dialogue essential to consult when seeking clarity with regard to the subject matter of the *Theaetetus*? Reference (be it explicit or implicit) to Socrates' trial and execution is not restricted to the *Apology* or *Theaetetus*; neither is Socrates' disavowal of knowledge, nor the validation of Socrates' habit of quizzing others via elenchus in the hope of concurrently purging them of untenable beliefs and bettering them morally. I could go on. The point here is that the *Theaetetus* could just as reasonably be understood as a second *Charmides*, *Protagoras* or *Gorgias*. For these dialogues lend just as much (or little) to understanding the *Theaetetus* as the *Apology* does.

Birkbeck College, University of London DANIELE LABRIOLA
d.labriola@bbk.ac.uk

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